2021 INSC 0352    REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4627 OF 2021 (Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) No.24735 of 2014) Ratul Mahanta     ..…Appellant(s) Versus Nirmalendu Saha ….  Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.S. Bopanna, J. 1. The appellant instituted title suit No.334 of 2011 in the   Court   of   learned   Munsif   No.2,   Kamrup   Guwahati against   the   respondent   herein   seeking   for   a   declaration that   on   the   western   boundary   of   the   suit   Schedule properties   A,   B   and   C   there   is   a   common   public   drain which   can   be   used   by   the   plaintiff.   A   declaration   is   also sought to the affect that the public drain on the boundary of   the   suit   Schedule   ‘C’   property   of   the   defendant, Page 1 of 26 connected to the plaintiff’s property cannot be obstructed by   the   defendant   at   any   point   of   time.   As   an   ancillary relief,   the   appellant   has   also   sought   for   permanent injunction   against   the   defendant   so   as   to   allow   free   flow of water in the said drain upto the main GMC drain.  2. The   respondent   having   appeared,   disputed   the claim put forth by the plaintiff on merits. In addition, the respondent   raised   the   issue   of   jurisdiction   for   the   civil court   to   entertain   the   suit   in   view   of   the   provisions contained   in   the   Guwahati   Municipal   Corporation   Act, 1971   (‘GMC’   Act   for   short).   In   the   said   suit,   since   the appellant   had   also   prayed   for   temporary   injunction,   on consideration it was granted by  the trial court, of course without   reference   to   the   objection   regarding   jurisdiction. The   respondent   had   therefore   assailed   the   order   of injunction  by   filing  an  appeal  before  the Lower   Appellate Court under Section 96 (1) read with Order  43 Rule 1 of the   Civil   Procedure   Code   (‘CPC’   for   short).   In   the   said appeal, the respondent herein who was the appellant had contended that the order dated 30.09.2011passed by the Page 2 of 26 learned   Munsif   was   not   justified   since   the   issue   relating to   the   maintainability   of   the   suit   vis­a­vis   the   provisions of  the  GMC  Act  barring  the   jurisdiction   of  the  civil  court goes   to   the   root   of   the   case.   It   was   contended   that   the same   was   required   to   be   considered   and   decided,   before considering any other relief prayed in the suit. The lower appellate   court   in   the   said   miscellaneous   application No.33/2011   through   its   order   dated   21.09.2012   arrived at   the   conclusion   that   the   jurisdiction   aspect   is   to   be decided   at   the   outset   by   the   learned   Munsif.   Therefore, without   going   into   the   merits,   the   lower   appellate   court remanded the matter by setting aside the order impugned in the said appeal for deciding the question of jurisdiction before considering grant of any other relief.  3. The   appellant   herein   claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by the   said   order   preferred   revision   petition   in   CRP No.260/2013 before the Gauhati High Court. The learned Judge while taking note of the rival contentions, through its   order   dated   29.08.2013   had   agreed   with   the   decision of   the   lower   appellate   court   that   the   jurisdiction   of   the Page 3 of 26 civil   court   to   entertain   the   suit   was   to   be   decided   at   the outset. The revision petition was accordingly disposed of. The parties were allowed to urge their contentions in the court of the learned Munsif.  4. Pursuant   thereto   the   learned   Munsif   has considered   the   issue   relating   to   jurisdiction   and   has   by its order dated 16.11.2013 arrived at the conclusion that the bar contemplated under the GMC Act does not apply to   the   fact   situation,   keeping   in   view   the   nature   of   the relief   prayed.   Accordingly,   the   learned   Munsif   has   held that the civil court has jurisdiction to try the suit between the   parties.   The   respondent   herein   claiming   to   be aggrieved   by   the   said   order   dated   16.11.2013   preferred revision petition in CRP No.128/2018 before the Gauhati High   Court.   The   learned   Judge,   through   the   order   dated 06.06.2014   has   held   that   the   jurisdiction   of   this   civil court   would   stand   ousted   by   implication   and   the   party can claim relief under the procedure prescribed under the GMC   Act   only.   In   that   background,   the   order   dated 16.11.2013   impugned   in   the   revision   petition   was   set Page 4 of 26 aside, the suit was held not maintainable and liberty was reserved to the appellant to ventilate his grievance under the   relevant   provisions   of   the   GMC   Act,   if   so   advised. Accordingly,   the   plaint   in   title   suit   No.334/2011   was ordered to be rejected. The appellant therefore claiming to be aggrieved by the order dated 08.04.2014 passed by the Gauhati High Court is before this Court in appeal.  5. Mr.   Parthiv   K.   Goswami,   learned   counsel   for   the petitioner   while   assailing   the   order   impugned   has contended   that   the   lower   appellate   court   in   the   first instance   and   the   High   Court   in   the   present   round   have erred   in   arriving   at   the   conclusion   that   the   suit   is   not maintainable. It is contended that the reasoning adopted by   the   High   Court   to   consider   the   present   case   to   be covered under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code   and   to   bar   the   civil   suit   is   not   justified.   It   is contended that there is no bar contemplated to approach the   civil   court   for   the   nature   of   relief   sought   in   the   suit, either under the GMC Act or under any other law for the time   being   in   force.   In   that   regard,   the   learned   counsel Page 5 of 26 has   referred   to   section   341   of   the   GMC   Act   which contemplates for a bar of jurisdiction and would point out that the same is restricted to the relief under the part to which   the   bar   is   made   applicable.   In   that   regard, reference is made to Part VI of the Act to contend that if at   all,   a   civil   suit   is   barred,   it   is   only   in   respect   of   the nature   of   activities   which   are   stated   in   section   322   and the other provisions which appear in Part VI of the Act. It is   argued   that   the   relief   sought   in   the   instant   suit   is   in respect of a drain which had existed on the western side of the suit Schedule Properties and to protect the right of free  flow   of   water   which   had   been   enjoyed  from   the   time the   plaintiff   had   purchased   the   property.   Such   right sought   to   be   protected   is   within   the   domain   of   the   civil court.   It   is   contended   that   even   though   the   provisions contained   in   section   246,   247   and   248   of   the   GMC   Act, refer   to   the   power   of   the   Commissioner,   any   right available   to   the   plaintiff   under   the   said   provisions   can only   be   in   aid   of   the   relief   to   be   sought   by   the   plaintiff, but   in   any   event   cannot   be   construed   as   a   bar   to Page 6 of 26 maintain the suit. It is therefore contended that the order passed by the High Court is not sustainable and the suit should be allowed to be proceeded on its merit.  6. Mr.   Arunabh   Chowdhury,   learned   counsel   for   the respondent seeks to sustain the order passed by the High Court. The contention  is that  the  GMC   Act contemplates a   bar   against   the   civil   court   entertaining   the   matters relating to the facilities which are to be considered by the Commissioner,   under   the   Act.   Even   assuming   that section 341 of GMC Act contemplates an express bar only in   respect   of   Part  VI,   the   provisions   contained   in   section 246, 247 and 248 of the GMC Act provide the forum to a property   owner   seeking   for   right   relating   to   drain   to approach   the   Commissioner,   who   shall   decide   the   said issue. In that context, it is contended that though section 341   is   not   made   applicable   to   Part   V,   by   necessary implication,   the   suit   would   stand   barred.   It   is   his contention   that   in   this   case   the   plaintiff   is   seeking   for   a right   in   respect   of   the   public   drain   and   in   such circumstance when the remedy is provided under the Act, Page 7 of 26 the   consideration   of   the   same   under   the   Common   law does   not   arise.   He   contends   that   the   High   Court   was justified in  invoking  the provision contained in  Order  VII Rule   11(d)   of   the   Civil   Procedure   Code   to   hold   that   the civil   court   did   not   have   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the instant   suit.   In   that   view,   the   rejection   of   the   plaint ordered   is   justified.   The   appellant   is   not   left   without   a remedy and the alternate forum is allowed to be invoked. In   such   circumstance,   the   order   impugned   does   not   call for interference.  7. In   the   background   of   the   above   contentions,   the nature   of   the   suit   and   the   relief   prayed   for   therein requires to be noticed only to the limited extent to arrive at   a   conclusion   as   to   whether   the   civil   court   had jurisdiction   to   proceed   with   the   suit   or   as   to   whether   a bar   with   regard   to   jurisdiction   as   provided   in   the   GMC Act   will   apply.   Before   adverting   to   that   aspect,   it   is necessary   to   take   note   of   the   contents   in   para   9   of   CPC which provides for exercise of jurisdiction by civil court. It reads as hereunder: ­ Page 8 of 26 “9.     The   Courts   shall   (subject   to   the provisions   herein   contained)   have jurisdiction   to   try   all   suits   of   a   civil   nature excepting   suits   of   which   their   cognizance   is either expressly or impliedly barred. ExplanationI­ A suit in which the right to property or to an office   is   contested   is   a   suit   of   a   civil   nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely   on   the   decision   of   questions   as   to religious rites or ceremonies. ExplanationII.­ For   the   purposes   of   this   section,   it   is immaterial   whether   or   not   any   fees   are attached   to   the   office   referred   to   in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.” A   bare   perusal   of   the   same   indicates   that   the courts   shall   have   jurisdiction   to   try   all   suits   of   civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In that background, though in   the   instant   case,   the   issue   had   not   arisen   before   the learned   Munsif   while   considering   an   application   under Order   VII   Rule   11(d)   of   CPC,   taking   note   of   the   fact   that the High Court has invoked the said provision to consider as   to   whether   the   suit   is   barred   and   has   thereafter   held that   the   civil   court   has   no   jurisdiction   and   ordered Page 9 of 26 rejection of plaint, it would be appropriate to take note of the   provision   contained   in   Order   VII   Rule   11(d)   which reads as hereunder: ­                  “ Order VII Rule 11 Rejection of plaint  ­ The plaint shall be  rejected in the following cases: ­ (a)   xx       xx       xx      xx (b)   xx       xx       xx      xx (c)    xx       xx       xx      xx (d)   where   the   suit   appears   from   the statement   in   the   plaint   to   be   barred   by any law. (e)    xx       xx       xx      xx (f)     xx       xx       xx      xx” The   perusal   of   the   above   noted   provision   would indicate   that   there   would   be   a   bar   for   the   civil   court   to entertain   the   suit,   if   such   suit   is   barred   either   expressly or   impliedly   by   any   law.   Further,   Order   VII   Rule   11(d) contemplates   that   from   the   statement   contained   in   the plaint the suit should appear to be barred by any law, in which case the plaint shall be rejected.  8. In   that   backdrop,   a   perusal   of   the   plaint   in   the instant   suit   would   disclose   that   the   case   pleaded   by   the appellant   is   that   he   along   with   one   Mr.   Dhan   Chandra Page 10 of 26 Mahanta   purchased   ‘schedule   ‘A’   property   measuring   15 lessas   on   08.12.1997   from   Mr.   Sailendra   Medhi   and others.   Mr.   Dhan   Chandra   Mahanta   relinquished   his right   in   favour   of   the   appellant.   The   appellant   has   thus become the sole owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ property. It is   contended   that   the   sale   deed   indicates   that   the   last part  of  the   western  boundary   contained   a   water   exhaust drain which was also passing along the western boundary of   the   property   belonging   to   Ms.   Suwola   Devi   and   would join   the   public   drain   maintained   by   Guwahati   Municipal Corporation   (‘GMC’   for   short).   Another   adjacent   land owner   purchased   Schedule   ‘B’   property   under   sale   deed dated   08.12.1997   wherein   also   the   western   boundary traverses   through   the   water   drain   which   connected   the public drain of GMC.  9. It   is   further   averred   in   the   plaint   that   the respondent   who   owns   the   property   on   the   southern   side of   the   appellant’s   property,   had   purchased   the   extent   of 13   lessa   under   sale   deed   dated   24.04.1984   wherein   the western   boundary   is   shown   as   public   drain.   Though   the Page 11 of 26 said   common   drain   had   existed   at   the   time   of   purchase and   was   being   used,   the   defendant   is   alleged   to   have blocked the same by dumping RCC material and therefore the water had overflowed into the appellant’s property. It is in  that  light, the  appellant  had prayed for  the  relief to declare  that  the  western  boundary   of  Schedule   A,  B   and C properties contained a common public drain which can be   used   and   the   further   prayer   made   in   the   plaint indicates   that,   injunction   sought   is   for   the   peaceful enjoyment   of   the   drain   facility   to   allow   the   free   flow   of water upto the main GMC drain.  10.  The question therefore is as to whether the nature of   the   relief   prayed   in   the   plaint   falls   exclusively   within the   domain   of   the   GMC   Act   and   as   to   whether   the   case put forth and the relief prayed is barred by any provision contained   in   the   GMC   Act   so   as   to   disentitle   the   civil court to entertain the suit as contemplated under Section 9 of the CPC, if so, whether a plaint of the present nature was   liable   to   be   rejected   as   envisaged   under   Order   VII Rule11(d) of CPC.   Page 12 of 26 11. At the outset it is necessary to take note of Section 341   of   the   GMC   Act   which   provides   for   the   bar   of jurisdiction of civil court which reads as hereunder: ­ “ 341­ Bar of jurisdiction­  Save as otherwise expressly   provided   no   civil   court   shall   have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question,   which   is   by   or   under   this   part required   to   be   settled,   decided   or   dealt   with by the Commissioner.” On perusal of the contents, it indicates that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any   question   which   is   under   that   part   wherein   Section 341   is   placed   and   is   required   to   be   settled,   decided   or dealt with by the Commissioner. The Part VI under which a   bar   is   imposed   relates   to   Land,   Buildings   and   Streets. Therefore,   on   the   face   of   it,   it   indicates   that   the   issue relating   to   a   common   drain   between   two   private individuals   residing   within   the   limits   of   the   Municipal Corporation is not an issue regarding which a specific bar is   contemplated   against   approaching   the   civil   court   for relief.  Page 13 of 26 12. The   GMC   Act   no   doubt   makes   provision   to empower  the Commissioner  under certain circumstances to   regulate   the   manner   in   which   the   use   of   the   drain connected   with   the   municipal   drain   is   to   be   used.   The provisions   to   that   effect   are   contained   in   Sections   246, 247   and  248,   in   Part  V   of   GMC   Act.  The   said   provisions read as hereunder: ­ “ 246.   Obligation   of   owner   or   joint   owner of drain  to  allow the  uses of  it  to  other:  ­ Every   owner   of   a   drain   connected   with   a municipal   drain   or   other   place   set   apart   by the   Commissioner   for   drainage   shall   be bound to allow the use of it to other persons, or   to   admit   other   persons   as   joint   owners, thereof, on such terms as may be prescribed under section 248. 247.   How   right   of   use   of   a   drain   may   be obtained   by   a   person   other   than   the owner:­   Any   person   desiring   to   drain   his premises   into   a   municipal   drain   through   a drain of which he is not an owner may make a   private   arrangement   with   the   owner   for permission to use his drain, or may apply to the   Commissioner   for   authority   to   use   such drain. 248.   Commissioner   may   authority   person other than the owner of a drain to use the same   or   declare   him   to   be   a   joint   user thereof:­   (1)   Where   the   Commissioner   is   of opinion   whether  on   receipt   of   an  application Page 14 of 26 or   otherwise,   that   the   most   convenient means by which the owner or occupier of any premises can drain such premises is through a drain belonging to some person other than the said owner or occupier the Commissioner shall,   give   the   owner   of   the   drain   a reasonable   opportunity   of   stating   his objection   thereto,   and   if   no   objection   is raised   or   if   the   objection   appears   to   him invalid   or   insufficient,   may,   by   an   order   in writing  authorise the said owner  or  occupier to   use   the   drain   or   declare   the   said   user   to be   a   joint   owner   thereof   on   such   conditions as   may   appear   to   him   equitable   with   regard to  the payment of  rent  or   compensation  and to   connecting   the   drain   of   the  said   premises with   the   communicating   drain   and   to   the responsibilities   of   the   parties   for maintaining, repairing, flushing and  clearing the joint drain. (2) In respect of the execution of any work under sub­section (1) the person in whose favour  the Commissioner’s order is made shall be subject to the same restriction and liabilities as are specified in sub­section (4) of section 245.” 13. Perusal   of   the   above   noted   provisions   would indicate that the Commissioner is empowered by granting the authority under GMC Act to compel the owner or joint owner of a drain to permit a person who is not the owner of   such   drain   to   use   that   drain.     In   effect,   the Commissioner   is   given   the   authority   to   create   a   right   in favour   of   the   property   owner   to   drain   out   the   water Page 15 of 26 through the drain owned by any other property owner.  In the instant case the appellant is not seeking  for creation of   such   right.     The   case   as   pleaded   and   noticed   above indicates   that   the   appellant   is   asserting   about   a   right which existed and is seeking to safeguard and continue to exercise such right.   The case pleaded is not to the effect that any of them own the drain but it is contended that it existed   as   the   western   boundary   of   all   the   properties   in the   vicinity   and   the   respondent   is   seeking   to   alter   that position   and   is   therefore   to   be   restrained.     Whether   the appellant will succeed or not will depend on the evidence that will be produced to support the pleading. 14. The   point   for   consideration   is   as   to   whether   the existence   of   such   provision   in   GMC   Act   would   impliedly bar a civil suit. For answering the said question, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision in the case of  Shiv Kumar   Chadha   v.   Municipal   Corporation   of   Delhi and   Others   (1993)   3   SCC   161   which   in   fact   was   also taken   note   by   the   learned   Munsif.   The   relevant consideration made therein is as hereunder: ­ Page 16 of 26 “11.   In the olden days the source of most of   the   rights   and   liabilities   could   be traced   to   the   common   law.   Then statutory   enactments   were   few.   Even such   enactments   only   created   rights   or liabilities but seldom provided forums for remedies. The result was that any person having   a   grievance   that   he   had   been wronged   or   his   right   was   being   affected, could   approach   the   ordinary   civil   court on   the   principle   of   law   that   where   there is a right there is a remedy —   ubi jus ibi remedium .   As   no   internal   remedy   had been   provided   in   the   different   statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary civil   courts   had   to   examine   the grievances   in   the   light   of   different statutes. With the concept of the welfare State,   it   was   realised   that   enactments creating   liabilities   in   respect   of   payment of   taxes,   obligations   after   vesting   of estates   and   conferring   rights   on   a   class of   citizens,   should   be   complete   codes   by themselves.   With   that   object   in   view, forums   were   created   under   the   Acts themselves   where   grievances   could   be entertained   on   behalf   of   the   persons aggrieved.  Provisions  were  also  made for appeals   and   revision   to   higher authorities. 12.   Then  a  question  arose as to where  a particular   Act   had   created   a   right   or liability   and   had   also   provided   a   forum for   enforcement   of   such   right   or   for protection from enforcement of a liability without   any   authority   in   law,   whether   a citizen could approach a court. It may be pointed   out   that   many   statutes   have Page 17 of 26 created   certain   rights   or   liabilities   and have   also   provided   the   remedial measures   in   respect   thereof.   But   such statutes   have   not   touched   the   common law   rights   of   the   citizen.   But   there   are some   statutes,   which   in   public   interest affect   even   the   common   law   rights   or liabilities   of   the   citizen,   which   were   in the   nature   of   existing   rights.   The distinction   between   the   two   types   of rights or liabilities is subtle in nature but at the same time very vital. 23.   With   the   increase   in   the   number   of taxing   statutes,   welfare   legislations   and enactments to protect a class of citizens, a trend can be noticed that most of such legislations   confer   decision   making powers   on   various   authorities   and   they seek  to  limit  or   exclude  court's  power  to review those decisions. The result is that the power of the court under Section 9 of the Code is being denuded and curtailed by such special enactments, in respect of liabilities   created   or   rights   conferred. This   Court   in   the   judgments   referred   to above   has   upheld   the   ouster   of   the jurisdiction   of   the   court   on   examination of two questions — (1) whether the right or   liability   in   respect   whereof   grievance has been made, had been created under an   enactment   and   it   did   not   relate   to   a pre­existing   common   law   right?   (2) Whether   the   machinery   provided   for redressal   of   the   grievance   in   respect   of infringement   of   such   right   or   imposition of a liability under such enactment, was adequate   and   complete?   The   ouster   of the   jurisdiction   of   the   court   was   upheld on the finding that the rights or liabilities Page 18 of 26 in   question   had   been   created  by   the   Act in question and remedy provided therein was adequate. 24.   But   the   situation   will   be   different where   a   statute   purports   to   curb   and curtail   a   pre­existing   common   law   right and   purports   to   oust   the   jurisdiction   of the   court   so   far   remedy   against   the orders   passed   under   such   statute   are concerned.   In   such   cases,   the   courts have   to   be   more   vigilant,   while examining the question as to whether an adequate   redressal   machinery   has   been provided,   before   which   the   person aggrieved   may   agitate   his   grievance.   In the   case   of   Katikara   Chintamani   Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu   [(1974) 1 SCC 567 : AIR 1974 SC 1069] this Court after referring   to   the   case   of   Addanki Tiruvenkata   Thata   Desika   Charyulu   v. State of A.P.  [AIR 1964 SC 807] observed: (SCC p. 579, para 35) “It   was   pertinently   added   that   this exclusion   of   the   jurisdiction   of   the   civil court   would   be   subject   to   two limitations.   First,   ‘the   Civil   Courts   have jurisdiction   to   examine  into   cases   where the   provisions   of   the   Act   have   not   been complied   with   or   the   statutory   tribunal has   not   acted   in   conformity   with   the fundamental   principles   of   judicial procedure.   The   second   is   as   regards   the exact   extent   to   which   the   powers   of statutory   tribunals   are   exclusive’.   The question   as   to   whether   any   particular case falls under the first or the second of the   above   categories   would   depend   on the   purpose   of   the   statute   and   its Page 19 of 26 general   scheme,   taken   in   conjunction with   the   scope   of   the   enquiry   entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors.” It   was   held   that   a   suit   for   declaration that   the   decision   of   the   Settlement Officer/Tribunal   holding   certain properties to be an ‘estate’ under Section 3(2)( d )   of   the   1908   Act   was   void,   was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an ‘inam village’. In  Pyx Granite   Co.   Ltd.   v.   Ministry   of   Housing and   Local   Government   [(1960)   AC   260] the   appellants   sought   a   declaration   of their   common   law   right   to   quarry   their land without the need to obtain planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947. In that connection it was said: “The   appellant­company   are   given   no new   right   of   quarrying   by   the   Act   of 1947.   Their   right   is   a   common­law   right and   the   only   question   is   how   far   it   has been   taken   away.   They   do   not   uno   flatu claim   under   the   Act   and   seek   a   remedy elsewhere.   On   the   contrary,   they   deny that   they   come   within   its   purview   and seek a declaration to that effect.” 25.   In   spite   of   the   bar   placed   on   the power   of   the  court,   orders  passed   under such   statutes   can   be   examined   on “jurisdictional   question”.   To   illustrate:   a special  machinery  has  been provided for removal   of   the   encroachments   from ‘public   land’   under   different   enactments in different States and the jurisdiction of the   court   has   been   barred   in   respect   of the   orders   passed   by   such   special Page 20 of 26 tribunals   or   authorities   constituted under   such   Acts.   Still   a   suit   will   be maintainable   before   a   court   on   a   plea that   the   land   in   question   shall   not   be deemed   to   be   a   public   land   within   the meaning of the definition of ‘public land’ given in the Act in question, and as such provisions   thereof   shall   not   be applicable.” 15.     Further,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Ramesh Gobindram   vs.   Sugra   Humayun   Mirza   Wakf   (2010)   8 SCC   726   while   examining   the   bar   of   civil   court   as contemplated under Section 85 of the Wakf Act, 1995 had drawn a distinction that such power would apply only in respect   of   the   issues   arising   under   certain   provisions   of Act   i.e.,   Section   6,   7   and   83   of   the   Wakf   Act,   1995   and had   held   that   a   suit   before   a   civil   court   would   be maintainable   for   other   reliefs   notwithstanding   the creation   of   the   Wakf   tribunal   under   the   Act,   unless   the dispute falls within the four corners of the powers vested in the Tribunal. Therefore, despite there being  the bar of jurisdiction   of   the   civil   courts   under   the   Act,   as   noted, except   for   the   disputes   arising   to   the   limited   extent   all Page 21 of 26 other issues were held to be maintainable before the civil court.  The relevant consideration is as hereunder: ­ “8.   Wakfs   and   matters   relating   thereto   were for   a   long   time   governed   by   the   Wakf   Act, 1954. The need for a fresh legislation on the subject   was,   however,   felt   because   of   the deficiencies   noticed   in   the   working   of   the said   earlier   enactment   especially   those governing   the   Wakf   Boards,   their   power   of superintendence   and   control   over   the management   of   individual   wakfs.   Repeated amendments   to   the   1954   Act,   having   failed to   provide  effective   answers  to   the   questions that   kept   arising   for   consideration, Parliament   had   to   bring   a   comprehensive legislation in the form of the Wakf Act, 1995 for   better   administration   of   wakfs   and matters   connected   therewith   or   incidental thereto.” 16. In   the   above   circumstance,   while   adverting   to   the present   case   it   is   seen   that   sections   246,   247   and   248 though   referred   to   the   ownership   and   the   manner   in which  the  drains  connected  to  municipal  drain are to  be used   and   the   Commissioner   is   given   the   authority   to compel   the   owner   of   a   drain   to   permit   another   property owner   to   use   the   same,   the   said   provisions   cannot   be considered either as an express or an implied bar on the civil court to entertain a suit relating to the declaration of Page 22 of 26 an   existing   right   to   use   of   the   drain   as   asserted   in   the plaint.  17. In   fact,   the   existence   of   a   drain   as   claimed   by   the appellant  in the  plaint  as on the date  of purchase of  the property and the same being used throughout is an issue which   is   to   be   proved   based   on   the   evidence   that   would be   tendered   in   the   suit.   The   provisions   contained   in Section   246,   247   and   248   of   the   GMC   Act   would   be   the provisions which would come to the aid of the appellant if ultimately the respondent establishes his ownership right over the drain, despite the appellant proving the existence of the drain. No doubt, the appellant could have also filed an   application   to   the   Commissioner   seeking   the   relief   to which the Commissioner could exercise his authority but that would have arisen only if the appellant had conceded to   the   position   that   the   respondent   is   the   owner   of   the drain. Even in such circumstance, if relief was not made available to the appellant by the Commissioner and if he was dissatisfied with the manner in which such authority was   exercised   by   the   Commissioner   it   would   still   have Page 23 of 26 been   open   to   approach   the   court   for   relief.   The   learned Advocate   for   respondent   has   in   this   regard   contended that an appeal is provided under Section 438 of GMC Act. However,   we   do   not   consider   it   as   an   alternate   and efficacious   remedy   in   a   case   of   the   present   nature.     The relief   sought   in   the   instant   suit   is   in   the   nature   of declaratory   relief   in   an   inter   se   dispute   between   the parties.     The   consideration   by   the   statutory   authority   as provided under GMC Act is of summary nature.  Further, the   appeal   provided   is   in   respect   of   any   notice   issued   or action   taken   or   proposed   to   be   taken   by   the Commissioner,   which   in   effect   provides   the   appeal remedy   only   to   the   owner   of   the   drain   against   whom action is proposed. 18. Further   as   already   noted,   in   the   instant   case   the averments   contained   in   the   plaint   and   the   prayer   made would   disclose   that   the   appellant   is   not   seeking   for creation of a right over the drain owned by the defendant nor  is any  issue raised with regard to  the drain  of GMC. But   the   case   as   put   forth   is   that   the   property   of   the Page 24 of 26 appellant,   Ms.   Suwola   Devi   and   the   defendant   are contiguous   to   one   another   which   are   shown   as   suit schedule   ‘A’,   ‘B’   and   ‘C'   properties   and   on   the   western side   of   the   property   starting   from   the   appellant’s property,   there   is   a   drain,   which   is   shown   as   the boundary and it facilitates the water to flow into the GMC drain. Such relief is to be considered in the suit based on the   evidence   that   would   be   tendered.   Therefore,   such relief is not barred under any law.  19. In view of the above, it is clear that the High Court without   taking   note   of   these   aspects   of   the   matter   has wrongly   invoked   the   provisions   contained   in   Order   VII Rule   11   (d)   of   the   Civil   Procedure   Code   to   reject   the plaint,  when  in the instant  facts there is neither   express nor   implied   bar   under   any   law.   On   the   other   hand,   the learned   Munsif   was   justified   in   passing   the   order   dated 16.11.2013   in   T.S.   No.   334/2011   holding   the   suit   to   be maintainable.  20. In the result, the order dated 06.06.2014 passed by the   Gauhati   High   Court   at   Guwahati   in   CRP Page 25 of 26 No.128/2014   is   set   aside.   The   plaint   in   title   suit No.334/2011 is restored to the file of the learned Munsif No.2   Kamrup   Guwahati.   The   parties   herein   shall   appear before the learned Munsif on 01.09.2021 as the first date for appearance without further notice, whereafter the suit shall be considered on its merits. 21. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. 22. Pending   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed of. ………….…………….J. (HEMANT GUPTA)             ………….…………….J.                                              (A.S. BOPANNA) New Delhi, August 10, 2021 Page 26 of 26