2021 INSC 0353                                                               REPORTABLE    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1154 OF 2018    Parubai                       .…Appellant(s) Versus The State of Maharashtra                   ….  Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.S. Bopanna,J. 1. The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   in   this   appeal assailing   the   judgment   dated   12.10.2017   passed   by   the High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay,   Bench   at Aurangabad   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.488/2007.   By   the said   judgment   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   appeal filed   by   the   appellant   herein   and   the   judgment   dated 16.11.2007   passed   by   the   Learned   Sessions   Judge Parbhani   in   Sessions   Case   No.27/2007,   convicting   the appellant   in   respect   of   the   offence   punishable   under Page 1 of 23 Section   302   and   436   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (‘IPC’   for short) is confirmed.  2. The   appellant   was   charged   of   the   offence   as accused   No.1   while   her   husband   Gulab   and   his   mother i.e.,   mother­in­law   of   the   appellant   were   charged   as accused   Nos.   2   and   3.   The   accused   Nos.   2   and   3   were acquitted by the Sessions Court. In that view, the appeal before   the   High   Court   and   the   present   consideration   is limited   to   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   herein   who   is accused   No.1.   The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   that   Gulab son   of   Gajanan   Watane   was   married   to   the   deceased Mandabai   and   they   had   two   children   namely   Akash,   a son   aged   5  years  and   Nikita,   the  daughter   aged  2  years. The   said   Gulab   had   an   extra   marital   affair   with   the appellant and ultimately  married her  on  02.01.2006 and got   their   marriage   registered   on   18.02.2006.     Thereafter the   appellant   was   also   living   with   her   husband   and Mandabai, the wife from the first marriage. The parents of Gulab were also living with them and were residing in the small   house   which   consisted   of   three   rooms.   One   of   the rooms in the house was occupied by their servant named Page 2 of 23 Piraji   Mankari.   When   this   was   the   position   the   husband of the  appellant  Gulab had  gone  to  Jalna  on  02.08.2006 to   procure   tyres   for   the   tractor.   The   mother­in­law   had gone to her daughter’s place to assist her for delivery. 3.   When   this   was   the   position,   on   the   intervening night   of   2/3.08.2006   at   about   2.30   to   3.00   am   an incident   of   fire   occurred   and   the   house   in   which   the appellant   and   her   family   were   residing   was   engulfed   in flames.   The   appellant   who   was   also   in   the   house   had come   out   of   the   house   unscathed   while   Mandabai   the first wife of Gulab and their daughter Nikita rushed out of the   house   with   burn   injuries,   while   their   son   Akash   got burnt to death inside the house. The father­in­law of the appellant was stated to be sleeping outside the house on a cot and having woken up in the confusion, noticing the injuries   suffered   by   his   daughter­in­law   Mandabai   and granddaughter   Nikita   had   instructed   the   servant   Piraji Mankari     to   secure   a   jeep   and   shift   them   to   hospital. Accordingly,   they   were   shifted   to   the   hospital   where   on the next day  the said Mandabai and her daughter Nikita died due to the burn injuries suffered by them.  Page 3 of 23 4. The father­in­law of the appellant namely  Gajanan had   lodged   a   complaint   and   had   also   implicated   the appellant.   In   that   light,   keeping   in   view   the   allegation made by Chhaya, the sister of the deceased, the husband of   the   appellant   and   mother­in­law   were   also   included and charged for the offence as accused No.2 and 3.   The prosecution   had   examined   PW­1   to   PW­9   and   the   trial court   on   taking   note   of   the   evidence   had   arrived   at   the conclusion that the case against the accused No. 2 and 3 had   not   been   proved   and   the   evidence   of   PW­2   to implicate  them  was not  trustworthy. However, insofar   as the   appellant   herein,   the   Sessions   Court   had   taken   note of   the   evidence   tendered   by   PW­1   and   PW­3   that   the appellant   was  also   sleeping  along  with  the  deceased   and in that circumstance was of the opinion that if the house caught fire accidently then the appellant also should have suffered   burn   injuries.       Since   she   had   come   out   of   the house without any injuries it was held that she is guilty. The   other   circumstances   noticed   by   the   trial   court   was that   the   spot   Panchnama   indicated   that   the   frock   of   the deceased   Nikita   had   been   seized   from   the   place   of Page 4 of 23 occurrence   and   the   Chemical   analysis   report   was   that   it had kerosene stains. The recovery of a can which smelt of kerosene   from   the   bushes   as   stated   by   PW­8   Kerba Balajirao   Phad,   P.S.I.,   was   taken   into   consideration   with reference to the recovery Panchnama at Exhibit 41.  5. The   Sessions   Court   was   of   the   opinion   that   the appellant had a strong motive and had the opportunity of committing   the   act.   It   held   that   if   the   appellant   is   to   be excluded, there should have been a reasonable possibility of anyone else being the real culprit, as such the chain of evidence   can   be   considered   to   be   complete   as   to   show that   in   all   probabilities   the   crime   must   have   been committed   by   the   appellant.   For   this   the   appellant sleeping   in   the  same   room   as  the   deceased  was  sleeping and   that   the   appellant   did   not   suffer   any   injuries   were held   as   the   circumstances   to   rule   out   the   possibility   of accidental fire. Since the appellant had not explained how she came out of the room without any burn injuries and deceased   Mandabai   had   suffered   injuries,   coupled   with the   kerosene   residues   traced   on   the   frock   of   Nikita,   the Sessions Court held that adverse inference can be drawn Page 5 of 23 that the appellant set fire to the house. The fact that she was   the   second   wife   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant had   executed   an   agreement   transferring   his   land   in favour   of   deceased   Mandabai   was   held   as   the   motive   to commit the offence, more particularly since she wanted to establish her dominance in the house.  6. The   High   Court   while   considering   the   matter   and reappreciating   the   evidence   had   discarded   the   extra­ judicial confession and further disbelieved the evidence of PW­1 which had been relied upon by the Sessions Court. The High Court was of the view that Gajanan (PW­1) the father­in­law   who   was   the   informant   could   not   have happily   accepted   the   appellant   as   the   second   wife   of   his son   when   he   had   already   got   married   to   deceased Mandabai. This was the reason for the High Court for not finding   it   worthy   of   placing   reliance   on   the   extra­judicial confession stated to have been made to him that she had sprinkled   kerosene   and   set   fire.   In   that   regard,   the   High Court   had   appropriately   taken   note   from   the   decision rendered   by   this   Court   indicating   that   extra­judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself.  Page 6 of 23 7. The   High   Court   has   thereafter   taken   note   of   the evidence   tendered   through   Vijay   (PW­4)   and   the   Police Sub­Inspector Phad (PW­8) with regard to the recovery of the   kerosene   can   at   the   instance   of   the   appellant   when she   was   in   police   custody.   The   recovery   was   disbelieved since   the   said   can   had   not   been   sent   for   chemical analysis.  As such the said circumstance accepted by the Sessions   Court   was   also   discarded.   Further,   the   oral dying   declaration   said   to   have   been   made   to   a   sister   of the deceased Chhaya (PW­2) had been disbelieved by the trial court which was also approved and was noted as not reliable,   by   the   High   Court.   The   dying   declaration recorded   by   the   police   head   constable   was   taken   note. The   High   Court   ultimately   arrived   at   its   conclusion   that the   appellant   is   guilty   of   committing   the   offence   since admittedly   the   appellant   had   not   sustained   the   slightest injury due to the fire which means that she left the house well in advance to the spreading of fire. The circumstance held against the appellant is that she did not try to alarm the   deceased   Mandabai   and   her   children   to   leave   the house   so   as   to   save   them   from   fire,   nor   did   she   try   to Page 7 of 23 bring   the   small   children   out   of   the   house   to   save   their lives.   The   High   Court   further   assumed   that   she   did   not shout   immediately   and   waited   until   the   deceased Mandabai and her children were fully caught by flames.  8. After   referring   to   the   abovesaid   circumstance,   the High   Court   ultimately   recorded   its   conclusion   as hereunder: ­    “26.       All   the   above   circumstances   speak volumes   about   the   guilty   mind   of   the appellant.   It   is   only   after   she   saw   the deceased   Mandabai   coming   out   of   the   house along   with   her   burning   daughter,   that   she raised   shouts   to   make   a   show   that   she   was totally   innocent.   In   the   circumstances,   the absence   of   any   injury   on   her   person   also would be a material circumstance to prove the guilty mind of the appellant. If that be so, only because   the   deceased   Mandabai   stated   that she   had   no   suspicion   against   anybody   and particularly   did   not   raise   suspicion   against the appellant behind the incident, it cannot be said that the dying declarations (Exhs. 37 and 38)   would   be   helpful   to   the   appellant   to establish her innocence.   27. The   burnt   frock   of   the   deceased   Nikita was   seized   vide   panchnama   (Exh.   34).   PSI Phad (PW 8) (Exh.48) deposes that he sent the said   frock   to   the   C.A.   for   analysis   and   report vide   letter   (Exh.50).   The   C.A.   report   (Exh.50) shows   that   kerosene   residues   were   detected Page 8 of 23 thereon.   It   is,   thus,   clear   that   kerosene   was used for setting the deceased Nikita on fire.  28.    The marriage certificate (Exh.29) shows that   the   marriage   of   the   appellant   and accused   No.2   was   registered   on   18.02.2006. The agreement (Exh.31) has been executed on 17.02.2006 i.e. one day prior to registration of marriage   of   the   appellant   with   accused   no.2. From the contents of this agreement, it seems that   the   deceased   Mandabai   was   rather skeptic about her future after the marriage of the   appellant   with   accused   no.2.   Therefore, she   obtained   a   written   assurance   from accused no.2 that after his marriage with the appellant,   he   would   maintain   the   deceased Mandabai and her children properly. Accused no.2   further   assured   to   transfer   certain   land in   the   name   of   the   deceased   Mandabai.   The appellant   started   residing   in   the   house   of accused   no.2   after   the   marriage.   It   was   quite natural on the part of the appellant as well as that   of   the   deceased   Mandabai   to   dominate each   other   to   have   control   over   the   family matters.   The   deceased   Mandabai   and   her children certainly would have come in the way of the appellant in establishing her primacy in the house. It is difficult to establish motive by any   direct   evidence.   It   has   to   be   inferred   on the   basis   of   the   attending   circumstances. From   the   facts   and   circumstances   emerging from   the   evidence,   it   is   clear   that   in   order   to have   the   dominating   position   in   the   house, the appellant finished the deceased Mandabai and her children. 29.         The   appellant   alone   was   inside   the house in the night of the incident besides the deceased   Mandabai   and   her   children.   As Page 9 of 23 stated above, she went out of the house much prior   to   spreading   of   the   fire,   In   view   of Section   106   of   the   Evidence   Act,   she   was under   an   obligation   to   explain   the circumstances,  which  were within  her  special knowledge, under which the fire erupted. She did not  at all discharge this burden  by  giving any   explanation   behind   eruption   of   fire.   All these circumstances clearly show that it is the appellant,   who   poured   kerosene   around   the persons   of   the   deceased   Mandabai   and   her children and set them on fire. 30.   The   prosecution   established   beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant only, who   set   the   deceased   Mandabai   and   her children   on   fire   with   a   view   to   remove   them from her marital life with accused no.2. If that be   so,   in   view   of   the   medical   evidence,   the deaths   of   the   deceased   Mandabai   and   her children   would   certainly   be   homicidal.   The appellant   set   the   dwelling   house   on   fire.   The learned   trial   Judge   rightly   convicted   the appellant   of   the   offences   punishable   under Sections 302 and 436 of the I.P.C.  We   concur   with   the   findings   recorded   by   the learned   trial   Judge   holding   the   appellant guilty   of the said offences. We further concur with   the   order   of   sentence   passed   by   the learned trial Judge against the appellant. The appeal is devoid of substance. It is liable to be dismissed.” 9. In   the   above   background,   having   heard   Mr. Sudhanshu   S.   Choudhari,   learned   counsel   for   the Page 10 of 23 appellant and Mr. Sachin Patil, learned counsel on behalf the   respondent­State   of   Maharashtra   we   have   perused the material on record. 10.   As   noted,   the   conclusion   as   reached   by   the   High Court would indicate that the evidence tendered on behalf of the prosecution has been discarded as not trustworthy but   ultimately   the   conclusion   has   been   reached   on   the assumption made only due to the fact that the appellant had   not   suffered   injuries   in   the   fire   accident.   It   is   no doubt true that the incident which occurred in this case, if caused by any person with an intention to cause death, is certainly  gruesome as it  resulted in  the death of three persons   of   which   two   were   small   children   and   is unpardonable.   However,   in   a   case   where   the   appellant was proceeded against mainly based on the extra­judicial confession   said   to   have   been   made   to   her   father­in­law namely   Gajanan   (PW­1)   and   the   said   evidence   has   been disbelieved   by   the   High   Court   as   not   being   trustworthy, the   issue   would   be   as   to   whether   the   chain   of circumstances to convict the appellant is complete.   Page 11 of 23 11. We   have   extracted   the   reasons   assigned   and conclusion   reached   by   the   High   Court   in   the   earlier portion of this order only to note that the High Court has held   the   appellant   guilty   more   on   preponderance   of probability   rather   than   reaching   a   conclusion   beyond reasonable   doubt.   Though   it   has   employed   the   phrase ‘beyond   reasonable   doubt’   in   its   concluding   paragraph, the   reasoning   preceding   the   same   are   only   conjectures and   surmises.   The   sole   circumstance   noted   by   the   High Court   with   reference   to   the   evidence   is   that   the   burnt frock   of   deceased   Nikita   was   seized,   vide   a   Panchnama (Exhibit 34) and the evidence of PW­8 that the frock had been   sent   for   chemical   analysis   and   the   report   as   per Exhibit   50   shows   that   Kerosene   residues   were   detected thereon.     In   that   circumstance,   the   High   Court   has   held that kerosene was used for setting the deceased Nikita on fire.     Even   if   that   was   taken   as   a   circumstance   in   the chain,   the   same   was   insufficient   unless   the   other circumstances in the chain were connected to point at the appellant.   In that regard, what is relevant to be noted is that   the   High   Court   has   in   its   earlier   part   of   the Page 12 of 23 reasoning   disbelieved   the   recovery   of   the   can   which   is stated who have smelt of kerosene since the said can had not   been   sent   for   chemical   analysis   and   also   the circumstance   under   which   it   was   said   to   have   been recovered.  12.   If   that   be   the   position,   even   if   the   chemical analysis  report   referring  to  the   frock  is  accepted   there  is nothing   on   record   to   connect   that   the   appellant   was responsible   for   the   sprinkling   of   the   kerosene   or   for   the kerosene to have come in contact with the frock of Nikita which   is   said   to   have   been   recovered   from   the   place   of occurrence.  That apart, the declaration of Mandabai, the deceased   on   03.08.2006   discloses   that   since   there   is   no electricity in the agricultural field, they sleep in the house and   keep  a   lantern   light   in   the   night   for   which   kerosene is obviously used.   Further, it has come in evidence that in   the   said   house   cooking   is   also   done   and   the   material pertaining   to   the   tractor   including   diesel   can   was   also kept   therein.     Therefore,   the   circumstance   that   the appellant   was   not   injured   in   the   incident   cannot   be   the basis   to   rely   on   the   presence   of   kerosene   stains   on   the Page 13 of 23 frock   as   a   circumstance   that   she   had   set   fire   by sprinkling kerosene.   13. The position of law is well settled that the links in the chain of circumstances is necessary to be established for   conviction   on   the   basis   of   circumstantial   evidence. This has been articulated in one of the early decisions of this Court in the case of  Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4 SCC 116.   The relevant paragraphs are as hereunder: ­   “153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would show   that   the   following   conditions   must   be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: ( 1 )   the   circumstances   from   which   the conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn   should   be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that   the   circumstances   concerned   “must   or should”   and   not   “may   be”   established.   There is   not   only   a   grammatical   but   a   legal distinction   between   “may   be   proved”   and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this   Court   in   Shivaji   Sahabrao   Bobade   v. State   of   Maharashtra   where   the   observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary  principle that the accused  must  be and not merely  may  be guilty before   a   court   can   convict   and   the   mental Page 14 of 23 distance   between   ‘may   be’   and   ‘must   be’   is long   and  divides  vague  conjectures  from  sure conclusions.” ( 2 )   the   facts   so   established   should   be consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the guilt   of   the   accused,   that   is   to   say,   they should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, ( 3 )   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a conclusive nature and tendency, ( 4 )   they   should   exclude   every   possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and ( 5 )   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in   all   human   probability   the   act   must   have been done by the accused. 154.   These   five   golden   principles,   if   we   may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. 159.   It   will   be   seen   that   this   Court   while taking   into   account   the   absence   of explanation   or   a   false   explanation   did   hold that it will amount to be an additional link to complete   the   chain   but   these   observations must   be   read   in   the   light   of   what   this   Court said earlier viz. before a false explanation can be   used   as   additional   link,   the   following essential conditions must be satisfied: ( 1 )   various   links   in   the   chain   of   evidence led by the prosecution have been  satisfactorily proved , ( 2 ) the said circumstance points to the guilt of   the   accused   with   reasonable   definiteness, and Page 15 of 23 ( 3 )   the   circumstance   is   in   proximity   to   the time and situation. 160.   If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can  use a false explanation  or  a false defence   as   an   additional   link   to   lend   an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present case, this does not  appear  to be such  a case. This   aspect   of   the   matter   was   examined   in Shankarlal   case   where   this   Court   observed thus: [SCC para 30, p. 43: SCC (Cri) p. 322] “Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place   of   proof   of   facts   which   the   prosecution has   to   establish   in   order   to   succeed.   A   false plea   can   at   best   be   considered   as   an additional   circumstances,   if   other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused.”  14. Further the mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless   the   circumstantial   evidence   tendered   by   the prosecution leads to the conclusion that it “must be true” and not “may be true”.   In that regard, it is necessary to take   note   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Devilal   Vs.   State   of   Rajasthan   (2019)   19   SCC   447, wherein   this   Court   on   noting   the   decision   of   the   case Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   (supra)   has   held   as hereunder;   Page 16 of 23 “17.   It   has   further   been   considered   by   this Court   in   Sujit   Biswas   v.   State   of   Assam 2013(12)   SCC   406   and   Raja   v.   State   of Haryana   2015(11)   SCC   43.   It   has   been propounded   that   while   scrutinising   the circumstantial   evidence,   a   court   has   to evaluate   it   to   ensure   the   chain   of   events   is established clearly and completely  to rule out any   reasonable   likelihood   of   innocence   of   the accused.   The   underlying   principle   is   whether the   chain   is   complete   or   not,   indeed   it   would depend   on   the   facts   of   each   case   emanating from   the   evidence   and   there   cannot   be   a straightjacket formula which can be laid down for   the   purpose.   But   the   circumstances adduced when considered collectively, it must lead   only   to   the   conclusion   that   there  cannot be a person other than the accused who alone is the perpetrator of the crime alleged and the circumstances   must   establish   the   conclusive nature  consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis  of the guilt of the accused. 18.  On an analysis of the overall fact situation in the instant case, and considering the chain of   circumstantial   evidence   relied   upon   by   the prosecution and noticed by the High Court in the   impugned   judgment,   to   prove   the   charge is visibly incomplete and incoherent to permit conviction   of   the   appellants   on   the   basis thereof   without   any   trace   of   doubt.   Though the   materials   on   record   hold   some   suspicion towards   them,   but   the   prosecution   has   failed to   elevate   its   case   from   the   realm   of   “may   be true”   to   the   plane   of   “must   be   true”   as   is indispensably   required   in   law   for   conviction on a criminal charge. It is trite to state that in a   criminal   trial,   suspicion,   howsoever   grave, cannot substitute proof. Page 17 of 23 19.   That   apart,   in   the   case   of   circumstantial evidence, two views are possible on the case of record,   one   pointing   to   the   guilt   of   the accused   and   the   other   his   innocence.   The accused is indeed entitled  to  have the benefit of   one   which   is   favourable   to   him.   All   the judicially laid parameters, defining the quality and   content   of   the   circumstantial   evidence, bring   home   the   guilt   of   the   accused   on   a criminal   charge,   we   find   no   difficulty   to   hold that the prosecution, in the case in hand, has failed to meet the same.” 15. In that backdrop, a perusal of the judgment passed by   the   Session’s   Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court   in   the instant   case,   for   its   ultimate   conclusion   has   made suspicion   the   reason   for   rendering   conviction   without there   being   any   strong   basis.     The   suspicion,   however strong,   cannot   take   the   place   of   proof.     Unfortunately, with   the   nature   of   observations   made   by   the   High   Court as   extracted   above,   it   has   ultimately   held   that   the prosecution   has   established   beyond   reasonable   doubt that   it   is   the   appellant   only   who   has   set   the   deceased Mandabai and her children on fire with a view to remove them from her marital life with accused No.2.  If the facts as   noted   by   the   High   Court   lead   to   such   suspicion, equally there are also circumstances which raise a doubt Page 18 of 23 whether the appellant can be held guilty only because she was not injured in the incident.  In that regard, what is to be noted is that the natural human conduct is that when there   is   any   incident   or   accident   the   immediate   reaction is to get away from the scene and save oneself.   If in the middle of the night for whatever reason there was fire and if   the   appellant   had   woken   up   and   noticed   it   a   little earlier,   the   natural   conduct   is   to   run   out   of   the   house instead of going into the house which is burning to check on the other inmates.   It takes a person lot of courage or be overdriven with compassion to get back into the house to   save   somebody   else   and   not   doing   so   may   be considered as morally wrong for not coming to the aid of fellow   human   being   in   distress,   but   it   cannot   be   a circumstance to hold a person  guilty  of a crime which is as   serious   as   murder   unless   the   other   circumstances   in the   chain   point   to   the   accused   so   as   to   lead   to   an irresistible conclusion of being guilty.  16. If the appellant was responsible for causing the fire with   the   intention   to   kill   Mandabai,   would   not   she   have closed   the   door   after   coming   out   of   the   house   to   ensure Page 19 of 23 that   she   does   not   come   out.     On   the   other   hand, Mandabai who came out alive and lived for a day has not blamed   or   suspected   anybody   including   the   appellant. She   would   have   stated   about   the   overt   act   if   any   was indulged in by the appellant.  Her declaration is clear that the   house   caught   fire   and   she   and   her   children   were caught   in   the   fire.   She   did   not   state   that   the   fire   set   on her   had   spread   to   the   house.   Further   even   as   per   the statement of PW­1, that is Gajanan, the father­in­law, he was   sleeping   just   outside   the   house   and   on   hearing   the appellant   shouting   he   woke   up   and   the   deceased   had stated   that   he   was   awake   when   she   came   out.   Neither has   he   stated   of   the   efforts   made   by   him   to   save   the deceased.     But   it   is   only   after   the   deceased   and   the granddaughter   came   out,   steps   were   taken.     One   other circumstance is also that the admitted position is that the house   had   three   rooms,   one   of   which   was   occupied   by PW­ 3 Piraji Mankari and his family, the fire accident was of   the   nature   which   had   destroyed   the   entire   house   and also the adjoining cowshed etc.  Even in that position the said   Piraji   Mankari   and   others   were   also   not   injured. Page 20 of 23 Therefore,   not   being   injured   alone   cannot   be   held   as   a circumstance   to   hold   one   guilty   of   having   set   fire   to   the house.   17. The   High   Court   has   further   held   the   second marriage;   the   desire   for   domestic   dominance   and   the execution   of   document   for   maintenance   on   17.02.2006, that   is,   a   day   before   registration   of   the   marriage   as   a circumstance and motive, which we are unable to accept. This   is   for   the   reason   that   the   marriage   had   been registered   after   an   arrangement   for   maintenance   was made   in   favour   of   the   first   wife   for   only   a   portion   of   the property   which   is   a   normal   thing   in   such   circumstance and   it   cannot   be   held   as   a   strong   motive   for   an   alleged crime   of   the   present   nature   where   the   appellant   would destroy   her   own   house   and   that   too   without   there   being any   other   incident   when   they   have   lived   together   in   the same house and the fire incident has occurred after more than six months from the date of marriage.   Therefore, if all these aspects are taken into consideration the doubts which   arise   in   the   mind   would   outweigh   the   reasons given   by   the  High   Court   for   pointing   to   the   suspicion   on Page 21 of 23 the   appellant   and   in   that   circumstance   certainly   the benefit of doubt should go in favour of the appellant.    18. The   High   Court   holding   the   appellant   guilty   of pouring   kerosene   around   the   deceased   and   her   children and setting them on fire since the appellant had failed to explain   the   reason   for   eruption   of   fire   in   view   of   such obligation   to   explain   under   Section   106   is   also   not sustainable   in   the   present   circumstance.     As   held   in Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda   (supra)   the   failure   to explain can only be held as an additional link to complete the chain of circumstance.   In the instant case, since the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the same cannot be held against the appellant.  On the other hand,   the   case   itself   is   that   the   fire   had   erupted   at midnight   when   the   appellant   and   others   were   sleeping and   she   come   out   shouting.     The   explanation   for   the cause   of   fire   by   the   appellant   would   have   arisen   only   if there   was   any   other   evidence   to   the   effect   that   the appellant was already awake and was outside even before the fire erupted. Page 22 of 23 19. Thus, taking into consideration all these aspects in the   facts   and   circumstance   of   this   case   we   are   of   the opinion   that   the   appellant   is   entitled   to   be   acquitted   as the   benefit   of   doubt   weighs   in   her   favour.     We   are therefore, unable to sustain the order of conviction of the appellant. 20. In   the   result,   the   judgment   dated   12.10.2017 passed   by   the   High   Court   affirming   the   conviction   and sentence ordered by the Sessions Court is set aside.  The appellant   Parubai   who  is   on   interim   bail   is   set  at   liberty and her bail bond shall stand discharged. 21. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 22. Pending   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed of. ……………………….J. (HEMANT GUPTA) ……………………….J.                                              (A.S. BOPANNA) New Delhi, August 10, 2021  Page 23 of 23