2021 INSC 0366
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5823 OF 2011
Lachhmi Narain Singh (D) Through LRs & Ors.      …Appellant(s)
Versus
Sarjug Singh (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors.         …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Hrishikesh Roy, J.
1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 15.04.2009
of   the   Patna   High   Court   whereby   the   appeal   filed   by   the   probate
applicant   was   allowed   in   his   favour   by   concluding   that   the   Will
favouring   Sarjug   Singh   was   not   cancelled.     Thus,   the   appellate
Court   reversed   the   Trial   Court’s   decision   which   held   that   the
applicant   is   disentitled   to   get   the   Will   probated   as   the   same   was
revoked.   The High Court to give the impugned verdict against the
objectors,   disbelieved   the   registered   deed   of   cancellation   dated
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02.02.1963 (Exbt C) whereby, the Exbt 2 Will,  was revoked by the
testator.
RELEVANT FACTS
2. Rajendra Singh (since deceased) had executed a Will on 14.09.1960
(Exbt   2)   in   favour   of   the   applicant   Sarjug   Singh.     The   executant
died issueless on 21.08.1963 leaving behind his sister Duler Kuer,
wife of late Thakur Prasad Singh and nephew Yugal Kishore Singh
and   also   the     probate   applicant   Sarjug   Singh.     The   case   of   the
applicant   is   that   the   testator’s   wife   died   long   ago   and   therefore
Rajendra   Singh     who   was     issueless   bequeathed   his   property   in
village   Pojhi   Bujurg   and   Pojhi   Kapoor,   District­Saran,   Bihar   by
executing   the   Will   (Ext.2)   favouring   the   respondent   Sarjug   Singh
(since deceased).
3. In   the   probate   proceeding   initiated   by   Sarjug   Singh   i.e.   Probate
Case No. 19/1967, objection was filed by Shyam Sunder Kuer alias
Raj   Bansi   Kuer   (claiming   to   be   the   second   wife   and   widow   of   the
testator).   Khedaran   Kuer   also   opposed   the   applicant   and   she
claimed to be the widow of Jamadar Singh who was the son of late
Jag Jitan Singh (brother of the testator Rajendra Singh).  According
to   the   objectors,   the   Will   favoring   Sarjug   Singh   was   revoked   and
cancelled   by   a   registered   deed   dated   02.02.1963   (Exbt.   C).   It   was
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also   the   objector’s   contention   that   Raj   Bansi   Kuer   was   in
possession   of   all   assets   belonging   to   late   Rajendra   Singh   and   she
along   with   Khedaran   Kuer,   sold   several   plots   of   land   to   the
appellants.     Eight   of   the   vendees   who   took   possession   after   such
purchase,   appeared  in   the   probate  proceedings  and   supported   the
case of the objectors.
4. It   is   relevant   to   state   that   the   validity   of   the   Will   in   favour   of   the
applicant   Sarjug   Singh   was   never   seriously   challenged   but   the
objectors   pleaded   that   the   concerned   Will   was   cancelled   by   a
registered deed on 02.02.1963 (Exbt. C) by the testator himself. The
applicant however claims that the testator was in very poor health,
paralytic   and   was   not   in   a   position   to   attend   the   Sub­Registrar’s
office   on   02.02.1963   to   execute   the   registered   cancellation   deed
(Ext.   ‘C’).     The   applicant   also   challenged   the   genuineness   of   the
testator’s thumb impression on the cancellation deed of the Will.
5. In   the   Probate   case   filed   by   Sarjug   Singh,   the   learned   First
Additional   District   Judge,   Chapra   firstly   concluded   that   the   Will
(Ext.   2)   is   a   genuine   document.   However,   by   referring   to   the
evidence laid by the objectors, the learned Judge then held that the
Will   (Ext.   2)   was   cancelled   on   02.02.1963   under   a   registered   deed
(Ext.  C),  a few  months   before  Rajendra  Singh  died  on  21.08.1963,
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at   Patna   hospital.       The   Court   also   referred   the   death   certificate
(Ext.   F)   to   conclude   that   the   same   does   not   indicate   that   the
testator   was   suffering   from   paralysis.   This   observation   was   made
by   the   trial   Court   to   reject   the   contention   of   the   applicant   to   the
effect   that   Rajendra   Singh   was   paralytic   and   was   incapable   of
cancelling the Will a few months before he died.  The learned Judge
then   considered   the   sale   deeds   produced   by   the   objector   Shyam
Sunder   Kuer   and   observed   that   she   was   dealing   with   Rajendra
Singh’s   property   as   his   legal   heir   and   this   according   to   the   Court
was   also   indicative   of   the   fact  that  the   Will   for   which   probate   was
sought, was revoked by the testator himself.
6. The   learned   trial   Court   while   examining   the   genuineness   of   the
cancellation   deed   dated   02.02.1963   (Ext.   ‘C’)   referred   to   the
evidence   of   the   handwriting   expert,   Hassan   Raza   (OW­3),   the
attesting   witness   of   cancellation   deed,   Jagarnath   Prasad   (OW­4)
and the scribe of the cancellation deed Shashinath Mishra (OW­5).
The   OW­3   as   an   expert,   compared   the   admitted   thumb   mark   of
Rajendra   Singh   on   the   deed   of   gift   dated   23.7.1947   in   favour   of
Jugal   Kishore   Singh   (Ext.   1)   and   on   the   Will   dated   14.09.1960   in
favour   of   Sarjug   Singh   (Ext.   2)   with   the   thumb   impression
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registered   at   Chapra   Registration   Office   and   recorded   the
following :­
“8.     …..xxx…The   expert   who   examined   these   thumb
marks   is   of   the   opinion   that   all   these   thumb
impressions tally.   O.W.3 S.E.T. Hassan Raza is the
Expert and Ext. B is his report.     There is nothing in
his   cross­examination   to   discard   his   evidence   and
report …..xxx….”
       After   referring   to   the   testimony   of   the   attesting   witness   and   the
scribe   of the cancellation deed, the trial Court concluded as below:­
“10.   …..xxx…There is no evidence on the side of the
applicant nor there is any suggestion to the attesting
witness   O.W.   4   and   Shashinath   Mishra   the   scribe
O.W.   5   to   the   effect   that   some   body   also   had
impersonated   Rajendra   Singh   before   the   Sub­
Registrar….xxx….”
7. On the above analysis, the learned trial Court, under its judgment
dated   14.12.1973   concluded   that   the   Will   has   been   revoked   and
the applicant Sarjug Singh is disentitled to get the Will probated.  
8.   Aggrieved   by   the   rejection   of   the   Probate   case   by   the   Trial   Court,
the   applicant   Sarjug   Singh   filed   the   First   Appeal   No.   127   of   1974
before   the   High   Court.   During   the   pendency   of   the   appeal,   on
21.03.2002,   Sarjug   Singh   died   but   no   application   was   filed   for
substitution of the deceased appellant.   
9.   The  High   Court  addressed   the  core   issue   on   whether  the   testator
had cancelled the Will.  Then the Court noted the precarious health
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condition of the testator and the failure of the objectors to produce
the   original   of   the   cancellation   deed   and   non­presentation   of   the
material   witness.   On   such   consideration,   the   appellate   Court   held
that the deed cancelling the Will should not be taken into evidence.
The learned Judge also noted that the validity of the Will was never
seriously questioned and the objectors had stated that the Will was
cancelled   by   the   testator   himself.   The   High   Court   accordingly
granted the probate and reversed the finding of the trial Court.  The
subsequent  purchasers  of  the  assets  who   supported  the  objector’s
case in the probate proceedings, have then filed the present appeal.
10.  In   course   of   the   proceedings   before   this   Court,   suggestion   was
earlier   made   to   the   parties   for   amicable   settlement   of   the   rival
claims   and   accordingly   time   was   granted   to   the   counsel   to   obtain
instructions.  But when the case was taken up for final hearing, the
Court   is   informed   by   the   respondents’   counsel   that   they   failed   to
reach any acceptable settlement and the appeal should therefore be
heard.
11.    Insofar as the non­substitution of the deceased Sarjug Singh before
the   High   Court   and   non­substitution   of   legal   heirs   of   other
contesting   parties,   the   same   need   not   detain   us   at   this   point,   in
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view   of   the   proceeding   on   13.04.2021   in   this   Court   where,   the
parties have agreed that although the appeal before the High Court
was   decided   against   a   dead   person   and   the   legal   heirs   of   the
present appellants were belatedly brought on record, since all legal
heirs of the contesting  parties are represented, the case should be
decided on its legal merit.   In view of such consensus, taking note
of   the   amended   memo   of   parties   which   were   filed,   we   have
proceeded to adjudicate the appeal.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
12.       We   have   heard   Ms.   Sreoshi   Chatterjee,   the   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants/objectors.   The   legal   heirs   of   Sarjug
Singh   (probate   applicant)   are   represented   by   the   learned   counsel
Mr. Abhay Kumar.  
13.       The   merit   of   the   claim   of   either   party   in   the   present   matter   will
hinge   around   the   core   issue   as   to   whether   Rajendra   Singh   had
actually revoked the Will in favour of Sarjug Singh and his physical
and mental capacity to execute the Cancellation Deed (Ext. C) and
also whether thumb impression of Rajendra Singh on the registered
document dated 02.02.1963 is genuine or not.
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14.    In   allowing   the   appeal   of   the   probate   applicant,   the   High   Court
referred   to   the   health   condition   of   Rajendra   Singh   who   suffered
from paralysis before his death and had opined that it would not be
possible for the testator to visit the Sub­Registrar’s Office, to cancel
the Will.  Inference was accordingly drawn on his impersonation, at
the   Sub­Registrar’s   Office.   Such   conclusion   was   reached   even
though, neither any suggestion nor any cross­examination was put
to the objector’s witnesses, regarding impersonation of the testator
Rajendra Singh at the Sub­Registrar’s Office.  It is also important to
record that Ext. B (Report of Handwriting Expert) and Ext. C (Deed
of   Cancellation)   were   both   marked   without   objection,   when   the
documents were tendered in the trial Court.
15.     The High Court  in our  assessment, failed to  give due weightage to
the   evidence   of   OW­3,   OW­4   and   OW­5   who   led   evidence   on
genuineness   of   the   cancellation   deed.     Instead,   erroneous
presumption   was   drawn   on   impersonation   and   incapability   of   the
testator,   to   visit   the   office   of   the   Sub­Registrar   to   register   the
Cancellation Deed.   
16. That   apart,   the   probate   applicant   never   opposed   the   acceptance
and marking of the concerned cancellation deed, in the trial Court.
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Therefore, in the face of the Expert’s Report (Ext. B), when the Deed
of   Cancellation   (Ext.   C)   were   marked   without   any   objection   before
the trial Court, those cannot be treated as inadmissible and should
have   been   accepted   as   genuine,   particularly   in   view   of   the
testimony of OW­3, OW­4 and OW­5, who  stood firm on execution
of the registered revocation deed by the testator, Rajendra Singh.    
17. On   the   issue   of   testator’s   thumb   impression   on   the   cancellation
deed, it is telling that all the four deeds executed by Rajendra Singh
in   his   lifetime,   contained   his   thumb   impression   and   not   his
signature.   Therefore,   adverse   presumption   on   genuineness   of   the
cancellation   deed   cannot   be   drawn   merely   because   the   testator
chose   to   append   his   thumb   impression.   That   apart,   the   Ext.   B
Report   of   the   handwriting   expert   (OW­3)   clearly   indicates   that   the
thumb impression on all the documents placed before the Expert’s
opinion   are   of   the   same  person  i.e.   of   Rajendra  Singh.       Since  the
said   Ext.   B   was   marked   in   Court,   without   objection   from   the
applicant,   the   genuineness   of   the   same   cannot   be   allowed   to   be
questioned   before   the   appellate   Court.       A   contrary   inference
according to our opinion, was erroneously drawn by the High court
by   referring   to   the   health   condition   of   the   testator,   when   the
revocation deed was registered.   
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18. The   key   characteristic   of   thumb   impression   is   that   every   person
has a unique thumb impression.   Forgery of thumb impressions is
nearly   impossible.     Therefore,   adverse   conclusion   should   not   be
drawn for affixing thumb impression instead of signing documents
of property transaction.  Therefore, genuineness of the Cancellation
deed   cannot   be   doubted   only   due   to   the   fact   that   same   was   not
signed   and   Rajendra   as   a   literate   person,   affixed   his   thumb
impression.  This is more so in this case since the testator’s thumb
impression was proved to be genuine by the expert.
19. Next,   we   need   to   consider   the   implication   of   the   conduct   of   the
objectors,   who   did   not   produce   the   original   deed   of   cancellation.
They also failed to take any steps to produce the original (reported
to   be   in   possession   of   Yugal   Kishore   Singh).     On   this,   the   probate
applicant   neither   objected   to   production   of   certified   copy   nor
insisted on production of the original Cancellation Deed. Mr. Abhay
Kumar,   learned   counsel   however   contended   that   even   the   Trial
Court   had   not   pressed   for   production   of   the   original   Cancellation
Deed.   As   can   be   seen,   the   probate   objectors   never   objected   to
presentation   of   the   certified   copy   of   Cancellation   Deed.   Before   the
trial   Court,   probate   applicant   primarily   argued   that   Rajendra   was
keeping   ill   ­health   and   it   was   not   possible   for   him   to   have   gone
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alone to the Sub­ Registrar’s office for getting the Cancellation Deed
registered.   When this was the contention of the applicant and the
concerned   deed   was   introduced   and   marked   without   protest,   the
High   court   in   the   face   of   overwhelming   evidence   in   support   of   the
genuineness   of   the   cancellation   deed,   should   not   have   drawn   an
adverse   inference   against   the   objectors   by   referring   to   the   health
condition of the testator.  
20.     In   such   scenario,   where   no   protest   was   registered   by   the   probate
applicant   against   production   of   certified   copy   of   the   Cancellation
Deed,   he   cannot   later   be   allowed   to   take   up   the   plea   of   non­
production   of   original   cancellation   deed   in   course   of   the   appellate
proceeding.   As   already   noted,   the   main   contention   of   probate
applicants   was   that   the   mode   of   proof   of   Cancellation   deed   was
inadequate.   However,   such   was   not   the   stand   of   the   probate
applicants   before   the   Trial   Court.   The   objection   as   to   the
admissibility   of   a   registered   document   must   be   raised   at   the
earliest stage before the trial court and the objection could not have
been   taken   in   appeal,   for   the   first   time.       On   this   we   may   draw
support from observations made by Justice Ameer Ali in  Padman v.
Hanwanta 1
 where the following was set out by the Privy Council 
1  AIR 1915 PC 111
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“The   defendants   have   now   appealed   to   His   Majesty­
in­Council,   and   the   case   has   been   argued   on   their
behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the
argument   that   a   registered   copy   of   the   Will   of   1898
was   admitted   in   evidence   without   sufficient
foundation   being   laid   for   its   admission.   No   objection,
however, appears to have been taken in the first court
against   the   copy   obtained   from   the   Registrar's   office
being put in evidence. Had such objection been made
at   the   time,   the   District   Judge,   who   tried   the   case   in
the   first   instance,   would   probably   have   seen   that   the
deficiency   was   supplied.   Their   Lordships   think   that
there   is   no   substance   in   the   present   contention.”
(emphasis in original)
21. A   similar   view   was   taken   by   George   Rankin,   J.   in   the   decision   of
Privy Council in   Gopal Das v. Sri   Thakurji 2
  where it was held that
Objection   as   to   the   mode   of   proof   must   be   taken   when   the
document   is   tendered   and   before   it   is   marked   as   an   exhibit.   It
cannot be taken in appeal.  Objection as to mode of proof should be
taken   before   a   document   is   admitted   and   marked   as   exhibit.   In
present   case   probate   applicant   never   raised   any   objection   in
regards to mode of proof of cancellation deed before the Trial Court,
as is evident from perusal of records and this must be held against
him.  
22.         In   support   of   our   above   conclusion,   we   may   usefully   refer   to   the
ratio   in   R.V.E   Venkatachala   Gounder   v.   Arulmigu   Viswesaraswami
2  AIR 1943 PC 83
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&   V.P   Temple 3
  where   Justice   Ashok   Bhan   while   dealing   with   the
aspect   of   disallowing   objection   as   to   mode   of   proof   at   appellant
stage as a rule of fair play to avoid prejudice to the other side, said
as follows:­
  “ 20.   …….….   In   the   latter   case,   the   objection   should   be
taken   when   the   evidence   is   tendered   and   once   the
document   has   been   admitted   in   evidence   and   marked   as
an   exhibit,   the   objection   that   it   should   not   have   been
admitted  in  evidence  or  that  the mode  adopted  for  proving
the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at
any   stage   subsequent   to   the   marking   of   the   document   as
an  exhibit.  The  latter  proposition is  a  rule  of  fair  play. The
crucial   test   is   whether   an   objection,   if   taken   at   the
appropriate   point   of   time,   would   have   enabled   the   party
tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such
mode   of   proof   as   would   be   regular.   The   omission   to   object
becomes   fatal   because   by   his   failure   the   party   entitled   to
object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an
assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the
mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does
not   prejudice   the   party   tendering   the   evidence,   for   two
reasons:   firstly,   it   enables   the   court   to   apply   its   mind   and
pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then
and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court
on   the   mode   of   proof   sought   to   be   adopted   going   against
the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking
indulgence   of   the   court   for   permitting   a   regular   mode   or
method of proof  and thereby removing the objection raised
by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the
evidence.   Such   practice   and   procedure   is   fair   to   both   the
parties.   Out   of   the   two   types   of   objections,   referred   to
hereinabove,   in   the   latter   case,   failure   to   raise   a   prompt
and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for
insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself
3  (2003) 8 SCC 752 
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which   is   sought   to   be   proved   being   admissible   in
evidence………”    (emphasis in original) 
23.       This   Court   in   the   opinion   written   by   Justice   S.   H.   Kapadia   in
Dayamathi Bai v. KM Shaffi 4
  has similarly held that objection as to
the   mode   of   proof   falls   within   procedural   law.   Therefore,   such
objections   could   be   waived.   Moreover,   objection   is   to   be   taken
before   the   document   is   marked   as   an   exhibit   and   admitted   in
Court.
24.       In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   it   is   clear   that   plea   regarding
mode   of   proof   cannot   be   permitted   to   be   taken   at   the   appellate
stage   for   the   first   time,   if   not   raised   before   the   trial   Court   at   the
appropriate   stage.     This   is   to   avoid   prejudice   to   the   party   who
produced the certified copy of an original document without protest
by   the   other   side.   If   such   objection   was   raised   before   trial   court,
then   the   concerned   party   could   have   cured   the   mode   of   proof   by
summoning   the   original   copy   of   document.     But   such   opportunity
may not be available or possible at a later stage. Therefore, allowing
such   objection   to   be   raised   during   the   appellate   stage   would   put
the   party   (who   placed   certified   copy   on   record   instead   of   original
copy)   in   a   jeopardy   &   would   seriously   prejudice   interests   of   that
4  (2004) 7 SCC 107
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party.       It   will   also   be   inconsistent   with   the   rule   of   fair   play   as
propounded   by   Justice   Ashok   Bhan   in   the   case   of   R.V.E.
Venkatachala  (Supra).  
25.     In consequence of above, we are of the considered opinion that the
High   Court   had   erred   by   ignoring   the   material   evidence   in
disbelieving the Cancellation Deed and on that score declaring that
the   applicant   is   entitled   to   grant   of   probate   of   the   Will   (Ext.   2).
Given   the   fact   that   Probate   applicant   never   raised   any   objection
regarding   the   mode   of   proof   before   the   trial   court,   there   was   no
occasion for the High Court to say that it was the duty of defendant
to produce original deed of cancellation.   The reliance therefore on
the  opinion  of  Lord  Thankerton   in   Babu   Anand   Behari  v.  Dinshow
& Co . 5
  is found to be unjustified.   This is because in that case, the
authenticity   of   some   extract   of   power   of   attorney,   was   questioned
but   in   the   present   case   the   certified   copy   of   the   registered
cancellation deed is produced and most importantly, the same was
not objected.   Moreover, the plea of mode of proof was never raised
before   the   trial   Court   and   therefore   High   Court’s   reliance   on
aforementioned case to support the applicant is unacceptable. 
5  AIR 1946 PC 24
Page  15  of  16

26. On the basis of the above examination, it is our considered opinion
that   the   Trial   Court   was   right   in   holding   that   Rajendra   was
medically fit and had cancelled the Will himself. It is also seen that
the   evidences   of   the   relevant   OWs   have   withstood   the   scrutiny   of
the Trial Court and those have remained unshaken and should be
trusted.         Considering   the   omission   of   the   probate   applicants   to
raise   objection   regarding   mode   of   proof   before   the   trial   court,   we
find merit in the case of the objectors.
27.     For the above reasoning, we allow the present appeal set aside the
impugned order of High Court and restore the judgment of the First
Additional District Judge Chapra, with no order as to costs. 
..……………………………….J.
        [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
…………………………………
J.
        [HRISHIKESH ROY]
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 17, 2021
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