2021 INSC 0369
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 852 of 2021
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2345 of 2019)
MADHAV             ...    APPELLANT(S)
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH   ... RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
Criminal Appeal No. 853 of 2021
(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9326 of 2018)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
Leave granted.
2. Challenging   their   conviction   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code,   1860   ( “IPC”   for   short )   and   the   sentence   of   life

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imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2500/­ imposed upon them by
the   I st
  Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Sagar,   M.P.,   and   confirmed
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur,   Accused   Nos.2   and   3   have   come   up   with   these
criminal appeals.
3. We   have   heard   Mr.   Ardhendumauli   Kumar   Prasad   and
Mr.   Amit   Arjariya,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellants   and   Shri   S.U.   Lalit,   learned   counsel   appearing   for
the State.
4. Smt. Sahodra Bai ( hereinafter referred to as “A­2” ), who is
the   appellant   in   one   of   these   appeals,   is   the   sister   of
Shri   Madhav   ( hereinafter   referred   to   as   “A­3 ”)   who   is   the
appellant   in   the   other   appeal.   Shri   Raju   Yadav   who   was
Accused No.1 is the husband of Sahodra Bai. 
5. The   case   of   the   prosecution   was   that   on   the   night   of
13.05.2008,   at   about   22.30   hrs.,   all   the   three   accused,   in
furtherance   of   the   common   intention   of   all,   attacked   one
Pappu   @   Nand Kishore (brother of A­1) with a knife and   lathis
resulting   in   his   death   and   that,   thereafter,   with   the   intention

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of screening the offenders from legal punishment, A­2 took the
victim   to   the   Government   Hospital   and   sent   a   false
information to the Police as though the murderous assault on
the victim was committed by two other persons by name Ruia
and   Kailash.   While   all   the   three   accused   were   charged   for
offences   punishable   under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34
IPC, A­2 was charged additionally  for the offences punishable
under Sections 211 and 194 IPC.
6. The prosecution mainly relied upon   (i)  the purported eye­
witness   account   of   PWs   4,   5,   6,   7   and   9,   (ii)   the   medical
evidence regarding the cause of death; and  (iii)  the recovery of
the   weapons   used   for   the   commission   of   the   offence   namely,
knife   and   lathis ,   from   the   houses   of   the   accused   and   the
report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory  (“FSL ”  for short ).
7. Out   of   the   witnesses   on   whose   ocular   testimony,   heavy
reliance was placed by the prosecution, PWs 6 and 7 were the
persons   whom   A­2   had   named   as   the   accused,   in   the   first
information sent from the hospital on the night of 13.05.2008.
PWs   4   and   5   were   related   to   PWs   6   and   7.   Actually   the

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prosecution   treated   PWs   4   and   5   as   hostile,   after   they   stated
during chief examination that they did not see A­3 at the spot,
which   was   contrary   to   their   statement   to   the   Police.   The
Sessions   Court   believed   their   testimony   partly   in   so   far   as   it
related   to   the   presence   of   A­1   and   A­2   at   the   spot   but
disbelieved their evidence, in so far as it related to the alleged
assault   on   the   victim.   But   the   High   Court   proceeded   on   the
footing, without any rhyme or reason, as though PWs 4 and 5
were independent witnesses who corroborated the testimony of
PW­9.   The   High   Court   even   overlooked   the   fact   that   the   Trial
Court   declared   them   as   hostile   at   the   request   of   the
prosecution. 
8. PW­6 was a person by name Kailash Yadav and PW­7 was
a   person   by   name   Ruia   Yadav.   As   stated   in   the   previous
paragraph,   PWs   6   and   7   were   the   ones   who   were   named   as
accused,   in   the   First   Information   Report   FIR   No.331   of   2008
registered   on   13.05.2008,   on   the   basis   of   the   intimation   sent
by   A­2   from   the   hospital.   The   Sessions   Court   disbelieved   the
evidence   of   PW­6   in   entirety,   but   accepted   one   portion   of   the

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statement of PW­7, on the basis of the so called corroboration
by one Smt. Radha Rani, mother of the deceased, examined on
the   side   of   the   defence   as   DW­1.   But   that   portion   of   the
evidence of PW­7 taken by the Sessions Court to be probable,
merely related to an argument that the victim Pappu had with
his   brother   Raju   (A­1)   nearly   two   hours   before   the   time   of
occurrence   of   the   crime.   Interestingly   the   argument   between
the   deceased   and   A­1   was   purportedly   in   relation   to   an
amount of Rs.250/­ borrowed by the deceased from PW­7, but
not repaid by him.
9. The   Sessions   Court   considered   Sapna   Yadav,   examined
as PW­9, who was aged 16 years at the time of occurrence, as
the   star   witness.   She   was   the   niece   of   the   deceased.   Though
her statement was recorded by the Police only on 03.06.2008,
after   21   days   of   the   date   of   occurrence,   the   Sessions   Court
proceeded   to   believe   her   evidence   and   convicted   all   the   three
accused   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Section   302   read
with   Section   34   IPC.     However,   A­2   was   acquitted   of   the
charges   under   Sections   211   and   194   IPC.   All   of   them   were

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sentenced   to   life   imprisonment   and   also   imposed   a   fine   of
Rs.2500/­.
10. A­1   and   A­2   being   husband   and   wife   respectively,
together   filed   an   appeal   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1323   of   2009
and   A­3  filed   a   separate   appeal   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.727   of
2009,   on   the   file   of   the   High   Court,   challenging   their
conviction and sentence. Relying mainly upon the testimony of
the star witness PW­9 and the medical evidence regarding the
cause   of   death,   the   High   Court   confirmed   the   conviction   and
sentence   and   dismissed   the   appeals.   Aggrieved   by   the
dismissal   of   their   appeals,   A­2   and   A­3   alone   have   come   up
with   the   above   criminal   appeals.   However,   A­1   has   been
arrayed as Respondent No.2, in the appeal filed by A­2.
11. Drawing   our   attention   to   the   inherent   contradictions   in
the   testimonies   of   PWs   9   and   14,   and   the   glaring
inconsistencies between their testimonies, the learned counsel
for   the   appellants   argued   that   the   conviction   was   based
entirely   upon   surmises   and   that   such   a   conviction   is   wholly
unsustainable in law. 

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12. However,   placing   reliance   upon   the   seizure   of   the   knife
and   lathis   allegedly   used   for   the   commission   of   the   offence,
from the houses of the accused under seizure memos and the
report received from FSL, it was argued by the learned counsel
representing   the   State   that   the   prosecution   had   established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the
Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court   were   justified   in   relying
upon the evidence of PW­9 and others.  
13. We  have  carefully  considered the material on  record and
the submissions of the learned counsel on both sides.
14. A close scrutiny of the sequence of events that happened
from the date of occurrence of the crime,   namely,   13.05.2008,
would   show   that   the   investigation   in   this   case,   instead   of
proceeding in pursuit of truth, had proceeded towards burying
the   truth.   This   can   be   best   appreciated   by   narrating   the
sequence of events as under:­
(a)  Admittedly, an information was received by one Shri
G.P. Dwivedi working as Assistant Sub­inspector  in
Moti   Nagar   Police   Station,   Sagar   District   at   about
23.00   hrs.   on   13.05.2008   from   the   Government

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Hospital   (Tili)   about   a   person   having   been   brought
dead. The information had been sent at the instance
of  A­2, who had  taken  the  body   of the  victim   in an
auto   rickshaw   to   the   hospital.   This   Assistant   Sub
Inspector   was   examined   as   PW­12.   According   to
PW­12, a FIR was registered in FIR No.331 of 2008
at 23.50 hrs. showing the name of the complainant
as Smt. Sahodra Bai (A­2) and showing Ruia Yadav
and Kailash Yadav (later examined as PWs 6 and 7)
as the accused.
(b) Admittedly   the   investigation   was   taken   over   by
another Assistant Sub­inspector by name R.K. Sen,
examined   as   PW­14.   According   to   him,   he   started
the   investigation   in   the   morning   of   14.05.2008.
Therefore,   in   the   normal   course,   one   would   have
expected   the   investigation   first   to   proceed   against
Ruia Yadav and Kailash Yadav, who were named as
accused. But interestingly right from the beginning,
the investigation carried out by PW­14 proceeded in
the reverse gear, by making the informant,  namely,
Sahodra   Bai   and   her   husband   and   brother   as
accused and the original accused Ruia and Kailash
as   witnesses.   One   would   have   expected   an
Investigating Officer, who takes up investigation in
the   morning   of   14.05.2008,   in   relation   to   a   FIR

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registered   at   23.50   hours   the   previous   night,   to
record   the   statements   of   the   informant,   visit   the
place   of   commission   of   the   crime,   secure   the
accused and  collect evidence to  find out the truth.
But   in   this   case,   the   IO,   right   from   the   beginning,
had turned the case entirely against the informant
and her family. The reason for the IO doing this, is
not far to seek. 
(c)       During   cross­examination,   PW­14   admitted   that
there were demonstrations by political parties when
the   investigation   was   taken   up   by   him   on
14.05.2008   against   Ruia   and   Kailash.   This   is
perhaps   why,   the   IO   first   took   A­1   to   the   Medical
Officer   (examined   as  PW­2)   of  the   District   Hospital
for   medical   examination   on   15.05.2008   and   got   a
report   to   the   effect   that   there   were   several
abrasions on the back of A­1. On the basis of such
a   report,   the   IO   concluded   that   these   abrasions
must have been caused during the scuffle that the
deceased had with A­1.
(c) After   obtaining   the   medical   report   about   the
injuries   on   the   body   of   A­1   on   15­5­2008,   PW­12
admittedly called all the three accused to the police
station   in   the   morning   of   16.05.2008   and   effected
their   arrest.   In   other   words,   within   three   days   of

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the   commission   of   the   crime,   persons   named   as
accused   in   the   FIR   were   made   witnesses   for   the
prosecution   and   the   informant,   her   husband   and
her brother were made as accused.
(d) It is only after 18 days of effecting the arrest of all
the three accused, that the statement of PW­9, the
so called star witness, was recorded by the IO.
15. It   is   quite   strange   and   completely   unfathomable   as   to
how,   where,   why   and   at   what   point   of   time,   the   investigation
that   should   have   started   against   PWs   6   and   7   took   a   U­turn
and   proceeded   towards   the   very   informant   and   her   family
members. Right from  the beginning, the defence taken by  the
accused   was   that   due   to   political   influence,   they   were   made
accused   and   the   actual   accused   were   made   witnesses.   This
stands   corroborated   by   the   admission   made   by   PW­14   (IO)
that   when   he   took   up   the   investigation   on   14.05.2008,   there
were demonstrations held by political parties.
16. What is shocking is the admission made by PW­14 during
cross­examination that he was not aware, at the time when he
started   the   investigation   (in   the   morning   of   14.05.2008),
whether   the   accused   named   in   the   FIR,   namely ,   Ruia   and

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Kailash Yadav (later examined as PWs 6 and 7) were in police
custody. But he admitted that after he took up investigation in
the morning of 14.05.2008, he did not arrest both of them.
17. The   reason   why   the   IO   did   not   even   suspect   the   role   of
Ruia   and   Kailash   Yadav   in   the   commission   of   the   crime,
remains   unexplained.   We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   at
times   persons   who   commit   a   crime,   themselves   make/lodge
the first information, so as to create an  alibi  of innocence. But
even   in   such   cases   the   investigation   would   normally   proceed
first   against   those   named   as   accused   in   the   FIR   and,
thereafter,   the   needle   of   suspicion   may   turn   against   the
informant himself.
18. A   useful   reference   can   be   made   in   this   regard   to   the
decision of this Court in   Kari Choudhary   vs.   Mst. Sita Devi
&   Ors . 1
.   It   was   a   case   where   the   mother­in­law   of   the   victim
first   filed   a   complaint   of   culpable   homicide   against   unknown
persons,   who,   allegedly   sneaked   into   the   bedroom   of   her
daughter­in­law and murdered her. During the progress of the
1   (2002) 1 SCC 714

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investigation   into   the   FIR   registered   on   the   basis   of   the
mother­in­law’s   complaint,   the   Police   found   that   the   murder
was  committed  pursuant   to  a  conspiracy  hatched  by  the  first
informant   and   her   other   daughters­in­law.   Therefore,   the
Police   sent   a   report   to   the   Court   to   the   effect   that   the
allegations   in   the   FIR   registered   at   the   behest   of   the   mother­
in­law   were   false.   The   Police   thereafter   registered   a   fresh   FIR
and continued the investigation against the original informant
and   others.   The   original   informant   filed   a   protest   petition
against the Report of the Police on the first FIR, but the same
was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate ( “CJM”for short ).
However, the said order was over­turned by the High Court in
a   revision   and   the   CJM   was   directed   to   conduct   an   inquiry
under   Section   202   of   the   Code.   Thereafter,   the   Police   filed   a
charge­sheet   against   the   original   informant   (mother­in­law)
and two others. The CJM committed the case to Sessions and
the Sessions Judge framed a charge for the offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 but the mother­in­law
approached the High Court and got the proceedings quashed.

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That   order   became   the   subject   matter   of   appeal   before   this
Court in  Kari Choudhary  (supra). The main contention of the
original informant in that case was that once the order of the
CJM   rejecting   the   protest   petition   was   set   aside   by   the   High
Court,  the  logical  consequence  of  such   an  order  was  that   the
conclusion   reached   by   the   Police   that   the   original   complaint
was false, also stood rejected. Therefore, it was contended that
there cannot be another  prosecution and that too  against the
original   informant.   While   rejecting   the   said   contention,   this
Court   held   that   the   course   adopted   by   the   Court   on   the   first
complaint   cannot   disable  the  Police  to   continue   to  investigate
into  the offence  and to reach  a final  conclusion regarding  the
real  culprit.  Yet  another  contention  before  this   Court  in   Kari
Choudhary   (supra)   was   that   once   the   proceedings   initiated
under   the   first   FIR   ended   in   a   final   report,   the   Police   had   no
authority to register a second FIR.  While dealing with the said
contention,   this   Court   opined;   “ Of   course   the   legal   position   is
that   there   cannot   be   two   FIRs   against   the   same   accused   in
respect   of   the   same   case.   But   when  there   are   rival   versions   in

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respect   of   the   same   episode,   they   would   normally   take   the
shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on
under both of them…” 
19. Therefore, it happens at times that the real culprit lodges
the   first   information   against   known   or   unknown   persons,   to
misdirect   the   investigation   of   an   offence.   But   even   in   such   a
case, it is only during the course of investigation into the first
FIR   that   the   case   may   take   a   U­turn.   When   it   does,   the
informant   may   also   have   to   face   additional   charges   for   the
offences punishable under various provisions of Chapter XI of
IPC.   This   is   exactly   the   reason   why,   in   this   case,   the
prosecution   charged   A­2   for   the   offences   punishable   under
Sections 194 and 211 IPC. But the Trial Court acquitted her of
the charges under these two provisions.
20. As   stated   earlier,   when   a   question   was   put   to   him   as   to
whether Ruia and Kailash Yadav (PWs 6 and 7), who were the
original accused, were ever taken into custody, the IO (PW­14)
feigned ignorance. The answer given by the IO is as follows:­
“ It   was   not   in   my   knowledge   that   when   I   started
investigation at that time Ruia and Kailash Yadav

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were   in   the   custody   of   the   police.   On   having
knowledge   about   this   information   that   case   is
registered   against   Ruia   and   Kailash,   I   have   not
tried to arrest them.” 
But interestingly, the star witness for the prosecution,  namely ,
PW­9,  who  was admittedly  just 16 years  of age at  the  time  of
occurrence, not only claimed knowledge about their arrest, but
also revealed what happened thereafter. The testimony of PW­
9 in this regard reads as follows:­
“ It   is   true   that   after   death   of   my   Mausa   Pappu,
Police had taken into custody Rooiya and Kailash
for   murder.   It   is   not   known   to   me   that   where   my
Mausa   was   living   who   is   leader   there.   It   is   true
that for taking into custody of Rooiya and Kailash
there   was   strike   in   Mohalla.   Persons   of   Yadav
caste   assembled.   It   is   true   that   persons   of   Yadav
caste   put   pressure   on   police   and   leaving   Rooiya
and Kailash on that day soil of my Mausa came.” 
21. Unfortunately neither the Trial Court nor the High Court
took   note   of   the   above   admission   on   the   part   of   PW­9   in   the
context of the admission made by the IO as PW­14.
22. That the case was foisted against the very informant and
their   family   members   due   to   political   pressure   is   also   borne
out   by   another   admission   made   by   PW­14   which   reads   as
follows:

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“ I   was   given   verbal   instructions   by   higher   police
officers   that   Kailash   Yadav,   Rooiya   @   Bhagirath
Yadav   be   impleaded   as   witnesses   instead   of
accused. When I have started the investigation at
that   time   Additional   Superintendent   of   Police
Tilak   Singh   has   given   me   verbal   order   that
Kailash   &   Rooiya   be   impleaded   as   witnesses
instead   of   accused.   In   my   diary   I   have   not
mentioned   about   that   order.   In   this   case   during
the   course   of   investigation   accused   was   having
bad relation with deceased this fact has not come
on record.” 
23. According   to   the   IO,   the   knife   used   by   A­1   for   the
commission   of   the   offence   was   seized   from   the   house   of   A­1.
Similarly   the   lathis   used   for   the   commission   of   the   offence
were also seized from the houses of A­2 and A­3.  Seizure was
effected, according to the IO, in the presence of witnesses and
seizure   memos   prepared.   But   those   witnesses   Dal   Chandra
and Deen Dayal did not support the prosecution. Dal Chandra
was   examined   as   PW­1   and   he   stated   categorically   (i)   that   in
his presence no enquiry was conducted from the accused;  and
(ii)   that   in   his   presence   no   weapons   were   seized   from   the
accused.   However,   he   admitted   his   signatures   in   the   seizure
memos. He explained this by stating that he signed the seizure
memo   and   memorandum   statement   outside   the   hotel   situate

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near the police station. Even after he was declared hostile, he
reiterated in response to the questions posed by the Additional
Public Prosecutor that seizure of the weapons was not effected
in   his   presence.   Yet   the   High   Court   gave   credence   to   the
testimony of PW­1 merely on the ground that he admitted the
signatures in the seizure memo and memorandum statement.
24. The   fact  that   right  from   the   beginning,  the   IO   proceeded
to   favour   those   two   persons   originally   named   as   accused   in
the   FIR,   is   also   borne   out   by   the   statement   made   by   him   in
chief examination that even on the very first day, he recorded
the   statements   of   several   witnesses   including   Kailash   and
Ruia.   It   means   that   he   started   with   a   pre­determination   that
the informant, her husband and her brother were the culprits
and   the   original   accused   were   innocent.   The   relevant   portion
of the evidence of PW­14 in this regard reads as follows:­
“ From   place   of   incidence   blood   stained   soil   and
common   soil   was   collected   and   was   sealed   in
different   –   different   packets   was   seized   in
presence   of   witnesses   and   seizure   Memo   is
Ex.P/15 on which from B to B is my signature.  On
that   date   only   witnesses   Rahul   Yadav,   Rajesh
Yadav,   Kailash   Yadav,   Ruia   @   Bhagirath   Yadav,
Baby   @   Leelabai,   Gandharv   Patel,   Raghuvir
Thakur,   Brijesh   Rawat,   Om   Prakash   Pathak,

18
Gorelal   Kurmi,   Mahesh   Kurmi   statement   was
obtained   as   told   by   them   and   nothing   was
increased or decreased from my side.”
25. Interestingly   the   story   built   by   the   prosecution   was   that
A­1   had   a   quarrel   with   his   brother   (the   deceased),   sometime
before the commission of the crime, over the non­repayment of
a   sum   of   Rs.250/­   by   the   deceased   to   Ruia   and   that   in   the
quarrel,  A­1  got   injured   and   that   thereafter   all   the  3   accused
attacked the  victim  resulting  in his  death.  A­1 had  no reason
to   take   up   the   cause   of   Ruia   and   go   to   the   extent   of
committing the murder of his own brother. But unfortunately,
the   Trial   Court   has   believed   this   story   on   the   basis   of   the
testimony of DW­1, the mother of both A­1 and the deceased.
All that DW­1 stated in her testimony was that A­1 questioned
the   deceased   as   to   why   he   was   not   returning   the   money   due
and payable to Ruia.  
26. Coming   to   the   testimony   of   PW­9,   projected   as   the   star
witness for the prosecution, the explanation given by the IO for
recording   her   statement   on   03.06.2008,   after   21   days   of   the
occurrence   of   the   crime,   is   unbelievable.   In   any   case,   if   her

19
evidence  is  to   be  accepted,   it  should   be  accepted   in   total.   We
have already extracted one portion of her evidence, where she
has   categorically   admitted   that   Ruia   and   Kailash   were
originally taken into custody and that there were protests from
the people of the caste to which they belonged and that those
people   also   put   pressure   on   the   police   to   give   a   clean   chit   to
Ruia   and   Kailash.   These   admissions   on   the   part   of   PW­9,
made the prosecution case completely untrustworthy.
27. Apart from the fact that the witnesses in whose presence
the   seizure  of  the  weapons   was  allegedly  effected,  had  turned
hostile,   there   was   also   one   more   thing.   There   is   nothing   on
record to show that the blood stains said to have been present
in   those   weapons,   matched   with   the   blood   of   the   deceased.
Unfortunately,   the   High   Court   proceeded  on   a   wrong   premise
that   there   was   scientific   evidence   to   point   to   the   guilt   of   the
accused, merely because as per Exhibit P­25 (FSL Report), the
knife   and   lathis   said   to   have   been   seized   by   the   police,
contained   stains   of   human   blood.   The   prosecution   has   not
established either through the report of FSL or otherwise, that

20
the blood stains contained in the knife and   lathis   were that of
the deceased.
28. We are conscious of the fact that there is a divergence of
views on this aspect. In   Raghav  Prapanna  Tripathi   vs.   The
State Of Uttar Pradesh 2
,   a Constitution Bench of this Court
by   a   majority   held   that,   “… that   it   would   be   far­fetched   to
conclude   from   the   mere   presence   of   blood­stained   earth   that
that  earth was stained with human blood and  that the human
blood was that of the victims…” .   In   Kansa Behera   vs.   State
of   Orissa 3
,   this   Court   acquitted   the   appellant   on   the   ground
that   though   the   Serologist   report   found   the   shirt   and   dhoti
recovered   from   the   possession   of   the   appellant   to   be   stained
with   human   blood,   there   is   no   evidence   to   connect   the   same
with the  blood  of  the deceased. In   Surinder   Singh   vs.   State
of Punjab 4
, the   blood stains found on the knife allegedly used
for   the   commission   of   the   offence,   were   established   to   be
human   blood.   But   this   Court   rejected   the   prosecution   theory
2   AIR 1963 SC 74
3   (1987) 3 SCC 480, 
4   (1989) Supp.(2) SCC 21

21
on   the   ground   that   those   blood   stains   on   the   knife   were   not
shown to be of the same group as the blood of the deceased.  In
Raghunath ,   Ramkishan   &   Ors .   vs.     State   of   Haryana, 5
this Court held that the blood stain, though of a human blood,
is not conclusive evidence to show that it belongs to the blood
group   of   the   deceased.   In   Sattatiya   vs.   State   of
Maharashtra 6
, this Court found the credibility of the evidence
relating  to the recovery of the object used for  the commission
of the crime, substantially dented, on account of the fact that
the   blood   stains,  though   found   to   be  of  human   source,  could
not be linked with the blood of the deceased.
29. In   contrast,   this   Court   held   in   State   of   Rajasthan   vs.
Teja   Ram   and   Others 7
,   that   at   times   the   Serologist   may   fail
to   deduct   the   origin   of   the   blood,   either   because   the   stain   is
too   insufficient   or   because   of   hematological   changes   and
plasmatic   coagulation.   After   referring   to   the   Constitution
Bench   decision   in   Raghav   Prapanna   Tripathi   (supra),   this
5   (2003) 1 SCC 398
6   (2008) 3 SCC 210
7   (1999) 3 SCC 507

22
Court   held   in   Teja   Ram   (supra)   that   it   is   not   as   though   the
circumstances  arising   from  the  recovery  of   the  weapon  would
stand   relegated   to   disutility,   in   all   cases   where   there   was
failure of detecting the origin of the blood. This Court indicated
in   Teja   Ram   (supra)   that,   “…the   effort   of   the   Criminal   Court
should   not   be   to   prowl   for   imaginative   doubts…”   and   that   the
doubts  should   be  of  reasonable  dimension,  which   a   judicially
conscientious mind entertains with some objectivity.
30. The   decision   Teja   Ram   (supra)   was   followed   in   Gura
Singh     vs.   State   of   Rajasthan 8
  and   in   Prabhu   Dayal   vs.
State of Rajasthan 9
.  
31. In   R.   Shaji   vs.    State  of  Kerala 10
, this  Court  took  note
of   almost  all   previous   decisions   starting   from   Prabhu   Babaji
Navle    vs.  State of Bombay 11
  and including those in  Raghav
Prapanna   Tripathi   (supra);   Teja   Ram   (supra),   Gura   Singh
(supra);   John   Pandian   vs.   State 12
;   and   Sunil   Clifford
8   (2001) 2 SCC 205
9   (2018) 8 SCC 127
10   (2013) 14 SCC 266
11   AIR 1956 SC 51
12   (2010) 14 SCC 129

23
Daniel  vs.  State of Punjab 13
  and came to the conclusion that
once   the   recovery   is   made   in   pursuance   of   a   disclosure
statement   made   by   the   accused,   the   matching   or   non­
matching of blood groups loses significance.
32. Therefore, as pointed out by this Court in  Balwan Singh
vs.     State   of   Chhattisgarh 14
,   there   cannot   be   any   fixed
formula   that   the   prosecution   has   to   prove,   or   need   not   prove
that   the   blood   groups   match.   But   the   judicial   conscience   of
the   Court   should   be   satisfied   both   about   the   recovery   and
about the origin of the human blood.  
33. In the case on hand, even PW­1, who allegedly witnessed
the seizure had turned hostile. Right from the beginning there
has   been   an   attempt   on   the   part   of   the   prosecution   to   shield
the   culprits   named   in   the   first   FIR,   on   account   of   political
pressure,   as   admitted   by   PW­14   and   corroborated   by   PW­9,
whom   the   prosecution   considered   to   be   a   star   witness.
Unfortunately,   both   the   Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court
completely overlooked these aspects. 
13   (2012) 11 SCC 205
14   (2019) 7 SCC 781

24
34. It   is   seen   from   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   that   the
accused   were   represented   by   amicus   curiae   either   due   to   the
inability of the accused to engage a counsel or due to the non­
appearance   of   the   counsel   engaged   by   them   at   the   time   of
hearing.   As   a   result,   the   accused   do   not   appear   to   have   had
the best of legal assistance. It is in such type of cases that the
burden   of   the   court   is   very   heavy   and   unfortunately,   the
Sessions   court   and   the   High   court   did   not   discharge   this
burden properly.
35. In   the   light   of   the   above,   we   are   clearly   of   the   view   that
the   investigation   in   this   case   was   carried   out   by   PW­14,   not
with the intention of unearthing the truth, but for burying the
same   fathom   deep,   for   extraneous   considerations   and   that   it
was   designed   to   turn   the   informant   and   her   family   members
as the accused and allow the real culprits named in the FIR to
escape.   Both   the   Sessions   Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court
have completely overlooked some of the important admissions
made by PWs 9 and 14. They have not even taken into account
the   normal   human   conduct.   It   is   unbelievable   that   A­1,   A­2

25
and A­3 caused the death of A­1’s brother due to the failure of
the victim to return an amount of Rs.250/­ due and payable to
Ruia (PW­7) and that thereafter, they deliberately named Ruia
as   the   accused.   It   is   equally   unbelievable   that   one   of   the
persons   who   killed   the   victim,   in   the   presence   of   witnesses,
took the body of the victim to the hospital in an autorickshaw.
The   normal   human   behaviour   in   such   circumstances   will   be
either   to   flee   the   place   of   occurrence   or   to   go   to   the   police
station to surrender, except in cases where they are intelligent
and seasoned criminals. Neither did happen. 
36. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the appeals
deserve   to   be   allowed.     But   before   we   do   that,   we   must   take
note of  the  fact that A­1  has not  come  up on  appeal. Though
Shri   Shreeyash   U.   Lalit,   learned   counsel   for   the   State
submitted   that       A­1’s   case   stands   on   a   completely   different
footing   and   that   therefore,   in   the   absence   of   an   independent
appeal   by   him,   he   cannot   be   granted   any   relief,   we   do   not
agree. This is not a case where we have proceeded on the basis
of   individual   overt   acts   on   the   part   of   A­2   and   A­3   (the

26
appellants­ herein )   to   conclude   that   they   are   entitled   to
acquittal.     This   is   a   case   where   we   have   disbelieved,   in
entirety,   the   story   of   the   prosecution.   Therefore,   to   deny   the
benefit of the said conclusion to A­1 merely on the ground of a
technicality that he is not on appeal would be to close our eyes
to a gross injustice, especially when we are empowered under
Article 142 to do complete justice.
37. Therefore, the appeals filed by the appellants are allowed
and   the   conviction   handed   over   by   the   Sessions   Court   and
confirmed by the High Court as against all the three accused,
including   A­1,   are   set   aside.   All   the   three   accused   shall   be
released   forthwith,   unless   they   are   in   custody   in   relation   to
any other case.
… ..…………....................J.
      (Indira Banerjee)
..…..………......................J
(V. Ramasubramanian)
AUGUST  18, 2021
NEW DELHI.