2021 INSC 0384
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REPORTABLE  	
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA	
 	
C RIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION	 	
 	
C riminal  Appeal No .  884  of 2021  	
Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 4617 of 2021  
 	
 
 
 
Salimbhai Hamidbhai Menon                   …Petitioner  
 
 
Versus   
 
 
Niteshkumar  Maganbhai  Patel & Anr.                               …Respondents  
   
 
 
 	
O R D E R   	
 
 
 
 	
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J  
 
 
1.  This appeal arises from a judgment dated 31 March 2021  of a Single Judge of 
the High Court of Gujarat.   
2.   On 10 October 2010, the appellant and the first responde nt entered into a 
deed of partnership under which a firm by the name of  Calla Associates was 
constituted. The share of the first respondent in the profit / loss is alleged to be 55 
per cent while the share of the appellant ,  45 per  cent .  O n 21  June 2017,  a document

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25.52 crores have  been paid or value has been received;  
(iii)   The  appellant  has received the benefit of the settlements which have been 
arrived at between the parties and lands have been transferred to him ; 
(iv)   On the earlier complaint lodged by the appellant, a ‘B’ s ummary was filed 
by the Gotri Police Station recording that the appellant had not come forth 
to record his statement and the transaction  between the parties appeared 
to be  of a monetary  nature;  
(v)   By Au gust 2019, these parcels  of land were  transferred to the appellant in 
pursuance of the settlements dated 12 March 2018 and 24 December 
2018;  and  
(vi)   The order of the High Court dated 31 March 2021 continued to remain in 
operation  due to the general orders operating during the second wave of 
the pandemic.  
21.   Mr Kanu Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of 
Gujarat has submitted that the impugned order of the High Court refers to the 
submission of the  police report by the APP which was taken on the record and that 
the  police report  has adverted to the forgery of two valuable documents namely ,  the 
deeds  of relinquishment  and dissolution of partnership.  
22.   After the High Court was moved in proceedings under Section 482 of the 
CrPC  for quashing the FIR ,  an order was initially passed on 23 December 2020, 
recording  the statement of Counsel for the first respondent that he was ready and 
willing to offer a settlement . Since Counsel for the parties desired  to explore the

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possibility of a settlement , the proceedings were adjourned to 10 February 2021. 
The  text of the  order of the High Court did not contain any direction restraining the 
arrest of the first respondent . But it appears from the subsequent order dated 9 
March 2021 that an oral  direction was issued by the Single Judge not to arrest the 
first  respondent .  In its order dated 9 March 2021, the High Court  adverted to the 
submission of Counsel for the first respondent that such a direction  was previously 
issued, which was not disputed by the appellant . Since the first respondent was 
arrested on 8 March 2021, he was directed to be released forthwith.  
23.   The procedure followed by the High Court of  issuing an  oral direction 
restraining the arrest of the first respondent  was irregular . If after hearing the part ies 
on 23 December 2020,  the High Court was of the view that an opportunity should be 
granted to Counsel for the appellant and the first respondent to explore the 
possibility of a settlement  and,  on that ground,  an interim prot ection against arrest 
ought t o be granted, a  specific judicial order to that effect was necessary.  Oral 
observations in court are in the course of a judicial discourse. The text of a written 
order is what is binding and enforceable.  Issuing oral directions  (presumably to the 
APP ) restraining arrest ,  does  not form a part of the judicial record and  must be 
eschewed. Absent a judicial order, the investigating officer would have no official 
record emanating from the High Court on the basis of which a stay of arrest is 
enforced. The adm inistration of criminal justice is not a private  matter between the 
complainant and the accused but implicates wider interest s of the State in 
preserving law and order  as well as a societal  interest in the sanctity of the criminal

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justice administration. T hough in a different context, the principle was set down by 
t his Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh  v  State of Gujarat	
1 :   	
“35.  This Court has often emphasized  that in a criminal case 
the fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in 
the hands of the parties, crimes being public wrongs in 
breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect 
the whole community as a community and are harmful  to the 
society in general. The concept of fair trial entails familiar 
triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the 
society and it is the community that acts through the State 
and prosecuting agencies. Interests of society are not to be 
tr eated completely with disdain and as persona non grata. 
Courts have always been considered to have an overriding 
duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of 
justice  — often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold 
the “majesty of the  law”…..” 	
24.   Oral directions of this nature by the High Court are liable to cause serious 
misgivings . Such a procedure is  open to grave abuse.  Most High Courts deal with  
high volumes  of cases. Judicial assessments change with the roster. Absent a 
written rec ord of what  has transpired in the course of a  judicial proceeding, it would 
set a dangerous precedent if the  parties and the investigating officer were expected 
to rely on unrecorded oral observations.  
25.   We are conscious of the fact that in civil proceedings, Counsel appearing on 
behalf of the contesting parties  do in certain cases mutually agree before the  court 
to  an ad interim  arrangement  and agree among themselves to record the terms of 
the  arrangement by an exchange of correspondence  between the advocates. This 
can typically happen when civil disputants are attempting an amicable settlement. 
C ivil cases involv e  disputes between two private contestants . In criminal 
                                                 1   (2004) 4 SCC 158

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proceedings ,  apart from the accused and the complainant, there is a vital interest of 
the State and of society in the prosecution of crime. The procedure which was 
followed by the Single Judge must therefore be eschewed in the future. Judges 
speak through their judgments and orders. The written text is capable of being 
assailed. The element of judicial accountability is lost where oral regimes prevail. 
This would set a dangerous precedent and is unacceptable. Judges, as much as 
public officials over whose conduct they preside, are accountable for their actions.   
26.   The Single Judge, by the impugned order dated 31 March 2021 issued an  ad 
interim  protection against  arrest till the next date of listing. The only reasons which 
are to be found in the order of the Court are  that : 
(i)   Proceedings are pending between the parties; and 
(ii)   Both of them have set the criminal machinery in action.  
27.   Having recorded this, the Single Judge has granted a stay of arrest “to strike” 
a balance between both the parties while  observing that the investigation may 
proceed. How this would strike a  balance between both the parties is unclear  from 
the reasons which have been adduced.  The FIR contains grave allegations 
involving:  
(i)   The interpolation of a deed of relinquishment so  as to cover a  significantly 
larger  number of properties tha n the sole property which was agreed to be 
relinquished;  and  
(ii)   The  fabrication of a  deed of dissolution of partnership.

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28.   The offences which  are alleged to be i nvolved are punishable under the 
provisions of Sections 405, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code. These 
offences  are of a serious nature. The APP had evidently apprised the Single Judge 
of the  police report dated 31 March 2020, to which a reference has been made by 
the Counsel  of the State of Gujarat ,  as noted earlier.  While an order granting a stay 
of arrest in a  proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC   lies within the jurisdiction of 
the High Court ,  the grant of such relief must be after a judicious application of mind,  
wh ich must emerge from the reasons which are recorded by the Judge. The 
formulation of reason s in a judicial order provides  the backbone of public confidence 
in the sanctity of the judicial process. While directing  that the proceedings are to be 
listed on a  future date, the High Court is undoubtedly not expected to deliver a 
detailed judgment elaborat ing upon reasons  why a stay of arrest has been granted. 
But the reasons recorded by the Court must reflect an application of mind to  relevant 
facts and circumsta nces, including:  
(i)   The nature and gravity  of the allegations; 
(ii)   The seriousness of the alleged  offence(s); 
(iii)   The  position of the accused and the likelihood of their availability for 
investigation;  and  
(iv)   The basis on which a stay of arrest has been gran ted till the next date. 
29.   The High Court has not alluded  to the allegations made in the FIR.  This 
constitutes a serious deficiency. The petition before the High Court is for quashing 
the FIR under section 482. While determining whether to grant ad- interim relief in

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such a case, involving a stay of arrest, the High Court must bear in mind the 
parameters for the exercise of the jurisdiction for quashing, which has been invoked. 
The interim order of a stay of arrest is in aid of the final relief which is sought in the 
petition. Hence, the considerations germane to the exercise of the jurisdiction to 
quash an FIR must be present to the mind while deciding whether an interim stay of 
arrest is warranted. What is present to the mind must emerge from the text of the 
order.  In  the recent judgment  in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. v.  State of 
Maharashtra	
2, this Court through one of us (Justice MR Shah) formulated the 
princip les which have to  be borne in mind by the High Court, when its intervention  is 
sought under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash an FIR. After setting out the 
principles, the Court observed:  
“59. Before passing an interim order of staying further 
investigation pending the quashing petition under Section 482 
Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the 
High Court has to apply the very parameters which are 
required to be considered while quashing the proceedings in 
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exercise of 
its inherent jurisdiction, referred to hereinabove.”                         	
 
 
30.   Expressing a caution, which  requires the High Courts to be circumspect in 
interfering with investigation, the Court noted:  	
“60. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of 
process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal 
dispute, only with a view to pressurize the accused. Similarly, 
in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be 
said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint 
may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable 
offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with 
circumsp ection, the High Court may stay the further 
investigation. However, at the same time, there may be 
genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency 	
                                                 2  2021 SCC  OnLine SC 315

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has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the 
cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck 
between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs 
disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the 
statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to 
investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and 
thos e innocent persons against whom the criminal 
proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse 
of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are 
hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court 
would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High 
Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further 
with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under 
the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High 
Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at  this stage the 
further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court 
must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement 
in the criminal administration of justice.”  	
 
This Court observed that while there may be some cases where the initiation of the 
criminal proceedings may be an abuse of law ,  it is in cases of an exceptional nature,  
where it is found that absence of interference would result in a miscarriage of justice,  
th at the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and Article 
2 26  of the Constitution. This Court has disapproved  of interim orders of High Courts 
which grant  stay of arrest  or which  direct that  no coercive steps  must be taken 
agains t the  accused, without assigning reasons. The impugned order of the High 
Court cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the principles which have been 
consistently laid down by this Court and reiterated in the above decision.  
31.   In Parbatbhai Aahir alias Par batbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur  v. State of 
Gujarat	
3, this Court formulated the governing principles to  guide the exercise of 
powers under Section 482 of the CrPC. Speaking for the three judge Bench, one of 	
                                                 3  (2017) 9 SCC 641

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us (Dr DY Chandrachud) observed:  	
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the 
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or 
to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer 
new powers. It only recognise and preserves powers which 
inhere in the High Court.  
(2)   The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to 
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on 
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the 
offender and the victim is not het same as the invocation of 
the  jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. 
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is 
governed by the provisions of  Section 320 CrPC. The power 
to quash under Section 482 is attracted  even if the offence is 
non- compoundable.   
(3)   In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding 
or complain should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction 
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the 
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent 
power.  
(4)   While the i nherent power of the High Court has a wide 
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the 
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of 
any court.  
(5) The decision as to whether a complaint or first information 
report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and 
victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the 
facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive 
elaboration of principles can be formulated.  
(6)   In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and 
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, 
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and 
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving 
mental  depravity or offences such as murder, rape and deceit 
cannot appr opriately be quashed though the victim or the 
family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences 
are, truly  speaking, not private in nature but have a serious 
impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in 
such cases is founded on the overriding element of public 
interest in punishing persons for serious offences.  
(7)   As distinguished from seri ous offences, there may be 
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant 
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing 
insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is 
concerned.

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(8)   Criminal cases involving offences whi ch arise from 
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar 
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in 
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have 
settled the dispute.  
(9)   In such a case, the High Court may quash the  
criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the 
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the 
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression 
and prejudice; and  
(10)  There is yet an exception to the principle set out in 
Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving 
the financial and economic well -being of the State have 
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute 
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified 
in declining  to quash where the offender is involved in an 
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or 
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of 
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the 
balance.”	
              	 	
 
32.   We are conscious of the fact th at in the present case the petition for quashing 
is still pending before the High Court. At the same time, the High Court was moved 
for  the grant of  ad interim relief in a petition for quashing the FIR. The considerations 
which ought to weigh in whether or not to exercise the jurisdiction to quash must be 
present  in the mind of the  Judge while determining whether an interim order should 
be made.  T hat these considerations have been borne in mind can only be evident 
from the reasons, however brief ,  which have been indicated in the order of the High 
Court.  This does not emerge from the impugned order of the High Court.

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33.   We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the 
High Court dated 31 March 2021. The High Court, it is clarified would be at liberty to 
proceed to deal with the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC which is pending 
consideration. T he appeal is disposed of in the above terms.  
34.   Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.  
 
 
 
 
…………...…...….......………………........J.	
 	
            [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]	 	
 
 
 
 
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.
 	
                              [MR  Shah ] 	 	
  	
New Delhi;	 	
August  31, 2021 .