2021 INSC 0387
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5060  OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7556 of 2021]
SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL        ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SANJAY AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5061 OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7557 of 2021]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5062  OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 7558 of 2021]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5063 OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 8870 of 2021]
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. All   these   appeals   take   exception   to   the   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of
Judicature   at   Bombay,   Bench   at   Aurangabad   dated   7 th
  May
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2021,   thereby   allowing   the   writ   petition   being   Writ   Petition
No.14440   of   2019,   filed   by   respondent   No.1­Sanjay   Sudhakar
Jadhav   and   setting   aside   the   Notification   dated   27 th
  November
2019 in respect of Dhule Municipal Corporation, vide which the
Office   of   Mayor   in   Dhule   Municipal   Corporation   for   the   term
commencing from June, 2021 was reserved for Backward Class
category.   The   High   Court   further   directed   the   State   of
Maharashtra to reconsider the reservation process for the office
of   Mayor   in   Dhule   Municipal   Corporation   in   accordance   with
the observations made by it in the judgment. 
3. Appeals  arising   out  of SLP(C)  Nos.  7556 of  2021, 7557 of
2021   and   7558   of   2021   are   filed   by   the   Municipal   Councillors
who belong to the Backward Class category whereas the appeal
arising   out   of   SLP(C)   No.   8870   of   2021   is   filed   by   the   State   of
Maharashtra.  
4. Facts   in   brief   giving   rise   to   filing   of   these   appeals   are   as
under:­
We   will   refer   to   the   facts   in   appeal   arising   out   of   SLP(C)
No.7556   of   2021.   The   respondent   No.1   though   belongs   to   the
Scheduled   Caste   category,   was   elected   as   a   Councillor   to   the
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Dhule   Municipal   Corporation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“said   Corporation”)   from   the   General   category.     By   the
Notification   dated   27 th
  November   2019,   the   Office   of   Mayor   in
the   said   Corporation   was   earmarked   for   Backward   Class   of
Citizens   for   the   next   term   of   two   and   half   years   commencing
from June, 2021. Contending that from the year 2003 onwards,
the   Office   of   Mayor   in   the   said   Corporation   was   reserved   for
Backward   Class   category   on   various   occasions,   but   was   not
reserved   for   Scheduled   Caste   category,   a   petition   came   to   be
filed   by   the   respondent   No.1,   challenging   the   said   reservation
with   a   prayer   for   direction   to   reserve   the   post   of   Mayor   of   the
said   Corporation   for   the   next   term   of   two   and   a   half   years   for
Scheduled Caste category.  The said petition came to be allowed
as aforesaid.  Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.  
5. The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   while   construing
sub­rule   (2)   of   Rule   3   of   the   Maharashtra   Municipal
Corporations   (Reservation   of   Offices   of   Mayors)   Rules,   2006
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “said   Rules”)   and   relying   on   the
judgment of the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held
that since already on two earlier occasions, the Office of Mayor
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of   the   said   Corporation   was   reserved   for   Backward   Class,
reserving  the same again for Backward Class coupled with the
fact that there has been no reservation for the Scheduled Caste
category,   amounted   to   violation   of   rotation   policy.     As   such,   it
remanded   the   matter   to   respondent   No.2­State   for
consideration afresh in accordance with these observations.
6. We   have   heard   Ms.   Meenakshi   Arora,   learned   Senior
Counsel   and   Mr.   Braj   Kishore   Mishra,   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   private   appellants   and   Mr.   Sachin
Patil,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   of
Maharashtra.   We   have   heard   Mr.   Nishant   Ramakantrao
Katneshwarkar,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondent­original writ petitioner.
7. It is the contention of the appellants that the judgment of
the   High   Court   is   rendered   without   considering   the   import   of
Clauses (d) and (e) of sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules.  It
is submitted that out of the 27 total seats of Mayors available in
the State, 1 is reserved for Scheduled Tribes, 3 are reserved for
Scheduled   Castes   and   7   are   reserved   for   Backward   Class   of
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Citizens.     Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   further   submitted
that out of 27 seats, only  9 seats are eligible for reservation of
Scheduled   Tribes   category.     It   is   stated   that   taking   into
consideration   the   fact   that   the   seats   reserved   for   Backward
Class of Citizens are 7 as against 3 for Scheduled Castes, which
is  more   than   twice,  it  is   quite   possible   that  while   applying   the
said Rules, the reservation may be provided for Backward Class
category   on   more   than   one   occasion   and   no   reservation   be
provided for Scheduled Castes even on a single occasion.
8. It   is   stated   on   behalf   of   the   State   that   while   earmarking
the   seats   of   Mayor,   the   State   of   Maharashtra   had   followed   an
appropriate procedure so as to give effect to the said Rules.   It
is   submitted   that,   however,   the   same   has   not   been   taken   into
consideration by the High Court.
9. As   against   this,   Mr.   Katneshwarkar,   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner would submit
that   the   High   Court   has   correctly   applied   the   principle   of
rotation   and   held   that   unless   all   the   categories   got
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representation   in   a   particular   Municipal   Corporation,   the
reservation for a particular category cannot be repeated.
10. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   from   2003   to   2017,   the   Office   of
Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class
category for two terms, out of the total 7 terms.  It is also not in
dispute   that   there   was   no   reservation   provided   for   the
Scheduled Castes category even once.  We will have to consider
the rival submissions in the backdrop of this factual scenario.  
11. It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   Article   243T   of   the
Constitution of India which reads thus:­
“ 243T. Reservation of seats
(1)   Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and
the   number   of   seats   so   reserved   shall   bear,   as
nearly   as   may   be,   the   same   proportion   to   the   total
number of seats to be filled by direct election in that
Municipality   as   the   population   of   the   Scheduled
Castes   in   the   Municipal   area   or   of   the   Scheduled
Tribes   in   the   Municipal   area   bears   to   the   total
population   of   that   area   and   such   seats   may   be
allotted   by   rotation   to   different   constituencies   in   a
Municipality.
(2)   Not   less   than   one   third   of   the   total   number   of
seats reserved under clause (1) shall be reserved for
women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the
case may be, the Scheduled Tribes.
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(3)   Not less than one third (including the number of
seats   reserved   for   women   belonging   to   the
Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes)   of   the
total   number   of   seats   to   be   filled   by   direct   election
in   every   Municipality   shall   be   reserved   for   women
and   such   seats   may   be   allotted   by   rotation   to
different constituencies in a Municipality.
(4)   The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities
shall   be   reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the
Scheduled   Tribes   and   women   in   such   manner   as
the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide.
(5)   The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2)
and the reservation of offices of Chairpersons (other
than   the   reservation   for   women)   under   clause   (4)
shall   cease   to   have   effect   on   the   expiration   of   the
period specified in Article 334.
(6)   Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature
of a State from making any provision for reservation
of   seats   in   any   Municipality   or   offices   of
Chairpersons   in   the   Municipalities   in   favour   of
backward class of citizens.”
12. Perusal   of   Clause   (1)   of   Article   243T   would   reveal   that   it
mandates   the   State   to   reserve   seats   for   Scheduled   Castes   and
Scheduled   Tribes   in   every   Municipality.     It   further   mandates
that   the   number   of   seats   so   reserved   shall   bear,   as   nearly   as
may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be
filled by direct election in the Municipality as the population of
the Scheduled Castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled
Tribes   in   the   Municipal   area   bears   to   the   total   population   of
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that area.   It further mandates that such seats may be allotted
by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.  Clause
(2) thereof provides that not less than 1/3 rd
 of the total number
of seats reserved under Clause (1) shall be reserved for women
belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled Tribes.   Clause (3) provides that not less than 1/3 rd
(including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to
the   Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes)   of   the   total
number of seats to be filled by direct election shall be reserved
for   women   and   such   seats   may   be   allotted   by   rotation   to
different   constituencies   in   a   Municipality.     Clause   (4)   thereof
provides   that   the   offices   of   the   Chairpersons   in   the
Municipalities   shall   be   reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the
Scheduled   Tribes   and   women   in   such   manner   as   the
Legislature of a State  may, by  law, provide.   Clause (6) thereof
enables   the   Legislature   of   the   State   to   make   provision   for
reservation   of   seats   in   any   Municipality   or   offices   of
Chairpersons in the Municipalities in favour of Backward Class
of Citizens.
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13. Section   19   of   the   Maharashtra   Municipal   Corporations
Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) provides for
election   of   Mayor   and   Deputy   Mayor   from   amongst   the
Councillors   in   the   Corporation.   It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to
Section 19 (1A) of the said Act:­
“19. Mayor and Deputy Mayor
(1) …
(1A) There   shall   be   reservation   for   the   office   of   the
Mayor   in   the   Corporation,   by   rotation,   for   the
Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled   Tribes,   women
and   the   Backward   Class   of   citizens,   in   the
prescribed manner.”
14. It could thus be seen that sub­section (1A) of Section 19 of
the   said   Act   provides   that   there   shall   be   reservation   for   the
office   of   the   Mayor   in   the   Corporation,   by   rotation,   for   the
Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled   Tribes,   Women   and   the
Backward Class of Citizens, in the prescribed manner.  
15. The  manner   of  reservation   has   been   provided   under   Rule
3 of the said Rules which reads thus:­
“3.  Reservation of offices for the election of Mayor ­ (1)
The   State   Government   shall,   by   notification   in   the
Official   Gazette ,   specify   the   number   of   offices   of
Mayors   in   the   Municipal   Corporations   in   the   State
to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes,   the   category   of   Backward   Class   of   Citizens
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and   Women   (including   the   women   belonging   to   the
category   of   Backward   Class   of   Citizens)   on   the
following principles:­
(a)   The   number   of   offices   of   Mayors   to   be   so
reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   Scheduled
Tribes   shall   bear,   as   nearly   as   may   be,   the   same
proportion   to   the   number   of   such   offices   in   the
Corporations   in   the   State   as   the   population   of   the
Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes   in   the
Municipal   Corporation   areas   bears   to   the   total
population of all Municipal Corporation areas: 
Provided that, such office of Mayor may not be
so   reserved,   if   the   number   of   Councillors   to   be
elected   at   ward   elections   from   the   category   of   the
Scheduled   Castes   or   Scheduled   Tribes   is   less   than
three: 
Provided   further   that,   while   specifying   such
reservation one­third of the total number of seats so
reserved shall  be reserved  for   the women  belonging
to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled Tribes: 
Provided also that, in a Municipal Corporation,
where   only   one   office   of   the   Councillor   is   reserved
for the Scheduled Caste or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled   Tribes,   then   it   shall   not   be   necessary   to
reserve   the   office   for   women   belonging   to   the
Scheduled   Castes   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the
Scheduled Tribes; 
(b) As nearly as may be, twenty­seven per cent
of the total number of offices of Mayors in the State
shall be reserved for the category of Backward Class
of Citizens: 
Provided   that,   one­third   of   the   offices   so
reserved   shall   be   reserved   for   Women   belonging   to
the category of Backward Class of Citizens; 
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(c)   One­third   of   the   total   number   of   offices   of
Mayors in the State (including the number of offices
reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled
Tribes   and   the   category   of   Backward   Class   of
Citizens) shall be reserved for women. 
(2) The State Government shall,­
(a)   By   notification   in   the   Official   Gazette ,   allot
by   draw   of   lots,   the   offices   of   the   Mayors   to   be
reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled
Tribes,   the   category   of   Backward   Class   of   Citizens
and Women,  on the principles specified in sub­rule
(1). 
(b) Ensure that, at any given point of time, the
number   of   offices   of   Mayors,   reserved   for   the
Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled   Tribes,   the
category of Backward Class of Citizens and Women
shall   not   be   less   than   the   number   determined   in
accordance with the provisions of sub­rule (1). 
(c) The lots in respect of women belonging to a
particular   category   shall   be   drawn   only   among   the
offices of Mayors reserved for such category. 
(d)   While   drawing   lots,   the   office   of   Mayor
reserved for such category in the earlier years shall
be   excluded   from   the   draw   of   lots   for   those
categories; 
(e) The offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be
rotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to
such Corporation, in which no reservation has been
made in the previous terms until such reservations
are given by rotation to each category.”
16. It   is   clear   that   sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   3   of   the   said   Rules
provides   that   the   Government   shall,   by   notification   in   the
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Official  Gazette,  specify  the  number  of  offices  of  Mayors  in  the
Municipal   Corporations   in   the   State   to   be   reserved   for   the
Scheduled   Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes,   Backward   Class   of
Citizens   and   Women   (including   the   women   belonging   to   the
category of Backward Class of Citizens).   Clause (a) of sub­rule
(1)   of   Rule   3   of   the   said   Rules   provides   that   the   number   of
offices   of   Mayors   to   be   so   reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes
and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same
proportion to the number of such offices in the Corporations in
the   State   as   the   population   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   the
Scheduled   Tribes   in   the   Municipal   Corporation   areas   bears   to
the   total   population   of   all   Municipal   Corporation   areas.
Obviously,   the   said   provision   is   in   tune   with   Clause   (1)   of
Article   243T   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     The   first   proviso
thereof   provides   that   such   office   of   Mayor   may   not   be   so
reserved,   if   the   number   of   Councillors   to   be   elected   at   ward
elections   from   the   category   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   or
Scheduled   Tribes   is   less   than   3.     The   second   proviso   provides
that   while   specifying   such   reservation,   1/3 rd
  of   the   total
number   of   seats   so   reserved   shall   be   reserved   for   the   women
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belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the
Scheduled   Tribes.     It   further   provides   that   in   a   Municipal
Corporation, where only one office of the Councillor is reserved
for the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled
Tribes,   then   it   shall   not   be   necessary   to   reserve   the   office   for
women belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may
be, the Scheduled Tribes.
17. Clause   (b)   of   sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   3   of   the   said   Rules
provides that as nearly as may be, 27% of the total number  of
offices of Mayors in the State shall be reserved for the category
of   Backward   Class   of   Citizens.     The   proviso   thereof   provides
that 1/3 rd
 of the offices so reserved shall be reserved for Women
belonging to the category of Backward Class of Citizens.  Clause
(c) of sub­rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that 1/3 rd
of the total number  of offices of Mayors in the State (including
the   number   of   offices   reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the
Scheduled   Tribes   and   the   category   of   Backward   Class   of
Citizens) shall be reserved for women.
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18. Sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules would be the most
relevant   one   inasmuch   as   it   is   that   provision   which   falls   for
consideration in the present matter.  Clause (a) thereof provides
that   by   notification   in   the   Official   Gazette,   the   State
Government shall allot by draw of lots, the offices of the Mayors
to be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes,
the   Backward   Class   of   Citizens   and   Women,   on   the   principles
specified   in   sub­rule(1).     Clause   (b)   thereof   provides   that   the
State Government shall ensure that, at any given point of time,
the   number   of   offices   of   Mayors,   reserved   for   the   Scheduled
Castes,   the   Scheduled   Tribes,   the   Backward   Class   of   Citizens
and   Women   shall   not   be   less   than   the   number   determined   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   sub­rule   (1).     Clause   (c)
provides   that   the   lots   in   respect   of   women   belonging   to   a
particular   category   shall   be   drawn   only   among   the   offices   of
Mayors   reserved   for   such   category.     Clause   (d)   provides   that
while   drawing   lots,   the   office   of   Mayors   reserved   for   such
category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of
lots for those categories.   Clause (e) provides that the offices of
Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated in the subsequent terms
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of  office  of   Mayor   to   such  Corporation  in   which   no  reservation
has   been   made   in   the   previous   terms   until   such   reservations
are given by rotation to each category.
19. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which is in tune
with   Section   19(1A)   of   the   said   Act   and   in   turn   with   the
constitutional   provision   under   Article   243T,   is   to   provide
reservation   to   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   Scheduled   Tribes   in
proportion to the total population of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled   Tribes   in   the   Municipal   Corporation   areas.     Insofar
as the Backward Class is concerned, the reservation provided is
fixed at 27% of the total number of offices of Mayors.   1/3 rd
  of
the total number of posts shall be reserved for women category
including   the   one   belonging   to   Scheduled   Castes,   Scheduled
Tribes   and   Backward   Class   of   Citizens.     Clause   (a)   of   sub­
rule(2)   of   Rule   3   of   the   said   Rules   mandates   the   State
Government   to   allot   by   draw   of   lots,   the   offices   of   Mayors   for
the   Scheduled   Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes,   Backward   Class   of
Citizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub­rule (1).
Clause (b) of sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates
the State Government to ensure that, at any given point of time,
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the   number   of   offices   of   Mayors,   reserved   for   the   said
categories,   shall   not   be   less   than   the   number   determined   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   sub­rule(1).     Clause   (c)   of
sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the lots in
respect   of   women   belonging   to   a   particular   category   shall   be
drawn   only   among   the   offices   of   Mayors   reserved   for   such
category.   Clause (d) of sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules
provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved
for such category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the
draw   of   lots   for   those   categories.     Clause   (e)   of   sub­rule   (2)   of
Rule 3 of the said Rules requires that the offices of Mayors to be
reserved,   shall   be   rotated   in   the   subsequent   terms   of   office   of
Mayor   to   such   Corporation,   in   which   no   reservation   has   been
made in the previous terms until such reservations are given by
rotation to each category.
20. The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub­rule (2)
of Rule 3 of the said Rules, has held that until the reservations
are given by rotation to each category, the reservation cannot be
provided   to   a   category   for   which   reservation   was   already
provided.     While   doing   so,   the   High   Court   has   relied   on   the
16

judgment   of   the   Karnataka   High   Court   in   M.   Abdul   Azeez   v.
State   of   Karnataka   and   Others 1
.     We   will   have   to   examine
the correctness of the said view.
21. The   procedure   adopted   for   draw   of   lots   followed   by   the
State was explained by filing an affidavit before the High Court
by   Smt.   Alice   Sufi   Pore,   Regional   Deputy   Director,   Municipal
Administration,   Aurangabad.     It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to
paragraphs (5) to (8) of the said affidavit:­ 
“ 5. The  principles  and  manner   for  the  reservation
is mentioned  in  the  Rule  3  (1)  and   procedure  to   be
followed   by   the   State   Government   is   mentioned   in
Rule   3   (2)   of   Maharashtra   Municipal   Corporations
(Reservation of Offices of Mayor) Rules 2006. As per
the   provisions   broadly   the   office   of   the   Mayor   of
Corporations   are   reserved   in   the   proportion
mentioned as follows:­
(a)  The number  of  offices of  the  Mayor   to  be
so reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes   shall   bear,   as   nearly   as   maybe   the   same
proportion to the total number of such offices in the
Corporations   in   the   State   as   the   population   of   the
Scheduled   Castes   and   Scheduled   tribes   in   the
Municipal   Corporation   areas   bears   to   the   total
population of all the Municipal Corporation Areas.
(b)  As   nearly   as   may   be,   27%   of   the   total
number of offices of the Mayors in the State shall be
reserved for the Backward class of Citizen.
1   Writ Petition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014
17

c)  One third of the total number of offices of
Mayors (including the number of offices reserved for
women belonging to the category of backward Class
of Citizen) in the Corporations in the State shall be
reserved for women.
6.  While   drawing   the   lots   for   the   reservation   of
the office of the Mayors of all 27 Corporations in the
state   on   13.11.2019   the   above   proportion
mentioned   in   the   concern   Rules   is   followed   in
totality   and   the   offices   of   Mayors   reserved   for
different classes is as follows:­
Sr.
No. Social
Class The posts needs to allot as
per rule Remarks
General  Women Total 
1. Scheduled
Tribes 1 0 1 As per the rules 
in proportion to 
the total 
population.  As 
per third proviso
of rule 3(1)(a).  
2. Scheduled
Castes 1 2 3 As per the rules 
in proportion to 
the total 
population.
3. Backward
class   of
Citizens 3 4 7 As per the rules 
27% of total 
posts.
4. General
women 0 8 8 One Half of the 
unreserved 
posts as per 
rules.
5. Open 8  0 8
Total  13 14 27
7.  As  per   Rule  3  (2)  (d)  while   allotting  the   offices
of the Mayor for persons belonging to the Scheduled
Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes   and   the   Backward   Class
of   Citizens   (including   women   belonging   to   the   said
18

categories) the offices of the Mayor reserved for any
of   the   said   categories   in   the   earlier   years   shall   be
excluded   Rule   3   (2)   (e)   indicates   the   policy   of
rotation has to be followed while allotting the offices
of Mayor.
8.  It is humbly submitted that the provisions and
the   essence   of   the   rules   of   reservation   is   followed
totally considering the total number of Corporations
and   the   reservations   in   earlier   years   in   27
Corporations   in   the   State.   The   approved   procedure
to   follow   the   above   rules   is   adopted   in   the   draw   of
lots dated 13.11.2019. The approved minutes of the
draw   of   lots   dated   13.11.2019   is   annexed   herewith
and   marked   as   Exhibit   ‘A’.   A   copy   of   the   factual
position of earlier Reservation in Annexed here with
and   marked   as   Exhibit   ‘B’.   As   per   the   factual
position   of   earlier   reservation   and   the   number   of
posts   mandatorily   needs   to   be   reserved   for   various
class the following approved principle is followed:­
a)  For   Schedule   Tribes   1   posts   of   Mayor
needs   to   be   mandatorily   reserved   and   out   of   27
Corporations   there   are   9   Corporations   where   the
number   of   Concillors   to  be   elected   at   ward   election
from   the   said   category   is   not   less   than   3.   Out   of
those   9   corporation   4   Corporations   were   reserved
for   schedule   tribes   in   earlier   years.   And   those   4
corporations   are   excluded   as   their   are   5
corporations   available   for   draw   of   lots,   which   were
not previously reserved for scheduled tribes. And in
the draw of lots dated 163.11.2019 by following the
laid   procedure   out   of   those   5   Corporations   1
corporation is reserved for schedule Tribe [sic].
b)  For   Schedule   Castes   3   posts   of   Mayor
needs   to   be   mandatorily   reserved   and   out   of   27
Corporation   12   corporations   were   reserved   for
schedule   Castes   in   earlier   years.   Those   12
19

Corporations   and   1   corporation   (vasi­Virar
Corporation) which was reserved for schedule tribes
in   the   first   draw   of   this   draw   of   lots   dated
13.11.2019   are   excluded,   So   there   are   14
Corporations   available,   which   were   not   previously
reserved   for   schedule   caste.   In   para   no.4   of   this
minutes   the   details   of   draw   of   lots   for   scheduled
caste   is   mentioned.   And   it   is   clear   that   Dhule
Corporation   was   also   considered   among   those   14
corporations in the draw for schedule caste. Though
it   is   a   draw   of   lots   out   of   those   14   corporations   3
corporations   (Mira­   Bhayender,   Ahmednagar   and
Parbhani   Corporation)   got   reserved   for   Schedule
caste [sic].
c)  For backward Class of Citizens 7 posts of
Mayor   needs   to   be   mandatorily   reserved   and   it   is
clearly   mentioned   that   out   of   27   Corporations   26
Corporations   excluding   newly   created   Panvel
Corporation   were   reserved   for   Backward   Class   of
Citizens   in   earlier   years.   As   26   Corporations   were
reserved   for   backward   Class   of   Citizens   in   earlier
years,   for   the   draw   of   lots   dated   13.11.2019   even
the   minimum   required   7   Corporations   were   not
available.   Which   were   not   previously   reserved   for
backward   Class   of   Citizens.   And   considering   this
fact   and   the   provisions   in   the   Act   and   Rules   the   7
Corporations   which   were   reserved   for   backward
Class   of   Citizens   in   the   earlier   years,   i.e.
immediately   preceding   term   were   excluded   in   the
draw of lots dated 13.11.2019. 
By   following   the   laid   procedure   the   4
Corporations   which   are   reserved   in   the   1 st
  and   2 nd
draws   for   Scheduled   Tribes   (1   Corporation)   and
scheduled   castes   (3   Corporations)   in   the   current
draw of lots and 7 corporations which were reserved
for   backward   Class   of   Citizens   in   the   immediately
preceding   term   are   excluded   and   the   remaining
corporations   including   Dhule   Corporation   are
20

considered   for   this   draw   and   in   the   draw   the   7
Corporations   are   reserved   for   backward   class   of
Citizens.” 
22. It   could   thus   be   seen   from   paragraph   (8)   of   the   said
affidavit   that   insofar   as   Scheduled   Castes   are   concerned,   3
posts of Mayor need to be mandatorily reserved. It could further
be   seen   that   out   of   27   Corporations,   12   Corporations   were
reserved for Scheduled Castes in earlier years.  It further states
that   those   12   Corporations   and   1   Corporation   (Vasai­Virar
Corporation)   which   was   reserved   for   Scheduled   Tribes   in   the
first draw of lots dated 13 th
  November 2019 were excluded.   As
such,   there   are   14   Corporations   available,   which   were   not
previously   reserved   for   Scheduled   Castes.     It   is   further   clear
that   when   draw   of   lots   was   done   for   the   Scheduled   Castes
category,   amongst   the   other   eligible   Corporations,   Dhule
Municipal   Corporation   was   also   considered.     However,   in   the
said   draw   of   lots,   3   Corporations   i.e.   Mira­Bhayandar,
Ahmednagar  and  Parbhani Municipal Corporation  got  reserved
for Scheduled Castes.
23. Insofar as Backward Class is concerned, it is stated that 7
posts   of   Mayor   need   to   be   mandatorily   reserved.     Out   of   27
21

Corporations,   26   Corporations   excluding   the   newly   created
Panvel   Corporation   were   reserved   for   Backward   Class   of
Citizens   in   the   earlier   years.     It   is   stated   that   since   26
Corporations   were   reserved   for   Backward   Class   of   Citizens,
even   the   minimum   required   7   Corporations   were   not   available
in   the   draw   in   question.   As   such,   7   Corporations   which   were
reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years i.e.
immediately preceding term, were excluded in the draw of lots.
So   also,   4   Corporations   which   got   reserved   for   Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the first and second draw, were
excluded.   As such, the draw of lots was done from the pool of
16 Corporations after excluding the 7 Corporations which were
reserved   for   Backward   Class   of   Citizens   in   the   immediately
preceding term and the 4 Corporations which were reserved for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
24. We   have   no   hesitation   in   observing   that   sub­rule   (2)   of
Rule   3   of   the   said   Rules   has   not   been   happily   worded.     On   a
plain   reading,   various   clauses   in   the   sub­rule   are   capable   of
being   interpreted   in   a   manner   that   there   are   inconsistencies
and at times, conflict amongst them.   We will have to therefore
22

examine   the   legal   position   with   the   aid   of   principles   of
interpretation as laid down by this Court in such situations.
25. In   Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras and
Others 2
, this Court observed thus:­  
“15.   No   canon   of   statutory   construction   is   more
firmly   established   than   that   the   statute   must   be
read   as   a   whole.   This   is   a   general   rule   of
construction applicable to all statutes alike which is
spoken   of   as   construction   ex   visceribus   actus .   This
rule   of   statutory   construction   is   so   firmly
established that it is variously styled as “elementary
rule”   (see   Attorney   General   v.   Bastow   [(1957)   1   All
ER   497]   )   and   as   a   “settled   rule”   (see   Poppatlal
Shah   v.   State   of   Madras   [AIR   1953   SC   274   :   1953
SCR   667]   ).   The   only   recognised   exception   to   this
well­laid   principle   is   that   it   cannot   be   called   in   aid
to   alter   the   meaning   of   what   is   of   itself   clear   and
explicit.   Lord   Coke   laid   down   that:   “it   is   the   most
natural   and   genuine   exposition   of   a   statute,   to
construe one part of a statute by another part of the
same   statute,   for   that   best   expresseth   meaning   of
the   makers”   (Quoted   with   approval   in   Punjab
Beverages   Pvt.   Ltd.   v.   Suresh   Chand   [(1978)   2   SCC
144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370]).”
26. In   Balasinor   Nagrik   Cooperative   Bank   Limited   v.
Babubhai   Shankerlal   Pandya   and   Others 3
,   this   Court
observed thus:­  
“4.   …..It is an elementary  rule that construction of
a section is to be made of all parts together. It is not
2   (1985) 3 SCC 103
3   (1987) 1 SCC 606
23

permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle
that the statute must be read as a whole is equally
applicable to different parts of the same section……”
27. Again   in   the   case   of   Mohan   Kumar   Singhania   and
Others   v.   Union   of   India   and   Others 4
,   this   Court   observed
thus:­  
“67.   We think, it is not necessary to proliferate this
judgment by citing all the judgments and extracting
the  textual   passages  from  the  various  textbooks  on
the principles of Interpretation of Statutes. However,
it will suffice to say that while interpreting a statute
the   consideration   of   inconvenience   and   hardships
should   be   avoided   and   that   when   the   language   is
clear and explicit and the words used are plain and
unambiguous,   we   are   bound   to   construe   them   in
their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses
of   the   Act   or   Rules   as   the   case   may   be,   so   far   as
possible,   to   make   a   consistent   enactment   of   the
whole statute or series of statutes/rules/regulations
relating   to   the   subject   matter,   Added   to   this,   in
construing a statute, the Court has to ascertain the
intention   of   the   law   making   authority   in   the
backdrop   of   the   dominant   purpose   and   the
underlying   intendment   of   the   said   statute   and   that
every   statute   is   to   be   interpreted   without   any
violence   to   its   language   and   applied   as   far   as   its
explicit   language   admits   consistent   with   the
established rule of interpretation.”
28. In   Sultana   Begum   v.   Prem   Chand   Jain 5
,   this   Court
observed thus:­
4   1992 Supp (1) SCC 594
5   (1997) 1 SCC 373
24

“15.   On   a   conspectus   of   the   case­law   indicated
above,   the   following   principles   are   clearly
discernible:
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head­
on   clash   between   two   sections   of   the   Act   and
to  construe  the   provisions   which  appear  to  be
in   conflict   with   each   other   in   such   a   manner
as to harmonise them.
(2)   The   provisions   of   one   section   of   a   statute
cannot   be   used   to   defeat   the   other   provisions
unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it
impossible   to   effect   reconciliation   between
them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts
all the time that when there are two conflicting
provisions   in   an   Act,   which   cannot   be
reconciled   with   each   other,   they   should   be   so
interpreted   that,   if   possible,   effect   should   be
given to both.   This is the essence of the rule of
“harmonious construction”.
(4)   The   courts   have   also   to   keep   in   mind   that
an   interpretation   which   reduces   one   of   the
provisions   as   a   “dead   letter”   or   “useless
lumber” is not harmonious construction.
(5)   To   harmonise   is   not   to   destroy   any
statutory provision or to render it otiose.”
29. In   Jagdish   Singh   v.   Lt.   Governor,   Delhi   and   Others 6
,
this Court observed thus:­
“7.   ….It   is   a   cardinal   principle   of   construction  of  a
statute   or   the   statutory   rule   that   efforts   should   be
made in construing the different provisions, so that,
each provision will have its play and in the event of
any   conflict   a   harmonious   construction   should   be
given.   Further   a   statute   or   a  rule  made  thereunder
should be read as a whole and one provision should
6   (1997) 4 SCC 435
25

be   construed   with   reference   to   the   other   provision
so   as   to   make   the   rule   consistent   and   any
construction   which   would   bring   any   inconsistency
or repugnancy between one provision and the other
should   be   avoided.   One   rule   cannot   be   used   to
defeat   another   rule   in   the   same   rules   unless   it   is
impossible   to   effect   harmonisation   between   them.
The   well­known   principle   of   harmonious
construction is that effect should be given to all the
provisions,   and   therefore,   this   Court   has   held   in
several   cases   that   a   construction   that   reduces   one
of   the   provisions   to   a   “dead   letter”   is   not   a
harmonious   construction   as   one   part   is   being
destroyed   and   consequently   court   should   avoid
such a construction…..”
30. In   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   v.   Hindustan   Bulk
Carriers 7
, this Court observed thus:­  
“16.   The courts will have to reject that construction
which   will   defeat   the   plain   intention   of   the
legislature   even   though   there   may   be   some
inexactitude   in   the   language   used.
(See   Salmon   v.   Duncombe   [(1886)   11   AC   627   :   55
LJPC   69   :   55   LT   446   (PC)]   AC   at   p.
634,   Curtis   v.   Stovin   [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB
174   :   60   LT   772   (CA)]   referred   to   in   S.   Teja   Singh
case   [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)
17.   If the choice is between two interpretations, the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest
purpose   of   the   legislation,   we   should   avoid   a
construction   which   would   reduce   the   legislation   to
futility,   and   should   rather   accept   the   bolder
construction,   based   on   the   view   that   Parliament
would   legislate   only   for   the   purpose   of   bringing
7   (2003) 3 SCC 57
26

about   an   effective   result.   (See   Nokes   v.   Doncaster
Amalgamated  Collieries   [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940
AC 1014 : 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred
to  in   Pye   v.   Minister  for  Lands  for  NSW   [(1954)  3  All
ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles
indicated   in   the   said   cases   were   reiterated   by   this
Court   in   Mohan   Kumar   Singhania   v.   Union   of
India   [1992   Supp   (1)   SCC   594   :   1992   SCC   (L&S)
455 : (1992) 19 ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1] .
18.   The   statute   must   be   read   as   a   whole   and   one
provision   of   the   Act   should   be   construed   with
reference   to   other   provisions   in   the  same   Act   so   as
to   make   a   consistent   enactment   of   the   whole
statute.
19.   The   court   must   ascertain   the   intention   of   the
legislature   by   directing   its   attention   not   merely   to
the   clauses   to   be   construed   but   to   the   entire
statute; it must compare the clause with other parts
of the law and the setting in which the clause to be
interpreted   occurs.   (See   R.S.   Raghunath   v.   State   of
Karnataka   [(1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286
:   (1992)   19   ATC   507   :   AIR   1992   SC   81]   .)   Such   a
construction   has   the   merit   of   avoiding   any
inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section
or   between   two   different   sections   or   provisions   of
the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid
a   head­on   clash   between   two   sections   of   the   same
Act. (See   Sultana Begum   v.   Prem Chand Jain   [(1997)
1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006] .)
20.   Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done
to   construe   the   provisions   which   appear   to   conflict
so   that   they   harmonise.   It   should   not   be   lightly
assumed   that   Parliament   had   given   with   one   hand
what it took away with the other.
21.   The   provisions   of   one   section   of   the   statute
cannot be used to  defeat those  of  another  unless it
is   impossible   to   effect   reconciliation   between   them.
27

Thus   a   construction   that   reduces   one   of   the
provisions   to   a   “useless   lumber”   or   “dead   letter”   is
not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not
to destroy.”
31. It could thus be seen that it is more than well settled that
it   is   the   duty   of   the   Court   to   construe   the   Statute   as   a   whole
and   that   one   provision   of   the   Act   has   to   be   construed   with
reference   to   other   provisions   so   as   to   make   a   consistent
enactment  of  the  whole  Statute.    It  is  the  duty   of  the  Court  to
avoid   a   head­on   clash   between   two   sections   and   construe   the
provisions   which   appear   to   be   in   conflict   with   each   other   in
such a manner so as to harmonise them.   It is further equally
settled   that   while   interpreting   a   particular   statutory   provision,
it should not result  into  making  the other  provision  a  “useless
lumber” or a “dead letter”. While construing the provisions, the
Court   will   have   to   ascertain   the   intention   of   the   law­making
authority   in   the   backdrop   of   dominant   purpose   and   the
underlying intendment of the Statute.
32. In   the   light   of   these   guiding   principles,   we   will   have   to
construe   the   provisions   that   fall   for   consideration.
28

Undisputedly, the said Rules are mechanism for giving effect to
the   constitutional   mandate   under   Article   243T   of   the
Constitution of providing reservation for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled   Tribes   and   the   enabling   provision   for   providing
reservation for Backward Class of Citizens in proportion to their
population.     As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   the   said   Rules
have   been   prescribed   so   as   to   provide   a   procedure   for   the
reservation of the office of Mayor in the Corporation by rotation
for   the   Scheduled   Castes,   the   Scheduled   Tribes,   Women   and
the Backward Class of Citizens as mandated under Section 19
(1A) of the said Act.   It could thus be seen that the intent and
the dominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is to provide
reservation   to   Scheduled   Castes,   Scheduled   Tribes,   Backward
Class   of  Citizens  and  Women   and   further   to   ensure   that   there
is   no   repetition   of   reservation   of   a   particular   category   in   a
particular Corporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant
purpose and the legislative intent of the said Rules is to provide
reservation in proportion of the population of such categories in
the   Municipal   areas   and   also   to   ensure   that   while   all   the
eligible   Corporations   get   reservation   at   some   point   of   time   for
29

the   different   categories,   at   the   same   time   there   would   be   no
repetition   of   reservation   until   the   rotation   is   complete.
However,   while   doing   so,   the   number   of   seats   reserved   for   a
particular   category   also   cannot   be   ignored.   As   already   pointed
out   hereinabove,   the   total   number   of   seats   reserved   for
Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class of citizens,
they are 7.   Sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules prescribes
the manner in which the seats are to be allotted to be reserved
for   various   categories   including   women.   Clause   (a)   thereof
provides   that   it   shall   be   done   by   notification   in   the   Official
Gazette by allotment of draw of lots.  Clause (d) thereof provides
that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such
category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of
lots   for   those   categories.     Clause   (e)   thereof   provides   that   the
offices   of   Mayors   to   be   reserved   shall   be   rotated   in   the
subsequent   terms   of   office   of   Mayor   to   such   Corporation,   in
which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until
such reservations are given by rotation to each category.
33. No   doubt,   that   at   the   first   blush,   an   isolated   reading   of
clause (e) is capable of being interpreted in a manner that until
30

reservation   is   provided   for   each   category   by   rotation,   the   said
office cannot be reserved for a category for which it was already
reserved.   However,  if  the  Rules  along   with   Article  243T   of  the
Constitution   and   Section   19(1A)   of   the   said   Act   are   read   as   a
whole,   then   the   dominant   purpose   behind   the   said   Rules
appears   to   be   that   the   reservation   as   mandated   in   the
Constitution,   should   be   provided   for   offices   of   Mayors   in   the
Corporations.     While   doing   so,   the   reservation   has   to   be
provided   by   a   draw   of   lots.     It   has   to   be   ensured   that   at   any
given point of time, the number of offices of Mayors reserved for
such categories should not be less than the number determined
in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   3   of
the said Rules.   Clause (d) of sub­rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said
Rules   also   provides   that   while   drawing   lots,   the   offices   of
Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years, shall be
excluded   from   the   draw   of   lots   for   those   categories.     The
purpose   appears   to   ensure   that   the   reservation   is   not   thrust
upon   a   particular   Corporation   again   and   again   and   all   the
Corporations,   at   some   point   of   time,   will   have   the   office   of
Mayor   reserved   for   particular   category   in   accordance   with   the
31

said Rules.   The office of Mayor can be reserved for  Scheduled
Tribes in only 9 Corporations whereas all the Corporations are
eligible   for   reservation   for   Scheduled   Castes   and   Backward
Class   of   Citizens.     However,   taking   into   consideration   the   fact
that   the   number   of   seats   reserved   for   Scheduled   Castes   are   3
whereas   for   Backward   Class   of   Citizens,   they   are   7   i.e.   more
than twice,  it is quite probable that the post of Mayor could be
reserved   for   two   earlier   terms   for   Backward   Class   of   Citizens
and   whereas   no   reservation   is   provided   for   Scheduled   Castes.
We   find   that   a   harmonious   construction   of   the   said   Rules
would   not   lead   to   a   conclusion   that   the   procedure   as   followed
by the State Government in allotting the reservation by draw of
lots,   would   be   said   to   be   inconsistent   with   the   scheme   of   the
said   Rules.     As   has   been   explained   in   the   affidavit   filed   before
the   High   Court   by   Smt.   Alice   Sufi   Pore,   after   excluding   12
Corporations   which   are   already   reserved   for   Scheduled   Castes
in   the   earlier   years   and   the   one   which   was   reserved   for
Scheduled   Tribes   in   the   first   draw   of   lots,   there   were   14
Corporations   available   including   the   Dhule   Municipal
Corporation.     The   said   Corporation   was   also   included   in   the
32

draw of lots for Scheduled Castes.  However, in the draw of lots,
it could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes.  However, insofar
as   Backward   Class   is   concerned,   out   of   27   Corporations,   26
Corporations   excluding   newly   created   Panvel   Corporation   were
already   reserved   for   Backward   Class   in   the   earlier   years.     As
such,   the   State   excluded   the   7   Corporations   which   were
immediately reserved for the Backward Class and also excluded
the   4   Corporations   which   were   reserved   for   Scheduled   Castes
and   Scheduled   Tribes   in   the   present   draw   of   lots.
Coincidentally,   in   the   draw   of   lots,   Dhule   Municipal
Corporation   was   one   of   the   7   Corporations   which   got   to   be
reserved for the Backward Class.
34. We find that such a situation is bound to occur in view of
the   difference   in   number   of   seats,   reserved   for   Scheduled
Castes and Backward Class of Citizens.  If the interpretation as
placed   is   to   be   accepted   then   unless   the   post   of   Mayor   is
reserved   for   Scheduled   Tribes   in   all   the   Corporations   to
complete   the   rotation,   it   will   not   be   possible   to   provide
reservation   for   the   categories   which   were   already   reserved
earlier.  However, it could be seen that as per the Rules, only 9
33

Corporations   could   be   reserved   for   Scheduled   Tribes.   We
therefore find that the combined reading of the said Rules along
with   the   constitutional   mandate   under   Article   243T   of   the
Constitution   and   Section   19(1A)   of   the   said   Act   would   not
permit the interpretation as placed by the High Court.
35. Apart from that, we find that another rule of interpretation
will   also   come   into   play.   It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the
observations   of   this   Court   in   State   of   Tamil   Nadu   v.   M.K.
Kandaswami and Others 8
:­
“26.   ….If   more   than   one   construction   is   possible,
that which preserves its workability, and efficacy  is
to   be   preferred   to   the   one   which   would   render   it
otiose or sterile…..”
36. This   Court   in   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   v.
Hindustan Bulk Carriers   (supra)  has observed thus:­  
“15.   A   statute   is   designed   to   be   workable   and   the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure
that object unless crucial omission or clear direction
makes   that   end   unattainable.
(See   Whitney   v.   IRC   [1926   AC   37   :   10   Tax   Cas   88   :
95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred
to in   CIT   v.   S. Teja Singh   [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959)
8   (1975) 4 SCC 745
34

35   ITR   408]   and   Gursahai   Saigal   v.   CIT   [AIR   1963
SC 1062 : (1963) 48 ITR 1] .)”
37. In   Balram   Kumawat   v.   Union   of   India   and   Others 9
,
this Court observed thus:­  
“25.   A   statute   must   be   construed   as   a   workable
instrument.   Ut   res   magis   valeat   quam   pereat   is   a
well­known   principle   of   law.   In   Tinsukhia   Electric
Supply   Co.   Ltd.   v.   State   of   Assam   [(1989)   3   SCC
709   :   AIR   1990   SC   123]   this   Court   stated   the   law
thus: (SCC p. 754, paras 118­120)
“ 118 .   The   courts   strongly   lean   against   any
construction   which   tends   to   reduce   a   statute
to   futility.   The   provision   of   a   statute   must   be
so   construed   as   to   make   it   effective   and
operative, on the principle ‘ ut res magis valeat
quam   pereat ’.   It   is,   no   doubt,   true   that   if   a
statute   is   absolutely   vague   and   its   language
wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless,
the   statute   could   be   declared   void   for
vagueness.   This   is   not   in   judicial   review   by
testing   the   law   for   arbitrariness   or
unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a
court   of   construction,   dealing   with   the
language   of   a   statute,   does   in   order   to
ascertain   from,   and   accord   to,   the   statute   the
meaning   and   purpose   which   the   legislature
intended   for   it.   In   Manchester   Ship   Canal
Co.   v.   Manchester   Racecourse   Co.   [(1900)   2   Ch
352   :   69   LJCh   850   :   83   LT   274   (CA)]   Farwell,
J. said: (pp. 360­61)
9   (2003) 7 SCC 628
35

‘Unless   the   words   were   so   absolutely
senseless that I could do nothing at all with
them,   I   should   be   bound   to   find   some
meaning   and   not   to   declare   them   void   for
uncertainty.’
119 .   In   Fawcett   Properties   Ltd.   v.   Buckingham
County Council   [(1960) 3 All ER 503 : (1960) 3
WLR   831   (HL)]   Lord   Denning   approving   the
dictum of Farwell, J. said: (All ER p. 516)
‘But   when   a   statute   has   some   meaning,
even   though   it   is   obscure,   or   several
meanings,   even   though   there   is   little   to
choose   between   them,   the   courts   have   to
say   what   meaning   the   statute   is   to   bear,
rather than reject it as a nullity.’
120 .   It   is,   therefore,   the   court's   duty   to   make
what   it   can   of   the   statute,   knowing   that   the
statutes   are   meant   to   be   operative   and   not
inept   and   that   nothing   short   of   impossibility
should   allow   a   court   to   declare   a   statute
unworkable.   In   Whitney   v.   IRC   [1926   AC   37   :
95   LJKB   165   :   134   LT   98   (HL)]   Lord   Dunedin
said: (AC p. 52)
‘A   statute   is   designed   to   be   workable,   and
the interpretation thereof by a court should
be   to   secure   that   object,   unless   crucial
omission   or   clear   direction   makes   that   end
unattainable.’ ”
26.   The courts will therefore reject that construction
which   will   defeat   the   plain   intention   of   the
legislature   even   though   there   may   be   some
inexactitude   in   the   language   used.
[See   Salmon   v.   Duncombe   [(1886)   11   AC   627   :   55
36

LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] (AC at p. 634).] Reducing
the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case
where   the   intention   of   the   legislature   cannot   be
given   effect   to,   the   courts   would   accept   the   bolder
construction   for   the   purpose   of   bringing   about   an
effective result…….”  
38. It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer an
interpretation   which   makes   the   Statute   workable.   The
interpretation   which   gives   effect   to   the   intention   of   the
legislature, will have to be preferred.   The interpretation which
brings about the effect of result, will have to be preferred than
the   one   which   defeats   the   purpose   of   the   enactment.     As
already discussed hereinabove, the dominant intent of the said
Rules   is   to   give   effect   to   the   reservation   policy   while   ensuring
that   reservations   are   not   repeated   in   particular   Corporations
and   at   the   same   time   in   all   the   Corporations,   there   shall   be
reservation, at some point of time, for all the eligible categories
by rotation. The legislative intent is to exclude the Corporations
which   were   earlier   reserved   for   a   particular   category   until   all
the   categories   are   provided   reservation.     However,   while   doing
so, the Court will have to interpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in
37

such   a   manner   that   this   scheme   is   made   workable   and   not
frustrated.  At the cost of repetition and particularly taking into
consideration   the   difference   in   number   of   seats   for   Scheduled
Castes   and   Backward   Class   of   Citizens,   we   find   that   the
interpretation as placed by the High Court, would not make the
said Rules workable and give effect to  the legislative intent.    It
would have been a different matter that even after completion of
the cycle, requisite reservation as per the Rules is not provided
to   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   excessive   reservation   is   provided
for   Backward   Class   of   Citizens.   Such   is   not   the   case.
Unfortunately, for the writ petitioner, even for the present term,
Dhule   Municipal   Corporation   was   also   in   the   pool   of   eligible
Corporations   for   draw   of   lots   for   Scheduled   Castes   category.
However,   in   the   draw,   it   could   not   be   reserved   for   Scheduled
Castes.     Only   thereafter,   Dhule   Municipal   Corporation   was
considered   in   the   pool   of   draw   of   lots   for   Backward   Class   of
Citizens.     This   was   so   because   in   the   immediate   preceding
elections,   the   office   of   Mayor   was   not   reserved   for   Backward
Class of Citizens.  
38

39. The   High   Court   has   strongly   relied   on   the   following
observations   of   the   Single   Judge   of   the   Karnataka   High   Court
in   M.   Abdul   Azeez   v.   State   of   Karnataka   and   Others
(supra) :­  
“ 27.1.    An   elementary test   to find out as to whether
the   principle   of   rotation   is   violated   or   not,   is   to
examine   as   to   whether   any   allotment   to   a   reserved
category   is   repeated   in   any   Municipality   before
commencement   of   a   fresh   cycle   of   rotation   for   that
category.     If   there   is   any   allotment   to   any   reserved
category for the second time in a Municipality before
completion   of   a   cycle   of   rotation   or   before
commencement   of   a   fresh   cycle   of   rotation   for   that
category,   it   would   be   a   clear   violation   of   the
principle of rotation .”
40.   However,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   the   Rules   that   fell   for
consideration   before   the   Karnataka   High   Court,   provided   that
the  offices of   the  President  and  Vice­President  shall  be  rotated
for   the   different   categories   from   term­to­term.   The   Rules
provided   that   the   cycle   of   the   reservation   will   begin   from   the
Municipal   Council   which   had   the   highest   population   of   a
particular category.  The rotation will go to the other Municipal
Councils   in   the   descending   manner   on   the   basis   of   the
population of a particular category in the concerned Municipal
39

Council area.  The scheme is that the Municipal Council which
has the highest number  of population of a particular category,
will be the first to be reserved for that category and the Council
with the least population of that category, would be the last one
to   be   reserved   for   that   category.     Only   after   completion   of   the
said   cycle,   the   reservation   can   come   back   for   a   particular
category which was reserved for it at the first instance.  It could
thus be seen that the Rules that fell for consideration before the
Karnataka   High   Court,   were   totally   different   than   the   ones
which fell for consideration before the Bombay High Court.
41. Though   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   was   not
bound   by   the   judgment   of   the   Single   Judge   and   it   had   only   a
persuasive  value,  we  may  gainfully   refer  to   the  observations  of
this Court in   The Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan
Kumar Dubey 10
:­ 
“7.   …..Even   where   there   appears   to   be   some
conflict,   it   would,   we   think,   vanish   when   the   ratio
decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is
the rule deducible from the application of law to the
facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes
its   ratio   decidendi   and   not   some   conclusion   based
upon   facts   which   may   appear   to   be   similar.   One
additional   or   different   fact   can   make   a   world   of
10   (1976) 3 SCC 334
40

difference   between   conclusions   in   two   cases   even
when   the   same   principles   are   applied   in   each   case
to similar facts…..”
42. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the   view
taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court needs to
be   interfered.   The   appeals   are   therefore   allowed   and   the
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   Bombay   High   Court   dated
7 th
 May 2021, is quashed and set aside.
….…..….......................J.
    [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 01, 2021.
41