2021 INSC 0547
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5819­5822  OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 2779­2782 of 2019]
RAJENDRA BAJORIA AND OTHERS        ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
HEMANT KUMAR JALAN
AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   challenge   the   judgment   and   order   passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta dated 14 th
September   2018,  thereby   allowing   the  appeals  being  APO   Nos.
491   and   520   of   2017   filed   by   the   respondents­defendants,
challenging   the   order   passed   by   the   Single   Judge   of   the   High
Court   of   Calcutta   dated   22 nd
  September   2017.     Vide   the   said
order   dated   22 nd
  September   2017,   the   Single   Judge   had
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dismissed G.A. Nos.1688 and 1571 of 2017 filed by the original
defendants,   seeking   dismissal   of   the   suit,   alternatively   for
rejection   of   the   plaint   as   well   as   for   revocation   of   the   leave
granted   under   Clause   12   of   the   Letters   Patent   in   the   instant
suit being C.S. No.79 of 2017.
3. A   partnership   firm   namely   ‘Soorajmull   Nagarmull’
(hereinafter   referred   to   as,   ‘the   partnership   firm’)   was
constituted   under   a   Deed   of   Partnership   dated   6 th
  December
1943.   Baijnath   Jalan,   Mohanlal   Jalan,   Babulal   Jalan,
Sewbhagwan   Jalan,   Keshabdeo   Jalan,   Nandkishore   Jalan,
Deokinandan   Jalan,   Chiranjilal   Bajoria   and   Kishorilal   Jalan
were the partners in the  partnership firm.   It is not  in dispute
that none of the partners are alive.  Plaintiff Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are
the sons of Late Chiranjilal Bajoria, who died on 31 st
 December
1981.   Plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 are the sons of Late Deokinandan
Jalan, who died on 12 th
 July 1997.  Plaintiff No. 6 is the son of
Late   Mohanlal   Jalan,   who   died   on   1 st
  May   1982.     The
defendants   are   the   legal   heirs   of   the   other   original   partners   in
the partnership firm.
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4. A  civil  suit being  C.S. No. 79 of  2017  came to be filed by
the plaintiffs before the Calcutta High Court seeking,   inter alia ,
the following reliefs:­
“(a)  Decree for declaration that the plaintiffs
along   with   the   defendants   are   entitled
to the assets and properties of the firm
"Soorajmull   Nagarmull"   as   the   heirs   of
the   original   partners   of   the
reconstituted   firm   under   the
partnership   deed   dated   6 th
  December,
1943,   in   the   share   of   the   said   original
partners   as   mentioned   in   paragraph   3
above; 
(b)  Decree for declaration that the plaintiffs
along   with   the   defendants   are
consequently   entitled   to   represent   the
firm   in   all   proceedings   before   the
concerned   authorities   of   the   State   of
Bihar   for   the   acquisition   of   its
Bhagalpur land; 
(c)  Decree   for   perpetual   injunction
restraining the defendant No.1 or any of
the   other   defendants   from   in   any
manner   representing   or   holding
themselves   out   to   be   the   authorised
representative   of   the   firm   or   the
repository   of   all   its   authority,   moneys
assets and properties or from seeking to
represent   the   firm   in   its   dealings   and
transactions   in   respect   of   any   of   its
assets   and   properties   including   the
acquisition   proceeding   of   the   firm's
Bhagalpur   land   or   from   receiving   any
monies   on   behalf   of   the   firm,   whether
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on   account   of   compensation   for   its
Bhagalpur land or otherwise; 
(d)  Decree   for   mandatory   injunction
directing   the   defendant   No.   1   to
disclose   full   particulars   of   all   assets
and   properties   of   the   firm,   full
particulars   of   all   its   dealings   and
transactions   including   any   dealing   or
transaction   concerning   any   asset   or
property   of   the   firm,   and   full   accounts
of   the   firm   for   the   purpose   of   its
dissolution;
(e)  Decree   for   the   dissolution   of   the   firm
Soorajmull   Nagarmull   and   for   the
winding   up   of   its   affairs   upon   realising
the   assets   and   properties   of   the   firm,
collecting   all   moneys   due   to   the   firm,
applying   the   same   in   paying   the   debts
of the firm, if any, in paying the capital
contributed   by   any   partner   and
thereafter   by   dividing   the   residue
amongst   the   heirs   of   the   original
partners   in   the   shares   to   which   they
were entitled to the profits of the firm in
terms of the Partnership Deed dated 6 th
December, 1943."
5. In   the   said   suit,   the   defendants   filed   two   applications
being   G.A.   Nos.   1688   and   1571   of   2017,   inter   alia ,   seeking
dismissal of the suit, or in the alternative, rejection of the plaint
on   the   ground   that   the   plaint   does   not   disclose   any   cause   of
action,   and   the   relief   as   claimed   in   the   plaint   could   not   be
granted.   It was also urged on behalf of the defendants that the
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suit was filed beyond the period of limitation, and as such, was
also liable to be rejected on the said ground.   The Single Judge
vide judgment and order dated 22 nd
 September 2017, dismissed
the   said   applications.   Insofar   as   the   ground   with   regard   to
limitation is concerned, the Single Judge found that the issue of
limitation   was   a   mixed   question   of   fact   and   law   and   did   not
consider   the   prayer   of   the   defendants   on   that   ground.     Being
aggrieved   thereby,   the   original   defendants   filed   appeals   being
APO Nos. 491 and 520 of 2017 before the Division Bench of the
High   Court.     The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   by   the
impugned judgment and order dated 14 th
  September 2018 held
that  the reliefs, as  claimed in  the  plaint,  could not be granted,
and   therefore,   while   allowing   the   appeals,   rejected   the   plaint
being   C.S.   No.   79   of   2017.     It,   however,   observed   that,   as
provided   under   Order   VII   Rule   13   of   the   Civil   Procedure   Code
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “CPC”),   the   order   of   rejection   of
the plaint shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiffs from
presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.
Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.
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6. We   have   heard   Shri   Gopal   Jain,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1, and
Shri   K.V.   Viswanathan   and   Shri   Gopal   Sankaranarayanan,
learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent
Nos. 2, 3, 7 to 9, 11, 12 and 16 to 21.
7. Shri   Gopal   Jain,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   appellants,   submitted   that   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   of   Calcutta   has   grossly   erred   in   allowing   the
appeals   and   reversing   the   well­reasoned   judgment   and   order
passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta.   Shri
Jain   submitted   that   the   Single   Judge,   after   reading   the
averments in the plaint, had rightly come to the conclusion that
the  plaint discloses cause of action,  and as such, could not  be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.  He submitted that the
Division   Bench,   in   the   impugned   judgment   and   order,   has
almost conducted a mini­trial to find out as to whether the relief
as claimed in the plaint could be granted or not. He submitted
that   such   an   exercise   is   impermissible   while   considering   an
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application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.  The learned Senior
Counsel,   relying   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Dahiben   v.   Arvindbhai   Kalyanji   Bhanusali   (Gajra)   Dead
Through Legal Representatives and Others 1
,   submitted that
the power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is a
drastic   one.   He   submitted   that   such   a   power   cannot   be
routinely exercised. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that
for finding out as to whether the cause of action exists or not, it
is   necessary   to   read   the   averments   made   in   the   plaint   in   their
entirety   and   not   in   piecemeal.     Shri   Jain,   therefore,   submitted
that the impugned judgment and order is not sustainable and is
liable to be set aside.
8. Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the   respondent   No.1,   submitted   that   if   the   averments   made   in
the   plaint   were   read   in   juxtaposition   with   the   provisions   of
Sections   40,   42,   43,   44   and   48   of   the   Indian   Partnership   Act,
1932 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) read with clauses
in   the   Partnership   Deed   dated   6 th
  December   1943,   it   would
1 (2020) 7 SCC 366
7

reveal that none of the reliefs, as claimed in the plaint, could be
granted. He submitted that as per Section 40 of the said Act, a
firm   can  be   dissolved   only  with   the   consent   of   all   the   partners
or   in   accordance   with   the   contract   between   the   partners.     He
submitted that, though under Section 42 of the said Act, a firm
could   be   dissolved   on   the   death   of   a   partner,   however,   this   is
subjected   to   a   contract   between   the   partners.     He   submitted
that,   a   perusal   of   clause   4   of   the   Partnership   Deed   dated   6 th
December   1943   would   show   that   it   specifically   provides   that
upon   the   death   of   any   partner,   the   partnership   shall   not   be
automatically dissolved.  As such, the submission in that regard
is without merit.   He submitted that Section 44 of the said Act
provides that the dissolution of the firm could be maintained on
the ground specified therein, only if the suit is at the instance of
the   partners.     He  submitted  that   admittedly   the  plaintiffs   were
not the partners, and as such, the suit at their instance was not
tenable. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgments of
this Court in the cases of   T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal
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and   Another 2
  and   Pearlite   Liners   (P)   Ltd.   v.   Manorama
Sirsi 3
,   in   support   of   his   submission,   that   if   the   reliefs,   as
sought   in   the   plaint,   cannot   be   granted,   then   the   only   option
available to the Court is to reject the plaint.
9. Shri   Viswanathan   and   Shri   Gopal   Sankaranarayanan,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.
2,   3,   7   to   9,   11,   12   and   16   to   21,   also   made   similar
submissions.
10. It will be relevant to refer to Sections 40, 42, 43 and 44 of
the said Act:­
“ 40.   Dissolution   by   agreement . —A   firm   may
be   dissolved   with   the   consent   of   all   the
partners   or   in   accordance   with   a   contract
between the partners.
41. …….
42. Dissolution on the happening of certain
contingencies . —Subject   to   contract   between
the partners a firm is dissolved—
( a )  if constituted for  a fixed term, by  the
expiry of the term;
( b )  if   constituted   to   carry   out   one   or
more   adventures   or   undertakings,  by
the completion thereof;
2 (1977) 4 SCC 467
3 (2004) 3 SCC 172
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( c )  by the death of a partner; and
( d )  by the adjudication of a partner as an
insolvent.
43.   Dissolution   by   notice   of   partnership   at
will . —Where   the   partnership   is   at   will,   the
firm   may   be   dissolved   by   any   partner   giving
notice in writing to all the other partners of his
intention to dissolve the firm.
(2)   The   firm   is   dissolved   as   from   the   date
mentioned   in   the   notice   as   the   date   of
dissolution   or,   if   no   date   is   so   mentioned,   as
from   the   date   of   the   communication   of   the
notice.
44. Dissolution by the  Court . —At the suit of
a   partner,   the   Court   may   dissolve   a   firm   on
any of following grounds, namely:—
( a )  that   a   partner   has   become   of
unsound mind, in which case the suit
may   be   brought   as   well   by   the   next
friend of the partner who has become
of   unsound   mind   as   by   any   other
partner;
( b )  that a partner, other than the partner
suing,   has   become   in   any   way
permanently   incapable   of   performing
his duties as partner;
( c )  that a partner, other than the partner
suing,   is   guilty   of   conduct   which   is
likely   to   affect   prejudicially   the
carrying   on   of   the   business,   regard
being   had   to   the   nature   of   the
business;
( d )  that a partner, other than the partner
suing,   willfully   or   persistently
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commits   breach   of   agreements
relating   to   the   management   of   the
affairs   of   the   firm   or   the   conduct   of
its   business,   or   otherwise   so
conducts   himself   in   matters   relating
to   the   business   that   it   is   not
reasonably   practicable   for   the   other
partners   to   carry   on   the   business   in
partnership with him;
( e )  that   a   partner,   other   than   the
partner,   suing,   has   in   any   way
transferred   the   whole   of   his   interest
in   the   firm   to   a   third   party,   or   has
allowed   his   share   to   be   charged
under   the   provisions   of   Rule   49   of
Order XXI of the First Schedule to the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   (5   of
1908),  or  has  allowed  it to  be sold in
the   recovery   of   arrears   of   land
revenue or of any dues recoverable as
arrears   of   land   revenue   due   by   the
partner;
( f )  that   the   business   of   the   firm   cannot
be carried on save at a loss; or
( g )  on any other ground which renders it
just   and   equitable   that   the   firm
should be dissolved.”
11. It will also be relevant to refer to Clauses 4, 6 and 7 of the
Partnership Deed dated 6 th
 December 1943:
“4.   That   upon   the   death   of   any   partner   the
partnership   shall   not   be   automatically
dissolved   but   the   surviving   partners   may
admit   the   legal   representative   of   the
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deceased   unto   the   partnership   by   mutual
consent.
5. ……
6.   In   case   of   death   of   any   partner   or
retirement   during   the   continuance   of   the
partnership   shall   be   deemed   to   exist   only
upto   to   the   end   of   the   accounting   period   of
the   year   during   which   the   death   or
retirement   occurs   and   the   estate   of   the
deceased partner or the retiring partner shall
be   entitled   to   receive   and   be   responsible   for
all profits and losses of the partnership up to
the end of the accounting period as the case
may be. 
7. This Indenture further witnesseth that the
said parties hereto hereby mutually covenant
and   agree   that   they   will   carry   on   the   said
business   in   partnership   until   dissolution
under and in accordance with the provisions
and   stipulation   hereinabefore   stated   or
contained in the said Indenture dated the 1 st
day   of   September,   1938   so   far   as   the   same
respectively   are   now   subsisting   and   capable
of   taking   and   are   applicable   to   the   altered
circumstances   hereinbefore   appearing   And
any   dispute   in   relation   to   the   said
partnership   shall   be   decided   by   Arbitration
according   to   the   provisions   of   the   Indian
Arbitration   and  for   that  purpose  each   of  the
disputing   parties   may   nominate   one
Arbitrator   Provided.   However   that   none   of
the   parties   hereto   shall   at   any   time   be
entitled   to   apply   to   any   Court   of   law   for   the
dissolution   of   the   partnership   or   for
appointment   of   a   Receiver   over   the
partnership or! any portion of its assets.”
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12. From   the   perusal   of   the   plaint,   it   could   be   gathered   that
the   case   of   the   plaintiffs   is   that   in   spite   of   demise   of   the   three
original   partners   of   the   partnership   firm,   through   whom   the
plaintiffs   were   claiming,   the   defendants   have   been   carrying   on
the   business   of   the   partnership   firm.     It   is   their   case   that   the
accounts   of   the   partnership   firm   have   not   been   finalized   and
that   the   share   of   the   profits   of   the   partnership   firm   has   not
been paid to them.   It is also the case of the plaintiffs that the
defendants are seeking to represent the partnership firm to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs and that the defendants are siphoning
off funds of the partnership firm.  It is their case that they along
with the defendants are entitled to the assets and properties of
the partnership firm as legal heirs of the original partners of the
partnership   firm,   reconstituted   under   the   Partnership   Deed
dated 6 th
 December 1943.
13. No   doubt   that,   it   is   rightly   contended   on   behalf   of   the
plaintiffs   that,   only   on   the   basis   of   the   averments   made   in   the
plaint, it could be ascertained as to whether a cause of action is
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made out or not.  It is equally true that for finding out the same,
the  entire pleadings in the plaint  will  have to be read and that
too, at their face value.   At this stage, the defence taken by the
defendants cannot be looked into.  
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in
the   case  of   T.   Arivandandam   v.   T.V.   Satyapal   and   Another
(supra):
“5.   We   have   not   the   slightest   hesitation   in
condemning   the   petitioner   for   the   gross
abuse   of   the   process   of   the   court   repeatedly
and   unrepentently   resorted   to.   From   the
statement of the facts found in the judgment
of   the   High   Court,   it   is   perfectly   plain   that
the   suit   now   pending   before   the   First
Munsif's   Court,   Bangalore,   is   a   flagrant
misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving
plaints.   The   learned   Munsif   must
remember   that   if   on   a   meaningful   —   not
formal   —   reading   of   the   plaint   it   is
manifestly   vexatious,   and   meritless,   in
the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
sue,   he   should   exercise   his   power   under
Order   7,   Rule   11   CPC   taking   care   to   see
that   the   ground   mentioned   therein   is
fulfilled.   And,   if   clever   drafting   has
created   the   illusion   of   a   cause   of   action,
nip   it   in   the   bud   at   the   first   hearing   by
examining   the   party   searchingly   under
Order   10,   CPC.   An   activist   Judge   is   the
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answer   to   irresponsible   law   suits.   The   trial
courts   would   insist   imperatively   on
examining   the   party   at   the   first   hearing   so
that bogus litigation can be shot down at the
earliest   stage.   The   Penal   Code   is   also
resourceful   enough   to   meet   such   men,   (Cr.
XI)   and   must   be   triggered   against   them.   In
this   case,   the   learned   Judge   to   his   cost
realised   what   George   Bernard   Shaw
remarked   on   the   assassination   of   Mahatma
Gandhi:
“It is dangerous to be too good.”
[emphasis supplied]
15. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that reading
of the averments made in the plaint should not only be formal
but also meaningful.  It has been held that if clever drafting has
created   the   illusion   of   a   cause   of   action,   and   a   meaningful
reading   thereof   would   show   that   the   pleadings   are   manifestly
vexatious   and   meritless,   in   the   sense   of   not   disclosing   a   clear
right   to   sue,   then   the   court   should   exercise   its   power   under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.  It has been held that such a suit has
to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing itself.  
15

16. It   will   also   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following
observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Pearlite   Liners   (P)
Ltd.  (supra) :
“ 10.   The question arises as to whether in the
background of the facts already stated, such
reliefs can be granted to the plaintiff. Unless
there   is   a   term   to   the   contrary   in   the
contract   of   service,   a   transfer   order   is   a
normal   incidence  of   service.   Further,  it   is   to
be   considered   that   if   the   plaintiff   does   not
comply   with   the   transfer   order,   it   may
ultimately   lead   to   termination   of   service.
Therefore,   a   declaration   that   the   transfer
order   is   illegal   and   void,   in   fact   amounts   to
imposing   the   plaintiff   on   the   defendant   in
spite   of   the   fact   that   the   plaintiff   allegedly
does   not   obey   order   of   her   superiors   in   the
management   of   the   defendant   Company.
Such   a   relief   cannot   be   granted.   Next   relief
sought in the plaint is for  a declaration that
she   continues   to   be   in   service   of   the
defendant   Company.   Such   a   declaration
again   amounts   to   enforcing   a   contract   of
personal   service   which   is   barred   under   the
law. The third relief sought by the plaintiff is
a   permanent   injunction   to   restrain   the
defendant   from   holding   an   enquiry   against
her.   If   the   management   feels   that   the
plaintiff   is   not   complying   with   its   directions
it   has   a   right   to   decide   to   hold   an   enquiry
against   her.   The   management   cannot   be
restrained   from   exercising   its   discretion   in
this behalf. Ultimately, this relief, if granted,
would   indirectly   mean   that   the   court   is
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assisting  the  plaintiff  in   continuing   with  her
employment   with   the   defendant   Company,
which  is  nothing  but  enforcing   a  contract  of
personal   service.   Thus,   none   of   the   reliefs
sought in the plaint can be granted to the
plaintiff under the law. The question then
arises as to whether such a suit should be
allowed   to   continue   and   go   for   trial.   The
answer in our view is clear, that is, such a
suit   should   be   thrown   out   at   the
threshold.   Why   should   a   suit   which   is
bound   to   be   dismissed   for   want   of
jurisdiction of a court to grant the reliefs
prayed for, be tried at all?   Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court was absolutely right
in   rejecting   the   plaint   and   the   lower
appellate   court   rightly   affirmed   the   decision
of   the   trial   court   in   this   behalf.   The   High
Court   was   clearly   in   error   in   passing   the
impugned   judgment   whereby   the   suit   was
restored   and  remanded  to   the   trial   court  for
being decided on merits. The judgment of the
High   Court   is   hereby   set   aside   and   the
judgments   of   the   courts   below,   that   is,   the
trial   court   and   the   lower  appellate   court   are
restored.   The   plaint   in   the   suit   stands
rejected.” 
[emphasis supplied]
17. It could thus be seen that the court has to find out as to
whether in the background of the facts, the relief, as claimed in
the plaint, can be granted to the plaintiff.  It has been held that
if   the   court   finds   that   none   of   the   reliefs   sought   in   the   plaint
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can be granted to the plaintiff under the law, the question then
arises is as to whether such a suit is to be allowed to continue
and   go   for   trial.     This   Court   answered   the   said   question   by
holding that such a suit should be thrown out at the threshold.
This Court, therefore, upheld the order passed by the trial court
of   rejecting   the   suit   and   that   of   the   appellate   court,   thereby
affirming   the   decision   of   the   trial   court.     This   Court   set   aside
the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   wherein   the   High   Court
had   set   aside   the   concurrent   orders   of   the   trial   court   and   the
appellate   court   and   had   restored   and   remanded   the   suit   for
trial to the trial court.
18. Therefore,   the   question   that   will   have   to   be   considered   is
as   to   whether   the   reliefs   as   claimed   in   the   plaint   by   the
plaintiffs could be granted or not.  We do not propose to do that
exercise, inasmuch as the Division Bench of the High Court has
elaborately   considered   the   issue   as   to   whether,   applying   the
provisions of the said Act read with the aforesaid clauses in the
Partnership Deed, the reliefs, as claimed in the plaint, could be
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granted   or   not.     The   relevant   discussion   by   the   High   Court
reads thus:
“(31) Let us take the prayers one by one. The
first   prayer   is   for   a   declaration   that   the
plaintiffs   and   the   defendants   are   entitled   to
the assets and properties of the said firm as
the   legal   heirs   of   the   original   partners.   It   is
trite   law   that   the   partners   of   a   firm   are
entitled   only   to   the   profits   of   the   firm   and
upon dissolution of the firm they are entitled
to   the   surplus   of   the   sale   proceeds   of   the
assets and properties of the firm, if any, after
meeting   the   liabilities   of   the   firm,   in   the
share agreed upon in the partnership deed. 
The   partners   do   not   have   any   right,   title   or
interest   in   respect   of   the   assets   and
properties   of   a   firm   so   long   as   the   firm   is
carrying on business. Hence, the plaintiffs as
legal   heirs   of   some   of   the   original   partners
cannot   maintain   any   claim   in   respect   of   the
assets   and   properties   of   the   said   firm.  Their
prayer for declaration of co­ownership of the
assets   and   properties   of   the   said   firm   is   not
maintainable in law. 
The   second   prayer   in   the   plaint   is   for   a
declaration  that  the  plaintiffs along  with the
defendants are entitled to represent the firm
in   all   proceedings   before   the   concerned
authorities   of   the   State   of   Bihar   for   the
acquisition   of   its   Bhagalpur   land.   The
framing   of   this   prayer   shows   that   this   is   a
consequential   relief   claimed   by   the   plaintiffs
which can only be granted if the first prayer
is allowed. Since, in our opinion, prayer (a) of
the   plaint   cannot   be   granted   in   law,   prayer
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(b)  also  cannot  be  granted.  Prayer   (c)  is  also
a   consequential   relief.   Only   if   the   plaintiffs
were   entitled   to   claim   prayer   (a),   they   could
claim   prayer   (c).   We   are   not   on   whether   or
not   the   plaintiffs   will   succeed   in   obtaining
prayer (a). According to us, the plaintiffs are
not   even   entitled   to   pray   for   the   first   relief
indicated   above   as   the   same   cannot   be
granted   under   the   law   of   the   land.
Consequently,   prayer   (c)   also   cannot   be
granted. 
Prayers (d) and (e) both pertain to dissolution
of   the   firm.   Prayer   (e)   is   for   a   decree   of
dissolution and  for  winding  up of the  affairs
of   the   firm.   Prayer   (d)   is   for   full   accounts   of
the   firm   for   the   purpose   of   its   dissolution
(emphasis is ours). However, it is settled law
that   only   the   partners   of   a   firm   can   seek
dissolution   of   the   firm.   Admittedly,   the
plaintiffs   are   not   partners   of   the   said   firm.
Sec.   39   of   the   Partnership   Act   provides   that
the   dissolution   of   partnership   between   all
the   partners   of   a   firm   is   called   'the
dissolution of the firm'. Sec. 40 provides that
a   firm   may   be   dissolved   with   the   consent   of
all   the   partners   or   in   accordance   with   a
contract   between   the   partners.   Sec.   41
provides   for   compulsory   dissolution   of   a
firm.   Sec.   42   stipulates   that   happening   of
certain   contingencies   will   cause   dissolution
of   a   firm   but   this   is   subject   to   contract
between   the   partners.   A   partnership­at­will
may   be   dissolved   by   any   partner   giving
notice in writing to the other partners of his
intention to dissolve the firm, as provided in
Sec.   43   of   the   Act.   Sec.   44   empowers   the
Court   to   dissolve   a   firm   on   the   grounds
mentioned therein on a suit of a partner. 
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Thus, it is clear that it is only a partner of a
firm   who   can   seek   dissolution   of   the   firm.
The   dissolution   of   a   firm   cannot   be   ordered
by   the   court   at   the   instance   of   a   non­
partner. Hence, the plaintiffs are not entitled
to   claim   dissolution   of   the   said   firm.
Consequently,   they   are   also   not   entitled   to
pray   for   accounts   for   the   purpose   of
dissolution of the firm.
(32) What should the Court do if it finds that
even   taking   the   averments   in   the   plaint   at
face   value,   not   one   of   the   reliefs   claimed   in
the plaint can be granted? Should the Court
send the parties to trial? We think not. It will
be an exercise in futility. It will be a waste of
time,   money   and   energy   for   both   the
plaintiffs   and   the   defendants   as   well   as
unnecessary consumption of Court's time. It
will   not   be   fair   to   compel   the   defendants   to
go through the ordinarily long drawn process
of   trial   of   a   suit   at   huge   expense,   not   to
speak   of   the   anxiety   and   un­peace   of   mind
caused   by   a   litigation   hanging   over   one's
head  like the Damocles's sword. No purpose
will be served by allowing the suit to proceed
to   trial   since   the   prayers   as   framed   cannot
be   allowed   on   the   basis   of   the   pleadings   in
the plaint. The plaintiffs have not prayed for
leave to amend the plaint. When the court is
of   the   view   just   by   reading   the   plaint   alone
and   assuming   the   averments   made   in   the
plaint   to   be   correct   that   none   of   the   reliefs
claimed   can   be   granted   in   law   since   the
plaintiffs   are   not   entitled   to   claim   such
reliefs,   the   Court   should   reject   the   plaint   as
disclosing   no   cause   of   action.   The   reliefs
claimed   in   a   plaint   flow   from   and   are   the
culmination of the cause of action pleaded in
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the   plaint.   The   cause   of   action   pleaded   and
the prayers made in a plaint are inextricably
intertwined. In the present case, the cause of
action   pleaded   and   the   reliefs   claimed   are
not recognized by the law of the land. Such a
suit   should   not   be   kept   alive   to   go   to
trial…..”
19. We   are   in   complete   agreement   with   the   findings   of   the
High Court.   Insofar as the reliance placed by Shri Jain on the
judgment of this Court in the case of  Dahiben  (supra) ,   to which
one  of  us  (L. Nageswara  Rao,  J.)  was  a  member,  is  concerned,
in our view, the said judgment rather than supporting the case
of   the   plaintiffs,   would   support   the   case   of   the   defendants.
Paragraphs   23.3,   23.4,   23.5   and   23.6   in   the   case   of   Dahiben
(supra) read thus:
“ 23.3.   The underlying object of Order 7 Rule
11( a ) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is
disclosed,  or   the  suit  is   barred   by   limitation
under Rule 11( d ), the court would not permit
the   plaintiff   to   unnecessarily   protract   the
proceedings   in   the   suit.   In   such   a   case,   it
would   be   necessary   to   put   an   end   to   the
sham   litigation,   so   that   further   judicial   time
is not wasted.
22

23.4.   In   Azhar   Hussain   v.   Rajiv
Gandhi   [ Azhar   Hussain   v.   Rajiv   Gandhi ,
1986   Supp   SCC   315.   Followed
in   Manvendrasinhji   Ranjitsinhji
Jadeja   v.   Vijaykunverba ,   1998   SCC
OnLineGuj281   :   (1998)   2   GLH   823]   this
Court   held   that   the   whole   purpose   of
conferment of powers under this provision is
to   ensure   that   a   litigation   which   is
meaningless,   and   bound   to   prove   abortive,
should   not   be   permitted   to   waste   judicial
time   of   the   court,   in   the   following   words   :
(SCC p. 324, para 12)
“ 12 .   …   The   whole   purpose   of
conferment   of   such   powers   is   to   ensure
that a litigation which is meaningless, and
bound   to   prove   abortive   should   not   be
permitted to occupy the time of the court,
and   exercise   the   mind   of   the   respondent.
The   sword   of   Damocles   need   not   be   kept
hanging   over   his   head   unnecessarily
without   point   or   purpose.   Even   in   an
ordinary   civil   litigation,   the   court   readily
exercises the power  to reject a plaint, if it
does not disclose any cause of action.”
23.5.   The   power   conferred   on   the   court   to
terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic
one, and the conditions enumerated in Order
7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered
to.
23

23.6.   Under  Order  7  Rule 11,  a  duty  is  cast
on the court to determine whether the plaint
discloses   a   cause   of   action   by   scrutinising
the   averments   in   the   plaint   [ Liverpool   &
London   S.P.   &   I   Assn.   Ltd.   v.   M.V.   Sea
Success   I ,   (2004)   9   SCC   512]   ,   read   in
conjunction with the documents relied upon,
or whether the suit is barred by any law.”
20. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that   the
power   conferred   on   the   court   to   terminate   a   civil   action   is   a
drastic   one,   and   the   conditions   enumerated   under   Order   VII
Rule 11 of CPC are required to be strictly adhered to.  However,
under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the duty is cast upon the court
to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, by
scrutinizing   the   averments   in   the   plaint,   read   in   conjunction
with  the   documents   relied  upon,   or   whether   the   suit  is  barred
by  any   law.   This  Court has  held that the underlying  object of
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is that when a plaint does not disclose
a   cause   of   action,   the   court   would   not   permit   the   plaintiff   to
unnecessarily   protract   the   proceedings.     It   has   been   held   that
in such a case, it will be necessary  to put an end to the sham
litigation so that further judicial time is not wasted.
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21. We   are   in   agreement   with   the   Division   Bench   of   the
Calcutta   High   Court   which,   upon   an   elaborate   scrutiny   of   the
averments   made   in   the   plaint,   the   reliefs   claimed   therein,   the
provisions   of   the   said   Act   and   the   clauses   of   the   Partnership
Deed,  came   to   the  conclusion   that   the   reliefs   as   sought   in   the
plaint, cannot be granted.  
22. The   appeals   are   found   to   be   without   merit,   and   as   such,
are   dismissed.     Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall   stand
disposed of.  No costs.
…..…..….......................J.
    [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
      …….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 21, 2021.
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