2021 INSC 0562
                                                       REPORTABLE
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.849­850 OF 2011
Triyambak S. Hegde   .…Appellant(s)
Versus
Sripad        ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   assailing   the
common   order   dated   01.12.2009   in   Criminal   Revision
Petition   No.1282/2006   connected   with   Criminal   Revision
Petition   No.1481/2006   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Karnataka. Through the said order the learned Single Judge
has   allowed   Criminal   Revision   Petition   No.1282/2006   filed
by   the   respondent   herein.   The   Criminal   Revision   Petition
No.1481/2006   filed   by   the   appellant   herein   has   been
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dismissed.   Consequently,   the   conviction   of   the   respondent,
ordered   by   the   learned   Judicial   Magistrate   and   affirmed   by
the learned Session Judge is set aside.   
2. The   case   of   the   appellant   is   that   the   respondent   who
was   known   to   him   for   the   past   few   years   approached   the
appellant and informed that due to his financial difficulty he
intends to sell the house situate in Sirsi town. The appellant
agreed   to   purchase   the   same   for   the   negotiated   total   sale
consideration   of   Rs.4,00,000/­   (Rupees   four   lakhs   only).   An
agreement dated 06.06.1996 was executed by the respondent
while   receiving   the   advance   amount   of   Rs.3,50,000/­
(Rupees   three   lakhs   fifty   thousand   only).   Subsequently,
when   the   appellant   made   certain   enquiries,   he   learnt   that
the house stood in the name of the father of the respondent
and   the   respondent   did   not   have   the   authority   to   sell   the
same. In that view, the appellant demanded the return of Rs.
3,50,000/­ (Rupees three lakhs fifty thousand only) which he
had paid as the advance amount. The respondent instead of
paying the entire amount, issued a cheque dated 17.05.1998
for   the   sum   of   Rs.   1,50,000/­   (Rupees   one   lakh   fifty
thousand   only)   being   part   of   the   amount.   The   appellant
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presented   the   cheque   for   realisation   on   20.05.1998   when   it
came   to   be   dishonoured   with   the   endorsement   ‘insufficient
funds’. 
3. The   appellant   therefore   got   issued   a   notice   informing
the respondent about the cheque being dishonoured and also
demanding payment of the cheque amount. The respondent,
though received the notice, failed to respond to the same. In
that view, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 200
of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code   (for   short   ‘CrPC’)   on
14.07.1998   in   the   Court   of   the   Judicial   Magistrate,   First
Class   (for   short   ‘JMFC’)   at   Sirsi   which   was   registered   as
Criminal Case No.790/2000. Through the said complaint the
appellant   sought   prosecution   of   the   respondent   under
Section   138   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments   Act,   1881   (for
short   ‘N.I.   Act’).   The   learned   JMFC   after   providing
opportunity   to   both   the   parties   convicted   the   respondent
through   the   judgment   dated   09.06.2005   for   the   offence
punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act; sentenced the
respondent   to   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   six   months
and   to   pay   the   fine   of   Rs.   2,00,000/­   (Rupees   two   lakhs
only). In default of payment of the fine amount, the accused
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was   ordered   to   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a   further
period   of   three   months.   Out   of   the   fine   amount,   Rs.
1,95,000/­ (Rupees one lakh ninety­five thousand only) was
ordered to be paid to the appellant as compensation. 
4. The respondent herein claiming to be aggrieved by the
said   judgment   dated   09.06.2005   passed   by   the   JMFC,   filed
an   appeal   before   the   District   &   Sessions   Judge,   Uttara
Kannada,   Karwar   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.57/2005.   The
appellant   herein   also   filed   an   appeal   in   Criminal   Appeal
No.65/2005   before   the   District   and   Sessions   Judge   seeking
that the sentence imposed on the respondent by the Learned
JMFC   be   enhanced,   as   the   compensation   of   Rs.   1,95,000/­
(Rupees   one   lakh   ninety­five   thousand   only)   ordered   to   be
paid   to   the   appellant   is   insufficient.   The   learned   Sessions
Judge having re­examined the matter and on reassessing the
evidence   dismissed   both   the   appeals   through   separate
judgments both dated 22.04.2006. The respondent herein, in
that   view,   filed   the   Revision   Petition   in   Criminal   Revision
Petition   No.1282/2006   and   the   appellant   herein   filed   the
connected   Revision   Petition   No.1481/2006   before   the   High
Court.   The   learned   Single   Judge,   as   noted   has   allowed   the
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Revision Petition filed by the respondent herein and set aside
the conviction order passed by the learned JMFC, which had
been   confirmed   by   the   learned   Sessions   Judge.   It   is   in   that
background, these appeals have arisen for consideration. 
5. We   have   heard   Mr.   Rajesh   Inamdar,   learned   counsel
for   the   appellant,   Mr.   G.V.   Chandrasekar,   learned   counsel
for the respondent and perused the appeal papers. 
6. Before   the   learned   Magistrate,   the   appellant   had
examined himself as PW1 and got marked the documents at
Exhibits   P1   to   P6.   The   deposition   of   the   appellant   as   PW1
indicated that the appellant and the respondent were known
to each other for  about 7 to 8 years prior to the transaction
in   question.   In   that   view,   in   the   year   1996   the   respondent
approached the appellant, explained his financial difficulties
and   due   to   his   financial   need,   offered   to   sell   the   property
situate   in   Sirsi.   In   that   light,   the   price   was   finalised   at   Rs.
4,00,000/­(Rupees   four   lakhs   only)   and   on   executing   an
agreement   dated   06.06.1996   (Exhibit   P­6),   the   advance
amount of Rs. 3,50,000/­(Rupees three lakhs fifty thousand
only) was paid.  The balance amount of Rs. 50,000/­ (Rupees
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fifty thousand only) was to be paid at the time of registration
and the transaction was to be completed within six months.
It   is   alleged   that   the   respondent   kept   on   postponing   the
registration   on   one   pretext   or   the   other.   Therefore,   on   an
enquiry the appellant learnt that the property was in fact in
the name of the father of the respondent and the respondent
was   not   the   absolute   owner.   Since   the   respondent   was   not
authorised   to   sell,   the   appellant   proceeded   to   cancel   the
agreement  and demanded to  pay  back the  advance amount.
In that view, the cheque dated 17.05.1998 (Exhibit P­2) was
drawn   by   the   respondent   for   the   sum   of   Rs.   1,50,000/­
(Rupees   one   lakh   fifty   thousand   only)   which   was   towards
part   of   the   advance   amount   paid   by   him.   The   cheque   on
being presented was however dishonoured. The memo issued
by the bank was marked as Exhibit P­3. The notice issued by
the appellant and the postal receipt was marked as Exhibits
P­4   and   P­5.   The   respondent   did   not   choose   to   tender   any
rebuttal evidence in the Court of JMFC, though he disputed
the incriminating circumstances which were put to him while
recording the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. 
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7. In that background, the learned JMFC on taking note
that the signature on the agreement dated Exhibit P­6, more
particularly   on   the   cheque   at   Exhibit   P­2   being   admitted,   it
raised   presumption   under   Section   118   and   139   of   the   N.I.
Act,   which   had   not   been   rebutted.   Therefore,   the   learned
JMFC   convicted   the   respondent.   As   noted,   the   learned
Sessions   Judge   on   re­appreciating   the   evidence   had
confirmed   the   conviction   and   sentence.   The   respondent
however put forth the contention in the Revision Petition only
at   the   time   of   argument,   that   the   appellant   did   not   pay   the
amount   but   his   signature   had   been   secured   on   the   cheque
(Exhibit   P­2)   and   the   agreement   (P­6)   under   peculiar
circumstances. It was contended on his behalf that he was a
party to a case in the Court of the Civil Judge, Sirsi wherein
he   had   engaged   the   services   of   an   advocate   by   name   Mr.
Rama   Joshi.   It   was   his   further   case   that   Mr.   Vishwanath
Hegde who is the junior of Mr. Rama Joshi happens to be the
relative of the appellant herein. He, thus being in a dominant
position had obtained the signature. 
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8. The   learned   Single   Judge   having   accepted   the   said
contention which was raised in the Revision for the first­time
during   arguments   proceeded   to   hold   that   the   appellant   had
not   discharged   the   burden   of   proving   that   he   had   paid   Rs.
3,50,000/­   (Rupees   three   lakhs   fifty   thousand   only)   to   the
respondent   and   that   the   cheque   had   been   issued   towards
payment of a part of the same. The learned Single Judge was
also of the opinion that the agreement at Exhibit P­6 cannot
be believed, as well. 
9. Mr. Rajesh Inamdar, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf  of   the   appellant   has   contended  that   the   signature  on
the documents at Exhibit P­6 and the cheque at Exhibit P­2
is   not   disputed   by   the   respondent.   In   that   view,   it   is
contended   that   the   learned   JMFC   was   justified   in   raising   a
presumption   against   the   respondent   and   convicting   him
since   there   was   no   rebuttal   evidence   or   contrary   material
whatsoever. It is contended that the document at Exhibit P­6
was   relied   to   indicate   that   there   was   a   transaction   entered
into   between   the   parties   towards   which   the   payment   was
made but the manner in which the High Court has adverted
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to the said document is beyond the scope of the requirement
in   a   proceeding   under   Section   138   of   the   N.I.   Act.   In   that
circumstance,   it   is   contended   that   the   learned   Single   Judge
has proceeded at a tangent and has set aside the concurrent
judgments   of   the   courts   below,   though   limited   scope   was
available in a Revision Petition. 
10. Mr.   G.V.   Chandrasekar,   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent   submitted   that   the   trial   court   and   the   lower
appellate   court   has   not   examined   the   case   in   its   correct
perspective.   Instead,   merely   because   the   signature   on   the
cheque was admitted the courts jumped to the conclusion by
raising   a   presumption,   though   there   was   no   evidence   on
record   to   show   that   the   appellant   possessed   the   funds   and
the same had been actually paid by him to the respondent to
constitute   legally   recoverable   debt.   It   is   contended   that   the
High   Court   was   justified   in   examining   and   concluding   with
regard   to   the   circumstance   under   which   the   cheque   had
been   signed   and,  in   that  light,   had   set   aside   the  conviction.
The   order   therefore   does   not   call   for   interference   is   his
contention.
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11. From   the   facts   arising   in   this   case   and   the   nature   of
the   rival   contentions,   the   record   would   disclose   that   the
signature   on   the   documents   at   Exhibits   P­6   and   P­2   is   not
disputed.   Exhibit   P­2   is   the   dishonoured   cheque   based   on
which   the   complaint   was   filed.   From   the   evidence   tendered
before   the   JMFC,   it   is   clear   that   the   respondent   has   not
disputed the signature on the cheque. If that be the position,
as   noted   by   the   courts   below   a   presumption   would   arise
under   Section   139   in   favour   of   the   appellant   who   was   the
holder   of   the   cheque.   Section   139   of   the   N.I.   Act   reads   as
hereunder: ­
“139.   Presumption   in   favour   of   holder ­   It   shall   be
presumed, unless  the contrary  is  proved,  that  the  holder
of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to
in   section   138   for   the   discharge,   in   whole   or   in   part,   of
any debt or other liability. ”
12. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant
in   the   context   of   the   cheque   having   been   signed   by   the
respondent,   the   presumption   for   passing   of   the
consideration would arise as provided under Section 118(a)
of N.I. Act which reads as hereunder: ­
“118.   Presumptions   as   to   negotiable   instruments   –
Until   the   contrary   is   proved,   the   following   presumptions
shall be made: ­
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(a) of   consideration   –   that   every   negotiable
instrument   was   made   or   drawn   for
consideration,   and   that   every   such
instrument,   when   it   has   been   accepted,
indorsed,   negotiated   or   transferred,   was
accepted,   indorsed,   negotiated   or   transferred
for consideration. ”
13.      The above noted provisions are explicit to the effect
that  such  presumption   would  remain,  until  the  contrary   is
proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard
has   relied   on   the   decision   of   this   court   in   K.   Bhaskaran
vs.   Sankaran   Vaidhyan   Balan   &   Anr. (1999)   7   SCC   510
wherein it is held as hereunder: ­
“9.   As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that
of   the   accused,   the   presumption   envisaged   in   Section
118   of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was
made   or   drawn   for   consideration   on   the   date   which   the
cheque bears.   Section 139   of the Act enjoins on the Court
to   presume   that   the   holder   of   the   cheque   received   it   for
the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on
the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Trial
Court   was   not   persuaded   to   rely   on   the   interested
testimony   of   DW­1   to   rebut   the   presumption.   The   said
finding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open
to the accused to contend differently on that aspect. ”
14. The   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   has   however
referred   to   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Basalingappa   vs.
Mudibasappa (2019)   5   SCC   418   wherein   it   is   held   as
hereunder: ­
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“25.   We having  noticed the ratio laid down by  this
Court   in   the   above   cases   on   Sections   118   (a)   and
139, we now summarise the principles enumerated
by this Court in following manner:
25.1.   Once   the   execution   of   cheque   is
admitted   Section   139   of   the   Act   mandates   a
presumption that the cheque was for the discharge
of any debt or other liability.
25.2.   The   presumption   under   Section   139   is   a
rebuttable   presumption   and   the   onus   is   on   the
accused   to   raise   the   probable   defence.   The
standard   of   proof   for   rebutting   the   presumption   is
that of preponderance of probabilities.
25.3.    To rebut the presumption, it is open for the
accused   to   rely   on   evidence   led   by   him   or   the
accused   can   also   rely   on   the   materials   submitted
by   the   complainant   in   order   to   raise   a   probable
defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities
can   be   drawn   not   only   from   the   materials   brought
on record by the parties but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which they rely.
25.4.   That   it   is   not   necessary   for   the   accused   to
come   in  the   witness   box   in  support   of   his   defence,
Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not
a persuasive burden.
25.5.  It is not necessary for the accused to come in
the witness box to support his defence.
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26.   Applying the preposition of law as noted above,
in   facts   of   the   present   case,   it   is   clear   that
signature   on   the   cheque   having   been   admitted,   a
presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that
the   cheque   was   issued   in   discharge   of   debt   or
liability.   The   question   to   be   looked   into   is   as   to
whether   any   probable   defence   was   raised   by   the
accused.   In   cross­examination   of   PW1,   when   the
specific question was put that cheque was issued in
relation to loan of Rs.25,000 taken by the accused,
PW1   said   that   he   does   not   remember.   PW1   in   his
evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which
date   he   received   monetary   benefit   of   Rs.8   lakhs,
which   was   encashed   by   the   complainant.   It   was
also brought in the evidence in the evidence that in
the year  2010, the complainant  entered into  a sale
agreement   for   which   he   paid   an   amount   of
Rs.4,50,000   to   Balana   Gouda   towards   sale
consideration.   Payment   of   Rs.4,50,000   being
admitted   in   the   year   2010   and   further   payment   of
loan   of   Rs.50,000   with   regard   to   which   Complaint
No.119  of 2012 was filed  by  the  complainant, copy
of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D­2, there
was   burden   on   the   complainant   to   prove   his
financial   capacity.   In   the   year   2010­2011,   as   per
own   case   of   the   complainant,   he   made   payment   of
Rs.18   lakhs.   During   his   cross­examination,   when
financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused
was   questioned,   there   was   no   satisfactory   reply
given   by   the   complainant.   The   evidence   on   record,
thus,   is   a   probable   defence   on   behalf   of   the
accused,   which   shifted   the   burden   on   the
complainant   to   prove   his   financial   capacity   and
other facts.”
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15.     In   that   light,   it   is   contended   that   the   very   materials
produced  by   the   appellant   and  the   answers  relating   to  lack
of   knowledge   of   property   details   by   PW­1   in   his   cross­
examination would indicate that the transaction is doubtful
and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was
paid. In such event, it was not necessary for the respondent
to  tender  rebuttal evidence but the  case put forth would  be
sufficient   to   indicate   that   the   respondent   has   successfully
rebutted the presumption.
16.         On   the   position   of   law,   the   provisions   referred   to   in
Section   118   and   139   of   N.I.   Act   as   also   the   enunciation   of
law as made by this Court needs no reiteration as there is no
ambiguity whatsoever. In,  Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa
(supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent,
though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against
raising   presumption,   the   facts   and   circumstances   are
entirely   different   as   the   transaction   between   the   parties   as
claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case
where   the   consideration   claimed   to   have   been   paid   did   not
find   favour   with   the   Court   keeping   in   view   the   various
Page  14  of  23

transactions   and   extent   of   amount   involved.   However,   the
legal  position   relating  to   presumption  arising   under  Section
118   and   139   of   N.I.   Act   on   signature   being   admitted   has
been   reiterated.   Hence,   whether   there   is   rebuttal   or   not
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
17. In   the   instant   facts,   as   noted,   the   case   put   forth
was that there was a transaction between the parties where
the   respondent   had  agreed to  sell the   house  towards  which
an   advance   amount   of   Rs.3,50,000/­   (Rupees   three   lakhs
fifty   thousand   only)   was   paid.   The   cheque   issued   by   the
respondent   was   towards   part   repayment   of   the   advance
amount since the appellant realized that the respondent did
not   have   proper   title   to   the   property   and   the   transaction
could   not   be   carried   forward.   Since   the   signature   on   the
agreement   (Exhibit   P­6)   and   more   particularly   the
dishonored   cheque   (Exhibit   P­2)   was   not   disputed,   the
presumption   as   provided   in   law   had   arisen.   Such
presumption   would   remain   till   it   is   rebutted.   The   question
however  is as to whether, either from  the material available
on record or the nature of contentions put forth it could be
Page  15  of  23

gathered   that   the   presumption   had   been   rebutted   by   the
respondent.   As   noted   by   the   High   Court,   the   contention   of
the respondent was that the relative of the appellant was the
junior   in   the   office   of   his   advocate,   Mr.   Rama   Joshi,   who
represented   the   respondent   in   a   civil   case.   In   that   light,   it
was   further   contended   that   due  to   such   dominant   position,
the respondent was made to sign on the agreement and the
cheque though the money had not been paid. The said story
was  urged for  the  first  time  before the  High Court.  There is
no such suggestion or admission to that effect as contended
by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent.   In   fact,   the
suggestion   made   to   PW1   in   his   cross­examination   is   to
contend   that   the   cousin   of   the   appellant   was   an   advocate
and as to whether he had consulted him before entering into
the agreement, to which PW1 has answered that he did not
find the need to do so. The admission that his cousin is an
advocate   does   not   lead   to   the   conclusion   that   he   had
admitted that he was in a dominant position.
18.   The   Learned   Single   Judge   however   while   accepting   the
said   story   has   referred   to   certain   discrepancies   in   the
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agreement (Exhibit P­6) relating to the details of the property
and the appellant having admitted with regard to not having
visited   the   property   or   having   knowledge   of   the   location   of
the   property.   Such   consideration,   in   our   opinion,   was   not
germane   and   was   beyond   the   scope   of   the   nature   of
litigation. The validity of the agreement in the manner as has
been examined by the learned Single Judge may have arisen
if   the   same   was   raised   as   an   issue   and   had   arisen   for
consideration   in   a   suit   for   specific   performance   of   the
agreement.   The   decision   in   K.   Chinnaswamy   Reddy   vs.
State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   and   Anr.   AIR   1962   SC   1788
relied   on   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   would
not be of assistance in the present facts. Firstly, in the said
decision   this   Court   has   expressed   the   limited   power
available   to   the   High   Court   in   Revision   Petition.   Even
otherwise,   we   have   disapproved   the   manner   in   which   the
learned   Single   Judge   has   proceeded   to   examine   the   matter
on contentions which were not raised as a foundation before
the   Trial   Court.   In   the   instant   case,   the   said   agreement
(Exhibit P­6) had been relied upon only to the limited extent
to indicate that there was a transaction between the parties
Page  17  of  23

due   to   which   the   amount   to   be   repaid   had   been   advanced.
To   that   extent   the   document   had   been   proved   in   evidence
and   such   evidence   had   not   been   discredited   in   the   cross­
examination. 
19.   Further,   though   the   respondent   had   put   forth   the
contention  that  a  relative  of  the   appellant   was  the  junior  of
his   advocate   and   he   has   used   his   dominant   position   to
secure   the   signature   on   the   cheque,   there   is   absolutely   no
explanation   whatsoever   to   indicate   the   reason   for   which
such necessity arose for him to secure the signatures of the
respondent, if there was no transaction whatsoever between
the   parties.   That   apart,   the   said   story   even   to   be   examined
was put forth for the first time before the High Court. As is
evident   from   the   records   the   notice   issued   by   the   appellant
intimating   the   dishonorment   of   the   cheque   and   demanding
payment,   though   received   by   the   respondent   has   not   been
replied.   In   such   situation,   the   first   opportunity   available   to
put   forth   such   contention   if   true   was   not   availed.   Even   in
the   proceedings   before   the   learned   JMFC,   the   respondent
has   not   put   forth   such   explanation   in   the   statement
Page  18  of  23

recorded under Section 313 of CrPC nor has the respondent
chosen to examine himself or any witness in this regard. The
said contention had not been raised even in the appeal filed
before the learned Sessions Judge.
20. Further, the story as put forth apart from being an
afterthought,   ex   facie   appears   to   be   contrary   to   the   records
since the contention on behalf of the respondent is that the
dominant position of the junior advocate in the office of Mr.
Rama   Joshi   was   used   to   secure   the   signature   when   the
respondent had engaged the said advocates in an earlier civil
case.   From   the   cause   title   in   the   present   case,   in   Criminal
Case   No.790/2000   before   the   JMFC,   it   is   seen   that   Mr.
Rama Joshi is the same learned advocate who had defended
the   respondent   in   this   litigation.   If   what   was   being   stated
was   the   true   fact,   the   respondent   would   have   brought   the
same to the notice of the said advocate and in such situation
would   not   have   engaged   the   same   advocate   against   whose
junior   he   had   a   grievance   and   engage   him   to   represent   the
case   relating   to   dishonor   cheque   which   was   of   the   same
subject   matter.   Further,   if   the   cheque   was   secured   in   such
Page  19  of  23

circumstance   and   was   not   voluntary,   it   is   difficult   to
comprehend   as   to   why   it   would   have   been   drawn   for
Rs.1,50,000/­(Rupees   one   lakh   fifty   thousand   only)   only
when it is the case of the appellant that the advance amount
paid   was   Rs.3,50,000/­(Rupees   three   lakh   fifty   thousand
only)   and   had   to   get   back   the   entire   advance   paid.   The
natural   conduct   would   have   been   to   secure   for   the   full
amount   if   that   was   the   situation.   Keeping   all   these   aspects
in view, the case put forth by the respondent does not satisfy
the requirement of rebuttal even if tested on the touchstone
of   preponderance   of   probability.   Therefore,   in   the   present
facts   it   cannot   be   held   that   the   presumption   which   had
arisen   in   favour   of   the   appellant   had   been   successfully
rebutted by the respondent herein. The High Court therefore
was not justified in its conclusion.
21.   Having   arrived   at   the   above   conclusion,   it   would   be
natural   to   restore   the   judgment   of   the   Learned   JMFC.
Though   in   that   regard,   we   confirm   the   order   of   conviction,
we   have   given   our   thoughtful   consideration   relating   to   the
appropriate   sentence   that   is   required   to   be   imposed   at   this
Page  20  of  23

stage, inasmuch as; whether it is necessary to imprison the
respondent   at   this   point   in   time   or   limit   the   sentence   to
imposition   of   fine.   As   noted,   the   transaction   in   question   is
not an out and out commercial transaction. The very case of
the appellant before the Trial Court was that the respondent
was   in   financial   distress   and   it   is   in   such   event,   he   had
offered to sell his house for which the advance payment was
made by the appellant. The subject cheque has been issued
towards repayment of a portion of the advance amount since
the   sale   transaction   could   not   be   taken   forward.   In   that
background,   what   cannot   also   be   lost   sight   of   is   that   more
than   two   and   half   decades   have   passed   from   the   date   on
which   the   transaction   had   taken   place.   During   this   period
there   would   be   a   lot   of   social   and   economic   change   in   the
status   of   the   parties.   Further,   as   observed   by   this   Court   in
Kaushalya Devi Massand vs. Roopkishore Khore  (2011) 4
SCC  593, the  gravity  of complaint  under  N.I.  Act cannot  be
equated   with   an   offence   under   the   provisions   of   the   Indian
Penal Code, 1860 or other criminal offences. In that view, in
our   opinion,   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   instant
case, if an enhanced fine is imposed it would meet the ends
Page  21  of  23

of   justice.   Only   in   the   event   the   respondent­accused   not
taking the benefit of the same to pay the fine but committing
default instead, he would invite the penalty of imprisonment.
Hence,   appropriate   modification   is   made   to   the   sentence   in
the manner as indicated hereinbelow:
22. For all the aforestated reasons, the following order;
(i) The   order   dated   01.12.2009   passed   by   the
High   Court  in   Criminal   Revision   Petition  No.
1282/2006 and 1481/2006 are set aside. 
 (ii) The   conviction   ordered   in   C.C.   No.790/2000
by the learned JMFC is restored.
 (iii) The   sentence   to   undergo   simple
imprisonment   for   six   months   and   fine   of
Rs.2,00,000/­   (Rupees   two   lakhs   only)   is
however   modified.   The   Respondent/Accused
is   instead   sentenced   to   pay   the   fine   of   Rs.
2,50,000/­   (Rupees  two   lakhs   fifty  thousand
only)   within   three   months.   In   default   of
payment   of   fine   the   Respondent/Accused
Page  22  of  23

shall   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   six
months. 
 (iv) From   the   fine   amount,   a   sum   of   Rs.
2,40,000/­ (Rupees two lakhs forty thousand
only)   shall   be   paid   to   the
Appellant/Complainant as compensation. 
 (v) The   Appeals   No.849­850/2011   are
accordingly allowed in part. 
 (vi) The   pending   applications,   if   any,   stand
disposed of.  
………….…………CJI
(N.V. RAMANA)
          ………….…………….J.
(SURYA KANT)
     ………….…………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
September 23, 2021
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