2021 INSC 0583
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 of 2012
Ramgopal & Anr.         ..... Appellant(s)
                                       VERSUS
The State of Madhya Pradesh  ..... Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 of 2012
Krishnappa & Ors. ..... Appellant(s)
                                       VERSUS
State of Karnataka ..... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J.
These   two   Criminal   Appeals,   No.   1489   of   2012   emanating   from
the judgment and order dated 27 th
  November, 2009 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench and No. 1488 of 2012 arising out
of   judgment   and   order   dated   9 th
  January,   2009   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Karnataka,   though,   pertain   to   two   different   and   distinct
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occurrences, but are proposed to be disposed of by way of a common
order   as   the   short   question   of   law   involved   in   both   these   appeals   is
identical. 
B RIEF  F ACTS   OF  C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O . 1489  OF  2012
2. The   prosecution   version,   arising   out   of   FIR   dated   3 rd
  November
2000,   Police   Station   Ambah,   Morena,   M.P.   is   that   on   account   of
certain   monetary   dispute,   the   Appellants   abused   and   assaulted
Padam   Singh  (Complainant).   Appellant  No.1  is  alleged  to  have  struck
the   Complainant   with   a   pharsa ,   which   resultantly   cut   off   the   little
finger   of   his   left   hand.   Appellant   No.2   also   struck   lathi   blows   on   the
body   of   the   Complainant.   Appellants   were   thereafter   committed   for
trial   under   Sections   294,   323   and   326   read   with   34   of   Indian   Penal
Code,   1860   (hereinafter,   ‘IPC’)   and   Section   3   of   the   Prevention   of
Atrocities   (Scheduled   Caste   and   Scheduled   Tribes)   Act,   1989.   Upon
analyzing   the   evidence,   the   Learned   Judicial   Magistrate(FC),   Ambah,
convicted   the  Appellants  under  Sections   294,   323  and  326   read   with
34   IPC   with   a   maximum   sentence   of   three   years   under   Section   326
read with 34 IPC. They were acquitted of the remaining charges.
3. The   Appellants   assailed   their   conviction   before   the   Court   of
Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Ambah.   During   the   pendency   of   that
Appeal,   the   Appellants   and   the   Complainant   reconciled   their
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difference(s)   and   a   compromise   ensued   between   them   on   13 th
September   2006.   Learned   Sessions   Judge   took   notice   of   the
settlement, moved jointly by the parties, and compounded the offences
under   Sections   294   and   323   read   with   34   IPC,   acquitting   the
Appellants   of   the   same.   The   Court,   nevertheless,   maintained   their
conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, since the said offence
is   `non­compoundable’   within   the   scheme   of   Section   320   Cr.P.C.
Learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   taking   into   consideration   the
settlement between the parties, reduced the quantum of sentence from
Rigorous Imprisonment of three years to one year. Still aggrieved, the
Appellants   preferred   a   Criminal   Revision   before   the   High   Court   of
Madhya   Pradesh,   Gwalior   Bench,   challenging   their   conviction   and
sentence.   Alternatively,   they   sought   compounding   of   offence   under
Section   326   IPC   in   light   of   the   compromise.   However,   such   a   prayer
was not acceded to by the High Court, re­iterating  that the offence is
‘non­compoundable’.   The   High   Court,   even   so,   further   reduced   the
duration   of   imprisonment   to   the   period   already   undergone   by   the
Appellants.   The   Appellants   are   now   before   this   Court,   seeking
compounding of their  Actus Reus  under Section 326 IPC in view of the
settlement between parties.
B RIEF  F ACTS   OF  C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O . 1488  OF  2012
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4. The   incident   is   charted   from   FIR   No.   24   of   1995,   Police   Station
Thirthahalli,   Shimoga,   Karnataka,   dated   28 th
  January   1995.   As   per
the   allegations,   the   Appellants   and   the   other   accused   persons,   all   of
whom   belong   to   the   same   family,   were   aggrieved   against   the
Complainant as he had imparted some inculpatory information to the
Forest Department officials, which had caused financial loss to them.
The disgruntled Appellants lured the Complainant to their house and
assaulted   him   with   weapons   after   tying   his   hands   to   a   window.   It   is
further   alleged   that   Accused   Nos.   5   to   7   instigated   the   Appellants   to
assault the Complainant, besides kicking him with fists and legs. The
Complainant’s   family   members   found   him   semi­conscious   lying   in   a
pit near their house.
5. The   Appellants,   together   with   Accused   Nos.   5   and   7   were   tried
and   convicted  under  Sections   143,   144,   147,  148,  342,  324   and   326
read   with   149   IPC   and   the   maximum   sentence   awarded   to   them   was
two   years   simple   imprisonment   under   Section   326   IPC.   The   trial
against Accused No. 6 was split after filing of the chargesheet, since he
remained   absconding.   The   Appellants   along   with   the   co­accused,
approached the High Court of Karnataka, challenging their conviction
and   sentence.   The   High   Court   acquitted   Accused   Nos.   5   &   7   finding
insufficient evidence to sustain their involvement in the subject crime,
but   maintained   the   conviction   and   sentence   qua   the   Appellants.   In
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this   case   as   well,   the   parties   entered   into   a   compromise.     The   said
compromise was, however, not placed on record before the Trial Court
or   the   High   Court.   The   Appellants   are   now   seeking   ‘compounding   of
the   offences’   and   their   consequential   acquittal   on   the   basis   of   the
compromise reached between them and the Complainant­victim.
6. When   both   these   appeals   came   up   for   hearing,   a   two­Judge
Bench   of   this   Court,   vide   common   order   dated   21 st
  September   2012
granted leave to appeal. The Bench further directed the appeals to be
listed after the disposal of reference made in  Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab 1
, where  a 3­Judge  Bench of this  Court,  at that point in time,
was considering the issue as to whether `non­compoundable’ offences
can   be   `compounded’   by   a   Court   or   in   the   alternative,   whether   the
High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   inherent   powers   under   Section   482
Cr.P.C.   could   quash   non­compoundable   offences,   based   on   a
compromise/settlement   arrived   at   between   the   accused   and   the
victim­complainant, and if so, under what circumstances. 
7. The   Appellants,   in   both   the   appeals,   thus   seek   the   Court   to
invoke   powers   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   to   do   complete
justice to them.
A NALYSIS :
1
  (2012) 10 SCC 303
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8. We   have   heard   learned   Counsels   for   the   Appellants   and   the
State(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning the
power   of   a   High   Court   to   quash   proceedings   emanating   from   non­
compoundable   offences   which   have   no   impact   or   depraving   effect   on
the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between the accused
and   the   victim­complainant,   are   no   longer   res   integra   and   the   same
have   been authoritatively settled by this Court in affirmative .   Learned
Counsel   for   the   Appellants   and   Complainant(s)   in   both   the   appeals
have,   therefore,   heavily   counted   on   the   compromise/settlement
between the parties and seek quashing of the criminal prosecution in
its entirety, Learned State Counsel(s) without controverting the factum
of compromise, vehemently opposed such a recourse and asserted that
no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals.
9. Before   scrutinizing   the   facts   of   these   cases   and   rephrasing   the
scope   of   powers   exercisable   by   a   High   Court   under   Section   482
Cr.P.C., it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid
down by a 3­Judge Bench of this Court in  Gian Singh (Supra)  case :
“61.   …the   power   of   the   High   Court   in   quashing   a
criminal  proceeding  or   FIR   or  complaint   in   exercise   of
its   inherent   jurisdiction   is   distinct   and   different   from
the   power   given   to   a   criminal   court   for   compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code.   Inherent
power   is   of   wide   plenitude   with   no   statutory
limitation   but   it   has   to   be   exercised   in   accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. :
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(i)  to  secure  the ends  of  justice,  or  (ii)  to  prevent
abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power   to   quash   the   criminal   proceeding   or
complaint   or   FIR   may   be   exercised   where   the
offender   and   the   victim   have   settled   their
dispute   would   depend   on   the   facts   and
circumstances of each case and no category can
be   prescribed.   However,   before   exercise   of   such
power,   the   High   Court   must   have   due   regard   to   the
nature  and  gravity  of  the  crime.  Heinous  and  serious
offences   of   mental   depravity   or   offences   like   murder,
rape,   dacoity,   etc.   cannot   be   fittingly   quashed   even
though   the   victim   or   victim's   family   and   the   offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
in   nature   and   have   a   serious   impact   on   society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the
offender   in   relation   to   the   offences   under   special
statutes   like   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   or   the
offences   committed   by   public   servants   while   working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing   criminal   proceedings   involving   such
offences.   But   the   criminal   cases   having
overwhelmingly   and   predominatingly   civil
flavour   stand   on   a   different   footing   for   the
purposes   of   quashing,   particularly   the   offences
arising   from   commercial,   financial,   mercantile,
civil,   partnership   or   such   like   transactions   or
the offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry,   etc.   or   the   family   disputes   where   the
wrong is  basically private or personal in nature
and   the   parties   have   resolved   their   entire
dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court
may   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   if   in   its
view,   because   of   the   compromise   between   the
offender   and   the   victim,   the   possibility   of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation
of   the   criminal   case   would   put   the   accused   to
great   oppression   and   prejudice   and   extreme
injustice   would   be   caused   to   him   by   not
quashing   the   criminal   case   despite   full   and
complete   settlement   and   compromise   with   the
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victim.   In other words, the High Court must consider
whether  it   would   be  unfair  or  contrary  to   the   interest
of   justice   to   continue   with   the   criminal   proceeding   or
continuation   of   the   criminal   proceeding   would
tantamount   to   abuse   of   process   of   law   despite
settlement   and   compromise   between   the   victim   and
the   wrongdoer   and   whether   to   secure   the   ends   of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to
an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in
the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
(Emphasis Applied)
10. The   compendium   of   these   broad   fundamentals   structured   in
more   than   one   judicial   precedent,   has   been   recapitulated   by   another
3­Judge Bench  of this Court in  State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi
Narayan & Ors . 2
 elaborating:
“(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the
Code   to   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   for   the   non­
compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code
can   be   exercised   having   overwhelmingly   and
predominantly   the   civil   character,   particularly   those
arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when
the   parties   have   resolved   the   entire   dispute   amongst
themselves;
(2)   Such   power   is   not   to   be   exercised   in   those
prosecutions   which   involved   heinous   and   serious
offences   of   mental   depravity   or   offences   like   murder,
rape,   dacoity,   etc.   Such   offences   are   not   private   in
nature and have a serious impact on society;
(3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the
offences under the special statutes like the Prevention
of   Corruption  Act   or   the  offences   committed   by  public
2   
 (2019) 5 SCC 688,  ¶ 15
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servants while working in that capacity  are  not to  be
quashed   merely   on   the  basis   of   compromise   between
the victim and the offender;
(4) xxx  xxx xxx
(5)  While exercising the power under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of non­compoundable offences, which are
private   in   nature   and   do   not   have   a   serious
impact on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise   between   the   victim   and
the   offender,   the   High   Court   is   required   to
consider   the   antecedents   of   the   accused;   the
conduct   of   the   accused,   namely,   whether   the
accused   was   absconding   and   why   he   was
absconding,   how   he   had   managed   with   the
complainant to enter into a compromise, etc. ”
(Emphasis Applied)
11. True it is that offences which are ‘non­compoundable’ cannot be
compounded   by   a   criminal   court   in   purported   exercise   of   its   powers
under   Section   320   Cr.P.C.   Any   such   attempt   by   the   court   would
amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C,
which   is   the   exclusive   domain   of   Legislature.   There   is   no   patent   or
latent   ambiguity   in   the   language   of   Section   320   Cr.P.C.,   which   may
justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket
of   ‘compoundable’   offences   which   have   been   consciously   kept   out   as
non­compoundable.   Nevertheless,   the   limited   jurisdiction   to
compound   an   offence   within   the   framework   of   Section   320   Cr.P.C.   is
not   an   embargo   against   invoking   inherent   powers   by   the   High   Court
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vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view
the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   a   case   and   for   justifiable
reasons   can  press  Section   482  Cr.P.C.   in  aid   to   prevent  abuse  of  the
process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
12. The   High   Court,   therefore,   having   regard   to   the   nature   of   the
offence   and   the   fact   that   parties   have   amicably   settled   their   dispute
and   the   victim   has   willingly   consented   to   the   nullification   of   criminal
proceedings,   can   quash   such   proceedings   in   exercise   of   its   inherent
powers   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.,   even   if   the   offences   are   non­
compoundable.   The   High   Court   can   indubitably   evaluate   the
consequential   effects   of   the   offence   beyond   the   body   of   an   individual
and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony,
even   if   goes   unpunished,   does   not   tinker   with   or   paralyze   the   very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non­heinous
offences or where the offences are pre­dominantly of a private nature,
can   be   annulled   irrespective   of   the   fact   that   trial   has   already   been
concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method
of applying laws evenly is always subject to  lawful exceptions. It goes
without   saying,   that   the   cases   where   compromise   is   struck   post­
conviction,   the   High   Court   ought   to   exercise   such   discretion   with
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rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident,
the   fashion   in   which   the   compromise   has   been   arrived   at,   and   with
due   regard   to   the   nature   and   seriousness   of   the   offence,   besides   the
conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone
for   exercising   the   extra­ordinary   power   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.
would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast
line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice.
A   restrictive   construction   of   inherent   powers   under   Section   482
Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts
and   circumstances   of   a   case,   may   rather   lead   to   grave   injustice.     On
the   other   hand,   in   cases   where   heinous   offences   have   been   proved
against   perpetrators,   no   such   benefit   ought   to   be   extended,   as
cautiously   observed   by   this   Court   in   Narinder   Singh   &   Ors.   vs.
State of Punjab & Ors. 3
 and Laxmi Narayan (Supra) .
14. In   other   words,   grave   or   serious   offences   or   offences   which
involve   moral   turpitude   or   have   a   harmful   effect   on   the   social   and
moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy,
cannot be  construed betwixt two  individuals  or groups  only,  for  such
offences   have   the   potential   to   impact   the   society   at   large.   Effacing
abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a
wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit
3   
(2014) 6 SCC 466,  ¶ 29
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to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a
‘settlement’   through   duress,   threats,   social   boycotts,   bribes   or   other
dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can
be avoided.”
15. Given   these   settled   parameters,   the   order   of   the   High   Court   of
Madhya Pradesh culminating into  Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012,
to   the   extent   it   holds   that   the   High   Court   does   not   have   power   to
compound a non­compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent
powers   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.   and   is,   thus,   unsustainable.
However, the judgment and order dated 9 th
 January, 2009 of the High
Court   of   Karnataka,   giving   rise   to   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1488   of   2012
cannot be faulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did
not bring any compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court.
16. Let us now delve into the nature of  powers vested in this Court
under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution,   with   an   intent   to   do   complete
justice.   It   would   be   ad   rem   to   outrightly   cite   the   Constitution   Bench
decision in  Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India &
Ors. 4
, where this Court has ruled as follows:
“83.   It   is   necessary   to   set   at   rest   certain
misconceptions   in   the   arguments   touching   the
scope   of   the   powers   of   this   Court   under   Article
142(1)   of   the   Constitution.   These   issues   are
4     
(1991) 4 SCC 584,   83
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matters   of   serious   public   importance.   The
proposition that a provision in any ordinary law
irrespective   of   the   importance   of   the   public
policy   on   which   it   is   founded,   operates   to   limit
the   powers   of   the   apex   Court   under   Article
142(1)   is   unsound   and   erroneous.   In
both   Garg   [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899­900 : AIR 1963
SC 996] as well as   Antulay cases   [(1988) 2 SCC 602 :
1988  SCC  (Cri)  372]  the  point   was  one  of  violation  of
constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The
observations   as   to   the   effect   of   inconsistency   with
statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those
cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned
on the breach of constitutional rights.   We agree with
Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under
Article   142   insofar   as   quashing   of   criminal
proceedings   are   concerned   is   not   exhausted   by
Section   320   or   321   or   482   CrPC   or   all   of   them
put   together.   The   power   under   Article   142   is   at
an   entirely   different   level   and   of   a   different
quality .   Prohibitions or limitations or provisions
contained   in   ordinary   laws   cannot,   ipso   facto,
act   as   prohibitions   or   limitations   on   the
constitutional   powers   under   Article   142.   Such
prohibitions   or   limitations   in   the   statutes   might
embody   and   reflect   the   scheme   of   a   particular   law,
taking   into   account   the   nature   and   status   of   the
authority  or  the  court on  which  conferment  of  powers
—   limited   in   some   appropriate   way   —   is
contemplated.   The   limitations   may   not   necessarily
reflect   or   be   based   on   any   fundamental
considerations   of   public   policy.   Sri   Sorabjee,   learned
Attorney General, referring to   Garg case   [1963 Supp 1
SCR   885,   899­900   :   AIR   1963   SC   996]   ,   said   that
limitation   on   the   powers   under   Article   142   arising
from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions
of   substantive   law”   must   really   mean   and   be
understood   as   some   express   prohibition   contained   in
any   substantive   statutory   law.   He   suggested   that   if
the   expression   ‘prohibition’   is   read   in   place   of
‘provision’ that would perhaps convey the appropriate
idea.   But   we   think   that   such   prohibition   should   also
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be   shown   to   be   based   on   some   underlying
fundamental   and   general   issues   of   public   policy   and
not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme
or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that
powers under Article 142 are subject to such express
statutory   prohibitions.   That   would   convey   the   idea
that   statutory   provisions   override   a   constitutional
provision.   Perhaps,   the   proper   way   of   expressing
the   idea   is   that   in   exercising   powers   under
Article   142   and   in   assessing   the   needs   of
“complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex
Court   will   take   note   of   the   express   prohibitions
in   any   substantive   statutory   provision   based   on
some   fundamental   principles   of   public   policy
and   regulate   the   exercise   of   its   power   and
discretion accordingly. The proposition does not
relate   to   the   powers   of   the   Court   under   Article
142,   but   only   to   what   is   or   is   not   ‘complete
justice’ of a cause or matter and in the ultimate
analysis   of   the   propriety   of   the   exercise   of   the
power.   No   question   of   lack   of   jurisdiction   or   of
nullity can arise .”
(Emphasis Applied)
17. The   afore­quoted   precept   has   been   consistently   followed   by   this
Court   in   numerous   subsequent   decisions,   including   in   Monica
Kumar & Anr. vs. State of U.P. 5
, Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Union
of India 6
  and   Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India 7
,
inter­alia, reiterating that: 
“47.   The   plenary   powers   of   this   Court   under   Article
142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and
are   complementary   to   those   powers   which
5   
(2008) 8 SCC 781,  ¶ 45
6  
(2014) 2 SCC 532,  ¶ 43
7  
(1998) 4 SCC 409,  ¶ 47
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are   specifically   conferred   on   the   Court   by   various
statutes   though   are   not   limited   by   those   statutes .
These   powers   also   exist   independent   of   the   statutes
with   a   view   to   do   complete   justice   between   the
parties.     These   powers   are   of   very   wide   amplitude
and   are   in   the   nature   of   supplementary   powers.   This
power exists as a separate and independent basis of
jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the
foundation   and   the   basis   for   its   exercise   may   be   put
on   a   different   and   perhaps   even   wider   footing,   to
prevent   injustice   in   the   process   of   litigation   and   to   do
complete   justice   between   the   parties .   This   plenary
jurisdiction   is,   thus,   the   residual   source   of
power   which   this   Court   may   draw   upon   as
necessary   whenever it is just and equitable to do
so   and in particular to ensure the observance of
the   due   process   of   law,   to   do   complete   justice
between the  parties ,  while administering justice
according to law. There is no doubt that it is an
indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is
free   from   the   restraint   of   jurisdiction   and
operates   as   a   valuable   weapon   in   the   hands   of
the   Court   to   prevent   “clogging   or   obstruction   of
the stream of justice” …”
(Emphasis Applied)
18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction of
this   Court   to   impart   complete   justice   under   Article   142   cannot   ipso
facto  be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also
noteworthy   that   even   in   the   absence   of   an   express   provision   akin   to
Section   482   Cr.P.C.   conferring   powers   on   the   Supreme   Court   to
abrogate   and   set   aside   criminal   proceedings,   the   jurisdiction
exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court
with   scopious   powers   to   quash   criminal   proceedings   also,   so   as   to
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secure complete justice.  In doing so, due regard must be given to the
overarching   objective   of   sentencing   in   the   criminal   justice   system,
which   is   grounded   on   the   sub­lime   philosophy   of   maintenance   of
peace   of   the   collective   and   that   the   rationale   of   placing   an   individual
behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We   thus   sum­up   and   hold   that   as   opposed   to   Section   320
Cr.P.C.   where   the   Court   is   squarely   guided   by   the   compromise
between   the   parties   in   respect   of   offences   ‘compoundable’   within   the
statutory   framework,   the   extra­ordinary   power   enjoined   upon   a   High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article
142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds
of Section 320 Cr.P.C.   Nonetheless, we  reiterate that such powers of
wide   amplitude   ought   to   be   exercised   carefully   in   the   context   of
quashing  criminal  proceedings,  bearing  in  mind:   (i)   Nature  and  effect
of   the   offence   on   the   conscious   of   the   society;   (ii)   Seriousness   of   the
injury,   if   any ;   (iii)   Voluntary   nature   of   compromise   between   the
accused and the victim; &   (iv)   Conduct of the accused  persons, prior
to   and   after   the   occurrence   of   the   purported   offence   and/or   other
relevant considerations.
20. Having   appraised   the   afore­stated   para­meters   and   weighing
upon   the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   two   appeals   before
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us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the
criminal   proceedings   and   consequently   set   aside   the   conviction   in
both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
Firstly , the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorized
as   purely   personal   or   having   overtones   of   criminal   proceedings   of
private nature;
Secondly ,   the   nature   of   injuries   incurred,   for   which   the   Appellants
have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or
commission   of   an   offence   of   such   a   serious   nature   that   quashing   of
which would override public interest;   
Thirdly , given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial
that   the   trial   against   the   Appellants   had   been   concluded   or   their
appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed;
Fourthly ,   the   parties   on   their   own   volition,   without   any   coercion   or
compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and
wish to accord a  quietus  to their dispute(s);
Fifthly , the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the
years   2000   and   1995,   respectively.   There   is   nothing   on   record   to
evince   that   either   before   or   after   the   purported   compromise,   any
untoward incident transpired between the parties;
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Sixthly , since the  Appellants  and  the complainant(s)  are residents of
the   same   village(s)   and/or   work   in   close   vicinity,   the   quashing   of
criminal   proceedings   will   advance   peace,   harmony,   and   fellowship
amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill­will
and have no vengeance against each other;  and
Seventhly ,   the   cause   of   administration   of   criminal   justice   system
would   remain   un­effected   on   acceptance   of   the   amicable   settlement
between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more
so looking at their present age.
CONCLUSION : 
C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O .1489  OF  2012
21. Consequently,   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   read   with   the
settlement dated 13 th
 September 2006, we find it appropriate to invoke
our   powers   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   and   quash   the
criminal   proceedings   in   the   aforesaid   case.   As   a   sequel   thereto,   all
offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489
of   2012   stand   annulled,   and   the   judgment   and   orders   passed   by   the
trial   court,   appellate   court   and   the   High   Court   are   set   aside.
Resultantly, the Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of
the charged offences for all intents and purposes. 
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C RIMINAL  A PPEAL  N O .1488  OF  2012
22. In  so  far  as this  appeal  is  concerned,  we note  that even though
the Learned Counsel(s) for the Appellants and the Complainant­victim
have jointly stated before this Court that the parties have settled their
dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either been brought on record
nor has it been even clarified that such a deed of settlement has been
recorded.   Admittedly,   the   factum   of   compromise/settlement   between
the parties has been raised for the first time before this Court. In the
absence of any proof of settlement, we find ourselves hard­pressed to
take   cognizance   of   the   asseverated   compromise.   We,   therefore,   direct
both the Appellants as well as the complainant­victim to appear before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit their settlement, if
any, in writing within a period of three months. The C.J.M. shall send
a   Report   to   this   Court   immediately,   recording   his   satisfaction   with
regard   to   the   genuineness   of   the   compromise.   In   the   event,   the   said
Report   would   reflect   a   bona­fide   settlement   between   the   parties,   the
present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed of in same
terms   as   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1489   of   2012,   referred   to   above.
Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event would be that the
Appellants   shall   be   treated   to   have   been   acquitted   of   all   the   charged
offences for all intents and purposes.  On the other hand, if no formal
settlement   is   placed   before   C.J.M.,   Shimoga   within   the   stipulated
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period or the Report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shall
stand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised or
involved in this appeal. 
23. Both the Criminal Appeals are  disposed of   in above terms.
……………………….. CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 29.09.2021
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