2021 INSC 0603
    REPORTABLE
         
                                                    
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6023 OF 2021   
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.25409/2017)
Paulmech Infrastructure Private                ….Appellant(s)
Limited       
Versus
The State of Odisha & Ors.                  ….  Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   assailing   the
order   dated   09.03.2017   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Orissa   at   Cuttack,   in   W.P.(C)   No.23103/2013.   By   the
said   order   the   High   Court   was   of   the   opinion   that   the
disputed questions of fact involved in the petition cannot
be   gone   into   in   the   writ   jurisdiction.     Accordingly,   the
prayer made in the petition was not entertained and the
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appellant   was   relegated   to   approach   the   appropriate
forum   available   for   redressal   of   its   grievance.   The
appellant, therefore being aggrieved is before this Court. 
2. The   respondent   No.1­State   of   Odisha   had   granted
the   lease   of   the   property   in   question   in   favour   of   the
respondent   No.5­Utkal   Ashok   Hotel   Corporation   Limited
(for   short   ‘UAHCL’)   for   99   years   under   the   document
dated 24.01.1989. UAHCL was, in that view, running an
establishment   in   the   name   and   style   ‘Hotel   Nilachal
Ashok’   in   the   said   premises   at   Puri.   The   same   being
unviable  was  closed down  with   the  approval   of  Board  of
Directors in the year 2004. Thereafter, UAHCL decided to
lease   out   the   same  for   a  period   of  40  years.   Tender   was
floated   in   the   year   2009.   The   appellant   was   one   among
the  tenderers  who   participated  in  the  process and   being
the   highest   bidder   was   considered.   Accordingly,   the
Letter   of   Intent   (for   short   ‘LOI’)   dated   19.01.2010   was
issued in favour of the appellant delineating the terms to
be complied pursuant to which the lease agreement was
to be signed. 
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3. Among   the   other   conditions   which   were   to   form
part   of   the   lease   agreement,   even   before   executing   the
lease agreement the requirement was for the appellant to
pay a sum of Rs.9.34 crores   to   UAHCL   within   30
days,   of   which   Rs.8.82   crores   was   towards   non­
refundable   amount   which   was   to   be   paid   upfront;   the
security   deposit   of   Rs.26   lakhs   and   the   advance
minimum guaranteed annual lease premium for the first
year of Rs.26 lakhs was also to be paid. 
4. On   payment   of   the   said   amount   the   lease   was   to
be   executed   and   the   other   conditions   would   come   into
operation.   The   appellant   who   was   unable   to   pay   the
amount within the time stipulated, requested the UAHCL
that   they   be   permitted   to   deposit   a   part   of   the   amount
i.e.,   Rs.4.41   crores   on   19.09.2010   and   the   balance
amount by 15.04.2010 which was favourably considered
by   UAHCL   through   their   communication   dated
12.02.2010. Such indulgence was shown as special case.
The appellant accordingly  deposited a  portion of upfront
amount to the tune of Rs.4.41 crores on 18.02.2010, but
the   balance   amount   was   not   deposited   within   the
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extended   time   stipulated   i.e.,   before   15.04.2010.   In   that
view,   the   lease   agreement   could   not   be   executed.
However,   in   view   of   the   request   from   the   appellant,
UAHCL   through   their   communication   dated   25.11.2010
once   again   acceded   to   the   request   permitting   the
appellant to pay the balance amount before 15.12.2010. 
5. The   appellant   thereafter   paid   (i)   the   sum   of   Rs.2
crores   on   28.12.2010,   (ii)   sum   of   Rs.1.41   crores   on
29.12.2010   and   (iii)   the   sum   of   Rs.70   lakhs   on
07.01.2011.   Such   payment,   according   to   the   appellant
constitutes the payment which was required to be made
as per the LOI. However, the time gap which had ensued
had   created   a   position   wherein   the   grievance   of   the
employees was to be addressed and they were to be given
the   benefit   of   voluntary   retirement.   Since   the   LOI   dated
19.01.2010 had also  provided for  regulating  the manner
in which the employees are to be treated during the lease
period   and   had   provided   the   liberty   to   offer   voluntary
retirement, the UAHCL required the appellant to bear the
liability   towards   the   same.   The   same   did   not   reach   a
finality   and   in   the   meanwhile   the   Board   of   Directors   of
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UAHCL   took   the   decision   to   terminate   the   LOI   dated
19.01.2010 since the appellant had failed to comply with
clause 2 thereof, which required the payment of Rs.9.34
crores within 30 days of issuance of LOI. 
6. Even   prior   to   communication   of   the   decision   on
10.12.2013,   the   appellant   filed   the   special   writ   petition
before   the   High   Court   on   01.10.2013   wherein   a   prayer
was   sought   to   direct   UAHCL   to   execute   the   lease
agreement pursuant to the terms agreed under LOI dated
19.01.2010   and   accept   the   balance   amount   along   with
interest   for   delayed   payment.     During   the   pendency   of
the   writ   petition   the   prayer   was   amended   and   the
appellant   sought   for   quashing   the   letter   dated
10.12.2013   whereby   UAHCL   decided   to   terminate   the
LOI. UAHCL had filed their objection statement opposing
the writ petition including contending therein with regard
to the maintainability of the writ petition in a contractual
matter.   The   learned   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
having   taken   note   of   the   rival   contentions   and   the
dispute involved for adjudication, was of the opinion that
the disputed questions are best left to be resolved before
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the appropriate forum. The appellant is assailing the said
order.
7. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Bansal, learned counsel
appearing   for   the   appellant,   Mr.   Ashok   Kumar   Gupta,
learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   UAHCL   and
perused the appeal papers.
8. The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   would
contend that the action of UAHCL to cancel the LOI and
retain the amount paid thereunder is not justified. In an
attempt   to   fortify   his   submission,   the   learned   counsel
has   referred   to   LOI   dated   19.01.2010   with   reference   to
clause   2,   to   point   out   that   the   upfront   amount   payable
within   30   days   though   not   paid   within   the   time
stipulated therein, the appellant had sought extension of
time   to   pay   which   was   agreed   to   by   the   communication
dated   04.02.2010   and   extended   by   the   communication
dated 25.11.2010. Though the time agreed thereunder is
up   to15.12.2010,   the   amount   paid   by   the   appellant   on
28.12.2010   (Rs.2   crores),   29.12.2010   (Rs.1.41   crores)
and 07.11.2011 (Rs.70 lakhs) had been accepted without
demur   and   as   such   the   upfront   payment   of   Rs.8.82
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crores as required had been paid. In that view, the lease
agreement   was   required  to   be  executed.  It  is  contended,
though   that   was   position,   UAHCL   instead   of   executing
the   lease   agreement   had   through   the   communication
dated   13.04.2011   raised   the   issue   of   the   appellant
having   to  bear   the   total   liability   on  account   of  providing
voluntary  retirement  to  the employees  which  was as  per
the decision of the  Board of UAHCL due to  insistence of
the   State   Government,   though   it   was   not   a   condition   in
the   LOI   nor   could   have   been   included   in   the   lease
agreement.   It   is   pointed   out   that   clause   11   of   the   LOI
though   provided   for   regulating   the   manner   in   which   the
employees   are   to   be   maintained   had   indicated   that   the
appellant shall not retrench them but the liberty was for
the   appellant   to   consider   VRS.   As   such   it   could   not   be
imposed   on   the   appellant   is   the   contention.   In   such
circumstance, it is contended by the learned counsel that
the   appellant   having   made   the   payment  was   entitled   for
the lease agreement to be executed in their favour. Hence
the   termination   being   bad,   be   set   aside   and   the   UAHCL
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be   directed   to   execute   the   lease   agreement   is   his
submission. 
9. The learned counsel for UAHCL would on the other
hand   contend   that   the   LOI   was   issued   in   favour   of   the
appellant after the tender process and as such the terms
of   the   LOI   was   required   to   be   complied.   Despite   the
payment of Rs.9.34 crores required to be made within 30
days, the appellant had failed to comply with the same. It
is  true  that   as   per   the   request   of  the  appellant   the   time
was  extended,   but  it   was  only   a  concession   as  a  special
case. Even as per the extension granted the payment was
required to be made by 15.12.2010. But, even as per the
admitted   case   of  the   appellant   the   payment  towards  the
balance   of   the   upfront   amount   was   made   only   on
28.12.2010,   29.12.2010   and   07.01.2011   which   was
subsequent to the date till which extension was provided.
That   apart,   since   the   requirement   is   to   pay   Rs.9.34
crores   within   the   time   stipulated,   the   security   deposit
and   advance   minimum   guaranteed   annual   lease
premium amount was also required to be paid within the
time   stipulated   but   had   not   been   paid.   As   such   the
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appellant cannot contend that they have performed their
obligation so as to assail the termination of LOI and seek
execution   of   the   lease   agreement.   In   that   view,   while
justifying   the   termination   it   is   also   contended   that   the
upfront   amount   of   Rs.8.82   crores   being   one­time   non­
refundable amount, it is within  the  powers of UAHCL to
retain   the   same.   Alternatively,   it   is   contended   that
UAHCL   was   forced   to   incur   idle   expenses   towards
maintenance   and   the   benefits   payable   to   the   employees
without getting returns as the lease had not materialised
due   to   the   default   committed   by   the   appellant.   In   this
regard,   roughly   an   amount   of   Rs.4.5   crores   has   been
incurred by  UAHCL which in any event, the appellant is
liable   to   reimburse.   In   that   view,   the   learned   counsel
seeks that the appeal be dismissed.  
     10. In the light of the contentions put forth, it is seen
that   the   lease   agreement   was   to   be   entered   into   between
the parties pursuant to the terms depicted in LOI and on
compliance   of   the   initial   obligations   set   out   therein.   The
present   dispute   relates   to   the   initial   payment   that   was
required   to   be   made   by   the   appellant   within   the   time
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frame set out in the LOI and non­adherence to which has
resulted   in   termination   of   LOI.   Clause   2   of   the   LOI
provides for the same, which reads as hereunder: ­
“2.   You   shall   execute   the   Operating   Lease
Agreement within 30 days of the issue of LOI
and   pay   an   amount   of   Rs.9.34   crore   within
these 30 days as per following details 
i. One­time   non­refundable   upfront
payment of Rs.8.82 crore. 
ii. Security   Deposit   (Rs.26.00   lakh)   as   per
article iv. 
iii. Advance   Minimum   Guaranteed   Annual
Lease   Premium   for   the   first   year
(Rs.26.00   lakh)   as   per   annex­ix­
Financial Bid.”
11. A perusal of the same indicates that the appellant
was   obliged   to   pay   an   amount   of   Rs.9.34   crore   within
30   days   from   19.01.2010   and   execute   the   Operating
Lease   Agreement.   Towards   the   said   amount,   a   sum   of
Rs. 8.82 crore was payable upfront as an one­time non­
refundable amount. Though the learned counsel for the
appellant   sought   to   contend   that   the   Minimum
Guaranteed   Annual   Lease   Premium   and   Security
deposit of Rs. 26 lakh each are to be paid subsequently
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when   the   lease   is   executed,   in   our   view   it   cannot   be
considered   to   be   loose   ended.   Since   Clause   2   refers   to
Rs.9.34   crore   which   is   payable   in   30   days   and   that
includes   the   said   amount   of   Advance   Annual   Premium
and   Security   deposit,   the   entire   amount   was   payable
within   30   days.   And   the   Lease   Agreement   was
simultaneously executable. It only means that the same
should   be   paid   and   the   formality   of   execution   of   Lease
Agreement also should be completed in the said 30 days
and   the   payment   to   be   made   includes   the   upfront
amount of Rs.8.82 crore.
12.   In   that   backdrop   it   is   necessary   to   examine   the
manner  in which the things have proceeded after  issue
of LOI. Admittedly the appellant was not ready with the
amount   to   make   the   payment   within   the   timeframe
contemplated   under   Clause   2   of   LOI.   The   appellant,
through their letter dated 04.02.2010 requested UAHCL
that   they   be   allowed   to   pay   50%   of   the   bid   money   by
19.02.2010   which   in   our   view   will   include   all   the
components   indicated   in   Clause   2   of   LOI   and   not   just
the   upfront   component.   The   rest   of   the   money   was
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undertaken   to   be   paid   by   15.04.2010.   UAHCL   through
their   reply   dated   12.02.2010   allowed   the   same   as   a
special   case.   The   appellant   once   again   through   their
letter  dated 17.11.2010 requested  for   extension of  time
for   payment   of   Rs.4.93   crore.   UAHCL   again   extended
the time till 15.12.2010.
13. Despite   such   indulgence   shown   by   UAHCL   the
appellant   did   not   make   the   balance   payment   before
15.12.2010. Instead, the sum of Rs.4.11 crore was paid
subsequent thereto and that too, in instalments of Rs. 2
crores on 28.12.2010; Rs.1.41 crore on 29.12.2010 and
Rs.70 lakhs on 07.01.2011.
14 . Though the learned counsel for the appellant seeks
to   contend   that   UAHCL   having   received   the   said
payment cannot at this stage contend that the payment
was not made within the time stipulated, we are unable
to   accept   such   contention.   UAHCL   is   a   corporation
which   has   different   departments   and   as   such   the
remittance made being accepted in itself cannot be taken
as  an  act to  condone the delay  caused by   the appellant
in complying with the terms of the LOI so as to alter the
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terms   of   contract.   There   is   no   material   on   record   that
subsequent   to   15.12.2010,   there   is   any   positive   act   on
behalf of UAHCL to either extend the time for payment or
for   having   expressly   condoned   the   delay   and   having
accepted   the   payment   so   as   to   regularise   the
transaction. This is relevant more so in the context that
at   an   earlier   point   as   against   the   time   stipulated   for
payment   under   the   LOI   specific   correspondence   was
exchanged   between   the   parties   and   the   time   had   been
expressly  extended prior  to the time fixed earlier  having
expired. In such situation, when admittedly the balance
payment had not been made prior to 15.12.2010, unless
the   appellant   had   obtained   express   extension   from
UAHCL   mere   tendering   the   payment   and   the   same
having been accepted cannot be construed as a positive
act to alter the contract. 
15 . No   doubt,   the   appellants   have   relied   on   the
communication   dated   13.04.2011   addressed   by   the
General   Manager,   UAHCL   indicating   therein   that   the
issue   of   offering   VRS   to   all   the   employees   unwilling   to
join   the   new   management   was   a   consideration   and   the
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VRS   amount   will   have   to   be   paid   by   the   appellant   to
UAHCL.   Apart   from   the   reason   assigned   by   the   High
Court   to   indicate   that   the   same   cannot   be   treated   in
favour  of the appellant, the said letter  does not indicate
that the discussion in that regard was after indicating to
the   appellant   that   the   delay   in   payment   of   the   upfront
amount   has   been   condoned   and   accepted.   If   at   all   the
said   aspect   relating   to   VRS   of   the   employees   was   also
mutually   agreed   and,   in   that   context,   if   UAHCL   had
proceeded to condone the delay and enter into the lease
agreement it is only in such circumstance the exchange
of   correspondence   in   that   regard   would   have   assumed
relevance.   If   that   be   the   position,   when   admittedly   the
appellant   was   required   to   make   the   agreed   payments
within   the   timeframe   indicated   under   LOI   dated
09.01.2010 and the appellants themselves being unable
to   comply   with  the   requirement,  though  having   secured
extensions   on   two   occasions   cannot   turn   around   to
contend otherwise at this juncture. Despite the extended
period   having   come   to   an   end   on   15.12.2010,   the
appellant   not   having   made   the   full   payment   within   the
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said date cannot at this stage contend to have complied
with   the   terms   so   as   to   seek   a   direction   to   UAHCL   to
execute   the   lease   agreement.   In   fact,   the   High   Court
having examined the material on record has also arrived
at such conclusion.
16. Notwithstanding   such   conclusion   reached   by   the
High Court, ultimately it has arrived at the decision that
in view of the disputed questions to be resolved between
the   parties,   the   same   cannot   be   gone   into   in   writ
jurisdiction.   The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in
that   view   has   placed   reliance   to   the   case   in   Unitech
Ltd.   and   Others   vs.   Telangana   State   Industrial
Infrastructure Corporation (TSICC and Ors.)   2021 (2)
SCALE 653, the decision to which one of us (Mr. Justice
M.R.   Shah)   is   a   member   on   the   Bench,   with   specific
reference to para 32 thereof, which reads as hereunder:
“32.   Much   of   the   ground   which   was   sought   to   be
canvassed   in   the   course   of   the   pleadings   is   now
subsumed   in   the   submissions   which   have   been
urged   before   this   Court   on   behalf   of   the   State   of
Telangana   and   TSIIC.   As   we   have   noted   earlier,
during   the   course   of   the   hearing,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   of
Telangana   and   TSIIC   informed   the   Court   that   the
entitlement   of   Unitech   to   seek   a   refund   is   not
questioned   nor   is   the   availability   of   the   land   for
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carrying   out   the   project   being   placed   in   issue.
Learned   Senior   Counsel   also   did   not   agitate   the
ground   that   a   remedy   for   the   recovery   of   moneys
arising out a contractual matter cannot be availed of
under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution.   However,   to
clear   the   ground,   it   is   necessary   to   postulate   that
recourse   to   the   jurisdiction   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution   is   not   excluded   altogether   in   a
contractual   matter.   A   public   law   remedy   is   available
for   enforcing   legal   rights   subject   to   well­settled
parameters.”
17. Having   noted   the   said   decision,   a   reference   to   the
order  passed by  the High Court would indicate that the
High   Court   though   having   referred   to   the   decisions   in
Arya   Vyasa   Sabha   v.   Commissioner   of   Hindu
Charitable   &   Religious   Institutions   &   Endowments ,
AIR   1976   SC   475 ,   DLF   Housing   Construction   Private
Ltd.   Vs.   Delhi   Municipal   Corporation   AIR   1976   SC
386,   National   Textile   Corporation   Ltd.   vs.   Haribox
Swalram  AIR 2004 SCC 1998 ,  Dwarka Prasad v. B.D.
Agarwal ,   AIR   2003   SC   2686,   and   Defence   Enclave
Residents'   Society   v.   State   of  U.P.   AIR  2004  SC  4877
to   note   the   limitations   while   considering   a   writ   petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has in that
view   taken   note   of   the   fact   situation   arising   in   the
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instant   case.   It   is   on   facts   that   the   High   Court   has
arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   such   disputed   questions
of   fact   cannot   be   resolved   in   the   writ   petition   of   the
present nature. Therefore, in the present facts, the High
Court   has   not   dismissed   the   writ   petition   on
maintainability   but   having   taken   note   of   the   issue
involved   was   of   the   opinion   that   the   contentions   urged
would necessitate the requirement of recording evidence
and   therefore   relegated   the   parties   to   an   appropriate
forum.   To   that   extent,   though   we   take   note   of   the
observations   made   by   the   High   Court,   keeping   in   view
the   nature   of   the   considerations   made,   the   prayers
which   were   sought   in   the   amended   writ   petition   were
required to  be conclusively  answered by  the  High  Court
on   the   aspect   as   to   whether   the   decision   of   UAHCL   to
terminate   the   LOI   dated   19.01.2010   was   justified   and
the   requirement   for   resolution   of   the   dispute   by   an
appropriate   forum   ought   to   have   been   left   open   only   to
the   incidental   aspect   which   may   require   appropriate
evidence to be tendered and adjudication to be made by
an appropriate forum. 
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18.   Keeping these aspects in view, having noted that the
appellant   had   failed   to   adhere   to   the   terms   indicated   in
the   LOI   dated   19.01.2010   and   the   payment   required
thereunder   not   being   made   even   within   the   extended
period, the Board of Directors of UAHCL were justified in
deciding   to   terminate   the   LOI   through   their   letter   dated
10.12.2013. In fact, the prayer no. 3 seeking calculation
of interest on the amount deposited and such amount is
being   sought   to   be   adjusted   towards   the   balance
payments   would   in   itself   indicate   that   even   to   the
knowledge of the appellant, the entire payments had not
been   made   even   as   on   the   date   of   the   filing   the   writ
petition.   In   such   circumstance,   when   the   LOI   has   been
rightly   terminated,   the   directions   sought   in   the   writ
petition   to   execute   the   lease   agreement   pertaining   to
‘Hotel   Nilanchal   Ashok’,   Puri   does   not   arise   and   the
prayers in that regard are liable to be rejected.  
19. Having   arrived   at   the   above   conclusion,   the   next
aspect   which   would   engage   our   attention   is   as   to   the
manner in which the amount paid by the appellant is to
be   treated.   The   learned   counsel   for   UAHCL   would
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contend   that   the   LOI  provides  that   the   one­time   upfront
amount   to   be   paid   is   non­refundable,   in   that   view,   it   is
contended   that   the   said   amount   is   not   liable   to   be
refunded. Even otherwise due to the delay caused by the
appellant and having obtained the status­quo order from
the   court   by   litigating   with   regard   to   the   subject   matter
UAHCL have been prevented from otherwise utilising the
property   which   has   caused   loss   to   them   and   the   said
amount   would   be   adjustable   towards   the   same   is   his
contention. 
20. On taking note of the contention, a close perusal of
the   phrase   employed   in   the   LOI   would   indicate   the   one­
time   payment   made   upfront   is   shown   as   “non­
refundable”   and   such   payment   is   towards   execution   of
the   Operating   Lease   Agreement.   If   that   be   the   position,
the terms of LOI is clear that the said payment is towards
the   lease   rentals   and   is   the   upfront   payment   which
becomes a part of the lease transaction and therefore not
refundable   only   if   the   lease   agreement   comes   into
operation   and   not   otherwise.   The   word   employed   is   not
“forfeiture”,   therefore,   the   amount   payable   towards   the
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advance   lease   rentals   and   the   other   advance   payments
provided   in   clause   2   of   the   LOI,   cannot   be   forfeited   if
there is default in complying with the term  and entering
into   the   lease   agreement,   going   by   the   stipulations
contained   in   the   LOI   governing   the   parties   herein.   That
apart,   as   noted,   the   amount   was   required   to   be   paid,
latest   by   the   extended   date   i.e.,   15.10.2010.   The   very
termination   of   the   LOI   is   for   the   reason   that   the   entire
payment   was   not   made   even   within   the   timeframe.   The
cause   for   termination   of   LOI   occurred   on   15.10.2010.
Hence   the   amount   paid   on   28.12.2010   (Rs.2   crores),
29.12.2010 (Rs.1.41crores) and 7.01.2011 (Rs. 70 lakhs)
being   clearly   made   after   the   said   date   in   any   event
cannot be retained by UAHCL as otherwise it will amount
to   unjust   enrichment.   Therefore,   it   is   liable   to   be
refunded.   Even   with   regard   to   the   amount   of   Rs.4.41
crores which was paid on 07.02.2010, since we have held
that the same cannot  be forfeited it  is an  amount which
will   be   available   for   accounting.   In   a   normal
circumstance,   a   direction   was   required   to   be   issued   to
refund the said amount also.
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21. However,   as   noted   it   is   the   contention   on   behalf   of
UAHCL   that   due   to   the   conduct   of   the   appellant   in   not
paying the amount within time and completing the lease
agreement formalities and thereafter  involving  UAHCL in
litigation   and   taking   benefit   of   the   status   quo   order,
UAHCL   was   unable   to   utilise   the   property   but   on   the
other hand had to incur expenses. On this aspect,   prima
facie   it   is   seen   that   the   lease   transaction   ought   to   have
been   entered   into   before   19.02.2010.   It   is   on   account   of
the   difficulty   expressed   by   the   appellant,   the   time   for
payment   of   upfront   amount   was   extended   ultimately   up
to   15.12.2010,   in   which   process   itself   more   than   10
months   had   elapsed.   Soon   thereafter   the   appellant   had
filed   the   writ   petition   before   the   High   Court   and   the
matter   has   been   pending   before   one   forum   or   the   other
for nearly a decade during which time the property could
not be utilised nor expenses could be frozen. Even if that
be   so,   it   would   not   be   appropriate   for   this   Court   to
hazard a guess with regard to the actual loss that would
have   been   suffered   by   UAHCL.   At   the   same   time,   when
this   prima   facie   aspect   is   noticed   it   would   also   not   be
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appropriate for this Court to direct UAHCL to refund the
amount   to   the   extent   of   Rs.4.41   crore   which   was   paid
within   the   timeframe   and   allow   UAHCL   to   thereafter
initiate recovery process. On the other hand, it would be
in   the   interest   of   justice   to   permit   UAHCL   to   retain   the
amount   and   grant   liberty   to   the   appellant   to   file   an
appropriately constituted civil suit seeking recovery of the
said amount. In the said proceedings it would be open for
UAHCL to put forth the contention to set off the amount
towards the loss suffered by them  or  to seek for  counter
claim   if any  further   amount   is  due.  In  such   proceedings
it   would   be   open   for   the   competent   civil   court   to
independently   consider   that   aspect   of   the   matter   on   its
own merits for which we have not expressed any opinion
on merits relating to that aspect. Even with regard to the
claim   of   interest,   if   any,   by   the   appellant   that   aspect   is
also   kept   open   to   be   adjudicated   in   the   civil   suit.   The
pendency   of   the   suit   shall   not   be   an   impediment   for
UAHCL to deal with the property or to re­tender the same
in any manner.
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22. In   the   light   of   the   above   we   pass   the   following
order:­
(i) The   order   dated   09.03.2017   passed   by
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P.
(C) No.23103/2013 stands modified.
(ii)  In that view, the prayer of the appellant
to   quash   the   letter   dated   10.12.2013
terminating   the   letter   of   LOI   dated
19.01.2010   stands   rejected.
Consequently,   the   termination   of   LOI
dated   19.01.2010   is   upheld.   However,
UAHCL   is   directed   to   refund   the
amounts   deposited   by   the   appellant   on
28.12.2010 (Rs.2 crores), on 29.12.2010
(Rs.1.41   crores)   and   on   07.01.2011
(Rs.70   lakhs),   in   all   amounting   to
Rs.4.11   crores   within   four   weeks   from
this day.  
(iii) The appellant is reserved liberty to file a
civil   suit   for   recovery   of   Rs.4.41   crores
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paid to UAHCL on 17.02.2010 subject to
the   observations   made   above   and   all
contentions of the parties in that regard
are left open. 
(iv) In   view   of   the   above   conclusions   and
disposal   of   the   appeal,   the   amount   of
Rs.3   crores   deposited   by   the   appellant
before this Court, which is kept in fixed
deposit   shall   be   refunded   to   the
appellant with accrued interest thereon. 
(v) The   appeal   is   disposed   of   accordingly
with no order as to costs. 
(vi) Pending   application,   if   any,   shall   stand
disposed of.
……………………J.
(M.R. SHAH)
 
……………………J.
                                           (A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
October 04, 2021 
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