2021 INSC 0606
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4557 OF 2012
DIPALI BISWAS  & ORS.                                       ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NIRMALENDU MUKHERJEE & ORS.                   …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Challenging   the   order   of   the   High   Court   confirming   the   order
of   the   Executing   Court   dismissing   their   application   under   Section
47   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   ( hereinafter   referred   to   as
the   ‘Code’ ),   the   legal   representatives   of   the   judgment­debtor   have
come   up   with   the   above   appeal.   Incidentally,   this   litigation   is
exactly   half   a   century   old   (it   started   with   a   suit   filed   in   1971)   and
this appeal arises out of the fifth round of litigation at the stage of
execution of a simple money decree and we wish that it is the knock
out round.  
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2. We   have   heard   Mr.   Rauf   Rahim,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants, and  Mr. Raja Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing  for
the respondent nos.1­7/auction purchasers.
3. One   Ms.   Rama   Rani   Devi,   filed   a   simple   suit   for   recovery   of
money   in   Money   Suit   No.16   of   1971   on   the   file   of   the   District
Munsif Court, Bongaon, District 24 Parganas, West Bengal, against
one Sasadhar Biswas, for recovery of a sum of Rs.3000/­. The suit
was decreed  ex parte  on 25.07.1974, directing the defendant to pay
the decretal amount in six equal instalments with a default clause.
4. Since the decree was not honoured, the decree holder filed an
execution   petition   in   Execution   Case   No.2   of  1975,  praying  for   the
attachment   and   sale   of   17   decimal   of   land   (approximately   about
7450   Sq.ft.)   in   Plot   No.26/159   under   Khatian   No.2555   of   Mouza
Bongaon.   It   appears   that   a   sale   proclamation   was   issued   by   the
executing   court   on   16.07.1975   after   which   Sasadhar   Biswas,   the
Judgment­debtor filed an application in Miscellaneous Case No.151
of   1975   assailing   the   sale   proclamation   issued   by   the   executing
court,   on   the   ground   of   material   irregularity   and   fraud.   But   the
same was dismissed on 03.09.1975.
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5. An   auction   sale   was   held   on   30.05.1979,   in   which   two
brothers   by   name,   Sachindra   Nath   Mukherjee   and   Dulal   Kanti
Mukherjee   became   the   highest   bidders,   they   having   offered   a   sum
of  Rs.5500/­,  as  the  highest  bid  amount.  The  highest  bidders  also
deposited the money into court.
First round
6. Mr.   Sasadhar   Biswas,   the   judgment­debtor   then   filed   an
application   on   27.06.1979   under   Order   XXI,   Rule   90   read   with
Section 152 of the Code praying for setting aside the auction sale on
the   ground   of   irregularities   in   the   sale   proclamation.   During   the
pendency of this petition in Miscellaneous Case No.47 of 1979, the
judgment­debtor   Sasadhar   Biswas   entered   into   a   compromise   on
19.07.1980,   not   with   the   decree   holder   but   with   the   auction
purchasers.  The memo of compromise reads as follows:­
“The petitioner and the auction purchaser Opp. party do
settle the suit mutually in the following manner.
1)       If the petitioner debtor pays the entire money due to the
auction purchaser opposite part in cash within 15 th
 December
or if he deposits it in their credit in the court and the auction
shall   be   revoked   and   the   original   execution   case   shall   be
disposed on full satisfaction. 
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2)     Otherwise that is if the petitioner debtor does not pay the
entire   money   due   to   the   auction   purchaser   opposite   party   in
cash   within   15 th
  December   on   deposits   that   amount   in   court
within   that   date   then   the   said   auction   shall   remain   effective
and this present suit shall be dismissed with costs.
     Hence it  is prayed  that according  to  the contents  of this
solenama   and   for   compliance   with   the   conditions   of   the
solenama   the  final  date  of  this  suit   may   be  kept   on  16.12.80
on the expiry of the 15 th
 December.”
7. It is relevant to point out that the amount of money deposited
by the auction purchasers into court was Rs.5500/­, but the decree
debt was around Rs.3360/­. Though the compromise memo entered
into   by   the   judgment­debtor   with   the   auction   purchasers   did   not
refer   to   the   decree   debt,   but   repeatedly   mentioned   the   words,
“ entire   money   due   to   the   auction   purchasers ”,   the   judgment­debtor
admittedly   deposited   on   15.12.1980,   only   a   sum   of   Rs.3700/­,
purportedly   on   the   basis   of   the   calculation   provided   by   the   court
officer in terms of Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code.
8. Since the deadline for payment of the entire money due to the
auction   purchasers   expired   on   15.12.1980   and   also   since   the
judgment­debtor deposited only a sum of Rs.3700/­, as against the
amount   of   Rs.5500/­   deposited   by   the   auction   purchasers,   the
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executing court dismissed the application under Order XXI, Rule 90
in Miscellaneous Case No.47 of 1979.
9. But   within   four   days,   the   executing   court   again   passed   an
order   on   20.12.1980   recalling   the   order   dated   16.12.1980   and
recording   full   satisfaction   in   the   execution.   Shocked   at   this   order,
the   auction   purchasers   filed   an   application   on   22.12.1980   for
recalling   the   order   dated   20.12.1980,   passed   purportedly   behind
their   back.   This   application   was   dismissed   by   the   executing   court
on   12.09.1981.   Challenging   the   said   order   dated   12.09.1981,
passed   by   the   executing   court,   the   auction   purchasers   filed   a
revision   in  C.R.No.3577  of  1981  on   the   file  of   the  High   Court.   The
High Court allowed the revision by an order dated 21.06.1983 and
remanded the matter back to the executing court, for re­hearing the
application   of   the   auction   purchasers   for   recall   of   the   order   dated
20.12.1980.
10. The   executing   court   passed   a   fresh   order   dated   11.07.1987
rejecting   the   application   of   the   auction   purchasers   on   merits,   but
this   order   was   set   aside   by   the   High   Court   in   a   revision   in
C.O.No.2487 of 1987, by an order dated 20.12.1990. By this order
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the  High  Court held that  the judgment­debtor  failed to honour  the
commitment   made   in   the   compromise   memo   to   deposit   the   entire
amount   due   to   the   auction   purchasers   and   that   therefore   the
auction   sale   should   be   confirmed   in   favour   of   the   auction
purchasers.   It   may   be   relevant   to   extract   Clause   No.4   of   the
operative portion of the order of the High Court in C.O. No.2487 of
1987 dated 20.12.1990.  It reads as follows:­
 “xxx            xxx           xxx                       xxx
4.       None   of   the   parties   shall   have   any   claim   whatsoever   as
against   the   applicant   in   respect   of   the   purchased   property
which   shall   be   deemed   to   be   his   absolute   property   on   and
from the expiry of 15 th
 December, 1980.” 
11. Thereafter,   a   mention   was   made   before   the   learned   judge,   on
behalf   of   the   counsel   for   the   judgment­debtor   seeking   recall   of   the
order   in   C.O.No.2487  of   1987   on   the   ground   that   the   counsel   was
not   present   at   the   time   of   disposal   of   the   revision   petition.
Therefore,   the   leaned   Judge   again   heard   the   matter   and   passed   a
detailed   order   dated   08.08.1991,   reiterating   his   earlier   order.   A
special   leave   petition   filed   against   the   order   dated   08.08.1991,   in
SLP(C)No.18092   of   1991   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   on
24.02.1992. The judgment­debtor moved a petition for review before
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this   Court  but   the   same  was   also   dismissed  on   12.08.1992.  Thus,
the 1 st
 round of litigation kicked off with an application under Order
XXI, Rule 90, in the year 1979, came to an end in 1992.
Second Round
12. The judgment­debtor then started the 2 nd
 round by filing a suit
in  suit  No.249 of  1992 on  the file of  the  District  Munsif, Bongaon,
for a declaration that the auction sale is void but the said suit was
dismissed as abated, on 02.12.1992.
Third Round
13. In the meantime, the auction purchasers filed petitions for the
issue   of   sale   certificate   and   the   judgment­debtor   filed   a   petition
under Order XXI, Rule 29 for stay of execution proceedings. But the
application   of   the   judgment­debtor   was   dismissed   and   the
applications   of   the   auction   purchasers   were   allowed   by   the
executing   court   by   an   order   dated   31.01.1994.   A   direction   was
given for the issue of a sale certificate to the auction purchasers in
terms   of   Order   XXI,   Rule   94.   Accordingly,   a   sale   certificate   was
issued on 08.02.1994. The sale certificate was also duly registered.
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14. Challenging   the   order   dated   31.01.1994   passed   by   the
executing court directing the issue of sale certificate, the judgment­
debtor filed a revision in C.O.No.1232 of 1994 on the file of the High
Court. Though the High Court entertained the revision and initially
granted   a   stay   of   further   proceedings   in   the   execution,   the   High
Court   eventually   dismissed   the   revision   petition   by   an   order   dated
05.09.2001   holding   that   the   earlier   order   in   C.O.No.2487   of   1987
dated 08.08.1991 had already clinched the issue.   With this order,
the third round came to an end.
Fourth Round
15. The   4 th
  round   began   with   an   application   by   the   auction
purchasers   seeking   delivery   of   possession.   This   application   was
allowed by the executing court on 15.03.2002, directing delivery to
be   effected   by   16.04.2002.   Since   the   judgment­debtor   had,   in   the
meantime,   constructed   a   building   on   the   land   sold   in   execution   of
the decree, the executing court directed the building so constructed
illegally, to be demolished.
16. The order of the executing court for delivery of possession was
challenged by the appellants herein ( the legal representatives of the
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judgment­debtor )   in   a   Civil   Petition   No.106   of   2002   before   the
Additional   District   Judge,   Barasat.   The   same   was   dismissed   on
26.02.2003.   This   order   was   challenged   before   the   High   Court   in
C.O.No.1276   of   2003,   but   the   same   was   dismissed   by   the   High
Court by an order dated 11.02.2005 pointing out that the issue has
already   been   clinched   by   the   previous   orders.   The   special   leave
petition   SLP(C)   No.12925   of   2005   filed   against   the   said   order,   was
dismissed by this Court on 18.07.2005. The petition seeking review
of  the   said  order  was  also   dismissed  by  this   Court  on  10.01.2006.
Thus, the fourth round of litigation came to a close.
Fifth Round (present round)
17. Not   to   be   put   off   by   repeated   failures,   the   appellants   herein,
like   the   tireless   Vikramaditya,   ( who   made   repeated   attempts   to
capture   ‘Betal’ )   started   the   present   round   (hopefully   the   final
round),   by   moving   a   petition   in   Miscellaneous   Case   No.15   of   2006
before   the   executing   court   under   Section   47   of   the   Code,   on   the
ground that the mandate of Order XXI Rule 64 was not followed in
the   auction   and   that   therefore   a   jurisdictional   error   has   crept   in
and   that   the   same   could   be   corrected   at   any   point   of   time   and   at
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any   stage   of   the   proceeding.   This   petition   filed   on   10.02.2006   was
dismissed by the executing court by an order dated 20.01.2007.
18. Challenging   the  said   order   dismissing  their   application   under
Section 47, the appellants filed a revision in C.O. No.1115 of 2007
on   the   file   of   the   High   Court.   This   revision   was   dismissed   by   the
High   Court   by   an   order   dated   28.03.2008,   on   the   ground   that   the
issue,   never   having   been   raised   earlier,   cannot   be   allowed   to   be
raised   at   this   distance   of   time.   It   is   against   the   said   order   of   the
High Court dated 28.03.2008, in C.O.No.1115 of 2007 that the legal
representatives   of   the   judgment­debtor   have   come   up   with   the
above appeal.
Contentions and our analysis
19. The   only   mantra ,   by   the   recitation   of   which,   the   appellants
hope   to   succeed   in   this   half­a­century   old   litigation,   is   Order   XXI,
Rule   64   of   the   Code.   This   provision   enables   an   executing   court   to
order   “that   any   property   attached   by   it   and   liable   to   sale   or   such
portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be
sold and that the proceeds of such sale or a sufficient portion thereof
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shall   be   paid   to   the   party   entitled   under   the   decree   to   receive   the
same ”.
20. It   is   the   contention   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants
that Order XXI, Rule 64 casts not a discretion, but an obligation, to
sell only such portion of the property as may be sufficient to satisfy
the   decree.   In   support   of   this   proposition,   the   learned   counsel   for
the appellants cited a few decisions, which we shall now deal with.
In  Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi   vs.   Pujari Padmavathamma
&   Ors 1
,   this   Court   held   that   the,   “ executing   court   derives
jurisdiction to sell properties attached, only to the point at which the
decree   is   fully   satisfied ”,   and   that   the   words,   “ necessary   to   satisfy
the decree ”, clearly indicate that no sale can be allowed beyond the
decretal   amount   mentioned   in   the   sale   proclamation.   This   Court
went   further   to   hold   that   the   issue   flowing   out   of   Order   XXI,   Rule
64   goes   to   the   very   root   of   the   jurisdiction   of   the   executing   court
and that therefore the fact that an objection in this regard was not
raised before the executing court is not sufficient to put him out of
court.
1  (1977) 3 SCC 337
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21. But   the   aforesaid   decision   arose   out   of   a   case   where   the
decretal   amount   for   which   the   properties   were   to   be   sold   was
mentioned   in   the   warrant   of   sale   and   sale   proclamation   as
Rs.16,715/­.   The   lands   in   two   villages   namely   Devanoor   and
Gudipadu   were   brought   to   sale.   The   sale   of   lands   in   one   village
alone fetched Rs.16,880/­. Yet the executing court proceeded to sell
the lands in  Gudipadu  also. It is in that context that this Court held
as aforesaid.  
22. The   decision   in   Ambati   Narasayya   vs   M.   Subha   Rao   &
Anr 2
,   while following   T.P. Subba Reddi   (supra), went a step further
and held that if the property is large and the decree to be satisfied
is small, the court must bring only such portion of the property, the
proceeds of which would be sufficient to satisfy the decree debt and
that  it is immaterial whether the property is one or several .
23. But the decision in   Ambati Narasayya   (supra) also arose out
of   a   particular   context.   The   land   that   was   sold   in   Ambati
Narasayya  (supra) was of the extent of 10 acres and it was sold for
Rs.17,000/­ for the satisfaction of a claim of Rs.2400/­. The land of
2  (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 693
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the   extent   of   10   acres   is   certainly   large   enough   and   is   capable   of
division.   But   in   the   case   on   hand,   the   extent   of   land   is   only   17
decimals, working out to ( 7450 Sq.ft.).
24. It   must   be   pointed   out   at   this   stage   that   under   Order   XXI,
Rule   66   (1)   the   executing   court   should   cause   proclamation   of   the
intended   sale   to   be   drawn   up   in   the   language   of   the   court.   Under
sub rule (2) of Rule 66 of Order XXI, such proclamation should be
drawn up after notice to the decree holder and the judgment­debtor.
Order XXI, Rule 66 reads as follows:­
66. Proclamation of sales by public auction.­   (1) Where any
property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of
a decree, the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended
sale   to   be   made   in   the   language   of   such   Court.
(2)   Such   proclamation   shall   be   drawn   up   after   notice   to   the
decree­holder   and   the   judgment­debtor   and   shall   state   the
time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as
possible—
(a) the property to be sold,  or, where a part of the property
would be sufficient to satisfy the decree, such part ;
(b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the estate,
where the property to be sold is an interest in an estate or in
part of an estate paying revenue to the Government;
(c) any incumbrance to which the property is liable;
(d)   the   amount   for   the   recovery   of   which   the   sale   is   ordered;
and
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(e) every  other  thing which the Court considers material for  a
purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of
the property:
    Provided   that   where   notice   of   the   date   for   settling   the
terms   of   the   proclamation   has   been   given   to   the   judgment­
debtor   by   means   of   an   order   under   rule   54,   it   shall   not   be
necessary   to   give   notice   under   this   rule   to   the   judgment­
debtor unless the Court otherwise directs:
    Provided   further   that   nothing   in   this   rule   shall   be
construed as requiring the Court to enter in the proclamation
of   sale   its   own   estimate   of   the   value   of   the   property,   but   the
proclamation   shall   include   the   estimate,   if   any,   given,   by
either or both of the parties.
(3)  Every application for an order for sale under this rule shall
be   accompanied   by   a   statement   signed   and   verified   in   the
manner   hereinbefore   prescribed   for   the   signing   and
verification   of   pleadings   and   containing,   so   far   as   they   are
known   to   or   can   be   ascertained   by   the   person   making   the
verification,   the   matters   required   by   sub­rule   (2)   to   be
specified in the proclamation.
(4) For the purpose of ascertaining the matters to be specified
in   the   proclamation,   the   Court   may   summon   any   person
whom   it   thinks   necessary   to   summon   and   may   examine   him
in   respect   to   any   such   matters   and   require   him   to   produce
any document in his possession or power relating thereto.
25. It is important to note here that two significant changes were
made to Order XXI, Rule 66 by  Act 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 01.02.1977.
Both these changes were made to sub rule (2) of Rule 66. One of the
changes   was   the   insertion   of   the   words   “ or   where   a   part   of   the
property   would   be   sufficient   to   satisfy   the   decree,   such   part ”
in clause (a) of sub rule (2). The second change was the insertion of
two  provisos  under sub rule (2).
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26. As   an   aside,   it   may   be   noted   that   the   second   proviso   to   sub
rule   (2)   inserted   by   Central   Act   104   of   1976,   was   redundant   in   so
far   as   Calcutta   is   concerned,   since   Calcutta   already   had   a   similar
proviso  inserted through a local amendment.
27. The   first   proviso   under   sub   rule   (2)   of   Rule   66   of   Order   XXI
gives   a   discretion   to   the   court   not   to   give   notice   under   Order   XXI,
Rule 66 to the judgment­debtor, if a notice for settling the terms of
the proclamation had been given to the judgment­debtor by means
of an order under Rule 54.
28. Rule  54 of   Order  XXI  prescribes  the  method  of   attachment  of
immovable property. Sub rule (1A) of Rule 54, also inserted by Act
104 of 1976, mandates that the prohibitory order under sub rule(1)
shall   require   the   judgment­debtor   to   attend   court   on   a   specified
date   to   take   notice   of   the   date   to   be   fixed   for   settling   the   terms   of
the proclamation of sale.  This is why the first  proviso  to sub rule (2)
of Rule 66 gives a discretion to the court to dispense with a second
notice under Order XXI, Rule 66(2).
29. Keeping in mind the above statutory prescriptions, if we come
to  the facts of the case, it is seen  that  the appellants have filed as
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additional   document   in   Annexure   A­3,   the   copy   of   the   extract   of
relevant   orders   passed   in   Money   Execution   Case   No.2   of   1975   by
the District Munsif Court, Bongaon. This document reveals that on
10.01.1975,   the   executing   court   ordered   the   issue   of   notice   of
attachment   under   Order   XXI,   Rule   54   of   the   Code.   It   was   only
thereafter   that   the   court   directed   on   16.07.1975,   the   issue   of   sale
proclamation under Order XXI, Rule 66.
30. Thereafter, the judgment­debtor  filed a petition under  Section
47   of   the   Code   on   02.09.1975   ( this   was   the   first   petition   under
Section 47, while the appeal on hand arises out of the second petition
under Section 47 ).
31. The   executing   court,   at   the   instance   of   the   judgment­debtor
also granted stay of further proceedings on 26.09.1975. But it is not
clear   from   Annexure   A­3   of   the   additional   documents   filed   by   the
appellants,   as   to   when   the   said   petition   under   Section   47   was
disposed   of.   However   it   is   clear   from   the   order   passed   on
22.04.1978   that   the   decree   holder   was   directed   to   take   further
steps. 
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32. Even after directing the publication of the sale proclamation in
the   newspaper,   the   executing   court   was   more   than   fair   to   the
judgment­debtor,   as   could   be   seen   from   the   order   passed   on
16.03.1979. On the said date the executing court found that in the
newspaper   publication,   the   case   number   was   wrongly   mentioned.
Therefore,   the   court   directed   the   issue   of   fresh   sale   proclamation
and fresh publication. It is only thereafter that the judgment­debtor
moved a petition on 30.05.1979 for postponement of the auction. It
was rejected and the court proceeded with the auction. The decree
holder   himself   participated   in   the   auction   after   getting   permission
from the court. However, it is only the third parties who succeeded
in getting the sale confirmed.
33. The above sequence of events would show that the judgment­
debtor   had   sufficient   opportunity   to   object   to   the   inclusion   of   the
entire   property   when   an   order   was   passed   under   Order   XXI,   Rule
54.   Subsequently   he   had   an   opportunity   to  object  to   the   inclusion
of   the   whole   of   the   property,   by   taking   advantage   of   the   amended
clause   (a)   of   sub   rule   (2)   of   Rule   66   of   Order   XXI,   which   speaks
about  a   part   of   the  property  that   would   be   sufficient   to   satisfy   the
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decree.   But   the   judgment­debtor   despite   filing   a   petition   under
Section 47 on 02.09.1975, did not point out how the property being
a vacant land of an extent of 17 decimals could have been divided.
It   must   be   pointed   out   at   the   cost   of   repetition   that   the   notice   of
attachment   under   Order   XXI,   Rule   54   was   ordered   on   10.01.1975
and the sale proclamation under Order XXI, Rule 66 was directed to
be issued on 16.07.1975. It is only thereafter that the first petition
under Section 47 was filed on 02.09.1975. Therefore, the appellants
cannot compare themselves to the judgment­debtors in  T.P. Subba
Reddi  or  Ambati Narasayya  (supra).
34. As   we   have   pointed   out   elsewhere,   the   objection   relating   to
Order   XXI,   Rule   64   has   been   raised   by   the   appellants   for   the   first
time in the 5 th
 round of litigation in execution. In the 1 st
  round, the
appellants   exhausted   the   gun­powder   available   under   Order   XXI,
Rule   90,   by   taking   recourse   to   a   compromise   with   the   auction
purchasers, after alleging material irregularity in the conduct of the
auction. The 1 st
 round which commenced in 1979 came to an end in
1992 with the dismissal of SLP(C) No.18092 of 1991. In the order of
the   High   Court   dated   20.12.1990   that   was   under   challenge   in   the
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said SLP, the High Court made it clear that none of the parties shall
have   any   claim   whatsoever   as   against   the   auction   purchaser   in
respect   of   the   purchased   property   (we   have   extracted   this   in   Para
10 above).
35. The   2 nd
  round   was   kick­started   with   a   suit   in   Suit   No.249   of
1992   for   a   declaration   that   the   auction   sale   was   void.   This   is
despite   the   express   bar   of   a   separate   suit,   under   Section   47(1)   of
the   Code.   But   the   2 nd
  round   got   aborted   with   the   dismissal   of   the
suit due to abatement.
36. The   3 rd
  round   started   with   objections   to   the   issue   of   sale
certificate   and   it   came   to   an   end   in   the   year   2001.   The   4 th
  round
commenced   when   the   auction   purchasers   moved   the   executing
court   for   delivery   of   possession.   Delivery   was   ordered   by   the
executing court on 15.03.2002. This round came to a close with the
dismissal of a SLP in the year 2005 and a review petition in the year
2006, arising out of the dismissal of a revision petition challenging
the order of the executing court for delivery of possession. It is only
thereafter   that   the   5 th
  round   of   litigation   was   started   by   the
appellants   by   filing   a   petition   under   Section   47   and   raising   the
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bogey of “ jurisdictional error ” on account of non­compliance with the
mandate of Order XXI, Rule 64. In other words, the appellants have
now exhausted almost all provisions available to a judgment­debtor
to stall execution and the case on hand is fit to be included in the
syllabus   of   a   law   school   as   a   study   material   for   students   to   get
equipped   with   the   various   provisions   of   the   Code   relating   to
execution.
Conclusion
37. The appellants cannot be allowed to raise the issue relating to
the breach of Order XXI, Rule 64 for the following reasons:­
(i) A judgment­debtor cannot be allowed to raise objections as to
the method of execution in instalments. After having failed to raise
the   issue  in  four  earlier  rounds  of  litigation,  the  appellants  cannot
be permitted to raise it now;
(ii) As   we   have   pointed   out   elsewhere,   the   original   judgment­
debtor   himself   filed   a   petition   under   Section   47,   way   back   on
02.09.1975.  What is on hand is a second petition under Section 47
and,   hence,   it   is   barred   by   res   judicata .   It   must   be   pointed   out   at
this   stage   that   before   Act   104   of   1976   came   into   force,   there   was
one   view   that   the   provisions   of   Section   11   of   the   Code   had   no
application   to   execution   proceedings.   But   under   Act   104   of   1976
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Explanation VII was inserted under Section 11 and it says that the
provisions   of   this   Section   shall   apply   to   a   proceeding   for   the
execution of a decree and reference in this Section to any suit, issue
or  former   suit  shall  be  construed as  references  to  a  proceeding  for
the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and
a former proceeding for the execution of that decree;
(iii) Even in the 5 th
 round, the appellants have not pointed out the
lay of the property, its dimensions on all sides and the possibility of
dividing the same into two or more pieces, with a view to sell one or
more of those pieces for the realisation of the decree debt;
(iv) The observations in paragraph 4 of the order of the High Court
dated 20.12.1990 in C.O.No.2487 of 1987 that, “ none of the parties
shall have any claim whatsoever as against the applicant in respect
of the purchased property which shall be deemed to be his absolute
property   on   and   from   the   expiry   of   15 th
  December,   1980 ”,   has
attained finality;
(v) Section 65 of the Code says that, “ where immovable property is
sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the
property   shall   be   deemed   to   have   vested   in   the   purchaser   from   the
time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale
becomes   absolute ”.   The   sale   of   a   property   becomes   absolute   under
Order   XXI,   Rule   92(1)   after   an   application   made   under   Rule   89,
Rule   90   or   Rule   91   is   disallowed   and   the   court   passes   an   order
confirming   the   same.   After   the   sale   of   an   immovable   property
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becomes absolute in terms of Order XXI, Rule 92(1), the Court has
to grant a certificate under Rule 94. The certificate has to bear the
date   and   the   day   on   which   the   sale   became   absolute.   Thus   a
conjoint  reading  of Section 65, Order  XXI, Rule 92 and  Order  XXI,
Rule 94 would show that it passes through three important stages
( other than certain intervening stages ). They are,   (i)   conduct of sale;
(ii)  sale becoming absolute; and  (iii)  issue of sale certificate. After all
these three stages are crossed, the 4 th
 stage of delivery of possession
comes   under   Rule   95   of   Order   XXI.   It   is   at   this   4 th
  stage   that   the
appellants have raised the objection relating to Order XXI, Rule 64.
It   is   not   as   if   the   appellants   were   not   aware   of   the   fact   that   the
property   in   entirety   was   included   in   the   proclamation   of   sale.
Therefore, the claim on the basis of Order XXI, Rule 64 was rightly
rejected by the High Court.
38. In view of the above, the appeal is devoid of merits and, hence,
it is dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.
......................................J.
(Hemant Gupta)
.......................................J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
October  05, 2021
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