2021 INSC 0613
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6238 OF2021
( ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 23856 OF 2014 )
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...APPELLANTS
VERSUS
METHU MEDA                  …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T 
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
Leave granted.
2. Questioning   the   validity   of   the   order   passed   in   Writ
Appeal No. 1090 of 2013 on 20.12.2013 upholding the order of
the   learned   Single   Judge   passed   on   27.09.2013   in   Writ
Petition No. 3897 of 2013,  this appeal has been preferred.
3. The   facts   unfolded   in   the   present   case   are   that   the
respondent was found involved in an offence of kidnapping  of
Nilesh   for   demand   of   ransom.   An   FIR   was   registered   against
him   on   22.8.2009.     After   investigation   challan   was   filed,   and
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he   was   tried   before   the   Sessions   Court,   Jhabua,   Madhya
Pradesh   in Sessions Case Serial No. 1 of 2010 for the charge
framed against  him     under  Sections 347/327/323/506  (Part­
II)   and   364A   IPC.     The   Sessions   Court   acquitted   him   for   the
said   charge   because   the   complainant,   who   was   abducted,
turned hostile in the Court.  Thereafter, respondent applied for
the post of Constable in Central Industrial Security Force (for
short   “CISF”)   and   got   selected   through   the   Staff   Selection
Commission   (for   short   “SSC”).     An   offer   of   appointment   for
provisional   selection   to   the   post   of   Constable/GD   was   issued
to   the   respondent   on   30.3.2012,   subject   to   the   conditions
given in the agreement form.   The respondent was required to
furnish  the   documents   including   attestation   forms,   certificate
of   character,   character   and   antecedent   certificate   from   local
Station   House   Officer.     The   respondent,   while   submitting   the
attestation   form,   specified   the   registration   of   above­said
criminal  case and  acquittal  from  the  charges in  a trial  by  the
competent court.  
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4 . As   the   offer   of   appointment   was   conditional,   therefore,
in   terms   of   the   CISF   Circular   No.   E­
EG7023/TRG.SEC/ADM.I/CIRCULARS/2010­1157 dated
31.03.2010. he was not allowed to join training. The Ministry
of   Home   Affairs   vide   letter   No.   I­45020/6/2010­Pers.II
issued the guidelines on 01.02.2012 for  consideration of the
cases   of   the   candidates   against   whom   criminal   cases   were
registered or tried by the courts.
5 .     In   furtherance   to   the   said   guidelines,   the   case   of   the
respondent   was   referred   to   AIG(L&R),   CISF   Hqrs,   New   Delhi
with   an   information   to   IG/TS,   CISF(TS)   NISA,   Hyderabad   vide
letter   No.   F37023/CISF/RTC(D)/Trg./CBG/2012/2656   dated
04.05.2012.       The   Standing   Screening   Committee   assembled
on   27.07.2012   and   examined   the   cases   of   89   candidates
including  the respondent and on 15.10.2012 passed an order
that respondent was not eligible for appointment.
6. Questioning the validity of the said action and asking  for
consequential reliefs, Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013 was filed
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench.   The
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learned   Single   Judge,   vide   order   dated   27.09.2013,     allowed
the Writ Petition directing the respondents therein to issue an
order   for   sending     the   respondent   herein   on   training
commencing   with   effect   from   21.10.2013.     The   Court   further
held   that   he   would   be   entitled   for   all   consequential   benefits
including   seniority,   notional   fixation   of   salary   etc.   but   back
wages   were   denied.     The   said   order   was   assailed   before   the
Division   Bench   by   filing   Writ   Appeal,   but   it   was   also
dismissed,   which   led   to   filing   the   present   appeal   through   the
department.
7 . The   validity   of   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge   and   also   by   the   Division   Bench   have   been   assailed,
inter   alia,   contending,     until   the   respondent   is   honourably
acquitted   from the charge   involving moral turpitude and the
decision   of   the   Screening   Committee   is   not   passed   mala   fide,
interference     in   such   decision   is   not   warranted.     Reliance   is
placed on the  decision  of this Court in   Inspector  General  of
Police   &   Another   vs.   S.   Samuthiram   (2013)   1   SCC   598   to
clarify the meaning of  ‘honourable acquittal’. 
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8. It   is   argued     that   merely   making   a   disclosure     of   the
criminal case in the attestation form is not sufficient.   As per
the Policy Guidelines dated 01.02.2012, in view of involvement
of   the   respondent   in   heinous   offences   including   the   offences
under   Sections   327/347/364A   IPC,   he   would   not   be   entitled
for   appointment   until   honourably   acquitted.       Even   though,
the   respondent   has   been   provisionally   selected   vide   letter
dated 30.03.2012, issued by the Chairman of the Recruitment
Board,   but   mere   acquittal   giving   benefit   of   doubt,   as   the
witnesses   have  turned  hostile,  would  not   make  the   candidate
suitable for appointment.  The impugned orders passed by the
High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   are   contrary   to   the   law   laid
down   in   the   case   of   Avtar   Singh   vs.   Union   of   India   and
Others   (2016)8   SCC   471,   Commissioner   of   Police,   New
Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh  (2013)7 SCC 685,  State
of   Madhya   Pradesh   and   Others   vs.   Abhijit   Singh   Pawar
(2018) 18 SCC 733,  State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Love
Kush   Meena   2021(4)   SCALE   634   and   Commissioner   of
Police   vs.   Raj   Kumar   2021(9)   SCALE   713.     It   is   urged   that
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acquittal in a criminal  case is not  conclusive for  suitability  of
the   candidate   for   appointment.     Thus,   unless   the   respondent
is   honourably   acquitted   in   a   criminal   case,   it   would   not
automatically entitle him for appointment to the post.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended
that the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High
Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   have   considered   the   judgment   of
Delhi   High   Court   in   the   case   of     Rahul   Yadav   vs   CISF   and
another , 178(2011) DLT 263, where the High Court observed
that   the   situation   and   background   of   the   candidates   hailing
from   the   rural   areas   were   relevant   factors   for   consideration.
Mere     registration   of   a   criminal   case   and   acquittal   from   the
said charges, would not disentitle him from appointment.  The
special leave petition preferred against the said judgment has
been dismissed by this Court on 05.10.2012.   On the point of
defining   the   ‘acquittal’,   the   judgment   in   Panna   Mehta   vs.
State of M.P.  (2002 )  4 M.P.H.T. 226 has been relied and urged
that if the respondent has not concealed the material fact and
specified details in the attestation form regarding the criminal
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case,   trial   and   its   result,   it   would   not   disentitle   him   from
appointment   to   the   post,   in   particular   when   in   Bombay   High
Court,   in   the   case   of     similarly   situated   person   Ramesh   has
been   sent   on   training.     It   is   urged     that   the   impugned   order
passed   by   the   High   Court     is   in   conformity   to   law.     The
judgment   in   Panna   Mehta   (supra)   is,   however,
distinguishable on facts in that a similarly situated person had
been sent on training.
10. After   having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   at
length,   the   question   which   arises   in   the   present   appeal   is
whether the decision of the Screening Committee  rejecting the
candidature   of the respondent, when there was no allegation
of     malice   against   the   Screening   Committee   and   the
respondent­writ   petitioner   had   been   acquitted   of   serious
charges,   inter   alia,   of   kidnapping   for   ransom   as   some
prosecution witnesses  had  turned hostile, ought to have been
interfered with.
11. While addressing the question, as argued the meaning of
expression   ‘acquittal’     is   required   to   be   looked   into.   The
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expressions   ‘honourable   acquittal’,   ‘acquitted   of   blame’   and
‘fully   acquitted’   are   unknown   to   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure or the Indian Penal Code.  It has been developed by
judicial pronouncements.   In the case of    State of Assam   &
Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari , (1972) 7 SLR 44, the
effect  of   the   word   ‘honourably   acquitted’   has   been   considered
in   the   context   of   the   Assam   Fundament   Rules   (FR)   54   (a)   for
entitlement   of   full   pay   and   allowance   if   the   employee   is   not
dismissed.     The   Court   has   referred   the   judgment   of   Robert
Stuart   Wauchope   vs.   Emperor   reported     in   (1934)   61   ILR
Cal.   168,   in   the   context   of   expression   ‘honourably   acquitted’,
Lord Williams, J. observed as thus:
  “The   expression   “honourably   acquitted”     is   one
which is unknown to courts of justice.   Apparently it
is   a   form   of   order   used   in   courts   martial   and   other
extra   judicial   tribunals.       We   said   in   our   judgment
that   we   accepted   the   explanation   given   by   the
Appellant believed it to be true and considered that it
ought   to   have   been   accepted     by   the     Government
authorities   and   by   the   magistrate.       Further   we
decided   that   the   Appellant   had   not   misappropriated
the monies referred to in the charge. It is   thus clear
that   the   effect   of   our   judgment   was   that   the
Appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it
was   possible   for   him   to   be   acquitted.   Presumably,
this   is   equivalent   to   what   Government   authorities
term “honourably acquitted”.  “
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12.   In the case of   R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India   AIR 1964
SC 787, it is observed and held by Wanchoo, J., as thus:
“Even   in   case   of   acquittal,   proceedings   may   follow   where
the acquittal is other than honourable.”
13 . In   view   of   the   above,   if   the   acquittal   is   directed   by   the
court   on   consideration   of   facts   and   material   evidence   on
record with the finding  of false implication or the finding that
the   guilt   had   not   been   proved,   accepting   the   explanation   of
accused   as   just,   it   be   treated   as   honourable   acquittal.     In
other words, if prosecution could not prove the guilt for other
reasons   and   not   ‘honourably’   acquitted   by   the   Court,   it   be
treated other than ‘honourable’, and  proceedings may follow.
14 . The   expression   ‘honourable   acquittal’   has   been
considered   in   the   case   of   S.   Samuthiram   (supra)   after
considering   the   judgments   of   Reserve   Bank   of   India   vs.
Bhopal Singh Panchal  (1994)1 SCC 541 ,  R.P. Kapur  (supra),
Raghava  Rajagopalachari   (supra);  this   Court  observed   that
the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a
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criminal   court   and   enquiry   conducted   by   way   of   disciplinary
proceeding is entirely different.  In a criminal case, the onus of
establishing   guilt   of   the   accused   is   on   the   prosecution,   until
proved beyond reasonable doubt.   In   case,   the   prosecution
failed   to   take   steps   to   examine   crucial   witnesses     or   the
witnesses   turned   hostile,   such   acquittal   would   fall   within   the
purview  of   giving  benefit   of  doubt   and   the  accused  cannot   be
treated  as  honourably  acquitted  by   the  criminal  court.  While,
in   a   case   of     departmental     proceedings,   the   guilt   may   be
proved   on   the   basis   of   preponderance   and   probabilities,   it   is
thus observed that acquittal giving benefit of doubt would not
automatically   lead   to     reinstatement   of     candidate   unless   the
rules provide so.
15. Recently,   this   Court   in   Union   Territory,   Chandigarh
Administration   and   Ors.   vs.   Pradeep   Kumar   and   Anr.
(2018)   1   SCC   797,   relying   upon   the   judgment   of   S.
Samuthiram   (supra)   said that acquittal in a criminal case is
not conclusive of the  suitability  of the  candidates on the  post
concerned.   It is observed,     acquittal or discharge of a person
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cannot   always   be   inferred   that   he   was   falsely   involved   or   he
had no criminal antecedent.     The said issue has further been
considered in   Mehar Singh   (supra) holding   non­examination
of   key   witnesses   leading   to   acquittal   is   not   honourable
acquittal,   in   fact,   it   is   by   giving   benefit   of   doubt.     The   Court
said   nature of acquittal is necessary for core consideration. If
acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not suitable for
government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors
and   the   nature   of   offence,   extent   of   his   involvement,
propensity   of   such   person   to   indulge   in     similar   activities   in
future,   are   the   relevant   aspects   for   consideration   by   the
Screening Committee, which is   competent to decide  all these
issues.
16 . In the present case, the charges were framed against the
respondent   for   the   offences   punishable     under   Sections
347/327/323/506(Part­II)   and   364A   IPC.     He   was   acquitted
after   trial     vide   judgment   dated   19.03.2010   by   the   Sessions
Judge, Jhabua because the person kidnapped Nilesh and also
his   wife   have   not   supported   the   case   of   prosecution.     As   per
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prosecution,   the   complainant   was   beaten     by   the   respondent
and   the   said   fact   found   support   from   the   evidence   of   doctor.
Therefore, it appears that the Committee was of the view that
acquittal   of   the   respondent,   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case,
cannot     be   termed   as   ‘honourable   acquittal’   and   the   said
acquittal may be treated by giving benefit of doubt.
17. The law with regard to the effect and consequence of the
acquittal, concealment of criminal case on appointments   etc.
has been settled in the case of  Avtar Singh  (supra), wherein a
three­Judge Bench of this Court  decided, as thus:
“ 38 .   We   have   noticed   various   decisions   and   tried   to
explain   and   reconcile   them   as   far   as   possible.     In
view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   summarize   our
conclusion thus:
“ 38.1   Information   given   to   the   employer   by   a
candidate   as   to   conviction,   acquittal   or   arrest,   or
pendency   of   a   criminal  case,   whether  before   or   after
entering   into   service   must   be   true   and   there   should
be   no   suppression   or   false   mention   of   required
information. 
38.2 .   While   passing   order   of   termination   of   services
or   cancellation   of   candidature   for   giving   false
information, the employer  may  take notice of special
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circumstances   of   the   case,   if   any,   while   giving   such
information. 
38.3 . The employer shall take into consideration the
Government   orders/instructions/rules,   applicable   to
the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 
38.4.   In   case   there   is   suppression   or   false
information   of   involvement   in   a   criminal   case   where
conviction   or   acquittal   had   already   been   recorded
before   filling   of   the   application/verification   form   and
such fact  later  comes to knowledge of employer, any
of the following recourse appropriate to the case may
be adopted : 
38.4.1 . In a case trivial in nature in which conviction
had   been   recorded,   such   as   shouting   slogans   at
young   age   or   for   a   petty   offence   which   if   disclosed
would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post
in   question,   the   employer   may,   in   its   discretion,
ignore   such   suppression   of   fact   or   false   information
by condoning the lapse. 
38.4.2   Where   conviction   has   been   recorded   in   case
which   is   not   trivial   in   nature,   employer   may   cancel
candidature or terminate services of the employee. 
38.4.3   If   acquittal   had   already   been   recorded   in   a
case   involving   moral   turpitude   or   offence   of
heinous/serious   nature,   on   technical   ground   and   it
is   not   a   3   case   of   clean   acquittal,   or   benefit   of
reasonable   doubt   has   been   given,   the   employer   may
consider   all   relevant   facts   available   as   to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee. 
38.5.   In   a   case   where   the   employee   has   made
declaration   truthfully   of   a   concluded   criminal   case,
the   employer   still   has   the   right   to   consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate. 
38.6.   In case when fact has been truthfully declared
in   character   verification   form   regarding   pendency   of
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a   criminal   case   of   trivial   nature,   employer,   in   facts
and circumstances of  the case, in its discretion may
appoint   the   candidate   subject   to   decision   of   such
case. 
38.7 . In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with
respect   to   multiple   pending   cases   such   false
information by itself will assume significance and an
employer   may   pass   appropriate   order   cancelling
candidature   or   terminating   services   as   appointment
of   a   4   person   against   whom   multiple   criminal   cases
were pending may not be proper. 
38.8.   If criminal case was pending but not known to
the   candidate   at   the   time   of   filling   the   form,   still   it
may   have   adverse   impact   and   the   appointing
authority   would   take   decision   after   considering   the
seriousness of the crime. 
38.9.   In   case   the   employee   is   confirmed   in   service,
holding   Departmental   enquiry   would   be   necessary
before   passing   order   of   termination/removal   or
dismissal   on   the   ground   of   suppression   or
submitting false information in verification form. 
38.10.   For   determining   suppression   or   false
information   attestation/verification   form   has   to   be
specific, not vague. Only such information which was
required   to   be   specifically   mentioned   has   to   be
disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant
comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be
considered   in   an   objective   manner   while   addressing
the question of fitness. However, in such cases action
cannot   be   taken   on   basis   of   suppression   or   5
submitting   false   information   as   to   a   fact   which   was
not even asked for. 
38.11 .   Before   a   person   is   held   guilty   of   suppressio
veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be
attributable to him.”
18 . In  view  of the  above, in  the  facts of  the present  case, as
per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5, it is clear that the employer is
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having right to consider the suitability of the candidate as per
government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the
decision   for   induction   of   the   candidate   in   employment.
Acquittal   on   technical   ground   in   respect   of   the   offences   of
heinous/serious   nature,   which   is   not   a   clean   acquittal,   the
employer   may   have   a   right   to   consider   all   relevant   facts
available   as   to   the   antecedents,   and   may   take   appropriate
decision as to the  continuance of the employee.  Even in case,
truthful   declaration   regarding   concluded   trial   has   been   made
by   the   employee,   still   the   employer   has   the   right   to   consider
antecedents   and   cannot   be   compelled   to   appoint   the
candidate.
19. If   we   look   into   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   the
instructions   of   the   Home   Department   dated   1.02.2012,
prevalent   at   the   time   of   selection   and   appointment   specify
such   candidate   would   not   be   considered   for   recruitment.     In
Circular No. 2/2010 dated 31.03.2010,  issued by the Office of
the   Training   Sector,   National   Industrial   Security   Academy,
Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), it
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is   clarified     if   a   candidate   is   found   involved   in   any   criminal
case, whether it is finalized or pending, the candidate may not
be   allowed   to   join   without   further   instructions   from   the
headquarter.  After seeking instructions from the headquarter,
the Standing Committee has taken the decision on 15.10.2012
that     because   of   acquittal   giving   benefit   of   doubt,   the
respondent­writ   petitioner   was   not   considered   eligible   for
appointment in CISF.
20. In the aforesaid fact, guidance can further  be taken from
the   judgment   of   Mehar   Singh   (supra),   in   paras   23,   34,   35,
this Court observed, as thus:
23.   A   careful   perusal   of   the   policy   leads   us   to
conclude   that   the   Screening   Committee   would   be
entitled   to   keep   persons   involved   in   grave   cases   of
moral   turpitude   out   of   the   police   force   even   if   they
are   acquitted   or   discharged   if   it   feels   that   the
acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not
honourable. The Screening Committee will be within
its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if
it   finds   that   the   acquittal  is   based   on   some   serious
flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the
result   of   material   witnesses   turning   hostile.   It   is
only experienced officers of the Screening Committee
who   will   be   able   to   judge   whether   the   acquitted   or
discharged   candidate   is   likely   to   revert   to   similar
activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed,   to   the   post   in   a   police   force.   The
Screening   Committee   will   have   to   consider   the
nature   and   extent   of   such   person’s   involvement   in
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the   crime   and   his   propensity   of   becoming   a   cause
for   worsening   the   law   and   order   situation   rather
than   maintaining   it.   In   our   opinion,   this   policy
framed   by   the   Delhi   Police   does   not   merit   any
interference from this Court as its object appears to
be   to   ensure   that   only   persons   with   impeccable
character enter the police force.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from
the   fact   that   in   their   application   and/or   attestation
form   they   have   disclosed   their   involvement   in   a
criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves
their   case.   Disclosure   of   these   facts   in   the
application/attestation   form   is   an   essential
requirement.   An   aspirant   is   expected   to   state   these
facts   honestly.   Honesty   and   integrity   are   inbuilt
requirements   of   the   police   force.   The   respondents
should   not,   therefore,   expect   to   score   any   brownie
points   because   of   this   disclosure.   Besides,   this   has
no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition
to   state   that   while   deciding   whether   a   person
against   whom   a   criminal   case   was   registered   and
who   was   later   acquitted   or   discharged   should   be
appointed   to   a   post   in   the   police   force,   what   is
relevant   is   the   nature   of   the   offence,   the   extent   of
his   involvement,   whether   the   acquittal   was   a   clean
acquittal   or   an   acquittal   by   giving   benefit   of   doubt
because   the   witnesses   turned   hostile   or   because   of
some   serious   flaw   in   the   prosecution,   and   the
propensity   of   such   person   to   indulge   in   similar
activities   in   future.   This   decision,   in   our   opinion,
can   only   be   taken   by   the   Screening   Committee
created   for   that   purpose   by   the   Delhi   Police.   If   the
Screening   Committee’s   decision   is   not   mala   fide   or
actuated   by   extraneous   considerations,   then,   it
cannot be questioned. 
35.   The   police   force   is   a   disciplined   force.   It
shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law
and   order   and   public   order   in   the   society.   People
repose   great   faith   and   confidence   in   it.   It   must   be
worthy   of   that   confidence.   A   candidate   wishing   to
join   the   police   force   must   be   a   person   of   utmost
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rectitude.   He   must   have   impeccable   character   and
integrity.   A   person   having   criminal   antecedents   will
not   fit   in   this   category.   Even   if   he   is   acquitted   or
discharged   in   the   criminal   case,   that   acquittal   or
discharge   order   will   have   to   be   examined   to   see
whether   he   has   been   completely   exonerated   in   the
case   because   even   a   possibility   of   his   taking   to   the
life   of   crimes   poses   a   threat   to   the   discipline   of   the
police   force.   The   Standing   Order,   therefore,   has
entrusted   the   task   of   taking   decisions   in   these
matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of
the   Screening   Committee   must   be   taken   as   final
unless   it   is   mala   fide.   In  recent   times,   the  image   of
the   police   force   is   tarnished.   Instances   of   police
personnel   behaving   in   a   wayward   manner   by
misusing   power   are   in   public   domain   and   are   a
matter of concern. The reputation of the police force
has   taken   a   beating.   In   such   a   situation,   we   would
not   like   to   dilute   the   importance   and   efficacy   of   a
mechanism like the Screening Committee created by
the   Delhi   Police   to   ensure   that   persons   who   are
likely   to   erode   its   credibility   do   not   enter   the   police
force.   At   the   same   time,   the   Screening   Committee
must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it
and must treat all candidates with even hand .
21. In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   it   is   clear     the   respondent   who
wishes   to   join   the   police   force   must   be   a   person   of   utmost
rectitude   and   have   impeccable   character   and   integrity.   A
person  having  a  criminal   antecedents  would  not  be  fit  in   this
category.  The employer is having  right to consider the nature
of   acquittal   or   decide   until   he   is   completely   exonerated
because   even   a   possibility   of   his   taking   to   the   life   of   crimes
poses   a   threat     to   the   discipline   of   the   police   force.     The
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Standing   Order,   therefore,   has   entrusted   the   task   of   taking
decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee and the
decision of the Committee would be final  unless  mala fide. In
the case of  Pradeep Kumar  (supra),  this Court has taken the
same   view,   as   reiterated   in   the   case   of   Mehar   Singh   (supra).
The same view has again been reiterated by  this Court in the
case of  Raj Kumar  (supra).
22. As   discussed   hereinabove,   the   law   is   well­settled.     If   a
person is acquitted giving  him  the benefit of doubt,   from  the
charge of  an offence involving moral turpitude or because the
witnesses   turned   hostile,   it   would   not   automatically   entitle
him   for   the   employment,   that   too   in   disciplined   force.   The
employer is having a right to consider his candidature in terms
of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee.  The mere
disclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is
not   sufficient.     In   the   said   situation,   the   employer   cannot   be
compelled   to   give   appointment   to   the   candidate.     Both   the
Single   Bench   and   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   have
not   considered   the   said   legal   position,   as   discussed   above   in
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the orders impugned.   Therefore, the impugned orders passed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition
No. 3897 of 2013 and Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1090
of 2013 are not sustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove. 
23. Accordingly,   this   appeal   is   hereby   allowed   and   the
impugned orders are set­aside.  No order as to costs.
……………………………J.
[ INDIRA BANERJEE ]
……………………………J.
[ J.K. MAHESHWARI ]
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 6, 2021.
   
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