2021 INSC 0635
                                                            REPORTABLE
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1167 OF 2021   
(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 7828/2019)
Manoj Mishra @ Chhotkau          .…Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Uttar Pradesh                            ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the judgment
dated   14.03.2018   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No.1102/2017.
Through the said judgment, the High Court has dismissed the
appeal   and   confirmed   the   conviction   and   sentence   ordered   to
the   appellant   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Court   and   Special
Judge POCSO Act, Bahraich in C.C. No.18/2014. The appellant
herein was arrayed as Accused No.4 in the said case.
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2. The  brief facts leading  to the  conviction  and  sentence of
the appellant is that the father of the prosecutrix filed a written
report   dated   09.08.2013   at   22:35   hours   before   the   police
alleging   therein   that   one   Ramasre   alias   Siri   had   enticed   his
daughter   aged   about   14   years   on   02.08.2013   and   had   taken
her   away.   In   the   said   complaint,   it   was   further   alleged   that
Raksharam,   Nangodiya   and   Manoj   Kumar   alias   Chhotkau   i.e.
the   appellant   herein   had   cooperated   with   him   in   the   alleged
incident.   An   FIR   was   lodged   in   Crime   No.625/2013   under
Sections   363   and   366   IPC.   The   prosecutrix   was   found   by   the
police along with Ramasre alias Siri. She was brought back and
subjected   to   medical   examination.     The   case   was   investigated
and a charge sheet was filed under Sections 363, 366, 376 and
506 Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) as also sections 3 and 4
of   Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act   (for   short
‘POCSO   Act’).     The   Court   had   thereafter   framed   the   charges
against   the   accused.   On   the   accused   denying   the   charge,   trial
was conducted.  The father and mother of the prosecutrix were
examined as PW­1 and PW­2 respectively, while the prosecutrix
herself   was   examined   as   PW­3.     Dr.   Rabia   Sultan   who   had
conducted   the   medical   examination   on   the   prosecutrix   was
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examined   as   PW­4.   The   Constable   Pramod   Kumar   Shah   who
had   carried   the   FIR   was   examined   as   PW­5   and   the   Sub­
Inspector   Tara   Prasad   Pandey   who   had   investigated   the   case
was examined as PW­6.
3. The   trial   court   having   analysed   the   said   evidence   which
was tendered before it, also taking into consideration the denial
put   forth   by   the   accused   while   recording   the   statement   under
Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘Cr.PC’) had
arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   charge   alleged   against   the
accused   was   proved.     Accordingly   the   accused   were   sentenced
to (i) 3 years rigorous imprisonment  with fine of Rs.3000/­ for
the   offence   under   Section   363   IPC;   (ii)   5   years   rigorous
imprisonment   with   fine   of   Rs.5,000/­     for   the   offence   under
Section 366 IPC; (iii) 20 years rigorous imprisonment with fine
of   Rs.25,000/­   for   the   offence   under   Section   376­D   IPC;   (iv)   2
years   rigorous   imprisonment   with   fine   of   Rs.2,000/­   under
Section   506   IPC   and   (v)   7   years   rigorous   imprisonment   with
fine   of   Rs.7,000/­   for   the   offence   under   Section   4   of   POCSO
Act.  The default sentence for non­payment of the fine was also
imposed   and   the   sentence   for   the   offence   under   the   said
provisions   were   ordered   to   run   concurrently   through   the
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judgment dated 20.05.2015.  Through the said judgment one of
the   accused   Raksharam   was   acquitted   on   holding   that   the
charges against him were not proved.  
4. The appellant had assailed the said judgment before the
High   Court   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1102/2017.     The   learned
Judge while adverting to the evidence tendered before the trial
court   had   reappraised   the   same   in   the   background   of   the
contentions   that   were   urged   and,   in   that   light,   had   arrived   at
the   conclusion   that   the   appellant   had   raped   the   prosecutrix
number of times after being enticed away by him.  In that view
of the matter the learned Judge was of the opinion that the trial
court  had  rightly  arrived  at  the  conclusion  on  the  basis  of  the
prosecution   evidence   that   the   appellant   was   involved   in   the
commission   of   the   crime.     The   judgment   of   conviction   and
sentence   was   accordingly   confirmed.     The   appellant   therefore
claiming to be aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned
Judge of the High Court is before this Court in this appeal.  
5. We   have   heard   Mr.   Anoop   Prakash   Awasthi   learned
counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant,   Mr.   Parmanand   Pandey
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learned   standing   counsel   for   the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and
perused the appeal papers.
6. The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   while   seeking   to
contend   that   the   trial   court   as   also   the   High   Court   had
committed an error in convicting and upholding the conviction
would seek to refer to the contradictions in the very manner in
which   the   complaint   was   initiated   and   the   various   statements
made   by   the   prosecutrix   herself.   It   is   contended   that   the
criminal proceedings was set in motion by the complaint dated
09.08.2013   wherein   it   has   been   stated   that   his   daughter   has
been tricked and enticed, therefore eloped somewhere.  When a
statement   was   recorded   on   10.08.2013,   he   has   alleged   that
Ramasre   alias   Siri   had   enticed   his   minor   daughter   and   his
statements   had   been   varying   from  time  to   time.    It  is   his  case
that   even   the   prosecutrix   has   made   contradicting   statements
with regard to the nature of the incident as also her age. In that
light,   it   is   contended   that   the   entire   theory   of   the   prosecutrix
being kidnapped, enticed or being raped in the manner as has
been   put   forth   is   not   reliable.     It   is   contended   that   even   with
regard   to   the   manner   in   which   the   prosecutrix   had   stated   of
having   gone   with   Ramasre   alias   Siri,   it   only   indicates   that   it
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was   consensual   and   in   any   event   the   appellant   has   been
named   only   thereafter   when   a   statement   was   recorded   under
Section   164   Cr.PC.     Though   in   her   evidence   as   PW­3   she   has
stated,   with   regard   to   the   incident;   in   her   cross­examination
she has stated, with regard to the physical relation she had for
the first time which had been told by her to the family but has
again   stated   that   she   disclosed   the   same   when   she   was   four
months’ pregnant and the family members enquired her  about
the same. 
7.   The learned counsel therefore contends that neither the
evidence of the parents who were examined as PW­1 and PW­2
nor   the   evidence   tendered   by   the   prosecutrix   as   PW­3   was
reliable and the trial court as well as the High Court ought not
to   have  passed  the   conviction  and   sentence   on   such  evidence.
Though PW­4 in her evidence and with reference to the medical
examination   report   has   stated   about   the   prosecutrix   being
pregnant   and   the   foetus   being   of   20­23   weeks,   that   by   itself
cannot   establish   the   charge   made   against   the   appellant   is   his
contention.   Alternatively,   it   is   contended   that   even   if   the
statement of the prosecutrix about the physical relations of the
appellant   with   her   and   that   she   has   filed   the   complaint   when
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the   appellant   had   refused   to   marry   her   despite   she   becoming
pregnant   is   accepted,   it   only   indicates   that   it   was   consensual
and   when   she   herself   has   stated   that   she   was   20   years   and
also   when   PW­4   the   doctor   in   her   cross­examination   has
indicated that due to the development of her body even if she is
stated to be 16­17 years there could be variation and it can be
17­18 years as per general variations. In such event, the charge
would   not   be   sustainable.     Even   otherwise,   in   the   facts   and
circumstance,   the   conviction   under   Section   376­D   IPC   is   not
justified and said provision ought not to have been invoked as
it does not qualify to be a gang rape.   For all the said reasons,
he contends that the judgment is liable to be set aside.
8. The   learned   standing   counsel   for   the   State   of   Uttar
Pradesh   contends   that   the   trial   court   as   also   the   High   Court
has referred to the evidence available on record.   Though there
may   be   certain   discrepancies   in   the   various   statements   the
same cannot qualify as contradictions and in that circumstance
when PW­1, PW­2 and PW­3 have all stated with regard to the
incident   in   support   of   the   prosecution   and   when   there   is
categorical medical examination to indicate that the prosecutrix
was   pregnant,   the   charge   would   stand   established.     It   is
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contended   that   in   such   circumstance   when   the   father   of   the
prosecutrix   has   indicated   the   age   as   14   years   and   the   doctor
also   has   indicated   the   age   to   be   around   16   years,   the
contention of the consensual sex will not be acceptable.  In that
view he contends that the judgment passed by the trial court as
also the High Court does not call for interference.  
9. In   the   light   of   the   above,   we   have   taken   note   of   the
nature of consideration made by the trial court as also the High
Court.  In so far as the incident based on which the charge was
framed   against   the   accused,   more   particularly   against   the
appellant,   the   parents   of   the   prosecutrix   and   the   prosecutrix
herself were examined as PW­1 to PW­3 who have spoken with
regard   to   the   same.     Though   reference   was   made   to   the
complaint and the statement of PW­1 and at the first instance
the complainant having named Ramasre alias Siri, it was in the
circumstance when he had noticed that the prosecutrix, i.e. his
daughter was not in the house and had accordingly lodged the
complaint on suspicion.   It is pursuant to the complaint when
the   police   took   action,   the   prosecutrix   and   the   said   Ramasre
alias Siri were retrieved by the police when they were travelling
to   Mumbai   as   per   the   very   statement   recorded   by   the
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prosecutrix   under   Section   164   Cr.PC.     In   that   circumstance
what   would   be   relevant   is   the   statement   and   the   evidence
tendered   by   the   prosecutrix   as   PW­3   before   the   trial   court
which described the events prior thereto and the circumstance
which   forced   her   to   be   with   Ramasre   alias   Siri   at   that   point.
Though   certain   discrepancies   were   referred   to   by   the   learned
counsel   for   the   appellant   in   the   manner   the   prosecutrix   had
described   the   incident   to   contend   that   as   per   her   own
statement the thatched hut was open from all sides and the act
was alleged to be committed during the day time which cannot
be   probable,   it   is   noticed   that   the   sum   and   substance   of   the
evidence   tendered   by   the   prosecutrix   as   PW­3   is   essentially
with   regard   to   the   physical   relationship   she   had   with   the
appellant due to which she had become pregnant and this was
disclosed   to   her   family   members   only   when   they   had   noticed
her   to   be   pregnant.     She   has   further   stated   that   in   that
situation when she had insisted on the appellant marrying her,
he   had   refused,   threatened   and   he   had   taken   the   help   of   the
co­accused   and   got   her   married   to   Ramasre   alias   Siri,   by
enticing and taking her away.
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10. In   that   background,   the   fact   that   the   appellant   had
physical   relationship   with   the   prosecutrix   on   more   than   one
occasion and the prosecutrix had not disclosed the same to her
parents   when   it   had   happened   for   the   first   time   about   four
months   earlier   but   was   brought   to   their   notice   when   her
pregnancy   was   noticed   will   have   to   be   viewed   from   the   stand
point   as   to   whether   the   charges   as   framed   would   stand
established.     It   is   no   doubt   true   that   the   prosecutrix   in   her
deposition   has   stated   that   on   the   day   of   the   incident   the
appellant,   Ramasre   alias   Siri,   Nangodiya   etc.   had   caught   hold
of   her.     However,   there   is   no   specific   indication   as   to   whether
the other accused and the appellant had indulged in sexual act
along  with  the appellant herein or  the reference is with regard
to   that   they   having   assisted   the   appellant   in   enticing   and
taking her away on the date of the complaint so as to marry her
of   to   Ramasre   alias   Siri.     What   is   also   to   be   taken   note   of,   is
that   the   said   Ramasre   alias   Siri   and   Nangodiya   are   siblings
being   the   sons   of   Raksharam   who   was   acquitted   by   the   trial
court.   To   establish   common   intention   on   their   part   in
furthering the sexual assault committed by the appellant, there
is convincing evidence to that effect.
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11. From   the   evidence   tendered   by   PW­2   to   PW­3,   more
particularly the evidence of PW­4 i.e., the doctor who examined
the   prosecutrix   it   would   disclose   that   she   had   examined   the
prosecutrix   at   7   pm   on   19.08.2013.   She   has   stated   that   the
victim   who   was   unmarried   was   fully   grown   up   and   on
conducting  the necessary  tests it was seen that the rupture of
the hymen was old and she was found to be 24 weeks into her
pregnancy.   The   medical   report   was   exhibited   as   K­2.   The
complementary report dated 24.08.2013 was marked as exhibit
K­4.   In   the   cross­examination   she   has   referred   to   the   age   of
prosecutrix   as   16   to   17   years.   Though   she   has   stated   that   it
could   be   17   to18   years   as   per   general   variations,   no   definite
opinion   to   that   effect   has   been   given   by   her.   In   the   cross­
examination she has however stated that the pregnancy was of
23  weeks. The  report  of  the  doctor  indicates  it  to  be  23 weeks
while   the   pathology   report   gives   the   status   of   the   single   alive
foetus   of   20   weeks   2   days   as   on   20.08.2013.   Though   there   is
marginal   variation   with   regard   to   the   number   of   weeks
mentioned,   the   pregnancy   was   not   less   than   20   weeks   and   if
the   same   is   kept   in   the   backdrop,   the   statement   of   the
prosecutrix that the appellant had intercourse with her for the
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first   time,   four   months   earlier,   which   is   an   approximate
indication   and   that   she   became   pregnant   would   coincide   with
the   period.   Though   there   are   minor   discrepancies   with   regard
to   the   statement   made   under   Section   164   Cr.PC   and   the
evidence tendered by the prosecutrix as PW­3, the thrust of the
allegation has been that   the appellant had committed physical
contact   with   her   against   her   will.   In   such   circumstance,   the
evidence   of   the   prosecutrix   and   the   medical   evidence   would
establish the charge of rape. 
12. The   question   which   would   however   arise   for   our
consideration   is   as   to   whether   the   charge   framed   against   the
accused under Section 376 D IPC would be justified and as to
whether the case would qualify to be one of gang rape. On this
aspect,   the   evidence   of   PW­1   and   PW­2   does   not   establish   the
same.   The   evidence   of   PW­3   i.e.,   the   prosecutrix   is   not
categorical in as much as the prosecutrix has alleged that when
she   was   sitting   in   her   thatched   hut,   the   appellant   came   after
parking   his   vehicle   (tractor)   besides   the   road   and   asked   for
water.   At   that   time,   he   asked   where   her   father   was   and   after
she told that he had gone out, the appellant had forced himself
upon her. She has further alleged that he kept doing the wrong
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act with her   for   four  months and  she became  pregnant.  When
she disclosed the pregnancy and asked the appellant to marry
her, he did not   yield. Therefore, insofar as the incident of rape
attributed   to   the   appellant   it   does   not   disclose   that   all   the
accused   had   committed   rape   on   her   or   had   the   common
intention   and   aided   the   commission.   It   is   no   doubt   true   that
she refers to the incident on the day she was said to have been
taken   away   by   all   the   accused.   In   that   regard   except   stating
that   she   was   carried   to   the   home   of   a   lady   who   they   were
calling as Aunty, and at her place committed sexual act there is
no  other   evidence available  on  record to  indicate  that  the  spot
was visited in the course of the investigation and the lady who
is   alleged   to   have   aided   has   either   been   apprehended   or
examined. It is also not established that all of them were seen
together or aided with common intention.
13. In   fact,   the   very   conclusion   reached   by   the   High   Court
itself   would   indicate   that   the   allegation   of   rape   as   established
by   the   prosecution   is   against   the   appellant   and   the   other
accused are not involved in such act.  The relevant conclusions
read as hereunder:
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“23.   It   has   also   been   placed   before   the   court   that   the
other co­accused were real brothers and their father, as
such   the   truthfulness   of   the   incident   is   highly
improbable. The main co­operation of other co­accused
appears  to  be in enticing  the prosecutrix  away  but  the
allegation of specific rape has been levelled against the
present   accused­appellant   only   and   that   too   four
months prior to the incident on one threat or the other.
This   also   gives   a   reason   for   enticing   her   away   and
getting her married to Ram Asrey alias Sirri.
26.   To   conclude,   the   prosecutrix   was   raped   by   the
accused­appellant   number   of   times   after   being   enticed
away   by   him   and   also   before   the   incident   the
truthfulness   or   reliability   of   her   statement   is
undoubtful and there is nothing which may negate the
acceptance   of   her   testimony.   In   the   instance,   the
commission   of   alleged   crime   against   the   prosecutrix
cannot be ruled out. 
27.   In   view   of   above,   it   is   difficult   to   comprehend   the
circumstances   in   which   the   charge   of   rape   and
enticement   against   the   accused­appellant   cannot   be
levelled.   The   reason   given   by   the   trial   court   for
conviction of the appellant are sufficient enough to hold
him guilty.”
14. Further,   when   the   prosecutrix   was   traced   based   on   the
complaint   lodged   by   her   father   all   of   them   were   not   with   her
but   she   was   found   only   with   Ramasre   @   Siri.   That   apart,   as
noted the other three accused apart from the appellant are the
siblings and their father Raksharam has been acquitted by the
trial   court.   In   that   circumstance,   the   charge   of   gang   rape   has
not been established with convincing evidence. However, having
already   noted   that   the   incident   of   rape   alleged   had   been
established,   it   would   be   a   case   to   convict   the   appellant   under
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Section   376   of   IPC.   However,   the   conviction   handed   down   by
the trial court and confirmed by the High Court under Section
363, 366 and under Section 4 of POCSO Act and the sentence
as ordered thereunder would not call for interference. 
15. Insofar as the charge alleged against the appellant under
Section 506 of IPC, it is noticed that the charge alleged against
the appellant is that on the date referred to i.e 02.08.2013, the
appellant threatened to kill the prosecutrix, the daughter of the
complainant and therefore had committed the offence which is
punishable   under   Section   506   IPC.   In   respect   of   the   said
charge   we   do   not   find   that   there   is   any   supporting   evidence
except   the   vague   statement   of   the   prosecutrix   in   her   evidence
as PW­3 that whenever she shouted when he had attempted to
have sexual acts with her, the appellant had threatened her not
to say anything to anyone as otherwise he would kill her. There
is no other statement or evidence relating to the incident or the
manner in which the threat in its true sense was put forth. In
that   view,   we   are   or   of   the   opinion   that   the   conviction   and
sentence   under   Section   506   imposed   by   the   trial   court   and
affirmed by the High Court is not sustainable and is liable to be
set aside.
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16. On arriving at the conclusion that the appellant is liable
to   be   convicted   under   Section   376   IPC   and   not   under   Section
376   D   IPC,   the   appropriate   sentence   to   be   imposed   needs
consideration.   The   incident   in   question   is   based   on   the
complaint dated 09.08.2013. In this circumstance, though it is
noted   that   Section   376   has   been   amended   w.e.f.   21.04.2018
providing   for   the   minimum   sentence   of   10   years,   the   case   on
hand   is   of   2013   and   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   was   on
20.05.2015. The incident having occurred prior to amendment,
the pre­amended provision will have to be taken note. The same
provides   that   a   person   committed   of   rape   shall   be   punished
with  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a term  which  shall  not  be less
than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life
and shall also be liable to fine. In the instant case, taking into
consideration all facts including that no material is available on
record   to   indicate   that   the   appellant   has   any   criminal
antecedents and that he is also a father of five children and the
eldest   son   is   more   than   18   years,   it   appears   that   there   is   no
reason   to   apprehend   that   the   appellant   would   indulgence
similar   acts   in   future.   In   that   circumstance,   we   deem   it
appropriate   that   the   sentence   of   7   years   would   have   been
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sufficient   deterrent   to   serve   the   ends   of   justice.   From   the
custody   certificate   dated   05.12.2017   issued   by   the   Jail
Superintendent,   District   Jail,   Bahraich,   it   is   noticed   that   the
appellant   has   been  in   custody   from   20.09.2013.  If  that  be  the
position,   he   has   been   in   custody   and   served   the   sentence   for
more   than   8   years   which   shall   be   his   period   of   sentence.   As
such   he   has   served   the   sentence   imposed   by   us   except
payment   of   fine.   The   fine   and   default   sentence   as   imposed   by
the trial court is maintained. 
17. In the result we make the following order: ­
(i) The   conviction   and   sentence   under   Section   363,
366,   and   Section   4   of   POCSO   Act   is   confirmed.
The   conviction   under   Section   506   IPC   is   set
aside.
(ii) The conviction order made by the trial court and
confirmed   by   the   High   Court   under   Section   376
D   IPC   is   modified.   The   appellant   is   instead
convicted   under   Section   376   IPC   and   is
sentenced,   for   the   period   undergone.   The   fine
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and   default   sentence   as   imposed   by   the   trial
court shall remain unaltered. 
(iii) Since   the   custody   certificate   dated   20.09.2013
indicates   that   the   appellant   has   undergone
sentence   for   more   than   8   years,   the   appellant   is
ordered   to   be   released   on   payment   of   fine   as   all
the sentences have run concurrently and if he is
not required to be detained in any other case. 
(iv) The appeal is accordingly allowed in part. 
(v) Pending   application,  if  any, shall  stand  disposed
of. 
……………………….J.
(M.R. SHAH)
                                                     ……………………….J.
                                               (A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
October 08, 2021 
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