2021 INSC 0661 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1209 OF 2021 PREM SHANKAR PRASAD                .. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.        .. RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling  aggrieved and  dissatisfied with the  impugned judgment and   order   dated   14.08.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Judicature   at   Patna   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Application   No. 50530   of   2019,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   allowed   the   said criminal miscellaneous application and has granted anticipatory bail to respondent No.2 herein – accused, the original informant – complainant has preferred the present appeal.  1 2. That   first   information   report   came   to   be   filed   by   the   appellant herein   against   respondent   No.2   with   Chapra   Town   Police Station,   Saran   in   case   No.453   of   2018   for   the   offences punishable   under   sections   406,   407,   468,   506   of   the   Indian Penal   Code,   1860.   A   warrant   of   arrest   came   to   be   issued   by learned   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate,   Saran,   Chapra   on 19.12.2018.   It   appears   that   thereafter   respondent   No.2   – accused   is   absconding   and   concealing   himself   to   avoid   service of   warrant   of   arrest.   Thereafter   learned   Chief   Judicial Magistrate   issued   a   proclamation   against   respondent   No.2 under   section   82   Cr.PC.   Only   thereafter   and   issuance   of proclamation   under   section   82   Cr.PC,   respondent   No.2   – accused   filed   anticipatory   bail   application   before   learned   Trial Court.   By   a   detailed   order   dated   29.01.2019   the   learned   Trial Court   dismissed   the   said   anticipatory   bail   application   and rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail on merits as well as on the   ground   that   as   the   accused   is   absconding   and   even   the proceedings   under   section   82/83   Cr.PC   have   been   issued,   the accused   is   not   entitled   to   the   anticipatory   bail.   That   thereafter the   accused   approached   the   High   Court   by   way   of   present 2 application  and   despite  the   fact   that   it   was  specifically   pointed to the High Court that since the process of proclamation under section   82   &   83   Cr.PC   have   been   issued,   the   accused   should not   be   allowed   the   privilege   of   anticipatory   bail,   ignoring   the aforesaid relevant aspect, by the impugned judgment and order the   High   Court   has   allowed   the   said   anticipatory   bail   by observing   that   in   the   event   of   his   arrest/surrender   within   six weeks   in   the   Court   below,   he   may   be   released   on   bail   on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/­ with two sureties of the like amount   each   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   learned   Chief   Judicial Magistrate, Saran, Chapra and subject to the conditions as laid­ down under section 438 (2) of Cr.PC.  3. Feeling  aggrieved and  dissatisfied with the  impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court granting anticipatory bail to respondent No.2 – accused, the original informant/complainant – appellant has preferred the present appeal.  4. Shri   Rituraj   Biswas,   learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of the   appellant   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the   facts   and 3 circumstances   of   the   case,   the   High   Court   has   committed   a grave error in allowing the anticipatory bail application.  4.1 It   is   submitted   that   considering   the   fact   that   the   accused   was avoiding   the   arrest   and   even   did   not   co­operate   with investigating   agency   and   even   after   the   arrest   warrants   were issued,   the   proceedings   under   sections   82­83   of   Cr.PC   were initiated, the High Court ought not to allow the anticipatory bail application.  4.2 It   is   submitted   that   though   the   factum   of   initiation   of proceedings under Section 82­83 of Cr.PC was pointed out, the High Court has simply ignored the same.  4.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   High   Court   has   not   at   all considered   the   seriousness   of   the   offences   alleged   namely   the offences   under   sections   406,   420   of   IPC,   which   were   in   detail considered   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   while   rejecting   the anticipatory bail application.      4.4 It is submitted that the High Court has granted the anticipatory bail   to   respondent   No.2   solely   observing   that   the   nature   of accusation arising out of a business transaction. It is submitted 4 that   merely   because   it   was   a   business   transaction,   without further   considering   the   nature   of   allegations   the   High   Court ought   not   to   have   granted   the   anticipatory   bail   to   respondent No.2 – accused.  4.5 Relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   court   in   case   of   State   of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Sharma reported in (2014) 2 SCC 171,   it   is   submitted   that   as   observed   and   held   by   this   court   a person against whom the proclamation has been issued and the proceedings under sections 82­83 of Cr.PC have been initiated, is not entitled to the benefit of anticipatory bail.  4.6 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   subsequently   a   charge­sheet has   been   filed   against   the   accused   –   respondent   No.2   for   the offences punishable under sections 406 and 420 of IPC.  4.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon above decision of this court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High   Court   granting   anticipatory   bail   to   respondent   No.2   – accused.  5 5. Shri Devashish Bharuka, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of   the   State   has   supported   the   appellant   and   has   submitted that on being found a prima facie case against respondent No.2 –   accused,   a   charge­sheet   has   been   filed   against   the   accused under sections 406 and 420 of IPC also.   6. Shri   Abhishek,   learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of respondent   No.2   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the   facts and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   High   Court   has   not committed any error in granting anticipatory bail to respondent No.2 – accused.   6.1 It is submitted that the High Court has rightly observed that the nature of accusation is arising out of a business transaction. It is submitted that merely because the cheque was given and the same came to be dishonored it cannot be said that the offences under sections 406 and 420 of IPC is made out. It is submitted that   at   the   most   the   case   may   fall   under   section   138   of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.  6 6.2 It   is   submitted   that   as   such   respondent   No.2   –   accused   was available for  interrogation  and therefore there is no question of absconding.  6.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on behalf of respondent No.2 – accused that at this stage only the charge­sheet   has   been   filed   in   the   court,   but   the   learned Magistrate has yet to take cognizance of the same. 7. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the appellant – original informant ­ complainant  as well as learned counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   and   the   learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2­ accused.  7.1 It is required to be noted that after investigation a charge­sheet has   been   filed   against   respondent   no.2   –   accused   for   the offences  punishable   under  sections   406,   420   of  IPC   also.  Thus it   has   been   found   that   there   is   a   prima   facie   case   against   the accused.   It   has   come   on   record   that   the   arrest   warrant   was issued by the learned Magistrate as far  as back on 19.12.2018 and thereafter proceedings under  sections 82­83 of Cr.PC  have been initiated pursuant to the order passed by the learned Chief 7 Judicial   Magistrate   dated   10.01.2019.   Only   thereafter respondent   No.2   moved   an   application   before   the   learned   Trial Court   for   anticipatory   bail   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Saran, by a reasoned order. The   relevant   observations   made   by   the   learned   Additional Sessions   Judge,   Saran,   while   rejecting   the   anticipatory   bail application are as under:­ “ Perused   the   record.   The   prosecution   case   as alleged   in   the   typed   application   of   the   informant Prem   Shankar   Prasad   is   that   the   informant   is   a retailer   shopkeeper   of   medicines   in   the   name   of Maa Medical Store, Gandhi Chauk, Chapra and the petitioner is his stockiest who runs his business in the   name   of   Rajnish   Pharma,   Mauna   Pakari.   The petitioner   and   the   informant   were   on   good   terms, so,   the   informant   gave   Rs.   36,00,000/­   to   the petitioner in case and through cheque for purchase of   medicine.   When   the   required   were   not   supplied to   the   informant,   the   informant   demanded   his   Rs. 36,00,000/­   then,   the   petitioner   gave   a   cheque   of Rs.   10,00,000/­   bearing   cheque   no.   137763   dated 25.11.2017   which   was   in   the   Canara   Bank   of   the petitioner   which   was   dishonored   by   the  bank   with a note "insufficient fund". Thereafter the informant demanded his money in case. On 20.06.18 but, the brothers   of   the   petitioner   misbehaved   with   the informant.   The   brothers   of   the   petitioner   also threatened   not   to   contact   the   police   or   the consequences   will   be   worst:   On   this   informant Chapra Town PS No. 453/2018 was registered and investigation proceeded. 8 Perused the case diary from which it transpires that   in   para   4   there   is   a   re­statement   of   the informant   in   which   he   has   supported   the prosecution case. In para 8, 9, 10, and 11 witness Amit   Kumar   Sinha,   Awadhesh   Kumar,   Dhannu Kumar   and   Uday   Shankar   Prasad   has   been examined under section 161 of Cr.PC in which they have   supported   the   prosecution   case.   In   para   16 there is supervision  note  of  SDPO,  Sadar  in  which prosecution   case.   In   found   true   under   sections 420,   406   of   IPC   and   138   of   NI   Act.   In   para   23 processes under  sections 82 and 83 of Cr.PC  have been issued against the petitioner in para 38 there is a statement of witness Ashutosh Mishra who is a medical representative and has stated that Rajnish Srivastava, being stockiest of the medicine used to sell   the   medicines   of   his   company   in   course whereof he has borrowed a sum of   Rs. 7,10,000/­ from   him.   When   he   asked   to   return   back   the money   he   has   issued   a   cheque   of   the   aforesaid amount   which   was   dishonor   by   his   bank   due   to insufficient   fund.   In   para   39   another   witness Pramod   Kumar   Thakur   has   been   examined   who has deposed that this petitioner Rajnish Srivastava has   borrowed   a   sum   of   Rs.   10,00,000/­   on   the pretext   of   purchasing   a   piece   of   land.   When   he demanded   his   money   back.   Rajnish   Srivastava gave   a   cheque   of   the   aforesaid   amount   which   was dishonored   by   the   bank.   The   investigation   in   the case is still going on. From perusal of the case record I find that the informant   has   alleged   to   have   given   a   sum   of     Rs. 36,00,000/­   to   this   petitioner   in   order   to   supply certain   medicines   which   was   neither   supplied   nor the   amount   was   ever   refunded.   Admittedly,   the said amount was given to the petitioner on an oral undertaking   as   there   is   nothing   on   record   to substantiate  the aforesaid averments, but, the fact remains   that   the   petitioner   in   order   to   refund   the 9 said   amount   has   issued   a   cheque   of Rs.10,00,000/­   bearing   cheque   no.   137763   dated 25.11.2017 which was deposed by the informant in the   bank,   but,   the   same   was   dishonored   with record   I   further   find   that   the   petitioner   is   in   the habit   of   borrowing   money   from   different   persons and   then   used   to   make   default   in   payment inasmuch as by issuing cheques without sufficient balance in his account which transpires form paras 38 and 39 of the case diary.” 7.2 Despite   the   above   observations   on   merits   and   despite   the   fact that   it   was   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   High   Court   that respondent   No.2   –   accused   is   absconding   and   even   the proceedings   under   sections   82­83   of   Cr.PC   have   been   initiated as far  as back on 10.01.2019, the High Court has just ignored the aforesaid relevant aspects and has granted anticipatory bail to   respondent   No.2   –   accused   by   observing   that   the   nature   of accusation is arising out of a business transaction. The specific allegations   of   cheating,   etc.,   which   came   to   be   considered   by learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge   has   not   at   all   been considered   by   the   High   Court.   Even   the   High   Court   has   just ignored   the   factum   of   initiation   of   proceedings   under   sections 82­83 of Cr.PC by simply observing that “be that as it may”. The aforesaid relevant aspect on grant of anticipatory bail ought not 10 to have been ignored by the High Court and ought to have been considered by the High Court very seriously and not casually. 7.3 In   the   case   of   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   vs.   Pradeep   Sharma (Supra),   it   is   observed   and   held   by   this   court   that   if   anyone   is declared   as   an   absconder/proclaimed   offender   in   terms   of section   82   of   Cr.PC,   he   is   not   entitled   to   relief   of   anticipatory bail. In paragraph 14 to 16, it is observed and held as under:­ “ 14.   In   order   to   answer   the   above   question,   it   is desirable   to   refer   to   Section   438   of   the   Code   which reads as under: “ 438.   Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending   arrest .—(1)   Where   any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested   on   accusation   of   having   committed a   non­bailable   offence,   he   may   apply   to   the High   Court   or   the   Court   of   Session   for   a direction under this section that in the event of   such   arrest   he   shall   be   released   on   bail; and   that   court   may,   after   taking   into consideration,   inter   alia,   the   following factors, namely— ( i ) the nature and gravity of the accusation; ( ii ) the antecedents of the applicant including the   fact   as   to   whether   he   has   previously undergone   imprisonment   on   conviction   by   a court in respect of any cognizable offence; 11 ( iii )   the   possibility   of   the   applicant   to   flee from justice; and ( iv )   where   the   accusation   has   been   made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either   reject   the   application   forthwith   or issue   an   interim   order   for   the   grant   of anticipatory bail: Provided   that,   where   the   High   Court   or,   as the   case   may   be,   the   Court   of   Session,   has not passed any interim order under this sub­ section   or   has   rejected   the   application   for grant of anticipatory  bail, it shall be open to an   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   to arrest,  without  warrant   the  applicant  on   the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.” The   above   provision   makes   it   clear   that   the   power exercisable   under   Section   438   of   the   Code   is somewhat   extraordinary   in   character   and   it   is   to   be exercised   only   in   exceptional   cases   where   it   appears that   the   person   may   be   falsely   implicated   or   where there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   holding   that   a person   accused   of   an   offence   is   not   likely   to otherwise misuse his liberty. 15.   In   Adri Dharan Das   v.   State of W.B.   [(2005) 4 SCC 303]   this   Court   considered   the   scope   of   Section   438 of the Code as under : (SCC pp. 311­12, para 16) “ 16 .   Section   438   is   a   procedural   provision which  is concerned with  the personal  liberty of   an   individual   who   is   entitled   to   plead innocence,   since   he   is   not   on   the   date   of application   for   exercise   of   power   under 12 Section   438   of   the   Code   convicted   for   the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant   must   show   that   he   has   ‘reason   to believe’   that   he   may   be   arrested   in   a   non­ bailable   offence.   Use   of   the   expression ‘reason   to   believe’   shows   that   the   belief   that the   applicant   may   be   arrested   must   be founded   on   reasonable   grounds.   Mere   ‘fear’ is   not   ‘belief’   for   which   reason   it   is   not enough for the applicant to show that he has some   sort   of   vague   apprehension   that someone   is   going   to   make   an   accusation against   him   in   pursuance   of   which   he   may be   arrested.   Grounds   on   which   the   belief   of the   applicant   is   based   that   he   may   be arrested   in   non­bailable   offence   must   be capable   of   being   examined.   If   an   application is   made   to   the   High   Court   or   the   Court   of Session,   it   is   for   the   court   concerned   to decide whether a case has been made out for granting   of   the   relief   sought.   The   provisions cannot   be   invoked   after   arrest   of   the accused.   A   blanket   order   should   not   be generally   passed.   It   flows   from   the   very language   of   the   section   which   requires   the applicant   to   show   that   he   has   reason   to believe that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only   if   there   is   something   tangible   to   go   by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's   apprehension   that   he   may   be arrested   is   genuine.   Normally   a   direction should   not   issue   to   the   effect   that   the applicant shall be released on bail ‘whenever arrested   for   whichever   offence   whatsoever’. Such ‘blanket order’ should not be passed as it   would   serve   as   a   blanket   to   cover   or protect   any   and   every   kind   of   allegedly unlawful   activity.   An   order   under   Section 438   is   a   device   to   secure   the   individual's 13 liberty,   it   is   neither   a   passport   to   the commission   of   crimes   nor   a   shield   against any   and   all   kinds   of   accusations   likely   or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in   the   background   of   the   legal   position   set out   above,   this   does   not   prima   facie   appear to   be   a   case   where   any   order   in   terms   of Section 438 of the Code can be passed.” 16.   Recently, in   Lavesh   v.   State (NCT of Delhi)   [(2012) 8   SCC   730]   ,   this   Court   (of   which   both   of   us   were parties) considered the scope of granting relief under Section   438   vis­à­vis   a   person   who   was   declared   as an   absconder   or   proclaimed   offender   in   terms   of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 733) “ 12 . From these materials and information, it is   clear   that   the   present   appellant   was   not available   for   interrogation   and   investigation and   was   declared   as   ‘absconder’.   Normally, when   the   accused   is   ‘absconding’   and declared   as   a   ‘proclaimed   offender’,   there   is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant   had   been   issued   and   is   absconding or   concealing   himself   in   order   to   avoid execution   of   warrant   and   declared   as   a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the   Code   he   is   not   entitled   to   the   relief   of anticipatory bail.” It   is   clear   from   the   above   decision   that   if   anyone   is declared   as   an   absconder/proclaimed   offender   in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.” 14 Thus   the   High   court   has   committed   an   error   in   granting anticipatory   bail   to   respondent   No.2   –   accused   ignoring   the proceedings under Section 82­83 of Cr.PC.   8. Even   the   observations   made   by   the   High   Court   while   granting the   anticipatory   bail   to   respondent   No.2   –   accused   that   the nature   of   accusation   is   arising   out   of   a   business   transaction and   therefore   the   accused  is   entitled   to   the   anticipatory   bail   is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. Even in the case of a business transaction  also  there  may  be offences  under   the  IPC more   particularly   sections   406,   420,   467,   468,   etc.   What   is required   to   be   considered   is   the   nature   of   allegation   and   the accusation and not that the nature of accusation is arising out of   a   business   transaction.   At   this   stage,   it   is   required   to   be noted that respondent No.2 ­ accused has been charge­sheeted for   the   offences   punishable   under   sections   406   and   420,   etc. and   a   charge­sheet   has   been   filed   in   the   court   of   learned Magistrate Court.  9. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the impugned judgment and order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the 15 High   Court   granting   anticipatory   bail   to   respondent   No.2   – accused is un­sustainable  and deserves to  be quashed  and  set aside   and   is   accordingly   quashed   and   set   aside.   However,   two weeks’ time from the date of pronouncement of this judgment is granted   to   respondent   No.2   to   surrender   before   the   concerned Trial Court and thereafter it will be open for respondent No.2 – accused   to   pray   for   regular   bail,   which   may   be   considered   in accordance with law and on its own merits. The present appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms.    ………………………………… J.       (M. R. SHAH) ………………………………… J. (A. S. BOPANNA) New Delhi,  October 21, 2021. 16