2021 INSC 0667
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1393 OF 2011
Ramawatar … Appellant
                                             VERSUS
State of Madhya Pradesh  … Respondent
JUDGMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
A   civil   dispute   over   the   ownership   and   possessory   rights   of   a
piece   of   land   between   the   Appellant   and   his   neighbour   Prembai   took
an   ugly   turn   when   the   Appellant   allegedly   not   only   threw   a   brick   on
the Complainant but also made filthy and slur remarks on her caste,
which   prompted   the   Complainant   to   lodge   FIR   No.   18/94   at   Police
Station O.E. Panna under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and
the   Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of   Atrocities   Act),   1989   (in   short
‘SC/ST   Act’)   read   with   Section   34  of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860  (in
short   ‘I.P.C.’).     The   Appellant   and   his   co­accused   were   subsequently
tried,   which   led   to   the   Appellant’s   conviction   under   Section   3(1)(x)   of
 
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the   SC/ST   Act   and   consequential   sentence   of   six   months   rigorous
imprisonment   and   fine   of   Rs.   1000/­.   The   Appellant   challenged   his
conviction   and   sentence   before   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh,
Jabalpur   Bench   but   his   appeal   was   dismissed   vide   the   impugned
judgment dated 02.08.2010.
B RIEF  F ACTS :
2. Ramawatar   (Appellant)   and   Prembai   (Complainant),   who   are
neighbours and live in adjoining houses, were entangled in a property
dispute   with  respect  to  a  portion  of  land  over  which  Prembai’s  house
was   built.   On   25.06.1994,   Ramawatar   and   his   brother   Katulal   @
Kuddu   (Co­accused)   broke   down   a   wall   to   make   a   door   that   opened
into   the   house   of   Prembai.   When   this   was   resisted   by   her,   a   quarrel
ensued   between   the   parties   and   the   Appellant   threw   a   brick   at   the
Complainant.   Thereafter,   this   incident   was   reported   and   a   complaint
was lodged at Police Station, Devendra Nagar on the same date itself,
and an M.L.C was also performed. Since the nature of the injury was
simple,  and  the  offence  was  found  non­cognizable,  the  Police  took  no
further   steps.   On   the   following   day,   i.e.,   26.06.1994,   when   the
Complainant   was   sitting   in   front   of   her   residence,   the   Appellant   and
his   brother   appeared   at   the   scene.   They   were   visibly   enraged   by   the
fact   that   Prembai   had   lodged   an   F.I.R.   against   them.   They   started
abusing   her   with   repeated   reference   to   her   caste   whilst   also
 
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threatening her of dire consequences. After that, the Complainant and
her husband Chotelal reported this incident before the Harijan Welfare
Police Station, and the subject­F.I.R. under the SC/ST Act was lodged
against the Accused.
3. The   investigation   commenced   in   light   of   the   afore­stated   facts.
Upon   collection   of   substantial   evidence,   Appellant   and   co­accused
were   committed   to   trial   under   Section   3(1)(x)   of   the   SC/ST   Act   read
with Section 34 of the I.P.C.
4. The   Trial   Court   noted   that   the   Complainant   belonged   to   the
‘Prajapati’   community   which   is   a   Scheduled   Caste.   It   was   also
observed that the parties had candidly admitted to a pending property
dispute   between   them.   The   Trial   Court   further   discerned   that   the
prosecution witnesses had, by and large, supported the version of the
Complainant and had indubitably substantiated that Ramawatar  and
Kuddu   used   deprecatory   language   upon   the   Complainant.   It   was
found   that   the   Appellant   had   made   specific   reference   to   the
Complainant’s   caste   escorted   by   the   intent   to   insult   her.   The   actions
of   the   Appellant   &   co­accused   Kuddu   were   thus   held   to   be   in
contravention of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read with Section 34
I.P.C.   The   Trial   Court,   therefore,   convicted   both   the   accused   persons
for the said offences and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months. 
 
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5. Discontented   with   their   conviction,   the   accused   preferred   an
appeal   before   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh,   Jabalpur   Bench.
However,   during   the   pendency   of   the   proceedings,   co­accused   Kuddu
passed away, and the appeal only survived qua the present Appellant.
His primary  contention before the High Court was that the abuses, if
any,   were   not   meant   to   demean   the   Complainant   on   account   of   her
being   a   member   of   the   Scheduled   Caste   community.   Instead,   the
incident   occurred   on   account   of   a   property   dispute   between   the
parties.   It   was   thus   submitted   that   the   alleged   incident   could   not
attract   the   provisions   of   the   SC/ST   Act.   However,   after   re­appraising
the evidence on record, the High Court disagreed with the Appellant’s
contention and held that there was sufficient material to establish that
the  Complainant  being  a  member  of  the  Scheduled   Caste  community
was humiliated by the Appellant. Thus, concurring with the findings of
the Trial Court, the High Court maintained the order of conviction and
sentence passed against the Appellant. 
6. Aggrieved, the Appellant has approached this Court.
C ONTENTIONS :
7. When   the   instant   appeal   came   up   for   hearing,   what   prompted
this   Court   to   issue   notice   was   that   the   matter   had   been   settled
between the parties, and the Complainant had filed an application for
compromise.   Reiterating   the   same   plea,   learned   Counsel   for   the
 
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Appellant   canvassed   before   us   that   the   parties   are   residents   of   the
same   village   and   there   is   no   existing   enmity   between   them.   It   was
submitted   that  the   parties   wished   to   settle   their   dispute   so   that  they
may   continue   to   have   cordial   relations.   He   drew   our   attention   to   a
decision of this Court in  Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand
&   Anr 1
,   wherein,   it   was   held   that   a   property   dispute   between   a
vulnerable   section   of   the   society   and   a   person   of   upper   caste   would
not attract an offence under the SC/ST Act, unless the allegations are
on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Learned Counsel for
the Appellant thus prayed for invocation of this Court’s powers under
Article   142   of   the   Constitution   to   quash   the   instant   criminal
proceedings.   The   Appellant’s   stand   and   the   application   for
compromise   were   fully   supported   by   the   learned   Counsel   for   the
Complainant.
8. Per   Contra,   learned   Counsel   for   the   Respondent   State,   without
controverting   the   factum   of   compromise,   vehemently   opposed   such   a
recourse.   It   was   contended   that   there   was   a   concurrent   finding   of
conviction,   and   no   substantial   question   of   law   was   involved   in   the
present appeal. Referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of
Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K 2
,   Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr
1   (2020) 10 SCC 710, ¶ 22 & 24
2   (1999) 2 SCC 213
 
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v.   State   of   Orissa 3
  and   Bankat   &   Anr   v.   State   of   Maharastra 4
,
learned   State   Counsel   submitted   that   the   purported   settlement
between the parties is inconsequential as the offence in question is not
compoundable   in   terms   of   Section   320   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (in   short   ‘Cr.P.C’).   It   was   thus   argued   that   the
present case did not warrant any interference by this Court.
A NALYSIS :
9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, we
are  of the opinion that two  questions fall for our  consideration  in  the
present   appeal.   First,   whether   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Court   under
Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal
proceedings   arising   out   of   a   ‘non­compoundable   offence?   If   yes,   then
whether   the   power   to   quash   proceedings   can   be   extended   to   offences
arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?
10. So   far   as   the   first   question   is   concerned,   it   would   be   ad   rem   to
outrightly   refer   to   the   recent   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 5
, wherein, a two­
Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI &
Surya   Kant,   J)   was   confronted   with   an   identical   question.   Answering
in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court
under   Section   320   Cr.P.C   cannot   be   construed   as   a   proscription
3   (1999) 5 SCC 238
4   (2005) 1 SCC 343
5   Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012
 
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against   the   invocation   of   inherent   powers   vested   in   this   Court   under
Article   142  of   the   Constitution   nor   on   the   powers   of   the   High   Courts
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for
exercising the extra­ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482
Cr.P.C.,  would  be to   do  complete  justice.  Therefore,  this  Court  or  the
High  Court,  as  the  case  may  be, after  having  given due  regard to  the
nature   of   the   offence   and   the   fact   that   the   victim/complainant   has
willingly   entered   into   a   settlement/compromise,   can   quash
proceedings   in   exercise   of   their   respective   constitutional/inherent
powers. 
11. The   Court   in   Ramgopal   (Supra)     further   postulated   that
criminal proceedings involving non­heinous offences or offences which
are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage
of   the   proceedings,   including   at   the   appellate   level.   The   Court,
however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may
attempt   to   escape   their   criminal   liabilities   by   securing   a   compromise
through   brute   force,   threats,   bribes,   or   other   such   unethical   and
illegal   means,   cautioned   that   in   cases   where   a   settlement   is   struck
post­conviction,   the   Courts   should,   inter­alia,   carefully   examine   the
fashion in which the compromise has  been arrived at, as well as, the
conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While
concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held:
 
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“ 19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide
amplitude   ought   to   be   exercised   carefully   in   the   context
of   quashing   criminal   proceedings,   bearing   in   mind:   (i)
Nature  and   effect   of  the  offence   on   the  conscious  of
the  society;  (ii)  Seriousness   of  the  injury,   if  any;   (iii)
Voluntary   nature   of   compromise   between   the
accused   and   the   victim;   &   (iv)   Conduct   of   the
accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of
the   purported   offence   and/or   other   relevant
considerations.”                         
                                                                          [Emphasis Applied]
12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of
this Court in  Ramgopal (Supra)   and re­iterate that the powers of this
Court   under   Article   142   can   be   invoked   to   quash   a   criminal
proceeding   on   the   basis   of   a   voluntary   compromise   between   the
complainant/victim and the accused.
13. We, however, put a further caveat   that the powers under Article
142   or   under   Section   482   Cr.P.C.,   are   exercisable   in   post­conviction
matters   only   where   an   appeal   is   pending   before   one   or   the   other
Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does
not   attain   finality   till   the   accused   has   exhausted   his/her   legal
remedies and  the  finality  is sub­judice before an  appellate court.  The
pendency   of   legal   proceedings,   be   that   may   before   the   final   Court,   is
sine­qua­non   to   involve   the   superior   court’s   plenary   powers   to   do
complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the
attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the
basis   of   a   compromise   would   be   impermissible.   Such   an   embargo   is
 
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necessitated   to   prevent   the   accused   from   gaining   an   indefinite
leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with
lurking   suspicion   about   its   bona   fide.   We   have   already   clarified   that
the   purpose   of   these   extra­ordinary   powers   is   not   to   incentivise   any
hollow­hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to
do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).
14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted
that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide
and far­reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is
that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be
constructed   as   a   limitation   on   the   Court’s   power   to   do   “complete
justice”.   However,   this   is   not   to   say   that   this   Court   can   altogether
ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In
fact,   the   Court   is   obligated   to   take   note   of   the   relevant   laws   and   will
have   to   regulate   the   use   of   its   power   and   discretion   accordingly.   The
Constitution Bench decision in the case of  Supreme Court Bar Assn.
v.   Union   of   India   &   Anr 6
  has   eloquently   clarified   this   point   as
follows:
“ 48.   The   Supreme   Court   in   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction
under   Article   142   has   the   power   to   make   such   order   as
is   necessary   for   doing   complete   justice   “between   the
parties   in   any   cause   or   matter   pending   before   it”.   The
very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits
for   itself   within   which   to   exercise   those   powers   and
6   (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 48
 
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ordinarily   it   cannot   disregard   a   statutory   provision
governing   a   subject,   except   perhaps   to   balance   the
equities   between   the   conflicting   claims   of   the   litigating
parties   by   “ironing   out   the   creases”   in   a   cause   or   matter
before   it.   Indeed   this   Court   is   not   a   court   of   restricted
jurisdiction   of   only   dispute­settling.   It   is   well   recognised
and   established   that   this   Court   has   always   been   a   law­
maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute­settling.
It   is   a   “problem­solver   in   the   nebulous   areas”   (see   K.
Veeraswami   v.   Union   of   India   [(1991)   3   SCC   655   :   1991
SCC   (Cri)   734]   but   the   substantive   statutory   provisions
dealing with the subject­matter of a given case cannot be
altogether   ignored   by   this   Court,   while   making   an   order
under   Article   142.   Indeed,   these   constitutional   powers
cannot,   in   any   way,   be   controlled   by   any   statutory
provisions   but   at   the   same   time   these   powers   are   not
meant   to   be   exercised   when   their   exercise   may   come
directly in conflict   with what  has been expressly  provided
for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”
15. Ordinarily,   when   dealing   with   offences   arising   out   of   special
statutes   such   as   the   SC/ST   Act,   the   Court   will   be   extremely
circumspect   in   its   approach.   The   SC/ST   Act   has   been   specifically
enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against
members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a
recognition   of   the   depressing   reality   that   despite   undertaking   several
measures,   the   Scheduled   Castes/Scheduled   Tribes   continue   to   be
subjected   to   various   atrocities     at   the   hands   of   upper­castes.   The
Courts   have   to   be   mindful   of   the   fact   that   the   Act   has   been   enacted
keeping   in   view   the   express   constitutional   safeguards   enumerated   in
Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin­fold objective of
 
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protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to
provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste­based atrocities.
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence
in   question,   although   covered   under   the   SC/ST   Act,   is   primarily
private   or   civil   in   nature,   or   where   the   alleged   offence   has   not   been
committed   on   account   of   the   caste   of   the   victim,   or   where   the
continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process
of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On
similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a
compromise/settlement,   if   the   Court   is   satisfied   that   the   underlying
objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the
felony   in   question   goes   unpunished,   the   mere   fact   that   the   offence   is
covered   under   a   ‘special   statute’   would   not   refrain   this   Court   or   the
High  Court,  from  exercising  their  respective  powers  under  Article  142
of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17.  Adverting to the case in hand, we note that the present Appellant
has been charged and convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x)
of the SC/ST Act 7
, which was as follows: 
“ 3.   Punishments   for   offences   of   atrocities­   (1)
Whoever, not  being  a member  of a  Scheduled  Caste  or  a
Scheduled Tribe,—
 xxxx 
7   Section 3(1)(x) of the Act stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016.
 
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( x )   intentionally   insults   or   intimidates   with   intent   to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe in any place within public view;
xxxx"
18. We   may   hasten   to   add   that   in   cases   such   as   the   present,   the
Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant­
victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free
will   and   not   on   account   of   any   duress.   It   cannot  be  understated   that
since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to
the   weaker   sections   of   our   country,   they   are   more   prone   to   acts   of
coercion,   and   therefore   ought   to   be   accorded   a   higher   level   of
protection.   If   the   Courts   find   even   a   hint   of   compulsion   or   force,   no
relief   can   be   given   to   the   accused   party.   What   factors   the   Courts
should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
19. Having   considered   the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
present   case   in   light   of   the   afore­stated   principles,   as   well   as   having
meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke
the   powers   under   Article   142   and   quash   the   instant   Criminal
proceedings   with   the   sole   objective   of   doing   complete   justice   between
the parties before us. We say so for the reasons that: 
Firstly,   the   very   purpose   behind   Section   3(1)(x)   of   the   SC/ST   is   to
deter   caste­based   insults   and   intimidations   when   they   are   used   with
 
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the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to
the   Scheduled   Caste/   Scheduled   Tribe   community.   In   the   present
case,   the   record   manifests   that   there   was   an   undeniable   pre­existing
civil   dispute   between  the   parties.   The  case   of  the  Appellant,  from   the
very   beginning,   has   been   that   the   alleged   abuses   were   uttered   solely
on   account   of   frustration   and   anger   over   the   pending   dispute.   Thus,
the   genesis   of   the   deprecated   incident   was   the   afore­stated
civil/property   dispute.   Considering   this   aspect,   we   are   of   the   opinion
that   it   would   not   be   incorrect   to   categorise   the   occurrence   as   one
being   overarchingly   private   in   nature,   having   only   subtle   undertones
of   criminality,   even   though   the   provisions   of   a   special   statute   have
been attracted in the present case.
Secondly,   the   offence   in   question,   for   which   the   Appellant   has   been
convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of
the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from
atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to us that
although   the   Appellant   may   not   belong   to   the   same   caste   as   the
Complainant,   he   too   belongs   to   the   relatively   weaker/backward
section   of   the   society   and   is   certainly   not   in   any   better   economic   or
social   position   when   compared   to   the   victim.   Despite   the   rampant
prevalence   of   segregation   in   Indian   villages   whereby   members   of   the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict
 
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their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case,
the   Appellant   and   the   Complainant   lived   in   adjoining   houses.
Therefore, keeping in mind the socio­economic status of the Appellant,
we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   overriding   objective   of   the   SC/ST   Act
would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed. 
Thirdly , the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on
record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise,
any  untoward  incident had  transpired  between the  parties.  The State
Counsel   has   also   not   brought   to   our   attention   any   other   occurrence
that   would   lead   us   to   believe   that   the   Appellant   is   either   a   repeat
offender or is unremorseful about what transpired. 
Fourthly ,   the   Complainant   has,   on   her   own   free   will,   without   any
compulsion,   entered   into   a   compromise   and   wishes   to   drop   the
present criminal proceedings against the accused. 
Fifthly,   given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial
against the Appellant had been concluded. 
Sixthly,   the   Appellant   and   the   Complainant   parties   are   residents   of
the   same   village   and   live   in   very   close   proximity   to   each   other.   We
have  no   reason   to  doubt  that  the   parties  themselves   have   voluntarily
settled   their   differences.   Therefore,   in   order   to   avoid   the   revival   of
healed wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent
to effectuate the present settlement.
 
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C ONCLUSION : 
20. Consequently,   and   for   the   aforementioned   reasons,   we   find   it
appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
and   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   to   do   complete   justice   between
the   parties.   As   a   sequel   thereto,   judgment   and   orders   passed   by   the
Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   are   set   aside.   Bail   bonds,   if   any,   are
discharged. The appeal is allowed in above terms.
……………………….. CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
………..………………… J.
(HIMA KOHLI)
NEW DELHI
DATED: 25.10.2021
 
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