2021 INSC 0668
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1827 OF 2011STATE	 OF	 MADHYA	 PRADESH
     ..... APPELLANT
VERSUS	
MAHENDRA	 ALIAS	 GOLU
..... RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
SURYA KANT, J.	
State   of   Madhya   Pradesh	 	(hereinafter   referred   to   as	
“Appellant”)   is   in   appeal   against   the   impugned   judgment   dated
08.10.2009   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh,   Principal
Bench   at   Jabalpur   wh e r e b y   th e   re s po n de n t’ s   co n v ic ti o n   und e r
S ec ti o n   37 6 (2 ) ( f )   r e ad   wi th   S ec ti o n   51 1   o f   I n d i an   P en al   C o d e
( f o r   sh o r t,   “ I P C ” )   h as   b ee n   s e t   as id e   an d   i ns te ad   h e   h as   be en
h e ld   g ui l ty   und e r   S ec ti o n   3 54   I P C   an d   c on s e que n tl y   hi s
s en te n ce   h as   b ee n   r ed uc ed   fr o m   5   y e ar s   to   2   y e ar s   R i g o r o us
I m p r i s o n me n t	
.
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BRIEF FACTS:
2.The   prosecution   case   is   that,   about   a   fortnight   prior   to	
20.12.2005
  (date   of   registration   of   FIR),   the   two   victim­prosecutrix
who   are	
 named	 as	  ‘X’	 (PW­1)	 and	  ‘Y’	 (PW­2),	 aged	 about	 9 years	
and	 8   years   respectively,   were   playing   ‘gilli­danda’   in   the   street	
located   near   the   respondent’s   house.   The   respondent   who   was
known to both the  
victims  	by virtue of living in the same locality,	
called   them   with   the   inducement   that   he   will   give	  them  
money.
Lured by the promise of getting money, both victims went along with
the   respondent  to  his  house   which  was  totally   empty   at  the  time  of
the   incident	
.  Taking   advantage   of   this   opportune   moment,   the	
respondent closed all the 	doors of the house from inside	. He then led	
the victims to one of the rooms in the house and 	declared 
that he would
marry   them.   It   is   stated   that   the   respondent   thereafter   undressed
PW­1 and made her lie down on the cotton cot which was kept in the
room. Meanwhile,  	
he also took off his clothes and started rubbing	
his   genitals   against   the   genitals   of   PW­1.   Further,   in   the   same
identical   manner,   the   above­mentioned   act   was   repeated   with
PW­2. 
3.	
Both   the   minor   victims,   as   an   obvious   reaction   to   the	
respondent’s   acts  must   have  felt   scared  and  shocked  because   of
which they allegedly started crying. The respondent apprehending
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that   the   neighbours   could   possibly   hear   the   victims’   voices,   told
them	 not	 to	  disclose  	anything   about   this   incident   and   silenced	
them   by   threatening   them   with   physical   harm.   However,   after   a
few   days,   both   victims   revealed   the   details   of   the   incident   to   their
friend   who   is   named   as   ‘Z’   (PW­8).   Fortunately,   the   incident   which
could   have   remained   buried   forever,   surfaced   because   of   the   fateful
and   inadvertent   intervention   of   PW­8.   It   is   stated   that   on   the
occasion   of   a   religious   gathering   at   PW­2’s   house,   PW­8   started
teasing PW­2 by calling her as ‘respondent’s wife’, which led to PW­6
(PW­2’s mother) inquiring the reasons behind the same. This chance
probe   spiralled   into   the   victims   revealing   the   incident’s   details   to
their   mothers.   On   the   same   day   of   the   gathering,   PW­2   confided   in
PW­6   when   the   latter   prodded   her   to   share   the   details   of   the
incident.   Similarly,   PW­1   confided   in   PW­3   (PW1’s   mother)   on   the
same   day   in   the   evening.	
  The   mothers   (PW­3   and   PW­6)   then
communicated   the   same   to   their   respective   husbands.   After   a  lapse
of 15 days of the incident, the present FIR was thus filed.
4. The Trial Court convicted the respondent for the offence under
Section   376(2)(f)   read   with   Section   511   IPC   though   acquitted   him
under Sections 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention   of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989.     The   respondent   was   sentenced	
to   undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   of   5   years   and   fine   of   Rs.
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5000/­. 5.	
The	  respondent   laid   challenge   to   his   conviction   before   the
Principal Bench  	
of	 Madhya	 Pradesh	 High	 Court and vide	 impugned	
judgment	  dated	 	08.10.2009,   the   High   Court	  modified   the	
judgment   of   the   Trial   Court;   set   aside   the   conviction   under
Section   376(2)(f)   read   with   Section   511   IPC   and	 convicted   the	
respondent under 	Section 354 IPC and 	sentenced him to undergo	
2 years	 of	 rigorous	 	imprisonment	 and	 fine	 of	 Rs.	 5000/­.   The	
High Court was of the opinion that:
“17.   On   going   through   the   evidence   on   record
particularly   allegations   in  	
FIR	 Ex.P/1,	 I am	 of	 the	
view	 	that	 	the	 	appellant	 	did	 	not	 	make	 	all	
efforts	 to	 attempt	 to   commit   rape   with   both	
prosecutrix,   he   had   not   gone   beyond   the
stage of	 preparation and he did not intend to	
do  so  at  all  events	. It  is  well settled  principle  of
law that preparation of any offence cannot be termed
as   attempt   to   commit   the  same  	
offence,  I  am of  the	
considered   view   that   the   strength   of   evidence   on
record   the	 	offence   of   indecent   assault   by   the	
appellant   on   both   the   prosecutrix  	u/s   354   IPC  	is
made   out   beyond   reasonable   doubt………
Consequently   the   appellant   is   acquitted   of   charge
376   (2)­(f)   read   with   Section   511   IPC   two   counts.
The   Appellant is   convicted      	
u/s	 354 	of	 IPC	.”
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[Emphasis applied]
6.The   aforestated   modification   and   resultant   reduction   in	
sentence are assailed before us at the instance of the Prosecution.
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES:
7. Mr.   Mukul   Singh,   learned	
 Counsel	  for	 the	 State	  vehemently	
contended that there are explicit 	allegations	 of	 ‘attempt 	 to	 commit	
rape’	 against	 the	 respondent.	 Both	 the	 prosecutrices	 have	 deposed	
as  ‘X’	  (PW­1)	 and	  ‘Y’ (	PW­2)  and  supported	 the	 prosecution	 case.	
They   unshakably   faced   the   grilling   cross­examination   and   have
minutely explained how the diabolic offence was committed. Both
the   victims   have   admirably   withstood   the   pressure   of   a
humiliating   and   unnerving   cross­examination.  	Their	 depositions	
have	 been	  duly  	corroborated	 by	  ‘Z’  	(PW­8)—a   chance	 witness	 of	
the	 circumstances.	 He	  urged	  that   the   Trial   Court   had   rightly	
convicted   the   respondent   for	  the  
commission   of   offence   under
Section   376   (2)(f)   read   with   Section   511   IPC   which   has   been
unjustifiably  modified  by  the High  Court overlooking  the  soul of the
Statute   or   the   settled   principles   attracted   to   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case. Learned Counsel further argued that the
High Court miserably failed to appreciate the ingredients of ‘attempt’
to commit rape and has lightened it as a case of mere  	
‘preparation’
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in a cavalier and insensitive manner.8. Contrarily,  learned  Counsel  for   the  respondent  submitted  that
even   if   the   prosecution   case   is   accepted   as   gospel   truth,   nothing
beyond   the   ‘preparation’   to   commit   rape   has   been   proved.   He
emphasised   that   the   Trial   Court   failed   to   draw   the   distinction
between ‘attempt’ to commit an offence or mere ‘preparation’ thereof
and erringly  convicted  	
the	 respondent for the offence of ‘attempt’ to	
commit   rape.	 He	  passionately   argued  	that	 the	  High   Court   has	
rightly	 rectified	  the   patent   error   and   modified   the   conviction   from	
‘
attempt   to   commit   rape’ 	to	 an 	offence	 of	 ‘outraging	 the	 modesty’	 of	
a woman	, as defined under  	Section	 354	 of	 IPC.     Further,  learned	
Counsel   for   the   respondent   has   also   urged   that   there   was   a
material contradiction in the testimony of PW­8 vis­	à­vis both the	
victims   regarding   the   former’s   presence   near   the   place   of
occurrence which makes the prosecution story highly doubtful. 
9.	
In all fairness, Mr. Praveen Chaturvedi, learned Counsel for	
the respondent has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court
in  
Aman   Kumar   vs.  	State	 	of   Haryana	1 	to   buttress   his	
contention of distinct features of mere ‘preparation’ to commit an
offence,   as   compared   to   an   actual   ‘attempt’   to   commit   it.   He,   in
specific,   relied   upon   the   following   paragraphs   of   the   cited
decision:
1
  (2004) 4 SCC 379
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“ 9.   A   culprit   first   intends   to   commit   the   offence,   then   makes
preparation   for   committing   it   and   thereafter   attempts   to
commit the offence. If the attempt succeeds, he has committed
the offence; if it fails due to reasons beyond his control, he is
said   to   have   attempted   to   commit   the   offence.   Attempt   to
commit an offence can be said to begin when the preparations
are complete and the culprit commences to do something with
the   intention   of   committing   the   offence   and   which   is   a   step
towards   the   commission   of   the   offence.   The   moment   he
commences   to   do   an   act   with   the   necessary   intention,   he
commences   his   attempt   to   commit   the   offence.   The   word
“attempt”   is   not   itself   defined,   and   must,   therefore,   be   taken
in its ordinary meaning. This is exactly what the provisions of
Section   511   require.   An   attempt   to   commit   a   crime   is   to   be
distinguished   from   an   intention   to   commit   it;   and   from
preparation made for its commission. Mere intention to commit
an   offence,   not   followed   by   any   act,   cannot   constitute   an
offence.   The   will  is   not   to   be   taken   for   the   deed   unless   there
be   some   external   act   which   shows   that   progress   has   been
made in the direction of it, or towards maturing and effecting
it.   Intention   is   the   direction   of   conduct   towards   the   object
chosen   upon   considering   the   motives   which   suggest   the
choice.   Preparation   consists   in   devising   or   arranging   the
means   or   measures   necessary   for   the   commission   of   the
offence.   It   differs   widely   from   attempt   which   is   the   direct
movement   towards   the   commission   after   preparations   are
made.   Preparation   to   commit   an   offence   is   punishable   only
when the preparation is to commit offences under Section 122
(waging   war   against   the   Government   of   India)   and   Section
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399 (preparation to commit dacoity). The dividing line between
a mere preparation and an attempt is sometimes thin and has
to   be   decided   on   the   facts   of   each   case.   There   is   a   greater
degree   of   determination   in   attempt   as   compared   with
preparation.
10.   An attempt  to commit  an offence  is an act, or a series  of
acts, which leads inevitably to the commission of the offence,
unless   something,   which   the   doer   of   the   act   neither   foresaw
nor   intended,   happens   to   prevent   this.   An   attempt   may   be
described   to   be   an   act   done   in   part­execution   of   a   criminal
design, amounting to more than mere preparation, but falling
short   of   actual   consummation,   and,   possessing,   except   for
failure   to   consummate,   all   the   elements   of   the   substantive
crime.   In   other   words,   an   attempt   consists   in   it   the   intent   to
commit a crime, falling short of, its actual commission. It may
consequently be defined as that which if not prevented would
have   resulted   in   the   full   consummation   of   the   act   attempted.
The   illustrations   given   in   Section   511   clearly   show   the
legislative intention to make a difference between the cases of
a mere preparation and an attempt.”
QUESTIONS   FOR   DETERMINATION:
10. In   this   factual   backdrop,   the   question   which   falls   for   our
consideration   is   whether   the   offence   p ro v ed   to   h av e   b ee n
co m m i t te d   b y   th e   r es p on d en t   amounts   to   ‘ a t t e m p t ’   to   commitrape   within   the   meaning   of   Section   376(2)(f)   read   with   Section
511 IPC	 or	  was it a mere ‘preparation’ which led to outraging the
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modesty of the victims	?ANALYSIS:	
Distinction	 between	 ‘Preparation’	 and	 ‘Attempt’	 to	 commit 	rape
11.	
It is	 a settled	 preposition	 of	 Criminal	  Jurisprudence  	that	 in	
every	 	crime,	 	there	 	is	 	first,	 	Mens	 	Rea   (	intention   to   commit),	
secondly,   preparation   to   commit   it,   and   thirdly,   attempt	 	to	
commit it. If the third stage, that is, ‘attempt’ is successful, then
the   crime   is	 complete.   If   the   attempt   fails,   the   crime   is   not	
complete, but law still punishes the	 
person for attempting the said
act.   ‘Attempt’   is   punishable   because   even   an   unsuccessful
commission   of   offence  is  preceded  by   mens   rea ,  moral   guilt,   and  its
depraving   impact   on   the   societal   values   is   no   less   than  	
the   actual	
commission. 
12.	
There   is   a   visible   distinction   between   ‘preparation’   and
‘attempt’   to   commit   an   offence   and   it   all   depends   on   the   statutory
edict   coupled   with   the   nature   of   evidence   produced   in   a   case.   The
stage   of   ‘ preparation’   consists   of   deliberation,   devising 	
or	 arranging	
the	 	means	 	or	 	measures,	 	which	 	would	 	be	 	necessary	 	for	 	the	
commission	 o  f       	the	 offence.	 Whereas,	 an ‘	attempt’	 to	 commit	 the	
offence,	 starts	 immediately	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 preparation.	
‘Attempt’  	is	 the	 execution	 of	 mens	 rea	         	after   preparation.	
`Attempt’   starts   where	  `	preparation’	  comes   to   an   end,   though   it
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falls	 short	 of	 actual 	commission	 of	 the 	crime.13. However, if the attributes are unambiguously beyond the stage
of preparation, then the misdemeanours shall qualify to be termed as
an   ‘attempt’   to   commit   the   principal   offence   and   such   ‘attempt’   in
itself   is   a   punishable   offence   in   view   of   Section   511   IPC.    	
The	
‘preparation’   or   ‘attempt’   to   commit   the   offence   will   be
predominantly determined on evaluation of the act and conduct of
an accused; and as to whether or not the incident	 tantamounts to	
transgressing the thin space between `preparation’ and ‘attempt’.
If no overt act is attributed to the accused to commit the offence
and   only   elementary   exercise   was   undertaken   and   if   such
preparatory   acts   cause   a   strong   inference   of   the   likelihood   of
commission   of   the   actual   offence,   the   accused   will   be   guilty   of
preparation   to   commit   the   crime,   which   may   or   may   not   be
punishable,   depending   upon   the   intent   and   import   of   the   penal
laws. 
14.	
Section 511 IPC is a	  general provision dealing with attempts to
commit   offences   which   are   not   made   punishable   by  	
other   specific	
sections   of   the   Code   and   it   provides,   inter   alia,   that,
  “whoever
attempts   to   commit   an   offence   punishable   by   this   Code   with
imprisonment   for   life   or   imprisonment,   or   to   cause   such   an
offence   to   be   committed,   and   in   such   attempt   does   any   act
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towards   the  commission  of  the  offence,   shall,   where   no   express
provision   is   made   by   this   Code   for   the   punishment   of   such
attempt,   be   punished   with   imprisonment   of   any   description
provided   for   the   offence,   for   a   term   which   may   extend   to   one­
half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one­half
of   the   longest   term   of   imprisonment   provided   for   that   offence,
or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both” . 
15. It is extremely relevant at this stage to brush up the elementary
components of the offence of ‘Rape’ under Section 375 IPC, as was in
force at the time when the occurrence took place in the instant case.
The definition of ‘Rape’, before the 2013 Amendment, used to provide
that   “ A   man   is   said   to   commit   “rape”   who,   except   in   the   case
hereinafter   excepted,   has   sexual   intercourse   with   a   woman
under   circumstances   falling   under   any   of   the   six   following
descriptions:—
First .—Against her will.
Secondly .—Without her consent.
Thirdly .—xxx  xxx  xxx
Fourthly .— xxx  xxx  xxx
Fifthly .— xxx  xxx  xxx
Sixthly .—With   or   without   her   consent,   when   she   is
under sixteen years of age.
Explanation .—Penetration   is   sufficient   to   constitute
the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.
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Exception .—Sexual   intercourse   by   a   man   with   his   own
wife, the  wife not being under  fifteen years of age, is not
rape.”
16. A   plain   reading   of   the   above   provision   spells   out   that   sexual
intercourse   with   a   woman   below   sixteen   years,   with   or   without   her
consent,   amounted  to  ‘Rape’  and   mere   penetration   was   sufficient  to
prove   such   offence.     The   expression   ‘penetration’   denotes   ingress   of
male   organ   into   the   female   parts,   however   slight   it   may   be.     This
Court   has   on   numerous   occasions   explained   what   ‘penetration’
conveys under the unamended Penal Code which was in force at the
relevant time.  In  Aman Kumar  (supra) , it was summarised that:­
“7. Penetration is the sine qua non for an offence of rape.  In
order to constitute penetration, there must be evidence clear
and   cogent   to   prove   that   some   part   of   the   virile   member   of
the   accused   was   within   the   labia   of   the   pudendum   of   the
woman, no matter how little (see Joseph Lines, IC&K 893).” 
17. Even   prior   thereto,   this   Court   in  Madan	 Lal	 vs.	 State	 of	
J&K	2 opined  that  the  degree  of the  act   of  an  accused  is  notably	
decisive   to   differentiate   between   ‘preparation’   and   ‘attempt’   to
commit rape.  It was held thus:	
“12.   The   difference   between   preparation   and   an
attempt   to   commit   an	 offence   consists   chiefly   in   the	
greater   degree   of   determination   and   what   is
2
  (1997) 7 SCC 677
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necessary   to   prove   for   an   offence   of   an   attempt   to
commit rape has been	 committed	 is	 that	 the	 accused	
has	 gone	 beyond	 the	 stage	 of	 preparation.	 If an	
accused strips  a girl naked  and then making her lie
flat on the ground	 undresses   himself   and   then   forcibly
rubs   his   erected   penis   on   the   private   parts  	
of	 the	 girl	
but	 fails	 to	 penetrate	 the	 same	 into	 the	 vagina	 and	
on	 such	 rubbing	 ejaculates	 himself	 then	 it is	 difficult	
for	 us	 to	 hold	 that	 it was	 a case	 of	 merely	    	assault	
under Section 354 IPC and not an attempt to commit
rape   under	 Section	 376	 read	 with	 Section	 511	 IPC.	
In	 the	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 of	 the	 
present case the
offence   of   an   attempt   to   commit   rape   by   the   accused
has   been  	
clearly	 established	 and	 the	 High	 Court	
rightly	 convicted	 him	 under   Section	 376	 read	 with	
Section	 511	 IPC.”
18.	
The difference between `attempt’ and `preparation’ in a rape	
case was again elicited  	by this Court  
in   Koppula Venkat Rao vs.
State of A.P. 3
,  	
laying down that	:­	
“10. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or
a   series   of   acts,   which	 
leads   inevitably   to   the
commission   of   the   offence,   unless   something,   which
the  	
doer	 of	 the	 act	 neither	 foresaw	 nor	 intended,	
happens	 to	 prevent	 this.	 	An   attempt	 may	 be	
described	 to	 be	 an	 act	 done	 in	 part­execution	
of	 	a 	criminal   design,	 	amounting	 	to	 	more
3
  (2004) 3 SCC 602
Page |  13

than	 mere	 preparation,	 but	 falling	 short	 of	
actual   consummation,	 	and,	 	possessing,	
except	 	for	 	failure	 	to	 	consummate,	 	all	 	theelements   of   the   substantive   crime.   In   other
words,   an   attempt   consists   in   it   the 	
intent	 to	 commit	
a crime,	 falling	 short	 of,	 its	 actual	 commission	 or
consummation/completion.   It   may   consequently   be
defined   as   that   which   if   not  	
prevented	 would	 have	
resulted	 	in	 	the	 	full	 	consummation	 	of	 	the	 	act	
attempted.	 
The   illustrations   given   in   Section   511
clearly   show   the   legislative   intention   to  	
make	 a	
difference	 	between	 	the	 	cases	 	of	 	a 	mere	
preparation	 and	 an	 attempt.	
11.	 In	 order	 to	 find	 an	 accused	 guilty	 of	 an	
attempt	 with	 intent	 to	 commit   rape,	 court	
has	 to	 be	 satisfied	 that	 the	 accused,	 when	
he	 	laid	 	hold	 	of	 	the   prosecutrix,	 	not	 	only	
desired	 	to	 	gratify	 	his	 	passions	 	upon	 	her	
person,	 but   that	 he	 intended	 to	 do	 so	 at	 all	
events,	 and	 notwithstanding	 any	 resistance	
on	 	her	 	part.	 	Indecent	 	assaults	 	are	 	often	
magnified	 into	 attempts	 at	 rape.	 In   order	 to	 come	
to	 a conclusion	 that	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 accused	
was	 indicative	 of   a   determination   to   gratify   his	
passion at all events, and in spite of all	 resistance,	
materials   must   exist.   Surrounding   circumstances
many times	 throw	 beacon	 light	 on	 that	 aspect.”
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[Emphasis applied]19. In   light  of   the  statutory   provisions  as   construed  by   this  Court
from time to time in the cited decisions, let us examine whether the
respondent attempted to commit  	
rape	 of	 the	 prosecutrices	 or	 there	
was	 only	 preparation	 on	  h i s  	behalf?
20.	
We   m ay   at   the   outse t   exp lain   th at   what   const itutes   an	
` attem pt’   is   a   m ix ed   questio n   of   law   and   facts.     ‘Attempt’   is
th e   di rect   movem en t   toward s   the   comm i ssion   aft er   t he
pr eparatio ns   ar e   ove r.     It   is   e ssenti al   to   prove   th at   t he
attempt   was   wi th   an   inten t   to   com mit   the   off en ce.     An
attempt   is   possib le   eve n   wh en   the   accused   i s   unsucc essful
in   com mi tting   the   pri nc ipal  offenc e.   Sim ilarly ,  if  the   attemp t
to   com mit   a   cr im e   is   accom pl ished,   then   the   c rim e   stands
com m itted  for  al l inten ts and purposes .
21.	
There   is   overwhelming   evidence   on   record   to   prove   the	
respondent’s  deliberate  overt steps  to   take  the  minor  girls  inside
his  house;   closing   the  
door(s);   undressing   the   victims   and   rubbing
his genitals on those of the prosecutrices.   As the victims started
crying,   the   respondent   could   not   succeed   in   his   penultimate   act
and   there   was   a   sheer   providential   escape   from   actual
penetration.   Had   the   respondent   succeeded   in   penetration,   even
partially,  his   act  would   have   fallen  within   the  contours   of   `Rape’
as   it   stood   conservatively   defined   under   Section   375   IPC   at   that
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time. 22.	
The   deposition   by   the	  victims   ( PW­1   and   PW­2)   are
impeccable.     Both   have   unequivocally   stated   as   to   how  	
the	
respondent allured them and indulged in all those traumatic acts
which   have   already   been   narrated   in   the   preceding   paragraphs.
The statements of both the victim­children inspire full confidence,
establish   their   innocence   and   evince   a   natural   version   without
any remote possibility of tutoring.
23. Additionally,   the   feeble   contention   regarding   the   contradiction
between the testimonies of PW­8 vis­	
à­vis both the victims is equally
untenable.     The   perceived   contradiction   is   not   adequate   to   unsettle
the   narrative   on   which   the   case   of   the   prosecution   is   based.   Even
otherwise,   this   contradiction   can   at   best   be   seen   as   a   mere
‘exaggeration’   on   behalf   of   a   child   witness   whose   remaining
testimony completely supports the prosecution.   As correctly pointed
out by the Trial Court, the pivotal fact that the details of the incident
were   shared   by   the   victims   with   PW­8   remains   undisputed   and   as
such   the   Courts   are   obliged   not   to   discard   the   entire   testimony   on
the basis of a minor exaggeration.  Furthermore, this Court has time
and   again   reiterated   that   the   victim’s   deposition   even   on   a
standalone basis is sufficient for conviction unless cogent reasons for
corroboration exist.
24.	
In   our   considered   opinion,   the   act   of   the   respondent   of
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luring   the   minor   girls,   taking   them   inside   the   room,   closing   the
doors and taking the victims to a room with the motive of carnal
knowledge,   was   the   end   of   ‘preparation’   to   commit   the   offence.
His   following   action   of   stripping   the   prosecutrices   and   himself,
and rubbing  his  genitals against  those of the victims  was indeed
an   endeavour   to   commit   sexual   intercourse.   These   acts   of   the
respondent   were   deliberately   done   with   manifest   intention   to
commit   the   offence   aimed   and   were   reasonably   proximate   to   the
consummation   of   the   offence.     Since   the   acts   of   the   respondent
exceeded   the   stage   beyond   preparation   and   preceded   the   actual
penetration,  the  Trial   Court  rightly  held  him  guilty  of attempting
to   commit   rape   as   punishable   within   the   ambit   and   scope   of
Section 511 read with Section 375 IPC as it stood in force at the
time of occurrence.  CONCLUSION :   
25. The  	
findings   given   contrarily  	by  	the	     	High	 	Court	  i n	
i g n o r a n c e   o f  	the material evidence on record, are perverse	 and	
u n	tenable	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 law.   We,   thus,   allow   the   appeal,   set	
aside the 
judgment   of   the   High   Court  an d   r es to r e   th at  o f  th e   T r i al
C o ur t.     Th e   re s po n de n t   is   d i r ec te d   to   s ur r e n de r   wi th i n   two
wee k s   an d   se rv e   the   r e m ai n de r   o f   h i s   s en te n ce   as   a war d ed   b y
th e   Tr i al   C o ur t.     I n   c as e   th e   r es p o nd e n t   f ai l s   to   s ur r e nd e r ,   th e
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Po l i ce   A uth o r i ti e s   ar e   d i r ec te d   to   ar r es t   h i m   an d   se nd   a
co m p l i an ce   r ep o r t.
26. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
………..………………… J.
(HIMA KOHLI)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 25.10. 2021
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