2021 INSC 0704
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2438 OF 2010
Bijender @ Mandar ..... Appellant
VERSUS
State of Haryana  ..... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J.
The   instant   Criminal   Appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment   and
order   dated   7 th
  September   2009   of   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and
Haryana   at   Chandigarh,   whereby   the   order   dated   20 th
  March   2002
passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Sonipat,   convicting   the
Appellant­Bijender   @   Mandar   under   Sections   392   and   397   IPC   was
affirmed. The High Court upheld the rigorous imprisonment of 5 years
along with fine of Rs.5000/­ for the offence punishable under Section
392 IPC. However, it reduced the sentence from 10 to 7 years rigorous
imprisonment   with   a   fine   of   Rs.10,000/­   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Section   397   IPC.   Both   the   sentences   were   directed   to   run
concurrently.
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F ACTS :
2. Briefly put, the Prosecution version is that on 14 th
 April 1999, at
around 11:00 AM, Bal Kishan (Complainant) was on his way to Delhi
on his motorcycle along with his nephew, Sanjay, to purchase a plot of
land   and   was   carrying   a   sum   of   Rs.   46,000/­   for   the   said   purpose.
When   the   Complainant   reached   near   the   farm   house   of   one   Virender
Bansal,   on   Jatheri   Road,   he   was   intercepted   by   a   vehicle.   The
Appellant   and   one   Manjeet   (co­accused)   stepped   out   of   the   said
vehicle, armed with country made pistols and asked the Complainant
to hand over the amount. The Complainant then handed over the key
of the bike. The Accused took out the bag containing the money from
the   boot   of   the   motorcycle   and   fled   from   the   spot.   Whereafter,   the
Complainant   rushed   towards   the   nearest   Police   Station   on   foot,
leaving   his   nephew   and   the   motorcycle   behind,   at   the   place   of   the
incidence.  To the good fortune of the Complainant, on his way to  the
Police Station, he met with ASI Rajinder Kumar (PW­14) and reported
the   occurrence   to   him.   Consequently,   an   FIR   was   lodged   and   the
investigation was set in motion. 
3. Four accused persons, including the Appellant were arrested on
the   basis   of   secret   information   received   by   the   police   and   they   were
charged under Sections 392, 397 and 120­B IPC and Section 25 of the
Arms Act. Whilst the 5 th
  co­accused (Vinod) could not be arrested and
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was   declared   a   proclaimed   offender   under   Section   82   Cr.P.C.,   the
other Accused including the Appellant abjured their guilt and pleaded
‘not   guilty’.   In   the   eventual   trial,   14   witnesses   were   examined   by   the
Prosecution.   No   evidence   was   led   by   the   Defence.   The   Prosecution
presented   its   narrative   before   the   Trial   Court   that   the   Accused
persons, along with Vinod, conspired together to loot the Complainant,
who, they were aware was carrying money for the purchase of a plot in
Delhi.   Whereas   co­accused   Mukesh   and   Subhash   had   provided   the
information, the Appellant, Manjeet and Vinod actually carried out the
robbery. 
4. The   case   of   the   Prosecution   banked   heavily   on   the   disclosure
statements  made by  the  Accused persons  and the  pre­trial  recoveries
made   pursuant   thereto.   The   Appellant   in   his   revelation   (Ex.   PD)
affirmed the chronicle presented by the Prosecution. He further stated
that Rs. 10,000/­ fell in his kitty as part of his share, out of which he
had   already   spent   Rs.   5,000/.   The   Appellant   led   the   police   to   his
residence   and   aided   in   recovering   Rs.   5,000/­   which   were   found
wrapped in a ‘red cloth’ (Ex. P1), along with a passbook (Ex. P2). It is
alleged   that   the   ‘red   cloth’   belonged   to   the   wife   of   the   Complainant,
with   the   name   ‘Kamla’   embroidered   on   it  and   the   passbook   belonged
to   the   Complainant.   Similarly,   the   disclosure   statements   of   the   co­
accused   led   to   the   recovery   of   some   paltry   amount   and   a   country
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made   pistol   belonging   to   co­accused   Manjeet,   which   was   allegedly
used   for   commission   of   the   crime.   These   incriminatory   statements
were in line with the divulgation of the Appellant.
5. During  the trial, a host of Prosecution witnesses turned hostile.
Even though the Complainant (PW­4), in his deposition, acknowledged
that   the   ‘red   cloth’   belonged   to   his   wife   but   he   refuted   that   the   pass
book   and/or   the   said   cloth   was   recovered   from   the   possession   of   the
Appellant   in   his   presence.   He   further   denied   that   the   Accused,
including   the   Appellant,   matched   the   identity   of   the   persons   who
committed   the   felony.   He   also   denied   that   the   recovery   memo   (Ex.
PD/2)   bore   his   signature.   The  Complainant’s   nephew,   Sanjay   (PW­6),
who   was   an   eye­witness,   also   debunked   the   very   occurrence   of   the
incident   in   its   entirety   and   testified   that   no   amount   was   snatched
from   his   uncle,   the   Complainant.   In   a   similar   vein,   PW­5   and   PW­8,
who were independent witnesses to the recovery of the articles by the
police and to the alleged conspiracy, respectively, also resiled and were
declared hostile. 
6. Only the formal witnesses supported the tale of the Prosecution
and   stood   their   ground   qua   the   guilt   of   the   Accused.   In   this   regard,
the   testimony   of   ASI   Rajinder   Kumar   (PW­14),   who   was   in­charge   of
the investigation, bears some significance. This witness affirmed to the
legitimacy   of   the   disclosure   statements   presented   by   all   the   Accused,
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including   the   Appellant,   and   stated   that   the   Complainant   in   his
supplementary   statement   before   the   police   had   contended   that   Rs.
46,000/­ were wrapped in a ‘red cloth’ which had Complainant’s wife’s
name embroidered on it along with a Passbook of Indian Bank. Albeit,
ASI   Rajinder   Kumar   in   his   cross­examination,   admitted   that   the   ‘red
cloth’ which was recovered from the house of the Appellant was easily
available in the market and that the name ‘Kamla’ could also be easily
engraved  thereupon. Further, he also  deposed that whilst co­accused
Manjeet   had   sought   for   Test   Identification   Parade   (for   short,   “T.I.P.”),
the   Complainant   refused   to   participate   in   the   same   and   instead   had
tendered   an   affidavit,   claiming   that   if   he   were   to   identify   Manjeet   he
would   be   killed.     H.C.   Karmbir   Singh   (PW­13),   who   was   present   with
PW­14 when the disclosure statements were tendered by the Accused,
also supported the Prosecution version and deposed that the recovery
of the incriminating articles was made in his presence.
7. The   Appellant   in   his   313   Cr.P.C.   statement   denied   the   recovery
of   all   the   incriminating   evidence   put   before   him.   To   the   same   effect
were   the   statements   made   by   other   co­accused   under   Section   313
Cr.P.C., denying the Prosecution version completely.
8. The   Trial   Court   found   strength   in   the   contention   of   the
Prosecution   that   the   material   witnesses   had   substantially   proved   its
version though with minor discrepancies. The Court further noted that
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an admission by an accused leading to the discovery of any   fact could
be   used   against   them   and   that   in   the   instant   case,   the   Accused   had
failed to provide any explanation as to how they came into possession
of the articles, especially the ‘red cloth’ and the passbook, which were
recovered from the custody of the Appellant. In light of the instant fact
scenario,   the   Trial   Court   concluded   that   recovery   of   the   Articles   was
sufficient   to   draw   the   inference   of   culpability   and   to   bring   home   the
guilt   of   the   Accused.   Consequently,   the   Trial   Court   convicted   the
Appellant   and   Manjeet   under   Sections   392   &   397   IPC.   Manjeet   was
further   convicted   under   Section   25   of   the   Indian   Arms   Act,   1959.
Accused   Mukesh   and   Subhash   were   also   convicted   under   Section
120B IPC. All the Accused were sentenced with a maximum sentence
of   rigorous   imprisonment   of   10   years   each   under   Section   397   IPC
and/or Section 120B IPC.
9. Discontented, the Accused preferred separate appeals before the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Their primary contention was that
none of the eye­witnesses or the independent witnesses supported the
Prosecution   case   and   that   they   could   not   be   convicted   solely   on   the
basis   of   disclosure   statements.   Upon   re­appraisal   of   evidence,   the
High   Court   was   unimpressed   by   the   plea   raised   on   behalf   of   the
Accused   and   concurred   with   the   findings   of   the   Trial   Court   and
further   noted   that   due   to   enormous   rise   in   instances   of   dacoity,   the
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non­identification of the accused in the Court could not be construed
as   a   material   consideration   where   other   evidence   points   towards   the
commission   of   the   crime.   The   High   Court   vide   a   common   judgment
maintained   the   conviction   of   the   Accused   persons.   Nonetheless,   the
High   Court   reduced   the   sentence   under   Section   397   IPC   to   rigorous
imprisonment of 7 years so as to meet the ends of justice. 
10. The aggrieved Appellant is now before this Court.  
C ONTENTIONS :
11. We   have   heard   learned   counsel(s)   for   the   Appellant   and   the
Respondent­State at a considerable length and perused the record in­
depth.   The   principal   contention   raised   on   behalf   of   the   Appellant   is
that   his   conviction   is   based   solely   on   the   basis   of   the   ‘disclosure
statement’ and that there is no other cogent evidence to withstand his
conviction under Sections 392 and 397 IPC. It was further contended
that   during   the   pendency   of   the   present   appeal,   this   Court,   in
Criminal   Appeal   No.   1375   of   2010   and   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1328   of
2013   had   already   acquitted   co­accused   Mukesh   and   Suresh   with   a
finding   that   there   was   a   lack   of   evidence   to   sustain   their   conviction
under Section 120B IPC.
12. Learned   State   Counsel,   on   the   other   hand,   reminded   us   of   the
limited   scope   of   interference   by   this   Court   in   a   case   of   concurrent
finding of fact and canvassed that the conviction of the Appellant, on
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the basis of his disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of Rs.
5,000/­ along with the ‘red cloth’ and the Indian Bank passbook, was
sufficient   to   foster   the   conviction   of   the   Appellant.   Regarding   the
acquittal   of   the   co­accused,   it   was   rebutted   that   the   allegations   qua
them   pertained   only   to   the   extent   of   conspiracy,   and   hence,   their
acquittal did not have any substantial impact on the conviction of the
Appellant   herein,   who   is   alleged   to   have   actually   carried   out   the
malfeasance. 
A NALYSIS :
13. It  may   be  accentuated  at  the  outset that although  this  Court is
bestowed with capacious powers under Article 136 of the Constitution,
yet,   while   beseeching   such   powers   in   a   criminal   appeal   by   special
leave, this Court would by and large abstain from entering into a fresh
re­appraisement   of   evidence   and   doubt   the   credibility   of   witnesses
when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save for certain exceptional
circumstances   where   the   decision(s)   under   challenge   are   shown   to
have committed a manifest error of law or procedure or the conclusion
reached is ex ­facie perverse.
14. Adverting   to   the   case   at   hand,   indubitably,   the   only   eye­
witnesses   to   the   alleged   crime,   i.e.,   the   Complainant   (PW­4)   and   his
nephew   (PW­6)   have   not   supported   the   case   of   the   Prosecution.   The
Complainant   (PW­4)   in   his   testimony   before   the   Court   unequivocally
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denied   that   the   Appellant   or   his   co­accused   were   involved   in   the
execution   of   the   offence.   Further,   in   the   deposition   of   ASI   Rajinder
Kumar (PW­14), who was the investigating officer of the case, there is
no   mention   of   T.I.P.   even   attempted   to   be   led,   in   so   far   as   the
Appellant is concerned. Ergo, the very identity of the Appellant as one
of the  perpetrators  stands  obscured, particularly,  considering  that all
the   accused   in   the   case   were   arrested   on   the   basis   of   a   secret
information, the origin of which is naturally unknown. 
15. The   short   question   that   falls   for   our   consideration   thus   is
whether   the   conviction   of   the   Appellant   on   the   strength   of   the
purported   disclosure   statement   (Ex.   PD)   and   the   recovery   memo   (Ex.
PD/2), in the absence of any corroborative evidence, can sustain? 
16. We have implored ourselves with abounding pronouncements of
this   Court  on   this   point.    It   may   be   true   that  at  times  the   Court  can
convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement
and   the   resultant   recovery   of   inculpatory   material.   However,   in   order
to   sustain   the   guilt   of   such   accused,   the   recovery   should   be
unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. 1
 We may
hasten   to   add   that   circumstances   such   as   (i)   the   period   of   interval
between   the   malfeasance   and   the   disclosure;   (ii)   commonality   of   the
recovered   object   and   its   availability   in   the   market;   (iii)   nature   of   the
1
  Vijay Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , (2014) 14 SCC 609
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object and its relevance to the crime;   (iv)   ease of transferability of the
object;   (v)   the   testimony   and   trustworthiness   of   the   attesting   witness
before the Court and/or other like factors, are weighty considerations
that aid in gauging the intrinsic evidentiary value and credibility of the
recovery. ( See :   Tulsiram Kanu vs. The State 2
; Pancho vs. State of
Haryana 3
;   State   of   Rajasthan   vs.   Talevar   &   Anr 4
  and   Bharama
Parasram Kudhachkar vs. State of Karnataka 5
)
17. Incontrovertibly,   where   the   prosecution   fails   to   inspire
confidence in the manner and/or contents of the recovery with regard
to   its   nexus   to   the   alleged   offence,   the   Court   ought   to   stretch   the
benefit of doubt to the accused. Its nearly three centuries old cardinal
principle of criminal  jurisprudence  that “ it   is  better  that  ten  guilty
persons   escape,   than   that   one   innocent   suffer ”.   The   doctrine   of
extending benefit of doubt to an accused, notwithstanding the proof of
a   strong   suspicion,   holds   its   fort   on   the   premise   that   “ the   acquittal
of   a   guilty   person   constitutes   a   miscarriage   of   justice   just   as
much as the conviction of the innocent ”.
18. It may  not be wise or  prudent to  convict a person  only  because
there   is   rampant   increase   in   heinous   crimes   and   victims   are   oftenly
2
  AIR 1954 SC 1
3
  (2011) 10 SCC 165. 
4
  (2011) 11 SCC 666
5
  (2014) 14 SCC 431
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reluctant to speak truth due to fear or other extraneous reasons. The
burden to prove the guilt beyond doubt does not shift on the suspect
save   where   the   law   casts   duty   on   the   accused   to   prove   his/her
innocence.   It   is   the   bounden   duty   of   the   prosecution   in   cases   where
material   witnesses   are   likely   to   be   slippery,   either   to   get   their
statements   recorded   at   the   earliest   under   Section   164   Cr.P.C.   or
collect   such   other   cogent   evidence   that   its   case   does   not   entirely
depend upon oral testimonies.
19. Unmindful   of   these   age­old   parameters ,   we   find   that   the
Prosecution in the present case has miserably failed to bring home the
guilt of the Appellant and Courts below have been unwittingly swayed
by   irrelevant   considerations,   such   as   the   rise   in   the   incidents   of
dacoity. In its desire to hold a heavy hand over such derelictions, the
Trial Court and the High Court have hastened to shift the burden on
the Appellant to elucidate how he bechanced to be in possession of the
incriminating   articles,   without   primarily   scrutinizing   the   credibility
and   admissibility   of   the   recovery   as   well   as   its   linkage   to   the
misconduct.   We say so for the following reasons:
Firstly ,   the   High   Court   and   the   Trial   Court   failed   to   take   into
consideration   that   the   testimony   of   ASI   Rajinder   Kumar   (PW­14)
exhibited   no   substantial   effort   made   by   the   police   for   conducting   the
search   of   the   residence   of   the   Appellant   in   the   presence   of   local
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witnesses.   The   only   independent   witness   to   the   recovery   was   Raldu
(PW­8) who was admittedly a companion of the Complainant.
Secondly ,   the   Complainant   (PW­4)   as   well   as   Raldu   (PW­8),   have
unambiguously   refuted   that   neither   the   passbook,   nor   the   ‘red   cloth’
was recovered from the possession of the Appellant, as claimed in his
disclosure statement.
Thirdly , while the Complainant (PW­4) negated his signatures on the
recovery   memo   (EX.   PD/2),   on   the   other   hand,   Raldu   (PW­8)   also
neither enumerated the recovery memo (Ex. PD/2) in the catalogue of
exhibited   documents,   nor   did   that   he   affirm   to   having   his
endorsement.
Fourthly ,   the   recovered   articles   are   common   place   objects   such   as
money which can be easily transferred from one hand to another and
the ‘red cloth’ with ‘Kamla’ embossed on it, as has been acceded by the
Investigating   Officer,   Rajinder   Kumar   (PW­14),   can   also   be   easily
available in market.
Fifthly , the recovery took place nearly a month after the commission
of   the   alleged   offence.   We   find   it   incredulous,   that   the   Appellant
during the entire time period kept both the red cloth and the passbook
in   his   custody,   along   with   the   money   he   allegedly   robbed   off   the
Complainant.
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Sixthly   and   finally ,   there   is   no   other   evidence   on   record   which   even
remotely points towards the iniquity of the Appellant.
20. It   appears   to   us   that   the   Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   have
erroneously drawn adverse inference against the Appellant, in spite of
the   Prosecution  having   lamentably   failed  to  adequately   dispense   with
its burden of proof to depict culpability of the Appellant. As far as the
view   of   the   Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   qua   the   alleged   threat   is
concerned, we find it hard­pressed to give credence to such allegations
in   the   absence   of   any   compelling   evidence   to   substantiate   the   same.
Although,   the   Prosecution   has   attempted   to   place   reliance   on   the
affidavit presented by the Complainant during the T.I.P. offered by the
co­accused­Manjeet, we find that the said affidavit does not name the
Appellant herein and pertains solely to Manjeet.
21. In   light   of   the   afore­stated   discussion,   we   are   of   the   considered
opinion that the evidence on record does not establish the guilt of the
Appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the Courts below have  arrived
at   recording   the   guilt   of   the   Appellant   in   absence   of   any   cogent
rationale, justifying his conviction.
C ONCLUSION :  
22. Consequently,   and   as   a   sequel   thereto,   the   criminal   appeal   is
allowed.   The   judgments   and   orders   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   and
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High Court are set­aside and the Appellant is acquitted of all charges.
Bail bond, if any, stands discharged. 
                    ……………………….. CJI.
      (N.V. RAMANA)
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
………..………………… J.
(HIMA KOHLI)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 08.11. 2021
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