2021 INSC 0793
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No.5976 of 2014
PADAM NABH & SONS      ... Appellant (s)
Versus
YASH PAL       ... Respondent (s)
 
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. This  appeal  arising   out  of an order  of  eviction passed by  the  Rent
Controller,   Shaheed   Bhagat   Singh   Nagar,   Nawanshahr,   under   Section
13­B   of   the   East   Punjab   Urban   Rent   Restriction   Act,   1949   and
confirmed on revision by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, raises
an   interesting   question   as   to   whether   a   Non­Resident   Indian   who
purchases   a   building   to   which   the   Act   applies,   subsequent   to   the
1

induction   of   the   tenant,   will   be   entitled   to   invoke   the   summary
jurisdiction under Sub­section (1) of Section 13­B or not.
2. We   have   heard   Mr.   Nidhesh   Gupta,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellant   and   Mr.   Pardeep   Gupta,   learned   counsel
appearing for the respondent.
3. Admittedly   one   Shri   Padam   Nabh,   who   was   the   father   of   the
proprietor/partner of the appellant­concern, was inducted as a tenant in
respect of a non residential building measuring about 12’ x 12’, situate
at   the   Old   Grain   Market   Nawanshahar.   The   induction   of   Shri   Padam
Nabh as a tenant, was by one Sat Prakash.
4. Claiming   (i)   that the original owner Sat Prakash sold the premises
in  question  to  his father  Brij Lal under  a  sale deed dated 6.2.1989;   (ii)
that the property devolved upon him and his brother after the demise of
his   father   in   the   year   1991   through   testamentary   succession;   (iii)   that
he went to Australia in March­1996 and returned to India on 4.02.2004;
and   (iv)   that   he   required   the   tenanted   premises   for   establishing   a
departmental   store,   the   respondent   filed   a   petition   for   eviction   under
Section 13­B of the Act. The petition was allowed by the Rent Controller
2

by an Order dated 19.01.2010.
5. Challenging   the   order   of   the   eviction   passed   by   the   learned   Rent
Controller, the appellant filed a revision before the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh. The revision having been dismissed by the
High Court, the tenant is on appeal before us.
6. The   main   contention   of   Shri   Nidhesh   Gupta,   learned   senior
counsel for the appellant is that the issue raised by the appellant is no
longer   res   integra,   but   covered   by   the   judgment   of   the   Constitution
Bench   of   this   Court   in   Nathi   Devi   vs.   Radha   Devi   Gupta 1
.   However,
the   High   Court,   in   the   impugned   order,   chose   to   follow   the   decision   of
the Division Bench of the High Court in   Smt. Bachan Kaur   vs.   Kabal
Singh 2
,   which   distinguished   the   Constitution   Bench   Judgment   in
Nathi   Devi   (supra).   Therefore,   it   is   contended   by   Shri   Nidhesh   Gupta,
learned   senior   counsel   that   the   impugned   order   of   the   High   Court
requires   to   be   interfered   with,   by   this   Court,   in   the   light   of   the   law
declared   by   the   Constitution   Bench   while   interpreting   an   identical
provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “ Delhi Act ”).
1     (2005) 2 SCC 271
2     2011(1) RCR (Rent) 368
3

7. Since   Nathi Devi   (supra) was concerned with the interpretation of
Section   14­B   of   the   Delhi   Rent   Control   Act,   1958   and   since   we   are
concerned   in   this   case   with   the   interpretation   of   Section   13­B   of   the
East   Punjab   Urban   Rent   Restriction   Act,   1949,   we   think   it   would   be
appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of both the enactments in
a tabular column for better appreciation.
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 East   Punjab   Urban   Rent
Restriction Act, 1949
14­B .   Right   to   recover   immediate
possession   of   premises   to   accrue
to   members   of   the   armed   forces,
etc. 
(1) Where the landlord ­
(a) is a released or retired person
from any  armed   forces   and   the
premises   let   out   by   him   are
required   for   his   own   residence;
or
(b) is a dependent of a member of
any armed  forces   who   had
been   killed   in   action   and   the
premises let out by such member
are required for  the
residence   of   the   family   of   such
member,   such   person   or,   as   the
case may be, the dependent may,
within   one   year   from   the   date   of
his   release   or   retirement   from
such   armed   forces   or,   as   the 13­A.     Right   to   recover   immediate
possession   of   residential   or
scheduled   building   to   accrue   to
certain   persons.   Where   a   specified
landlord   at   any   time,   within   one
year   prior   to   or   within   one   year
after   the   date   of   his   retirement   or
after   his  retirement  but  within  one
year   of   the   date   of   commencement
of   the   East   Punjab   Urban   Rent
Restriction   (Amendment)   Act,
1985, whichever is later, applies to
the   Controller   alongwith   a
certificate   from   the   authority
competent   to   remove   him   from
service   indicating   the   date   of   his
retirement   and   his   affidavit   to   the
effect   that   he   does   not   own   and
possess   any   other   suitable
accommodation in the local area in
which   he   intends   to   reside   to
recover   possession   of   his
4

case may be, the date of death of
such member, or within a period
of   one   year   from   the   date   of
commencement of the  Delhi Rent
Control   (Amendment)   Act ,   1988,
whichever   is   later,   apply   to   the
Controller   for   recovering   the
immediate   possession   of   such
premises.
(2)   Where   the   landlord   is   a
member   of   any   of   the   armed
forces   and   has   a   period   of   less
than one year preceding the date
of   his   retirement   and   the
premises   let   out   by   him   are
required   for   his   own   residence
after   his   retirement,   he   may,   at
any   time,   within   a   period   of   one
year   before   the   date   of   his
retirement,   apply   to   the
Controller   for   recovering   the
immediate   possession   of   such
premises.
(3) Where the landlord referred to
in sub­section (1) or sub­ section
(2)   has   let   out   more   than   one
premises, it shall be open to him
to   make   an   application   under
that   sub­section   in   respect   of
only   one   of   the   premises   chosen
by him.
Explanation   ­     For   the   purposes
of   this   section,   "armed   forces"
means   an   armed   force   of   the
Union   constituted   under   an   Act
of   Parliament   and   includes   a
member   of   the   police   force
constituted   under   Section   3   of residential   building     or   scheduled
building,   as   the   case   may   be,   for
his   own   occupation,   there   shall
accrue,   on   and   from   the   date   of
such   application   to   such   specified
landlord, notwithstanding anything
contained   elsewhere in this Act or
in any other law for the time being
in force or in any contract (whether
expressed   or   implied),   custom   or
usage   to   the   contrary,   a   right   to
recover immediately the possession
of   such   residential   building   or
scheduled   building     or   any   part   or
parts of such building if it is let out
in part or parts:
Provided   that   in   case   of   death   of
the specified landlord, the widow or
widower   of   such   specified   landlord
and   in   the   case   of   death   of   such
widow   or   widower,   a   child   or   a
grandchild or a widowed daughter­
in­law   who   was   dependent   upon
such specified landlord at the time
of   his   death   shall   be   entitled   to
make   an   application   under   this
section to the Controller­
(a) In   the   case   of   death   of   such
specified   landlord,   before   the
commencement   of   the   East
Punjab   Urban   Rent   Restriction
(Amendment)   Act,   1985,   within
one year of such commencement;
(b) In   the   case   of   death   of   such
specified   landlord   after   such
commencement,   but   before   the
date of his retirement, within one
5

the   Delhi   Police   Act,  1978  (34  of
1978).
14­C . Right to recover immediate
possession of premises to accrue
to Central Government and Delhi
Administration   employees­     (1)
Where   the   landlord   is   a   retired
employee   of   the   Central
Government   or   of   the   Delhi
Administration,   and   the
premises   let   out   by   him   are
required   for   his   own   residence,
such   employee   may,   within   one
year   from   the   date   of   his
retirement   or   within   a   period   of
one   year   from   the   date   of
commencement of the  Delhi Rent
Control   (Amendment)   Act ,   1988,
whichever   is   later,   apply   to   the
Controller   for   recovering   the
immediate   possession   of   such
premises.
(2)   Where   the   landlord   is   an
employee   of   the   Central
Government   or   of   the   Delhi
Administration   and   has   a   period
of   less   than   one   year   preceding
the   date   of   his   retirement   and
the   premises   let   out   by   him   are
required   by   him   for   his   own
residence after his retirement, he
may, at any time, within a period
of one year before the date of his
retirement,   apply   to   the
Controller   for   recovering   the
immediate   possession   of   such
premises.
(3) Where the landlord referred to year of the date of his death;
(c) In   the   case   of   death   of   such
specified   landlord   after   such
commencement   and   the   date   of
his   retirement   within   one   year   of
the date of such retirement:
and   on   the   date   of   such
application   the   right   to   recover
the   possession   of   the   residential
building or scheduled building, as
the   case   may   be,   which   belonged
to   such   specified   landlord   at   the
time   of   his   death   shall   accrue   to
the applicant:
   
     Provided further that nothing in
this   section   shall   be   so   construed
as   conferring   a   right,   on   any
person   to   recover   possession   of
more   than   one   residential   or
scheduled   building   inclusive   of
any   part   or   any   parts   thereof   if   it
is let out in part or parts:
    Provided   further   that   the
Controller   may   give   the   tenant   a
reasonable   period   for   putting   the
specified   landlord   or,   as   the   case
may   be   ,   the   widow,   widower,
child,   grandchild   or   widowed
daughter­in­law   in   possession   of
the   residential   building   or
scheduled   building,   as   the   case
may   be,   and   may   extend   such
time   so   as   not   to   exceed   three
months in the aggregate. 
          Explanation­ For the purpose
6

in   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­section
(2)   has   let   out   more   than   one
premises, it shall be open to him
to   make   an   application   under
that   sub­section   in   respect   of
only   one   of   the   premises   chosen
by him.
14­D.  Right to recover immediate
possession of premises to accrue
to   a   widow.   ­     (1)   Where   the
landlord   is   a   widow   and   the
premises let out by her, or by her
husband   are   required   by   her   for
her   own   residence,   she   may
apply   to   the   Controller   for
recovering   the   immediate
possession of such premises.
(2) Where the landlord referred to
in   sub­section   (1)   has   let   out
more  than  one  premises,  it shall
be   open   to   her   to   make   an
application   under   that   sub­
section   in   respect   of   any   one   of
the premises chosen by her.
14   (6)   Where   a   landlord   has
acquired   any   premises   by
transfer,   no   application   for   the
recovery   of   possession   of   such
premises   shall   lie   under   sub­
section   (1),   on   the   ground
specified   in   clause   (e)   of   the
proviso thereto, unless a period of
five   years   have   elapsed   from   the
date of the acquisition." of   this   section,   the   expression
“retirement” means termination of
service   of   a   specified   landlord
otherwise than by resignation.
13­B .   Right   to   recover   immediate
possession   of   residential   building
or   scheduled   building   and/or
non­residential building to accrue
to   non­resident   Indian.   ­   (1)
Where an owner is a non­resident
Indian   and   returns   to   India   and
the   residential   building   or   sched ­
uled building and/or non­residen ­
tial   building,   as   the   case   may   be,
let out   by him or her, is required
for his or her use, or for the use of
anyone   ordinarily   living   with   or
dependent   on   him   or   her,   he   or
she,   may   apply   to   the   Controller
for   immediate   possession   of   such
building  or   buildings,  as   the  case
may be :
Provided that a right to apply
in   respect   of   such   a   building   un ­
der this section, shall be available
only   after   a   period   of   five   years
from   the   date   of   becoming   the
owner   of   such   a   building   and
shall   be   available   only   once   dur ­
ing the lifetime of such an owner.
(2) Where   the   owner   referred   to
in sub­section (1) has let out more
than   one   residential     building   or
7

scheduled   building   and/or   non­
residential   building,   it   shall   be
open to him or her to make an ap ­
plication   under   that   sub­section
in   respect   of   only   one   residential
building   or   one   scheduled   build ­
ing   and/or   one   non­residential
building,   each   chosen   by   him   or
her.
(3) Where   an   owner   recovers
possession   of   a   building   under
this   section,   he   or   she   shall   not
transfer   it   through   sale   or   any
other   means   or   let   it   out   before
the expiry of a period of five years
from the date of taking possession
of the said building, failing which,
the   evicted   tenant   may   apply   to
the Controller for an order direct ­
ing   that   he   shall   be   restored   the
possession   of   the   said   building
and   the   Controller   shall   make   an
order accordingly.”
8. In  Nathi Devi,  eviction was sought under Section 14­D of the Delhi
Act   by   a   widow   landlady.   The   Rent   Controller   allowed   the   eviction
summarily   and   High   Court   confirmed   the   same.   In   the   special   leave
8

petition filed by the tenant, the decision of this Court in  S. Surjit Singh
Kalra   vs   Union   of   India   &   Anr. 3
  was   relied   upon   in   support   of   the
contention that a landlady who acquired the tenanted premises by way
of   transfer,   could   not   avail   the   remedy   under   Section   14­D   for   the
eviction   of   a   pre­existing   tenant.   However,   the   Bench   of   two   Hon’ble
Judges   of   this   Court   before   whom   Nathi   Devi   (supra)   first   came   up,
doubted   the   correctness   of   the   decision   in   S.   Surjit   Singh   Kalra
(supra) and, hence, directed the special leave petition to be placed before
a   three   Member   Bench.     The   three   Member   Bench   noticed   the   conflict
between the   S. Surjit Singh Kalra   and   Kanta Goel   vs.   B.P. Pathak 4
.
The conflict was with respect to the interpretation of the words “ let out ”
appearing in the relevant provision. Due to this conflict,  Nathi Devi  was
referred  to  the  Constitution  Bench  by  an  order  reported  in   Nathi   Devi
vs.  Radha Devi Gupta 5
.  The short order of reference reads as follows: 
“ Specifically   the   issue   is   in   relation   to   the   meaning   of   the
words" let out".  Do they mean the creation of a fresh tenancy
or   do   they   refer   to   an   existing   tenancy?   If   the   former,   the
section   can   be   resorted   to   only   by   the   creator   of   the   tenancy
(widow   or   her   late   husband).   If   it   is   the   latter,   even   a
3     (1991) 2 SCC 87
4     (1977) 2 SCC 814
5     (2000) 9 SCC 249
9

transferee (widow) is entitled to invoke it. We find that there is
some   conflict   in   the   views   taken   by   two   Benches   of   three
learned Judges each. An observation in the judgment in Surjit
Singh Kalra v. Union of India suggests that the words "let out"
refer only to the creation of a tenancy. On the other hand, the
judgment   in   Kanta   Goel   v.   B.   P.   Pathak   interprets   the   words
"let out" in the context of Section 14­D of the Act to mean that
even   a   transferee   landlord   can   invoke   the   provision.   It   is,   in
these   circumstances,   necessary   that   this   appeal   should   be
heard by a Bench of five learned Judges. It shall be so placed
after  obtaining  the  directions   of  the   Hon’ble  the   Chief   Justice
of India in this regard.”
9. The   Constitution   Bench,   after   referring   to   the   provisions   of
Sections   14B   to   14D   as   well   as   Section   14(6)   of   the   Delhi   Act   held   (i)
that these provisions carve out an exception to the normal procedure for
eviction;   (ii)   that   being   in   the   nature   of   exception,   they   must   be
construed strictly and   (iii)   that the words   “let out by him”   or “ let out by
her”   clearly   signify   that   the   premises   let   out   by   any   other   person   will
stand   excluded   from   the   operation   of   the   summary   procedure.
Paragraphs   28   and   32   of   the   Constitution   Bench   Judgment   in   Nathi
Devi   (supra)   are   extracted   as   follows,   as   the   entire   argument   of   the
petitioners, revolves around the same:
“ 28.   The   observations   in   the   aforesaid   judgments   no   doubt
support   the   case   of   the   appellant.   This   Court   did   clearly   lay
down that the expression, "the premises let out by him" in  Section
10

14­B  of the Act did mean that it is he who has let out alone could
evict,   and   in   case   the   landlord   had   been   killed   in   action   his
dependent  could  seek immediate eviction of  the  premises let out
by such person. It is noticeable that the expression, "premises let
out   by   him"   is   used   in   Sections   14­B   and 14­C ,   but   the
expression, in   Section 14­D   is "premises let out by her, or by her
husband."   Section   14­B   contemplates   two   situations,   firstly,
where   the   landlord   is   a   released   or   retired   person   from   any
armed   forces   and   secondly,   where   he   was   killed   in   action.   In
case   the  landlord   was  killed   in  action  a   right   has   been   given  to
his   dependant   within   one   year   of   the   death   of   the   landlord,   to
apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
the   premises.   Section   14C   confers   a   right   on   a   retired   employee
of   the   Central   Government   or   of   the   Delhi   Administration   who
requires   the   premises   let   out   by   him   for   his   own
residence.   Section   14­D   confers   a   right   on   a   widow   of   the
landlord to seek immediate possession of the premises let out "by
her, or by her husband". The scheme of these Sections appears to
be  that  where  the  landlord  is  alive  and  the  premises  have  been
let   out   by   him,     only   he   can   make   an   application   for   immediate
possession  of   the   premises  for  his   own   use.  Only  in  the  case   of
his   death   his   dependant   under   Section   14­A ,   and   his   widow
under   Section   14­D   can   seek   immediate   possession   of   the
premises. The  use  of the expression, "let  out  by him" in   Sections
14­B   and   14­C   and   the   expression,   "let   out   by   her,   or   by   her
husband"   in   Section   14­D   have   significance.   If   it   was
unnecessary   in   the   scheme   of   these   Sections   as   to   who   had
actually let out the premises, the legislature would not have used
the term "let out by him" or "let out by her, or by her husband". In
interpreting   a   provision   one   cannot   assume   that   the   words
employed by the legislature are  redundant.   Section 14­D   gives a
right   to   file   an   application   under  that   provision   only  to   a   widow
who had  let out the premises or whose husband had let out the
premises.   Consequently,   if   the   premises   had   been   let   out   by
11

someone   else,   Section   14­D   will   not   apply.   As   pointed   out   in
Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression used in   Section 14­B   is
"the   premises   let   out   by   him",   unlike   the   expression   used
in   Section 14   (1)(e) where the legislature employed the expression
"the premises let out for residential purposes". Thus in the case of
a   landlord   belonging   to   the   general   category   it   was   immaterial
whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else, as
long   as   he   was   the   landlord   of   the   premises   at   the   time   of
making   an   application   seeking   eviction   of   the   tenant.   But   the
expression,   "let   out   by   her,   or   by   her   husband"   conveys   a
different   meaning   altogether.   The   widow's   right   to   recover
immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises
were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It
appears   to   us   that   the   legislature   has   purposely   employed   a
different   expression   in   Section   14­D   as   also   in   Section   14­
B   and   14­C .   We   are   here   concerned   with   an   application   filed
under   Section   14­D   which   specifies   in   clear   terms   that   a   widow
can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or
if her husband had let out the premises. If, as observed in Kanta
Goel   (supra),   the   expression,   "the   premises   let   out   by   him"   has
been   used   only   to   convey   the   idea   that   the   premises   must   be
owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly,
and not  that  he had himself let out the  premises, the legislature
would   not   have   then   used   the   expression   "let   out   by   her,   or   by
her   husband."   The   very   fact   that   the   Section   specifies   that   the
premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her
husband   implies   that   the   provision   would   not   apply   to   a
premises   let   out   by   any   other   person.   If   the   intention   of   the
legislature was to confer an unlimited right on a widow landlord,
the   use   of   the   words   "the   premises   let   out   by   her,   or   by   her
husband"   would  have   been   unnecessary  and   the   Section   would
have simply read as follows:­ 
"Where the landlord is a widow and the premises
are   required   by   her   for   her   own   residence,   she
12

may   apply   to   the   Controller   for   recovering   the
immediate possession of such premises."
By  expressly providing  that  the  premises  must  be  one  let  out
by   her   or   by   her   husband,   the   legislature   has   clearly   excluded
from   the   purview   of   the   said   provision   "premises   let   out   by   any
other   person"   even   if   in   course   of   time   the   widow   may   have
become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is,
and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly
employed by the legislature. The expression, "let out by her, or by
her   husband"   is   not   an   expression   which   permits   of   any
ambiguity.   We   must,   therefore,   give   it   its   normal   meaning.   So
understood   the   conclusion   is   inescapable   that   the   legislature
intent   was   only   to   confer   a   special   right   on   a   limited   class   of
widows viz. the  widow who let the  premises or whose husband
had   let   the   premises   before   his   death,   and   which   premises   the
widow requires for her own use.
“ 32. There is another aspect of the matter.   Section 14­D   uses the
expression,   "premises   let   out   by   her,   or   by   her   husband"   which
are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply
to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of
"such   premises".   "Such   premises"   obviously   is   relatable   to   the
premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its
ambit   any   other   premises   which   may   have   been   let   out   by   any
other   person.   We,   therefore,   find   substance   in   the   submission
urged on behalf of the appellant that   Section 14­D   benefits only a
class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out
the   premises.   If   the   intention   was   to   benefit   all   widows,   the
section   would   have   provided   that   a   widow   is   entitled   to   obtain
immediate   possession   of   the   premises   owned   by   her   and   the
expressions,   "let   out   by   her   or   by   her   husband"   and   "such
premises"   in   Section   14­D   would   be   redundant.   The   High   Court,
therefore,   fell   in   error   in   thinking   that   only   two   conditions   were
required to be fulfilled for the application of   Section 14­D   namely,
13

the   landlady   is   a   widow,   and   the   premises   are   required   by   her
for   her   residence.   In   addition   to   these   two   requirements,   in   our
view,   Section   14­D   insists   that   the   premises   must   be   one   let   out
by   her   or   by   her   husband.   A   widow   or   her   late   husband   who
acquired   a   tenanted   premises   by   sale   or   transfer   cannot   invoke
the provisions of   Section 14D   to evict a preexisting tenant.”
10. But   it   is   difficult   to   accept   the   contention   that   Nathi   Devi   which
interpreted Section 14­D of the Delhi Act, would apply with equal force
to   the   interpretation   of   Section   13­B   of   the   East   Punjab   Urban   Rent
Restriction   Act.   There   are   several   distinguishing   features   between   the
Delhi   Act   and   the   Punjab   Act.   Even   before   we   take   note   of   the
distinguishing features, we must keep in mind the fact that the shortage
of   housing   and   the   exploitation   of   tenants   by   landlords   in   the   urban
areas,  in   the   aftermath   of  the   world  wars,  led  to   the   enactment   of  rent
control legislations in the country. The problems created by the post war
conditions differed from State to State and hence, the solution sought to
be offered in the form of legislation also differed from State to State. As a
matter   of   fact   the   East   Punjab   Urban   Rent   Restriction   Act,   1949   is   an
offshoot of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 and the Punjab
Urban   Rent   Restriction   Act,   1947,   both   of   which   are   pre­independent
14

and   pre­partition   legislation.   On   the   contrary,   the   Delhi   Act   of   1958   is
an offshoot of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The areas to
which   these   acts   applied   had   their   own   peculiar   geographical   features
and   socio­economic   conditions.   This   is   why   the   language   employed   in
these   rent   control   legislations   differ,   though   they   may   have   a   common
template.
11. Coming   to   the   distinguishing   features   between   the   Delhi   Act   and
the   East   Punjab   Act,   it   may   be   seen   immediately   that   the   Delhi   Act
covers four categories of persons,  namely,   (i)  a landlord in occupation of
a residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any
local   authority   and   who   is   required   to   vacate   such   residential
accommodation;   (ii)   a landlord, released or retired from armed forces or
a   dependent   of   a   member   of   any   armed   forces   who   had   been   killed   in
action,   including     a   member   of   the   armed   forces   who   is   due   to   retire
within one year;   (iii)   a landlord who is a retired employee of the Central
Government or of the Delhi Administration; and  (iv)  a widow. But under
the   Punjab   Act,   the   right   to   seek   immediate   possession   is   conferred   in
favour of only two categories of persons,  namel y,  (i)  a specified landlord,
15

meaning thereby a person entitled to receive rent in respect of a building
on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a
public service or post in a connection with the affairs of the union or of a
State; and  (ii)  an owner who is a non resident Indian and who returns to
India.
12. While   Section   13­A   of   the   East   Punjab   Act   was   inserted   by
amending  Act 2 of 1985, Section 13­B was inserted by Punjab Act 9 of
2001. Delhi Act does not contain any special provision for the benefit of
NRI landlords. It is common knowledge that the major chunk of the NRI
diaspora   is   from   three   states,   namely,   Punjab,   Andhra   Pradesh   and
Kerala. Therefore, the legislature thought fit to exempt buildings owned
by   NRIs   from   the   rigors   of   the   Rent   Restriction   Act.   Hence,   the   normal
rule   of   interpretation   of   a   legislation   for   the  welfare   of   the   tenants,   will
give way while interpreting the provisions as applicable to the exempted
categories.
13. It may be of interest to note that while carving out an exception in
favour   of   four   categories   of   persons,   under   Sections   14­A,   14­B,   14­C
and 14­D, the Delhi Act used only the word   “landlord” . But the Punjab
16

Act uses the word   “specified landlord ” under Section 13­A and the word
“owner”   in Section 13­B. It is needless to mention that there is a world
of   difference   between   the   expression   “landlord”   and   the   expression
“owner”.   While the owner of a premises may also be the landlord of the
premises,   a   landlord,   within   the   meaning   of   the   expression   under   the
Rent Control legislations, need not necessarily be the owner of the said
premises.   Therefore,   while   interpreting   Section   13­B   of   the   Punjab   Act,
the   Court   must   keep   in   mind   the   distinction   between   those   two
expressions.
14. The   proviso   to   Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   13­B   which   curtails   the
right of the owner to invoke this provision for a period of five years from
the date of becoming the owner, makes it clear that the words “ let out by
him”  require a different interpretation .
15. If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Nidhesh Gupta on the basis
of the decision in  Nathi Dev i  (supra) is accepted, a NRI who is the owner
of the building will be required to satisfy two conditions,  namely,   (i)  that
the premises was let out by him; and  (ii ) that a period of five years from
17

the date of becoming the owner has elapsed. The proviso to Sub­section
(1)   cannot   be   construed   as   imposing   a   condition   additional   to   the   one
prescribed   in   Sub­Section   (1).   The   correct   method   of   interpreting   Sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   13­B   and   the   proviso   thereunder   is   to   hold   that
irrespective   of   the   person   by   whom   the   tenant     was   inducted,   a   NRI
owner   will   have   to   wait   for   a   period   of   five   years   from   the   date   of
becoming the owner, to be entitled to invoke Section 13­B.
16. We must also keep in mind the distinction between   (i)   inception of
tenancy   or   induction   of   a   person   as   a   tenant;   and   (ii)   letting   out   a
premises   on   lease.   Section   13­B(1)   does   not   use   the   expression
“inducted   by   him   or   her ”.   If   these   words   had   been   used,   they   would
certainly refer to the inception of the tenancy. Section 13(B)(1) uses the
expression  “let out”.
17. Section 106(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 declares that a
leasing   of   immovable   property   for   agricultural   or   manufacturing
purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year (in the absence
of   a   contract   or   local   law   or   usage   to   the   contrary).   It   also   says   that   a
lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be
18

a lease from month to month. Therefore, if a NRI becomes the owner of
the   building   to   which   the   Act   applies   and   the   tenancy   of   a   person   in
occupation   is   attorned   in   his   favour,   the   premises   would   become   a
premises let out by  him, as otherwise the jural relationship of landlord
and tenant will not come into existence. Once a NRI acquires a premises
which   is   in   the   occupation   of   a   tenant   inducted   by   his   predecessor   in
title, he becomes the owner. The moment the tenancy is attorned in his
favour, then the jural relationship of tenant landlord is created and the
premises   become   one   let   out   by   him.   It   is   perhaps   with   a   view   to
highlight   this   aspect   that   the   legislature   has   carefully   used   the
expression   “owner ”   in   Section   13­B,   even   while   using   the   expression
“landlord”  in other places.
18. Therefore,   the   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Nathi   Devi
(supra)   as   applicable   to   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   Delhi   Rent   Act
cannot be pressed into service for interpreting Section 13­B of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Hence, we find that the order of the
High   Court   impugned   in   the   present   appeal   is   perfectly   valid   and   does
not call for any interference. Therefore the appeal is dismissed.
19

19. However   the   tenant   is   granted   six   months’   time   to   vacate   the
premises, provided the usual undertaking is furnished within a period of
two weeks. There will be no order as to costs.
 
… ..…………....................J.
      (Hemant Gupta)
.…..………......................J
(V. Ramasubramanian)
NOVEMBER 17, 2021
NEW DELHI.
20