2021 INSC 0779
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REPORTABLE
     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5884 OF 2009
Akkamma & Ors.          …..Appellant(s)
     Versus
Vemavathi & Ors.               …Respondent(s)
     J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The appellants before us are the plaintiffs in a suit instituted in
the   year   1987   by   their   predecessor   Arakeri   Abbaiah   claiming   for
declaration  of ownership of certain immovable property  comprising  of
10.54 guntas situated in Vibhuthipura Village, Krishnarajapura Hobli,
Bangalore   South   Taluk.   Relief   was   also   claimed   in   that   suit   in   the
form   of   injunction   directing   the   defendants   therein   not   to   interfere
with   his   peaceful   possession   and   enjoyment   of   the   suit­property.   On
his   death,   Arakeri   Abbaiah’s   legal   representatives   were   brought   on
record.   In   this   judgment,   we   shall   refer   to   Arakeri   Abbaiah   as   the
original   plaintiff.   He   was   the   son­in­law   of   the   first   defendant   in   the
suit­ Muniyappa. Both the defendants have passed away subsequently
and   their   legal   representatives   are   on   record.   The   original   second

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defendant was the son of the first defendant at the time the suit was
instituted.   Prior   to   this   suit,   another   suit   was   filed   by   the   original
plaintiff   involving   broadly   the   same   immovable   property   in   the   year
1982. We shall discuss about the said suit later in this judgment and
the   two   suits   shall   be   henceforth   referred   to   by   their   years   of
institution,   i.e.   1982   suit   and   1987   suit   respectively.   The   case   of   the
original plaintiff before the Trial Court was that he had purchased the
suit   land   from   its   erstwhile   owner,   Papaiah   under   a   registered   sale
deed dated 29 th
 May, 1972. The total area of the land that the original
plaintiff claimed to have had purchased was 1 acre 15 guntas and the
disputed   property   forms   part   of   that   block   of   land.   In   the   plaint,   the
original   plaintiff’s   case   was   that   he   was   in   exclusive   possession   and
enjoyment of the suit land ever since the date of purchase. 
2. The   subject­suit,   i.e.   the   1987   suit   was   founded,   inter­alia,   on
the   allegation   that   the   defendants   were   making   attempts   to   interfere
with   the   original   plaintiff’s   peaceful   possession   and   enjoyment   of   the
property.   It   was   specifically   alleged   that   on   15 th
  February,   1987   the
defendants   interfered   with   the   peaceful   possession   and   enjoyment   of
the   suit   land.   It   has   also   been   alleged   in   the   plaint   that   attempt   to
trespass   into   the   suit   scheduled   property   was   repeated   by   the
defendants   on   25 th
  February,   1987.   In   the   1987   suit,   as   we   have

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already   indicated,   reliefs   claimed   included   declaration   to   the   effect
that the original plaintiff was the absolute owner of the suit land and
prayer was also made for permanent injunction. 
3. The original plaintiff had instituted the earlier suit in the Court of
XVIII Additional City Civil Judge at Bangalore City. The 1982 suit was
for perpetual injunction, and the claim for injunctive relief was similar
to that asked for in the 1987 suit though not on the same allegation of
interference. The earlier suit was registered as O.S. No. 3029/82. The
said   suit   was   dismissed   by   the   Trial   Court   on   the   ground   that   the
plaintiff could not establish his lawful possession. The decision of the
Trial Court in the 1982 suit was appealed against by the predecessor
of   the   present   appellants,   but   that   appeal   was   also   dismissed   by   the
High Court of Karnataka on 25 th
 November, 1986. It was thereafter the
suit,   from   which   the   present   appeal   arises,   was   instituted   showing
threats   of   dispossession   on   the   aforesaid   two   dates.   This   suit   was
contested by  the defendants by  filing written statement and they had
set up title for themselves. The defendants raised the plea of purchase
of the suit land in benami transaction, and the first defendant claimed
to be the real owner of the suit land.   The said suit was dismissed on
7 th
  November,   1997.   It   has,   however,   been   stated   in   the   list   of   dates
contained   in   the   paperbook   that   the   Trial   Court   did   not   accept   the

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defendants’ plea of benami transaction. 
4. This   judgment   was   appealed   against   by   the   plaintiff   before   the
High Court. In appeal, the legal representatives of the original plaintiff
were   brought   on   record.   The   appeal   was   allowed   by   the   High   Court
and the matter was remitted to the Trial Court. In the judgment of the
High   Court   delivered   on   19 th
  August,   2004   by   which   the   matter   was
remanded, it was, inter­alia, held and directed:­
“4.   In   this   suit,   the   plaintiff   has   produced   R   o   R   extracts
marked   at   Exs.   P­4   to   P.6   to   prove   his   possession   around   the
date   of   the   suit.   The   Plaintiff,   on   his   part,   has   tendered
evidence.   The   Defendants   although   filed   Written   Statement,
have   failed   to   cross­examine   the   Plaintiff   witnesses   and   failed
to  let   in  their   evidence  The  dismissal  of   earlier   injunction  Suit
would not come in the way of the plaintiff to file a Suit to seek
comprehensive relief of declaration of title. But the earlier Suit
for permanent injunction was dismissed on the ground that the
Plaintiff   failed   to   prove   his   possession.   The   RoR   extracts
produced by Plaintiff at Exs. P. 4 to P. 6 show that Plaintiff is in
possession.   The   trial   court   without   reference   to   the   said
evidence,   has   mechanically   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the
filing   of   the   present   suit   is   not   maintainable   in   view   of   the
dismissal of the earlier suit and the related regular first appeal.
In   that   view   of   the   matter,   it   is   just   and   necessary   that   the
judgment of the Trial Court has to be set aside.
5. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the trial court is set
aside   and   the   matter   is   remitted   to   the   Trial   Court   for   fresh
disposal in accordance with Law. If Defendants participate and
request   for   summoning   PW   1   and   PW   2   for   the   purpose   of
Cross­examination,   the   request   is   to   be   granted   and   so   also
Defendants   should   be   permitted   to   adduce   their   evidence.   No
fresh   notices   need   be   issued   to  the   parties   by   the   Trial  Court.
Parties   are   directed   to   appear   before   the   Trial   Court   on
06/09/2004.   LCRs   to   be   transmitted   forthwith.   The   suit   is   to
be   disposed   of   by   the   end   of   December   2004.   The   legal
representatives   of   the   appellant   Plaintiff   are   entitled   to   get
themselves impleaded in the suit  by  filing a memo and getting

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the   cause   title   amended   accordingly.   It   is   said   that   PW   1   is
dead. The Plaintiff is also entitled to adduce additional evidence
if he so desires.” 
(quoted   verbatim   from   the   copy   of   the   judgment   as
reproduced in the paperbook)
5. On   remand,   the   Court   of   VIII   Additional   City   Civil   Judge   at
Bangalore   City   in   the   judgment   delivered   on   18 th
  December,   2004
found that the plaintiffs (the plural form is being used as the suit was
being prosecuted from that point of time by legal representatives of the
deceased plaintiff) had proved ownership to the suit property. But on
the   aspect   of   possession   and   obstruction   thereto,   the   finding   of   the
Court   went   against   the   plaintiffs.   The   defendants’   stand   that   the
plaintiffs   were   never   in   possession   of   the   property   and   there   was   no
cause of action for the suit was upheld. The Trial Court went against
the   plaintiffs   mainly   on   the   ground   that   the   plaintiff   could   not
establish   that   he   was   in   possession.   The   Trial   Court   referred   to   the
evidence   of   the   plaintiff   witness   no.   1,   i.e.   the   original   plaintiff   who
had admitted that his father­in­law was in possession of the suit land
and   was   cultivating   thereon.   In   the   1987   suit,   the   original   plaintiff
could   not   demonstrate   as   to   how   he   came   in   possession   of   the   suit­
land   after   dismissal   of   the   1982   suit.   This   suit   was   dismissed,   inter­
alia, on the following reasoning:­
“(i) Though the plaintiff had admitted that the first defendant
was in possession and cultivation of the suit land, he did not

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ask for relief for possession.
(ii)   Mere   suit   for   declaration   was   not   maintainable   without
the   relief   for   possession.   By   declaring   the   plaintiff   was   the
owner of the property, no purpose would be served.”    
6. It was also held in that judgment that the suit was time­barred.
On the point of limitation, it was held by the Trial Court, on remand:­
“15.   ……Further   the   dispute   of   title   is   confirmed   by   filing   the
Written Statement by the Defendant No. 1 on 28/01/1983 but
the   Plaintiff   filed   the   present   suit   on   02/03/1987   after   lapses
of 4 years 2 months. The Plaintiff had to file this suit within 3
years   from   the   date   of   filing   the   written   statement   by   the
present  Defendant in O.S 3029/82. But filed after 4 years two
months. So, the Suit filed by the Plaintiff for declaration of title
is   barred   by   time.   Accordingly   I   answer   Issue   No.   5   in
affirmative.”
(quoted   verbatim   from   the   copy   of   the   judgment   as
reproduced in the paperbook)  
7. Against this judgment of dismissal, the plaintiffs approached the
High   Court   of   Karnataka.   The   appeal   was   registered   as   Regular   First
Appeal   No.   331   of   2005   and   was   ultimately   dismissed   on   21 st
  July,
2008.  
8. We   find   from   the   judgment   under   appeal   that   in   course   of
hearing   before   the   High   Court,   the   plaintiffs   sought   to   amend   the
plaint seeking alternative relief of possession of the suit property from
the defendants. On that point, the High Court has observed and held:­
“6.   ……..The   dispute   between   the   parties   is   pending   from   the
year   1982.   The   Trial   Court   vide   judgment   dated   7.9.1985   in
O.S.   No.   3029/82   held   that   plaintiffs   were   not   in   possession
and enjoyment of the schedule property as on the date of filing
the suit in the year 1982. After lapse of 26 years, the plaintiffs

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are now  filing  the application  seeking  amendment  of plaint  for
alternative   relief   for   recovery   of   possession   of   the   schedule
property.   I   perused   the   affidavit   filed   and   I   am   not   satisfied
with   the   explanation   of   the   Plaintiffs   for   delay   in   filing   the
application for amendment. It is not a case where the Plaintiffs
were not aware of the fact, that the Trial Court in its judgement
dated 7.9.1985 in O.S. No. 3029/82 held that the Plaintiff was
not   in   possession   of   the   schedule   property.   At   this   length   of
time, if the application of Plaintiff is allowed, it will lead to de­
novo   trial.   Therefore,   the   application   of   the   Plaintiff   for
amendment of the plaint is hereby rejected.”
(quoted   verbatim   from   the   copy   of   the   judgment
reproduced in the paperbook)
9. The High  Court’s opinion was based on the  reasoning  contained
in an earlier decision of the same High Court, the case of  Sri Aralappa
vs. Sri Jagannath & others   (ILR 2007 Kar 339). In this judgment, it
was held:­
“31. Even if the plaintiff comes to Court asserting that he is in
possession and that if it is found after trial that he was not in
possession   on   the   date   of   the   suit,   even   then,   the   suit   for
declaration and permanent injunction is liable to be dismissed
as not maintainable, as no decree for permanent injunction can
be granted if the plaintiff is not in possession on the date of the
suit.   In   such   circumstances,   it   is  necessary   for   the   plaintiff   to
amend   the   plaint   before   the   judgment   and   seek   relief   of
possession.   Therefore,   a   suit   for   declaration   of   title   and
permanent injunction, by the plaintiff who is not in possession
on the date of the suit, when he is able to seek further relief of
recovery of possession also, omits to do so, the Court shall not
make   any   such   declaration   and   the   suit   is   liable   to   be
dismissed as not maintainable”. 
10. Before   us,   it   has   been   urged   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that
having regard to the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963,  the   suit  ought  not  to  have  been  dismissed  as along  with  claim
for  declaration,   injunctive  relief  was   also   asked   for.   Section   34  of   the

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1963 Act reads:­
“Discretion   of   court   as   to   declaration   of   status   or   right.   –
Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to
any property, may institute a suit against any person denying,
or   interested   to   deny,   his   title   to   such   character   or   right,   and
the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that
he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for
any further relief: 
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where
the   plaintiff,   being   able   to   seek   further   relief   than   a   mere
declaration of title, omits to do so. 
Explanation.   –   A   trustee   of   property   is   a   “person   interested   to
deny”   a   title   adverse   to   the   title   of   some   one   who   is   not   in
existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.”
The aforesaid provision of law has been construed uniformly in a
series   of   judgments.   In   the   case   of   M.   K.   Rappai   and   Ors.   vs.   John
and   Ors.   [(1969   (2)   SCC   590]   dealing   with   a   similar   provision   in
Section   42   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act,   1877,   which   was   identically
phrased, it was held:­
“12. ………a bare declaration of right will be within the mischief
of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and Section 34 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963.”
Same   proposition   of   law   has   been   followed   in   Ram   Saran   and
Anr.   vs.   Smt.   Ganga   Devi   [(1973)   2   SCC   60],   Vinay   Krishna   vs.
Keshav   Chandra   and   Anr.   [(1993)   Supp   3   SCC   129]   and   Anathula
Sudhakar   vs.   P.   Buchi   Reddy   (Dead)   By   LRS.   And   Ors.   [(2008)   4
SCC 594]. 
11. The   High   Court,   on   factual   score,   observed   in   the   judgment

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under appeal:­
“8.   I   am   in   full   agreement   with   the   view   taken   by   the   learned
Single Judge in Aralappa’s case. In the instant case the finding
of the Trial Court in O.S. No. 3029/82 stating that the Plaintiffs
were not in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property
had become final. It is not the case of Plaintiff that subsequent
to judgement in O.S. No. 3029/82 he recovered the possession
of the schedule property. That being the situation, there was no
impediment   for   the   Plaintiff’s   to   seek   the   relief   for   recovery   of
possession   when   they   filed   O.S.   No.   1014/87.   The   Plaintiffs
having omitted to seek further relief of possession they are not
entitled for declaring and injunction. The reasoning of the Trial
Court in the impugned judgment is in accordance with law and
the   same   is   supported   by   evidence   on   record.   I   find   no
justifiable   ground   to   interfere   with   the   impugned   judgment
passed by the Trial Court.”  
(quoted   verbatim   from   the   copy   of   the   judgment   as
reproduced in the paperbook )
12. The position here is that the original plaintiff sued for declaration
of   title   and   possession   in   the   1987   suit.   The   first   Court   found   the
original plaintiff not to be in possession. It is true that reliefs claimed
by   the   original   plaintiff   were   both   for   declaration   and   injunction,   but
the   latter   having   failed   to   establish   possession   of   the   suit   land,   his
case for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the
suit   land   failed.   The   plaintiffs   want   us   to   proceed   on   the   basis   that
since the Trial Court found ownership of the suit property having been
proved,   possession   should   have   been   presumed.     In   two   High   Court
decisions,  Devish vs. M.K. Subbiah and Ors.  (AIR 1970 Mys 249) and
Navalram   Laxmidas   Devmurari   vs.   Vijayaben   Jayvantbhai   Chavda

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(AIR   1998   Guj   17),   the   presumption   of   law   that   possession   follows
tittle has been highlighted. 
13. Our   attention   has   also   been   drawn   to   certain   portions   of   M.
Krishnaswamy’s   “Law   of   Adverse   Possession”   (12 th
  Edition).   In   this
commentary, the author has summarised the legal position in relation
to   presumption   of   law   in   relation   to   vacant   lands   in   the   following
manner: ­
“ Possession   is   not   necessarily   the   same   as   actual   user.   To
prove possession, it is not necessary, generally, to prove user of
land.   If   the   land   is   of   such   a   nature   as   to   render   it   unfit   for
actual enjoyment in the usual modes, it may be presumed that
the   possession   of   the   owner   continues   until   the   contrary   is
proved.
The   jurisprudential   concept   of   possession   is   made   up   of   two
ingredients:   (i)   the   corpus :   and   (ii)   the   animus .   Corpus   means
actual exclusive physical CONTROL over the property denoting
physical   possession.   The   animus   denotes   the   intention   and
exercise   of   right   to   possess   the   property   as   owner   to   the
exclusion   of   others.   These,   two   ingredients   put   together   go   to
constitute legal possession. Thus, the mere throwing of   Gudha
(Garbage) over an open plot of land for a very long period much
more than even 12 years will not constitute legal possession of
the persons throwing  Gudha  and muchless can such user ripen
into   adverse   possession   so   as   to   extinguish   the   title   of   the
rightful owner.” 
14. But   these   statements   of   law   would   not   operate   in   this   case,   as
the original plaintiff in the earlier suit had admitted possession as also
use   of   the   subject­land   by   the   first   defendant.     No   case   of   granting
right   of   user   has   been   made   out   either.   Neither   the   plaintiff   has
alleged   casual   use   of   the   subject­land   by   the   first   defendant.   The

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original   plaintiff’s   claim   for   possession   was   rejected   in   the   1982   suit
and   in   the   subsequent   suit   also,   which   gives   rise   to   this   appeal,   the
plaintiffs   could   not   demonstrate   repossession   of   land   on   the   basis   of
which he could obtain injunctive relief from disturbance of possession.
In both the two reported decisions in the cases of   Devish   (supra)   and
Navalram   Laxmidas   Devmurari   (supra)   referred   to   earlier,   the   first
two Courts – being  the Courts of fact had come to  affirmative finding
about   the   plaintiffs’   possession   of   the   suit   property.     So   far   as   the
proceeding   before   us   is   concerned,   the   finding   of   the   First   Court   is
otherwise.   The   plaintiffs   sought   to   introduce   prayer   for   recovery   of
possession   to   cure   the   defect   of   not   having   made   out   a   case   on   that
count by way of amendment of plaint at the appellate stage. The High
Court rejected this prayer. We have quoted earlier in this judgment the
reason for such rejection. We are in agreement with the High Court on
this   point.   While   in   a   situation   of   this   nature,   amendment   of   plaint
could   be   asked   for   (Vinay   Krishna   vs.   Keshav   Chandra   and   Anr.) ,
such a plea ought to have been made within the prescribed limitation
period.   This   position   of   law   has   been   clarified   in   the   case   of
Venkataraja   and   Ors.   vs.   Vidyane   Doureradjaperumal   (Dead)
Through   Legal   Representatives   and   Ors.   [   (2014)   14   SCC   502].   In
this case, it has been held:­ 

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“24. A mere declaratory decree remains non­executable in most
cases  generally.  However,  there  is  no  prohibition  upon  a  party
from   seeking   an   amendment   in   the   plaint   to   include   the
unsought   relief,   provided   that   it   is   saved   by   limitation.
However, it is obligatory  on the part  of the defendants to raise
the   issue   at   the   earliest.   (Vide   Parkash   Chand   Khurana   vs.
Harnam Singh and State of M.P. vs. Mangilal Sharma).”  
15. We   agree   with   that   part   of   the   decision   of   the   High   Court   in
which   it   has   been   held   that   possession   of   the   suit   property   was   not
established   by   the   plaintiffs   and   hence   injunctive   relief   could   not   be
granted.  As  we   have  already   recorded,   we  are  also   in  agreement   with
the  High  Court’s reasoning  for  rejecting  the plea for  amendment. But
we   do   not   agree   fully   with   the   entire   reasoning   of   the   High   Court   for
dismissal   of   the   appeal   as   spelt   out   in   the   said   judgment.   The   bar
contained   in   proviso   to   Section   34   of   the   1963   Act,   in   our   opinion,
could not be applied in the case of the plaintiffs as consequential relief
for   injunction   from   interference   with   the   suit­land   was   claimed.   The
prohibition contained in the proviso to Section 34 would operate only
if the sole relief is for  declaration  without any  consequential relief. In
the   plaint   of   the   1987   suit,   relief   for   injunction   was   asked   for.   Such
dual   relief   would   protect   the   suit   from   being   dismissed   on
maintainability ground.  It is a fact that the plaintiff ought to have had
asked for recovery of possession, given the factual background of this
case,   but   the   plaint   as   it   was   originally   framed   reflected   that   the

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original plaintiff  was  in  possession  of the suit land. Such  plea  rightly
failed before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 
16. The   prohibition   or   bar   contained   in   proviso   to   Section   34   of   the
1963  Act  determines   the  maintainability  of   a   suit  and   that   issue  has
to   be   tested   on   the   basis   the   plaint   is   framed.   If   the   plaint   contains
claims for declaratory relief as also consequential relief in the form of
injunction   that   would   insulate   a   suit   from   an   attack   on
maintainability   on  the  sole  ground  of   bar  mandated  in  the  proviso  to
the aforesaid section. If on evidence the plaintiff fails on consequential
relief,   the   suit   may   be   dismissed   on   merit   so   far   as   plea   for
consequential   relief   is   concerned   but   not   on   maintainability   question
invoking   the   proviso   to   Section   34   of   the   1963   Act.   If   the   plaintiff
otherwise   succeeds   in   getting   the   declaratory   relief,   such   relief   could
be granted. On this count, we do not accept the ratio of the Karnataka
High   Court   judgment   in   the   case   of   Sri   Aralappa   (supra)   to   be   good
law. In that decision, it has been held:­
“31. Even if the plaintiff comes to Court asserting that he is in
possession and that if it is found after trial that he was not in
possession   on   the   date   of   the   suit,   even   then,   the   suit   for
declaration and permanent injunction is liable to be dismissed
as not maintainable, as no decree for permanent injunction can
be granted if the plaintiff is not in possession on the date of the
suit.   In   such   circumstances,   it   is  necessary   for   the   plaintiff   to
amend   the   plaint   before   the   judgment   and   seek   relief   of
possession.   Therefore,   a   suit   for   declaration   of   title   and
permanent injunction, by the plaintiff who is not in possession
on the date of the suit, when he is able to seek further relief of
recovery of possession also, omits to do so, the Court shall not

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make   any   such   declaration   and   the   suit   is   liable   to   be
dismissed as not maintainable”. 
17. So far  as the reliefs claimed in the suit out of which this appeal
arises,   prayer   for   declaration   was   anchored   on   two   instances   of
interference with the possession of land of the plaintiffs and injunctive
relief   for   restraint   from   interference   with   the   property   was   also
claimed.     But  possession   of  the  said  property   by   the   original   plaintiff
was not established. The alternative relief sought to be introduced at a
later   stage   of   the   suit   was   also   found   to   be   incapable   of   being
entertained   for   the   reason   of   limitation.   Thus,   the   foundation   of   the
case   of   the   plaintiffs   based   on   these   two   factual   grounds   collapsed
with   the   fact­finding   Courts   rejecting   both   these   assertions   or
allegations.   But   that   factor   ought   not   to   be   a   ground   for   denying
declaration   of   ownership   to   the   plaintiffs.   There   is   no   bar   in   the
Specific   Relief   Act,   1963   in   granting   standalone   declaratory   decree.
The   Trial   Court   came   to   a   positive   finding   that   the   original   plaintiff
was   the   owner   of   the   suit­property.   But   it   held   that   in   absence   of
declaration   of   relief   of   possession   by   the   plaintiff,   declaration   of   title
cannot be granted. We have already expressed our disagreement with
this   line   of   reasoning.   It   seems   to   be   a   misconstruction   of   the
provisions of Section 34 of the 1963 Act. The Trial Court and the High
Court have proceeded on the basis that the expression “further relief”

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employed   in   that   proviso   must   include   all   the   reliefs   that   ought   to
have been claimed or might have been granted. But in our view, that is
not the requirement of the said proviso. This takes us to the corollary
question   as   to   whether   the   1987   suit   could   have   been   held   to   be
barred under the principle contained in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. In our opinion, the said provisions of the Code
would not apply in the facts of this case, as the denial of legal right in
the   1987   suit   is   pegged   on   two   alleged   incidents   of   15 th
  and   25 th
February,   1987.   These   allegations   can   give   rise   to   claims   for
declaration  which  obviously   could not  be  made in  the  1982 suit.  The
claim   for   declaratory   decree   could   well   be   rejected   on   merit,   but   the
suit   in   such   a   case   could   not   be   dismissed   invoking   the   principles
incorporated in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of 1908. 
18. The High Court has proceeded on the footing that in the subject­
suit, the original plaintiff must have had asked for relief for recovery of
possession and not having asked so, they became disentitled to decree
for  declaration and  possession.  But as we have already  observed, the
proviso   to   Section   63   of   the   1963   Act   requires   making   prayers   for
declaration as well as consequential relief. In this case, if the relief on
second count fails on merit, for that reason alone the suit ought not to
fail   in   view   of   aforesaid   prohibition   incorporated   in   Section   34   of   the

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1963 Act.
19. Having   opined  on  the  position   of  law  incorporated  in  Section  34
of   the   1963  Act,   we  shall   again  turn   to   the   facts  of  the  present   case.
The   first   suit   was   for   perpetual   injunction,   in   which   the   original
plaintiff lost for failing to establish possession. In the second suit (the
1987  suit),  reliefs   were  claimed  for   declaration   based   on   allegation   of
subsequent disturbances and on that basis injunctive relief was asked
for. The plaintiffs’ claim  for being  in possession however  failed. Thus,
no   injunction   could   be   granted   restraining   the   defendants   from
disturbing   or   interfering   with   the   original   plaintiffs’   possession   of   the
suit   land.   But   as   the   Trial   Court   found   ownership   of   the   original
plaintiff   was   proved,   in   our   view   the   original   plaintiff   was   entitled   to
declaration that he was the absolute owner of the suit property. There
is no bar in granting such decree for declaration and such declaration
could not be denied on the reasoning that no purpose would be served
in   giving   such   declaration.   May   be   such   declaratory   decree   would   be
non­executable in the facts of this case, but for that reason alone such
declaration   cannot   be   denied   to   the   plaintiff.     Affirmative   finding   has
been   given   by   the   Trial   Court   as   regards   ownership   of   the   original
plaintiff  over  the  subject­property. That  finding   has not  been  negated
by   the   High   Court,   being   the   Court   of   First   Appeal.   In   such

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circumstances,   in   our   opinion,   discretion   in   granting   declaratory
decree   on   ownership   cannot   be   exercised   by   the   Court   to   deny   such
relief   on   the   sole   ground   that   the   original   plaintiff   has   failed   to
establish his case on further or consequential relief. 
20. In   these   circumstances,   we   sustain   the   judgment   of   the   High
Court that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief as prayed
for and also the rejection of the plaintiffs’ plea for introduction of relief
for   possession.   But   at   the   same   time,   we   set   aside   that   part   of   the
judgment by which it has been held that the plaintiffs were disentitled
to   declaration  of  ownership  of  the  property.  We  accordingly  hold  that
the   plaintiffs   are   entitled   to   declaration   that   they   are   owners   of   the
suit property and there shall be a decree to that effect. 
21. The appeal is party allowed in the above terms.
22. There shall be no orders as to costs. 
 ……........................J.
(L. NAGESWARA   RAO)
……........................J.
(ANIRUDDHA   BOSE)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 25, 2021