2021 INSC 0768
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2373 OF 2010
SURINDER SINGH        ..... APPELLANT
                                       VERSUS
STATE (UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH) ..... RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
  Appellant–Surinder   Singh   has   laid   challenge   to   the   judgement
dated 19 th
 May 2010 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, whereby,
the order of his conviction and sentence dated 25 th
  July 2006 passed
by   Learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Chandigarh   was   confirmed.
The   Appellant   has   been   convicted   under   Section   307   of   the   Indian
Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter   ‘IPC’)   and   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act,
1959   (hereinafter,   ‘Arms   Act’),   and   sentenced   to   rigorous
imprisonment   of   3   years   for   both   the   offences,   with   a   direction   that
sentences will run concurrently.
FACTS:
2. The prosecution case in brief is that, on 10 th
  July 1999, Mansur
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Ali,   Advocate   (Complainant)   was   sitting   at   his   residential   office   along
with   his   clerk   Maler   Singh   (PW­3),   giving   dictation   to   his   steno,  
R.K.   Sood   (PW­4).   At   about   5:30   PM,   the   Appellant,   who   was   then   a
Head Constable in Chandigarh Police, entered the residential office of
the Complainant in an inebriated condition and stating that he was a
beat   officer   of   the   lane,   asked   for   a   glass   of   water.   He   thereafter   sat
across the Complainant and after consuming the water served to him
by   Balbir   Singh   (PW­5),   pulled   out   his   service   pistol   and   threatened
the   Complainant  by  pointing   the   pistol   at  him   and  stated   that   “there
are 10 bullets in this gun and I will kill 10 people today ”. Appellant also
asked   the   Complainant   to   stand   and   raise   his   hands.   At   the   same
time, he directed Maler Singh and R.K. Sood to step outside the office,
to which they complied. In the meantime, the Appellant moved around
the table, towards the Complainant, pulled the lever and made himself
ready   to   fire.     Sensing   the   seriousness   of   the   situation,   Complainant
lunged   at   the   Appellant   and   pushed   his   hand   towards   the   ceiling,
which resulted in the bullet, fired from the pistol, hitting the ceiling of
the office. 
3. The Appellant then attempted to fire a second time, however, he
was unable to and in the said exercise a bullet fell from his pistol. By
that time, the ladies of the house had entered the office and raised a
holler.   Panic­stricken,   Appellant   rushed   out   of   the   office,   leaving
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behind   his   wireless   set   on   the   table   of   the   Complainant   and   his
scooter outside the house. No injury  was caused to the Complainant.
The   incident   was   then   reported   to   the   police.   Upon   receiving   the
information,   about   10­15   minutes   later,   police   officials   arrived   at   the
house of the Complainant and F.I.R. was lodged against the Appellant,
whereafter,   the   police   officials   sprang   into   action   and   the   Appellant
was   arrested   by   SI   Ramesh   Chand   (PW­6),   who   found   the   Appellant
near   the   Masjid   of   Sector   20­A,   with   the   pistol   still   in   his   hand.
Appellant was then taken for medical examination where he refused to
give his urine or blood samples. 
4. The   investigation   ensued   in   light   of   the   above­stated   facts,   and
upon   collection   of   substantial   evidence,   the   charge   sheet   was   filed
against   the   Appellant.   The   case   was   committed   to   the   Additional
Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, and charges under Section 307 IPC and
Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   were   framed.   The   Appellant   abjured   his
culpability and claimed trial.
5. In   the   eventual   trial,   a   total   of   14   witnesses   were   examined   by
the Prosecution and 3 witnesses were led by the Defense. The case of
the Prosecution relied heavily on  the testimonies  of the eye­witnesses
present at the site of the incidence, including the Complainant (PW­2)
who in his deposition stood by the version of events as stated by him
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in the F.I.R. The Complainant deposed candidly and admitted that had
the   Appellant   not   come   near   him   and   shot   while   being   seated,   he
would   not   have   been   able   to   stop   the   Appellant.   Complainant   also
categorically   stated   that   while   moving   towards   him   the   Appellant
brought the pistol in firing mode by pulling the lever and aiming at his
face,   which   made   him   realize   the   gravity   of   the   situation.   Likewise,
R.K. Sood (PW­4) corroborated the deposition of the Complainant and
stated that he witnessed the shot being fired by the Appellant through
the mesh wired door, while standing in the veranda, right outside the
office.  Maler  Singh  (PW­3),  though  denied  having  seen  the  shot being
fired, attested to the presence of the Appellant in a drunk state and to
have   heard   the   shot   having   been   fired   while   he   was   in   the   veranda
along with PW­4. 
6. Dr. Bidhi Chand (PW­7), examined the Appellant at 7:20 PM on
the day of the incident, after his arrest by S.I. Ramesh Chand (PW­6).
This   witness   acknowledged   the   Medico­Legal   Report   dated   10 th
  July
1999   (Ex   J   MLR),   and   deposed   that   upon   medical   examination,   the
Appellant was found under the influence of Alcohol.
7. The   Statement   of   Mr.   B.   Badaniya   (PW­13)   also   bears   some
importance. This witness in his examination before the Court, relying
on   the   Central   Forensic   Science   Laboratory   (in   short   ‘CFSL’)   Report  
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(Ex.   PW­13/A),   deposed   that   the   empty   cartridge   found   at   the
residential  office  of  the Complainant,  upon forensic  examination,  was
proved to have been fired from the pistol used by the Appellant. In his
cross­examination,   PW­13   testified   as   to   the   manner   in   which  
semi­automatic or semi­loader guns, such as the weapon used by the
Appellant, function.
8. On   the   contrary,   the   Appellant   raised   a   plea   claiming   an
alternate   version   of   events   under   his   Section   313   Cr.P.C.   statement.
He claimed that he was on visiting terms with the Complainant and on
the   day   of   the   incidence,   he   was   routinely   visiting   the   house   of   the
Complainant. He kept the gun along with his wireless set on the table
and unbeknownst to him, the Complainant picked up the weapon and
accidentally   fired.   He   further   asserted   that   the   Complainant   had
lodged a false version of events to save himself of any criminal liability.
Mukesh   Mittal   (DW­1)   also   supported   the   case   of   the   Appellant,
claiming   that   the   Complainant   had   himself   told   DW­1   right   after   the
occurrence   that   he   had   accidentally   fired   from   the   weapon.   The   Trial
Court found the version of events contended by the Appellant dubious.
As   far   as   DW­1   is   concerned,   during   his   cross­examination,   he   was
unable to  substantiate how or  why he  was present near  the house of
the   Appellant   at   the   time   of   the   event,   and   thereby   failed   to   inspire
confidence.
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9. Since there is no dispute regarding the presence of the Appellant
at   the   residential   office   of   the   Complainant   at   the   time   of   the
incidence,   or   that   the   bullet   was   fired   from   his   service   pistol,   the
pivotal   question   before   the   Trial   Court   was,   whether   the   Appellant
fired the pistol, and, if so, was the weapon used with the intent to kill
the   Complainant.   The   Trial   Court   observed   that   the   prosecution
witnesses   had,   by   and   large,   supported   the   prosecution   version   and
that   no   reason   was   adduced   to   depict   why   the   Complainant   would
want to falsely implicate the Appellant. Although the Trial Court noted
that   there   were   some   inconsistencies   in   the   statements   put   forth   by
the   prosecution   witnesses,   however,   the   same   were   held   to   be   minor
contradictions brought about naturally due to the passage of time. The
Court found version of the Defense to be “ a patch of lies and figment of
imagination ”, and rejected the same in its entirety. 
10. As   far   as   the   charge   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   was
concerned,   the   Trial   Court   observed   that   the   Appellant   had   used   his
service pistol without any prior permission and for an illegal purpose.
The act of firing by the Appellant was thus held to be in contravention
of Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Trial Court therefore convicted the
Appellant under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and
awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 3 years. 
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11. Discontented   with   his   conviction,   the   Appellant   preferred   an
appeal   before   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   &   Haryana.   The   High   Court
upon   reappraisal   of   the   evidence,   sustained   conviction   and   the
consequential sentence imposed by the Trial Court and dismissed the
appeal.
12. Aggrieved, the Appellant is now before this Court.
CONTENTIONS: 
13. We   have   heard   learned   counsel(s)   for   the   Appellant   and   the
Respondent­State   at   a   considerable   length   and   perused   the   record  
in­depth.  There  are  four   principal  contentions  raised  on  behalf  of  the
Appellant.  First , that there was an absence of ‘motive’ on behalf of the
Appellant   to   kill   the   Complainant.   It   is   urged   that,   if   either   of   the
versions   are   believed,   at   best,   there   were   good   relations   between   the
parties   and   at   worst   they   were   strangers,   thus,   the   Appellant   could
have no motive or desire to kill the Complainant.  Second , there was an
absence of intent, which could not be imputed from the conduct of the
Appellant. 
14. Third,   doubts were sought to be created through re­appreciation
of evidence once again, including, by depicting that the statements of
the   eye­witnesses   suffered   from   material   contradictions,   fatal   to   the
case   of   the   prosecution   and   also   that   PW­3   to   PW­5   were   interested
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witnesses,   they   being   employees   of   the   Complainant.   And,   that   as
against it, the version of the Appellant in his statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. was the correct chronicle of events and was more probable
than the narrative of the prosecution.  Fourth and finally , it was argued
that   the   conviction   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   was   not
sustainable   as   the   weapon   used   by   the   Appellant   was   licensed   and
misuse of a licensed  weapon is not a mischief under  Section 5  of the
Arms Act.
15. Learned   State   Counsel,   on   the   other   hand,   reminded   us   of   the
scope   of   interference   by   this   Court   in   a   case   of   concurrent   finding   of
fact  and   canvassed   that   no   substantial   question   of   law   is   involved   in
this appeal. 
ANALYSIS:
16. Having   given   our   thoughtful   consideration   to   the   rival
contentions,   we   find   that   the   following   two   questions   fall   for  
our consideration:
A. Whether the High Court erred in maintaining the conviction of
the Appellant under Section 307 IPC?
B. Whether   conviction   of   the   Appellant   under   Section   27   of   the
Arms Act is sustainable?
17. It   may   be   highlighted   at   the   outset   that   although   there   are
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spacious   powers   vested   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution,
nevertheless,   while   imploring   such   powers   in   a   criminal   appeal   by
special leave, this Court would ordinarily abstain from entering into a
fresh   re­appraisement   of   evidence   and   doubt   the   credibility   of
witnesses   when   there   is   a   concurrent   finding   of   fact,   save   for   certain
exceptional   circumstances.   Notwithstanding   thereto   and   in   the
interest   of   justice,   we   have   endeavoured   to   peruse   and   discuss   the
entire   evidence   on   record   to   ascertain   whether   or   not   the   concurrent
finding   of   conviction   suffers   from   any   perversity   and/or   whether   the
conviction of the Appellant is legally and factually sustainable.
A. Whether the guilt of the Appellant under Section 307 IPC has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt?
18. Before   we   advert   to   the   factual   matrix   or   gauge   the
trustworthiness   of   the   witnesses,   it   will   be   beneficial   to   brace
ourselves   of   the   case­law   qua   the   essential   conditions,   requisite   for
bringing   home   a   conviction   under   Section   307   IPC.   In   State   of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr. 1
,  this Court, while
re­appreciating the true import of Section 307 IPC held as follows:
“ 12.   To   justify   a   conviction   under   this   section,   it   is
not   essential   that   bodily   injury   capable   of   causing
death   should   have   been   inflicted.   Although   the
nature   of   injury   actually   caused   may   often   give
considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to
1
  (2005) 5 SCC 554
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the   intention   of   the   accused,   such   intention   may
also be deduced from other circumstances, and may
even,   in   some   cases,   be   ascertained   without   any
reference at all to actual wounds.  The section makes a
distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if
any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far
as   the   person   assaulted   is   concerned,   but   still   there   may
be   cases   in   which   the   culprit   would   be   liable   under   this
section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused
to   the   victim   of   the   assault   should   be   sufficient   under
ordinary   circumstances   to   cause   the   death   of   the   person
assaulted.   What   the   court   has   to   see   is   whether   the   act,
irrespective   of   its   result,   was   done   with   the   intention   or
knowledge   and   under   circumstances   mentioned   in   the
section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the
penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an
intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
13.   It   is   sufficient   to   justify   a   conviction   under
Section   307   if   there   is   present   an   intent   coupled
with   some   overt   act   in   execution   thereof.   It   is   not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death
should   have   been   inflicted.   The   section   makes   a
distinction   between   the   act   of   the   accused   and   its
result, if  any. The  court  has to see whether  the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention
or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in
the section.  Therefore, an accused charged under Section
307   IPC   cannot   be   acquitted   merely   because   the   injuries
inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”
(Emphasis Applied)
19. These   very   ingredients   have   been   accentuated   in   some   of   the
later   decisions,   including   in   State   of   M.P.   vs.   Kashiram   &   Ors. 2
,
Jage   Ram   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   Haryana 3
  and   State   of   M.P.   vs.
Kanha @ Om Prakash 4
.
2    
( 2009) 4 SCC 26
3
 ( 2015) 11 SCC 366
4
  (2019) 3 SCC 605
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20. It   is   by   now   a  lucid   dictum   that  for   the   purpose   of   constituting
an   offence   under   Section   307   IPC,   there   are   two   ingredients   that   a
Court   must   consider,   first ,   whether   there   was   any   intention   or
knowledge   on   the   part   of   accused   to   cause   death   of   the   victim,   and,
second ,   such   intent   or   knowledge   was   followed   by   some   overt   actus
rea   in execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to
whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may
deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding
circumstances of the offence, including the nature of weapon used or
the   nature   of   injury,   if   any.     The   manner   in   which   occurrence   took
place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim.  It is
thus   not   necessary   that   a   victim   shall   have   to   suffer   an   injury
dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC.
21. It   would   also   be   fruitful   at   this   stage,   to   appraise   whether   the
requirement   of   ‘motive’   is   indispensable   for   proving   the   charge   of
attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. 
22. It   is   significant   to   note   that   ‘motive’   is   distinct   from   ‘object   and
means’   which   innervates   or   provokes   an   action.     Unlike   ‘intention’,
‘motive’ is not the yardstick of a crime.  A lawful act with an ill motive
would   not   constitute   an   offence   but   it   may   not   be   true   when   an
unlawful act is committed with best of the motive.  Unearthing ‘motive’
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is akin to an exercise of manual brain­mapping.   At times, it becomes
herculean task to ascertain the traces of a ‘motive’. 
23. This Court has time and again ruled: 
“that  in  case the prosecution  is  not able  to discover
an  impelling motive,  that could  not reflect  upon  the
credibility   of   a   witness   proved   to   be   a   reliable
eyewitness.   Evidence   as   to   motive   would,   no   doubt,
go   a   long   way   in   cases   wholly   dependent   on
circumstantial   evidence.   Such   evidence   would   form
one   of   the   links   in   the   chain   of   circumstantial
evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in
cases   where   there   are   eyewitnesses   of   credibility,
though   even   in   such   cases   if   a   motive   is   properly
proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution
case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion.
But   that   does   not   mean   that   if   motive   is   not
established,   the   evidence   of   an   eyewitness   is
rendered untrustworthy.”
[ See:   Shivaji   Genu   Mohite   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 5
    and
Bipin Kumar Mondal vs. State of West Bengal 6
]
24. We   are   thus   of   the   considered   opinion   that   whilst   motive   is
infallibly   a   crucial   factor,   and   is   a   substantial   aid   for   evincing   the
commission   of   an   offence   but   the   absence   thereof   is,   however,   not
such   a   quintessential   component   which   can   be   construed   as   fatal   to
the   case   of   the   prosecution,   especially   when   all   other   factors   point
towards   the   guilt   of   the   accused   and   testaments   of   eye­witnesses   to
the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record.
25. Applying these broad parameters to the facts and circumstances
5  
  (1973) 3 SCC 219
6
 (2010) 12 SCC 91
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of the case in hand, we find the plea raised by the Appellant devoid of
any merit. The prosecution no doubt has failed to attribute any motive
to   the   Appellant   for   yearning   to   kill   the   Complainant,   however,   as
noted above, the absence of motive alone cannot abjure the guilt of the
Appellant. We are one with the concurrent findings of the two Courts
that   the   conduct   of   the   Appellant   is   sufficient   to   surmise   that   his
action   was   intended   to   eliminate   the   Complainant,   and   that   his
conviction under Section 307 IPC is fully justified. 
26. We say so for the following reasons:
Firstly ,   neither   the   presence   of   the   Appellant   at   the   site   of   the
episode, nor the fact that the bullet was fired through his service pistol
is   disputed   by   the   Appellant.   Even   otherwise,   the   CFSL   Report   dated
15 th
 September 1999 (Ex­PW 13/A), prepared by Mr. B. Badaniya (PW­
13)   proves   that   the   cartridge   recovered   from   the   office   of   the
Complainant   was   fired   from   the   service   pistol   recovered   from   the
possession of the Appellant;
Secondly ,   the   Medico­Legal   Report  (Ex.   J   MLR)   and   the   testimony   of
Dr.   Bidhi   Chand   (PW­7)   corroborate   with   the   ocular   versions   of   the
Complainant (PW­2), Maler  Singh (PW­3) and R.K. Sood (PW­4),  all of
whom   have   sworn   in   their   respective   depositions   that   the   Appellant  
was in an inebriated condition when he entered the residential office of
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the Complainant;
Thirdly ,   both   the   Complainant   and   R.K.   Sood   (PW­4)   have
categorically   testified   to   the   effect   that   after   consuming   water,   the
Appellant   pulled   out   his   pistol   and   aimed   the   same   at   the
Complainant,   whereafter,   he   directed   Maler   Singh   and   R.K.   Sood   to
get out of the room;
Fourthly , we also bear in mind that the offending weapon was a semi­
loader/semi­automatic   pistol   which   was   specifically   pulled   out   of   the
cover and aimed at the Complainant. Mr. B. Badaniya (PW­13) in his
cross­examination   has   categorically   stated   that   a   semi­automatic
pistol   must   be   brought   into   firing   mode   by   pulling   back   the   frame   of
the weapon manually for the first time, to enable a bullet to be fired.
Further,   both   the   Complainant   and   R.K.   Sood   (PW­4)   have
unequivocally asserted that the bullet was fired by the Appellant. 
Fifthly,   the   version   of   the   Complainant,   that   had   he   not   interfered
and   caught   hold   of   the   hand   of   the   Appellant,   the   gun,   which   was
aimed   onto   his   face   would   have   unloaded   the   bullet,   resulting   in
unfortunate consequences carries weight;  and
Sixthly   and   finally,   the   alternate   version   set   up   by   the   Appellant  
looks to be incredulous that he took his loaded pistol out of the cover,
placed it on the table of the Complainant, and let him toy around with
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it   as   the   Complainant   pleased.   There   is   also   nothing   on   record  
to   support   that   the   Appellant   made   any   attempt   at   all   to   bring   his
version   to   the   notice   of   his   Superiors,   as   claimed   by   him   in   his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
27. Consequently, and for the reasons afore­stated, we find that the
Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   have   unerringly   convicted   the
Appellant for the charge under Section 307 IPC.
B. Whether the Conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of
the Arms Act is sustainable?
28.  Adverting to the conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of
the   Arms   Act,   it   appears   to   us   that   the   Trial   Court   has   erred   in
arriving at his culpability. There is no gainsay that in order to prove a
charge   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act,   the   prosecution   must
necessarily demonstrate contravention of either Section 5 or Section 7
of   the   Act.   In   the   instant   case,   although   not   explicitly   stated,   it
appears   that   the   Trial   Court   has   held   it   to   be   a   case   of   breach   of
Section 5 of the Arms Act, which stipulates that no person shall use,
possess,   manufacture,   etc.   any   firearms,   unless   such   person   holds   a
license   in   this   behalf,   and   prescribes   a   minimum   punishment   of   3
years of imprisonment. The relevant extracts of unamended Sections 5
and 27 of the Arms Act which were in force at the relevant time, read
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as follows: 
“ 5.   Licence   for   manufacture,   sale,   etc.,   of   arms   and
ammunition . [(1)] No person shall— ―
(a) use, manufacture, sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or
prove, or 
(b)   expose   or   offer   for   sale   or   transfer   or   have   in   his
possession   for   sale,   transfer,   conversion,   repair,   test   or
proof, 
any firearm or any other arms of such class or description
as may be prescribed or any ammunition, unless he holds
in   this   behalf   a   licence   issued   in   accordance   with   the
provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
[(2)] xxxx
27. Punishment for using arms, etc. (1) Whoever uses	
―
any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 shall
be   punishable   with   imprisonment   for   a   term   which   shall
not   be   less   than   three   years   but   which   may   extend   to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2)   Whoever   uses   any   prohibited   arms   or   prohibited
ammunition   in   contravention   of   section   7   shall   be
punishable   with   imprisonment   for   a   term   which   shall   not
be   less   than   seven   years   but   which   may   extend   to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(3)   Whoever   uses   any   prohibited   arms   or   prohibited
ammunition   or   does   any   act   in   contravention   of   section   7
and   such   use   or   act   results   in   the   death   of   any   other
person, shall be punishable with death.”  
29. True it is that prior to the amendment of Section 27 of the Arms
Act,   vide   Arms   (Amendment)   Act   1988,   the   said   provision   penalized
the   use   of   any   arms   and   ammunitions   for   any   ‘unlawful   purpose’.
However,   post   its   amendment,   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   is   strictly
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confined to violation of conditions mentioned either under Section 5 or
7   of   the   Arms   Act   and   the   ‘unlawful   purpose’   of   using   arms   and
ammunitions   is   no   longer   an   inseparable   component   of   the
delinquency.
30. The   Appellant  was  admittedly  a  police  official   at  the   time   of   the
incidence and the arms and ammunitions used for the commission of
the offence, were placed in his possession under the sanction accorded
by   the   Competent   Authority.   The   Appellant   being   in   authorised
possession of the weapon, cannot be said to have used an unlicensed
weapon, as prohibited under Section 5 of the Arms Act. It appears that
the Trial Court was swayed by irrelevant considerations such as illegal
use of the weapon, and lost track of the objective of the Statute, which
has   been   enacted   to   provide   a   licensing/regulatory   regime,   to   enable
law­abiding citizens to carry arms, and also to prohibit the possession,
acquisition, manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms, unless
authorized by the Central Government. In other words, illegal use of a
licensed   or   sanctioned   weapon   per   se   does   not   constitute   an   offence
under Section 27, without proving the misdemeanour under Section 5
or   7   of   the   Arms   Act.   At   best,   it   could   be   a   ‘misconduct’   under   the
service   rules,   the   determination   of   which   was   not   the   subject   of   the
trial.
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31. In   light   of   the   afore­stated   discussion,   we   find   that   the   order   of
the   Trial   Court   in   convicting   the   Appellant   or   of   the   High   Court   in
maintaining   such   conviction   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act,   is
unwarranted and unjust. Accordingly, the Appellant is acquitted of the
charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
Quantum of Sentence under Section 307 IPC
32. The   equality   of   ratio   between   two   sets   of   variables   is   now   well
known   as   the   doctrine   of   proportionality.   The   bedrock   of   sentencing
policy   in   our   criminal   justice   system   is   also   based   on   the   axiom   of
proportionality.   This   principle   of   commensurate   sentencing   treats
offenders as agents capable of evaluating their own illegal conduct and
the social censure associated with it, which is communicated to them
by   imposing   a   proportionate   sentence. 7
  The   exercise   for   assessing
‘proportionality’   is   thus   dependent   upon   the   gravity   of   the   offence
which is determined according to ­ (a) mischief caused or risk involved
in  the offense;  (b)  the overall  conduct of the  offender  and; (c) motives
ascribed   to   the   felon.   Further,   the   equality   of   treatment   so   as   to
eliminate   discriminatory   practices   in   the   award   of   sentencing,   is
integral   to   the   canons   of   proportionality.   Needless   to   say,   the
guarantee   of   even­handedness   before   the   law(s),   as   enshrined   in
7
    Andrew   Ashworth,   Sentencing   and   Criminal   Justice   (5th   edition,   Cambridge
University Press 2010)
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Article   14   of   our   Constitution,   encompasses   the   administration   of
criminal justice system as well.
33. Having said that, we cannot be incognizant of the fact that there
are   practical   difficulties   in   achieving   absolute   consistency   in   regards
to   sentencing.   It   must   be   candidly   acknowledged   that   there   is   an
element of discretion present while adjudicating the issue of sentence,
however,   the   same   cannot   be   exercised   in   an   unprincipled   manner.
This   Court   has   explicitly   ruled   out   the   practice   of   awarding
disproportionate   sentences,   especially   those   that   showcase   undue
leniency,   for   it   would   undermine   the   public   confidence   in   efficacy   of
law.
34.    The sentencing policy, therefore, keeps pace with changing time.
Undoubtedly,   the   primary   emphasis   while   deciding   the   quantum   of
sentence   should   lie   on   the   gravity   or   penal   value   of   the   offense.
However,   other   guiding   elements   of   rehabilitative   justice   model,
including,   appreciation   of   grounds   for   mitigation   of   sentence   also
deserve to be duly considered within the permissible limits of judicial
discretion.   The   awarding   of   just   and   proportionate   sentence   remains
the solemn duty of the Courts and they should not be swayed by non­
relevant   factors   while   deciding   the   quantum   of   sentence.   Naturally,
what   factors   should   be   considered   as   ‘relevant’   or   ‘non­relevant’   will
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depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no straight
jacket formula can be laid down for the same. 
35. Adverting   to   the   facts   of   the   case,   in   hand,   we   are   of   the
considered   view   that   at   this   stage,   the   sentence   awarded   to   the
appellant is no longer in degree to the crime which he has committed.
Remitting the Appellant to the rigors of imprisonment at this juncture
of   his   life   would   not   serve   the   ends   of   justice   due   to   following
mitigating factors:
a. No   motive   or   element   of   planning   has   been   proved   by   the
Prosecution in the present case which indicates the possibility that
the offense could have been committed on impulse by the Appellant.
Hence, the culpability of the offender in such situations is less than
that which  is  ascribed  in  premeditated   offenses  as  the  commission
of   planned   illegal   acts   denotes   an   attack   on   societal   values   with
greater   commitment   and   continuity   in   comparison   to   spontaneous
illegal acts.
b. Even though the factum of injury may not have a direct bearing on
a conviction under Section 307 IPC, the same may be considered by
a Court at the time of sentencing. No doubt, the offence committed
by   the   Appellant   squarely   falls   within   the   four   corners   of   Section
307   IPC,   but   fortunately   neither   the   complainant   nor   any   other
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person was hurt by the untoward act of the Appellant. 
c. Appellant   has   already   undergone   a   sentence   of   3   months   and   19
days.   Additionally,   despite   the   occurrence   taking   place   in   1999,
there   is   no   indication   that   Appellant   has   been   involved   in   any
untoward   activity   before   or   after   the   incident.   This   highlights   the
Appellant’s   good   character   and   indicates   that   the   incident   can   be
interpreted   as   an   isolated   lapse   of   judgment.   Further,   the
Appellant’s   clean   post­incident   behaviour   suggests   that   he   is
rational   individual   who   is   capable   of   responding   to   the   social
censure   associated   with   the   offence.   Hence,   the   passage   of   a   long
time   period   coupled   with   a   clean   record,   both   before   and   after   the
incident is definitely a factor that calls for mitigation of sentence.
d. Barring this particular incident wherein he was under the influence
of   alcohol,   the   Appellant   had   an   unblemished   service   record   with
sixteen   good   citations   in   his   favour.   This   indicates   that   he   was   a
valuable member of society than the present criminal incident might
lead one to assume. This is not to say that courts should draw up a
social   balance   sheet   when   sentencing,   but   only   to   take   these
positive social contributions as a factor for mitigation of sentence.
e. Lastly,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   the   Appellant   was   suspended   in   the
year   1999   and   has   also   been   subsequently   dismissed   from   service
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in   the   year   2007.   Hence,   this   should   also   be   considered   as   a
reasonable   factor   for   mitigation   because   the   dismissal   and   the
consequent   loss   of   social   security   benefits   such   as   pension,   also
construes as a form of social sanction.
CONCLUSION:
36. Consequently   and   for   the   afore­stated   reasons,   the   criminal
appeal is partly allowed. While the conviction and sentence awarded to
the   Appellant   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   is   set   aside,   his
conviction   under   Section   307   IPC   is   maintained.   The   sentence   under
Section 307 IPC is however reduced to the period already undergone.
Since, Appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are discharged.
……………………….. CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
………..………………… J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
NEW DELHI
DATED: 26.11.2021
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