2021 INSC 0807
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1457 OF 2021
Mohd Zahid         ..Appellant(S)
VERSUS
State through NCB      ..Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   dated   31.03.2017   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Delhi   at   New   Delhi   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.   879   of
2002,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said
appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant   herein   ­   original   accused
and   has   confirmed   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
learned   Trial   Court,   convicting   the   appellant   for   the   offence
under   Section   29   read   with   Section   21(c)   of   the   Narcotics
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Drugs   and   Psychotropic   Substances   Act,   1985   (hereinafter
referred to as the NDPS Act) and sentencing him to undergo
rigorous   imprisonment   (RI)   for   a   period   of   15   years   with   a
fine of Rs.1,50,000/­ for  the aforesaid offence in view of the
provisions   of   Section   31(ii)   of   the   NDPS   Act,   the   original
accused has preferred the present appeal.  
2. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeal   in   nutshell   are   as
under:­
2.1 That the appellant herein – original accused faced the trial in
connection   with   FIR   No.134/1999   for   the   offence   under
Section   23   and   Section   21   of   the   NDPS   Act,   PS   Customs,
Amritsar,   Punjab   for   recovery   of   4   kg   of   heroin.   He   was
sentenced to undergo 12 years RI by the Amritsar Court. One
another   FIR   was   also   filed   against   the   appellant   herein   –
original   accused   being   FIR   No.43/1999   at   New   Delhi   for
recovery   of   750   grams   of   heroin   from   Delhi.   In   the   second
case   also   by   judgment   and   order   dated   30.01.2002,   he   was
held guilty for the offence under Section 29 read with Section
21(c)   of   the   NDPS   Act.   The   learned   Trial   Court   at   Delhi
imposed   the   sentence   of   10   years   RI   (minimum   sentence),
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however,   in   view   of   the   provisions   of   Section   31   (ii)   of   the
NDPS   Act,   which   provides   for   an   enhanced   punishment   for
offences   after   previous   conviction,   and   considering   the   fact
that earlier appellant was convicted for the offence under the
NDPS Act in a case arising out of the FIR No.134/1999, the
learned   Trial   Court  awarded   minimum   sentence   of   15   years
RI. No specific order was passed by the learned Trial Court at
Delhi in the trial arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (subsequent
trial)   that   the   sentence   imposed   of   15   years   RI   would   run
concurrently or consecutively.  
3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and
order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court at Delhi
in a case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (second/subsequent
case),   the   appellant   –   original   accused   preferred   the   appeal
before the High Court. Before the High Court, it was mainly
submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   –   accused   that   as   the
appellant   –   accused   had   already   undergone   12   years
sentence   in   a   case   arising   out   of   FIR   No.134/1999,   he
cannot   be   punished   twice   and   that   in   a   case   arising   out   of
FIR   No.43/1999   he   has   already   undergone   sentence   of   6
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years   and   2   months,   a   lenient   view   may   be   taken   and   the
sentences   imposed   in   both   the   cases/trials,   one   arising   out
of FIR No.134/1999 (Amritsar Case) and another arising out
of   FIR   No.43/1999   (New   Delhi   Case)   shall   be   held   to   run
concurrently. By the impugned judgment and order the High
Court   has   not   accepted   the   above   and   has   dismissed   the
appeal. Hence, the accused has preferred the present appeal.
4. Ms.   Sangeeta   Kumar,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
appellant, in  her  short  written  submissions,  has stated  that
the   appellant   is   a   foreign   national,   resident   of   Lahore,
Pakistan   and   has   been   behind   bars   for   the   last   nearly   22
years as he was arrested on 15.06.1999 in respect of FIR No.
134   of  1999  by   the  Police   Station,   Customs,  Punjab   and   he
was   charged   for   the   offences   under   Sections   21   and   23   of
NDPS Act, 1985, for import of 4kg heroin and was convicted
by   the   order   of   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Amritsar,
dated 08.12.2000. 
Without  prejudice   to   the  aforesaid  submissions,  learned
counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that   the   appellant   was
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under trial for the period from 17.09.1999 to 14.02.2002 and
for   the   second   offence   the   said   period   has   not   been   taken
into consideration. It was submitted that if the sentences are
to run consecutively and if the aforesaid period is also taken
into   consideration,   then   the   number   of   years   that   the
appellant has to be behind bars, would have to be reduced.
4.1 Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that   the
appellant   was   30   years   of   age   when   he   was   convicted   and
presently, he is 52 years old. His conduct in jail is good and
there   is   no   adverse   remark   made   against   him   by   the   Jail
Superintendent .   Hence,   the   two   sentences   which   the
appellant   is   now   undergoing,   may   be   held   to   run
concurrently under Section 427 Cr.P.C.
4.2 It   is   submitted   that   the   appellant   –   accused   has   already
completed   12   years   RI   in   FIR   No.134/1999   and   if   the
sentences   imposed,   in   both   the   cases   –   arising   out   of   FIR
No.134/1999   registered   at   Amritsar   and   arising   out   of   FIR
No.43/1999   registered   at   New   Delhi,   are   not   held   to   run
concurrently   and   the   appellant   –   accused   is   to   undergo
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sentences   consecutively,   in   that   case   the   appellant   is
required   to   undergo   in   all   27   years   of   imprisonment.   It   is
submitted   that   therefore   the   sentences   imposed   in   both   the
cases are to be held to run concurrently. 
4.3 It   is   submitted   that   as   such   in   the   case   arising   out   of   FIR
No.43/1999, the Delhi Court while imposing the sentence of
15 years RI has not passed any order whether the sentences
in both the cases to run concurrently or not. It is submitted
that   therefore   the   appellant   should   be   given   benefit   of
Section 427 of Cr.PC. 
5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Akaanksha
Kaul,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   –
respondent.   Heavy   reliance   is   placed   on   Section   427   of
Cr.PC.   It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   the   accused
faced two separate trials for separate offences and not arising
out   of   the   same   transaction   and   therefore   the   sentences
imposed in both the cases are to run consecutive only.  
5.1 It is submitted that general rule is that sentences imposed in
two separate trials in separate offences will run consecutively
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where   there   are   two   different   transactions;   different   crime
numbers   and   cases   have   been   decided   by   different
judgments.   It   is   submitted   that   exceptions   are   cases   falling
under   proviso   to   Section   427(1)   of   Cr.PC;   falling   under
Section  427(2) of Cr.PC  or  when  the court directs sentences
shall run consecutively.  
5.2 It   is   submitted   that   even   the   power   conferred   on   the   court
under   Section   427   of   Cr.PC   to   order   concurrent   sentence   is
discretionary, but the discretion ought to be exercised having
regard   to   the   nature   of   the   offence   committed   and   the   facts
situation in which the question arises. 
5.3 It is submitted that in the present case, the sentencing court
did   not   direct   the   sentences   to   run   concurrently.   It   is
submitted that in the present case appellant – accused faced
two   separate   trials   for   two   separate   offences   and   for   two
different   transactions   (not   arising   out   of   the   same
transaction)   and   therefore   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the
appellant   that   the   sentences   imposed   in   both   the   cases   to
run concurrently has no substance and cannot be granted. 
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5.4 In support of her above submissions, she has relied upon the
following   decisions   of   this   court:­   Mohd.   Akhtar   Hussain
alias   Ibrahim   Ahmed   Bhatti   Vs.   Assistant   Collector   of
Customs   (Prevention),   Ahmedabad   &   Anr.   (1988)   4   SCC
183;   Ranjit   Singh   Vs.   Union   Territory   of   Chandigarh   &
Anr . (1991) 4 SCC 304;  V.K. Bansal Vs. State of Haryana &
Anr.  (2013) 7 SCC 211;  Neera Yadav Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation   (2017)   8   SCC   757;   Vicky   @   Vikas   Vs.   State
(NCT of Delhi)   (2020) 11 SCC 540;   Gurdev Singh Vs. State
of   Punjab   (2021)   6   SCC   558;   Sharad   Hiru   Kolambe   Vs.
State of Maharashtra & Ors.   (2018) 18 SCC 718 and  Rajpal
Vs. Om Prakash & Anr.  (2019) 17 SCC 809. 
5.5 It is further submitted that in the present case, the appellant
– accused as such is a habitual offender. In connection with
FIR   No.134/1999,   he   was   convicted   for   the   offence   under
Section   23   and   Section   21   of   the   NDPS   Act   for   having   in
possession/recovery   of   4   kg   of   heroin   and   in   another   case
arising out of FIR No.43/1999, he has been convicted for the
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recovery   of   750   grams   of   heroin.   It   is   submitted   that
therefore   the   appellant   –   accused   is   not   entitled   to   any
leniency as prayed.   
6. Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decisions   of   this   court,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the   present
appeal.
7. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the respective parties at length. 
8. The   short   question   which   is   posed   for   the   consideration   of
this   Court   is,   whether,   the   sentences   imposed   against   the
appellant   –   accused   by   two   different   courts   in   two   different
trials   but   against   the   same   accused/person   should   run
concurrently   as   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   –
accused or consecutively. 
8.1 At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   present
case,   the   appellant   –   accused   has   been   convicted   by   two
different   courts   in   two   different   trials   for   the   offences   with
respect   to   the   different   transactions.   In   one   case,   he   has
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been sentenced to undergo 12 years RI for the offence under
Section   23   and   Section   21   of   the   NDPS   Act   by   Amritsar
Court and in another case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 he
has   been   sentenced   to   undergo   15   years   RI   for   the   offence
under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by
Delhi Court. In one case he has been convicted for having in
possession  of   4  kg   of  heroin  and  in   another   case  for  having
750   grams   of   heroin.   It   is   also   required   to   be   noted   that
judgments   have   been   delivered   in   both   the   cases   one   after
another   and   in   the   subsequent   judgment   and   order   of
conviction   and   sentence   by   the   Delhi   court   there   is   no
specific   order   passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   (Court   at
Delhi) that the sentences to run concurrently. In view of the
above   facts,   the   question   posed   for   the   present   appeal   is
required to be considered.      
8.2 While   considering   the   issue   in   the   present   appeal   Section
427   of   Cr.PC   is   required   to   be   referred   to   which   reads   as
under:­
427.   Sentence   on   offender   already   sentenced   for   another
offence.
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(1)   When   a   person   already   undergoing   a   sentence   of
imprisonment   is   sentenced   on   a   subsequent   conviction   to
imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment
or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of
the   imprisonment   to   which   he   has   been   previously
sentenced,   unless   the   Court   directs   that   the   subsequent
sentence   shall   run   concurrently   with   such   previous
sentence:   Provided   that   where   a   person   who   has   been
sentenced   to   imprisonment   by   an  order   under   section  122
in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such
sentence,   sentenced   to   imprisonment   for   an   offence
committed   prior   to   the   making   of   such   order,   the   latter
sentence shall commence immediately.
(2)   When   a   person   already   undergoing   a   sentence   of
imprisonment   for   life   is   sentenced   on   a   subsequent
conviction to imprisonment  for  a  term  or imprisonment for
life,   the   subsequent   sentence   shall   run   concurrently   with
such previous sentence.
Therefore   on  a  fair   reading   of   Section   427  of   Cr.PC,   when   a
person   who   is   already   undergoing   a   sentence   of
imprisonment   is   sentenced   on   a   subsequent   conviction   to
imprisonment   or   imprisonment   for   life,   such   imprisonment
or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of
the   imprisonment   to   which   he   has   been   previously
sentenced.     Meaning   thereby   the   sentences   in   both   the
conviction   shall   run   consecutively.   However,   there   is   an
exception   to   that,   namely   unless   the   Court   directs   that   the
subsequent   sentence   shall   run   concurrently   with   such
previous   sentence.   There   is   one   another   exception.   As   per
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Sub­section   (2)   of   Section   427   of   Cr.PC   when   a   person
already   undergoing   a   sentence   of   imprisonment   for   life   is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a
term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall
run concurrently  with such previous sentence. Therefore, in
aforesaid   two   cases   only   the   subsequent   sentence   shall   run
concurrently   with   previous   sentence.   Otherwise   the
subsequent   sentence   shall   run   consecutively   and   the
imprisonment in subsequent sentence shall commence at the
expiration   of   the   imprisonment   to   which   he   has   been
previously sentenced. 
8.3 At   this   stage,   few   decisions   of   this   court   on   whether   the
subsequent   sentence   should   run   concurrently   or
consecutively are required to be referred to.
8.3.1 In   the   case   of   Mohd.   Akhtar   Hussain   (Supra) ,   it   is
observed   and   held   that   if   the   transaction   relating   to
offences   is   not   the   same   or   the   facts   constituting   the   two
offences   are   quite   different   in   that   case   the   subsequent
sentence should run consecutively.
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In   the   case   of   Mohd.   Akhtar   Hussain ,   this   Court
observed   that   the   broad   expanse   of   discretion   left   by
legislation   to   sentencing   Courts   should   not   be   narrowed
only   to   the   seriousness   of   the   offence.   No   single
consideration   can   definitively   determine   the   proper
sentence. In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the court
must   consider,   and   sometimes   reject,   many   factors.   The
court   must  ‘recognise,   learn   to  control   and  exclude’   many
diverse data. It is a balancing  act and tortuous process to
ensure   reasoned   sentence.   In   consecutive   sentences,   in
particular,   the   Court   cannot   afford   to   be   blind   to
imprisonment which the accused is already undergoing.
Mohd.   Akhtar   Hussain   is   a   case   which   arose   under
Gold (Control) Act, 1968 involving a Pakistani national, the
sentence   in   the   first   case   was   imprisonment   for   7   years
and   fine   of   Rs.   10   lakhs   awarded   by   the   court   of   Chief
Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Ahmedabad   in   CC   No.   1674   of
1982. Upon appeal, the High Court confirmed the sentence
but   reduced   the   fine   to   Rs.   5   lakhs.   The   special   leave
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   therein   was   dismissed   by
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this   Court   and   the   conviction   and   sentence   became   final.
When   the   appellant   was   under   judicial   custody   in   the
aforesaid case, there was further investigation with regard
to his smuggling activities. It revealed widespread racket of
smuggling   gold   and   silver   in   collusion   with   several
persons. The appellant therein was again prosecuted along
with   18   others   under   Section   135   of   the   Customs   Act,
1962.   The   appellant   therein   was   convicted   and   sentenced
for   4   years   rigorous   imprisonment   and   fine   of   Rs.   Two
lakhs and default sentence in case of non­payment of fine. 
Thereafter,   the   State   as   well   as   the   appellant   therein
approached   the   High   Court.   The   High   Court   accepted   the
State’s   appeal   and   it   enhanced   the   sentence   from   4   years
to   7   years   and   made   it   consecutive.   Consequently,   the
High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   of   the   appellant.   The
result   was   that   he   had   to   serve   in   all   14   years
imprisonment   which   he   had   challenged   before   this   Court.
Ultimately,   this   Court   restored   the   sentence   imposed   by
the Trial Court and set aside the sentence enhanced by the
High Court by allowing the appeal.
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8.3.2 In   the   case   of   Ranjit   Singh   (Supra)   in   paragraph   8,   it   is
observed and held as under:­ 
“8.   Sub­section   (1)  of   Section   427   CrPC   provides   for   the
situation   when   a   person   already   undergoing   a   sentence
of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction
to   imprisonment   or   life   imprisonment.   In   other   words,
sub­section   (1)   of   Section   427   CrPC   deals   with   an
offender  who while  undergoing   sentence  for  a  fixed  term
is   subsequently   convicted   to   imprisonment   for   a   fixed
term   or   for   life.   In   such   a   situation,   the   first   sentence,
being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is
known   when   the   subsequent   conviction   is   made.   Sub­
section   (1)   says   that   in   such   a   situation,   the   date   of
expiry   of   the   first   sentence   which   the   offender   is
undergoing   being   known,   ordinarily   the   subsequent
sentence   would   commence   at   the   expiration   of   the   first
term   of   imprisonment   unless   the   court   directs   the
subsequent   sentence   to   run   concurrently   with   the
previous   sentence.   Obviously,   in   cases   covered   by   sub­
section   (1)   where   the   sentence   is   for   a   fixed   term,   the
subsequent  sentence  can  be  consecutive unless directed
to  run  concurrently.  Sub­section  (2),  on  the   other   hand,
provides for   an offender  “already  undergoing  sentence of
imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well
settled since the decision of this Court in   Gopal Vinayak
Godse   [ Ranjit   Singh   v.   U.T.   of   Chandigarh ,   (1984)   1   SCC
31   following   Mithu   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (1983)   2   SCC   277
and   reiterated   in   Maru   Ram   [(1981)   1   SCC   107   that
imprisonment   for   life   is   a   sentence   for   the   remainder   of
the   life   of   the   offender   unless   the   remaining   sentence   is
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This
being   so   at   the   stage   of   sentencing   by   the   court   on   a
subsequent   conviction,   the   earlier   sentence   of
imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner
and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent
sentence   of   imprisonment   for   a   term   or   for   life   running
consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   427.   As   rightly   contended   by   Shri
Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence
of   imprisonment   for   life   being   understood   to   mean   as   a
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sentence   to   serve   the   remainder   of   life   in   prison   unless
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a
person   having   only   one   life   span,   the   sentence   on   a
subsequent   conviction   of   imprisonment   for   a   term   or
imprisonment   for   life   can   only   be   superimposed   to   the
earlier   life   sentence   and   certainly   not   added   to   it   since
extending the life span of the offender  or for  that matter
anyone   is   beyond   human   might.   It   is   this   obvious
situation which is stated in sub­section (2) of Section 427
since   the   general   rule   enunciated   in   sub­section   (1)
thereof   is   that   without   the   court's   direction   the
subsequent   sentence   will   not   run   concurrently   but
consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of
the   court   is   needed   to   make   the   subsequent   sentence
run  concurrently   with   the   previous   sentence   is  provided
for   in   sub­section   (2)   which   has   been   enacted   to   avoid
any possible controversy based on sub­section (1) if there
be   no   express   direction   of   the   court   to   that   effect.   Sub­
section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general
rule   enacted   in   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   427   that   a
sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry
of   the   first   sentence   unless   the   court   directs   it   to   run
concurrently.   The   meaning   and   purpose   of   sub­sections
(1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub­
section (2) is, therefore, clear.”
8.3.3 In   the   case   of   V.K.   Bansal   (Supra)   after   relying   upon   the
decision of this Court in the case of  Mohd. Akhtar (Supra)
in paragraph 10 it is observed and held as under:­ 
“10.   We are in the case at hand concerned more with the
nature   of   power   available   to   the   Court   under   Section
427(1)   of   the   Code,   which   in   our   opinion   stipulates   a
general rule to be followed except in three situations: one
falling   under   the   proviso   to   sub­section   (1)   to   Section
427; the second falling under sub­section (2) thereof; and
the third where the court directs that the sentences shall
run concurrently. It is manifest from Section 427(1) that
the   Court   has   the   power   and   the   discretion   to   issue   a
direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred
upon  the  Court  the  discretionary  power   shall  have to  be
exercised   along   the   judicial   lines   and   not   in   a
mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to
lay   down   any   straitjacket   approach   in   the   matter   of
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exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut
and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of
issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of
Section   427(1).   Whether   or   not   a   direction   ought   to   be
issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of
the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation
in   which   the   question   of   concurrent   running   of   the
sentences arises.”
8.3.4 In   the   case   of   Neera   Yadav   (Supra)   while
interpreting/considering   Section   427   of   Cr.PC   it   is
observed   and   held   that   Section   427   of   Cr.PC   deals   with
sentence   passed   on   an   offender   who   is   already   sentenced
for   another   offence   and   the   power   conferred   on   the   Court
under   Section   427   to   order   concurrent   sentence   is
discretionary.   It   is   further   observed   that   the   policy   of   the
legislature is that normally the sentencing should be done
consecutively.   It   is   further   observed   that   only   in
appropriate   cases,   considering   the   facts   of   the   case,   the
court   can   make   the   sentence   concurrently   with   an   earlier
sentence imposed. It is further observed that the discretion
exercised by the sentencing court to direct the concurrency
will   have   to   be   exercised   on   sound   principles   and   not   on
whims. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a
given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or
offences committed.  It  is  further  observed  and  held  in  the
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said   decision   that   it   is   well   settled   that   where   there   are
different   transactions,   different   crime   numbers   and   the
cases   have   been   decided   by   the   different   judgments,
concurrent   sentences   cannot   be   awarded   under   Section
427   of   Cr.PC.   It   is   further   observed   that   however,   the
general rule that there cannot be concurrency of sentences
if   conviction   relates   to   two   different   transactions,   can   be
changed by an order of the court. 
8.3.5 In the case of  Sharad Hiru Kolambe  (Supra) , it is observed
and held that unless the court directs that the punishment
for   such   two   or   more   offences   at   same   trial   should   run
concurrently, the normal principle is that the punishments
would   commence   one   after   the   expiration   of   the   other.
Similarly,   in   a   case   where   a   person   already   undergoing   a
sentence   is   later   imposed   sentence   in   respect   of   offence
tried   at   subsequent   trial,   the   general   rule   is   that   the
subsequent   sentence   imposed   run   consecutively   unless
there is a specific order passed by the court while imposing
any   subsequent   sentence,   exercising   discretion   conferred
under   Section   427   of   Cr.PC   that   in   the   facts   and
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circumstances   the   subsequent   sentence   should   run
concurrently, the sentence imposed in both the cases shall
run consecutively. 
8.3.6 In   the   case   of   Gulam   Mohammad   Malik   Vs.   State   of
Gujarat   and   Anr.   (2018)   14   SCC   473 ,   this   Court
considered   two   appeals.   One   from   the   judgment   of   the
High Court of Gujarat and the other from the High Court of
Bombay   in   respect   of   the   same   appellant.   In   both   cases,
the   appellant   was   charged   for   the   offences   under   Section
8(c),   20(b)   and   29   of   the   NDPS   Act,   1985.   Insofar   as   the
case   filed   in   Gujarat   was   concerned,   registered   as   NDPS
Case   No.   1   of   2002,   the   appellant   was   convicted   and
directed   to   undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   for   ten   years
and   to   pay   fine   of   Rs.   1   lakh   and   in   default   to   undergo
further rigorous imprisonment for one year in case the fine
was   not   paid.   Appellant   therein   preferred   an   appeal
challenging   the   aforesaid   conviction   and   sentence   before
the   High   Court   which   dismissed   his   appeal.   In   fact,   the
appeal   by   the   State   for   enhancement   of   sentence   was
dismissed. 
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In the second case, the appellant therein was tried by
the   Special   Judge   for   NDPS,   Court   of   Sessions,   Greater
Bombay in Special Case No. 60 of 2002, culminating in the
conviction and sentence of appellant therein under Section
8(c),   20(b)(ii)   read   with   Section   31A   of   the   NDPS   Act   and
was sentenced to death. Death reference had been sent for
confirmation  before   the   High   Court.   The   appellant  therein
had   also   filed   an   appeal   against   the   aforesaid   conviction
and sentence in the High Court of Bombay. The High Court
rejected  the  Confirmation  Case no.  2  of  2008,  filed  by  the
State   by   not   affirming   the   death   sentence   and   dismissed
the   appeal   of   the   appellant   and   the   death   sentence   was
converted   into   thirty   years   rigorous   imprisonment   and   a
fine of Rs.3 lakhs. The matter pertaining to the conversion
of the death sentence was considered before this Court and
on considering  Section 31 of the NDPS Act on the facts of
the said case, it was held that the appellant therein had to
be   given   maximum   punishment   and   thereafter   multiplier
of   one   and   a   half   times   applied.   Minimum   term   of
imprisonment prescribed under Section 31 is 10 years, on
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that   reckoning,   when   it   is   enhanced   by   one   and   a   half
times,   the   minimum   sentence   comes   to   15   years.
Ultimately,   sentence   ordered   by   this   Court   was   rigorous
imprisonment of 16 years. The Court also had in mind that
the   appellant   therein   was   65   years   of   age   and   suffering
from   various   ailments.   It   was   also   ordered   that   the
sentence would run concurrently and so far as with regard
to both the cases, fine of Rs. 1 lakh which was imposed by
the Trial Court in Gujarat was concerned, the same would
remain.   As  far   as  fine   of  Rs.  3  lakhs   in  Bombay   case  was
concerned, the same was reduced from Rs. 3 lakhs to Rs. 2
lakhs. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed.
9. Thus   from   the   aforesaid   decisions   of   this   Court,   the
principles of law that emerge are as under:­
(i) if   a   person   already   undergoing   a   sentence   of
imprisonment   is   sentenced   on   a   subsequent
conviction   to   imprisonment,   such   subsequent
term   of   imprisonment   would   normally
commence   at   the   expiration   of   the
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imprisonment   to   which   he   was   previously
sentenced;
(ii) ordinarily   the   subsequent   sentence   would
commence   at   the   expiration   of   the   first   term   of
imprisonment   unless   the   court   directs   the
subsequent   sentence   to   run   concurrently   with
the previous sentence;
(iii) the general rule is that where there are different
transactions, different crime numbers and cases
have   been   decided   by   the   different   judgments,
concurrent   sentence   cannot   be   awarded   under
Section 427 of Cr.PC;
(iv) under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the
power and discretion to issue a direction that all
the   subsequent   sentences   run   concurrently
with   the   previous   sentence,   however   discretion
has to be exercised judiciously depending  upon
the   nature   of   the   offence   or   the   offences
committed   and   the   facts   in   situation.   However,
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there   must   be   a   specific   direction   or   order   by
the   court   that   the   subsequent   sentence   to   run
concurrently with the previous sentence. 
10. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions   and   the   principles   of   law  enumerated   hereinabove
to  the  facts  of  the  case  on   hand,  the  submissions  on   behalf
of   the   appellant   –   accused   that   his   subsequent   sentence   to
run concurrently with the previous sentence is to be rejected
outright.   In   the   present   case   the   appellant   has   been
convicted with respect to two different transactions, there are
different crime numbers and the cases have been decided by
the   different   judgments.   Therefore,   the   appellant   is   not
entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence under Section
427   of   Cr.PC.   As   observed   hereinabove,   there   is   no   specific
order   or   direction   issued   by   the   court   while   imposing   the
subsequent   sentence   that   the   subsequent   sentence   to   run
concurrently with the previous sentence. 
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11. Even   otherwise   as   observed   hereinabove   under   Section   427
(1) of Cr.PC, the Court has the power and discretion to issue
a direction that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently
with   the   previous   sentence   in   that   case   also,   the   discretion
has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of
offence   or   the   offences   committed.   In   the   present   case   the
appellant   –   accused   has   been   convicted   for   the   offences
under  the  NDPS  Act.  He  has  been  convicted  in  one   case  for
recovery of 4 kg heroin and sentenced to undergo 12 years RI
and   in   another   case   there   is   a   recovery   of   750   grams   of
heroin   and   considering   the   Section   31   (ii)   of   the   NDPS   Act,
he   has   been   sentenced   to   undergo   15   years   RI.   No   leniency
should be shown to an accused who is found to be guilty for
the   offence   under   the   NDPS   Act.   Those   persons   who   are
dealing   in   narcotic   drugs   are   instruments   in   causing   death
or   in   inflicting   death   blow   to   a   number   of   innocent
young   victims   who   are   vulnerable.   Such   accused   causes
deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society. They are
hazard to the society. Such organized activities of clandestine
smuggling   of   narcotic   drugs   and   psychotropic   substances
into   this   country   and   illegal   trafficking   in   such   drugs   and
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substances have  a deadly   impact  on  the  society   as a whole.
Therefore,   while   awarding   the   sentence   or   punishment   in
case   of   NDPS   Act ,   the   interest   of   the   society   as   a   whole   is
required to be taken into consideration. Therefore, even while
applying   discretion   under   Section   427   of   Cr.PC,   the
discretion shall not be in favour of the accused who is found
to be indulging in illegal trafficking in the narcotic drugs and
psychotropic   substances.   As   observed   hereinabove,   even
while exercising discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC to run
subsequent   sentence   concurrently   with   the   previous
sentence,   the   discretion   is   to   be   exercised   judiciously   and
depending   upon   the   offence/offences   committed.     Therefore,
considering the offences under the NDPS Act which are very
serious   in   nature   and   against   the   society   at   large,   no
discretion   shall   be   exercised   in   favour   of   such   accused   who
is indulging into the offence under the NDPS Act. 
12. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the
submissions   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   –   accused   to   direct
the   subsequent   sentence   in   case   arising   out   of   FIR
No.43/1999   to   run   concurrently   with   the   previous   sentence
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arising out of FIR No.134/1999 is hereby rejected. In view of
the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above   the   present
appeal   fails   and   the   same   deserves   to   be   dismissed   and   is
accordingly dismissed. 
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
December 07, 2021
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