2021 INSC 0816                                                                REPORTABLE    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1860 OF 2011    K.S. Ranganatha               .…Appellant(s) Versus Vittal Shetty          ….  Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.S. Bopanna,J. 1. The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   assailing   the judgment   dated   18.08.2010   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Karnataka   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.   485   of   2008.   By   the   said judgment,   the   Learned   Single   Judge   has   allowed   the   appeal filed   by  the   respondent   herein   and   set  aside   the   judgment   of acquittal   passed   by   the   IIIrd   Additional   Civil   Judge   (Junior 1 Division)   and   JMFC,   Udupi   in   favour   of   the   appellant   herein in   Criminal   Case   No.   3207   of   2004.   Consequently,   the appellant   herein   was   convicted   and   sentenced   to   pay compensation   of   Rs.4,00,000/­   (Rupees   four   lakhs)   within four   months.   In   default   thereto,   the   appellant   was   sentenced to   simple   imprisonment   for   a   period   of   six   months.   The appellant   was   further   ordered   to   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.5,000/­   to the   State,   in   default,   to   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a period   of   15   days.   The   appellant   therefore   is   claiming   to   be aggrieved by the judgment impugned herein.  2. The   factual   matrix,   in   brief,   is   that   the   appellant   and the   respondent   are   known   to   each   other.   Both   of   them   hail from   Udupi   in   Karnataka.   The   respondent   filed   a   private complaint   under   Section   2(d)   read   with   Section   200   of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   (‘Cr.PC’   for   short)   against   the appellant   seeking   that   he   be   punished   for   committing   the offence   punishable   under   Section   138   of   the   Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI  Act’ for  short). The complaint  was filed on 17.03.2004 before the II Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, Udupi in P.C. No. 213 of 2004 which was thereafter registered as CC No. 3207 of 2004. It was the case 2 of   the   respondent   that   the   appellant   carried   on   the   business of   money   lending   and   land   brokerage   for   which   he   used   to take   loan   from   the   respondent   as   and   when   required.   In   one such transaction, as per the case put forth by the respondent is   that   the   appellant   borrowed   a   sum   of   Rs.   3,75,000/­ (Rupees   three   lakh   seventy­five   thousand)   from   the respondent   on   12.06.2003   and   executed   an   ‘on   demand promissory   note’   and   a   receipt   in   acknowledgment.   The appellant also issued a post­dated cheque bearing No. 062589 for   Rs.   4,00,000/­   (Rupees   four   lakhs)   dated   12.12.2003, which  included  interest  for   six   months.  The  said  cheque  was drawn on Corporation Bank, Ambalpady Branch, Udupi. 3. As per the case of the respondent, when the cheque was presented   for   realisation   on   17.02.2004,   the   same   was dishonoured   by   the   bank   for   “insufficient   funds”   in   the account   of   the   appellant.   Having   got   issued   a   legal   notice dated   18.02.2004   and   on   the   demand   for   payment   of Rs.4,00,000/­   (Rupees   four   lakhs)   not   being   complied,   the respondent filed the complaint in the jurisdictional court, the details   of   which   is   referred   to   supra.   The   appellant   however came   out   with   the   defence   that   though   he   had   borrowed   an 3 amount of Rs.80,000/­ from the respondent in the year 1995, the   same   was   repaid   with   interest,   amounting   to Rs.3,20,000/­   (Rupees   three   lakh   twenty   thousand)   through various   cheques   and   there   was   no   further   amount   due   and payable. The appellant therefore denied that he had taken any loan on 12.06.2003, as alleged. It was the further case of the appellant   that   the   respondent   had   assaulted   and   threatened him  on  20.01.2004 and  by  force had  obtained his  signatures on   blank   papers   as   also   on   some   cheque   leaves   which   were being   misused.   The   appellant   had   in   that   regard   lodged   a complaint   on   02.02.2004,   the   trial   of   which   was   held   in   the Court   of   Additional   Civil   Judge   (Junior   Division)   and   JMFC, Udupi   in   CC   No.   6318/2004.   However,   admittedly   the respondent   herein   was   acquitted   in   the   said   proceedings, through   the   judgment   dated   06.12.2006   which   has   attained finality.  4. In   order   to   contend   that   the   complaint   filed   by   the respondent   alleging   dishonour   of   cheque   was   motivated,   the appellant alleged that as he had incurred debts, he decided to sell   one   of   the   properties   belonging   to   him,   which   was purchased in the year 1994, so as to clear the said debts. The 4 respondent   evinced   interest   to   purchase   the   same   for Rs.3,00,000/­  (Rupees  three  lakh)  but  the  appellant  declined to   sell   it   to   the   respondent   as   according   to   him,   the   said property   was   worth   more   than   Rs.7,00,000/­   (Rupees   seven lakh). The appellant alleged that the respondent had therefore filed the instant complaint, based on false allegations. 5. On the rival contentions, the learned trial Judge raised the   point   for   consideration,   as   to   whether   the   respondent herein   had   proved   that   the   cheque   dated   12.12.2003   for   Rs. 4,00,000/   (Rupees   four   lakh)   was   issued   by   the   appellant   to discharge the legal debt or liability and thereby committed the offence   punishable   under   Section   138   N.I   Act.   The   learned trial   Judge   having   accepted   the   version   put   forth   by   the appellant   passed   an   order   of   acquittal.   The   learned   Judge   of the   High   Court,   has   on   the   other   hand,   accepted   the   case   of the   respondent   herein   and   taking   into   account   the presumption that had arisen on the cheque being issued and such   presumption   not   being   rebutted   for   the   reasons indicated   by   it,   has   allowed   the   appeal   and   convicted   the appellant which has resulted in this appeal. 5 6. We   have   heard   Mr.   S.N.   Bhat,   learned   counsel   for   the appellant, Mr. Ranji Thomas, learned senior counsel with Mr. V.N.   Raghupathy,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   and perused the appeal papers. 7. From   the   rival   contentions   urged   before   us   and   the facts   which   emerge   from   the   records,   it   is   clear   that     cheque bearing   No.062589   dated   12.12.2003   drawn   on   Corporation Bank,   Ambalpady   Branch,   Udupi   for   the   sum   of   Rs. 4,00,000/­ (Rupees four lakh), which is the subject matter of the   complaint   in   CC   No.3207   of   2004,   has   been   brought   on record.   However,   in   the   light   of   the   defence   that   was   raised, the   point   which   arises   for   consideration   is   as   to   whether   the said cheque was in fact issued by the appellant on 12.06.2003 by   post­dating   it   to   12.12.2003   and   making   it   payable   on   or after that date, towards discharge of a legal debt. 8. The   legal   aspect   relating   to   the   presumption   arising   in law when a cheque is issued, is to be noted at the threshold. No   doubt,   as   noted   by   the   trial   court   with   reference   to   the decision   of  this  Court  in   K.Prakashan     vs.   P.K.   Surendran (2008)   1   SCC   258,   the   initial   burden   is   placed   on   the 6 complainant   to   discharge.    Learned   counsel  for   the  appellant has   further   relied   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Reverend Mother   Marykutty   vs.   Reni   C.   Kottaram   &   Anr.   (2013)   1 SCC 327 with reference to para 13, which reads as hereunder; “13. That apart, having considered the conclusions of the learned trial Judge, we find that those conclusions were drawn by adducing cogent and convincing reasoning and we do not find any fault in the said conclusions drawn by the learned trial Judge. In the circumstance, the principles set out in the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in M.S. Narayana Menon as regards the presumption to be drawn and the preponderance of probabilities to be inferred, as set out in paras 31 to 33, are fully satisfied. Those principles, set out in paras 31 to 33, can be usefully referred to which are as under: “ 31. A Division Bench of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal albeit in a civil case laid down the law in the following terms: (SCC PP.50-51 para 12) ‘ 12. Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118( a ) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on 7 the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non- existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a ) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt.’ This Court, therefore, clearly opined that it is not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence. 32. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. 33. Presumption drawn under a statute has only an evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may be evidence even for the purpose of drawing presumption under another.” Applying the abovesaid principles to the case on hand, we find that the judgment of the trial court in having drawn the conclusions to the effect that the appellant sufficiently rebutted the initial presumption as regards the issuance of the cheque under Sections 138 and 139 of the Act, was perfectly justified. We also find that the preponderance of 8 probabilities also fully supports the stand of the appellant as held by the learned trial Judge. The judgment of the High Court in having interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge without proper reasoning is, therefore, liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 1707 of 2007, order dated 17-3- 2010 (Ker)] is also set aside.” 9. The   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   respondent   on   the other hand, relied on the decision of this Court in   Kalamani Tex   &   Anr.   vs.   P.   Balasubramanian   (2021)   5   SCC   283 which is as hereunder: ­ “16. The appellants have banked upon the evidence of DW 1 to dispute the existence of any recoverable debt. However, his deposition merely highlights that the respondent had an over-extended credit facility with the bank and his failure to update his account led to debt recovery proceedings. Such evidence does not disprove the appellants' liability and has a little bearing on the merits of the respondent's complaint. Similarly, the appellants' mere bald denial regarding genuineness of the deed of undertaking dated 7-11-2000, despite admitting the signatures of Appellant 2 thereupon, does not cast any doubt on the genuineness of the said document. 17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, where this Court held that: (SCC p. 209, para 36) 9 “36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.” 18. Considering the fact that there has been an admitted business relationship between the parties, we are of the opinion that the defence raised by the appellants does not inspire confidence or meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”. In the absence of any other relevant material, it appears to us that the High Court did not err in discarding the appellants' defence and upholding the onus imposed upon them in terms of Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for dishonour of cheque as well as civil liability for realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. 10. It   would   also   be   apposite   to   take   note   of   a   decision   in Triyambak   S.   Hegde   vs.   Sripad   in   Criminal   Appeal Nos.849­850   of   2011   dated   23.09.2021   wherein   it   was observed as hereunder:  10 “12. Insofar   as   the   payment   of   the amount by the appellant in the context of   the   cheque   having   been   signed   by the   respondent,   the   presumption   for passing   of   the   consideration   would arise as provided under Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which reads as hereunder: ­ “118.   Presumptions   as   to   negotiable instruments   –   Until   the   contrary   is   proved, the following presumptions shall be made: ­ (a) of   consideration   –   that   every negotiable   instrument   was   made   or drawn   for   consideration,   and   that every   such   instrument,   when   it   has been   accepted,   indorsed,   negotiated or   transferred,   was   accepted, indorsed,   negotiated   or   transferred for consideration. ” 13.      The above noted provisions are explicit   to   the   effect   that   such presumption   would   remain,   until   the contrary   is   proved.   The   learned counsel   for   the   appellant   in   that regard   has   relied   on   the   decision   of this   court   in   K.   Bhaskaran   vs. Sankaran   Vaidhyan   Balan   &   Anr. (1999) 7 SCC 510 wherein it is held as hereunder: ­ “ 9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted   to   be   that   of   the   accused, the   presumption   envisaged in   Section   118   of   the   Act   can   legally be   inferred   that   the   cheque   was made   or   drawn   for   consideration   on the   date   which   the   cheque bears.   Section 139   of the Act enjoins 11 on   the   Court   to   presume   that   the holder   of   the   cheque   received   it   for the discharge of any debt or liability. The   burden   was   on   the   accused   to rebut   the   aforesaid   presumption. The   Trial   Court   was   not   persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW­1 to rebut the presumption. The said   finding   was  upheld  by   the  High Court.   It   is   not   now   open   to   the accused   to   contend   differently   on that aspect.” 14. The   learned   counsel   for   the respondent has however referred to the decision   of   this   Court   in Basalingappa   vs.   Mudibasappa (2019)   5   SCC   418   wherein   it   is held as hereunder: ­ “25.   We having noticed the ratio laid down   by   this   Court   in   the   above cases   on   Sections   118   (a)   and   139, we   now   summarise   the   principles enumerated   by   this   Court   in following manner: 25.1.   Once   the   execution   of   cheque is   admitted   Section   139   of   the   Act mandates   a   presumption   that   the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2.   The   presumption under   Section   139   is   a   rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused   to   raise   the   probable defence.   The   standard   of   proof   for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 12 25.3.      To rebut the presumption, it is   open   for   the   accused   to   rely   on evidence   led   by   him   or   the   accused can   also   rely   on   the   materials submitted   by   the   complainant   in order   to   raise   a   probable   defence. Inference   of   preponderance   of probabilities   can   be   drawn   not   only from   the   materials   brought   on record   by   the   parties   but   also   by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4.  That it is not necessary for the accused to come  in the witness  box in   support   of   his   defence,   Section 139   imposed   an   evidentiary   burden and not a persuasive burden. 25.5.   It   is   not   necessary   for   the accused to come  in the witness  box to support his defence.” 11. The   position   of   law   as   noted   above   makes   it   crystal clear that when a cheque is drawn out and is relied upon by the   drawee,   it   will   raise   a   presumption   that   it   is   drawn towards   a   consideration   which   is   a   legally   recoverable amount;   such   presumption   of   course,   is   rebuttable   by proving to the contrary. The onus is on the accused to raise a probable defence and the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is on preponderance of probabilities. 13 12. In  the backdrop  of  the legal position  being   enunciated, the   facts   herein   are   to   be   noted.   It   was   the   case   of   the respondent herein that the appellant had borrowed the sum of Rs.3,75,000/­   (Rupees   three   lakh   seventy­five   thousand)   on 12.06.2003 which was agreed to be repaid with interest in six months.   Hence,   cheque   No.062589   dated   12.12.2003   for Rs.4,00,000/­ (Rupees four lakh) drawn on Corporation Bank was issued. It is true that the respondent had relied on an ‘on demand promissory note’ and had stated that one Mr. Harish Moolya was also present. The said Mr. Harish Moolya who had also signed as witness to the ‘on demand promissory note’ was not   examined   as   a   witness   due   to   which   the   learned   trial Judge held the transaction as not proved and in that context it   was   held   that   the   respondent   has   failed   to   prove   the   case beyond   reasonable  doubt.   However,  it  is   to  be  noted  that   the respondent   had   tendered   evidence   relating   to   the   cheque being issued and had discharged the initial burden. 13. The   entire   consideration   by   the   learned   Trial   Judge   to arrive   at   his   conclusion   was   predicated   on   the   allegation levelled   by   the   appellant   that   an   incident   had   occurred   on 20.01.2004   when   the   respondent   is   stated   to   have   obtained 14 the   cheque   and   signatures   on   certain   blank   papers   by   using force.   Much   is   made   about   the   respondent   having   presented the   cheque   during   February   2004   to   assume   that   he   would not   have   waited   that   long   if   the   cheque   was   really   dated 12.12.2003   and   was   issued   earlier.   Such   an   assumption would   not   be   justified   when,   in   fact,   the   cheque   is   dated 12.12.2003 and was presented within its period of validity. To assume the incident alleged by the appellant to have occurred on   20.01.2004   to   be   true,   the   cheque   ought   to   have   been dated on or  after  20.01.2004. The date of presentation of the cheque is of no consequence provided it is presented within its validity   period.   That   the   alleged   offence   had   been   committed by   the   respondent   on   20.01.2004   itself,   was   considered   in C.C.   No.6318/2004.   When   a   jurisdictional   Court   had   gone into   the   very   same   allegation   and   had   rendered   its   judgment on   06.12.2006,   another   court   exercising   co­ordinate jurisdiction could not have brushed it aside lightly. 14. The learned Judge of the High Court also referred to the earlier proceedings only as a passing reference. In the instant case, what needs to be noted is the defence that had been put forth   before   the   learned   Magistrate   to   defeat   the   case   of   the 15 respondent herein, so as to consider whether such contention of the appellant can still be considered as a probable defence. The defence put forth by the appellant in the instant case i.e., Section   138   NI   Act   proceedings   in   C.C.   No.3207   of   2004   as referred   to   by   the   learned   Magistrate   in   the   course   of   the judgment, reads as hereunder: ­ “It is further alleged that during the year 2003, in order to clear off the dues to some others, the accused has decided to sell the above referred property and the accused expressed his desire to sell his property before the complainant. At that time, the complainant proposed to purchase the said property from the accused for Rs.3,00,000/, but the accused has refused to sell the said property to the complainant for the above said amount of Rs.3,00,000/- since, the property is worth Rs. 7 lakh. In view of the proposal made by the complainant for small amount, the accused is declined to sell his property to him. Thereafter, the accused himself began to search the customers for purchasing the said property at that time the complainant mislead the proposed purchasers who are ready to purchase the said property representing that the said property was pledged by the accused for the purpose of loan which was obtained by the accused from the finance of the complainant and accordingly, the purchasers who are come forward to purchase the same refused to purchase the said property thereby, the accused transferred some of the portion of the said property to his creditors and some of the portion was transferred in the name of his wife. When facts stood thus, on 20.1.04, when the accused went to taluk office at Udupi with his bike, the complainant chased the accused in his Maruthi Omni Van and thereafter, kidnapped the accused and took him to his office which was situated at Sri. Rama Building at Udupi, wherein the complainant wrongfully 16 restrained the accused and assaulted him with hands and also with iron rods and forcibly obtained various signatures on some blank papers and also on some cheque leaves only with an intention to knock off the property of the accused. It is further alleged that at that time the complainant warned the accused to get some papers from the wife of the accused since the property was stands in the name of the wife of the accused. At that time the complainant further threatened that he will finish the life of the accused as well as wife and children of the accused, if the said alleged act is intimated by the accused to the police. Thereafter the said incident, the complainant appointed the paid goondas to watch the activities of the accused and the said goonda people also always watched the activities of the accused nearby the compound of the accused, thereby, there was delay in lodging the complaint and accordingly, the accused herein lodged the complaint against the complainant on 2.2.04 nearly after lapse of 12 days from the date of incident. It is further alleged that the complainant is having criminal mind and he has got every criminal background and also faced various criminal charges like offences punishable u/s. 302 and 326 of IPC and also engaged in Criminal activities amongst those, this incident is also one of the charge faced by the accused. It is further alleged that the accused never issued the cheque in question voluntary and the same was obtained by the complainant by force and accordingly, the case was registered against the complainant for the offences punishable u/s. 365, 342, 323 and 506 of IPC and accordingly, the cheque in question and some other documents also misused by the complainant against the accused. In the light of the above said defence, the accused humbly prayed for acquittal.” 15. A close perusal of the above indicates that the sum and substance   of   the   defence   is   that   the   documents   and   cheque had   been   obtained   by   the   respondent   on   20.01.2004   by 17 threatening   the   appellant.   In   that   regard,   the   circumstances thereto were referred and it has been categorically stated that the appellant had filed a complaint, pursuant to which a case was   registered   against   the   respondent   for   the   offence punishable under Sections 365, 342, 323 and 506 of IPC. This makes   it   relevant   for   us   to   take   note   of   the   aspect   that   was considered in the above noted criminal complaint filed by the appellant.   The   said   case   was   registered   as   C.C.   No.6318   of 2004.   In   that   case,   the   learned   Magistrate,   on   taking   note   of the allegation made by the appellant, had raised the points for consideration and the findings were summarised. They are as follows: ­  “5.   Heard   both   sides   and   perused   the   record. Now,   the   points   that   arise   for   the   due consideration of this Court are as follows: ­ (1) Whether the prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubts that on 20.1.2004 at about 11 p.m. within the jurisdiction of Udupi Town PS at Shivalli Village in Sriram Building at Room No. 11 i.e. inside Svitha Finance, having old hatred, the accused locked up CW1 K.S. Rangnathan inside the said finance, thereby wrongfully confined CW1 committed the offence punishable U/s. 342 of IPC? (2) Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all reasonable doubts that on the same date, place and time, the accused in continuation voluntarily 18 assaulted with his hands on the face, neck and other parts of the body of CWl and thereby committed the offence punishable U/s. 323 of IPC? (3) Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all reasonable doubts that on the same date, place and time, the accused in continuation threatened the life of CWl, his wife and children if CWl will not return the loan amount within the prescribed time and thereby committed the offence punishable U/s. Part II of 506 of IPC. (4) What order? 6.   Now   the   findings   of   this   Court   on   the   above said   points  that   arisen   for   due   consideration   are answered as follows:­ Point No. 1 : In the Negative Point No. 2: In the Negative Point No. 3: In the Negative Point No. 4: As per final order for the following:” 16. To   arrive   at   the   negative   findings   on   the   points raised,   the   learned   Magistrate   has   assigned   detailed reasons   and   has   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the evidence   of   the   complainant   in   respect   of   the   incident alleged to have taken place near the Taluk office, is not at all   acceptable   and   therefore   the   prosecution   has   failed. Further,   though   an   investigation   was   conducted   in   the said proceedings and the trial had proceeded, no material objects   had   been   seized,   which   has   been   commented 19 upon by the learned Magistrate. The same would indicate that the cheques and other documents relied upon in the present   proceedings,   were   not   found   to   be   created   by threatening   the   appellant,   as   alleged.   The   Court   had therefore   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   prosecution had   miserably   failed   to   prove   its   case   beyond   all reasonable   doubts   against   the   accused   for   the   alleged offences. The said finding and conclusion arrived at in the relevant   proceedings   would   indicate   that   the   incident alleged   to   have   occurred   on   20.01.2004,   was   not   proved to have taken place.  17. If   that   be   the   position,   the   defence   sought   to   be   put forth   in   the   instant   case   and   the   witnesses   examined   in the   instant   proceedings   are   only   by   way   of   improvement in   respect   of   the   same   cause   of   action.   Therefore,   the defence sought to be put forth relating to the cheque and other   documents   having   been   obtained   by   force,   cannot be   accepted   as   a   probable   defence   when   the   respondent successfully  discharged  the  initial  burden  cast  on  him  of establishing  that the cheque signed by the appellant was issued   in   his   favour   toward   discharge   of   a   legally 20 recoverable   amount.   The   fact   that   the   appellant   has admitted about an earlier  transaction where according to him, he had borrowed the amount and repaid the same in the  year  1995, would indicate that  the appellant and  the respondent had entered into financial transactions earlier as well and another transaction was probable between the parties who were known to each other. In the light of the other   circumstances   established   by   the   respondent,   it would   indicate   that   the   respondent   had   discharged   the burden of proving that the transaction had actually taken place.   To   rebut   the   same,   the   very   case   put   forth   by   the appellant   cannot   be   accepted   as   probable   defence   since the said aspect had already been considered in a separate proceeding   (C.C.No.6318/2004)   and   the   respondent   had been acquitted in the said proceedings. 18. Hence,   the   conclusion   reached   by   the   learned Magistrate   in   C.C.   No.3207/2004   to   acquit   the   appellant herein, was not justified. The learned Single Judge of the High   Court   was   therefore   justified   in   his   conclusion though   detailed   reasons   have   not   been   assigned.   In   that view,   we   see   no   reason   to   interfere   with   the   judgment 21 dated   18.08.2010,   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   Criminal Appeal No.485/2008, impugned in this appeal.  19. Accordingly,   the  appeal   being   devoid   of   merit   stands dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.  20. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.                                                                                                    ….…………………….CJI. (N.V. RAMANA)                                                            ..……………………….J.                                        (A.S. BOPANNA)                                                       …….……………………J.        (HIMA KOHLI) New Delhi,  December 08, 2021  22