2021 INSC 0818
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 255­256 OF 2018
BHAGCHANDRA        ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   appellant   has   approached   this   Court,   being
aggrieved   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated   19 th
  December
2017,   passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 1684 of
2017,   thereby   dismissing   the   appeal   preferred   by   the
appellant challenging the judgment and order passed by the
Second Additional Sessions Judge (hereinafter referred to as
the   “trial   judge”)   dated   4 th
  April   2017,   vide   which   the
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appellant   was   convicted   for   the   offences   punishable   under
Section 302 read with Section 201 and Section 506­B of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”).
The trial judge had awarded death sentence to the appellant
for   the   offences   punishable   under   Section   302   of   the   IPC   (3
counts)   and   7   years’   rigorous   imprisonment   each   for   the
offences   punishable   under   Sections   201   and   506­B   of   the
IPC   respectively.   The   trial   judge   has   also   made   a   reference
being CRRFC No. 03 of 2017 to the High Court under Section
366   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “Cr.P.C.”)   for   confirmation   of   death   penalty.
Vide   impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court
confirmed the death penalty. 
2. The prosecution story in brief, is thus:
Appellant­Bhagchandra   is   the   real   brother   of   deceased
Thakur Das and deceased Devki Prasad.   Deceased Akhilesh
was   the   son   of   deceased   Devki   Prasad   and   as   such,   the
nephew   of   the   appellant.   PW­1­Kiran   Patel   is   the   wife   of
deceased Devki Prasad.  PW­2­Urmila and PW­3­Kamlesh are
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the   daughter   and   son   of   deceased   Devki   Prasad   and   Kiran
Patel (PW­1).
3. Deceased Devki Prasad resided in village Pur along with
his brother deceased Thakur Das, his wife PW­1­Kiran Patel,
daughter   PW­2­Urmila,   sons   PW­3­Kamlesh,   deceased
Akhilesh, and Kisiyabai, mother of the appellant. 
4. It   is   the   prosecution   case   that   on   the   fateful   early
morning   of   11 th
  October   2015   at   around   05.00­05.30   am,
complainant­Kiran Patel (PW­1) had gone to attend the call of
nature.     While   returning,   she   saw   the   appellant   armed   with
an   axe   getting   out   of   her   house.     It   is   the   prosecution   case
that there was previous enmity between the appellant on one
hand  and   deceased   Thakur  Das   and  deceased   Devki   Prasad
on   the   other.   She   therefore   suspected   some   foul   play.
Immediately   after   entering   the   house,   she   saw   Thakur   Das
lying   dead   smeared   with   blood   and   his   neck   was   detached
from   the   body.     In   the   courtyard,   she   also   found   her   son
Akhilesh lying dead. It is the prosecution case that deceased
Devki Prasad had gone to his field in the night so as to guard
the crops.  Suspecting something might be done to him, PW­
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1 rushed towards the field which was nearby the house. She
saw the appellant assaulting her husband Devki Prasad with
an axe.   She tried to stop the appellant but he threatened to
kill her.   In the meanwhile, the relatives and the neighbours
had gathered at the spot.
5. Immediately   after   the   incident,   a   First   Information
Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) came to be registered
on the basis of the oral complaint given by Kiran Patel (PW­
1),   in   the   Police   Station,   Maharajpur.   After   investigation,
charge­sheet   came   to   be   filed   before   the   concerned   court
which committed the case to the Sessions Judge.
6. The   trial   judge   framed   charges   against   the   appellant
under   Sections   302   (3   counts),   201   and   506   Part­II   of   the
IPC.     The   appellant   denied   all   the   charges   and   claimed   that
he   was   falsely   implicated   by   Kiran   Patel   (PW­1)   to   grab   the
property. 
7. At  the  conclusion   of  the  trial,  the   trial  judge  found   the
appellant   guilty   of   committing   the   offences   he   was   charged
with and as such, awarded sentences as stated hereinabove.
The trial court also made a Reference being CRRFC No. 03 of
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2017   to   the   High   Court   for   confirmation   of   the   capital
punishment awarded by it.
8. Being   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   of   conviction   and
sentence passed by the trial court, the appellant preferred an
appeal   being   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1684   of   2017   before   the
High   Court.     The   High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   and
confirmed   the   death   penalty   awarded   by   the   trial   court.
Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
9. We   have   heard   Shri   N.   Hariharan,   learned   Senior
Counsel,   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Smt.
Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned Assistant Advocate General,
appearing on behalf of the respondent­State.
10. Shri   Hariharan   would   submit   that   the   entire   case
against   the   appellant   is   a   fabricated   one   and   has   been
framed   at   the   instance   of   Kiran   Patel   (PW­1).     The   learned
Senior   Counsel   submitted   that   the   evidence   as   placed   on
record by the prosecution does not establish the guilt of the
accused­appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
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11. The   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that   firstly,   the
time   of   the   incident   as   shown   by   the   prosecution   is   itself
doubtful.     He   submitted   that   the   Post­Mortem   Report   of   all
the   three   deceased   persons   would   show   that   semi­digested
food was found in the stomach of the deceased persons.   He
therefore   submitted   that   the   death   would   have   occurred
around   3­4   hours   after   their   last   meal.     He   submitted   that
from   the   evidence   brought   on   record,   it   would   show   that
deceased Devki Prasad had left for the field at around 09.00
pm.     He   submitted   that   therefore   the   deceased   must   have
taken   their   meal   at   around   09.00   pm.     As   such,   the   death
has occurred between 12.00 midnight and 01.00 am.
12. He   further   submitted   that   there   are   material
contradictions in the testimonies of PW­1­Kiran Patel, PW­2­
Urmila   and   PW­3­Kamlesh.   He   submitted   that   even   the
conduct   of   PW­1   is   unnatural.   She   has   stated   that,   while
going   to   answer   the   call   of   nature,   she   had   put   a   latch   to
close   the   door   of   the   house.     He   submitted   that   normally   a
person would not do such an act.  He further submitted that
the   evidence   of   PW­7­Rakesh   Vishwakarma   is   totally
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unnatural.     From   the   evidence   of   PW­7,   it   is   clear   that
though   he   has   witnessed   the   incident,   he   has   not   informed
the same to the police, who were very much available in the
village.   He   has   only   informed   PW­6­Kamlesh   Patel   s/o
Gulabchandra Patel (for the sake of convenience, hereinafter
referred   to   as   “Kamlesh­II”).     He   submitted   that   it   is   clear
that PW­7 is an introduced witness.
13. Shri   Hariharan   further   submitted   that   the   prosecution
has   withheld   the   most   important   witness   i.e.   Kisiyabai,
mother of deceased Thakur Das and Devki Prasad as well as
the   appellant,   though   her   statement   was   recorded   under
Section 161 Cr.P.C.  He submitted that since the prosecution
has   withheld   an   important   witness,   an   adverse   inference
needs   to   be   drawn   against   the   prosecution.     The   learned
Senior Counsel, in this respect, relies on the judgment of this
Court in the case of  Pratap Singh and Another v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 1
.
14. The   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that   the   so­
called   recovery   of   axe   on   the   memorandum   of   appellant
1   (2005) 13 SCC 624
7

under   Section   27   of   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “Evidence   Act”)   is   also   of   no
relevance.     He   submitted   that   firstly,   the   Serology   Report
does   not   support   the   prosecution   case.     He   submitted   that
the   recovery   on   memorandum   would   be   relevant   only   if   the
prosecution   is   in   a   position   to   establish   that   the   article
recovered   was   used   in   the   crime.     He   submitted   that   apart
from   the   Serology   Report   not   supporting   the   prosecution
case, the said axe has not been put to any of the witnesses to
establish that it was the same weapon which was used in the
crime.
15. Shri Hariharan would submit that the trial court as well
as   the   High   Court   has   not   considered   the   evidence   in   its
correct perspective.  He submitted that the evidence has been
considered in a totally erroneous manner.  He submitted that
though this Court is exercising the jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India, since the matter pertains to
death   penalty,   it   is   necessary   that   this   Court   should
reappreciate the entire evidence.   He relies on the judgments
of this Court in the cases of  Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad
8

Amir Kasab alias Abu Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra 2
,
Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State of Orissa 3
  and   Mohd. Arif alias
Ashfaq   v.   Registrar,   Supreme   Court   of   India   and
Others 4
.
16. Shri Hariharan, in the alternative, submitted that in no
circumstances, the death penalty was warranted in the facts
of the present case.  He submitted that firstly, the trial court
has imposed the death penalty on the same day on which the
conviction   was   recorded.     He   submitted   that   a   sufficient
period   of   time   between   the   order   of   conviction   and   the
sentence   ought   to   have   been   given   to   the   appellant   so   that
the appellant would have availed of his right to point out the
aggravating   and   mitigating   circumstances.     He   further
submitted that the courts below have also failed to take into
consideration that the accused was not a hardened criminal.
The   accused   did   not   have   any   criminal   antecedents   and   it
was his first crime.  He further submitted that the trial court
as   well   as   the   High   Court   has   not   taken   into   consideration
2   (2012) 9 SCC 1
3   (2003) 9 SCC 310
4   (2014) 9 SCC 737
9

the possibility of the appellant being reformed.  It is therefore
submitted   that   the   death   penalty   is   not   warranted   at   all   in
the facts and circumstances of the present case.
17. Smt.   Chaturvedi,   on   the   contrary,   submitted   that   both
the   courts   below   have   rightly   convicted   the   appellant   and
also   awarded   death   penalty.   She   submitted   that   minor
inconsistencies   in   the   evidence   of   the   witnesses   should   not
be given much importance. She further submitted that when
ocular   evidence   has   been   found   by   the   court   to   be   cogent,
trustworthy   and   reliable,   then   some   inconsistencies   in   the
medical   evidence   would   not   be   relevant.     She   relies   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Krishnan   and
Another   v.   State   represented   by   Inspector   of   Police 5
  to
assert the said contention. She further submitted that merely
because the Serology Report is not conclusive, it cannot be a
ground   to   disbelieve   the   prosecution   case.     For   the   said
proposition,   she   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the
case of  R. Shaji v. State of Kerala 6
.
5   (2003) 7 SCC 56
6   (2013) 14 SCC 266
10

18. Smt.   Chaturvedi,   in   order   to   meet   the   challenge   about
the evidence of PW­7­Rakesh, submitted that the reaction of
a   witness   to   a   situation   may   differ   from   person   to   person.
She   submitted   that   merely   because   PW­7­Rakesh   has
informed   PW­6­Kamlesh   first,   which   was   prior   to   informing
the police, it does not put a dent on his testimony.   For this,
she   relies   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 7
.
19. She   further   submitted   that   taking   into   consideration
the   brutality   of   murder,   wherein   three   blood   relatives   have
been done away with for no fault of theirs, warrants no lesser
penalty   than   the   death   penalty.     She   submitted   that   the
necks   of   all   the   three   persons   were   segregated   due   to   the
brutal attack and as such, the trial court has rightly awarded
death   penalty   and   the   High   Court   has   rightly   confirmed   the
same.  She relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Ravi s/o Ashok Ghumare v. State of Maharashtra 8
.
20. Shri   Hariharan,   in   rejoinder,   submitted   that   in   view   of
the law laid down by this Court, relevant material is required
7   (1999) 8 SCC 649
8   (2019) 9 SCC 622
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to be placed before the court while considering as to whether
the   death   penalty   should   be   awarded   or   not.   He   submitted
that   accordingly,   an   affidavit   of   the   close   relatives   of   the
appellant   has   been   placed   on   record.   He   further   submitted
that the certificate from the prison authority is also placed on
record which would show that the conduct of the appellant is
satisfactory, not warranting death penalty.  
21. With   the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties, we have examined the materials placed on record.
22. PW­1­Kiran   Patel   is   the  wife   of  deceased   Devki  Prasad.
She   has   stated   in   her   evidence   that   on   the   date   of   the
incident,   at   around   05.00   am,   she   had   gone   out   to   answer
the   call   of   nature.     At   that   time,   her   brother­in­law   Thakur
Das,   sons   Akhilesh   and   Kamlesh,   daughter   Urmila   and
mother­in­law   Kisiyabai   were   sleeping   at   home.   When   she
returned after  around 10 minutes, she saw appellant armed
with   an   axe   coming   out   of   her   house.     She   suspected   some
foul play.  When she entered the house, she saw her brother­
in­law  Thakur   Das   lying  dead   in   outer   room.     His  neck   was
cut.     When   she   came   in   the   courtyard,   she   saw   her   son
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Akhilesh   dead,   having   injuries   on   his   neck   and   head.     She
stated that her   son  Kamlesh  and daughter  Urmila had  gone
to   the   place   of   Gulab   after   seeing   the   appellant   assaulting
their   uncle   and   brother.     Both   of   them   came   and   informed
her   that   Thakur   Das   and   Akhilesh   were   assaulted   by   the
appellant.     She   suspected   that   the   appellant   had   gone
towards   the   field   and   therefore,   she   followed   the   appellant
towards   the   field.     She   saw   the   appellant   assaulting   her
husband Devki Prasad with the axe.   When she tried to stop
the   accused   from   assaulting   the   deceased,   the   accused
abused her and told her to go away and threatened her that
she   would   also   meet   the   same   fate.     She   stated   that   when
she was returning home, she saw PW­7­Rakesh.   Thereafter,
PW­4­Rammilan,   PW­5­Khillu   Patel   and   PW­6­Kamlesh­II
also   came.     She   has   further   stated   in   her   evidence   that
deceased Thakur Das was residing with the appellant for 10
years.  However, the appellant started demanding the land of
Thakur   Das   and   his   tractor.     As   such,   the   appellant   forced
Thakur Das to leave his house.   Thereafter, Thakur Das had
started   residing   with   the   family   of   deceased   Devki   Prasad.
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She has stated that the appellant thought that Thakur Das’s
property   would   come   to   the   family   of   Devki   Prasad   and   so,
the   appellant   had   assaulted   and   killed   her   brother­in­law,
her   husband   and   son.     PW­1   has   been   cross­examined   at
length.     However,   in   spite   of   lengthy   cross­examination,   her
evidence   insofar   as   the   incident   is   concerned,   has   gone
unchallenged.
23. PW­2­Urmila   was   about   11­12   years   old   at   the   time   of
incident.  After putting preliminary questions to her, the trial
judge   found   that   she   was   capable   of   understanding   the
questions   and   answering   the   same   and   as   such,   her
statement was recorded without administering oath to her.
24. She   stated   that   on   the   day   of   the   incident,   after   her
mother went to answer the call of nature, she was doing the
household   work.     She   heard   the   sound   of   ‘ dham   dham ’   and
thought that it might be a dog’s sound. She went towards the
place   from   where   the   sound   was   coming   and   saw   that   the
appellant   was   assaulting   the   deceased   with   an   axe.     Her
brother Akhilesh was sleeping in the courtyard.  She tried to
wake  him  up  but  he  did  not   get  up.    The  appellant   came  to
14

the   courtyard   along   with   the   axe   and   started   assaulting
Akhilesh.   She   got   frightened   and   therefore   went   to   PW­6­
Kamlesh­II’s   house.   Her   brother   Kamlesh   (PW­3)   had   also
woken up.  He also tried to wake Akhilesh up but he did not
get up.   The appellant tried to catch hold of Kamlesh (PW­3)
too,   however,   Kamlesh   (PW­3)   ran   away   with   Urmila   to
Kamlesh­II’s   house.     She   further   stated   that   thereafter,   her
mother   came.     She   informed   about   the   incident   to   her
mother.  Thereafter, her mother went to the field.  She stated
that   her   mother   saw   the   appellant   assaulting   the   deceased.
Thereafter, her mother came home and started shouting and
raising   hue   and   cry.   As   such,   PW­6­Kamlesh­II   and   PW­4­
Rammilan came there.   The said child witness has also been
thoroughly   cross­examined.     However,   her   evidence   insofar
as   the   main   incident   is   concerned,   has   gone   unchallenged.
Similar is the evidence of PW­3­Kamlesh who was aged 12­13
years at the time of the incident.
25. It   will   be   thus   clear   from   the   evidence   of   PW­1­Kiran
Patel,   that   she   has   personally   witnessed   the   appellant
assaulting   deceased   Devki   Prasad.     It   will   be   further   clear
15

from   the   evidence   of   PW­2­Urmila   and   PW­3­Kamlesh   that
they   have   personally   witnessed   the   appellant   assaulting
deceased   Thakur   Das   and   deceased   Akhilesh.   The   evidence
of   these   three   witnesses   would   also   reveal   that   immediately
after   PW­1   came   from   field,   she   was   informed   by   PW­2   and
PW­3 about the assault by the appellant on Thakur Das and
Akhilesh.     The   testimony   of   these   three   witnesses   is   duly
corroborated by the other witnesses.   PW­4­Rammilan is the
son   of   Shyambihari.     Shyambihari   is   another   brother   of
deceased Thakur  Das,  deceased Devki  Prasad  and appellant
Bhagchandra.     He   has   stated   in   his   deposition   that   on   the
date   of   incident   when   he   was   going   out   at   around   5.30   am,
his   aunt   Kiran   Patel   was   shouting   maar   dala ,   maar   dala .
When he went near his aunt Kiran Patel, he saw that inside
the house, Thakur Das and Akhilesh were lying dead.  When
he went to the field, he saw Devki Prasad lying dead in front
of the tractor.   He stated that Kiran informed him about the
incident.   This   witness   had   accompanied   PW­1   to   the   Police
Station   for   lodging   the   report.   This   witness   has   also
undergone   lengthy   cross­examination.     Nothing   damaging
16

has   come   on   record   in   the   cross­examination.   This   witness
would   be   in   a   sense   a   neutral   witness   inasmuch   as   his
relation  with  both,  the  appellant  and  the  deceased, is of  the
same   degree.   PW­1   had   immediately   disclosed   about   the
incident   to   him   and   he   had   accompanied   her   to   lodge   the
FIR.
26. Similar is the testimony of PW­5­Khillu Patel.
27. PW­6­Kamlesh­II   is   also   related   to   the   witnesses,
deceased   and   the   appellant.     He   stated   that   on   the   date   of
the incident at around 04.00 am, he had gone to answer the
call of nature.  While returning, he received a message on his
mobile   and   in   that   light,   he   saw   the   appellant   running
towards   him.     On   him   questioning   the   appellant   as   to   what
he   was   doing   there,   the   appellant   said,   “I   thought   that   you
are Thakur Das”.   At that time, the appellant was having an
axe with him.  Thereafter, PW­6 came home and was resting.
At   around   05.00­05.30   am,   the   children   of   Devki   Prasad
namely   Urmila   (PW­2)   and   Akhilesh   (PW­3)   came   to   him.
Both   were   frightened   and   told   him   that   Bhagchandra   uncle
had   hacked   Thakur   Das   and   Akhilesh   with   the   axe.     He
17

further   stated   that   he   too   was   afraid   as   he   was   alone   and
could   not   do   anything.     He   stated   that   in   the   meantime,
Kiran  Bhabhi  had come and informed about the incident.
28. It could thus be seen that all these witnesses establish
the   presence   of   each   other.     PW­1­Kiran   Patel   stated   about
the presence of PW­4­Rammilan, PW­5­Khillu Patel and PW­
6­Kamlesh­II and about them immediately coming to the spot
and her informing them about the incident.   PWs 4, 5 and 6
corroborated   the   testimony   of   PW­1   in   that   aspect.     PW­2­
Urmila   and   PW­3­Kamlesh   stated   about   witnessing   the
incident   of   appellant   assaulting   deceased   Thakur   Das   and
Akhilesh, and running towards the house of Kamlesh­II and
informing   him   about   the   same.     PW­6   too   corroborated   this
version of PWs 1, 2 and 3.
29. Insofar   as   the   evidence   of   PW­7­Rakesh   is   concerned,
we   find   that   the   conduct   of   the   said   witness   appears   to   be
somewhat   unnatural.     He   stated   that   after   witnessing   the
incident, he had gone to another village on motorcycle to see
his   friend.     From   there,   he   had   gone   to   the   Hospital   at
Maharajpur.     After   that,   he   came   home   at   around   10.00­
18

10.30 am.   Though, the police were present in the village, he
did   not   inform   them   about   the   incident.     On   his   own,   he
stated   that   he   had   informed   Kamlesh­II   about   the   incident.
We therefore find that it will not be appropriate to rely on his
testimony.     However,   even   if   the   testimony   of   PW­7   is
eschewed, we find that the ocular  testimonies of PWs 1 to 6
establish   the   case   of   the   prosecution   beyond   reasonable
doubt   that   it   is   the   appellant   who   had   assaulted   the
deceased persons.  
30. No   doubt   that   there   are   minor   discrepancies   in   the
evidence   of   these   PWs.   It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the
following   observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of
Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Master and Others 9
:­
“15.   Before   appreciating   evidence   of   the
witnesses   examined   in   the   case,   it   would   be
instructive to refer to the criteria for appreciation
of   oral   evidence.   While   appreciating   the
evidence   of   a   witness,   the   approach   must   be
whether the evidence of the witness read as a
whole   appears   to   have   a   ring   of   truth.   Once
that   impression   is   found,   it   is   undoubtedly
necessary   for   the   court   to   scrutinise   the
evidence   more   particularly   keeping   in   view
the   deficiencies,   drawbacks   and   infirmities
9   (2010) 12 SCC 324
19

pointed   out   in   the   evidence   as   a   whole   and
evaluate   them   to   find   out   whether   it   is
against the general tenor of the evidence and
whether   the   earlier   evaluation   of   the
evidence   is   shaken   as   to   render   it   unworthy
of   belief.   Minor   discrepancies   on   trivial
matters   not   touching   the   core   of   the   case,
hypertechnical approach by taking sentences
torn   out   of   context   here   or   there   from   the
evidence,   attaching   importance   to   some
technical   error   committed   by   the
investigating   officer   not   going   to   the   root   of
the   matter   would   not   ordinarily   permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
16.   If   the   court   before   whom   the   witness   gives
evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion
about   the   general   tenor   of   the   evidence   given   by
the   witness,   the   appellate   court   which   had   not
this  benefit  will have  to  attach  due weight  to  the
appreciation   of   evidence   by   the   trial   court   and
unless the reasons are weighty and formidable, it
would   not   be   proper   for   the   appellate   court   to
reject the evidence on the ground of variations or
infirmities   in   the   matter   of   trivial   details.   Minor
omissions   in   the   police   statements   are   never
considered   to   be   fatal.   The   statements   given
by   the   witnesses   before   the   police   are   meant
to   be   brief   statements   and   could   not   take
place   of   evidence   in   the   court.   Small/Trivial
omissions would not justify a finding by court
that   the   witnesses   concerned   are   liars.   The
prosecution   evidence   may   suffer   from
inconsistencies here and discrepancies there,
but   that   is   a   shortcoming   from   which   no
criminal   case   is   free.   The   main   thing   to   be
seen   is   whether   those   inconsistencies   go   to
the   root   of   the   matter   or   pertain   to
20

insignificant   aspects   thereof.   In   the   former
case,   the   defence   may   be   justified   in   seeking
advantage   of   incongruities   obtaining   in   the
evidence.   In   the   latter,   however,   no   such   benefit
may be available to it.
17.   In   the   deposition   of   witnesses,   there   are
always   normal   discrepancies,   howsoever
honest   and   truthful   they   may   be.   These
discrepancies   are   due   to   normal   errors   of
observation,   normal   errors   of   memory   due   to
lapse   of   time,   due   to   mental   disposition,
shock   and   horror   at   the   time   of   occurrence
and   threat   to   the   life.   It   is   not   unoften   that
improvements   in   earlier   version   are   made   at   the
trial   in   order   to   give   a   boost   to   the   prosecution
case,   albeit   foolishly.   Therefore,   it   is   the   duty
of   the   court   to   separate   falsehood   from   the
truth. In sifting the evidence, the court has to
attempt to separate the chaff from the grains
in   every   case   and   this   attempt   cannot   be
abandoned on the ground that the case is baffling
unless   the   evidence   is   really   so   confusing   or
conflicting that the process cannot reasonably be
carried   out.   In   the   light   of   these   principles,   this
Court   will   have   to   determine   whether   the
evidence   of   eyewitnesses   examined   in   this   case
proves the prosecution case.” 
[ emphasis supplied ]
31. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   what   is   required   to   be
considered   is   whether   the   evidence   of   the   witness   read   as   a
whole appears to have a ring of truth.   It has been held that
minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching  the core
21

of   the   case,   hypertechnical   approach   by   taking   sentences
torn out of context here or there from the evidence, would not
ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.  It has
been   held   that   the   prosecution   evidence   may   suffer   from
inconsistencies   here   and   discrepancies   there,   but   that   is   a
shortcoming   from   which   no   criminal   case   is   free.     What   is
important is to see as to whether those inconsistencies go to
the   root   of   the   matter   or   pertain   to   insignificant   aspects
thereof.     It   has   been   held   that   there   are   always   normal
discrepancies   due   to   normal   errors   of   observation,   normal
errors   of   memory   due   to   lapse   of   time,   due   to   mental
disposition, shock and horror at the time of occurrence.  It is
the duty of the court to separate falsehood from the truth in
every case.
32. Applying   these   principles,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the
minor   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution
witnesses   are   not   of   such   a   nature   which   would   persuade
this Court to disbelieve their testimonies.   It is further  to be
noted   that   the   witnesses   are   rustic   villagers   and   some
inconsistencies in their depositions are bound to be there.  
22

33. In   this   respect,   it   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the
following   observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Krishna
Master  (supra):
“23.   The record of the case shows that this witness
Jhabbulal   was   cross­examined   at   great   length.   He
was subjected to gruelling cross­examination which
runs   into   31   pages.   The   first   and   firm   impression
which  one  gathers on  reading  the   testimony  of  this
witness   is   that   he   is   a   rustic   witness.   A   rustic
witness,   who   is   subjected   to   fatiguing,   taxing   and
tiring cross­examination for days together, is bound
to   get   confused   and   make   some   inconsistent
statements.   Some   discrepancies   are   bound   to   take
place   if   a   witness   is   cross­examined   at   length   for
days   together.   Therefore,   the   discrepancies   noticed
in the evidence of a rustic witness who is subjected
to gruelling  cross­examination should not be blown
out of proportion. To do so is to ignore hard realities
of   village   life   and   give   undeserved   benefit   to   the
accused who have perpetrated heinous crime.
24.   The   basic   principle   of   appreciation   of   evidence
of   a   rustic   witness   who   is   not   educated   and   comes
from  a poor  strata of society is that the evidence of
such   a   witness   should   be   appreciated   as   a   whole.
The   rustic   witness   as   compared   to   an   educated
witness   is   not   expected   to   remember   every   small
detail   of   the   incident   and   the   manner   in   which   the
incident   had   happened   more   particularly   when   his
evidence is recorded after a lapse of time. Further, a
witness   is   bound   to   face   shock   of   the   untimely
death   of   his   near   relative(s).   Therefore,   the   court
must   keep   in   mind   all   these   relevant   factors   while
appreciating evidence of a rustic witness.”
23

34. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that in case
of   rustic   witnesses,   some   inconsistencies   and   discrepancies
are   bound   to   be   found.     It   has   been   held   that   the
inconsistencies   in   the   evidence   of   the   witnesses   should   not
be   blown   out   of   proportion.   To   do   so   is   to   ignore   hard
realities   of   village   life   and   give   undeserved   benefit   to   the
accused.     It   has   been   held   that   the   evidence   of   such
witnesses has to be appreciated as a whole.  A rustic witness
is not expected to remember every small detail of the incident
and   the   manner   in   which   the   incident   had   happened.
Further,   a   witness   is   bound   to   face   shock   of   the   untimely
death  of his  near  relatives.    Upon  perusal  of the  evidence  of
the witnesses as a whole, we are of the considered view that
their evidence is cogent, reliable and trustworthy.
35. Having   held   that   the   ocular   testimony   of   the   witnesses
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
we come to the other contentions of the appellant.  Insofar as
the   contention   of   the   appellant   that   the   medical   evidence
does not support the prosecution case, it will be appropriate
24

to rely on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Krishnan
and Another  (supra):­ 
“18.   The evidence of Dr Muthuswami (PW 7) and
Dr   Abbas   Ali   (PW   8)   do   not   in   any   way   run
contrary to the ocular evidence. In any event, the
ocular   evidence   being   cogent,   credible   and
trustworthy,   minor   variance,   if   any,   with   the
medical evidence is not of any consequence.
20.   Coming to the plea that the medical evidence
is   at   variance   with   ocular   evidence,   it   has   to   be
noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue
primacy   to   the   hypothetical   answers   of   medical
witnesses   to   exclude   the   eyewitnesses'   account
which   had   to   be   tested   independently   and   not
treated   as   the   “variable”   keeping   the   medical
evidence as the “constant”.
21.   It   is   trite   that   where   the   eyewitnesses'
account   is   found   credible   and   trustworthy,
medical   opinion   pointing   to   alternative
possibilities   is   not   accepted   as   conclusive.
Witnesses,   as   Bentham   said,   are   the   eyes   and
ears   of   justice.   Hence   the   importance   and
primacy   of   the   quality   of   the   trial   process.
Eyewitnesses'   account   would   require   a   careful
independent   assessment   and   evaluation   for   its
credibility   which   should   not   be   adversely
prejudged   making   any   other   evidence,   including
medical   evidence,   as   the   sole   touchstone   for   the
test   of   such   credibility.   The   evidence   must   be
tested   for   its   inherent   consistency   and   the
inherent probability of the story; consistency with
the   account   of   other   witnesses   held   to   be
creditworthy;   consistency   with   the   undisputed
facts,   the   “credit”   of   the   witnesses;   their
performance   in   the   witness   box;   their   power   of
observation etc. Then the probative value of such
25

evidence   becomes   eligible   to   be   put   into   the
scales for a cumulative evaluation.”
36. As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   the   ocular   evidence
of   the   eye   witnesses   is   cogent,   reliable   and   trustworthy.
Apart from that, the oral version in the testimonies of PWs 1,
2 and 3 is duly corroborated by the injuries as shown in the
Post­Mortem   Report   of   the   deceased   persons.   Therefore,   the
contention in this regard is liable to be rejected.
37. The   attack   of   the   appellant   is   on   the   other
circumstances  like  the  recovery   of  the  axe  under  Section  27
of   the   Evidence   Act   not   being   relevant,   since   the   same   not
being   established   to   be   used   in   the   offence   nor   in   the
Serology Report, etc.  
38. Since the present case is a case of direct evidence, even
if the prosecution has failed to prove the other incriminating
circumstances   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   in   our   view,   it   will
not   have   an   effect   on   the   prosecution   case.     In   the   present
case,   another   factor   that   is   to   be   noted   is   that   immediately
after   the   incident,   FIR   is   lodged   by   PW­1   who   was
26

accompanied by PW­4. The FIR fully corroborates the ocular
evidence of prosecution witnesses.
39. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view
that   even   upon   reappreciation   of   the   evidence,   it   cannot   be
said that the trial court has committed an error in convicting
the appellant and the High Court in confirming the same.
40. That   leaves   us   with   the   question   of   sentence.     We   will
have to consider as to whether the capital punishment in the
present case is warranted or not. 
41. Recently,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Mohd.   Mannan
alias   Abdul  Mannan   v.   State   of  Bihar 10
, after  considering
earlier   judgments   of   this   Court   on   the   present   issue   in   the
cases   of   Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 11
  and   Machhi
Singh and Others v. State of Punjab 12
,   observed thus:­  
“72.   The   proposition   of   law   which   emerges   from
the   judgments   referred   to   above   is   itself   death
sentence   cannot   be   imposed   except   in   the   rarest
of rare cases, for which special reasons have to be
recorded,   as   mandated   in   Section   354(3)   of   the
Criminal   Procedure   Code.   In   deciding   whether   a
case falls within the category of the rarest of rare,
10   (2019) 16 SCC 584
11   (1980) 2 SCC 684
12   (1983) 3 SCC 470
27

the   brutality,   and/or   the   gruesome   and/or
heinous   nature   of   the   crime   is   not   the   sole
criterion. It is not just the crime which the Court
is   to   take   into   consideration,   but   also   the
criminal,   the   state   of   his   mind,   his   socio­
economic   background,   etc.   Awarding   death
sentence   is   an   exception,   and   life   imprisonment
is the rule.”
42. This   Bench,   recently,   in   the   case   of   Mofil   Khan   and
Another v. The State of Jharkhand 13
 has observed thus:­ 
“ 8. One   of   the   mitigating   circumstances   is   the
probability   of   the   accused   being   reformed   and
rehabilitated.   The   State   is   under   a   duty   to
procure   evidence   to   establish   that   there   is   no
possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the
accused.   Death   sentence   ought   not   to   be
imposed,   save   in   the   rarest   of   the   rare   cases
when   the   alternative   option   of   a   lesser
punishment   is   unquestionably   foreclosed   (See:
Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab   (1980)   2   SCC
684).   To   satisfy   that   the   sentencing   aim   of
reformation   is   unachievable,   rendering   life
imprisonment   completely   futile,   the   Court   will
have   to   highlight   clear   evidence   as   to   why   the
convict   is   not   fit  for   any   kind   of  reformatory   and
rehabilitation   scheme.   This   analysis   can   only   be
done   with   rigour   when   the   Court   focuses   on   the
circumstances relating to the criminal, along with
other   circumstances   (See:   Santosh   Kumar
Satishbhushan   Bariyar   v.   State   of   Maharashtra
(2009)   6   SCC   498).   In   Rajendra   Pralhadrao
Wasnik   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   (2019)   12   SCC
460,   this   Court   dealt   with   the   review   of   a
13   RP(Criminal)   No.   641/2015   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1795/2009   dated
26.11.2021
28

judgment of this Court confirming death sentence
and observed as under: 
“45.   The   law   laid   down   by   various
decisions   of   this   Court   clearly   and
unequivocally   mandates   that   the
probability   (not   possibility   or
improbability   or   impossibility)   that   a
convict   can   be   reformed   and
rehabilitated   in   society   must   be
seriously   and   earnestly   considered   by
the   courts   before   awarding   the   death
sentence.   This   is   one   of   the   mandates
of the  “special  reasons” requirement  of
Section   354(3)   CrPC   and   ought   not   to
be   taken   lightly   since   it   involves
snuffing   out   the   life   of   a   person.   To
effectuate   this   mandate,   it   is   the
obligation   on   the   prosecution   to   prove
to the court, through evidence, that the
probability   is   that   the   convict   cannot
be   reformed   or   rehabilitated.   This   can
be   achieved   by   bringing   on   record,
inter   alia,   material   about   his   conduct
in jail, his conduct outside jail if he has
been   on   bail   for   some   time,   medical
evidence   about   his   mental   make­up,
contact   with   his   family   and   so   on.
Similarly,   the   convict   can   produce
evidence on these issues as well.””
43. In the present case, it is to be noted that the trial court
had   convicted   the   appellant   and   imposed   death   penalty   on
the   very   same   day.   From   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court,   it
does   not   appear   that   the   appellant   was   given   a   meaningful
time   and   a   real   opportunity   of   hearing   on   the   question   of
29

sentence.  From the judgment of the trial court as well as the
High   Court,   it   does   not   appear   that   the   courts   below   have
drawn   a   balance   sheet   of   mitigating   and   aggravating
circumstances.  The trial court as well as the High Court has
only   taken   into   consideration   the   crime   but   have   not   taken
into  consideration the  criminal,  his state  of  mind,  his socio­
economic   background   etc.     At   this   juncture,   it   will   be
relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in
the   case   of   Rajendra   Pralhadrao   Wasnik   v.   State   of
Maharashtra 14
:­
“ 47.   Consideration   of   the   reformation,
rehabilitation and reintegration of the convict into
society   cannot   be   overemphasised.   Until   Bachan
Singh   [ Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (1980)   2
SCC   684   :   1980   SCC   (Cri)   580]   ,   the   emphasis
given by the courts was primarily on the nature of
the   crime,   its   brutality   and   severity.   Bachan
Singh   [ Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (1980)   2
SCC   684   :   1980   SCC   (Cri)   580]   placed   the
sentencing   process   into   perspective   and
introduced   the   necessity   of   considering   the
reformation   or   rehabilitation   of   the   convict.
Despite   the   view   expressed   by   the   Constitution
Bench,   there   have   been   several   instances,   some
of   which   have   been   pointed   out
in   Bariyar   [ Santosh   Kumar   Satishbhushan
Bariyar   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   (2009)   6   SCC
498   :   (2009)   2   SCC   (Cri)   1150]   and
14   (2019) 12 SCC 460
30

in   Sangeet   v.   State   of   Haryana   [ Sangeet   v.   State
of   Haryana ,   (2013)   2   SCC   452   :   (2013)   2   SCC
(Cri)   611]   where   there   is   a   tendency   to   give
primacy to the crime and consider the criminal in
a   somewhat   secondary   manner.   As   observed
in   Sangeet   [ Sangeet   v.   State   of   Haryana ,   (2013)   2
SCC   452   :   (2013)   2   SCC   (Cri)   611]   “In   the
sentencing   process,   both   the   crime   and   the
criminal   are   equally   important.”   Therefore,   we
should   not   forget   that   the   criminal,   however
ruthless   he   might   be,   is   nevertheless   a   human
being   and   is   entitled   to   a   life   of   dignity
notwithstanding his crime. Therefore, it is for the
prosecution and the courts to determine whether
such a person, notwithstanding his crime, can be
reformed and rehabilitated. To obtain and analyse
this information is certainly not an easy task but
must nevertheless be undertaken. The process of
rehabilitation   is   also   not   a   simple   one   since   it
involves   social   reintegration   of   the   convict   into
society.   Of   course,   notwithstanding   any
information   made   available   and   its   analysis   by
experts   coupled   with   the   evidence   on   record,
there   could   be   instances   where   the   social
reintegration of the convict may not be possible. If
that should happen, the option of a long duration
of imprisonment is permissible.”
44. In   view   of   the   settled   legal   position,   it   is   our   bounden
duty to take into consideration the probability of the accused
being reformed and rehabilitated.   It is also our duty to take
into   consideration   not   only   the   crime   but   also   the   criminal,
his   state   of   mind   and   his   socio­economic   conditions.     The
deceased   as   well   as   the   appellant   are   rustic   villagers.   In   a
31

property   dispute,   the   appellant   has   got   done   away   with   two
of   his   siblings   and   a   nephew.     The   State   has   not   placed   on
record any evidence to show that there is no possibility with
respect   to   reformation   or   rehabilitation   of   the   convict.     The
appellant   has   placed   on   record   the   affidavits   of   Prahalad
Patel,   son   of   appellant   and   Rajendra   Patel,   nephew   of
appellant   and   also   the   report   of   the   Jail   Superintendent,
Central   Jail,   Jabalpur.     The   appellant   comes   from   a   rural
and   economically   poor   background.   There   are   no   criminal
antecedents. The  appellant cannot  be said to  be a  hardened
criminal.     This   is   the   first   offence   committed   by   the
appellant, no doubt, a heinous one.  The certificate issued by
the   Jail   Superintendent   shows   that   the   conduct   of   the
appellant   during   incarceration   has   been   satisfactory.   It
cannot   therefore   be   said   that   there   is   no   possibility   of   the
appellant   being   reformed   and   rehabilitated   foreclosing   the
alternative option of a lesser sentence and making imposition
of death sentence imperative.  
45. We   are   therefore   inclined   to   convert   the   sentence
imposed on the appellant from death to life.  However, taking
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into consideration the gruesome murder of two of his siblings
and   one   nephew,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   appellant
deserves rigorous imprisonment of 30 years.
46. Accordingly,   the   appeals   are   partly   allowed.     The
conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under
Sections   302,   201   and   506­B   of   the   IPC   is   affirmed.
However,   the   death   sentence   awarded   to   the   appellant   is
converted to life imprisonment for a period of 30 years.
47. Before   we   part   with   the   judgment,   we   must   appreciate
the   valuable   assistance   rendered   by   Shri   N.   Hariharan,
learned Senior  Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
and   Smt.   Swarupama   Chaturvedi,   learned   Assistant
Advocate   General   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­
State.
……....….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
..…....….......................J.
      [B.R. GAVAI]
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….…….........................J.       
  [B.V. NAGARATHNA]
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 09, 2021.
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