2021 INSC 0837
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 499­500 OF 2018
LOCHAN SHRIVAS        ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   appellant   has   approached   this   Court   being
aggrieved   by   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Chhattisgarh,   Bilaspur   dated   17 th
  November   2017,
thereby   dismissing   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant
challenging   the   judgment   and   order   dated   17 th
  June   2016,
passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Fast   Track   Court,
Raigarh   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “trial   judge”)   vide
which the trial judge convicted the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 377, 201, 302
read   with   Section   376A   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860
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(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “IPC”)   and   Section   6   of   the
Protection   of   Children   from   Sexual   Offences   Act,   2012
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “POCSO   Act”).   Vide   the   same
judgment   and   order,   the   appellant   was   sentenced   to   death
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.  For
the   other   offences   for   which   the   appellant   was   found   guilty,
sentences   of   rigorous   imprisonment   of   3   years,   5   years,   7
years   and   life   imprisonment   have   been   awarded   to   the
appellant.     The   trial   judge   has   also   made   a   reference   being
Cr. Ref. No. 1 of 2016 to the High Court under Section 366 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as   “Cr.P.C.”)   for   confirmation   of   death   penalty.     Vide   the
impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   while
dismissing   the   appeal   of   the   appellant,   has   confirmed   the
death penalty.
2. The prosecution case in brief is thus:
Complainant­PW­1   Gudiya   Parveen   w/o   PW­2­Mohd.
Armaan   resided   at   D­29,   4 th
  Floor,   Bajrangdheepa   Colony
with   her   husband   and   her   minor   victim   daughter   aged   3
years.     At   about   10.00   am,   on   24 th
  February   2016,   she   had
gone downstairs to wash clothes. At that time, she called her
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husband   for   bathing  the   victim.     Her   husband   told   her   that
the   victim   had   gone   downstairs   to   play.   PW­1   then   went
upstairs   and   told   her   husband   that   the   victim   was   not
downstairs.   Thereafter, her husband (PW­2) and she started
looking   for   the   victim,   but   the   victim   was   not   found
anywhere. Since the victim could not be found, PW­1 went to
Jutemill Police Station and lodged a report of the victim going
missing.  They  continued  the  search  and  ultimately   returned
to   their   house   at   around   03.00­04.00   am   in   the   morning.
PW­3­Mohd.   Sahid   alias   Raju   Khan   told   her   that   appellant­
Lochan Shrivas, a resident of D­15 in the same building had
said   that   if   they   would   allow   him   to   conduct   a   worship,   he
could   find   their   child   in   an   hour.     Therefore,   they   agreed   to
conduct   the   worship.   After   the   worship,   the   appellant
informed them that the child was tied and kept inside a sack
in the bushes near a pole beside the road in Amlibhauna. On
this,   PW­1   and   other   prosecution   witnesses   developed   a
suspicion, and as such, PW­3 informed the police. The police
interrogated   the   appellant,   who   confessed   his   crime   before
them. Thereafter, on a memorandum under Section 27 of the
Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
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“Evidence   Act”),   a   sack   from   the   bushes   was   recovered,
wherein  the  dead  body  of  the  deceased  soaked  in  blood   was
found (Ex.­P.12).   On the basis of the oral report (Ex.­P.1) of
PW­1,   a   First   Information   Report   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“FIR”)   (Ex.­P.36)   came   to   be   registered   for   the   offence
punishable under Section 363 of the IPC.  After completion of
investigation, a charge­sheet came to be filed before the trial
judge   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   363,   376,
377, 302, 201 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 
3. Charges came to be framed for the offences punishable
under   Sections   363,   376(2)(i),   377,   201,   302   read   with
Section   376A   of   the   IPC   and   Section   6   of   the   POCSO   Act.
The accused pleaded to be not guilty and claimed to be tried.
At   the   conclusion   of   the   trial,   the   trial   judge   recorded   the
aforesaid   order  of  conviction   and   sentence.     Being   aggrieved
thereby, an appeal was preferred by the appellant and also a
reference   was   made   by   the   trial   judge   under   Section   366   of
the Cr.P.C.   By the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant   and
confirmed the death sentence.  Hence, the present appeals.
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4. We   have   heard   Shri   Anand   Grover,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Shri
Nishanth   Patil,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondent­State.
5. Shri   Anand   Grover,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
on behalf of the appellant submitted that the present case is
a case based on circumstantial evidence.   He submitted that
the   prosecution   has   utterly   failed   to   establish   the
incriminating   circumstances   and   in   any   case,   failed   to
establish   the   chain   of   events,   which   leads   to   no   other
conclusion than the guilt of the accused.   He submitted that
there are many missing links in the prosecution case, and as
such,   the   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   as   recorded   by
the   trial   judge   and   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   is   not
sustainable   in   law.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted
that   the   main   incriminating   circumstance,   on   which   the
prosecution   relies,   is   the   recovery   of   the   dead   body   of   the
victim.  He submitted that the recovery is from an open place
accessible   to   one   and   all.     He   therefore   submitted   that   the
said recovery is of no assistance to the prosecution case.  He
further   submitted   that   the   alleged   recovery   of   black   jeans
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half   pant   (Ex.­P.15)   of   the   deceased   and   the   white   gamchha
(Ex.­P.16)   is   from   a   place   accessible   to   one   and   all.     He
submitted that in any case, the Forensic Science Laboratory
(hereinafter referred to as the “FSL”) reports are inconclusive,
and therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the link
between the recovered materials and the crime.
6. Shri   Grover   submitted   that   the   evidence   of   PW­9­
Chameli Sarthi, Constable would reveal that she had gone to
the   spot   from   where   the   body   of   the   victim   was   alleged   to
have   been   recovered   at   around   06.00   am.     It   is   thus   clear
that   the   police   were   already   aware   about   the   place   from
where   the   body   was   alleged   to   have   been   recovered   on   a
memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
7. He   further   submitted   that   the   finger   nails   of   the
appellant were cut by a barber PW­8­Kishore Shrivas and not
by   any   forensic   expert.     He   therefore   submitted   that   the
circumstance  of  finding  human  blood  on  the  said nails   is  of
no   use   to   the   prosecution   case.     This   is   particularly   so   in
view   of   the   long   delay   in   seizure   of   the   nail   samples   and
sending them to the FSL. The learned Senior Counsel further
submitted   that   it   is   improbable   that   the   prosecution   could
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have   called   the   photographer   at   such   a   short   notice.     He
submitted   that   the   alleged   recovery   is   at   around   08.00   am
which   are   not   the   business   hours,   and   as   such,   the   very
evidence   regarding   photography   and   videography   becomes
doubtful. 
8. The   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant   further
submitted   that   the   entire   record   would   reveal   that   the
appellant   was   not   given   an   opportunity   of   meaningfully
defending   the   case.     He   submitted   that   since   the   Raigarh
District   Bar   Association   had   taken   a   resolution   that   no
lawyer   from   the   Bar   would   appear   for   the   appellant,   it   was
difficult for him to engage a lawyer.  The lawyer appointed by
the   court   from   a   list   of   panel   lawyers,   also   was   not   given
sufficient opportunity to defend the case of the appellant.  He
submitted that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the mother and
the father of the victim, were recorded on the very same day
on   which   the   lawyer   was   appointed   for   the   appellant.     He
further submitted that the trial court recorded the judgment
and   order   of   conviction,   and   the   sentence   on   the   very   same
day   without   giving   an   appropriate   opportunity   to   the
appellant.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel   therefore   submitted
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that   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   the   case   beyond
reasonable doubt and the appeals deserve to be allowed.
9. The   learned   Senior   Counsel,   in   the   alternative,   would
submit   that   in   any   case,   the   death   penalty   would   not   be
warranted   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case.     He   submitted
that the trial court as well as the High Court has taken into
consideration   only   the   aspect   of   crime   and   they   have   not
dealt with the aspect regarding the criminal.   It is submitted
that   the  trial  court  as well  as  the  High  Court  has  not  taken
into   consideration   the   socio­economic   background   of   the
appellant   so   also   the   possibility   of   the   appellant   being
reformed   or   rehabilitated.   It   is   therefore   submitted   that   the
imposition of death penalty in the facts of the present case is
not at all warranted.
10. Shri   Nishanth   Patil,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   respondent­State,   on   the   contrary,   submitted
that   the   prosecution   has   established   the   case   beyond
reasonable   doubt.     It   is   submitted   that   the   prosecution   has
proved   all   the   incriminating   circumstances   beyond
reasonable doubt.  He further submitted that the prosecution
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has also established the link of proved circumstances, which
leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused.
11. Shri   Patil   further   submitted   that   the   appellant   has
committed   a   heinous   act   of   rape   on   a   minor   girl   and   then
brutally   killed   her,   and   as   such,   the   case   warrants   for   no
other penalty than the death penalty.
12. With   the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties, we have scrutinized the entire evidence on record in
depth.    Normally,  this  Court  while  exercising   its  jurisdiction
under  Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   would   not   go
into detailed analysis of the evidence.   However, since in the
present   case,   the   trial   court   has   imposed   death   penalty,
which   is   confirmed   by   the   High   Court,   we   have   scrutinized
the evidence minutely. 
13. The   law   with   regard   to   conviction   in   cases   based   on
circumstantial evidence has been very well crystalised in the
celebrated   case   of   Hanumant,   son   of   Govind   Nargundkar
v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh 1
. A three­Judge Bench of this
Court, speaking through Mehr Chand Mahajan, J., observed
thus:
1   1952 SCR 1091
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“It   is   well   to   remember   that   in   cases   where   the
evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully
established,   and   all   the   facts   so   established
should   be   consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of
the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature   and   tendency
and   they   should   be   such   as   to   exclude   every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In
other words, there must be a chain of evidence so
far   complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable
ground   for   a   conclusion   consistent   with   the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as
to show that within all human probability the act
much have been done by the accused.”
14. It is thus clear that for  resting  a conviction in the case
of circumstantial evidence,  the circumstances from which the
conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn,   should   be   fully
established,   and   all   the   facts   so   established   should   be
consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the
accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and   tendency,   and   they   should   be   such   as   to   exclude   every
hypothesis,   but   the   one   proposed   to   be   proved.   There   must
be   a   chain   of   evidence   so   complete   as   not   to   leave   any
reasonable   ground   for   a   conclusion   consistent   with   the
innocence   of   the   accused,   and   it   must   be   such   as   to   show
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that   within   all  human  probabilities,  the   act  must  have  been
done by the accused.
15. Subsequently,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Sharad
Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 2
,   observed
thus: 
“153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would
show   that   the   following   conditions   must   be
fulfilled   before   a   case   against   an  accused   can   be
said to be fully established:
( 1 )   the   circumstances   from   which   the
conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be   drawn
should be fully established.
It   may   be   noted   here   that   this   Court   indicated
that   the   circumstances   concerned   “must   or
should”   and   not   “may   be”   established.   There   is
not   only   a   grammatical   but   a   legal   distinction
between “may be proved” and “must be or should
be   proved”   as   was   held   by   this   Court   in   Shivaji
Sahabrao   Bobade   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   [(1973)
2   SCC   793   :   1973   SCC   (Cri)   1033   :   1973   Crl   LJ
1783]   where   the   observations   were   made   :   [SCC
para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the   accused   must   be   and   not
merely   may   be   guilty   before   a   court
can   convict   and   the   mental   distance
between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long
and   divides   vague   conjectures   from
sure conclusions.”
( 2 )   the   facts   so   established   should   be
consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they   should   not   be   explainable   on   any
2   (1984) 4 SCC 116
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other   hypothesis   except   that   the
accused is guilty,
( 3 )   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a
conclusive nature and tendency,
( 4 )   they   should   exclude   every   possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
( 5 )   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence
so   complete   as   not   to   leave   any
reasonable   ground   for   the   conclusion
consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the
accused   and   must   show   that   in   all
human   probability   the   act   must   have
been done by the accused.
154.   These   five   golden   principles,   if   we   may   say
so,   constitute   the   panchsheel   of   the   proof   of   a
case based on circumstantial evidence.”
16. As   has   been   held   by   this   Court,   in   a   case   of
circumstantial   evidence,   before   the   case   can   be   said   to   be
fully established against an accused, it is necessary that   the
circumstances   from   which   the   conclusion   of   guilt   is   to   be
drawn,   should   be   fully   established,   and   all   the   facts   so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the   guilt   of   the   accused.   They   should   not   be   explainable   on
any   other   hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is   guilty.   The
circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature   and
tendency.   They   should   exclude   every   hypothesis   except   the
one   to   be   proved.   There   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so
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complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probabilities, the act must have
been done by the accused.
17. The   aforesaid   view   has   been   consistently   followed   by
this Court in a catena of decisions.
18. The circumstances, which the trial court has culled out
in   its   judgment   while   holding   that   the   prosecution   has
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, are thus: 
“1.  The accused telling PW5 Munni that he can
tell   the   location   of   the   missing   victim   in   an
hour if he does Pooja.
2.  PW5   Munni   telling   PW3;   Mo   Sahid   alias
Raju Khan what the accused had told her as
above.
3.  PW3   Mo   Sahid   alias   Raju   Khan   telling   the
victim's parents of the above conversation.
4. The deceased's parents PW1 Gudiya Parveen
and PW2 Mo Armaan asking the accused to
perform the Pooja.
5.  The   accused   saying   that   the   victim's   body
was in a gunny sack near an electricity pole
on the side of the road in Amlibhauna.
6.  PW3   Mo   Sahid   alias   Raju   Khan   telling   the
police   of   the   aforesaid   claims   by   the
accused.
7.  Police   questioning   the   accused   and   the
accused going along with the police to locate
the   victim's   dead   body   in   a   gunny   sack   in
Amlibhauna.
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8.  The accused leading the police to recover the
pillow and the towel from his home­
9.  The   accused   leading   the   police   to   the
rubbish   dump   where   he   had   thrown   the
victim's pants.
10.  Material   used   in   a   Pooja   being   recovered
from the home of the victim
11.  According   to   Ex   P   46,   the   fact   that   blood
was   found   under   the   accused's   nails   and
that   the   victim's   vaginal   slide   had   traces   of
human sperm.”
19. The   High   Court   also   by   giving   an   elaborate   reasoning
has   held   that   the   prosecution   has   proved   the   chain   of
incriminating   circumstances,   which   leads   to   no   other
conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.
20. We   will   now   consider   the   evidence   led   on   behalf   of   the
prosecution   to   establish   the   incriminating   circumstances
against the appellant.
21. PW­1­Gudiya Parveen, mother of the victim has deposed
that she lived in D­29, 4 th
 Floor, Bajrangdheepa Colony.  The
appellant lived downstairs in D­15 in the same building.  On
24 th
  February   2016   at   about   10.00   am,   she   had   gone
downstairs to wash clothes.   She had called her husband for
bathing  the victim.   However, her husband told her that the
victim   had   gone   downstairs   to   play.     Thereafter,   they
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searched for the victim but she was not found, and therefore,
they went to Jutemill Police Station and lodged the report of
the   victim   going   missing.     On   the   basis   of   the   oral   report
(Ex.­P.1),   an   FIR   (Ex.­P.36)   came   to   be   registered.     The   oral
report   (Ex.­P.1)   is   duly   proved   in   the   evidence   of   PW­1
whereas, the FIR (Ex.­P.36) has been proved in the evidence
of PW­16­Dinesh Bahidar, Assistant Sub­Inspector.  
22. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   first   circumstance   that
the   prosecution   has   proved,   is   that   the   victim   went   missing
at   around   10.00   am,   and   thereafter,   they   started   searching
for   her.     When   the   victim   was   not   found   anywhere,   an   oral
report (Ex.­P.1) came to be lodged at around 22.00 hours on
24 th
  February  2016 on  the basis of  which, an  FIR (Ex.­P.36)
came to be registered. 
23. PW­1, in her testimony, has further stated that she and
her   husband   PW­2­Mohd.   Armaan   tried   to   search   for   the
child.  Since she could not be found, they returned at around
03.00­04.00   am.     When   they   returned   home,   Raju   Khan
(PW­3)   informed   them   that   appellant­Lochan   Shrivas,   a
resident   of   D­15,   has   stated   that  if   they   would   allow   him   to
conduct a worship, he could find the child in an hour.  Then,
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PW­1   agreed   for   conducting   the   worship.     She   arranged   for
the things required for worship – vermilion, lemons, earthen
lamps, incense sticks and coal.   After these things had been
brought, the appellant performed the worship in the room of
PW­1.   He  had asked them  to cover  all  the pictures of  Allah
by   a   cloth.   After   performing   the   worship,   the   appellant   told
them   that   the   child   was   inside   a   sack   in   the   bushes   near   a
pole beside the road in  Amlibhauna .  
24. Similar   is   the   evidence   of   PW­2­Mohd.   Armaan,   the
husband of PW­1 and father of the victim.  PW­3­Raju Khan,
who   is   a   neighbour,   had   stated   in   his   evidence   that   when
they   could   not   find   the   victim,   they   returned   at   around
03.00­03.30 am.   He stated that when they returned, Munni
alias   Sarbari   (PW­5)   told   them   that   appellant­Lochan
Shrivas,   who   lived   in   D­15   was   telling   her   that   the   child
could   be   traced   by   worship.     Accordingly,   the   worship   was
performed,   and   after   that,   appellant­Lochan   said   that   the
victim   was   inside   a   sack   in   the   bushes   near   a   pole   beside
Amlibhauna  road.
25. PW­5­Munni   alias   Sarbari,   who   is   also   a   resident   of
Bajrangdheepa   colony,   stated   that   she   had   also   joined   for
16

searching   the   victim.     However,   since   the   victim   was   not
found,   they   returned.   At   about   03.00­03.30   am   on   25 th
February   2016,   the   appellant   met   her   and   said,   “If   you
conduct   worship,   your   child   will   be   found.”     She   told   the
same   to   Raju   Khan   (PW­3).     Then,   the   appellant   conducted
worship and said that the deceased was inside a sack in the
bushes near a pole beside the road in  Amlibhauna .  
26. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   prosecution   has   proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant, on his own, told
PW­5­Munni   alias   Sarbari   that   if   a   worship   was   performed,
the whereabouts of the victim  could be found.   PW­5­Munni
alias   Sarbari   informed   this   fact   to   PW­3­Raju   Khan,   who   in
turn,   informed   the   same   to   PWs   1   and   2.     Accordingly,   a
worship   came   to   be   performed.     After   the   worship   was
performed,   the   appellant   told   them   that   the   victim   could   be
found in a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road in
Amlibhauna .
27. PW­19­Amit   Patley,   Sub­Inspector,   Investigating   Officer
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “IO”),   has   also   seized   the
materials   which   were   used   for   performing   the   worship   (Ex.­
P.18).   The said panchnama is witnessed by Raju Khan (PW­
17

3).     The   said   seizure   panchnama   therefore   corroborates   the
ocular version of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5.
It is thus clear that when PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5 returned to
their  place of  residence, the  appellant informed PW­5  that  if
they   perform   a   worship,   the   deceased   could   be   found.
Accordingly,   a   worship   was   performed   and   after   performing
the said worship, the appellant said that the deceased could
be found in a sack in the bushes near a pole beside the road
in   Amlibhauna .   This   circumstance   could   be   an   important
circumstance   for   considering   the   conduct   of   the   appellant
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.  Reliance in this respect
could be placed on the judgments of this Court in the cases
of   Prakash   Chand   v.   State   (Delhi   Administration) 3
,
Himachal   Pradesh   Administration   v.   Shri   Om   Prakash 4
and  A.N. Venkatesh and Another v. State of Karnataka 5
.
28. The   next   and   the   most   important   circumstance   on
which the prosecution relies, is the recovery  of dead body  of
the victim on a memorandum of the appellant under Section
27   of   the   Evidence   Act.     The   evidence   of   PWs   1,   2,   3   and   5
3   (1979) 3 SCC 90
4   (1972) 1 SCC 249
5   (2005) 7 SCC 714
18

would reveal that immediately after the appellant performing
worship and telling them that the victim was inside a sack in
the   bushes   near   a   pole   beside   the   road   in   Amlibhauna ,   a
suspicion arose and Raju Khan (PW­3) immediately informed
the police and the police arrived.  The evidence of all the four
witnesses is consistent in that regard. Amit Patley, IO(PW­19)
also corroborated this fact with regard to the police receiving
the said information.   In his evidence, PW­19 stated that he
registered the said information in Rojnamcha No.2 dated 25 th
February 2016 at 06.10 am.   The said Rojnamcha entry has
been   exhibited   at   Ex.­P.38   and   its   attested   copy   is   at   Ex.­
P.38­C.
29. PW­19,   in   his   evidence,   stated   that   after   receiving   the
information,   he   immediately   went   to   the   spot   and   took   the
appellant   into   his   custody   and   interrogated   him.     He   stated
that the appellant, on being interrogated, stated thus:
“The previous day on 24.02.2016, at about 10:00,
he had been alone in his room. The deceased who
lived   in   D­29   on   the   floor   above   his   house   was
coming   downstairs   whom   she   persuaded   and
took   into   his   room   and   closed   his   room   from
inside   and   got   the   pants   worn   by   the   deceased
removed and forcibly made physical relation with
her.   Meanwhile,   the   deceased   started   crying
loudly   so   he   pressed   the   mouth   and   nose   of   the
19

deceased   with   a   pillow.   By   making   physical
relation,  excessive  bleeding  started,  seeing  which
he   got   nervous   and   thinking   that   the   secret
should   not   be   revealed,   he   murdered   the
deceased by strangulating her and wipe the blood
and   the   ejaculated   sperm   smeared   on   his   penis
with  a  towel kept in  the room. He filled the dead
body of the deceased in a plastic sack of lentil by
twisting her hands and legs. He tied the bag with
a   plastic   rope.   He   wore   his   clothes.   He   filled   the
pants   worn   by   the   deceased   in   a   polythene   and
threw   it   from   the   balcony   to   the   place   where
garbage is disposed and entering the room placed
the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   that   he   had   filled
in   a   plastic   sack,   in   a   yellow   bag.   He   locked   the
room, carried the bag in hands and went on foot
to hide the dead body in a bush near electric pole
at   Amlibhouna   road   and   stated   of   keeping   the
bag  in his home on returning  and of keeping the
pillow   with   which   he   had   pressed   the   nose   and
mouth  of  the  deceased  and  the  towel  with  which
he had wiped the blood and semen on his penis,
in his room and stated of getting the dead body of
the   deceased,   her   pants,   pillow   and   towel
recovered.”
30. The   memorandum   statement   under   Section   27   of   the
Evidence   Act   was   duly   executed   and   the   same   was   marked
as   Ex.­P.11.     The   prosecution   has   examined   PW­3­Raju
Khan, who is a witness to the said memorandum statement.
31. PW­19 further stated that thereafter, in the presence of
the witnesses, he recovered a blue plastic bag bearing a map
of India and the text “No.1 Dal Best Quality Dal”, which had
been   tied   with   a   plastic   rope.     He   got   the   bag   cut   open   by
20

Raju   Khan   (PW­3)   in   the   presence   of   the   father   of   the
deceased   (PW­2)   and   other   witnesses.     In   the   said   sack,   the
dead   body   of   the   victim   soaked   in   blood   and   in   a   naked
condition was found.   The body was identified by PW­2, who
is   the   father   of   the   deceased.     The   recovery   panchnama   is
duly executed under Ex.­P.12.  The prosecution has relied on
the   evidence   of   PW­3,   who   was   a   panch   witness   to   the   said
panchnama.
32. The said recovery on the memorandum of the appellant
under  Section 27 of  the  Evidence Act,  has  been  attacked by
the   defence   on   the   ground   that   the   same   is   from   an   open
place, accessible to one and all.  In this respect, it is apposite
to rely on the following observations of this Court in the case
of  State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh 6
:   
“26.   There   is   nothing   in   Section   27   of   the
Evidence   Act   which   renders  the   statement   of   the
accused   inadmissible   if   recovery   of   the   articles
was   made   from   any   place   which   is   “open   or
accessible to others”. It is a fallacious notion that
when   recovery   of   any   incriminating   article   was
made from a place which is open or accessible to
others, it would vitiate the evidence under Section
27   of   the   Evidence   Act.   Any   object   can   be
concealed in places which are open  or  accessible
to   others.   For   example,   if   the   article   is   buried   in
6   (1999) 4 SCC 370
21

the   main   roadside   or   if   it   is   concealed   beneath
dry   leaves   lying   on   public   places   or   kept   hidden
in a public office, the article would remain out of
the   visibility   of   others   in   normal   circumstances.
Until   such   article   is   disinterred,   its   hidden   state
would   remain   unhampered.   The   person   who   hid
it alone  knows where it is until he discloses that
fact   to   any   other   person.   Hence,   the   crucial
question   is   not   whether  the   place   was   accessible
to   others   or   not   but   whether   it   was   ordinarily
visible to others. If it is not, then it is immaterial
that the concealed place is accessible to others.”
 
It could thus be seen that this Court has held that what
is relevant is not whether  the place was accessible to others
or not, but whether it was ordinarily visible to others.   If the
place   at   which   the   article   hidden   is   such   where   only   the
person   hiding   it   knows   until   he   discloses   that   fact   to   any
other   person,   then   it   will   be   immaterial   whether   the
concealed place is accessible to others.
33. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following
observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   John   Pandian   v.
State represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 7
: 
“ 57.   It   was   then   urged   by   the   learned   counsel
that   this   was   an   open   place   and   anybody   could
have planted veechu aruval. That appears to be a
very   remote   possibility.   Nobody   can   simply
produce   a   veechu   aruval   planted   under   the
7   (2010) 14 SCC 129
22

thorny   bush.   The   discovery   appears   to   be
credible. It has been accepted by both the courts
below and we find no reason to discard it. This is
apart from   the  fact  that  this  weapon  was  sent  to
the   forensic   science   laboratory   (FSL)   and   it   has
been   found   stained   with   human   blood.   Though
the  blood  group  could  not   be  ascertained,  as the
results were inconclusive, the accused had to give
some   explanation   as   to   how   the   human   blood
came   on   this   weapon.   He   gave   none.   This
discovery   would   very   positively   further   the
prosecution case.”
34. A perusal of the material placed on record would reveal
that   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   was   recovered   on   the
basis   of   the   information   supplied   by   the   appellant   that   he
had concealed the body  in a sack in the bushes near a pole
beside   the   road   in   Amlibhauna.     The   evidence   of   PW­7­
Krishna Kumar Jaiswal, Photographer would reveal that after
he   received   the   notice,   he   went   to   the   spot   and   clicked   the
photographs   (Ex.­P.23).     He   has   further   stated   that   he   has
also made the videography of the entire procedure.
35. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following
observations   made   by   the   High   Court   in   para   (35)   of   the
impugned judgment:
“ 35.     We   have   gone   through   the   video   movie
prepared   and   after   watching   the   video,   we   are   of
23

the view that the recovery of dead body was made
from   a   place   which   cannot   be   said   to   be
accessible   to   an   ordinary   person   without   prior
knowledge   as   the   body   recovered   was   kept
concealed   in   a   gunny   bag   inside   the   shrubs
situated   at   sufficient   distance   from   the   main
road.   In   the   statement   under   Section   313   CrPC,
the   accused/appellant   failed   to   explain   how   he
came   to   know   that   the   deceased   had   been
murdered   and   thrown   in   the   shrubs   after
wrapping her in a gunny bag……..”
It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   High   Court   had   itself
viewed  the  video  and  on  seeing  the   same,  it  was  of  the  view
that   the   recovery   of   the   dead   body   was   made   from   a   place,
which cannot be said to be accessible to an ordinary person
without   prior   knowledge   since   the   body   recovered   was   kept
concealed   in   a   gunny   bag   inside   the   shrubs   situated   at
sufficient distance from the main road.  
36. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   the   appellant   on   the
judgment of this Court in the case of  Krishan Mohar Singh
Dugal   v.   State   of   Goa 8
  is   concerned,   in   the   said   case,   the
accused   was   convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under
Section   20(b)(ii)   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and   Psychotropic
Substances  Act,  1985,  solely  on  the  basis  of  recovery  at  the
8   (1999) 8 SCC 552
24

instance   of   the   accused   on   the   basis   of   memorandum
statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.   In the said
case,  the  recovery   was  from  a  place under  the  coconut  tree,
which   was   accessible   to   one   and   all.   It   was   not   a   case   of
concealment in a place, which was only within the knowledge
of   the   person   concealing   it.     In   any   event,   in   the   said   case,
the   conviction   was   solely   on   the   basis   of   the   said   recovery
and as such, was found to be untenable.  
37. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   by   the   appellant   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Nilesh   Dinkar
Paradkar   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 9
  is   concerned,   in   the
said   case,   the   conviction   was   solely   on   the   basis   of
identification   by   voice   and   as   such,   was   not   found   to   be
tenable.  As such, these cases would not be of any assistance
to the case of the appellant.
38. It   has   been   sought   to   be   urged   on   behalf   of   the
appellant   that   from   the   evidence   of   PW­9­Chameli   Sarthi,   it
is   clear   that   the   police   already   knew   about   the   place   where
the   dead   body   was   concealed.     PW­9   had   taken   the   dead
body of the deceased to District Hospital, Raigarh.   It will be
9   (2011) 4 SCC 143
25

apposite   to   refer   to   the   relevant   portion   of   the   deposition   of
PW­9: 
“We went to  the place of  incident Amlibhowna at
6 a.m. from the outpost.   From there, we directly
went   to   the   hospital   with   all.     Today,   I   cannot
state   at   what   time   we   left   the   place   of   incident
Amlibhowna.  The witness now says, “Perhaps we
left   at   8­9   O’   clock.     Along   with   Prakash   Tiwari,
Sub­Inspector   Amit   Patle   was   also   present   with
me  and policemen from  other  police station  were
also present. Two person were going ahead taking
the   dead   body   in   an   auto­rickshaw,   we   were
following by our bikes.”
PW­9   stated   that   she   went   to   the   place   of   incident
Amlibhauna at 06.00 am from the outpost.   It is to be noted
that   according   to   the   evidence   of   PWs   1,   2,   3   and   19,   PW­3
informed PW­19 about the incident at around 06.00 am.  The
said information was registered in the Rojnamcha at around
06.10 am.  What is stated by this witness is that she went to
Amlibhauna   which   is   a   locality.     However,   that   by   itself
would   not   be   sufficient   to   come   to   a   conclusion   that   the
police   already   knew   about   the   place   from   where   the   dead
body   was   recovered.     She   stated   that   she   had   left   for   the
hospital   at   around   08.00­09.00   o’clock.     The   evidence   of   a
witness cannot be read in piecemeal.  The evidence has to be
26

read as a whole.   If the evidence of this witness is read as a
whole,   the   attack   on   her   evidence   is   not   justified.     In   any
case, the recovery of the body on the information given by the
appellant,   is   duly   proved   by   the   memorandum   of   the
appellant   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act   (Ex.­P.11)
and the recovery panchnama (Ex.­P.12). That apart, the oral
testimony of PWs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 19 corroborates the same.
39. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the
prosecution   has   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   the
recovery   of   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   on   the
memorandum   of   the   appellant   under   Section   27   of   the
Evidence   Act,   was   from   a   place   distinctly   within   the
knowledge of the appellant.  
40. Another   circumstance   against   the   appellant   is   the
recovery   of   the   black   jeans   half   pant   of   the   deceased   (Ex.­
P.15)   from   the   dumping   area   and   the   gamchha   and   pillow
(Ex.­P.16) from the house of the appellant.   PW­3 is a panch
witness   to   the   recovery   of   black   jeans   half   pant   (Ex.­P.15).
He is also a witness to the spot panchnama (Ex.­P.17) where
the   worship   was   conducted.     It   is   further   noted   that   on   the
27

gamchha  seized from the house of the appellant, blood­stains
were found.   Much attack has been made by  the defence on
the   ground   that   the   FSL   Report   does   not   connect   the
appellant   with   the   said   blood   found   on   gamchha .     To
consider   this   submission,   we   may   gainfully   refer   to   the
following observations of this Court in the case of  R. Shaji v.
State of Kerala 10
:  
“ 30.   It   has   been   argued   by   the   learned   counsel
for   the   appellant   that   as   the   blood   group   of   the
bloodstains   found   on   the   chopper   could   not   be
ascertained,   the   recovery   of   the   said   chopper
cannot be relied upon.
31.   A   failure   by   the   serologist   to   detect   the   origin
of   the   blood   due   to   disintegration   of   the   serum
does   not   mean   that   the   blood   stuck   on   the   axe
could   not   have   been   human   blood   at   all .
Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain
is   insufficient   in   itself,   or   due   to   haematological
changes   and   plasmatic   coagulation,   that   a
serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood
in  question.  However,  in  such  a  case,  unless  the
doubt   is   of   a   reasonable   dimension,   which   a
judicially   conscientious   mind   may   entertain   with
some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the
accused in this regard. Once the recovery is made
in   pursuance   of   a   disclosure   statement   made   by
the   accused,   the   matching   or   non­matching   of
blood   group(s)   loses   significance.   (Vide   Prabhu
Babaji   Navle   v.   State   of   Bombay   [AIR   1956   SC
51   :   1956   Cri   LJ   147]   ,   Raghav   Prapanna
Tripathi   v.   State   of   U.P.   [AIR   1963   SC   74   :   (1963)
10   (2013) 14 SCC 266
28

1   Cri   LJ   70]   ,   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Teja
Ram   [(1999)   3   SCC   507   :   1999   SCC   (Cri)
436]   ,   Gura   Singh   v.   State   of   Rajasthan   [(2001)   2
SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323 : AIR 2001 SC 330]
,   John   Pandian   v.   State   [(2010)   14   SCC   129   :
(2011)   3   SCC   (Cri)   550]   and   Sunil   Clifford
Daniel   v.   State   of   Punjab   [(2012)   11   SCC   205   :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 438] .)
32.   In view of the above, the Court finds that it is
not possible to accept the submission that in the
absence   of   a   report   regarding   the   origin   of   the
blood,   the   accused   cannot   be   convicted,   for   it   is
only   because   of   the   lapse   of   time   that   the   blood
could not be classified successfully. Therefore, no
advantage   can   be   conferred   upon   the  accused   to
enable him to claim any benefit, and the report of
disintegration   of   blood,   etc.   cannot   be   termed   as
a missing link, on the basis of which the chain of
circumstances may be presumed to be broken.”
 
41. The next circumstance is the finding of the blood­stains
on   the   nail   clipping   of   the   appellant.     PW­8­Kishore   Shrivas
is a barber.  He has stated that on being called by the police,
he cut the nails of both the hands of the appellant.  The said
nails   were   cut   under   the   panchnama   Ex.­P.19,   which   is
signed   by   the   said   barber   as   well   as   PW­3.     The   said
circumstance is attacked on the ground that the IO had not
called   the   forensic   team   for   seizure   of   the   said   nails.
However, even if this circumstance is excluded, we find that
the other circumstances, which have been discussed in detail
29

by   us   in   the   foregoing   paragraphs,   conclusively   bring   home
the guilt of the appellant. 
42. The   panchnamas   are   sought   to   be   attacked   on   the
ground   that   PW­3   is   the   only   panch   witness   to   all   these
panchnamas.   We   are   of   the   view   that   this   contention
deserves no merit in the light of the following observations of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Himachal   Pradesh
Administration  (supra): 
“ 10.   Further   having   held   this   it   nonetheless   said
that there was no injunction against the same set
of   witnesses   being   present   at   the   successive
enquiries if nothing could be urged against them.
In   our   view   the   evidence   relating   to   recoveries   is
not   similar   to   that   contemplated   under   Section
103   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code   where
searches are required to be made in the presence
of two or more inhabitants of the locality in which
the   place   to   be   searched   is   situate.   In   an
investigation   under   Section   157   the   recoveries
could   be   proved   even   by   the   solitary   evidence   of
the   Investigating   Officer   if   his   evidence   could
otherwise   be   believed.   We   cannot   as   a   matter   of
law   or   practice   lay   down   that   where   recoveries
have   to   be   effected   from   different   places   on   the
information   furnished   by   the   accused   different
sets   of   persons   should   be   called   in   to   witness
them.   In   this   case   PW   2   and   PW   8   who   worked
with   the   deceased   were   the   proper   persons   to
witness the recoveries as they could identify some
of   the   things   that   were   missing   and   also   they
could   both   speak   to   the   information   and   the
recovery   made   in   consequence   thereof   as   a
30

continuous   process.   At   any   rate   PW   2   who   is
alleged to be the most interested was not present
at the time of the recovery of the dagger.”  
43. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the
prosecution   has   established   the   following   circumstances
beyond reasonable doubt:
(i) The victim was reported missing and an FIR
was lodged in this regard;
(ii) The   appellant   had   claimed   that   he   could
disclose   the   whereabouts   of   the   victim   by
performing a worship;
(iii) The   said   worship   came   to   be   conducted   by
the   appellant   in   the   early   hours   of   25 th
February  2016 in the presence of PWs 1, 2,
3 and 5 and the appellant disclosed to them
that the dead body of the victim was inside a
sack   in   the   bushes   near   a   pole   beside   the
road in Amlibhauna;
(iv) A suspicion arose in the minds of PWs 1, 2,
3  and   5  and   they   immediately   informed   the
police.   The   said   information   is   recorded   in
Rojnamcha No. 2 under Ex.­P.38;
(v) Police   immediately   reached   the   spot   and
interrogated the appellant. On interrogation,
a   memorandum   under   Section   27   of   the
Evidence Act came to be recorded;
31

(vi) On   the   basis   of   memorandum   of   the
appellant   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence
Act,   the   dead   body   of   the   victim   (Ex.­P.12)
was   recovered   from   a   sack   which   was
concealed   by   the   appellant   under   the
bushes   from   a   place   distinctly   within   his
knowledge; and
(vii) On   a   memorandum   of   the   appellant   under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, a black jeans
half   pant   of   the   victim   (Ex.­P.15)   and   a
gamchha   of   the   appellant   (Ex.­P.16),   were
recovered   from   the   dumping   area   behind   D
Block in Nagar Nigam Colony and the house
of the appellant respectively.
44. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid proven
circumstances   establish   a   chain   of   circumstances,   which
leads  to   no  other   conclusion   than   the  guilt  of  the  appellant.
Apart   from   that,   in   the   statement   recorded   under   Section
313   Cr.P.C.,   though   all   these   incriminating   circumstances
have   been   put   to   the   appellant,   he   has   not   offered   any
explanation except saying that it is wrong and false.   In this
respect,   we   may   refer   to   the   following   observations   of   this
Court in the case of  Sharad Birdhichand Sarda  (supra):  
32

“ 151.   It is well settled that the  prosecution  must
stand or  fall on its own legs and it cannot derive
any   strength   from   the   weakness   of   the   defence.
This   is   trite   law   and   no   decision   has   taken   a
contrary view. What some cases have held is only
this   :   where   various   links   in   a   chain   are   in
themselves   complete,   then   a   false   plea   or   a   false
defence   may   be   called   into   aid   only   to   lend
assurance   to   the   court.   In   other   words,   before
using   the   additional   link   it   must   be   proved   that
all the links in the chain are complete and do not
suffer   from   any   infirmity.   It   is   not   the   law   that
where   there   is   any   infirmity   or   lacuna   in   the
prosecution   case,   the   same   could   be   cured   or
supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not
accepted by a court.  
45. It   is   trite   law   that   though   the   false   explanation   cannot
be   taken   to   complete   a   missing   link   in   the   chain   of
circumstances,   it   can   surely   be   taken   to   fortify   the
conclusion of conviction recorded on the basis of the proven
incriminating   circumstances.   We   find   that   the   non­
explanation   of   the   circumstances   would   fortify   the   finding,
which   is   based   on   the   chain   of   incriminating   circumstances
that   leads   to   no   other   conclusion   than   the   guilt   of   the
appellant.
46. An   important   aspect   arises   for   consideration   in   the
present   appeals   so   also   in   the   various   other   appeals   where
the   accused   is   not   given   an   appropriate   opportunity   of
33

defending   the   case.     In   the   present   case,   we   find   that   the
charges were framed on 6 th
 May 2016.  On 6 th
 June 2016, the
accused   appeared   before   the   court   and   submitted   that   he
was   not   competent   to   engage   a   lawyer   at   his   own   cost.     As
such, the trial judge appointed Shri Kamlesh Saraf from the
Panel   as   the   lawyer   to   represent   the   accused.     Immediately
on   the   next   day,   the   evidence   of   PWs   3   to   7   were   recorded.
The trial judge passed the  judgment  and order  of conviction
on   17 th
  June   2016   and   also   awarded   death   penalty   on   the
same   day.     We   find   that   though   a   speedy   trial   is   desirable,
however,   sufficient   time   ought   to   have   been   given   to   the
counsel for the accused to prepare for  the case after  he was
appointed.   Even   insofar   as   the   award   of   sentence   is
concerned,   some   period   ought   to   have   been   given   between
the date of conviction and the award of sentence, specifically
when   a   death   penalty   was   awarded.     However,   from   the
evidence which we have scrutinized in depth, we do not find
that   any   prejudice   was   caused   to   the   accused   inasmuch   as
the   witnesses   have   been   cross­examined   in   detail   by   the
lawyer appointed by the court.
34

47. That   leaves   us   with   the   question   of   sentence.     We   will
have to consider as to whether the capital punishment in the
present case is warranted or not. 
48. Recently,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Mohd.   Mannan
alias   Abdul  Mannan   v.   State   of  Bihar 11
, after  considering
earlier   judgments   of   this   Court   on   the   present   issue   in   the
cases   of   Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 12
  and   Machhi
Singh and Others v. State of Punjab 13
,   observed thus:  
“72.   The   proposition   of   law   which   emerges   from
the   judgments   referred   to   above   is   itself   death
sentence   cannot   be   imposed   except   in   the   rarest
of rare cases, for which special reasons have to be
recorded,   as   mandated   in   Section   354(3)   of   the
Criminal   Procedure   Code.   In   deciding   whether   a
case falls within the category of the rarest of rare,
the   brutality,   and/or   the   gruesome   and/or
heinous   nature   of   the   crime   is   not   the   sole
criterion. It is not just the crime which the Court
is   to   take   into   consideration,   but   also   the
criminal,   the   state   of   his   mind,   his   socio­
economic   background,   etc.   Awarding   death
sentence   is   an   exception,   and   life   imprisonment
is the rule.”
49. This   Bench,   recently,   in   the   case   of   Mofil   Khan   and
Another v. The State of Jharkhand 14
, has observed thus: 
11   (2019) 16 SCC 584
12   (1980) 2 SCC 684
13   (1983) 3 SCC 470
14   RP(Criminal)   No.   641/2015   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.1795/2009   dated
26.11.2021
35

“ 8. One   of   the   mitigating   circumstances   is   the
probability   of   the   accused   being   reformed   and
rehabilitated.   The   State   is   under   a   duty   to
procure   evidence   to   establish   that   there   is   no
possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the
accused.   Death   sentence   ought   not   to   be
imposed,   save   in   the   rarest   of   the   rare   cases
when   the   alternative   option   of   a   lesser
punishment   is   unquestionably   foreclosed   (See:
Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab   (1980)   2   SCC
684).   To   satisfy   that   the   sentencing   aim   of
reformation   is   unachievable,   rendering   life
imprisonment   completely   futile,   the   Court   will
have   to   highlight   clear   evidence   as   to   why   the
convict   is   not   fit  for   any   kind   of  reformatory   and
rehabilitation   scheme.   This   analysis   can   only   be
done   with   rigour   when   the   Court   focuses   on   the
circumstances relating to the criminal, along with
other   circumstances   (See:   Santosh   Kumar
Satishbhushan   Bariyar   v.   State   of   Maharashtra
(2009)   6   SCC   498).   In   Rajendra   Pralhadrao
Wasnik   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   (2019)   12   SCC
460,   this   Court   dealt   with   the   review   of   a
judgment of this Court confirming death sentence
and observed as under: 
“45.   The   law   laid   down   by   various
decisions   of   this   Court   clearly   and
unequivocally   mandates   that   the
probability   (not   possibility   or
improbability   or   impossibility)   that   a
convict   can   be   reformed   and
rehabilitated   in   society   must   be
seriously   and   earnestly   considered   by
the   courts   before   awarding   the   death
sentence.   This   is   one   of   the   mandates
of the  “special  reasons” requirement  of
Section   354(3)   CrPC   and   ought   not   to
be   taken   lightly   since   it   involves
snuffing   out   the   life   of   a   person.   To
effectuate   this   mandate,   it   is   the
obligation   on   the   prosecution   to   prove
36

to the court, through evidence, that the
probability   is   that   the   convict   cannot
be   reformed   or   rehabilitated.   This   can
be   achieved   by   bringing   on   record,
inter   alia,   material   about   his   conduct
in jail, his conduct outside jail if he has
been   on   bail   for   some   time,   medical
evidence   about   his   mental   make­up,
contact   with   his   family   and   so   on.
Similarly,   the   convict   can   produce
evidence on these issues as well.””
50. In the present case, it is to be noted that the trial court
had   convicted   the   appellant   and   imposed   death   penalty   on
the very same day. The trial court as well as the High Court
has   only   taken   into   consideration   the   crime   but   they   have
not  taken into  consideration  the criminal, his state of mind,
his socio­economic background, etc.   At this juncture, it will
be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court
in   the   case   of   Rajendra   Pralhadrao   Wasnik   v.   State   of
Maharashtra 15
:
“ 47.   Consideration   of   the   reformation,
rehabilitation and reintegration of the convict into
society   cannot   be   overemphasised.   Until   Bachan
Singh   [ Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (1980)   2
SCC   684   :   1980   SCC   (Cri)   580]   ,   the   emphasis
given by the courts was primarily on the nature of
the   crime,   its   brutality   and   severity.   Bachan
Singh   [ Bachan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (1980)   2
SCC   684   :   1980   SCC   (Cri)   580]   placed   the
15   (2019) 12 SCC 460
37

sentencing   process   into   perspective   and
introduced   the   necessity   of   considering   the
reformation   or   rehabilitation   of   the   convict.
Despite   the   view   expressed   by   the   Constitution
Bench,   there   have   been   several   instances,   some
of   which   have   been   pointed   out
in   Bariyar   [ Santosh   Kumar   Satishbhushan
Bariyar   v.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   (2009)   6   SCC
498   :   (2009)   2   SCC   (Cri)   1150]   and
in   Sangeet   v.   State   of   Haryana   [ Sangeet   v.   State
of   Haryana ,   (2013)   2   SCC   452   :   (2013)   2   SCC
(Cri)   611]   where   there   is   a   tendency   to   give
primacy to the crime and consider the criminal in
a   somewhat   secondary   manner.   As   observed
in   Sangeet   [ Sangeet   v.   State   of   Haryana ,   (2013)   2
SCC   452   :   (2013)   2   SCC   (Cri)   611]   “In   the
sentencing   process,   both   the   crime   and   the
criminal   are   equally   important.”   Therefore,   we
should   not   forget   that   the   criminal,   however
ruthless   he   might   be,   is   nevertheless   a   human
being   and   is   entitled   to   a   life   of   dignity
notwithstanding his crime. Therefore, it is for the
prosecution and the courts to determine whether
such a person, notwithstanding his crime, can be
reformed and rehabilitated. To obtain and analyse
this information is certainly not an easy task but
must nevertheless be undertaken. The process of
rehabilitation   is   also   not   a   simple   one   since   it
involves   social   reintegration   of   the   convict   into
society.   Of   course,   notwithstanding   any
information   made   available   and   its   analysis   by
experts   coupled   with   the   evidence   on   record,
there   could   be   instances   where   the   social
reintegration of the convict may not be possible. If
that should happen, the option of a long duration
of imprisonment is permissible.”
51. In   view   of   the   settled   legal   position,   it   is   our   bounden
duty to take into consideration the probability of the accused
38

being reformed and rehabilitated.   It is also our duty to take
into   consideration   not   only   the   crime   but   also   the   criminal,
his state of mind and his socio­economic conditions.  
52. The appellant is a young person, who was 23 years old
at   the   time   of   commission   of   the   offence.   He   comes   from   a
rural  background. The  State  has  not  placed any  evidence to
show  that  there  is  no  possibility   with  respect  to  reformation
and the rehabilitation of the accused.  The High Court as well
as   the   trial   court   also   has   not   taken   into   consideration   this
aspect of the matter.  The appellant has placed on record the
affidavits   of   Leeladhar   Shrivas,   younger   brother   of   the
appellant   as   well   as   Ghasanin   Shrivas,   elder   sister   of   the
appellant.     A   perusal   of   the   affidavits   would   reveal   that   the
appellant   comes   from   a   small   village   called   Pusalda   in
Raigarh district of Chhattisgarh.   His father was earning his
livelihood as a barber.  The appellant was studious and hard­
working.     He   did   really   well   at   school   and   made   consistent
efforts to bring the family out of poverty.  The conduct of the
appellant   in   the   prison   has   been   found   to   be   satisfactory.
There   are   no   criminal   antecedents.     It   is   the   first   offence
committed   by   the   appellant.   No   doubt,   a   heinous   one.     The
39

appellant is not a hardened criminal.   It therefore cannot be
said   that   there   is   no   possibility   of   the   appellant   being
reformed   and   rehabilitated   foreclosing   the   alternative   option
of a lesser sentence and making imposition of death sentence
imperative.  
53. A bench consisting of three Judges of this Court had an
occasion   to   consider   similar   facts   in   the   case   of   Sunil   v.
State   of   Madhya   Pradesh 16
.   In   the   said   case   too,   the
appellant­accused   was   around   25   years   of   age   who   had
taken   away   a   minor   girl.     The   accused   had   committed   rape
on   the   said   minor   and   caused   her   death   due   to   asphyxia
caused   by   strangulation.     The   trial   court   had   sentenced   the
accused   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   363,
367,   376(2)(f)   and   302   of   the   IPC   and   awarded   him   death
penalty.  The same was upheld by the High Court.  In appeal,
this Court held thus: 
“ 12.   In   the  present   case,   we   do   not   find   that  the
requirements   spelt   out   in   Bachan   Singh   [ Bachan
Singh   v.   State of Punjab , (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC   (Cri)   580]   and   the   pronouncements
thereafter   had   engaged   the   attention   of   either   of
the   courts.   In   the   present   case,   one   of   the
compelling/mitigating   circumstances   that   must
16   (2017) 4 SCC 393
40

be   acknowledged   in   favour   of   the   appellant­
accused   is   the   young   age   at   which   he   had
committed   the   crime.   The   fact   that   the   accused
can be reformed and rehabilitated; the probability
that   the   accused   would   not   commit   similar
criminal   acts;   that   the   accused   would   not   be   a
continuing   threat   to   the   society,   are   the   other
circumstances   which   could   not   but   have   been
ignored   by   the   learned   trial   court   and   the   High
Court.
13.   We have considered the matter in the light of
the   above.   On   such   consideration,   we   are   of   the
view  that in  the present case, the  ends of  justice
would   be   met   if   we   commute   the   sentence   of
death   into   one   of   life   imprisonment.   We   order
accordingly.   The   punishments   awarded   for   the
offences   under   Sections   363,   367   and   376(2)( f )
IPC by the learned trial court and affirmed by the
High Court are maintained.”
54. We   are   also   inclined   to   adopt   the   same   reasoning   and
follow the same course as adopted by this Court in the case
of   Sunil   (supra).     The   appeals   are   therefore   partly   allowed.
The   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   for   the   offences
punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 377, 201, 302
read   with   Section   376A   of   the   IPC   and   Section   6   of   the
POCSO   Act   is   maintained.     However,   the   death   penalty
imposed   on   the   appellant   under   Section   302   IPC   is
commuted  to life imprisonment.    The sentences awarded for
41

the   rest   of  the   offences   by   the   trial   court   as  affirmed   by   the
High Court, are maintained.
55. Before   we   part   with   the   judgment,   we   must   appreciate
the   valuable   assistance   rendered   by   Shri   Anand   Grover,
learned Senior  Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
and Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent­State.
……....….......................J.
  [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
……....….......................J.
 [B.R. GAVAI]
       ……….........................J.       
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 14, 2021.
42