2021 INSC 0859
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7696 OF 2021
Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao        ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Reddy Sridevi & Ors.                     ..Respondent (S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned   order
dated   16.09.2021   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Andhra
Pradesh  at Amaravati in  I.A. No.1 of  2021 in  Second  Appeal
No.331   of   2021   by   which   the   High   Court   has   condoned   a
huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal, the
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appellant   ­   original   plaintiff   –   respondent   before   the   High
Court, has preferred the present appeal.      
2. That   the  appellant   herein   –  original  plaintiff  filed  a  civil  suit
being   O.S.   No.   40   of   2013   for   permanent   injunction   against
the   respondents   herein   –   original   defendants.   That   the   Trial
Court dismissed the said suit by judgment and decree dated
23.04.2016.   That   the   First   Appellate   Court   allowed   the   suit
by   quashing   and   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   decree
passed   by   the   Trial   Court,   by   judgment   and   decree   dated
01.02.2017.   That   the   original   defendants   –   respondents
herein   applied   for   the   certified   copy   of   the   judgment   and
order   on   04.02.2017.   The   same   was   ready   for   delivery   on
10.03.2017. That after a period of approximately 1011 days,
the   respondents   herein   –   original   defendants   preferred   the
Second Appeal before the High Court. Application to condone
the   delay   was   also   filed   being   I.A.   No.1   of   2021.   By   the
impugned   order,   the   High   Court   has   condoned   the   delay   of
1011   days   in   preferring   the   Second   Appeal,   which   is   the
subject matter of appeal before this Court. 
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3. Learned counsel appearing  on behalf of the appellant herein
–   original   plaintiff   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the
present   case,   High   Court   has   committed   a   grave   error   in
condoning huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal.
3.1 It   is   submitted   that   as   such   no   sufficient   cause   was   shown
by the respondents herein ­ appellants before the High Court,
explaining   the   huge   delay   of   1011   days   in   preferring   the
Second Appeal. 
3.2 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   while   condoning   the   huge
delay   of   1011   days,   the   High   Court   has   also   not   observed
that sufficient cause has been shown explaining the delay of
1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal. 
3.3 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   considering   the   averments
in   the   application   for   condonation   of   delay,   there   is   no
explanation   whatsoever   explaining   the   delay   for   the   period
after 15.03.2017 till June, 2021 ­ till the Second Appeal was
preferred. 
3.4 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   cases   of   Ramlal,   Motilal   and
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Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,  (1962) 2 SCR 762;  P.K.
Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Anr.,  (1997) 7 SCC
556   as   well   as   the   decision   in   the   cases   of   Pundlik   Jalam
Patil   Vs.   Executive   Engineer,   Jalgaon   Medium   Project,
(2008)   17   SCC   448   and   Basawaraj   and   Anr.   Vs.   Special
Land Acquisition Officer.,  (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is prayed to
allow the present appeal.                        
4. Shri   Siddhartha   Srivastava,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf  of  respondent   Nos.1  and  No.2  –  appellants  before  the
High Court, has supported the impugned order passed by the
High Court allowing the application for condonation of delay
and condoning the delay in preferring the appeal. 
4.1 It   is   submitted   that   when   the   High   Court   has   exercised
discretion and has condoned the delay, the same may not be
interfered   with   by   this   Court   in   exercise   of   powers   under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
 
4.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 that as rightly observed by
the   High   Court   if   the   delay   is   condoned   in   that   case   the
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appeal   will   be   considered   and   decided   on   merits   and
therefore, no prejudice would be caused to the appellant. It is
submitted   that   in   order   to   enable   the   respondents   –
appellants   before   the   High   Court,   to   submit   the   case   on
merits instead of non­suiting them on the technical ground of
delay, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
5. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the respective parties at length.
6. At the outset, it is noted that by the impugned order the High
Court has condoned a huge delay of 1011 days in preferring
the   Second   Appeal   by   respondent   Nos.1   and   2   herein   –
original defendants – appellants before the High Court. While
condoning the delay, the High Court has observed as under:­
“In   these   circumstances,   when   there   are   certain
questions, which require a debate in the second appeal, it
is not necessary that this matter be rejected at this stage,
without   inviting   a   decision   on   merits.   lf   the   delay   is
condoned   though   enormous,   what   happens   at   best   is   to
give   an   opportunity   to   the   parties   to   canvass   their
respective   case.   Since   this   question   being   of   procedure,
the attempt of the court should be to encourage a healthy
discussion on merits than rejecting at threshold.
Viewed from such perspective, accepting the reasons
assigned   by   the   petitioner,   the   delay   in   presenting   this
second appeal should be condoned. 
Apparently, there is no wilful negligence on the part
of   the   petitioners   nor   this   attempt   suffers   from   want   of
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due diligence. It appears being a bonafide attempt on the
part of the petitioners to canvass their  claim particularly
when   the   trial   court   had   accepted   their   plea,   which   was
subjected to reversal by the appellate court. However, the
petitioners  should   compensate  the  respondent   by   means
of   costs   for   this   delay.   The   contention   of   the   respondent
that   valuable   rights   are   accrued   to   her   on   account   of
inaction   of   the  petitioners   in  failing   to  prefer   the   Second
Appeal   within   time,   cannot   be   a   significant   factor   in   the
backdrop of the circumstances found in this case. 
In   the   result,   this   petition   is   allowed   condoning   the
delay of 1011 days in filing  the second appeal subject to
payment   of   costs   of   Rs.2,000/­   (Rupees   Two   thousand
only)   to   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   on   or
before 05.10.2021.”
Thus from  the  aforesaid,  it can  be seen  that the High  Court
has   not   observed   that   any   sufficient   cause   explaining   the
huge delay of 1011 days has been made out. 
6.1 The High Court has observed that if the delay is condoned no
prejudice will be caused to the appellant as the appeal would
be   heard   on   merits.   The   High   Court   has   also   observed   that
there   is   no   wilful   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   respondents
herein   nor   it   suffers   from   want   of   due   diligence.   However,
from   the   averments   in   the   application   for   condonation   of
delay,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   it   was   a   case   of   a   gross
negligence   and/or   want   of   due   diligence   on   the   part   of   the
respondents   herein   –   appellants   before   the   High   Court   in
filing such a belated appeal.
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6.2 We   have   gone   through   the   averments   in   the   application   for
the   condonation   of   delay.   There   is   no   sufficient   explanation
for   the   period   from   15.03.2017   till   the   Second   Appeal   was
preferred   in   the   year   2021.   In   the   application   seeking
condonation of delay it was stated that she is aged 45 years
and   was   looking   after   the   entire   litigation   and   that   she   was
suffering   from   health   issues   and   she   had   fallen   sick   from
01.01.2017   to   15.03.2017   and   she   was   advised   to   take   bed
rest for the said period. However, there is no explanation for
the   period   after   15.03.2017.   Thus,   the   period   of   delay   from
15.03.2017 till the Second Appeal was filed in the year 2021
has not at all been explained. Therefore, the High Court has
not exercised the discretion judiciously. 
7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay  in filing
the appeal are referred to and considered as under:­ 
7.1 In   the   case   of   Ramlal,   Motilal   and   Chhotelal   (supra),   it   is
observed and held as under:­
In   construing   s.   5   it   is   relevant   to   bear   in   mind   two
important   considerations.   The   first   consideration   is   that
the   expiration   of   the   period   of   limitation   prescribed   for
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making   an   appeal   gives   rise   to   a   right   in   favour   of   the
decree­holder   to  treat   the   decree   as  binding  between  the
parties.   In   other   words,   when   the   period   of   limitation
prescribed   has   expired   the   decree­holder   has   obtained   a
benefit   under   the  law   of   limitation  to  treat   the  decree  as
beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued
to the decree­holder by lapse of time should not be light­
heartedly   disturbed.   The   other   consideration   which
cannot   be  ignored  is  that  if  sufficient  cause  for   excusing
delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone
delay   and   admit   the   appeal.   This   discretion   has   been
deliberately   conferred  on  the  Court   in  order   that   judicial
power   and   discretion   in   that   behalf   should   be   exercised
to   advance   substantial   justice.   As   has   been   observed   by
the Madras High Court in  Krishna v. Chattappan , (1890)
J.L.R.   13   Mad.   269,   "s.   5   gives   the   Court   a   discretion
which   in   respect   of   jurisdiction   is   to   be   exercised   in   the
way   in   which   judicial   power   and   discretion   ought   to   be
exercised upon principles which are well understood; the
words ‘sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so
as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor
inaction   nor   want   of   bona   fide   is   imputable   to   the
appellant."
7.2 In the case of   P.K. Ramachandran   (supra), while refusing to
condone   the   delay   of   565   days,   it   is   observed   that   in   the
absence   of   reasonable,   satisfactory   or   even   appropriate
explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not
to  be  condoned lightly. It is further  observed that  the law  of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be   applied   with   all  its   rigour   when  the   statute   so   prescribes
and   the   courts   have   no   power   to   extend   the   period   of
limitation   on   equitable   grounds.   It   is   further   observed   that
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while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court
has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3 In the case of   Pundlik Jalam Patil   (supra), it is observed as
under:­
“The   laws   of   limitation   are   founded   on   public   policy.
Statutes   of   limitation   are   sometimes   described   as
“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation   creates   insecurity   and   uncertainty;   some   kind
of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
based   on   the   maxim   “interest   reipublicae   ut   sit   finis
litium”,   that   is,   the   interest   of   the   State   requires   that
there   should   be   end   to   litigation   but   at   the   same   time
laws   of   limitation   are   a   means   to   ensure   private   justice
suppressing   fraud  and perjury,  quickening  diligence  and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing time­limit for
litigation   is   based   on   public   policy   fixing   a   lifespan   for
legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant   to   see   that   the   parties   do   not   resort   to   dilatory
tactics   but   avail   their   legal   remedies   promptly.   Salmond
in   his   Jurisprudence   states   that   the   laws   come   to   the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”   
7.4 In  the   case  of   Basawaraj   (supra),  it   is  observed  and   held   by
this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised   judiciously   based   on   facts   and   circumstances   of
each   case.   It   is   further   observed   that   the   expression
“sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is
further   observed   that   even   though   limitation   may   harshly
affect   rights   of   a   party   but   it   has   to   be   applied   with   all   its
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rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that
in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides
or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground
for   condoning   the   delay   even   by   imposing   conditions.   It   is
observed   that   each   application   for   condonation   of   delay   has
to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court.
It   is   further   observed   that   if   courts   start   condoning   delay
where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions
then   that   would   amount   to   violation   of   statutory   principles
and showing utter disregard to legislature.
7.5 In the case of   Pundlik Jalam Patil   (supra), it is observed by
this   Court   that   the   court   cannot   enquire   into   belated   and
stale   claims   on   the   ground   of   equity.   Delay   defeats   equity.
The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber
over their rights”.  
8. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions   to   the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand   and   considering
the averments in the application for condonation of delay, we
are   of   the   opinion   that   as   such   no   explanation   much   less   a
sufficient   or   a   satisfactory   explanation   had   been   offered   by
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respondent   Nos.1   and   2   herein   –   appellants   before   the   High
Court   for   condonation   of   huge   delay   of   1011   days   in
preferring   the   Second   Appeal.   The   High   Court   is   not   at   all
justified   in   exercising   its   discretion   to   condone   such   a   huge
delay.   The   High   Court   has   not   exercised   the   discretion
judiciously.   The   reasoning   given   by   the   High   Court   while
condoning   huge   delay   of   1011   days   is   not   germane.
Therefore,   the   High   Court   has   erred   in   condoning   the   huge
delay   of   1011   days   in   preferring   the   appeal   by   respondent
Nos.1   and   2   herein   –   original   defendants.   Impugned   order
passed   by   the   High   Court   is   unsustainable   both,   on   law   as
well as on facts.
9. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the
present   Appeal   is   Allowed.   The   impugned   order   dated
16.09.2021 passed by the High Court condoning the delay of
1011   days   in   preferring   the   Second   Appeal   by   respondent
Nos.1   and   2   herein   is   hereby   quashed   and   set   aside.
Consequently,   Second   Appeal   No.331   of   2021   preferred   by
respondent   Nos.1   and   2   herein   stands   dismissed   on   the
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ground   of   delay.   The   present   Appeal   is   accordingly   Allowed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.                       
   …………………………………J.
                      (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
  (B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
December  16, 2021
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