2021 INSC 0863
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No.8083 of 2011
U.P. AVAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD THROUGH 
HOUSING COMMISSIONER & ANR.      ... Appellant (s)
Versus
NOOR MOHAMMAD & ORS.       ... Respondent(s)
WITH
 
Civil Appeal No.8072 of 2011
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. U.P.   Avas   Evam   Vikas   Parishad,   which   is   a   statutory   authority   of
the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   for   housing   and   development,   has   come   up
with   the   present   appeals,   challenging   the   orders   of   the   High   Court   of
Judicature   at   Allahabad,   setting   aside   a   Notification   cancelling   a
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previous Notification issued under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act,   1894   for   the   release   of   the   land   of   the   respondents   herein   from
acquisition.
2. We have heard Shri Vishwajit Singh, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants and Mr. Krishnam Mishra and Mr. Anand Varma, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
3. A   Notification   dated   25.07.1964   was   issued   by   the   State
Government   under   Section   36   of   the   United   Provinces   Town
Improvement Act, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as  “the U.P. Act”)    for the
acquisition   of   land   of   a   total   extent   of   acre   1.85   in   Village   Mirzapur,
Tehsil­Sadar,   District   Gorakhpur   for   the   public   purpose   of   providing
housing/residential accommodation.  This notification is akin to Section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
4. The   above   notification   was   followed   by   another   notification   dated
17.06.1967   under   Section   42   of   the   U.P.   Act,   which   is   equivalent   to
Section   6   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894.   It   appears   that   the
emergency   clause   was   invoked   and   the   enquiry   dispensed   with,   before
the declaration was made. The possession of the entire land except one
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piece   bearing   plot   No.292/2   measuring   an   extent   to   0.028   acres,   was
taken   over   by   the   State   Government   on   24.07.1970  and   an   award   was
also passed on 30.03.1971.
5. From   the   year   1983,   the   land   owners   made   attempts   to   get   the
lands   released   from   acquisition,   but   fortune   fluctuated   in   a   see­saw
battle.
6. Eventually   by   a   Notification   dated   7.04.2003   issued   in   exercise   of
the   powers   conferred   by   Section   49(1)   of   the   U.P.   Avas   Evam   Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 read with Section 48(1) and 49(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, the land was exempt from acquisition. But within
a   couple   of   years,   the   Government   issued   another   notification   dated
15.09.2005 cancelling  the   notification  dated  07.04.2003  on   the  ground
that the land owners had played fraud by making false representations,
while seeking the release of the land.
7. Challenging   the   said   Notification   dated   15.09.2005,   the   original
land   owners   filed   a   writ   petition   in   W.P   (C)   No.64727   of   2005   and   the
purchaser of one part of the land from the original owners filed another
writ   petition   in   W.P   No.50151   of   2008.   Both   these   writ   petitions   were
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allowed   by   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   by   an   Order   dated
31.08.2010,   holding   that   once   the   acquired   land   is   released   from
acquisition, by way of Notification, the Government can reclaim the land
only   by   initiating   a   fresh   process   of   acquisition.   Aggrieved   by   the   said
order,   the   Housing   and   Development   Authority   has   come   up   with   the
above appeals.
8. Before we address the rival contentions for consideration, it may be
necessary   to   bring   on   record   the   background   in   which   the   original
Notification   dated   07.04.2003   under   Section   48(1)   of   the   Land
Acquisition   Act   was   passed   and   the   reasons   for   the   issue   of   the   latter
notification   dated   15.09.2005   cancelling   the   previous   one.   This
background as well as the reasons are stated very pithily in the second
Notification dated 15.09.2005 and, hence, it is reproduced as follows:
“   Land   in   Village   Mirzapur/Betiahtata,   Gorakhpur   was   acquired
under  the   provisions   of    U.P.   Town   Improvement   Act,  1919   for  the
Betiahata South Scheme , Gorakhpur of the  U.P. Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad and later on 8.6.1965, it was transferred to the U.P. Avas
Evam   Vikas   Parishad   for   planned   development   of   the   area.   The
State   Government   issued   Notification   u/s   17   of   the   Land
Acquisition   Act,   1894   vide   no.   93Ka/37­19(1)(16)­66   dated
13.1.1970.
An   application  dated   28.2.83   along  with   a  letter  addressed  to   the
Chief Secretary dated nil in connection with Khasra no. 257 (rakba
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0.51   Acre),   Khasra   no.   254   (rakba   0.30   Acre)   ,   Khasra   no.   255/1
(rakba 0.18 Acre), Khasra no. 255/2 (rakba 0.18 Acre), Khasra no.
291/1   (rakba   0.31   Acre),   Khasra   no.   291/2   (rakba   0.31   Acre),
Khasra no. 292/1 (rakba 0.03 Acre), Khasra no. 292/2 (rakba 0.03
Acre) total rakba 1.85 acre land, sent by applicants Smt. Shakuran
w/o   Late   Rojan,   Shri   Noor   Mohd.,   Shri   Shafi   Mohd.,   Shri   Ramjan
Mohd.   all   sons   of   sons   of   Late   Salarbux   Mohalla   Tetiahata   South
(New  Avas   Vikas   Colony),  Post   Office  Sadar,  Dist.  Gorakhpur  was
received   by   the   Government   on   23.1.84   by   which   the   applicants
brought   to   the   notice   of   the   government   that   the   aforesaid   plots
belonged to them which have been acquired by the Parishad. There
exist   17   or   18   cemeteries   of   their   forefathers   and   they   earn   their
livelihood by way of vegetation/horticulture on the said land. There
are   20   members   in   their   family   and   none   of   them   have   their   own
house   and   that   they   would   live   there   by   making   houses   on   the
land.   After   due   consideration   on   the   applications   received   from
applicants,   the   government   issued   G.O.   no.   472/37­2­85­3
HB(108)/83   dated   30.01.85   thereby   exempting   the   aforesaid
khasras   from   acquisition   with   the   condition   that   the   landowners
will not sell out the land. Following the aforesaid G.O., the Housing
Commissioner, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad wrote a letter to the
government requesting for cancellation of the aforesaid G.O. dated
30.01.85   and   accordingly,   Amendment   Order   dated   27.6.85   was
issued   by   the   Government   whereby   cancelling   the   earlier   G.O.
dated   30.1.85   in   which   it   was   specifically   mentioned   that   the
layout   map   of   the   Yojana   may   be   modified,   while   excluding   the
Mazaars, if any exists on the disputed land.
Subsequent to the aforesaid order, the applicants filed writ petition
no.   19757   /1985   in   the   Hon'ble   High   Court.   In   compliance   of   the
orders   of   the   Hon'ble   High   Court,   after   giving   serious   thoughts   to
the joint representation of the applicants, the same was rejected on
21.12.91.   The   applicants   again   filed   writ   petition   no.   5002/1992
before   the   Hon'ble   High   Court   in   which   the   Hon'ble   High   Court
passed "dismissed as withdrawn" order on 19.5.99.
Thereafter, the government reviewed the representations submitted
by   the   applicants   from   time   to   time.   In   their   representations,   the
applicants   had   primarily   stated   that   they   were   poor   unemployed
persons. None of their family members was in government service.
The aforesaid land was the only source of their livelihood and they
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earn  their  livelihood  by  way of  vegetation/horticulture   on the   said
land. There are 20 members in their family and none of them have
their own house and that they would live there by making houses
on the land. Cemeteries of their forefathers exist on the land and as
per the  general  policy of the Government, such land  should not  be
acquired.   In   view   of   the   facts   contained   in   the   representation   and
after   due   consideration,   Notification   no.1049/9­Aa­2­2003­3   HB
(AB)/83   dated   7   April   1983   was   issued   for   exempting   Khasra   no.
257   (rakba   0.51   Acre),   Khasra   no.   254   (rakba   0.30   Acre),   Khasra
no. 255/1 (rakba 0.18 Acre), Khasra no. 255/2 (rakba 0.18 acre),
Khasra no. 291/1 (rakba 0.31 Acre), Khasra no.291/2 (rakba 0.31
Acre),   Khasra   no.   292/1   (rakba   0.03   Acre),   Khasra   no.   292/2
(rakba 0.03 Acre) total rakba 1.85 acre land from acquisition. 
After   passing   of   the   Notification,   it   came   to   the   notice   of   the
government from various sources that the aforesaid exempted land
was being used for commercial purposes and the land­mafias were
buying and selling the land after raising illegal constructions on it.
In   view   of   the   complaints,   inquiry   was   got   conducted   from   the
Housing   Commissioner   and   the   up­to­date   status   of   the   land   was
sought.   The   Housing   Commissioner   submitted   his   inquiry   report
thereby informed as under:­ 
a)  1.00 Acre {out of total 1.17 Acre land of Khasra no. 254 (rakba
0.30  acre),  khasra  no. 255  (rakba  0.36  acre),  khasra  no.  257
(rakba   0.51   acre)}   was   sold   out   on   23.4.2003   through
Agreement Deed. 
b)  5220   sq.ft.   land   from   Khasra   no.   255   was   sold   through
registry on 29.4.2004 to Shri Shravan s/o Jaket, Dist. Deoria.
c)   2370   sq.ft.   land   from   Khasra   no.   254   was   sold   through
registry   on   16.9.2004   to   Shri   Bajrang   Prasad   Gupta   s/o   Shri
Mahavir Prasad. 
d)   9000   sq.ft.   land   from   Khasra   no.   254   and   255   was   sold
through registry on 21.9.2004 to Smt. Lalita Chhabaria v1/o
Shri Hari Prasad Chhabaria.
e)  Entire rakba 0.51 of Khasra no. 257 was sold through registry
n   16.9.2004   to   Smt.   Vartika   Singh   w/o   Shri   Krishna   Singh
and Shri Brijesh Kumar Singh s/o Shri Shiv Poojan Singh. 
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From   the   above,   it   is   evident   that   the   facts   placed   by   the
applicants before the Government, on the basis of which their land
was   released   from   acquisition   vide   Notification   dated   7.4.2003,
were   misleading   and   false.   The   applicants   are   in   the   process   of
selling   the   land   after   dividing   it   in   small   plots   and   they   neither
using   the   land   for   earning   their   livelihood   by   way   of   doing
vegetation   nor   for   any   other   purpose.   Therefore,   after   due
consideration,   the   Governor   of   Uttar   Pradesh   has   been   pleased   to
approve cancellation of the aforesaid Notification no. 1049/9­Aa­2­
2003­3   HB   (AB)/83   dated   7   April,   1983   issued   in   respect   of
releasing the aforesaid land from acquisition .”
9. The   main   ground   on   which   the   High   Court   set   aside   the   second
Notification   dated   15.09.2005   was   that   once   a   Notification   is   issued
under   Section   48(1)   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894,   the   land   gets
released   from   acquisition   and   that,   therefore,   the   only   way   the   State
Government   could   retrieve   the   land   is   to   initiate   the   process   of
acquisition afresh. This reasoning is based upon two premises, namely,
(i)   that   while   there   is   a   provision   under   Section   48(1)   of   the   Land
Acquisition Act for the withdrawal of the land from acquisition, there is
no   provision   in   the   Act   for   cancellation   of   a   Notification   under   Section
48(1); and   (ii)   that once a Notification under  Section 48 (1) of the Land
Acquisition Act is issued, the land gets vested in the original owner and
that therefore, divesting cannot take place without following the process
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of acquisition as enunciated in the Statute.
10. But insofar  as the first  contention  is concerned, Section  21 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 is a complete answer. It reads as follows:­
“ 21.  Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend,
vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye­laws .­
Where,   by   any   Central   Act   or   Regulations   a   power   to   issue
notifications, orders, rules or bye­laws is conferred, then that
power   includes   a   power,   exercisable   in   the   like   manner   and
subject  to  the  like  sanction and  conditions  (if  any), to add to,
amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye­
laws so issued.”
11. Therefore, the power to issue Notification would include a power to
rescind   the   Notification.   This   position   was   not   contested   by   the
respondents,   when   their   attempts   to   have   the   land   released   from
acquisition,   proved   unsuccessful   on   earlier   occasions.   As   a   matter   of
fact,   on   the   application   presented   by   the   respondents   on   28.02.1983,
the   Government   issued   a   letter   dated   30.01.1985   requesting   the
Parishad  to  initiate  necessary   action   for  exemption   of  the  land,  subject
to   the   condition   that   the   land   owners   will   not   sell   the   land.   This
condition   was   stipulated   in   view   of   the   fact   that   the   request   of   the
respondent   was   based   on   religious   sentiments   due   to   the   alleged
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existence of  cemeteries of about 20 of their  forefathers on  the acquired
land. But the proposal mooted by the State Government on 30.01.1985
was opposed by the Parishad on the ground that there was no mention
about   any   cemeteries,   when   the   land   owners   filed   objections   to   the
acquisition.   In   the   light   of   such   objections,   the   Government   issued
proceedings   dated   27.06.1985   withdrawing   the   earlier   proposal   dated
30.01.1985.
12. Therefore,   the   land   owners   filed   a   writ   petition   in   Civil
Miscellaneous writ Petition No.19757 of 1985, seeking a direction to the
Government   and   to   the   Parishad   not   to   dispossess   them.   This   Writ
Petition   was   disposed   of   by   an   Order   dated   30.09.1988,   permitting   the
land   owners   to   file   a   representation   to   the   Government   within   one
month   and   directing   the   State   Government   to   consider   the   said
representation.  
13. Pursuant to the said order, the land owners made a representation
dated 10.10.1988. But the same was rejected by the State Government
by an Order dated 21.12.1991, pointing out that the land already stood
vested in the Parishad and that Parishad has already become the owner.
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14. Challenging   the   Order   of   rejection   dated   21.12.1991,   the   land
owners   filed   a   fresh   writ   petition   in   W.P.   (C)   No.5002   of   1992.   But   the
said   writ   petition   was   dismissed   as   withdrawn,   on   9.04.1999.
Thereafter,   a   fresh   representation   was   made   on   29.05.1999.   It   was
reiterated   in   the   said   representation   that   there   are   cemeteries   and
Mazaars of the forefathers of the land owners and that regular religious
programmes   were   being   conducted   in   the   acquired   land.   It   is   on   the
basis   of   the   said   representation   that   the   Notification   dated   7.04.2003
was issued under Section 48(1).
15. Therefore,   it   is   clear   that   the   land   owners   were   actually   playing
hide   and   seek   by   pleading   religious   sentiments,   leading   to   the   issue   of
the Notification dated 7.04.2003 under Section 48(1). In other words the
Notification   under   Section   48(1)   was   invited   by   the   land   owners   by
making   false   representations.   The   land   owners   have   actually   played
fraud   upon   the   Government   and   secured   the   Notification   dated
7.04.2003.  Hence, they cannot be allowed to contend that the land can
be acquired only through a fresh process of acquisition.
16. The   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­land   owners   contended
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that   Section   21   of   the   General   Clauses   Act,   does   not   confer   an
overarching   power   on   the   Government   to   rescind   a   notification
conferring vested rights in immoveable property, especially when such a
power is not contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The right
to   property,   though   not   a   fundamental   right,   is   held   to   be   a
Constitutional right and a human right and that, therefore, according to
the   counsel   for   the   respondents,   the   same   cannot   be   taken   away   by
taking recourse to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
  17. In   support   of   the   aforesaid   contention,   Mr.   Anand   Varma   learned
counsel   for   the   respondents   relies   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
Industrial   Infrastructure   Development   Corporation   (Gwalior)   M.P.
Ltd.  vs.  CIT 1
, wherein it was held as follows:
“ 21. The   general   power,   under   Section   21   of   the   General
Clauses   Act,   to   rescind   a   notification   or   order   has   to   be
understood   in  the  light   of  the  subject­matter,  context   and  the
effect of the relevant provisions of the statute under which the
notification   or   order   is   issued   and   the   power  is   not   available
after   an   enforceable   right   has   accrued   under   the   notification
or   order.   Moreover,   Section   21   has   no   application   to   vary   or
amend or review a quasi­judicial order…”
18. The   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   also   relied   upon   the
1     (2018) 4 SCC 494
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decision   in   H.C.   Suman   vs.   Rehabilitation   Ministry   Employees   Co­
Operative House Building Society Ltd. New Delhi and Ors. 2
,  wherein
it was held that a substantial right created in favour of a party, which is
enforceable  in   law   cannot  be  taken   away   by   a   subsequent  order   under
general power of rescindment available under the General Clauses Act.
19. But   the   decision   in   Industrial   Infrastructure   Development
Corporation  (supra)  arose out of an order passed under Section 12­A of
the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was admittedly a quasi judicial order.
In   paragraphs   19   and   20   of   the   said   decision,   this   Court   pointed   out
that   “ the   functions   exercisable   by   CIT   under   section   12­A   are
neither   legislative   nor   executive   but   essentially   quasi­judicial   in
nature”   and   that   “ an   order   under   section   12­A   of   the   Income   Tax
Act   does   not   fall   in   the   category   of   orders   mentioned   in
Section   21,   which   would   be   in   the   nature   of
Notification/Rules/bye­laws” . 
20. But a proceeding under section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is
2      (1991) 4 SCC 485
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administrative   in   nature   as   can   be   seen   from   the   language   employed.
Section 48 of the Act reads as follows:
48.   Completion   of   acquisition   not   compulsory,   but
compensation to be awarded when not completed.  – 
(1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall
be   at   liberty   to   withdraw   from   the   acquisition   of   any   land   of   which
possession has not been taken. 
(2)   Whenever   the   Government   withdraws   from   any   such   acquisition,
the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the
damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any
proceedings   there   under,   and   shall   pay   such   amount   to   the   person
interested,   together   with   all   costs   reasonably   incurred   by   him   in   the
prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.
(3) The provision of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to
the determination of the compensation payable under this section.”
What is provided in Section 48(1) is the power/liberty to withdraw from
acquisition.   It   is   an   administrative   act.   Therefore,   the   reliance   on   the
decision   in   Industrial   Infrastructure   Development   Corporation
(supra)  is misplaced. 
21. For the very same reason, the decision in  H.C.Suman,  is also of no
assistance to the respondents in as much as the first notification of the
Lt.   Governor,   which   was   sought   to   be   withdrawn   by   the   subsequent
notification, was issued pursuant to a quasi­judicial order passed by the
Lt.   Governor   on   a   statutory   appeal.   The   quasi   judicial   order   created   a
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vested   right   which   was   given   effect   through   a   notification.   Therefore,
this Court held in para 35 of the decision in  H.C.Suman  that the vested
right  created  by   a  quasi­judicial   order  cannot   be  taken   away  by   taking
recourse   to   the   general   power   of   rescindment   available   under   the
General Clauses Act. Hence the reasoning contained in the said decision
cannot be applied to the case on hand.     
22. While a Notification for acquisition issued under Section 4(1) of the
Land   Acquisition   Act   seeks   to   take   away   an   individual’s   right   to
property,   a   Notification   under   Section   48(1)   is   actually   the   reverse   or
opposite.   It   confers   benefit   upon   an   individual   and   hence   it   is   not
supposed to be preceded by any enquiry. The essence of an order which
is   quasi­judicial   in   nature   is   that   it   is   preceded   by   an   opportunity   of
hearing to the party affected thereby. A notification under Section 48(1)
does   not   warrant   any   notice   or   opportunity   of   hearing,   to   the   original
land   owners.   If   at   all   any   person   will   be   aggrieved   by   the   Notification
under Section 48(1), it will be the beneficiary of the acquisition, which in
this   case   is   the   Parishad,   and   not   the   land   owners.   Therefore,   we   can
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understand if the Parishad makes out a grievance that their rights were
taken   away   by   the   notification   under   Section   48(1)   especially   after   the
land vested in them.
23. Therefore, we reject the argument that a Notification under Section
48(1) is a quasi­judicial order. As a consequence, we reject the argument
that   the   Government   cannot   fall   back   upon   Section   21   of   the   General
Clauses Act to rescind an order under Section 48(1). 
24. Coming   to   the   second   limb   of   the   argument   that   the   Notification
under Section 48(1) has created a vested right and that the same cannot
be taken away unilaterally by a subsequent Notification for cancellation,
we   have   to   state   that   the   first   Notification   was   secured   by   the
respondents   by   false   representations   and   by   playing   fraud.   When   the
respondents wanted to ward off the acquisition, they claimed that there
were   cemeteries   of   their   forefathers,   but   after   the   first   notification   was
issued, they started selling the land to third parties, who cannot and do
not share the same religious sentiments with the respondents. We have
already   extracted   the   second   Notification   dated   15.09.2005   which
contains   the   list   of   sales   made   by   the   land   owners.   The   enquiry
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conducted   by   the   Housing   Commissioner   has   revealed   that   the   land
mafia   has   taken   over   the   land.   It   is   trite   to   point   out   that   an   order
secured by fraud and misrepresentation will not confer any vested right
and   that,  therefore,  the   land  owners  cannot  pitch  their  claim  either  on
the basis of vesting or on the basis of Article 300A.
25. Interestingly,   Sh.   Anand   Varma,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in  Mutha Associates
and   Ors.   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   and   Ors. 3
,   in   support   of   his
contention   that   even   if   the   impugned   notification   is   taken   to   be
administrative   in   nature,   the   same   should   be   preceded   by   an
opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   land   owners.   But   the   decision   in   Mutha
Associates   (supra)   is   actually   a   double­edged   weapon   insofar   as   the
respondents   are   concerned.   In   that   case,   this   Court   held   that   even   for
the exercise of the power of withdrawal under Section 48(1) of the Land
Acquisition   Act,   an   opportunity   had   to   be   given   necessarily   to   the
beneficiary.   In   fact   two   principles   could   be   culled   out   from   Mutha
3     (2013) 14 SCC 304
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Associates .   They   are:   (i)   that   the   publication   of   the   Notification   under
Section   48,   is   necessary   just   as   the   publication   of   notifications   under
Sections 4 and 6 are mandatory; and   (ii)   that the beneficiary should be
heard before the withdrawal of land from acquisition.
26. In   this   case,   the   Notification   dated   7.04.2003   does   not   appear   to
have   been   preceded   by   an   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   beneficiary,
namely,   U.P.   Avas   Evam   Vikas   Parishad.   Therefore,   the   withdrawal   of
such   an   illegal   notification,   which   was   secured   by   fraud,   cannot   be
found fault with.
27. Therefore,   in   fine,   all   the   contentions   of   the   respondents­   land
owners   are   liable   to   be   rejected   and   the   appeals   liable   to   be   allowed.
Accordingly   both   the   appeals   are   allowed,   the   impugned   orders   of   the
High Court are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents
are   dismissed.   Since   the   acquisition   has   been   complete   in   all   respects
the appellant­Parishad may proceed to implement the public purpose for
which the land was acquired. There will be no order as to costs.
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… ..…………....................J.
      (Hemant Gupta)
.…..………......................J
(V. Ramasubramanian)
DECEMBER 16, 2021
NEW DELHI .
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