2021 INSC 0865
REPORTABLE  
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7721 OF 2021
   (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5792 of 2020)
Madhya Pradesh Public Service 
Commission                                        .…Appellant(s)
Versus
Manish Bakawale & Ors.           ….  Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
        
      1. The   appellant­Madhya   Pradesh   Public   Service
Commission   is   assailing   the   order   dated   08.11.2019
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   W.A.
No.474   of   2019.   Through   the   said   order   the   learned
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Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the
intra­court appeal filed by  the appellant herein. In doing
so,   the   learned   Division   Bench   has   affirmed   the   order
dated  03.01.2019   passed  by   the   learned   Single  Judge  of
that Court in W.P. No.20855 of 2017. The learned Single
Judge, had thereby allowed the writ petition and directed
the   respondents   in   the   writ   petition,   which   included   the
appellant herein to consider the case of respondent No.1
herein for appointment on the post of the Chief Municipal
Officer   (‘CMO’   for   short)   Grade­Kh,   Assistant   Director   or
any   other  post  mentioned  by   the  respondent  No.1 in   his
preference letter. 
2. The   facts   in   a   nutshell   are   that   the   appellant
issued   an   advertisement   No.2   dated   17.03.2016   inviting
online   application   from   eligible   candidates   for   the   State
Service   Examination   2016   for   the   various   category   of
posts   under   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   different
departments.   The   advertisement   was   exhaustive
providing detailed information and it clearly indicated the
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eligibility   criteria.   The   last   date   for   submitting   the
application   was   shown   as   14.04.2016   and   the
preliminary   examination   was   scheduled   to   be   held   on
29.05.2016.   The   educational   qualification   and   other
criteria were the same for all the posts advertised except
the   age   limit   being   different   as   specified.   That   apart,   for
the   posts   of   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police,   Assistant
Jail   Superintendent   and   Deputy   Transport   Inspector,
specific   Physical   Measurement   was   indicated   as   the
minimum   eligibility   criteria.   Therefore,   the   candidates
satisfying   the   eligibility   criteria   could   choose   their   order
of preference to the various posts that were advertised. 
3. The respondent No.1 submitted his application and
had shown his order of preference. The second preference
shown   was   for   the   post   of   Deputy   Superintendent   of
Police, which could have been opted by a candidate if the
candidate   satisfied   the   minimum   required   physical
measurement.   Pursuant   to   such   applications,   the
preliminary   examination   and   the   written   examination
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was   conducted.   The   respondent   who   had   applied   under
the Scheduled Caste (‘SC’ for short) category had secured
892   marks   out   of   1575   marks.   The   marks   obtained   by
the   respondent   No.1   was   not   sufficient   in   the   order   of
merit   to   be   selected   for   the   post   as   per   his   first
preference,   namely   Deputy   District   Collector.   However,
the   marks   secured   was   sufficient   to   be   placed   in   the
merit list for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Accordingly,   the   respondent   No.1   was   included   in   the
main list for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police
by   the   appellant.   In   compliance   with   the   remaining
formalities   for   appointment   the   respondent   No.1
appeared   before   the   Medical   Board   when   it   was   found
that   his   height   was   only   162   cms.   as   against   the
prescribed   minimum   height   of   168   cms.   The   respondent
No.1 was therefore not eligible to be appointed to the post
of Deputy Superintendent of Police. 
4. It   is   in   the   above   backdrop   the   respondent   No.1
approached the High Court since as per the appointment
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made to the other posts it revealed that a schedule caste
candidate who had secured 892 marks was appointed to
the post of CMO. The respondent No.1 having shown his
subsequent   preference   for   CMO   in   his   application   form
claimed that in such event he having obtained 892 marks
was   entitled   to   be   appointed   in   the   post   of   CMO.     The
learned   Single   Judge   having   accepted   such   contention
had allowed the writ petition and directed consideration.
The   learned   Division   Bench   approved   the   same.   It   is   in
that   circumstance   the   appellant,   which   is   the   authority
saddled   with   the   responsibility   of   undertaking   the
selection process is before this Court in this appeal. 
5. We have heard Dr. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel
for   the   appellant,   Mr.   Pawan   Reley,   learned   counsel   for
the   contesting   respondent   and   perused   the   appeal
papers. 
6. At the outset, a perusal of the order passed by the
learned Division Bench would indicate that it has merely
taken   note   of   the   consideration   made   by   the   learned
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Single   Judge   by   extracting   the   order   passed   in   the   writ
proceedings   before   affirming   the   same.   In   that   light,   on
adverting to the order passed by the learned Single Judge
it   would   reveal   that   the   learned   Judge   on   taking   note   of
Rule 4(3)(c)(2) of M.P. State Civil Services Rules, 2015 has
arrived at the conclusion that the Rule is clear that if the
candidate   is   selected   in   the   main   list,   then   he/she   will
not   be   considered   for   the   remaining   post   of   preference
made.   However,   the   learned   Single   Judge   has   thereafter
arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   though   the   respondent
No.1   was   selected   in   the   main   list   on   the   basis   of   the
higher priority of post, he could not be appointed on the
said   post   as   he   had   not   qualified   on   the   benchmark
regarding his height and as such he should be considered
in the next preferred post. 
7. Dr.   Harsh   Pathak,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant while assailing such conclusion reached by the
High   Court   has   made   detailed   reference   to   the   Rules,
more   particularly   Rule   4(3)(c)(1)   and   (2)   of   the   Rules.   It
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would   be   appropriate   to   take   note   of   Rule   4(3)(c)(1)   and
(2) which read as hereunder: ­
“Category   wise   recommendation   of   the
candidates,   for   any   specific   service/post   will   be
made   according   to   the   marks   obtained   by   them
and preference sheet (if any) submitted by them.
If   a   candidate   is   selected   in   the   main   list  on
the   basis   of   the   higher   priority   of   post   given
by   him   in   the   preference   sheet,   he/she   will
not be considered for the remaining post(s) of
preference sheet.”
8. In that light, the learned counsel has also referred
to   the   advertisement   which   contains   the   details   of   the
requirement  and  the  qualification for   the post.  Since  the
respondent   No.1   had   indicated   his   second   preference   to
the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police and the issue
presently is with regard to the wrong preference made by
him and in that light, the claim for next preference to the
post   of   CMO,   the   requirement   of   the   physical
measurement   for   the   post   of   Deputy   Superintendent   of
Police   explicitly   stated   in   the   advertisement   needs   to   be
noted, which is as hereunder: ­
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Physical Measurement:
The physical measurement prescribed for
the   posts   of   Deputy   Superintendent   of
Police, Assistant Jail Superintendent and
Deputy Transport Inspector are as under:
9. In   that   background   reference   is   made   to   the
application   submitted   by   the   respondent   No.1(Annexure
P2)   wherein   the   order   of   preference   is   given.   The
preference for Deputy Superintendent of Police is at No.2
while the preference for the post of CMO is at No.16, but
the   fact   remains   that   the   preferences   are   indicated.
However,   what   is   relevant   to   be   noted   is   the   declaration
which   is   required   to   be   made   by   the   candidate   in   the
application, which reads as hereunder: ­
“DECLARATION
8No. Name of  Post Gender Height
(in c.m.) Chest Siege
Without 
Inflating 
(in C.M.) With
Inflated 
(in C.M.)
1. State Police 
Service 
(Dy. Supdt. Of 
Police Male 168 84 89

* I,   hereby   declare   that   all   the   aforesaid
information   given   by   me   are   true   and
correct   to   the   best   of   my   belief,   and
nothing   material   is   concealed.   It   is   well
within   my   knowledge   that   in   the   event   of
furnishing   of   incorrect   and   false
information   the   criminal   proceedings   can
be   initiated   against   me.   Along   with   this
the   benefits   received   and   granted   by   the
Commission can be declared null and void
at any stage/time. 
* I   had   read   over   and   understood   the
instructions   of   Commission   word   to
word and I hereby undertake to comply
the same. 
* I also hereby declare that the choice for
which   posts   have   been   given   by   me,   I
fulfilled all the prescribed eligibility i.e.
age   limit,   educational   qualification,
experience,   physical   measurement   etc.
for those posts. 
* On   being   found   ineligible   at   any   stage
of   selection,   before   selection   or
thereafter   my   candidature   can   be
cancelled at any time for which I will be
solely responsible.  
10. The learned counsel has also referred to the online
precedence/priority   form   with   reference   to   the
instructions   contained   therein   concerning   to   eligibility
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and  the warning,  to  which  the  applicant i.e., respondent
No.1   herein   has   declared   as   having   understood   all   the
stipulations   and   has   undertaken   to   abide   by   the   same.
The   relevant   instructions   and   the   warning,   as   also   the
undertaking read as hereunder: ­
“INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TO ELIGIBILITY:
 It   may   be   ensured   at   the   time   of   filling   of
precedence/priority   form   the   priority   for
which posts have been given the candidate
is having  all the eligibility criteria for  those
posts. 
 While   giving   preference   for   the   uniform
posts,   applicant   should   ensure   that   he
fulfils   all   the   terms   and   conditions   of
physical criteria’s.
WARNING:
 If   the   precedence/priority   form   is
submitted for  the selection  of uniform  post
by   the   candidate/applicant   then   the
applicant   his/her   own   may   ensure   that
he/she is  fulfilling  all the  terms  prescribed
for   age   limit,   educational   qualification   and
prescribed   physical   measurement   for   the
advertised posts applied by him/her. If any
error/mistake   in   the   information   provided
by   the   applicant   shall   be   found   then   the
Commission   shall   be   having   the   right   to
cancel   the   candidature   because   of
submitting   erroneous   information   the
candidate/eligibility   of   such
candidate/applicant   prior   to   selection   or
thereafter at any stage can be cancelled for
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which   the   applicant   shall   be   solely
responsible for the same. 
 On   furnishing/submitting   erroneous
information   by   the   candidate/applicant,   it
will   be   considered   as   grave   error   and   on
being   found   erroneous   selection   of
applicant   the   same   can   be   cancelled   for
which   the   applicant   himself/herself   shall
be responsible. 
I,   Agree   –   I   hereby   declare   that,   I   have   read   and
understood   all   the   stipulations   given   in   the
advertisement,   corrigendum’s   and   hereby
undertake to abide by them. 
Sd/­ Illegible
Manish Bakawale
02.06.2017”
11. In   that   view,   it   is   contended   that   the   respondent
No.1 having understood the instructions and also having
taken   note   of   the   eligibility   and   requirements   has
indicated   his   second   preference   to   the   post   of   Deputy
Superintendent   of   Police.   Such   preference   exercised
would   be   to   the  effect   that   the   respondent   No.1   satisfies
the   eligibility   requirement   of   physical   measurement   as
declared   by   him   and   has   therefore   opted   for   the   said
post. In that background, the appellant while taking note
of   the   preference   and   the   marks   obtained   in   the
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examination   had   included   his   name   in   the   main   list   as
the  candidate  who  had  obtained  892  marks  in  the  order
of merit was eligible to be considered under the schedule
caste   category   for   the   post   of   Deputy   Superintendent   of
Police. On such inclusion in the main list, the candidate;
in   this   case   the   respondent   No.1   would   stand   excluded
from   further   consideration   for   any   other   post   even   if
shown as next preference. 
12. Thereafter,   the   remaining   candidates   would   be
considered for the post that they have preferred based on
the   eligibility   criteria   and   the   marks   obtained   by   such
candidates.   In   that   manner   the   list   would   be   finalised
simultaneously for all the different posts advertised in the
different   departments.   From   such   list,   on   verification   of
the   testimonials   and   the   relevant   criteria   which   is   the
eligibility   for   the   post   would   be   taken   note   and   the
appointment   orders   will   be   issued.   In   that   circumstance
when   the   respondent   No.1   had   preferred   the   post   of
Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   and   had   secured   the
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marks  required  but   was  found  ineligible  to   be  appointed
in   that   post   cannot   thereafter   turn   around   to   seek
appointment in the next preferred post when already the
persons   eligible   are   considered   for   such   post   and   the
main   list   is   finalised.   In   such   circumstance,   it   is
contended that the order passed by the High Court is not
sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. 
13. The   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   on   the
other hand contended that the Rule cannot be taken note
in   such   narrow   perspective.   Though   the   physical
requirement   is   indicated,   the   Rule   9   provides   regarding
the   physical   fitness.   It   is   contended   that   the   physical
criteria   cannot   be   a   bar   merely   because   at   the   time   of
medical examination the benchmark is not reached. It is
contended   that   there   is   a   likelihood   that   the   chest
measurement could be as per requirement at the time of
application   and   therefore   the   preference   would   be
indicated   in   such   manner.   Subsequently   if   there   is   a
change   in   the   physical   measurement,   the   same   should
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not be treated as a bar. In that view, it is contended that
the rule 4(3)(c)(2) which has been referred ought not to be
interpreted   narrowly.   In   that   light,   the   learned   counsel
for   the   respondent   sought   to   justify   the   order   passed   by
the   High   Court   by   contending   that   the   learned   Single
Judge having noted the Rule and on taking note that the
respondent No.1 although selected in the main list for the
higher post for which preference was given, he could not
be   appointed   as   he   had   not   obtained   the   benchmark
regarding   his   choice   and   in   that   view   has   to   be
considered   for   the   next   preferred   post.   It   is   in   that
circumstance,   the   learned   Single   Judge   held   that   the
Rule   would   not   be   applicable   in   the   present   case.   The
learned   counsel   has   further   relied   on   the   precedents   to
contend that the Rule is to be interpreted in a beneficial
manner and not in a literal sense. 
14.     From   the   facts   narrated   above   and   the   contentions
put­forth   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   it   is
evident that though several posts were advertised and the
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applications were sought from the eligible candidates, the
preliminary   and   written   examination   was   common   and
the marks as obtained in the said examination was taken
into   consideration   to   include   the   candidates   based   on
merit to the post for  which the candidate concerned had
given his preference. The advertisement had indicated the
requirement   of   the   Rule   that   a   candidate   who   had
preferred   the   higher   of   the   posts   which   has   been
advertised would be selected against such post depending
on the merit in the examination. To that extent Rule 4(3)
(c)(2) of Rules 2015 noted above is clear and specific that
the  category­wise  recommendation   of  the  candidates  will
be   made   according   to   the   marks   obtained   by   them   and
the  preference  sheet  submitted by   the  candidate.  Clause
(2)   of   Sub­Rule   (3)   further   clarifies   that   if   a   candidate   is
selected   in   the   main   list   on   the   basis   of   the   higher
priority of the post given by  him in the preference sheet,
the   candidate   will   not   be   considered   for   the   remaining
post indicated in the preference sheet. 
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15.     In   the   instant   case,   the   fact   that   the   respondent
No.1   had   given   his   preference   to   the   post   of   Deputy
District   Collector,   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   and
thereafter to the other posts including CMO in that order
of   preference   is   not   in   dispute.   The   further   fact   that   the
respondent   No.1   had   secured   892   marks   out   of   1575
marks   is   the   common   case   of   the   parties.   Though   the
respondent No.1 had given first preference to the post of
Deputy District Collector, the marks obtained by him was
not   sufficient   to   be   included   in   the   main   list   based   on
merit   for   that   post.   In   that   light,   the   second   preference
given   by   respondent   No.1   to   the   post   of   Deputy
Superintendent   of   Police   was   taken   into   consideration.
For   the   said   post   eight   vacancies   had   been   notified   as
reserved   for   the   Scheduled   Castes   candidates.   In   that
view,   the   said   892   marks   obtained   by   respondent   No.1
was   sufficient   to   accept   the   preference   and   include   the
name of the respondent No.1 in the main list for the post
of Deputy Superintendent of Police. 
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16.  While   taking   note   of   this   position,   what   is   also   to
be kept in view is the additional eligibility criteria for the
said   post   which   had   been   clearly   depicted   in   the
advertisement calling for applications and was within the
knowledge   of   respondent   No.1.   Clause   9   thereof,   which
has been extracted and taken note supra in the course of
this  order  indicates  that   the  minimum  height  prescribed
for the said post was 168 cms. The application submitted
by   the   respondent   No.1   apart   from   indicating   that   his
second   preference   is   to   the   post   of   Deputy
Superintendent   of   Police,   he   had   further   signed   in
acknowledgment   of   the   declaration   made   in   the
application   which   has   also   been   extracted   above   in   the
course   of   this   order.   The   same   would   indicate   that   a
declaration   is   made  to  the   effect   that   all   the  information
given by him are true and correct and that it is within his
knowledge   that   in   the   event   of   furnishing   incorrect   and
false   information,   proceedings   can   be   initiated   against
him.   It   is   further   declared   that   the   choice   for   the   posts
which   have   been   given   by   him,   he   has   fulfilled   all   the
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prescribed   eligibility   i.e.   age   limit,   educational
qualifications,   experience,   physical   measurement   etc.
for   those   posts.   It   is   also   indicated   that   if   he   was   found
ineligible at any stage of selection, his candidature can be
cancelled.   The   declaration   is   explicit   that   the   choice   of
preference   to   the   post   has   been   made   by   him   since
according to him he has fulfilled the prescribed eligibility
criteria, including   physical  measurement . If that be the
position, the positive declaration made by the respondent
No.1   is   that   he   satisfies   the   minimum   eligibility   of   168
cms. height required for the post he has preferred which
is   the   higher   post   than   the   next   preference.   In   such
event,   the   authority   concerned   on   perusal   of   the
application   would   presuppose   that   such   physical
eligibility   criteria   is   possessed   by   the   candidate
concerned   and   he   therefore   has   made   his   choice   for   the
post. In such event if the marks required for the said post
is obtained by the candidate, he would be included in the
main   selection   list.   Though,   the   appointment   is   a
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subsequent   act   which   would   take   place   on   verifying   the
details   and   the   candidate   being   found   to   be   eligible,   the
right   of   a   candidate   for   selection   will   stand   exhausted
once he is in the main list as per the Rule. While   taking
note   of   this   aspect,   what   is   to   be   kept   in   view   is   that
Clause   (c)(2)   of   the   Rule4   (3)   concerned   employs   the
phrase   “selected   in   the   main   list”   and   “not   appointed   to
the post”. 
17.  The precedents relied on by the learned counsel for
respondent   No.1   may   now   be   noted.   In   R.L.   Arora   vs.
State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   Ors.   AIR   1964   SC   1230,
the question arose relating to the new clause included in
Section   40(1)   relating   to   acquisition   of   property   for   the
company and in that context while considering the same
it   has   been   observed   by   this   Court   that   literal
interpretation   is   not   always   the   only   interpretation   of   a
provision   in   a   statute.   In   Surjit   vs.   Mahanagar
Telephone  Nigam Limited   2009 16 SCC  722, the issue
considered   was   with   regard   to   the   scope   and   extent   of
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Rule   443   and   2   (pp)   of   the   Telegraph   Rules   to   consider
where the telephone standing in the name of one spouse
could be dis­connected for non­payment of the bill by the
other.   In   those   circumstances,   it   was   observed   that   in
order   to   interpret   a   statute   one   has   to   consider   the
context in which  it has been made and the  purpose and
object   it   seeks   to   achieve.   In   Union   of   India   and   Ors.
vs.   Major   General   Madan   Lal   Yadav   (Retd.)   (1996)   4
SCC   127,   the   issue   relates   to   the   provisions   under   the
Army   Act.   The   claim   put­forth   by   the   Officer   was   taken
into   consideration.   The   observation   contained   therein,
relied   upon   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent
No.1   herein   to   the   effect   that   a   man   shall   not   take
advantage   of   his   own   wrong   to   gain   the   favourable
interpretation   of   law   stated   in   the   said   decision,   in   fact
would go against the respondent No.1 himself. 
18. None   of   the   referred   decisions   would   be   of
assistance to respondent No.1 though on the principle of
law   laid   down   in   the   said   decisions   there   can   be   no
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quarrel   whatsoever.   The   learned   counsel   for   respondent
No.1 has also placed before us the decision of the Gujarat
High   Court   in   the   case   relating   to   recruitment   process
which   was   considered   in   D.G.   Dalal   vs.   State   of
Gujarat   (2002)   2GLR   1011.   No­doubt   in   the   said   case,
Rule   9   of   Rules   1969   which   was   considered   therein
provided   with   regard   to   single   application   for   all   posts
and indication of the preference to be provided as in the
present   case,   but   the   question   arose   therein   since   the
posts   had   fallen   vacant.   The   issue   therein   was   with
regard   to   the   appointments   being   made   on   merit,   based
on   preference   and   also   a   waiting   list   being   maintained
against such posts. Since, certain candidates selected for
the   higher   posts   had   not   reported,   vacancy   had   arisen
and   to   such   vacant   posts   the   candidates   in   the   waiting
list were considered. In that view, a grievance was raised
by   the   candidates   who   were   selected   for   the   second
preferred   posts   since   they   had   higher   merit   than   the
persons   who   were   in   the   waiting   list   for   the   higher   post
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which had not been given to them at the first instance as
there   was   no   vacancy   and   the   next   post   based   on
preference   was   given.   It   is   in   that   circumstances   where
the   vacancies   had   arisen,   the   Rule   had   been   considered
to   indicate   the   manner   in   which   the   Rule   is   to   be
operated.   In   fact,   the   Rule   was   under   challenge   in   that
case.   It   has   no   application   to   the   facts   herein   so   as   to
persuade us to accept the same in the present matter.
19.   As   noted,   the   selection   for   all   the   posts   in   the
instant   case   were   through   a   single   advertisement   and
common   examination.   The   selection   process   conducted
by the appellant for the benefit of the departments under
the   government   was   not   one   post   after   the   other   on
completing the entire process to the higher post. Since, a
common   examination   was   held   and   the   common   merit
list was prepared, the adjustment of the candidates were
based on  their  preference according  to  their  order  in the
merit   list.   The   respondent   No.1   having   declared   that   he
possessed   the   physical   eligibility   for   the   post   of   Deputy
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Superintendent   of   Police   and   since   he   had   obtained   the
requisite   marks   he   was   selected   and   placed   in   the   main
selection list. It is true as indicated from the records that
another   Scheduled   Caste   candidates   who   had   secured
892   marks   had   been   given   the   post   of   CMO   as   per   the
preference indicated by him. When such is the process of
selection,   if   the   respondent   No.1   who   had   made
declaration   about   the   correctness   of   his   eligibility   and
secured the selection to be placed in the main list for the
said   post,   he   has   to   blame   himself   if   found   ineligible
since   his   height   was   admittedly   162   cms.   which   was   in
fact within his knowledge. He ought not to have exercised
the   preference.   But   having   acted   so   at   that   stage,   if   he
seeks   appointment   to   the   next   preferred   post   and   such
request   is   accepted,   it   will   result   in   displacing   a
candidate   who   having   made   a   truthful   declaration   had
indicated the appropriate preference, who is selected and
placed in the main list. Therefore, in such circumstance,
if   any   interference   is   made   in   the   process   of   selection,
apart   from   the   fact   that   it   could   interfere   with   the
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administrative  process  would   also  cause  hardship  to  the
candidates who have already been appointed and are not
before this Court. In the present facts and circumstances,
the Rule concerned provides for a definite process, which
was   also   depicted   in   the   advertisement   calling   for
applications.   The   Rule   is   not   under   challenge.   The
candidate concerned had applied without demur and also
furnished   a   declaration   with   regard   to   correctness   of
details   provided.   He   cannot   thereafter   turn   around   to
seek alteration of the position to the detriment of others. 
20.  In that view, the High Court was not justified in its
conclusion.   We   accordingly,   set   aside   the   order   dated
03.01.2019 passed in W.P. No.20855/2017 and the order
dated   08.11.2019   passed   in   W.A.   No.474/2019.
Consequently,   the   Writ   Petition   in   W.P.   No.20855/2017
before   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   Bench   at
Indore stands dismissed.
21.  The   above   appeal,   is   accordingly,   allowed   with   no
order as to costs. 
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22.  Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………..………..………….…………….J.
(DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD   )
      ………………………...……………………….J.
                              (A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
December 17, 2021
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