2021 INSC 0867
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1779 of 2021
BRIGADE ENTERPRISES LIMITED ... Appellant (s)
Versus
ANIL KUMAR VIRMANI & ORS.        ... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Challenging   an   order   of   the   National   Consumer   Disputes
Redressal   Commission,   passed   under   Section   35(1)(c)   of   the
Consumer   Protection   Act,   2019,   allowing   91   purchasers   of   51
apartments   in   the   residential   complex   developed   by   them,   to   file   a
consumer   complaint   in   a   representative   capacity,   on   behalf   of   and
for the benefit of more than about 1000 purchasers, the builder has
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come up with the above appeal.
2. We have heard Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel for
the appellant, Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel for the
respondents   and   Mr.   Omanakuttan   K.   K.,   learned   counsel
appearing for the intervenors.
3. About 91 persons who purchased 51 residential apartments, in
a   residential   complex   comprising   of   about   1134   apartments,
promoted   by   the   appellant   herein,   joined   together   and   filed   a
consumer complaint on the file of the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal   Commission,   New   Delhi.   The   Consumer   complaint   was
accompanied   by   an   application   under   Section   35(1)(c),   seeking   the
permission   of   the   National   Commission   to   prosecute   the   matter
jointly,   for   the   benefit   of   and   on   behalf   of,   not   only   of   the   91
applicants, but of numerous other consumers who have purchased
apartments   in   the   same   complex.   In   other   words   the   consumer
complaint filed by those applicants, who are respondents herein, is
a class action and the permission sought by them was in the nature
of a permission that could be granted by the Civil Court in terms of
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Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. Though the builder who is the appellant herein objected to the
application under Section 35(1)(c), the National Commission allowed
the   application   by   relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the
Chairman,   Tamil   Nadu   Housing   Board,   Madras   vs.   T.N.
Ganapathy 1
  and   the   decision   of   the   National   Commission   in
Ambrish   Kumar   Shukla   vs.   Ferrous   Infrastructure   Pvt.   Ltd.
Aggrieved by the said Order, the builder has come up with the above
appeal. 
5. The   main   grievance   of   the   appellant­builder,   as   projected   by
Mr.   Jayant   Bhushan,   learned   senior   counsel   is   that   out   of   total   of
1134   apartments   constructed   and   sold   by   them,   the   owners   of
merely   51   apartments   have   joined   together   and   invoked   the
jurisdiction of the National Consumer Commission and that such a
miniscule percentage of consumers cannot seek to file the complaint
in a representative capacity. It is also the contention of the learned
senior   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   there   was   no   commonality   of
1     (1990) 1 SCC 608
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interest   or   grievance,   as   some   individual   apartment   owners   have
also   invoked   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Karnataka   State   Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, seeking redressal of their separate
and distinct grievances.
6. However,   the   contention   of   Mr.   Ajit   Kumar   Sinha,   learned
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondents/original
complainants is that the issue is no longer  res integra  in view of the
decisions of this Court in  Chairman,   Tamil Nadu Housing Board,
Madras  vs.  T.N. Ganapathy  and  Vikrant Singh Malik & Ors.  vs.
Supertech   Limited   &   Ors . 2
  It   is   also   his   contention   that   the
respondents have the sameness of interest with the buyers of all the
1134   apartments,   which   is   a   sine   qua   non   for   maintaining   an
application   under   Section   35(1)(c)   and   that,   therefore,   the   National
Commission was right in allowing the application. 
7. Before   we   get   into   an   analysis   of   the   rival   contentions   with
specific reference to the statutory provisions, it is necessary to look
into   the   reliefs   prayed   for,   by   the   respondents   in   their   consumer
2     (2020) 9 SCC 145
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complaint   and   the   pleadings  on   the  basis  of   which   the   reliefs  were
so sought. The reliefs sought by the respondents in their consumer
complaint,  for   the   benefit   of   and  on   behalf   of   the   purchasers   of   all
the flats in the entire residential complex reads as follows:­
“ That   in   view   of   the   abovementioned   facts   and
circumstances   this   Hon’ble   Commission   may   graciously   be
pleased to pass orders and to direct the OP to:­ 
i. Direct the OP to pay to each of the Complainants and to
each   buyer   having   same   interest   delay   compensation,
as  stipulated in the Sale and  Construction Agreements,
for   unpaid   period   out   of   the   “Total   Period   of   Delay”   as
indicated in Para 46 of the Consumer Complaint; 
ii. Direct the OP to pay to each of the Complainants and to
each buyer having same interest, compensatory interest
@ 12% p.a. on individual consideration amount paid, for
abnormal   and   inordinate   delay   in   construction,   till
handing   over   possession   of   flats   to   the   complainants,
computing total period of delay as indicated in Para 46
of the Consumer Complaint; 
iii. Award   cost   of   the   Complaint   to   the   Complainants;
and/or 
iv. Pass any other and/or further relief, which this Hon’ble
Commission   thinks   fit   and   proper,   in   the   facts   and   cir ­
cumstances   of   the   case,   in   favour   of   the   complainants
and against the OP.”
8. The   pleadings   on   the   basis   of   which   the   respondents   sought
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the aforesaid prayers, in brief,   are as follows:   (i)   that the appellant
launched   the   subject   project   in   the   year   2013;   (ii)   that   the   project
styled   as   “Brigade   Lakefront”   was   to   comprise   of   about   1100   units
in   three   blocks,   namely ,   Amber   block,   Blue   block   and   Crimson
block;   (iii)   that Amber block, also called Building No.1, was to have
seven wings,  namely , Wings A, B, C, D, E, F and G; Blue block, also
called Building  No.2 was to have Wings H, I, J, K, L, M and N and
Crimson block, also called Building Nos.3 and 4 were to have Wings
O, P, Q, R, S and T;  (iv)  that in respect of the flats in Blue block, the
promised   delivery   date   was   30.06.2016   with   a   six   months   grace
period;   (v)   that   though   the   completion   certificate   and   structural
stability certificate were also issued by the Consultant/Architect for
the buildings in Blue block on 3.05.2017, the occupancy certificate
was issued partially on 28.12.2018 and the occupancy certificate for
the   balance   was   issued   on   25.06.2019;   (vi)   that   in   respect   of   the
buildings   in   Crimson   block,   the   promised   delivery   date   was
31.01.2018 with a grace period of six months;   (vii)   that though the
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completion   certificate   for   the   Crimson   block   was   issued   by   the
architect   on   10.08.2018,   the   occupancy   certificate   was   issued
partially   on   28.12.2018;   (viii)   that   the   builder   was   guilty   of   unfair
trade   practice,   inasmuch   as   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the
agreement prescribed a paltry compensation of Rs.5 per square feet
to   the   purchasers,   if   there   was   delay   in   completion   of   the   project,
while penal interest was levied on the buyers at 18% p.a. whenever
they   committed   default   or   delay   in   making   payment;   (ix)   that   on
account   of   the   delay   on   the   part   of   the   appellant   in   handing   over
possession,   the   buyers   suffered   losses   in   the   form   of   payment   of
monthly   rent,   interest   on   the   loans   taken   and   payment   of   higher
registration   charges,   as   the   circle   rates   had   gone   up   in   the
meantime;   and   (x)   that   therefore   they   were   constrained   to   file   a
complaint.
9. From   the   aforesaid   averments   contained   in   the   consumer
complaint, it could be seen that the delay on the part of the builder
in   handing   over   possession,   was   the   primary   ground   on   which
compensation   was   sought   by   the   respondents.   We   have   already
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extracted   the   prayers   made   in   the   original   complaint.   Interestingly
the   prayer   portion   of   the   complaint   does   not   contain   the
quantification   of   the   total   amount   of   compensation   sought   by   the
respondents either individually or collectively for and on behalf of all
the   purchasers   of   all   the   1134   residential   apartments.   The   prayer
portion of the complaint refers to paragraph 46 of the complaint, for
the   purpose   of   computation   of   delay   compensation.   But   paragraph
46   of   the   complaint   does   not   convey   any   meaning   except   if   taken
into   account   along   with   paragraph   45.   Therefore,   paragraphs   45
and 46 of the complaint are extracted as follows:
“ 45. Computation   of   “Total   Period   of   Delay”—The
Complainants   assert   that   the   Total   Period   of   Delay   be
calculated as follows: 
Delay   Period   Start   –   Promised   Date   of   Possession,   not
considering the grace period; and 
  Delay   Period   End   –   Either   of   the   following   two   dates
based on facts of individual complainants: 
a.  Where   possession   was   taken   prior   to   issuance   of
Occupancy   Certificate,   the   Date   of   Occupancy
Certificate; OR 
b.  Where possession was taken after the issuance of
Occupancy   Certificate,   then   Date   of   possession
Offered; 
It would be relevant to state that the meaning and nature
of   ‘possession’   as   stated   by   the   complainants   in   this
para   would   mean   legal   possession   only   where   said
possession   had   been   given   or   offered   to   be   given   upon
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confirmation   of   readiness   of   the   flat   for   possession,   in
adherence to Schedule of Construction Agreement. 
46.   It   is   clearly   and   unambiguously   inferred   that   the
Buyers   shall   receive   possession   by   executing   the   Sale
Deed   and   getting   the   same   registered.   Both   actual
possession and sale deed registration have to be done in
unison   in   accordance   with   clauses   of   the   agreement   for
construction.   Hence,   possession   without   registering   and
executing   sale   deed   or   vice   versa   does   not   together
construe to be “possession” for the purpose of calculating
the delay suffered by the buyers. If both events are done
on   separate   times,   the   later   date   of   the   two   would
prevail.   It   is   respectfully   submitted   that   for   the   given
residential   project,   the   date   of   grant   of   Occupancy
Certificate   shall   be   reckoned   as   the   pivotal   event   to
ascertain   delayed   possession   and   calculating
compensation based thereon.”
10. Paragraphs   45   and   46   contain   a   tacit   admission   that   the
period   of   delay   in   handing   over   possession   of   the   flats,   may   vary
from   buyer   to   buyer   in   respect   of   the   purchasers   of   all   the   1134
apartments.   This   is   why   the   respondents   have   sought   the
indulgence   of   the   Commission   to   compute   the   delay   in   respect   of
each case, on the basis of formulae indicated in paragraph 45.
11. However,   paragraph   41   of   the   consumer   complaint   contains
the   valuation   of   the   complaint,   at   least   insofar   as   the   91
complainants   who   jointly   filed   the   consumer   complaint   are
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concerned.   The   relevant   portion   of   paragraph   41   of   the   complaint
reads as follows:
“ It   is   submitted   that   as   per   the   Agreement   terms   reproduced
above, OPs are committed to pay meager delay compensation
of Rs. 5/­ per sq. ft. of saleable area, per month,  which comes
to around 0.1%   per annum of the sale consideration, or even
lesser.   On   the   contrary,   the   penalty   charged   by   the   OPs   in
case   the   buyers’   default   or   delay   in   paying   the   instalment   is
18% per annum. It is clear that the balance of performance is
over 180 times against the buyers who have been bearing the
brunt   of   the   absolute   mismanagement   of   project   by   the   OPs.
The buyer is not only patiently waiting for the possession but
also gets a double whammy to keep paying all the instalments
without   enjoying   the   property.   Of   the   total   number   of
complainants   those   who   have   preferred   to   approach   this
Hon’ble   Forum   in  this  instant   Complaint,  the   aggregate  value
of sale for 51 complainant­buyers alone, is about Rs. 66 Crore
whereas   the   aggregate   amount   disbursed   by   the   OP   so   the
same buyers, in the name of Delay Compensation is a meager,
less than Rs. 10 lakh which is just about 0.1% for the entire of
delay of more than 2 years .”
12. Before we proceed further  we must record one important fact,
namely,   that   even   according   to   the   respondents­complainants,   the
project   comprised   of   three   blocks   namely   Amber   block,   Blue   block
and Crimson block. Amber block was to have seven Wings with 386
apartments.   It   appears   that   none   of   the   owners   of   these   386
apartments   in   Amber   block   have   joined   with   the   respondents­
complainants. This  is why  the  entire discussion  about  the  delay  in
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completion   of   the   project,   with   reference   to   the   timeline   of   events
found   in   paragraph   14   of   the   consumer   complaint,   refers   only   to
Blue block and Crimson block. The appellant has given a tabulation
in   their   counter   to   the   original   complaint,   pointing   out   that   Blue
block comprises of 412 apartments, out of which the owners of only
47   apartments   have   joined   in   the   filing   of   the   complaint   and   that
Crimson block has 336 apartments, out of which the owners of only
4 apartments have joined in the complaint.
13. In view of the fact that none of the owners of the apartments in
Amber block have joined in the filing of the complaint, coupled with
the fact that there is no pleading with respect to the timeline of the
project in respect of Amber  block, the  consumer  complaint filed by
the   respondents   cannot   be   treated   as   one   representing   the   owners
of  386  apartments  in  Amber  block. The respondents  ought  to  have
either included as one of the complainants, the owner of one of the
apartments in Amber block or at least made necessary averments in
the   pleading  about   the  timeline   for  completion   of  the  Amber   block,
to make the complaint, as one filed in a representative capacity on
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behalf of the owners of flats in all the three blocks. Let us now see
at least whether the complaint was maintainable in a representative
capacity   on   behalf   of   the   owners   of   the   flats   in   Blue   block   and
Crimson block, in the light of the requirements of Section 35(1)(c) of
the Act. 
14. Section   35(1)(c)   enables   one   or   more   consumers,   where   there
are   numerous   consumers   having   the   same   interest,   with   the
permission of the District Commission, to file a complaint, on behalf
of or for the benefit of all consumers so interested. It is needless to
point out that the   sine qua non   for invoking Section 35(1)(c) is that
all consumers on whose behalf or for whose benefit the provision is
invoked, should have the same interest. Interestingly, Section 35(1)
(c)   uses  the   disjunction   “ or ”   in   between   two  sets   of   words,  namely,
(i)   “ on   behalf   of ”;   and   (ii)   “ for   the   benefit   of ”.   Clause   (c)   of   Sub­
Section (1) of Section 35 reads as under:
“ one   or   more   consumers,   where   there   are   numerous
consumers   having   the   same   interest,   with   the   permission   of
the District Commission, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all
consumers so interested.”
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15. Therefore, a complaint filed under Section 35(1)(c) could either
be   “ on   behalf   of ”   or   “ for   the   benefit   of ”   all   consumers   having   the
same interest.
16. Section   38(11)   of   the   Consumer   Protection   Act,   2019   makes
the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the First Schedule to the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to cases where the complainant is
a   consumer   referred   to   in   Section   2(5)(v),   which   defines   a
‘ complainant ’   to   mean   one   or   more   consumers,   where   there   are
numerous consumers having the same interest.
17. Order I Rule 8, CPC, unlike Section 35(1)(c) operates both ways
and   contains   provisions   for   a   two­way   traffic.   It   not   only   permits
plaintiffs to sue in a representative capacity but also permits people
to   be   sued   and   to   be   defended   in   an   action,   in   a   representative
capacity. Order I Rule 8 reads as follows:­
“ 8.   One   person   may   sue   or   defend   on   behalf   of   all   in
same   interest. —(1)   Where   there   are   numerous   persons
having the same interest in one suit,— 
(a)   one   or   more   of   such   persons   may,   with   the
permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend
such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons
so interested; 
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(b)   the   Court   may   direct   that   one   or   more   of   such
persons   may sue   or  be  sued,  or may  defend   such  suit,
on   behalf   of,   or   for   the   benefit   of,   all   persons   so
interested. 
(2)   The   Court   shall,   in   every   case   where   a   permission   or
direction is given under sub­rule (1), at the plaintiff's expense,
give   notice   of   the   institution   of   the   suit   to   all   persons   so
interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of
the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not
reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as  the Court
in each case may direct. 
(3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is
instituted,   or   defended,   under   sub­rule   (1),   may   apply   to   the
Court to be made a party to such suit. 
(4)   No   part   of   the   claim   in   any   such   suit   shall   be   abandoned
under sub­rule (1), and no such suit shall be withdrawn under
sub­rule   (3),   of   rule   1   of   Order   XXIII,   and   no   agreement,
compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit
under rule 3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the
plaintiff's   expense,   notice   to   all   persons   so   interested   in   the
manner specified in sub­rule (2). 
(5) Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does
not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court
may substitute in his place any other person having the same
interest in the suit. 
(6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall  be  binding
on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit
is instituted, or defended, as the case may be.”
18. In   simple   terms,   the   salient   features   of   the   stipulations
contained in Order I Rule 8 CPC can be summed up as follows:
(i) where   there   are   numerous   persons   having   the   same
interest   in   one   suit,   one   or   more   of   such   persons   may,
with the permission of  the  Court, sue on  behalf  of  or  for
the benefit of all persons so interested; 
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(ii)   where   there   are   numerous   persons   having   the   same
interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may be
sued or one or more such persons may defend such suit,
on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested; 
(iii)   the Court itself may, without the plaintiffs or defendants
seeking any permission under Order I Rule 8(1)(a), direct
that   one   or   more   such   persons   may   sue   or   be   sued   or
may defend the suit on behalf of and for the benefit of all
persons interested; 
(iv)   notice   of   the   institution   of   the   suit   to   all   persons   so
interested   either   by   personal   service   or   by   public
advertisement   should   be   ordered   by   the   Court   in   both
categories of cases, namely, where permission is given by
the   Court   on   the   application   of   the   individuals   or
direction is issued by the Court itself;
(v)    any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is
instituted or defended may seek to be made a party to the
suit;
(vi)  abandonment   of   the   whole   or   part   of   the   claim,
withdrawal of the suit or the recording of any agreement,
compromise   or   satisfaction   shall   not   be   allowed   by   the
Court unless notice to all persons interested in the matter
is   issued   either   by   personal   service   or   by   public
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advertisement.
(vii)   the Court may at any time substitute the person suing or
defending   in   a   representative   capacity,   with   any   other
person,   if   the   former   was   not   prosecuting   the   suit   or
defence with due diligence.  
(viii)   the decree passed in the suit covered by this Rule will be
binding on all persons.
19. The   Explanation   under   Order   I   Rule   8   is   of   significance.     It
distinguishes   persons   having   the   same   interest   in   one   suit   from
persons having the same cause of action. To establish sameness of
interest,   it   is   not   necessary   to   establish   sameness   of   the   cause   of
action.
20. The   Explanation   under   Order   I   Rule   8,   is   a   necessary
concomitant of the provisions of the Rules 1 and 3 of Order I.
Order I Rule 1, CPC, allows many persons to join in one suit as
plaintiffs. Order I, Rule 3 allows many persons to be joined in
one   suit   as   defendants.   But   to   fall   under   Order   I   Rule   1   or
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Order  I   Rule   3,   the   right   to  relief  should  arise   out   of  or  be  in
respect   of   the   same   act   or   transaction   allegedly   existing   in
such   persons,   jointly,   severally   or  in  the   alternative.   To   some
extent,   Rules   1   and   3   of   Order   I   are   founded   upon   the
sameness of the cause  of action.  This  is why the Explanation
under   Order   I   Rule   8   distinguishes   sameness   of   interest   from
the sameness of the cause of action . 
21. Since   “ sameness   of   interest ”   is   the   pre­requisite   for   an
application under Order I Rule 8, CPC read with Section 35(1)(c) of
the   Consumer   Protection   Act,   2019,   it   was   necessary   for   the
respondents   to   include   in   the   consumer   complaint,   sufficient
averments   that   would   show   sameness   of   interest.   As   we   have
pointed   out   earlier   the   total   number   of   residential   apartments
constructed in three blocks comprising of about 20 wings   (7 wings
each in  Amber  and   Blue   blocks   and  6  wings  in  Crimson  block )  were
1134.   There   are   no   pleadings   insofar   as   the   purchasers   of   386
residential apartments in the 7 wings of Amber block are concerned.
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Even   in   respect   of   the   owners   of   the   remaining   748   residential
apartments   in   blue   block   and   Crimson   block,   the   complaint   does
not   contain  any  specific   averments   regarding   sameness   of   interest.
The delay in handing  over possession of the residential apartments
might   have   given   rise   to   a   cause   of   action   for   the   individual
purchasers of flats to sue the builder. But sameness of the cause of
action   is   not   equal   to   sameness   of   interest.   The   existence   of
sameness of interest, has been questioned by the appellant­builder
on   the   ground   that   delay   compensation   as   stipulated   in   the
Agreements   was   offered   to   the   purchasers   and   that   some   of   them
accepted the same without any demur or protest, while a few others
have refused to accept. It is not clear from the consumer complaint
as   to   how   (i)   those   who   have   accepted   the   compensation   under
protest;   (ii)   those who accepted without protest; and   (iii)   those who
refused to accept the compensation, have the sameness of interest.
22. The   period   of   delay   in   the   completion   of   the   project   and   the
handing   over   of   possession,   does   not   appear   to   be   uniform   in   all
1134   cases.   The   respondents­complainants   cannot   project
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sameness of interest for the purchasers in whose case the period of
delay   was   negligible   and   those   in   whose   cases   there   was   a   huge
delay.
23. We may have to look at the issue also from the point of view of
the   buyers.   The   delay   in   handing   over   possession   need   not
necessarily   be   the   only   deficiency   in   service   on   the   part   of   the
appellant­builder.   Some   of   the   purchasers   of   flats   may   also   have
other complaints and their right to proceed against appellant cannot
be   stultified   by   a   few   individuals   invoking   Section   35(1)(c).   That   a
few   purchasers   have   chosen   to   approach   the   Karnataka   State
Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission   to   ventilate   their
individual   grievances   shows   that   all   the   1134   buyers   do   not   have
the   same   interest   as   that   of   the   respondents.   At   least   if   the
respondents   have   given   the   names   of   purchasers   of   all   flats   on
whose   behalf   the   present   complaint   could   be   entertained,   they
would have been better off. But they have not done so. 
24. Reliance   is   placed   by   the   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
respondents,   upon   the   Judgment   of   this   Court   in   Chairman,
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Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras  vs.  T.N. Ganapathy  (supra),
to   drive   home   the   point   that   the   object   of   Order   I   Rule   8   is   to
facilitate the decision of questions in which large number of persons
are interested, without recourse to the ordinary procedure and that,
therefore,   the   provision   must   receive   an   interpretation   which   will
subserve the object of its enactment. This Court pointed out in the
said case that  though  each  of the  allottees of plots  by  the  Housing
Board   may   be   interested   individually   in   fighting   out   the   demand
separately   made   or   likely   to   be   made   by   the   Board,   it   would   not
make Order I Rule 8 inapplicable.
25. But the above decision in  Tamil Nadu Housing Board  (supra)
cannot be pressed into service by  the respondents for  two reasons,
namely,  (i)  that what was questioned in a representative suit in that
case, was the additional demand sought to be made by the Housing
Board on all the allottees uniformly, for an amount over and above
the   tentative   price   originally   fixed;   and   (ii)   that   in   any   case   this
Court   restricted   the   applicability   of   the   decision   only   to   those
allottees   of   the     low   income   group.   Therefore,   the   sameness   of
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interest   has   to   be   tested   on   the   basis   of   the   nature   of   the   reliefs
claimed and the pleadings that pinpoint the sameness of interest.
26. In  Rameshwar Prasad Shrivastava & Ors. vs. Dwarkadhis
Projects Private Limited & Ors. 3
, this Court was concerned with a
case   where   a   complaint   filed   by   a   group   of   19   persons   who   were
allotted residential apartments in a Group Housing Project, came to
be   dismissed   by   the   National   Commission,   for   want   of   a   proper
application   under   Section   12(1)(c)   of   the   1986   Act   [equivalent   to
Section  35(1)(c) of  the  2019  Act].  After  referring  to   the  definition   of
the   expression   “ complainant ”   in   Section   2(1)(b)(iv)   of   the   1986   Act
and   the   requirement   of   Section   13(6)   of   the   1986   Act,   this   Court
upheld the Order of the National Commission holding the complaint
to   be   not   maintainable.   This   Court   held   that   the   requirement   of
Order I Rule 8 prescribed in Section 13(6) of the 1986 Act should be
read into Section 12(1)(c) of the 1986 Act.
27. In   Anjum   Hussain   and   Ors.   vs.   Intellicity   Business   Park
Private Limited and Ors. 4
, this Court reversed the decision of the
3     (2019) 2 SCC 417
4     (2019) 6 SCC 519
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National Commission which dismissed an application under Section
12(1)(c)   of   the   1986   Act,   on   the   ground   that   the   object   of   Section
12(1)(c) is to  reduce multiplicity  of proceedings and that,  therefore,
it must receive an interpretation which would subserve the object of
its enactment. 
28. In   Vikrant   Singh   Malik   and   Ors.   vs.   Supertech   Limited
and   Ors.   (supra) ,   this   Court   upheld   the   order   of   the   National
Commission that dismissed an application under Section 12(1)(c) of
the   1986   Act,   on   the   ground   that   the   reliefs   prayed   for   in   the
consumer   complaint,   were   confined   only   to   26   complainants   and
that   even   the   pleadings   as   framed   and   drawn   up,   highlighted   only
the specific grievances of those 26 complainants.
29. All   the   above   decisions   show   that   for   allowing   an   application
under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1986 Act or Section 35(1)(c) of the 2019
Act,   the   pleadings   and   the   reliefs   are   to   be   considered.   If   so
considered,   the   National   Commission   could   not   have   granted
permission to the respondents in this case, to file the complaint in a
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representative   capacity   for   and   on   behalf   of   the   owners   of   all   the
1134 flats.
30. That   takes   us   to   the   next   question   as   to   the   fate   of   the
complaint filed by the respondents. It is sought to be contended that
once   the   application   under   Section   35(1)(c)   is   held   liable   to   be
rejected, the complaint should also go, as more than one consumer
cannot institute a complaint unless they come within the definition
of   the   word   “ complainant ”   and   also   satisfy   the   requirements   of
Section 38(11) read with Order I Rule 8 CPC. 
31. It   is   true   that   the   definition   of   the   word   “ complainant ”   is   little
misleading. Section 2(5) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 reads
as under:
“ (5) "complainant" means—
(i)  a consumer; or
(ii)  any   voluntary   consumer   association   registered   under   any   law
for the time being in force; or
(iii)  the Central Government or any State Government; or
(iv)  the Central Authority; or
(v)  one   or   more   consumers,   where   there   are   numerous   consumers
having the same interest; or
(vi)  in case of death of a consumer, his legal heir or legal represen ­
tative; or
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(vii)  in   case   of   a   consumer   being   a   minor,   his   parent   or   legal
guardian;
32. Section 38(11) reads as under:­
“ 38. Procedure on admission of complaint.
(11)  Where the complainant is a consumer referred to in sub­clause
(v)   of   clause   (5)   of   section   2,   the   provisions   of   Order  I   Rule   8   of   the
First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall
apply   subject   to   the   modification   that   every   reference   therein   to   a
suit or decree shall be construed as a reference to a complaint or the
order of the District Commission thereon.”
33. Section 35(1) reads as under:
“ 35.     Manner   in   which   complaint   shall   be   made.­   (1)   A
complaint, in relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed
to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be
provided, may be filed with a District Commission by— 
(a)  the consumer,­­ 
(i) to whom such goods are sold or delivered or agreed to
be   sold   or   delivered   or   such   service   is   provided   or
agreed to be provided; or 
(ii)   who   alleges   unfair   trade   practice   in   respect   of   such
goods or service; 
(b)  any  recognised  consumer association,  whether  the   con ­
sumer   to   whom   such   goods   are   sold   or   delivered   or
agreed   to   be   sold   or   delivered   or   such   service   is   pro ­
vided   or   agreed   to   be   provided,   or   who   alleges   unfair
trade   practice   in   respect   of   such   goods   or   service,   is   a
member of such association or not; 
(c)  one or more consumers, where there are numerous con ­
sumers having the same interest, with the permission of
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the  District  Commission,  on  behalf  of,  or  for  the   benefit
of, all consumers so interested; or 
(d)  the   Central   Government,   the   Central   Authority   or   the
State Government, as the case may be: 
Provided   that   the   complaint   under   this   sub­section   may   be
filed electronically in such manner as may be prescribed. 
34. A   careful   reading   of   the   above   provisions   would   show   that
there   is   no   scope   for   the   contention   that   wherever   there   are   more
consumers than one, they must only take recourse to Order I Rule 8
CPC, even  if the  complaint is  not  on  behalf of  or  for   the benefit  of,
all   the   consumers   interested   in   the   matter.   There   may   be   cases
where only  “ a few  consumers ” and  not  “ numerous  consumers ” have
the same interest.   There is nothing in the Act to prohibit these few
consumers from joining together and filing a joint complaint. A joint
complaint stands in contrast to a complaint filed in a representative
capacity.   For   attracting   the   provisions   of   Section   35(1)(c),   the
complaint filed by one or more consumers should be on behalf of or
for the benefit of numerous consumers having same interest. It does
not mean that where there are only very few consumers having the
same   interest,   they   cannot   even   join   together   and   file   a   single
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complaint,   but   should   take   recourse   only   to   independent   and
separate complaints.
35. It is true that Section 2(5)(i) uses the expression “ a consumer ”.
If the vowel “ a ” and the word “ consumer ” appearing in Section 2(5)(i)
are to be understood to exclude more than one person, it will result
in   a   disastrous   consequence   while   reading   Section   2(5)(vi).   Section
2(5)(vi) states that in the case of death of a consumer, “ his legal heir
or   legal   representative ”   will   be   a   complainant.   Unless   the   words
“ legal heir ” and “ legal representative ” are understood to mean ‘legal
heirs’   and   ‘legal   representatives’,   a   meaningful   reading   of   the
provision may not be there.
36. Under Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, words in
the   singular   shall   include   the   plural   and   vice   versa   in   all   Central
Acts   and   Regulations,   unless   there   is   anything   repugnant   in   the
subject   or   context.   We   cannot   read   anything   repugnant   in   the
subject   or   context   of   Section   2(5)   or   35(1)(c)   or   38(11 )   of   the
Consumer   Protection   Act,   2019   to     hold   that   the   word   in   the
singular, namely,  “consumer”  will not include the plural.  
26

37. We may take for example a case where a residential apartment
is   purchased   by   the   husband   and   wife   jointly   or   by   a   parent   and
child   jointly.   If   they   have   a   grievance   against   the   builder,   both   of
them   are   entitled   to   file   a   complaint   jointly.   Such   a   complaint   will
not   fall   under   Section   35(1)(c)   but   fall   under   Section   35(1)(a).
Persons   filing   such   a   complaint   cannot   be   excluded   from   Section
2(5)(i)  on  the  ground   that   it  is  not   by   a  single  consumer.  It  cannot
also   be   treated   as   one   by   persons   falling   under   Section   2(5)(v)
attracting   the   application   of   Order   I   Rule   8   CPC   read   with   Section
38(11). 
38. Therefore,   the   proper   way   of   interpreting   Section   35(1)   read
with section 2(5), would be to say that a complaint may be filed:   (i)
by   a   single   consumer;   (ii)   by   a   recognised   consumer   Association;
(iii)  by one or more consumers jointly, seeking the redressal of their
own   grievances   without   representing   other   consumers   who   may   or
may  not have  the  same interest;   (iv)   by  one  or  more consumers on
27

behalf   of   or   for   the   benefit   of   numerous   consumers;   and   (v)   the
Central Government, Central Authority or State Authority.
39. It   must   be   remembered   that   the   provisions   of   the   Consumer
Protection   Act   are   in   addition   to   and   not   in   derogation   of   the
provisions of  any  other  law for  the time being  in force, by virtue of
Section 100. Even Section 38 which prescribes the procedure to be
followed   by   the   Commission   for   enquiring   into   the   complaint,   does
not   expressly   exclude   the   application   of   the   provisions   of   CPC.
Though   Sub­sections   (9),   (11)   and   (12)   of   Section   38   make   specific
reference only to a few provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
principle   behind   Order   I   Rule   1   enabling   more   than   one   person   to
join in a suit as plaintiff is not expressly excluded.  
40. Therefore, we are of the considered view that while the National
Commission   was   wrong   in   this   case,   in   the   peculiar   facts   and
circumstances   in   permitting   an   application   under   Section   35(1)(c)
read with Order I Rule 8 CPC, it does not mean that the complaint
filed   by   the   respondents   itself   is   liable   to   be   thrown   out.   The
complaint filed by the respondents may have to be treated as a joint
28

complaint   and   not   a   complaint   in   a   representative   capacity   on
behalf  of  1134 purchasers.    The  purchasers  of  other  flats,  such  as
the   intervenors   herein   may   join   as   parties   to   the   consumer
complaint, if they so desire.   As a matter of fact, it is stated by the
intervenors   that   pursuant   to   the   impugned   order,   advertisements
were   issued   and   the   intervenors   have   already   filed   impleadment
application before the National Commission.  They are entitled to be
impleaded.  
41. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order
of   the   National   Commission   is   modified   to   the   effect   that   the
complaint   filed   by   the   respondents   shall   be   treated   as   a   joint
complaint filed on behalf of only the respondents herein and not as
a complaint filed in a representative capacity on behalf of or for the
benefit  of  all  the  owners of   all  the  1134  flats.  Persons  who  wish  to
implead   themselves   as   parties   to   the   complaint   filed   by   the
respondents, may be allowed by the National Commission to do so,
provided their grievance is also limited to the grievance as projected
by   the   respondents   in   their   consumer   complaint.   The   intervenors
29

herein,   in   view   of   what   is   stated   in   their   application,   shall   also   be
allowed   to   be   impleaded   in   the   consumer   complaint.   The
intervention   application   is   closed   with   the   above   direction.   There
shall be no order as to costs. 
 
… ..…………....................J.
      (Hemant Gupta)
.…..………......................J.
        (V. Ramasubramanian)
DECEMBER 17, 2021
NEW DELHI .
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