2021 INSC 0868
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REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.               OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.6335 OF 2021)
BRIJMANI DEVI      …..APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
PAPPU KUMAR & ANR.       ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.              OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.7916 OF 2021)
O R D E R
NAGARATHNA J. 
Leave granted. 
2. These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the   informant   ­
appellant assailing the orders dated 22.07.2021 and 13.09.2021
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Patna   in   Criminal
Miscellaneous   Nos.11683   of   2021   and   26463   of   2021

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respectively whereby bail has been granted to the accused who is
the   common   respondent   in   the   appeals,   in   connection   with
Naubatpur   P.S.   Case   No.93   of   2020   and   Parsa   Bazar   P.S.   Case
No.316 of 2017 respectively. 
3. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant is the mother
of   the   deceased   Rupesh   Kumar.   She   is   stated   to   be   an
eyewitness   to   the   killing   of   her   son   and   also   the   person   who
lodged the First Information Report being FIR No.93 of 2020 for
offence of murder of her son under section 302 read with section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the ‘IPC’) and section 27
of the Arms Act against common respondent­accused herein viz.,
Pappu Kumar and one other person named Deepak Kumar. 
4. That   FIR   No.93/2020   dated   19.02.2020   is   stated   to   have
been filed by the appellant herein between 2.30 hrs and 3.00 hrs
in   the   night  stating   that  her   son   Rupesh   Kumar   aged   about   35
years was sleeping in the room constructed on the roof top of her
house.   A   relative,   Deepak   Kumar   was   also   sleeping   there.   She
was   sleeping   in   another   room   which   is   beside   the   aforesaid
room.   She   has   further   stated   that   she   heard   the   sound   of   a
person   walking   and   also   talking   and   then   she   saw   that
respondent–accused was present and he had a pistol in his hand

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and   when   he   saw   her,   he   caught   her   and   forcefully   tied   her
mouth   with   his   Gamchha   (towel)   and   he   shot   her   son   on   the
head from his pistol in front of her and Deepak Kumar too shot
once   at   her   son’s   head.   As   a   result,   her   son   died.   Other   family
members   reached   the   spot   upon   hearing   the   firing   sound.   But
the accused ran away waiving their pistols. 
5. Earlier,   FIR   No.316   of   2017   was   lodged   at   Police   Station
Parsa   Bazar   by   appellant’s   deceased   son   himself   viz.,   Rupesh
Kumar   for   causing   serious   bullet   injury   to   him,   under   sections
341, 307 read with section 34 of IPC and section 27 of the Arms
Act,   by   giving   a   ferdbeyan   against   the   very   same   respondent­
accused   herein   and   his   two   acquaintances   to   K.K.   Verma,   ASI,
Shashtri Nagar PS, District Patna, on 28.12.2017 at 7.57 pm at
Emergency   Ward,   Paras   Hospital,   Patna.   This   ferdbeyan   was
given   in   respect   of   an   incident   which   occurred   on   the   previous
day   i.e.   27.12.2017   when   he   had   gone   to   meet   his   friend
Shailendra   at   Sipara.   While   Rupesh   Kumar   was   returning   from
his   friend’s   house,   the   respondent­accused   along   with   his   two
acquaintances   caught   him   and   respondent­accused   fired   and
caused   bullet   injury   to   him.     When   Rupesh   Kumar   ran   and
reached a farmer’s house in the nearby village and narrated the

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entire   story   to   him,   he   was   taken   to   the   police   station   on   a
motorcycle and had lodged FIR No.316/2017.
6. According to the appellant, the respondent­accused herein
had   attempted   to   kill   her   son   viz.,   Rupesh   Kumar   in   the   year
2017 by firing at him and an FIR was lodged being FIR No.316 of
2017.   But   after   lodging   FIR   No.   93   of   2020,   the   respondent­
accused   had   absconded   for   about   seven   months.   He   had   also
threatened   the   appellant   herein   and   exerted   pressure   on   the
appellant­informant   and   her   family   to   withdraw   the   complaint,
failing   which   he   would   eliminate   the   entire   family.     That   a
written complaint of the appellant dated 30.09.2020 was filed to
the   police,   in   pursuance   of   which   complaint   the   respondent­
accused   was   nabbed   in   connection   with   murder   of   Rupesh
Kumar. 
7. While   on   the   run   respondent­accused   was   arrested   on
30.09.2020.   The   respondent­accused   has   been   in   judicial
custody   for   a   period   of   nine   months   till   he   was   granted   bail   by
the High Court. 
8. In fact, the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at
Patna,   took   cognizance   of   the   offences   and   issued   summons   to
the   respondent­accused   herein   in   connection   with   FIR

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No.316/2017. An order of remand to judicial custody was passed
in   connection   with   Naubatpur   P.S.   Case   No.316/2017   under
section 307 of IPC on 06.01.2021. 
9. That   the   accused   made   an   application   seeking   bail   before
the   Sessions   Court,   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional
Sessions   Judge­I,   Danapur   by   Order   dated   08.12.2020.
Thereafter, the respondent­accused filed an application for grant
of   bail   by   suppressing   his   criminal   antecedents   and   by   the
impugned   order   dated   22.07.2021,   the   High   Court   granted   him
bail in connection with the case being FIR No.93/2020 registered
at   Naubatpur   P.S.   for   offence   under   section   302   read   with
section   34   of   IPC   and   section   27   of   the   Arms   Act,   subject   to
certain conditions. 
10. Subsequently,   the   High   Court,   vide   order   dated
13.09.2021,   also   granted   bail   to   respondent­accused   in
connection   with   the   other   case   being   FIR   No.316/2017
registered   at   Parsa   Bazar   P.S.     for   offences   under   sections   341,
307 read with section 34 of IPC and section 25 of the Arms Act.
Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred these appeals before
this Court. 

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11. We have heard Sri Smarhar Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant   and   Sri   R.   Basant,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for
respondent­accused and perused the material on record. 
12. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that   the
respondent­accused   has   been   named   in   eight   cases.   Even
though, the said accused may have been acquitted in a few cases,
there are still three cases pending against him. He had attempted
unsuccessfully   to   kill   the   deceased   Rupesh   Kumar   in   the
year   2017.   Later   in   the   year   2020,   he   killed   the   deceased   and
absconded   for   about   seven   months.   The   mother   of   the   deceased
appellant   herein,   is   the   informant   and   she   has   been   threatened
by   respondent.   He   was   in   judicial   custody   only   for   a   period   of
nine   months   as   he   had   earlier   absconded   but   has   now   been
granted   bail   by   the  High   Court   contrary   to   the   settled   principles
of law and the judgments of this Court. 
13. Further   it   is   urged   that   the   High   Court   has   not   assigned
reasons   for   grant   of   bail   in   the   instant   cases   whereas   the
respondent­accused is alleged to have committed heinous crimes
which   could   result   in   life   imprisonment   or   even   death   penalty.
Respondent­accused,   being   a   habitual   offender,   could   not   have
been   granted   bail   by   the   High   Court.   According   to   the   learned

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counsel  for  the appellant, the  High Court in a very cryptic order
de   hors   any   reasoning   has   granted   bail   to   the   respondent­
accused. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant,
who is mother of the deceased, to allow these appeals by setting
aside the impugned orders. In support of his submission, reliance
has been placed on certain decisions of this Court which shall be
referred to later.
14. Per   contra,   Sri   Basant,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the
respondent­accused,   supported   the   impugned   orders   and
contended that accused no.2 in the case is the brother­in­law of
the deceased and both of them were accused in another case in
which   the   respondent­accused   herein   has   been   enlisted   as   a
witness.   The   deceased   and   Deepak   Kumar   –   accused   no.2   were
living   together   in   the   same   house.   He   may   have   fired   at   the
deceased but not  the respondent­accused herein. This is a case
of false implication of the respondent­accused by the informant.
15.       That   the   gun   was   recovered   from   accused   no.2   and   there
has   been   no   recovery   made   from   respondent­accused.   There
have been several cases against the deceased and accused no.2
also. 

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16. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent­accused further
contended   that   respondent­accused   was   350   kms   away   on   the
intervening night of 18 th
  and 19 th
  February, 2020. He was not at
the spot of the crime at all. This is evident from the mobile phone
details.   Therefore,   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   considering
these aspects and granting bail to the respondent­accused.
 
17. In   support   of   his   submission,   Sri   Basant,   learned   Senior
Counsel, placed reliance on   Gudikanti Narsimhulu & Ors. vs.
Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh   ­ (1978) 1
SCC   240 ,   which   prescribes   the   approach   of   a   Court   while
granting bail. The Court considering an  application  seeking bail
cannot enter into an in­depth analysis of the case so as to hold a
mini   trial   of   the   case.   It   is   also   unnecessary   to   give   lengthy
reasons at the time of granting bail. It was contended that bail is
the   norm   and   jail   is   the   exception.   Once   bail   has   been   granted
by a Court, it is only in very rare cases that there is interference
as it would have the effect of cancellation of bail. That the liberty
of   a   person   cannot   be   interfered   with   unless   the   situation
warrants.  
18. It   was   further   submitted   that   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant   was   not   right   in   contending   that   the   respondent

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­accused   had   absconded.   In   fact,   there   was   no   chargesheet
against him. It was only when a protest petition was filed, that a
chargesheet was filed against him and he was arrested. 
19. It   was   further   submitted   that   the   allegations   against   the
respondent­accused are false and hence the impugned orders of
the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals. 
20. Having   regard   to   the   contention   of   Sri   Smarhar   Singh,
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the   impugned   orders
granting   bail   to   the   respondent­accused   are   bereft   of   any
reasoning   and   they   are   cryptic   and   bail   has   been   granted   in   a
casual   manner,   we   extract   those   portions   of   the   impugned
orders   dated   22 nd
  July,   2021   and   13 th
  September,   2021   passed
by   the   High   Court,   which   provides   the   “reasoning”   of   the   Court
for granting bail, as under : 
“Impugned Order dated 22.7.2021
During   course   of   investigation,   it   has   come   that   at   the
time   and   date   of   occurrence   petitioner   was   at   Araria.
Petitioner is in custody since 30.09.2020.
Considering  the  facts and  circumstances of the  case  and
the   fact   that   false   implication   against   the   petitioner
cannot   be   rule   out,   the   petitioner   above­named,   is
directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail bond of
Rs. 10,000/­ (Ten thousand) with two sureties of the like
amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Additional
Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   III,   Patna   in   connection   with

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Naubatpur   P.S.   Case   No.93   of   2020,   subject   to   following
conditions:
(i) The   petitioner   shall   co­operate   in   the   trial
and   shall   be   properly   represented   on   each
and   every   date   fixed   by   the   court   and   shall
remain   physically   present   as   directed   by   the
Court   and   in   the   event   of   failure   on   two
consecutive   dates   without   sufficient   reasons,
his   bail   bond   shall   be   liable   to   be   cancelled
by the court below.
(ii) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or
the   witnesses   of   the   case,   in   that   case,
prosecution   will   be   at   liberty   to   move   for
cancellation of bail of the petitioner.”
Impugned Order dated 13.09.2021 
“Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and
the fact petitioner is in custody since 06.01.2021, let the
petitioner,   mentioned   above,   be   enlarged   on   bail   on
furnishing  bail  bond  of  Rs.  10,000/­  (ten thousand)  with
two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of
learned   Sub   Judge­VIII,   Patna,   in   connection   with   Parza
Bazar   P.S.   Case   No.   316/2017,   subject   to   the   following
conditions:
(1)  Petitioner shall co­operate in the trial and
shall be properly represented on each and every
date   fixed   by   the   Court   and   shall   remain
physically   present   as   directed   by   the   Court   and
on   his/her   absence   on   two   consecutive   dates
without   sufficient   reason,   his/her   bail   bond
shall be cancelled by the Court below.
(2)   If   the   petitioner   tampers   with   the
evidence   or   the   witnesses,   in   that   case,   the
prosecution   will   be   at   liberty   to   move   for
cancellation of bail.”

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21. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   matter   of   granting   bail   to   an
accused as under:
a) In  Gudikanti Narasimhulu  (supra), Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content and meaning of Article 21 of the
Constitution   of   India,   has   also   elaborated   the   factors   that
have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail   which   are
extracted as under:
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent.   The   punishment   to   which   the   party   may
be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the
course   of   justice   would   be   thwarted   by   him   who
seeks   the   benignant   jurisdiction   of   the   Court   to   be
freed for the time being.
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the
Court   considering   the   likelihood   of   the   applicant
interfering   with   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   or
otherwise   polluting   the   process   of   justice.   It   is   not
only   traditional   but   rational,   in   this   context,   to
enquire   into   the   antecedents   of   a   man   who   is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record
–   particularly   a   record   which   suggests   that   he   is
likely   to   commit   serious   offences   while   on   bail.   In
regard   to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict   further
about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore
not an exercise in irrelevance.”
b) Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi & ORS  – (2001) 4
SCC   280   is   a   case   wherein   this   Court   proceeded   to   state

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the   following   principles   which   are   to   be   considered   while
granting bail: 
“(a)   While   granting   bail   the   court   has   to   keep   in
mind   not   only   the   nature   of   the   accusations,   but
the   severity   of   the   punishment,   if   the   accusation
entails   a   conviction   and   the   nature   of   evidence   in
support of the accusations.
(b)   Reasonable   apprehensions   of   the   witnesses
being   tampered   with   or   the   apprehension   of   there
being   a   threat   for   the   complainant   should   also
weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c)   While   it   is   not   expected   to   have   the   entire
evidence   establishing   the   guilt   of   the   accused
beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to
be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support
of the charge.
(d)   Frivolity   in   prosecution   should   always   be
considered   and   it   is   only   the   element   of
genuineness that shall have to be considered in the
matter   of   grant   of   bail,   and   in   the   event   of   there
being   some   doubt   as   to   the   genuineness   of   the
prosecution,   in   the   normal   course   of   events,   the
accused is entitled to an order of bail.”
c) This   Court   in   Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan
Singh –  (2002) 3 SCC 598,  speaking through Banerjee, J.,
observed as under: 
“3.   Grant of bail though being a discretionary order
—   but,   however,   calls   for   exercise   of   such   a
discretion   in   a   judicious   manner   and   not   as   a
matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent
reason   cannot   be   sustained.   Needless   to   record,
however,   that   the   grant   of   bail   is   dependent   upon
the   contextual   facts   of   the   matter   being   dealt   with
by   the   court   and   facts,   however,   do   always   vary
from   case   to   case.   While   placement   of   the   accused
in   the   society,   though   may   be   considered   but   that
by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of
grant of bail and the same should and ought always

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to be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of
the   basic   considerations   for   the   grant   of   bail   —
more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance
of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent
on the factual matrix of the matter.”
d)  In   Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias
Pappu   Yadav   &   Anr.   –   (2004)   7   SCC   528 ,   this   Court
observed in paragraph 11 as under :
“11.   The   law   in   regard   to   grant   or   refusal   of   bail   is
very   well   settled.   The   court   granting   bail   should
exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not
as   a   matter   of   course.   Though   at   the   stage   of
granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and
elaborate   documentation   of   the   merit   of   the   case
need  not be undertaken, there is  a need  to indicate
in   such   orders   reasons   for   prima   facie   concluding
why   bail   was   being   granted   particularly,   where   the
accused   is   charged   of   having   committed   a   serious
offence.   Any   order   devoid   of   such   reasons   would
suffer   from   non   ­application   of   mind.   It   is   also
necessary   for   the   court   granting   bail   to   consider
among   other   circumstances,   the   following   factors
also before granting bail; they are:
a) The nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment   in   case   of   conviction   and   the
nature of supporting evidence.
b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with
the witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant.
(c)   Prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   court   in
support   of   the   charge.   (See   Ram   Govind
Upadhyay   v.   Sudarshan   Singh,   (2002)   3
SCC 598 and Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6
SCC 338. ”

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e) Gobarbhai   Naranbhai   Singala   vs.   State   of   Gujarat   &
Ors.   etc.   etc.   –   (2008)   3   SCC   775,   is   a   case   which
concerns   cancellation   of   bail   by   this   Court   in   a   petition
filed   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   In   the
said   case   reliance   was   placed   on   Panchanan   Mishra   vs.
Digambar Mishra  – (2005) 3 SCC 143  wherein in para 13
it was observed as under: 
“13. The object underlying the cancellation of bail is
to   protect   the   fair   trial   and   secure   justice   being
done   to   the   society   by   preventing   the   accused   who
is   set   at   liberty   by   the   bail   order   from   tampering
with the evidence in the heinous crime … It hardly
requires to be stated that once a person is released
on   bail   in   serious   criminal   cases   where   the
punishment   is   quite   stringent   and   deterrent,   the
accused   in   order   to   get   away   from   the   clutches   of
the   same   indulge   in   various   activities   like
tampering   with   the   prosecution   witnesses,
threatening   the   family   members   of   the   deceased
victim   and   also   create   problems   of   law   and   order
situation.”
Further   on   referring   to   the   State   of   UP   vs.
Amarmani Tripathi   – (2005) 8 SCC 21 , this Court noted
the   facts   of   the   case   therein   to   the   effect   that   the
respondent   therein   had   been   named   in   ten   other   criminal
cases   in   the   last   25   years   or   so,   out   of   which   five   cases
were   under   section   307   IPC   for   attempt   to   murder   and
another   under   section   302   IPC   for   committing   murder.
That   in   most   of   the   cases   he   was   acquitted   for   want   of

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sufficient   evidence.   Without   saying   anything   further   this
Court   noted   that   the   High   Court   in   the   said   case
completely ignored the general principle for grant of bail in
a   heinous   crime   of   commission   of   murder   in   which   the
sentence, if convicted, is death or life imprisonment. 
It   was   further   observed   that   in   the   impugned   order
therein   the   findings   recorded   touched   upon   the   merits   of
the   case   and   the   learned   Judge   had   proceeded   as   if   an
order  of  acquittal   was   being   passed,  contrary  to  what  had
been said in  Amarmani Tripathi  which is that only a brief
examination has to be made to satisfy about the facts and
circumstances or a prima facie case. 
f) This   Court   in   Ash   Mohammad   vs.   Shiv   Raj   Singh   @
Lalla   Bahu   &   Anr.   –   (2012)   9   SCC   446 ,   observed   that
though the period of custody is a relevant factor, the same
has   to   be   weighed   simultaneously   with   the   totality   of   the
circumstances   and   the   criminal   antecedents.   That   these
are   to   be   weighed   in   the   scale   of   collective   cry   and   desire
and   that   societal   concern   has   to   be   kept   in   view   in
juxtaposition to individual liberty, was underlined.

16
g) In  Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr.  – (2016) 15 SCC
422,   after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court
on   the   consideration   of   factors   for   grant   of   bail   observed
through   Dipak   Misra,   J.   (as   His   Lordship   then   was)   in
paragraphs 15 and 18 as under: 
“15.   This   being   the   position   of   law,   it   is   clear   as
cloudless   sky   that   the   High   Court   has   totally
ignored   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the   accused.
What   has   weighed   with   the   High   Court   is   the
doctrine of parity. A history­sheeter  involved in the
nature   of   crimes   which   we   have   reproduced
hereinabove,   are   not   minor   offences   so   that   he   is
not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous   nature   and   such   crimes,   by   no   stretch   of
imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases
do create a thunder and lightening having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind.
The   law   expects   the   judiciary   to   be   alert   while
admitting   these   kind   of   accused   persons   to   be   at
large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of
discretion   judiciously   and   not   in   a   whimsical
manner. 
x x x 
18.   Before   parting   with   the   case,   we   may   repeat
with   profit   that   it   is   not   an   appeal   for   cancellation
of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of
supervening   circumstances.   The   annulment   of   the
order  passed by   the  High  Court  is  sought  as many
relevant   factors   have   not   been   taken   into
consideration   which   includes   the   criminal
antecedents   of   the   accused   and   that   makes   the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result
is the lancination of the impugned order.”
h)     In  Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)  – (2018) 12
SCC   129 ,  this   Court  has   spelt  out  some   of   the   significant

17
considerations   which   must   be   placed   in   the   balance   in
deciding whether to grant bail: 
“17.   While   granting   bail,   the   relevant
considerations  are:   (i)   nature   of   seriousness   of   the
offence;   (ii)   character   of   the   evidence   and
circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the   accused;
and   (iii)   likelihood   of   the   accused   fleeing   from
justice;   (iv)   the   impact   that   his   release   may   make
on   the   prosecution   witnesses,   its   impact   on   the
society;   and   (v)   likelihood   of   his   tampering.   No
doubt,   this   list   is   not   exhaustive.   There   are   no
hard­and­fast   rules   regarding   grant   or   refusal   of
bail,   each   case   has   to   be   considered   on   its   own
merits.   The   matter   always   calls   for   judicious
exercise of discretion by the Court.”
i) Recently in  Bhoopindra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr.  (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021) ,  this Court has
observed as under in the matter of exercise of an appellate
power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid
reasons   as   distinct   from   an   application   for   cancellation   of
bail   by   quoting   Mahipal   vs.   Rajesh   Kumar   ­   (2020)   2
SCC 118 :
“16. The considerations that guide the power of an
appellate  court  in  assessing   the correctness  of  an
order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different   footing
from   an   assessment   of   an   application   for   the
cancellation   of   bail.   The   correctness   of   an   order
granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of   whether
there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the
discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether
the   order   granting   bail   is   perverse,   illegal   or
unjustified. On the other  hand, an application for
cancellation   of   bail   is   generally   examined   on   the
anvil   of   the   existence   of   supervening

18
circumstances   or   violations   of   the   conditions   of
bail by a person to whom bail has been granted.” 
22. On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision
arrived   at   by   a   court,   or   for   that   matter,   even   a   quasi­judicial
authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court
in   Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited   &   Anr.   Vs.   Masood
Ahmed   Khan   &   Ors.   –   (2010)   9   SCC   496 ,   wherein   after
referring   to   a   number   of   judgments   this   Court   summarised   at
paragraph   47   the   law   on   the   point.   The   relevant   principles   for
the purpose of this case are extracted as under: 
(a) Insistence   on   recording   of   reasons   is   meant   to   serve   the
wider   principle   of   justice   that   justice   must   not   only   be
done it must also appear to be done as well.
(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any   possible   arbitrary   exercise   of   judicial   and   quasi­
judicial or even administrative power.
(c) Reasons   reassure   that   discretion   has   been   exercised   by
the   decision­maker   on   relevant   grounds   and   by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(d) Reasons   have   virtually   become   as   indispensable   a
component   of   a   decision­making   process   as   observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi­judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) The   ongoing   judicial   trend   in   all   countries   committed   to
rule   of   law   and   constitutional   governance   is   in   favour   of
reasoned   decisions   based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is
virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

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(f) Judicial or even quasi­judicial opinions these days can be
as   different   as   the   judges   and   authorities   who   deliver
them.   All   these   decisions   serve   one   common   purpose
which   is   to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important
for   sustaining   the   litigants'   faith   in   the   justice   delivery
system.
(g) Insistence   on   reason   is   a   requirement   for   both   judicial
accountability and transparency.
(h) If   a   judge   or   a   quasi­judicial   authority   is   not   candid
enough   about   his/her   decision­making   process   then   it   is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to   the   doctrine   of   precedent   or   to   principles   of
incrementalism.
(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons”
is not to be equated with a valid decision­making process.
(j) It   cannot   be   doubted   that   transparency   is   the   sine   qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in   decision­making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and
decision­makers less prone to errors but also makes them
subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in   Defence
of   Judicial   Candor   [(1987)   100   Harvard   Law   Review   731­
37)
(k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role
in   setting   up   precedents   for   the   future.   Therefore,   for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision   is   of   the   essence   and   is   virtually   a   part   of   “due
process”.
23. Though   the   aforesaid   judgment   was   rendered   in   the
context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by
the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, reliance

20
could   be   placed   on   the   said   judgment   on   the   need   to   give
reasons while deciding a matter.
  
24. The   Latin   maxim   “ cessante   ratione   legis   cessat   ipsa   lex ”
meaning “reason is  the soul of the law, and when the reason of
any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also
apposite. 
25. While   we   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   liberty   of   an
individual   is   an   invaluable   right,   at   the   same   time   while
considering   an   application   for   bail   Courts   cannot   lose   sight   of
the   serious   nature   of   the   accusations   against   an   accused   and
the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the
accusations   may   not   be   false,   frivolous   or   vexatious   in   nature
but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as
to   enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a   prima   facie   conclusion.   While
considering   an   application   for   grant   of   bail   a   prima   facie
conclusion   must   be   supported   by   reasons   and   must   be   arrived
at   after   having   regard   to   the   vital   facts   of   the   case   brought   on
record.   Due   consideration   must   be   given   to   facts   suggestive   of
the   nature   of   crime,   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the   accused,   if
any,   and   the   nature   of   punishment   that   would   follow   a
conviction vis­à­vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.  

21
26. We   have   extracted   the   relevant   portions   of   the   impugned
orders   above.   At   the   outset,   we   observe   that   the   extracted
portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of
the  High court while  granting  bail. As  noted  from  the  aforecited
judgments,   it   is   not   necessary   for   a   Court   to   give   elaborate
reasons   while   granting   bail   particularly   when   the   case   is   at  the
initial   stage   and   the   allegations   of   the   offences   by   the   accused
would   not   have   been   crystalised   as   such.   There   cannot   be
elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is
one   that   would   result   in   a   conviction   or,   by   contrast,   in   an
acquittal   while   passing   an   order   on   an   application   for   grant   of
bail.   At   the   same   time,   a   balance   would   have   to   be   struck
between the nature of the allegations made against the accused;
severity   of   the   punishment   if   the   allegations   are   proved   beyond
reasonable   doubt   and   would   result   in   a   conviction;   reasonable
apprehension  of  the  witnesses  being   influenced  by  the  accused;
tampering   of   the   evidence;   the   frivolity   in   the   case   of   the
prosecution;   criminal   antecedents   of   the   accused;   and   a   prima
facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in   support   of   the   charge   against
the accused. 

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27. Ultimately,   the   Court   considering   an   application   for   bail
has   to   exercise   discretion   in   a   judicious   manner   and   in
accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to the
crime   alleged   to   be   committed   by   the   accused   on   the   one   hand
and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other. 
28. Thus,   while   elaborating   reasons   may   not   be   assigned   for
grant   of   bail,   at   the   same   time   an   order   de   hors   reasoning   or
bereft   of   the   relevant   reasons   cannot   result   in   grant   of   bail.   It
would   be   only   a   non   speaking   order   which   is   an   instance   of
violation   of   principles   of   natural   justice.   In   such   a   case   the
prosecution   or   the   informant   has   a   right   to   assail   the   order
before a higher forum. 
29. In   view  of  the  aforesaid  discussion,  we   shall  now  consider
the facts of the present case. The allegations against respondent­
accused   as   well   as   the   contentions   raised   at  the   Bar   have   been
narrated   in   detail   above.   On   a   consideration   of   the   same,   the
following aspects of the case would emerge:
a) Allegations   against   the   respondent­accused   are   under
Sections   341,   307   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and
Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   in   respect   of   FIR   No.   316   of
2017   lodged   at   Police   Station   Parsa   Bazar   which   is   with

23
regard   to   attempt   to   murder   Rupesh   Kumar   the   injured,
who   had   himself   given   the   Ferdbayan   against   the
respondent   ­   accused   herein.   The   other   case,   namely,   FIR
No.   93   of   2020   is   with   regard   to   the   offence   of   murder   of
appellant’s   son   Rupesh   Kumar   under   Section   302   read
with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act
against   respondent­accused   herein   and   accused   no.2
Deepak Kumar. Thus, offences alleged against respondent­
accused herein are serious offences vis­a­vis the very same
Rupesh   Kumar   at   two   points   of   time,   namely,   in   2017
when   attempt   to   murder   him   is   alleged   and   in   2020
allegation   of   murder   has   been   cast   by   the   appellant,
mother of the deceased who is stated to be an eyewitness.
Thus, the allegations against the respondent ­ accused vis­
a­vis   the   same   person,   namely,   the   informant   Rupesh
Kumar in both the cases.
b) According   to   the   respondent­accused,   there   has   been   a
history   of   enmity   between   the   accused   and   the   deceased.  
c) The   accusation   against   the   respondent­accused   is   that   he
shot   Rupesh   Kumar   with   a   fire   arm,   namely,   a   pistol   on
two occasions. 

24
d) The   respondent­accused   herein   has   been   named   in   about
eight   cases   and   though   he   may   have   been   acquitted   in   a
few   of   them,   there   are   still   cases   pending   against   him.
Thus,   it   is   inferred   that   respondent­accused   has   criminal
antecedents. 
e) It   has   also   come   on   record   that   the   respondent   ­   accused
had   absconded   for   a   period   of   seven   months   after   the
complaint   in   respect   of   the   second   offence   was   lodged
against him. Therefore, his arrest was delayed.  
f) It   is   also   the   case   of   the   appellant   that   the   respondent­
accused   had   threatened   the   informant   mother   of   the
deceased. 
g) Thus,   there   is   a   likelihood   of   the   respondent­accused
absconding   or   threatening   the   witnesses   if   on   bail   which
would have a vital bearing on the trial of the cases.
h) Also,   for   securing   the   respondent­accused   herein   for   the
purpose   of   commencement   of   the   trial   in   right   earnest   in
both   the   cases,   as   the   accused   had   earlier   absconded,
discretion   could   not   have   been   exercised   in   favour   of   the
respondent­accused in the instant cases. 

25
i) In   the   impugned   order   dated   13.09.2021,   the   High   Court
has   noted   that   there   was   a   previous   enmity   between   the
deceased   and   the   petitioner   with   regard   to   contesting   an
Election as Mukhiya of Chhotki Tangraila Gram Panchayat
but   this   fact   has   not   been   taken   into   consideration   in   the
context   of   the   allegation   against   the   accused   and   with
regard to grant of bail. 
30. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case in
juxtaposition   with   the   judgments   referred   to   above,   we   do   not
think   that   these   cases   are   fit   cases   for   grant   of   bail   to
respondent­accused   in   respect   of   the   two   serious   accusations
against   him   vis­à­vis   the   very   same   person   namely   deceased
Rupesh Kumar. 
31. The High court has lost sight of the aforesaid vital aspects
of   the   case   and   in   very   cryptic   orders   has   granted   bail   to   the
respondent­accused. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the
High   Court   was   not   right   in   allowing   the   applications   for   bail
filed   by   the   respondent­accused.   Hence,   the   impugned   orders
passed by the High Court are set aside. The appeals are allowed. 

26
32. The   respondent­accused   is   on   bail.   His   bail   bonds   stand
cancelled   and   he   is   directed   to   surrender   before   the   concerned
jail authorities within a period of two weeks from today.  
……………………………..J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO] 
…………………………….J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
……………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
NEW DELHI; 
17 TH
 DECEMBER, 2021.