2021 INSC 0872
             REPORTABLE
                                                         
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1333 OF 2018 
Ram Ratan         .…Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh             ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The   appellant   is   before   this   Court   in   this   appeal
assailing   the   judgment   dated   23.02.2017   passed   by   the
High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   Criminal   Appeal
No.691/2013   titled   Ram   Ratan   vs.   State   of   Madhya
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Pradesh. Though  the said  appeal  was disposed of  by  the
High   Court   along   with   the   companion   appeal,   the
consideration   herein   is   limited   to   the   case   against   the
appellant  herein  i.e.  Ram   Ratan  who  was  arrayed  as  the
first accused before the trial court. 
2. The   appeal   before   the   High   Court   was   filed   by   the
appellant,   being   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   dated
31.07.2013   passed   by   the   Special   Judge   (MPDVPK   Act)
1981,   Sheopur   in   Special   Case   No.13/2013   (old   case
No.26/2012).  Through   the  said judgment,  the  trial  court
has   convicted   the   appellant   along   with   the   other   two
accused   namely,   Chotu   and   Raju   alias   Rajendra   under
Section   392   and   397   of   Indian   Penal   Code   (“IPC”   for
short)   read   with   Section   11/13   of   Madhya   Pradesh
Dakaiti   Aur   Vyapharan   Pravbhavit   Kshetra   Adhiniyam
1981   Act   (“MPDVPK   Act,   1981”   for   short)   and   sentenced
the   appellant     and   other   accused   to   rigorous
imprisonment of 7 years with fine of Rs.1000/­, in default
of   the   same,   to   undergo   imprisonment   for   a   further
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period   of   4   months.   The   co­accused   Raju   alias   Rajendra
was further convicted and sentenced under Section 25 (1­
B) (a) of Arms Act to one­year rigorous imprisonment with
fine   of   Rs.500/­,   in   default   of   the   same,   to   further
undergo 2 months rigorous imprisonment. Though all the
three accused had filed the respective appeals before the
High Court against the said conviction and sentence, the
co­accused   Chotu   died   during   the   pendency   of   his
appeal,   due   to   which   the   said   appeal   abated.   As   noted
above, though the appeal of Raju alias Rajendra was also
considered   by   the   High   Court   through   the   common
judgment,   the   present   appeal   is   filed   by   the   appellant
alone   and   as   such   the   conviction   and   sentence   of   the
appellant   based   on   the   contentions   put­forth   on   his
behalf only are adverted to in this judgment.
3. The brief facts are that one, Rajesh Meena lodged a
complaint on 27.06.2012, alleging that on the intervening
night of 26­27/6/2012, while he was sleeping in the hut
constructed   in   the   field   to   guard   the   crops,   at   about
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02:30   a.m,   the   appellant   along   with   Raju   alias   Rajendra
and Chotu came to him and woke him up. The said Raju
alias   Rajendra   was   having   a   gun   with   him   and   on
pointing  the same towards the chest of the  complainant,
demanded   to   part   with   the   money.   The   complainant
informed   that   he   did   not   have   any   money,   due   to   which
the key of his motorcycle was snatched and the said Raju
alias   Rajendra   also   took   out   the   mobile   phone   from   the
pocket   of   his   shirt.   Thereafter,   all   the   three   accused
persons   forced   the   complainant   to   sit   on   the   motorcycle
along with them. When they reached the village Nanawat,
the   motorcycle   got   punctured   and   therefore   all   the
persons compelled the complainant to get down from the
motorcycle   and   the   motorcycle   was   taken   away.   By   the
said   time   since   it   was   dawn,   his   uncle   named   Tulsiram
was   passing   by   to   milk   the   buffaloes.   The   complainant
narrated   the   incident,   following   which,   steps   were   taken
to   lodge   the   complaint.   The   police   having   taken   action,
recovered   the   motorcycle   as   also   the   mobile   phone   and
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apprehended   the   accused.   The   police   on   completing   the
investigation   filed   the   chargesheet   against   the   appellant
for   the   offences   under   Sections   392/397   of   IPC   and
under Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act, 1981. 
4. The   trial   court   framed   charges   through   the   order
dated   26.02.2013   under   Sections   392/397   of   IPC   and
Sections   11/13   of   MPDVPK   Act,   1981   against   the
appellant   and   Chotu,   while   an   additional   charge   under
Section   25   (1­B)   (a)/27   of   the   Arms   Act   was   framed
against   the   other   co­accused   namely,   Raju   alias
Rajendra.   The   appellant   and   his   co­accused   having
pleaded not guilty, stood trial in the matter.
5. The trial court having noted the evidence tendered
through   PW1   to   PW12,   the   documents   which   were
marked and the material objects identified, arrived at its
ultimate   conclusion.   While   doing   so,   the   trial   court   has
referred   in   detail   to   the   evidence   tendered   by   the
complainant   Rajesh   (PW1)   who   narrated   the   entire
incident from the time he was woken up in the midnight
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and   stated   about   having   identified   the   accused   as   there
was a  light  burning   in the  hut.  Tulsiram   (PW2),  uncle of
the   complainant   and   Mukesh   (PW3),   brother   of   the
complainant   corroborated   the   version   stated   by   the
complainant.   Dhanpal   (PW5),   father   of   the   complainant
had  also stated  with  regard  to  the sequence  in which he
had   come   to   know   about   the   incident   in   the   same
sequence   as   had   been   stated   by   PW3.   Mahavir   (PW4),
Ramjilal   (PW6)   and   Dhanjeet   (PW7)   are   the   witnesses   to
the   seizure   of   motorcycle   and   the   gun   respectively.
However,   PW6   and   PW7   had   turned   hostile.
Chandrabhan   Singh   (PW8)   is   the   witness   who   examined
the   12­bore   gun.   A.L.   Azad   (PW11)   is   the   police   officer
who arrested the accused and the other witnesses are the
procedural official witnesses.
6. The   trial   court   on   analysing   the   said   evidence
returned   the   finding   that   the   appellant   and   his   co­
accused   had   indulged   in   the   incident   complained   of   and
therefore   held   the   charge   to   be   proved.   The   conviction
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and   the   sentence   were   accordingly   handed   down.   The
appellant   and   his   co­accused   while   assailing   the
judgment   of   the   trial   court,   apart   from   contending   that
the   case   has   been   falsely   alleged   against   them,   had   also
contended   that   the   charge   under   Section   397   of   IPC
cannot   be   sustained.   It   was   their   case   that   the   firearm
even if was proved to be carried, had not been used and
as such the charge under Section 397 IPC would not lie.
The   High   Court   having   adverted   to   the   matter   in   detail
has   reappreciated   the   evidence   with   regard   to   the
incident and accordingly upheld the judgment passed by
the   trial   court   convicting   the   appellant   and   sentencing
him   in   the   manner   as   has   been   done.   The   appellant
therefore   claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   judgment
passed  by   the   trial  court   and  upheld   by   the  High   Court,
is assailing the same in this appeal.
7. Heard Mr. Shishir Kumar Saxena, learned counsel
for the appellant, Mr. Sunny Choudhary, learned counsel
for the respondent and perused the appeal papers.
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8. The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   while
assailing the judgments would at the outset contend that
the   complaint   lodged   by   PW1   and   the   evidence   tendered
by him are not sufficient to indicate that the appellant is
guilty   of   the   charge   alleged   against   him.   It   is   contended
that   the   appellant   has   been   implicated   due   to   political
rivalry,   though   no   such   incident   as   alleged   had   taken
place. In addition to the judgments cited before the High
Court   and   the   contentions   put­forth   therein,   learned
counsel   has   also   relied   on   the   decision   of   this   Court
dated   29.10.2021   in   Crl.   Appeal   No.903   of   2021   titled
Ganesan   vs.   State   Rep.   by  Station   House   Officer   and
connected   appeal   i.e   Crl.   Appeal   No.904   of   2021.   With
reference   to   the   said   judgment,   it   is   contended   that
firstly, the charge under Section 397 of the IPC would not
be sustainable since the  gun  has not  been  used and the
conviction   can be sustained only if the ‘offender’ uses any
deadly weapon while committing robbery. It is contended
that   even   otherwise,   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC
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would   not   be   sustainable   against   the   appellant   herein
since   there   is   no   serious   allegation   or   proof   of   the
appellant   having   used   any   weapon   much   less   deadly
weapon even if the incident of robbery which occurred is
held to be proved against the appellant. In that view, it is
contended   that   the   appellant   is   liable   to   be   acquitted   or
in the alternative, even if it is held that the charge under
Section   392   IPC   is   proved,   the   appellant   has   undergone
sentence   of   nearly   4   years   which   is   sufficient
punishment, which aspect be considered by this Court.
9.   The   learned   counsel   for   the   State   would   refer   to
the evidence tendered   before the trial court in detail and
has   pointed   out   that   the   trial   court   as   also   the   High
Court   has   taken   note   of   the   said   evidence.   The   charge
having   been   proved,  both  the  Courts  have   arrived  at   the
conclusion   that   the   contention   as   put­forth   by   the
appellant   or   his   co­accused   was   not   acceptable.   It   is
contended   that   the   motorcycle   and   the   mobile   phone
which   had   been   stolen   by   the   accused   had   been
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recovered   and   the   gun   which   was   used   was   also   seized
and   examined   by   the   expert.   In   that   circumstance,   it   is
contended that when the expert has opined that the gun
was in working condition, the actual use of the firearm by
firing   from   it   is   not   required   but   the   exposure   of   the
weapon   so   as   to   create   fear   in   the   mind   of   the   victim   is
sufficient   to   prove   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC.   It
is, therefore, contended that the judgment passed by the
trial court and confirmed by the High Court does not call
for interference.
10. From   the   evidence   as   noted   by   the   trial   court   and
the   High   Court,   it   is   seen   at   the   outset   that   the
complainant   Rajesh   (PW­1)   has   spoken   in   detail   with
regard to the incident which occurred on the intervening
night   of   26­27/6/2012.   The   manner   in   which   he   was
woken up by the accused and the demand for money that
was made by  brandishing  the  firearm  has  been  narrated
in   detail.   The   identification   of   the   persons   which   was
possible   due   to   the   light   which   was   on,   is   also   stated.
10

Though  lengthy  cross­examination  has been  made, in  so
far   as   the   incident   relating   to   which   PW1   had   given   the
detailed   account,   has   remained   intact   and   has   not   been
discredited.   Insofar   as   the   contention   put­forth   by   the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   he   has   been
implicated   due   to   political   reasons,   there   is   no   material
on record. It is no doubt true that as pointed out from the
cross­examination   contained   in   paras   27,   28   and   29   of
the   cross­examination,   PW1   has   stated   that   his   cousin
Ramcharan   is   a   political   leader.   Further,   in   the   same
paragraph, though he has stated that all the members of
his family advised him that he should file a report against
the accused persons and that he had filed the report after
getting the said suggestion, it does not indicate that there
was any incident of political rivalry due to which the story
was   created   and   the   complaint   was   filed.   It   is   only   an
attempt   by   the   learned   counsel   to   try   and   connect   the
unconnected matters.   The cousin being  a political leader
may   be   a   fact   but   with   regard   to   the   complaint,   all   that
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PW1   has   mentioned   is   the   manner   in   which   the
complaint   was   lodged   relating   to   the   incident   which   had
taken   place   after   the   suggestion   given   by   the   family
members that the law should be set in motion. The same
does not take away the gravity of the situation or alter the
truth of the matter.
11. Having taken note of the manner in which the trial
court has referred to the evidence and the same has been
reappreciated   by   the   High   Court,   we   do   not   deem   it
necessary to once again go into the evidence of the other
witnesses,   having   noted   the   detailed   account   given   by
PW1   which   would   be   of   substance   in   this   proceeding   to
answer the relevant contention. Therefore, the evidence is
sufficient and convincing to arrive at the conclusion that
the   incident   as   narrated   by   PW1   had   occurred   and   the
appellant and his co­accused had committed robbery.
12. Though,   this   remains   the   position,   the   question
which   needs   consideration   is   with   regard   to   the
contention that the firearm had not been put to use and
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therefore   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC   is   not
sustainable   and   also   the   further   contention   that   the
charge   under   Section   397   even   otherwise   would   not   be
sustainable   against   the   appellant   since   there   is   no
material   or   evidence   to   indicate   that   the   appellant   had
used   the   firearm,   even   if   it   is   held   that   the   incident   had
occurred as alleged.
13. For better understanding, it would be appropriate 
to take note of the provisions contained in Sections 392 
and 397 of IPC which read as hereunder:                         
“ 392.   Punishment   for   robbery. ­   Whoever
commits   robbery   shall   be   punished   with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the
highway   between   sunset   and   sunrise,   the
imprisonment   may   be   extended   to   fourteen
years.
397.   Robbery,   or   dacoity,   with   attempt   to
cause   death   or   grievous   hurt. ­   If,   at   the
time   of   committing   robbery   or   dacoity,   the
offender   uses   any   deadly   weapon,   or
causes   grievous   hurt   to   any   person ,   or
attempts   to   cause   death   or   grievous   hurt   to
any     person,   the     imprisonment   with   which
such offender  shall be punished shall not be
less than seven years.”  
    (Emphasis supplied)
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14. On the said aspect, it would be appropriate to take
note of the decision in the case of   Shri Phool Kumar vs.
Delhi   Administration   (1975)   1   SCC   797   wherein   it   is
observed as hereunder: ­
“5.   Section   392   of   the   Penal   Code   provides:
Whoever   commits   robbery   shall   be   punished
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may   extend   to   ten   years,   and   shall   also   be
liable   to   fine;   and,   if   the   robbery   be
committed   on   the   highway   between   sunset
and   sunrise,   the   imprisonment   may   be
extended   to   fourteen   years.   The   sentence   of
imprisonment   to   be   awarded   under   Section
392 cannot be less than seven years if at the
time of committing robbery the offender uses
any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to
any   person   or   attempts   to   cause   death   or
grievous   hurt   to   any   person:   vide   Section
397.   A   difficulty   arose   in   several   High
Courts   as   to   the   meaning   of   the   word
“uses” in Section 397. The term ‘offender’
in   that   section,   as   rightly   held   by   several
High   Courts,   is   confined   to   the   offender
who uses any deadly weapon. The use of a
deadly weapon by one offender at the time
of   committing   robbery   cannot   attract
Section   397   for   the   imposition   of   the
minimum punishment on another offender
who   had   not   used   any   deadly   weapon.   In
that view of the matter use of the gun by one
of   the   culprits   whether   he   was   accused   Ram
Kumar   or   somebody   else,   (surely   one   was
there who had fired three shots) could not be
and has not been the basis of sentencing the
appellant   with   the   aid   of   Section   397.   So   far
as   he   is   concerned,   he   is   said   to   be   armed
with   a   knife   which   is   also   a   deadly   weapon.
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To   be   more   precise   from   the   evidence   of   PW
16 “Phool Kumar had a knife in his hand”. He
was therefore carrying a deadly weapon open
to the view of the victims sufficient to frighten
or   terrorize   them.   Any   other   overt   act,   such
as,   brandishing   of   the   knife   or   causing   of
grievous   hurt   with   it   was   not   necessary   to
bring the offender within the ambit of Section
397 of the Penal Code.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Further,   in   Dilawar   Singh   vs.   State   of   Delhi
(2007) 12 SCC 641, it is held as hereunder: ­
“19.   The   essential   ingredients   of   Section   397
IPC are as follows:
1. the accused committed robbery.
2. while committing robbery or dacoity (i) the
accused used deadly weapon 
(ii)   to   cause   grievous   hurt   to   any   person   (iii)
attempted to cause death or grievous hurt to
any person. 
3.   “Offender”   refers   to   only   culprit   who
actually   used   deadly   weapon.   When   only
one   has   used   the   deadly   weapon,   others
cannot   be   awarded   the   minimum
punishment.   It   only   envisages   the
individual   liability   and   not   any
constructive   liability.   Section   397   IPC   is
attracted   only   against   the   particular
accused   who   uses   the   deadly   weapon   or
does   any   of   the   acts   mentioned   in   the
provision.   But   the   other   accused   are   not
vicariously   liable   under   that   section   for
acts of the co­accused.
21.   In   the   instant   case   admittedly   no   injury
has   been   inflicted.   The   use   of   weapon   by
offender   for   creating   terror   in   mind   of   victim
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is   sufficient.   It   need   not   be   further   shown   to
have been actually used for cutting, stabbing
or shooting, as the case may be.” 
(Emphasis supplied)
16. I n   the   decision   of   Ganesan   (supra)   referred   to   by
the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   the   above   noted
decisions   of   this   Court   has   been   referred  and   this   Court
has held as hereunder: ­     
 “12.7. Thus, as per the law laid down by this
Court in the aforesaid two decisions the term
‘offender’   under   Section   397   IPC   is   confined
to the ‘offender’ who uses any deadly weapon
and use of deadly  weapon by one offender  at
the time of committing robbery cannot attract
Section   397   IPC   for   the   imposition   of
minimum   punishment   on   another   offender
who   has   not   used   any   deadly   weapon.   Even
there   is   distinction   and   difference   between
Section   397   and   Section   398   IPC.   The   word
used   in   Section   397   IPC   is   ‘uses’   any   deadly
weapon   and   the   word   used   in   Section   398
IPC   is   ‘offender   is   armed   with   any   deadly
weapon’.   Therefore,   for   the   purpose   of
attracting   Section   397   IPC   the   ‘offender’   who
‘uses’   any   deadly   weapon   Section   397   IPC
shall be attracted.
In   light   of   the   above   observations   and
the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid   two  decisions   the   case   on   behalf   of
the   accused   in   the   present   appeals   is
required   to   be   considered.   Even   as   per   the
case of the prosecution and even considering
the evidence on record it can be seen that the
present accused A1 and A3 are not alleged to
have  used  any   weapon.  The  allegation  of  use
of   any   weapon   was   against   Benny   and
Prabhakaran.   Therefore,   in   absence   of   any
allegations   of   use   of   any   deadly   weapon   by
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the   appellants   herein­   Accused   Nos.1   and   3
Section 397 IPC shall not be attracted and to
that extent the Learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants­ accused are right in
submitting   that   they   ought   not   to   have   been
convicted   for   the   offence   punishable   under
Section 397 IPC.”
17. From   the   position   of   law   as   enunciated   by   this
Court  and   noted   above,  firstly,  it   is  clear   that   the   use   of
the   weapon   to   constitute   the   offence   under   Section   397
IPC   does   not   require   that   the   ‘offender’   should   actually
fire   from   the   firearm   or   actually   stab   if   it   is   a   knife   or   a
dagger  but  the  mere  exhibition  of   the  same,  brandishing
or   holding   it   openly   to   threaten   and   create   fear   or
apprehension  in the mind of  the  victim  is  sufficient.  The
other   aspect   is   that   if   the   charge   of   committing   the
offence   is   alleged   against   all   the   accused   and   only   one
among   the   ‘offenders’   had   used   the   firearm   or   deadly
weapon,   only   such   of   the   ‘offender’   who   has   used   the
firearm   or   deadly   weapon   alone   would   be   liable   to   be
charged under Section 397 IPC. 
18. Though the above would be the effect and scope
of   Section   397   IPC   as   a   standalone   provision,   the
17

application   of   the   same   will   arise   in   the   totality   of   the
allegation   and   the   consequent   charge   that   will   be
framed and the accused would be tried for such charge.
In such circumstance, in the teeth of the offence under
Section 397 IPC being applicable to the offender alone,
the vicariability of the same will also have to be noted if
the charge against the accused under Sections 34, 149
IPC   and   such   other   provisions   of   law,   which   may
become relevant, is also invoked along with Section 397
IPC.   In   such   event,   it   will   have   to   be   looked   at
differently   in   the   totality   of   the   facts,   evidence   and
circumstances involved in that case and the provisions
invoked   in   that   particular   case   to   frame   a   charge
against   the   accused.   In   the   instant   case,   the   charge
under   Section   34   IPC   was   not   framed   against   the
appellant nor was such an allegation raised and proved
against   the   appellant.   Hence,   benefit   of   the
interpretation raised on the scope of Section 397 IPC to
hold   the   aggressor   alone   as   being   guilty,   will   be
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available   to   the   appellant   if   there   is   no   specific
allegation against him. 
19. Keeping   this   aspect   in   view,   it   is   necessary   to
examine   the   manner   in   which   PW1   has   alleged   against
the   appellant   so   as   to   consider   whether   the   appellant   is
also   an   ‘offender’   who   used   the   firearm   so   as   to   be
charged under both, Section 392 and 397 IPC even if he
is   complicit   to   the   incident,   more   particularly   when
Section 34 IPC has not been invoked in the instant case.
20. Apart  from  the  narration  of  the  incident contained
in   the   FIR,   the   evidence   tendered   by   the   victim   Rajesh
(PW1) about the incident is as hereunder: ­    
“02. On the same night, at the aforesaid time
of   2:30   AM,   all   these   three   accused   persons
who   are   present   before   me   in   this   Court   by
names   Raju,   Chotu   and   Gujar   approached
me at which time I was sitting on a temporary
watch  tower  put  by   me near   to the  tube  well
for   guarding   my   cultivation   field   and   a   bulb
was glowing there. In the illumination of said
bulb,   I   could   see   and   identify   them.   At   that
relevant   time,   I   was   sleeping   there.   Among
them   Raju   Gujar   woke   up   me   from   my
sleep   and   pointed   the   nozzle   of   the
country   rifle   on   my   chest   and   demanded
with   me   to   handover   whatever   money   I
had   in   my   possession   at   that   relevant
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moment.   I   informed   Raju   Gujar   that   I   do
not   have   any   money   with   me.   Still,   he
continued   to  keep  the   said  weapon  on   my
chest   itself   and   again   asked   me   to   hand
over   the   keys   of   my   motor   cycle.   At   that
relevant   time,   I   was   having   my   Splendour
Honda   Motor   Cycle.   On   being   scared   by   the
fear   of   said   Raju   as   well   as   apprehending
danger   from   his   arm,   I   politely   handed   over
the   key   of   the   Motorcycle   to   said   Raju   Gujar
by putting those keys in his hand. 
03. At that time in my pocket, my mobile was
kept.   It   was   a   Spice­42   Model   branded
company   phone.   By   again   putting   the
firearm   ­   Rifle   on   my   chest   he   took   my
mobile   by   himself   by   inserting   his   hands
in   my   pocket   and   taking   out   the   mobile
set from the pocket out.”
    (Emphasis supplied)
21. From   the   extracted   portion   and   more   particularly
the emphasized portion of the evidence tendered by PW1,
his   account   is  specific   to   the  fact   that   it  was   Raju  Gujar
alias   Rajendra   who   had   pointed   out   the   firearm   to   his
chest   and   indulged   in   the   act   of   robbing   him   of   his
possession namely, the mobile. It is no doubt true that in
the   further   portion   of   the   evidence   tendered   by   PW1   he
had referred to all the three accused having forced him to
sit   on   the   motorcycle   and   had   taken   him   away.   It   is
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further stated that after they reached Nanawat village and
the tyre of the motorcycle got punctured, he was made to
get   down   from   the   motorcycle.   At   this   point,   it   has   been
stated that the appellant pointed his ‘gun rifle’ at him and
made   him   to   step   down   from   the   motorcycle   and   by
threatening   him,   had   taken   him   in   the   direction   of
Amalada   village.   Though,   he   has   deposed   to   that   extent,
the   fact   of   the   appellant   having   used   another   country
made   rifle   other   than   the   one   which   was   being   used   by
Raju   alias   Rajendra   has   not   been   established.   It   is   no
doubt   true,   that   the   appellant   had   participated   in   the
offence   of   committing   robbery   since   ultimately   the
motorcycle was hidden at a place which was known to the
appellant   and   the   property   seizure   memo   indicates   that
the   motorcycle   was   recovered   at   the   instance   of   the
appellant   that   certainly   constitutes   an   offender   under
Section 392 IPC.
22. Further,   the   relevant   contents   in   the   FIR   reads   as
hereunder: ­ 
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“At   about   2:30   in   the   morning   the   accused
Raju, Co­accused Chotu and Ramratan came
to   him.   The   Raju   was   having   a   gun   with
him   and   forced   him   to   wake   up   and
demanded   money   when   the   complainant
inform   that   he   does   not   have   any   money,
therefore   the   Raju   pointed   out   his   gun
towards   the   chest   of   the   complainant   and
the   complainant   in   its   turn   handed   over
the   key   of   the   motorcycle   the   Raju   has
also   took   out   the   mobile   from   the   pocket
of   the   shirt   of   the   complainant,   thereafter
all   three   accused   person   who   is   the
complainant   to   sit   on   the   motorcycle   along
with   them,   when   they   reached   near   the
village Nanawat the motorcycle got punctured
and   therefore   all   the   three   person   compelled
to   complainant   to   get   down   from   the
motorcycle   and   thereafter   they   took   his
motorcycle   and   went   away   toward   Aamlda
and   Morkhudana,   then   I   reached   at   Aamlda,
and   all   happening   narrated   to   his   maternal
uncle   Tulsiram,   and   then   his   father   also
came   there,   thereafter   I   searched   the
motorcycle   but   it   is   not   searched   out
therefore   came   to   local   police   station   for
lodging   the   report,   and   he   wants   to   take
necessary action.”
  
         (Emphasis supplied)
23. Therefore,   if   the   contents   of   the   FIR   and   the
evidence   tendered   by   PW1   are   taken   note   of,   it   would
stand   established   that   though   all   the   three   accused   had
taken part in the offence of committing robbery, only one
of the accused namely  Raju alias Rajendra had used the
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firearm. The said firearm was seized from the possession
of Raju alias Rajendra and from the evidence of A.L. Azad
(PW11)   it   is   clear   that   the   accused   Raju   alias   Rajendra
had disclosed that the firearm was kept in his house and
it   was   recovered   in   the   presence   of   the   witnesses.   In
addition,   Pritam  Singh   (PW9)   has   stated   that   permission
had been sought for prosecuting Raju alias Rajendra with
regard to seizure of the 12­bore gun and permission had
been  granted.  Chandrabhan  Singh  (PW8)  in his  evidence
had   stated   that   he   had   examined   the   gun   and   the   same
was   capable   of   being   fired.   His   evidence   would   disclose
that only one gun had been seized and examined by him.
Further,   based   on   the   said   evidence   it   is   Raju   alias
Rajendra   alone   who   has   been   convicted   under   the
provisions of the Arms Act.
24. If   that   be   the   position,   it   would   stand   established
and   proved   beyond   doubt   that   only   one   of   the   accused
namely   Raju   alias   Rajendra   had   used   the   firearm   and
there   was   neither   any   allegation   apart   from   a   stray
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sentence   nor   was   such   charge   of   having   used   firearm
proved against the appellant. In that light, if the position
of law enunciated by this Court as noticed above is kept
in   view,   the   charge   under   Section   397   IPC   can   be
fastened   on   the   ‘offender’   who   actually   uses   the   firearm.
In the instant case, since the facts and the evidence does
not indicate that the appellant could be construed as an
‘offender’   who   used   the   firearm,   the   charge   alleged
against   him   and   held   to   be   proved   by   the   trial   Court   as
also   the   High   Court   under   Section   397   IPC   and   Section
11/13   of   MPDVPK   Act,   1981   cannot   be   sustained.
However, the appellant having participated in the offence
of   committing   robbery   which   stands   established   with
sufficient   evidence,   the   conviction   handed   down   by   the
trial   court   and   upheld   by   the   High   Court   under   Section
392 IPC is sustainable to that extent.
25. In   view   of   the   above   conclusion,   the   sentence
imposed on the appellant needs consideration. Since, we
have   arrived   at   the   conclusion   that   the   charge   under
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Section 397 and Section 11/13 of MPDVPK, Act, 1981 are
not proved against the appellant, the sentence of 7 years
rigorous   imprisonment   imposed   by   the   trial   Court   and
upheld by the High Court is liable to be set aside, which
is accordingly done. Insofar as, the offence proved under
Section 392 IPC, the same provides for the punishment of
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10
years   and   also   to   fine.   As   noted,   the   motorcycle   and   the
mobile   which   was   stolen   have   been   recovered.   However,
the appellant having indulged in the offence of robbery, in
our   opinion,   imprisonment   of   around   3   years   would   be
sufficient   punishment.   In   instant   case,   it   is   noticed   that
the appellant has undergone imprisonment for a period of
3 years 5 months and 1 day as on 10.11.2021, as per the
statement   filed   before   this   Court.   Hence,   if   the   sentence
undergone by the appellant is treated as the punishment,
it would meet the ends of justice. 
26. In the result, we pass the following order: ­
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i) The   judgment   dated   19.10.2012   passed   by
the   Special   Judge,   (MPDVPK   Act)   in   Special
Case   No.13/2013   (Old   Case   No.26/2012)
insofar   it   has   convicted   the   appellant   under
Section   397   IPC   read   with   Sections   11/13   of
MPDVPK   Act,   1981   and   upheld   by   the   High
Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   Criminal   Appeal
No.691/2013 are set aside to that extent.
ii) The conviction of the appellant under Section
392  IPC  by   the  trial  court  and  upheld  by  the
High Court, is sustained.
iii) The   sentence   imposed   on   the   appellant   is
modified to that of the period of imprisonment
undergone   by   the   him   till   this   day.   The   fine
imposed   and   default   sentence   thereof   is
retained.
(iv) The   appellant   is   ordered   to   be   set   at   liberty
forthwith   if   the   fine   is   paid   and   he   is   not
required to be detained in any other case.
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(v) The   appeal   is   allowed   in   part   to   the   extent
indicated above.
(vi) All   pending   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand
disposed of.
 
  ….…………………….CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
 
..……………………….J.
                                       (A.S. BOPANNA)
                 …….……………………J.
   (HIMA KOHLI)
New Delhi,
December 17, 2021 
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