2022 INSC 0003
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7403 OF 2021
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation      ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Dilip Uttam Jayabhay                    ..Respondent (S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment  and order  dated 23.01.2020 passed  by  the  High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of
2003, by which the High Court has dismissed the said writ
petition   preferred   by   the   appellant   –   Maharashtra   State
Road   Transport   Corporation   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“MSRTC”)   in   which   it   challenged   the   order   passed   by   the
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Industrial   Court   in   Revision   Application   (ULP)   No.13   of
2002,   directing   reinstatement   of   respondent   without   back
wages   but   with   the   continuity   of   service,   original   writ
petitioner – MSRTC has preferred the present appeal. 
2. The   respondent   herein   was   serving   as   a   driver   and   plying
passenger buses. That on 23.10.1992 when he was driving
the   bus,   it   met   with   an   accident   with   a   jeep   coming   from
the opposite direction. It appears that instead of taking the
bus   to   the   left   side,   he   took   the   bus   to   the   extreme   right
which was the wrong side and as a result, the jeep and the
bus   collided.   The   accident   resulted   in   death   of   four
passengers   on   the   spot   and   six   passengers   were   seriously
injured. The jeep was completely damaged with its radiator
and   engine   board   broken   and   damaged   and   the   inside   of
the   jeep   was   completely   crushed.   The   impact   of   the
collision   was   so   high   that   the   jeep   was   pushed   back   by
about   25   feet.   The   bumper   of   the   bus   was   also   crushed.
The   driver   of   the   jeep   also   sustained   injuries.   The
respondent   was   subjected   to   disciplinary   enquiry.   On
conclusion   of   enquiry   he   was   dismissed   from   service.   He
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was   also   prosecuted   for   the   offence   under   Section   279   of
IPC. However, he came to be acquitted. (his acquittal shall
be dealt with herein below). The respondent challenged the
order   of   dismissal   before   the   Labour   Court.   The   Labour
Court   upheld   the   order   of   dismissal.   In   a   revision
application   the   Industrial   Tribunal   considering   the
acquittal   of   the   respondent   in   criminal   proceedings   and
observing   that   the   drivers   of   both   the   vehicles   were
negligent  (contributory  negligence), the  Industrial  Tribunal
exercised   powers   under   item   No.1(g)   of   Schedule­IV   of   the
Maharashtra   Recognition   of   Trade   Unions   and   Prevention
of   Unfair   Labour   Practices   Act,   1971.   (“MRTU”   and   “PULP
Act,  1971”   for   short),   and  held   that   the   order   of   dismissal
is   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct   proved.   Before   the
Industrial Tribunal the respondent/workman did not press
for   the   back   wages.   The   Industrial   Tribunal   directed   his
reinstatement   without   back   wages   but   with   continuity   of
service.
3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order   dated
31.07.2003   passed   by   the   Industrial   Tribunal   ordering
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reinstatement   without   back   wages   but   with   continuity   of
service,   the   appellant   preferred   writ   petition   before   the
High Court. By the impugned judgment and order the High
Court has not only dismissed the writ petition preferred by
the appellant, but has also directed appellant to pay to the
respondent   back   wages   with   effect   from   01.11.2003   to
31.05.2018   i.e.   which   is   the   date   of   his   superannuation.
The High Court has also directed that the respondent shall
also be entitled to retiral benefits on the basis of continuity
of service with effect from date of his dismissal and till his
superannuation.  
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and  order  passed by  the High Court, dismissing
the   writ   petition   and   confirming   the   order   passed   by   the
Industrial Tribunal setting aside the order of dismissal and
ordering reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages, the MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.
5. Ms.   Mayuri   Raghuvanshi,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of the appellant – MSRTC has vehemently submitted
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that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the
Industrial Court committed a grave error in interfering with
the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate
to the misconduct proved.
5.1 It   is   submitted   that   both,   the   High   Court   as   well   as   the
Industrial   Court   have   not   at   all   considered   and/or
appreciated the difference between the disciplinary enquiry
and the criminal proceedings. 
5.2 It is submitted that the High Court as well as the Industrial
Court had erred in relying upon the acquittal of respondent
in   criminal   case.   It   is   submitted   that   the   Industrial   Court
and   the   High   Court   have   failed   to   appreciate   that   the
acquittal   has   no   bearing   or   relevance   on   the   disciplinary
proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are
different and the proceedings operate in different fields and
have   different   objectives.   Reliance   is   placed   on   the
decisions   of   this   Court   in   cases   of   Samar   Bahadur   Singh
Vs.  State  of  U.P.  & Ors.,  (2011) 9  SCC  94   and   Union  of
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India & Ors. Vs.  Sitaram Mishra & Anr., (2019) 20 SCC
588 . 
5.3 It is further submitted that in fact the Labour Court rightly
held that acquittal in the criminal case would not come to
the   rescue   of   the   respondent   as   the   acquittal   in   the
criminal   case   is   on   the   failure   of   the   prosecution   to
examine   investigating   officer,   panch   for   spot   panchnama,
etc., and to prove their case beyond doubt. It is submitted
that   on   the   other   hand   in   the   departmental   proceedings
misconduct has been proved. It is therefore submitted that
the Industrial Court and the High Court ought not to have
given undue importance to the acquittal of the respondent
in the criminal case. 
5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the facts and
circumstances of the case when in the vehicle accident four
persons   died   due   to   the   negligence   on   the   part   of   the
respondent in driving the vehicle carelessly and negligently
and   during   his   three   years’   tenure   he   was   punished   four
times   earlier,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   punishment   of
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dismissal   was   shockingly  disproportionate.   It   is   submitted
that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   case
would   not   fall   under   item   No.1(g)   of   Schedule­IV   of   the
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
5.5 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   Industrial   Court
specifically   observed   in   the   order   that   the   misconduct   is
not   of   a   minor   or   technical   character.   It   is   further
submitted   that   the   Industrial   Court   also   observed   that
there   is   no   victimization   and   the   action   of   the   MSRTC
cannot be said to be not in good faith. The Industrial Court
also   observed   that   the   MSRTC   has   neither   falsely
implicated   the   complainant   –   respondent   nor   has   it
dismissed   the   respondent   for   patently   false   reasons   and
therefore   respondent   failed   to   prove   the   alleged   unfair
labour practice as per the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is
submitted that however the Industrial Court has interfered
with   the   order   of   punishment/dismissal   imposed   by   the
disciplinary authority invoking clause 1(g) of Schedule­IV of
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. 
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5.6 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   respondent   admitted
that   he   was   gainfully   employed   after   his   dismissal.
Therefore, the order of reinstatement was not warranted at
all. 
5.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellant   that   even   otherwise   the   directions
issued   by   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   and
order  in para 8 directing  the appellant – MSRTC  to  pay  to
the   respondent   back   wages   with   effect   from   1 st
  November,
2003   to   31 st
  May,   2018,   could   not   have   been   passed   in   a
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   –   MSRTC.   It   is   submitted
therefore that such an order is as such beyond the scope of
the writ petition before the High Court.    
6. Making   the   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the
present appeal. 
7. Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the   respondent   has   supported   the   judgment   and   order
passed by  the Industrial Court and confirmed by the High
Court.
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7.1 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
case   when   the   Industrial   Court   found   the   order   of
dismissal   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct   proved,   the
same   can   be   said   to   be   an   unfair   labour   practice   as   per
item   No.   1(g)   of   Schedule­IV   of   the   MRTU   &   PULP   Act,
1971. Thus the Industrial Court rightly interfered with the
order of dismissal and the same is rightly confirmed by the
High Court.
7.2 It is contended that in the present case as such it was not
the   fault   on   the   part   of   the   respondent   –   driver.   That   the
jeep driver coming from the opposite side was on the wrong
side   of   the   road   and   the   respondent   tried   to   avoid   the
accident. It is submitted that the criminal court found that
even the jeep driver was also negligent and considering the
fact   the   criminal   court   acquitted   the   respondent   –   driver,
the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   Industrial   Court,
ordering   reinstatement   without   back   wages   but   with
continuity   of   service   does   not   warrant   any   interference.   It
is   submitted   therefore   that   the   High   Court   rightly   did   not
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interfere   with   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
Industrial   Court   ordering   reinstatement   without   back
wages. 
8. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal. 
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length. 
10. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the
departmental   proceedings   the   misconduct   alleged   against
the   respondent   –   driver   of   driving   the   vehicle   rashly   and
negligently   due   to   which   the   accident   occurred   in   which
four   persons   died   has   been   proved.   Thereafter,   the
disciplinary   authority   passed   an   order   of   dismissal,
dismissing   the   respondent   –   workman   from   service.   The
Labour   Court   did   not   interfere   with  the   order   of   dismissal
by   giving   cogent   reasons   and   after   re­appreciating   the
entire   evidence   on   record   including   the   order   of   acquittal
passed   by   the   criminal   court.   However,   the   Industrial
Court   though   did   not   interfere   with   the   findings   recorded
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by   the   disciplinary   authority   on   the   misconduct   proved,
interfered with the order of dismissal solely  on the ground
that   punishment   of   dismissal   is   disproportionate   to   the
misconduct   proved   and   the   same   can   be   said   to   be   to   be
unfair labour practice as per item No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of
the   MRTU   &   PULP   Act,   1971.   The   same   is   not   interfered
with by the High Court. 
10.1 Therefore,   the   short   question   which   is   posed   for   the
consideration   of   this   Court   is   whether   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case the punishment of dismissal can
be said to be an unfair labour practice on the ground that
the   same   was   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct   proved
and   therefore   the   Industrial   Court   was   justified   in
interfering   with   the   order   of   dismissal   and   ordering
reinstatement with continuity of service.
10.2 Having   gone  through  the   findings  recorded  by  the  enquiry
officer   in   the   departmental   enquiry   and   the   judgment   and
order  passed  by  the   labour   court  as well  as  the  Industrial
Court and even the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the criminal court, it emerges that when the respondent
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was   driving   the   vehicle   it   met   with   an   accident   with   the
jeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident
four  persons died. From  the  material on  record it emerges
that   the   impact   of  the   accident  with   the  jeep  coming   from
the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back
25   feet.   From   the   aforesaid   facts   it   can   be   said   that   the
respondent   –   workman   was   driving   the   vehicle   in   such   a
great   speed   and   rashly   due   to   which   the   accident   had
occurred in which four persons died. Even while acquitting
the accused – respondent – driver who was facing the trial
under   Sections   279   and   304(a)   of   IPC   Criminal   Court
observed   that   the   prosecution   failed   to   prove   that   the
incident   occurred  due  to   rash  and  negligent  driving   of   the
accused – respondent herein only and none else. Therefore,
at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep
was   also   negligent,   it   can   be   said   to   be   a   case   of
contributory   negligence.   That   does   not   mean   that   the
respondent   –   workman   was   not   at   all   negligent.   Hence,   it
does not absolve him of the misconduct.  
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10.3 Much stress has been given by the Industrial Court on the
acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. However,
as   such   the   Labour   Court   had   in   extenso   considered   the
order of acquittal passed by the criminal court and did not
agree   with   the   submissions   made   on   behalf   of   the
respondent   –   workman   that   as   he   was   acquitted   by   the
criminal  court he  cannot  be  held guilty   in  the disciplinary
proceedings.  
10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by  the criminal
court   it   appears   that   the   criminal   court   acquitted   the
respondent   based   on   the   hostility   of   the   witnesses;   the
evidence   led   by   the   interested   witnesses;   lacuna   in
examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot
panchnama   of   the   incident,   etc.   Therefore,   criminal   court
held   that   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   the   case
against   the   respondent   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   On   the
contrary   in   the   departmental   proceedings   the   misconduct
of   driving   the   vehicle   rashly   and   negligently   which   caused
accident   and   due   to   which   four   persons   died   has   been
established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law
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an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance
on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in
both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in
different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the
Industrial   Court   has   erred   in   giving   much   stress   on   the
acquittal   of   the   respondent   by   the   criminal   court.   Even
otherwise   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the   Industrial
Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the
disciplinary   authority   holding   charge   and   misconduct
proved   in   the   departmental   enquiry,   and   has   interfered
with the punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that
same   is   shockingly   disproportionate   and   therefore   can   be
said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g) of
Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. 
10.5 Now   so   far   as   the   order   passed   by   the   Industrial   Court
ordering   reinstatement   with   continuity   of   service   by
invoking   clause   No.1(g)   of   Schedule­IV   of   the   MRTU   &
PULP Act, 1971 is concerned, as per clause No. 1(g) only in
a   case   where   it   is   found   that   dismissal   of   an   employee   is
for   misconduct   of   a   minor   or   technical   character,   without
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having   any   regard   to   the   nature   of   the   particular
misconduct   or   the   past   record   of   service   of   the   employee,
so   as   to   amount   to   a   shockingly   disproportionate
punishment.   Clause   No.1   of   Schedule­IV   of   the   MRTU   &
PULP Act, 1971  reads as under:­
“Schedule IV
1. To discharge or dismiss employees­
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise
of the employer’s rights;
(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal
case on false evidence or on concocted evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence
without leave;
(f) in   utter   disregard   of   the   principles   of   natural
justice   in   the   conduct   of   domestic   enquiry   or
with undue haste;
(g) for   misconduct   of   a   minor   or   technical
character,   without   having   any   regard   to   the
nature of the particular misconduct or the past
record   of   service   of   the   employee,   so   as   to
amount   to   a   shockingly   disproportionate
punishment.”
Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU &
PULP Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that
the   dismissal   of   the   respondent   was   for   misconduct   of   a
minor or technical character, without having any regard to
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the nature of the misconduct.   The respondent – workman
has   been   held   to   be   guilty   for   a   particular   charge   and
particular   misconduct.   Even   the   past   record   of   service   of
the   respondent   has   not   been   considered   by   the   Industrial
Court.   As   per   case   of   the   appellant   –   MSRTC   the
respondent   –   workman   was   in   service   for   three   years   and
during   three   years’   service   tenure   he   was   punished   four
times.   Therefore,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   order   of
dismissal was without having any regard to the past record
of the service of the respondent. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances   of   the   case,   the   Industrial   Court   wrongly
invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP
Act, 1971.   
11. Even   otherwise   in   the   facts   of   the   case   when   in   the
departmental   enquiry,   it   has   been   specifically   found   that
due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver –
respondent, the accident took place in which four  persons
died,   when   the   punishment   of   dismissal   is   imposed   it
cannot   be   said   to   be   shockingly   disproportionate
punishment. In the departmental proceedings every aspect
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has been considered. At the cost of repetition, it is observed
that   even   the   Industrial   Court   has   not   interfered   with   the
findings   recorded   by   the   enquiry   officer   in   the
departmental   proceedings.   Therefore,   in   the   facts   and
circumstance of the case, the Industrial Court committed a
grave   error   and   has   exceeded   in   its   jurisdiction   while
interfering   with   the   order   of   dismissal   passed   by   the
disciplinary   authority,   which   was   not   interfered   by   the
Labour Court.
12. It   is   also   required   to   be   noted   that   before   the   Industrial
Court   the   respondent   –   workman   –   driver   admitted   that
after the order of dismissal he has been gainfully employed.
Therefore also the reinstatement in service with continuity
of service was not warranted. 
13. Even  the directions  issued by  the  High Court in para 8 in
the   impugned   judgment   and   order   directing   the   appellant
to   pay   wages   to   the   respondent   –   workman   for   the   period
from   01.11.2003   to   31.05.2018   also   could   not   have   been
passed   by   the   High   Court   in   a   writ   petition   filed   by   the
appellant.   It   was   not   the   petition   filed   by   the   workman   –
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respondent. Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued
in   para   8   of   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   cannot   be
sustained   as   the   same   is   beyond   the   scope   and   ambit   of
the controversy before the High Court. 
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present   Appeal   Succeeds.   The   judgment   and   order   passed
by the Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No.13
of   2002   and   the   impugned   judgment   and   order  passed   by
the High Court in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003 are hereby
quashed   and   set   aside   and   the   judgment   and   Award
passed   by   the   Labour   Court   in   Complaint   (ULP)   No.96   of
1993   is   hereby   ordered   to   be   restored.   Consequently,   the
order   of   dismissal   passed   by   the   disciplinary   authority
dismissing   the   respondent   –   workman   from   service   is
hereby   upheld.   The   present   appeal   is   allowed   to   the
aforesaid extent.  There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
                 (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
  (B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
January  03, 2022
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