/2022 INSC 0025/ 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.111­113 OF 2015 RAJESH PRASAD  …..APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR. ETC.      ….RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T NAGARATHNA J.  These   appeals   have   been   filed   by   the   appellant   ­ informant   (PW­7   Rajesh   Prasad)   assailing   the   judgment   and order   dated   5 th   August,   2009   passed   by   the   High   Court   of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal Nos.714, 747 and 814 of   2008   by   which   the   judgment   of   conviction   dated   26 th   June, 2008   and   order   of   sentence   dated   30 th   June,   2008   passed   by the   Additional   District   &   Sessions   Judge,   Fast   Track   Court­V, Munger, has been set aside by allowing the   aforesaid appeals and by accordingly answering the Death Reference No.13/2008 and  consequently  acquitting all the accused.  2 2. The   Court   of   Additional   District   &   Sessions   Judge,   Fast Track   Court­V,   Munger,   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘Fast Track Court’) vide its judgment dated 26 th June,2008 convicted the respondents herein viz., Upendra Ram, Mahendra Ram and Munna   Ram.   By   order   dated   30 th   June,   2021,   the   Fast   Track Court   sentenced   Upendra   Ram   to   undergo   imprisonment   for life with fine of Rs.5000/­ and in default of payment of fine he was further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under section 302/34 read with section 120B of the Indian  Penal   Code  (for   short,  the  ‘IPC’)    and  also  sentenced  to undergo   rigorous   imprisonment  for   one   year   for   offence   under section   504   of   IPC   and   further   sentenced   to   undergo   rigorous imprisonment  for  ten   years  each  for  the   offence   under   section 3/4   of   the   Explosive   Substances   Act,   1908   and   ordered   that the   sentences   run   concurrently.   The   Fast   Track   Court sentenced the accused viz., Munna Ram and Mahendra Ram to death   under   sections   302/34   read   with   section   120B   of   IPC and sections 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, subject to confirmation by the High Court. The Fast Track Court however acquitted the other accused viz., Fantus Mandal, Dhappu Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad. 3 3. It   is   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   on   Thursday,   10 th March,   2005,   at   about   5.00   pm,   accused   Mahendra   Ram, Upendra   Ram,   Munna   Ram,   Dhappu   Ram,   all   being   sons   of Kishori   Ram   and   Chandrabhanu   Prasad,   with   two   other unknown   persons   proceeded   towards   the   informant   viz., Rajesh Prasad (PW­7) and protested that as the informant had opposed their illegal activities, his entire family would be blown off   by   a   bomb.   Accused   Munna   Ram   threw   a   bomb   at   the informant’s   father   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   who   was   sitting   in   his betel   (pan)   shop.   The   rear   portion   of   his   father’s   head   was blown   off   leading   to   his   death.   Accused   Mahendra   Ram   threw another  bomb  against  O.P.  Verma  and  as  a result  thereof,  his head   was   blown   away   and   he   died   on   the   spot.   Further, Upendra   Ram   hurled   another   bomb   which   missed   injuring anyone   else   and   exploded   on   the   road.   Then   accused Chandrabhanu   and   Dappu   Ram   stated   that   they   would proceed   from   there   as   their   job   had   been   completed   and   they tried to flee from the spot, but the furious public caught hold of an unknown person and assaulted him as a result of which he was   seriously   injured   and   he   died.   The   accused,   while   fleeing away, threatened that their action was a result of opposition by the   informant   against   the   illicit   sale   of   liquor   by   them   and   if 4 anyone   again   obstructed   their   business,   they   would   face similar   consequences.   Accused­Chandrabhanu   Prasad   helped the accused­Munna Ram to flee from the spot.  4. The informant had further stated that he was objecting to the   illegal   sale   of   liquor   by   the   accused   and   on   account   of enmity and in pursuance of their common intention and object, they   had   hurled   bombs   and   killed   the   father   of   the   informant as well as others.  5. On receipt of the said information, a  case was registered at Kotawali PS being Case No.136/2005 dated 10 th March, 2005 under   sections   302/34,   120B   of   IPC   and   section   3/4   of   the Explosive  Substances   Act,  1908  (hereinafter  referred  to   as   the ‘Act’) against the accused.  The police investigated the case and submitted   the   chargesheet   dated   7 th June,   2005   against   the accused before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger, keeping investigation pending with regard to the other charges for   offences   under   sections   302,   120B,   504,   225   of   IPC   and section   3/4   of   the   Act.   On   8 th   June,   2005,   the   Chief   Judicial Magistrate,   Munger,   took   cognizance   of   the   alleged   offences against   the   accused   and   committed   the   case   to   the   Court   of Sessions   after   complying   with   the   provision   of   section   207   of 5 the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   (for   short,   the   ‘Cr.PC’)   vide order dated 17 th  June, 2005.  6.  The   case   was   transferred   to   the   Court   of   Additional District Judge­I, Munger and later on, to the Fast Track Court on   9 th   December,   2005.   Thereafter,   the   charge   for   the concerned offences was read over and explained to the accused in   Hindi   to   which   they   pleaded   not   guilty   and   claimed   to   be tried.  7. The prosecution examined altogether ten witnesses and took note   of   Material   Objects   (MOs).   Thereafter,   statements   of   the accused   under   section   313   Cr.PC   were   recorded.   All   the accused denied the alleged occurrence and submitted that they were innocent and had been falsely implicated. They contended that there were dues in respect of liquor taken by Ashok Yadav from   the   informant   who   was   running   an   illegal   liquor   shop. The   said   dues   were   demanded   from   Ashok   Yadav   for   which there   was   a   scuffle   between   them   and   the   family   of   the informant assaulted Ashok Yadav. As a result, some unknown persons   became   furious   and   hurled   bombs   and   caused   the alleged   occurrence.   That   the   associates   of   the   informant   had 6 looted   the   tea   shop   of   accused   Dhappu   Ram   and   that   the informant had falsely implicated the accused.  8.  We have heard Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel for the appellant;   Sri   Saket   Singh,   learned   counsel   for   the   State   and Sri   Ranjan   Mukherjee,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­ accused and perused the material on record.  9. Appellant’s   counsel   submitted   that   the   High   Court   was not   right   in   setting   aside   the   judgment   of   conviction   and sentence   passed   by   the   Fast­Track   Court,   thereby   acquitting the accused. She drew our attention to the evidence of PWs 3, 4,   5,   8,   9   and   10   and   contended   that   the   same   would   clearly establish   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond   reasonable   doubt. However,   the   High   Court   has   not   appreciated   the   case   of   the appellant herein in its proper perspective and has set aside the judgment   of   the   Fast­Track   Court.   The   appellant­informant PW­7 who is one of the sons of the deceased Chhote Lal Mahto had   clearly   stated   in   the   complaint   and   also   in   his   deposition about   the   culpability   of   the   accused   which   has   not   been properly appreciated by the High Court.  7 10.   While   drawing   our   attention   to   the   evidence   on   record, learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that   the   High Court   has   arrived   at   incorrect   conclusions   and   thereby reversing the judgment of the Fast­Track Court.  11. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that while acquitting the accused, the High Court has directed that proceedings of perjury be initiated against the appellant herein which   was   wholly   unnecessary   having   regard   to   the   fact   that the Fast Track Court had accepted the case of the prosecution and on the basis of the evidence of the appellant herein as well as other eyewitnesses had convicted the accused.  12. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   finally   contended   that the   impugned   judgment   of   acquittal   may   be   set  aside   and   the judgment   of   the   Fast   Track   Court   be   restored   as   the   accused have   committed   serious   offences   under   section   302/34   read with section 120B of IPC as well as other sections resulting in death  of  two  persons,  one  being  the  father  of  the  appellant as well   as   another,   on   account   of   the   bombs   hurled   by   the accused   against   the   deceased.   She   submitted   that   the   third bomb   which   was   hurled   by   an   accused   missed   injuring   any person but that would not in any way lead to his acquittal.  8 13.  Per   contra,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respondents­accused   supported   the   judgment   of   the   High Court and contended that the High Court has rightly perceived and   assessed   the   evidence   on   record   and   as   a   result   reversed the   erroneous   judgment   of   the   Fast­Track   Court.   It   was submitted   that   the   Fast­Track   Court   failed   to   note   that   the evidence   on   record   did   not   prove   the   case   of   the   prosecution beyond   reasonable   doubt   vis­à­vis   the   accused   and   despite that   death   penalty   had   been   imposed   on   two   of   the   accused and   life   imprisonment   on   another   accused   which   has   been rightly   reversed   by   the   High   Court   by   a   reasoned   judgment. Therefore,   the   impugned   judgment   would   not   call   for   any interference  at the  hands of this  Court as  there is no  merit  in these appeals. Hence, the appeals may be dismissed.  14.  Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respective   parties,   the   following   points   would   arise   for   our consideration: (a)   Whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in reversing   the   judgment   of   conviction   and sentence   awarded   by   the   Fast­Track   Court, thereby acquitting all the accused? 9 (b) Whether the judgment of the High Court calls for any interference or modification by this Court? (c) What order? 15.  The   Fast­Track   Court   considered   the   case   of   the prosecution being that on 10 th   March, 2005 at about 5.00 pm, the   accused   came   to   the   informant   and   stated   that   since   the informant   and   his   family   were   objecting   to   his   illegal   sale   of country   made   liquor,   he   along   with   his   family   would   be eliminated. Then, accused Munna Ram hurled a bomb that he was   holding   in   his   hand   and   the   father   of   the   informant, Chhote   Lal   Mahto,   sitting   at   the   betel   shop   died   in   the   blast. Second   bomb   was   hurled   by   accused   Mahendra   Ram   causing the   death   of   a   pedestrian   named   O.P.   Verma   and   the   third bomb   was   thrown   by   accused   Upendra   Ram,   which   exploded on   the   road.   The   accused   then   fled   from   the   spot.   That   the offences were committed by the accused as a result of objection raised   by   the   deceased   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   and   his   son   PW­7 Rajesh   Prasad­informant,   appellant   herein,   against   the   illegal liquor business of the accused.  16. The   Fast­Track   Court   also   noted   that   the   defence   was unable to substantiate their case that the tea shop of accused 10 Dhappu   Ram   had   been   looted   by   the   informant   and   his associates.   They   further   stated   that   there   were   disputes   in respect of payment of prices of liquor by Ashok Yadav and as a result the latter and his associates had exploded the bombs.  17. The versions of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 who were eyewitnesses as well as that of PW­7 i.e. the informant were accepted by the Fast   Track   Court  as   being   consistent  with   each   other   as   their ocular   testimony   proved   the   prosecution   case   beyond   any reasonable   doubt.   Accordingly,   three   of   the   accused   were convicted and sentenced as noted above. 18. The   Fast   Track   Court   on   considering   the   evidence   on record held as under and came to the following conclusion: (i) That   PW­1,   PW­3,   PW­4   and   PW­7   are   related   to each   other,   they   being   the   son­in­law,   cousin   and sons   of   the   deceased,   Chhote   Lal   Mahto respectively.   PW­2   is   the   shopkeeper   of   the   PCO booth which is the shop adjoining the betel shop of the   informant.   PW­2  was   also   injured   by   a   splinter of   the   bomb   which   was   hurled   on   the   deceased Chhote Lal Mahto who was in his betel shop. PW­8 also   witnessed   the   occurrence.   As   such,   PW­2   and 11 PW­8 are independent witnesses. PW­5 is the doctor who performed the post­mortem examination of the deceased   and   PWs­9   and   10   are   the   Investigating Officers (IOs) of the case.  (ii) That   totally   three   bombs   were   hurled   resulting   in the death of Chhotey Lal Mahto and another person and   the   third   bomb   exploded   on   the   road.   As   a result,   the   public   became   furious   and   caught   hold of   an   unknown   person   and   assaulted   him,   which resulted   in   his   death.   It   had   come   in   the   evidence that the said person was Ashok Yadav.  (iii) That   the   name   of   Fantus   alias   Udai   Prakash Mandal   had   not   been   found   in   the   FIR   and   the witnesses   had   not   testified   against   his   involvement in  the occurrence  nor has  there  been any  overt act alleged against him.  (iv) No overt act had been alleged against Dhappu Ram and Chandrabhanu Prasad.  (v) Consequently,   Fantus   Mandal,   Dhappu   Ram   and Chandrabhanu Prasad were not found guilty of any offences alleged and they were acquitted.  12 (vi) Considering   the   evidence   on   record,   it   was   found that   Upendra   Ram,   Munna   Ram   and   Mahendra Ram   were   guilty   and   they   were   convicted   and sentenced as stated above by the Fast Track Court.  19.  In   the   appeals   filed   by   the   accused   and   in   the   Death Reference   No.13/2008,   the   High   Court,   on   considering   the submissions   made   on   behalf   of   the   accused   as   well   as   the State, noted at the outset as under:  “It   is   trite   law   that   acquittal   of   a   co­accused   cannot simpliciter be a ground for acquittal of other accused. There   may   be   factors   distinguishing   the   two   cases. Alternately,   an   erroneous   acquittal   and   absence   of any   challenge   to   the   same   cannot   be   a   ground   to demand   similar   treatment   by   others.   Likewise,   the testimony   of   an   interested   witness   cannot   be discarded on that ground alone. It would only require the   Court   to   be   more   cautious   and   scrutinize   the evidence   carefully.   Evidence,   otherwise   cogent   and convincing   cannot   be   rejected   on   the   ground   that there   was   no   independent   witness,   though   the occurrence   had   taken   place   on   a   busy   road.   But, there may be circumstances where the witnesses are interested   and   the   manner   of   occurrence   as described   requires   corroboration   by   independent witness also. Ultimately, therefore, it shall all depend on   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case.   It   has also to be kept in mind that it shall be those close to the   deceased,   who   shall   be   most   keen   that   the   real culprits be booked.”   13 With the aforesaid observations, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction of the accused who were convicted by   the   Fast­Track   Court   as   well   as   sentence   imposed   upon them   and   accordingly,   allowed   the   appeals   by   acquitting   all the accused. 20.   Before   proceeding   further,   it   would   be   useful   to   review the   approach   to   be   adopted   while   deciding   an   appeal   against acquittal   by   the   trial   court   as   well   as   by   the   High   Court. Section   378   of   the   Cr.P.C   deals   with   appeals   in   case   of acquittal.   In   one   of   the   earliest   cases   on   the   powers   of   the High   Court   in   dealing   with   an   appeal   against   an   order   of acquittal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in   Sheo Swarup vs. R. Emperor ,   AIR 1934 PC 227(2)  considered the provisions   relating   to   the   power   of   an   appellate   court   in dealing   with   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   and observed as under: “16.   It   cannot,   however,   be   forgotten   that   in   case   of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available   to   him   under   the   fundamental   principle   of criminal   jurisprudence   that   every   person   should   be presumed   to   be   innocent   unless   he   is   proved   to   be guilty   by   a   competent   court   of   law.   Secondly,   the accused   having   secured   an   acquittal,   the presumption   of   his   innocence   is   certainly   not weakened   but   reinforced,   reaffirmed   and strengthened by the trial court. 14 But   in   exercising   the   power   conferred   by   the   Code and   before   reaching   its   conclusions   upon   fact,   the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the   trial  Judge   as  to   the  credibility  of  the   witnesses; (2)   the   presumption   of   innocence   in   favour   of   the accused,   a   presumption   certainly   not   weakened   by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding   of   fact   arrived   at   by   a   judge   who   had   the advantage   of   seeing   the   witnesses.   To   state   this, however,   is   only   to   say   that   the   High   Court   in   its conduct   of   the   appeal   should   and   will   act   in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” It   was   stated   that   the   appellate   court   has   full   powers   to review and to reverse the acquittal.  21. In   Atley   vs.   State   of   U.P. ,   AIR   1955   SC   807 ,   the approach   of   the   appellate   court   while   considering   a   judgment of acquittal was discussed and it was observed that unless the appellate   court   comes   to   the   conclusion   that   the   judgment   of the acquittal was perverse, it could not set aside the same. To a similar   effect   are   the   following   observations   of   this   Court speaking through Subba Rao J., (as His Lordship then was) in Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 : “9.   The   foregoing   discussion   yields   the   following results:   (1)   an   appellate   court   has   full   power   to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is   founded;   (2)   the   principles   laid   down   in   Sheo 15 Swarup   case afford a correct guide for the appellate court’s   approach   to   a   case   disposing   of   such   an appeal;  and (3) the different phraseology  used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) ‘substantial and compelling   reasons’,   (ii)   ‘good   and   sufficiently   cogent reasons’, and (iii) ‘strong reasons’ are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an   appeal   against   acquittal   to   review   the   entire evidence   and   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion;   but   in doing so it should not only  consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order   of   acquittal   in   its   arriving   at   a   conclusion   on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.” The  need  for the  aforesaid observations arose  on  account of  observations  of  the   majority  in   Aher   Raja   Khimavs.   State of   Saurashtra,   AIR   1956   SC   217   which   stated   that   for   the High Court to take a different view on the evidence  “there must also  be substantial and compelling reasons  for holding that  the trial court was wrong.” 22. M.G. Agarwal vs. State of  Maharashtra ,   AIR 1963 SC 200   is   the   judgment   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court, speaking   through   Gajendragadkar,   J.   (as   His   Lordship   then was). This Court observed that the approach of the High Court (appellate   court)   in   dealing   with   an   appeal   against   acquittal ought to be cautious because the presumption of innocence in 16 favour   of   the   accused   “is   not   certainly   weakened   by   the   fact that he has been acquitted at his trial.”  23. In  Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows:  “In   short,   our   jurisprudential   enthusiasm   for presumed   innocence   must   be   moderated   by   the pragmatic   need   to   make   criminal   justice   potent   and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance   possibilities   as   good   enough   to   set   the delinquent   free   and   chopping   the   logic   of preponderant   probability   to   punish   marginal innocents.” 24. This   Court   in   Ramesh   Babulal   Doshi   vs.   State   of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 , spoke about the approach of the appellate   court   while   considering   an   appeal   against   an   order acquitting the accused and stated as follows:  “While   sitting   in   judgment   over   an   acquittal   the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the   question   whether   the   findings   of   the   trial   court are   palpably   wrong,   manifestly   erroneous   or demonstrably   unsustainable.   If   the   appellate   court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal  is not to  be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the   order   of   acquittal   cannot   at   all   be   sustained   in view   of   any   of   the   above   infirmities   it   can   then­and then   only­   reappraise   the   evidence   to   arrive   at   its own conclusions.” 17 The object and the purpose of the aforesaid approach is to ensure   that   there   is   no   miscarriage   of   justice.   In   another words,   there   should   not   be   an   acquittal   of   the   guilty   or   a conviction of an innocent person.  25. In   Ajit   Savant   Majagvai   vs.   State   of   Karnataka , (1997)   7   SCC   110 ,  this   Court  set  out   the   following   principles that would regulate and govern the hearing of an appeal by the High   Court   against   an   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   Trial Court: “16.   This   Court   has   thus   explicitly   and   clearly   laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the   hearing   of   appeal   by   the   High   Court   against   an order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   trial   court.   These principles   have   been   set   out   in   innumerable   cases and may be reiterated as under: (1) In   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal,   the High   Court   possesses   all   the   powers,   and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing   an   appeal   against   an   order   of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole   issue,   reappraise   the   evidence   and  come to   its   own   conclusion   and   findings   in   place   of the   findings   recorded   by   the   trial   court,   if   the said   findings   are   against   the   weight   of   the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before   reversing   the   finding   of   acquittal,   the High   Court   has   to   consider   each   ground   on which   the   order   of   acquittal   was   based   and   to record   its   own   reasons   for   not   accepting   those 18 grounds   and   not   subscribing   to   the   view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In   reversing   the   finding   of   acquittal,   the   High Court   has   to   keep   in   view   the   fact   that   the presumption   of   innocence   is   still   available   in favour   of   the   accused   and   the   same   stands fortified   and   strengthened   by   the   order   of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If   the   High   Court,   on   a   fresh   scrutiny   and reappraisal   of   the   evidence   and   other   material on   record,   is   of   the   opinion   that   there   is another   view   which   can   be   reasonably   taken, then   the   view   which   favours   the   accused should be adopted. (6) The   High   Court   has   also   to   keep   in   mind   that the   trial   court   had   the   advantage   of   looking   at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in  the  Court  especially  in  the witness­ box. (7) The   High   Court   has   also   to   keep   in   mind   that even   at   that   stage,   the   accused   was   entitled   to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable   person   would   honestly   and conscientiously   entertain   as   to   the   guilt   of   the accused.” 26. This   Court   in   Ramesh   Babulal   Doshi   vs.   State   of Gujarat,   (1996)   9   SCC   225   observed   vis­à­vis   the   powers   of an   appellate   court   while   dealing   with   a   judgment   of   acquittal, as under:  “7. … While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the   question   whether   the   findings   of   the   trial   court 19 are   palpably   wrong,   manifestly   erroneous   or demonstrably   unsustainable.   If   the   appellate   court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal  is not to  be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the   order   of   acquittal   cannot   at   all   be   sustained   in view of any  of the  above infirmities it can  then—and then   only—reappraise   the   evidence   to   arrive   at   its own conclusions.” 27.     This   Court   in   Chandrappa   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of Karnataka ,   (2007)   4   SCC   415 ,   highlighted   that   there   is   one significant   difference   in   exercising   power   while   hearing   an appeal   against   acquittal   by   the   appellate   court.   The   appellate court   would   not   interfere   where   the   judgment   impugned   is based   on   evidence   and   the   view   taken   was   reasonable   and plausible.   This   is   because   the   appellate   court   will   determine the fact that there is presumption in favour of the accused and the   accused   is   entitled   to   get   the   benefit   of   doubt   but   if   it decides   to   interfere   it   should   assign   reasons   for   differing   with the decision of acquittal.  28.   After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words:  “42.   From   the   above   decisions,   in   our   considered view,   the   following   general   principles   regarding 20 powers   of   the   appellate   court   while   dealing   with   an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An   appellate   court   has   full   power   to   review, reappreciate   and   reconsider   the   evidence   upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973  puts   no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such   power   and   an   appellate   court   on   the evidence   before   it   may   reach   its   own conclusion,   both   on   questions   of   fact   and   of law. (3) Various  expressions,  such  as,  “substantial   and compelling   reasons”,   “good   and   sufficient grounds”,   “very   strong   circumstances”, “distorted  conclusions”, “glaring  mistakes”, etc. are   not   intended   to   curtail   extensive   powers   of an   appellate   court   in   an   appeal   against acquittal.   Such   phraseologies   are   more   in   the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with   acquittal   than   to   curtail   the   power   of   the court to  review the evidence and to come to  its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that   in   case   of   acquittal,   there   is   double presumption   in   favour   of   the   accused.   Firstly, the   presumption   of   innocence   is   available   to him   under   the   fundamental   principle   of criminal   jurisprudence   that   every   person   shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty   by   a   competent   court   of   law.   Secondly, the   accused   having   secured   his   acquittal,   the presumption   of   his   innocence   is   further reinforced,   reaffirmed   and   strengthened   by   the trial court. (5) If   two   reasonable   conclusions   are   possible   on the   basis   of   the   evidence   on   record,   the 21 appellate   court   should   not   disturb   the   finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 29. In   Nepal   Singh   vs.   State   of   Haryana–   (2009)   12   SCC 351 , this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court which had set aside the judgment of acquittal pronounced by the trial court   and   restored   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   acquitting the accused on reappreciation of the evidence.  30.   The   circumstances   under   which   an   appeal   would   be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows:  A)  Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order   of   acquittal,   especially   when   the   order   of   acquittal has   been   confirmed   upto   the   High   Court.   It   is   only   in rarest   of   rare   cases,   where   the   High   Court,   on   an absolutely   wrong   process   of   reasoning   and   a   legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring   some   of   the   most   vital   facts,   has   acquitted   the accused,   that   the   same   may   be   reversed   by   this   Court, exercising   jurisdiction   under   Article   136   of   the Constitution.   [State   of   U.P.   v.   Sahai,   AIR   1981   SC 1442] 22 Such   fetters   on   the   right   to   entertain   an   appeal   are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case,   even   though   it   is   held   by   a   superior   court. [ Arunachalam v. Sadhananthan, AIR 1979 (SC) 1284] An   appeal   cannot  be  entertained   against  an  order  of acquittal   which   has,   after   recording   valid   and   weighty reasons,   has   arrived   at   an   unassailable,   logical conclusion   which   justifies   acquittal.   [State   of   Haryana v. Lakhbir Singh, (1990) CrLJ 2274 (SC)] B)    However , this Court has on certain occasions, set aside   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   a  High   Court.   The circumstances   under   which   this   Court   may   entertain   an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarised as follows:  i) Where   the   approach   or   reasoning   of   the   High Court is perverse:  a) Where   incontrovertible   evidence   has   been rejected   by   the   High   Court   based   on   suspicion and   surmises,   which   are   rather   unrealistic. 23 [State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Sukhpal   Singh,   AIR 1984 SC 207]  For   example,   where   direct,   unanimous   accounts of   the   eye­witnesses,   were   discounted   without cogent   reasoning;   [State   of   UP   v.   Shanker,   AIR 1981 SC 879] b) Where   the   intrinsic   merits   of   the   testimony   of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were   discounted   on   the   ground   that   they   were ‘interested’   witnesses;   [State   of   UP   v.   Hakim Singh, AIR 1980 SC 184] c) Where   testimony   of   witnesses   had   been disbelieved   by   the  High   Court,   on  an  unrealistic conjecture   of   personal   motive   on   the   part   of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the   witnesses   had   no   axe   to   grind   in   the   said matter.  [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh, AIR 1984 SC 207]  d) Where   dying   declaration   of   the   deceased   victim was   rejected   by   the   High   Court   on   an   irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on   one   of   the   persons   present   at   the   site   of 24 occurrence   of   the   crime.   [Arunachalam   v. Sadhanantham, AIR 1979 SC 1284]  e) Where   the   High   Court   applied   an   unrealistic standard   of   ‘implicit   proof’   rather   than   that   of ‘proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt’   and   therefore evaluated   the   evidence   in   a   flawed   manner. [State   of   UP   v.   Ranjha   Ram,   AIR   1986   SC 1959] f) Where   the   High   Court   rejected   circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory,   which   were   beyond   the   plea   of   the accused;     [State   of   Maharashtra   v. ChampalalPunjaji   Shah,   AIR   1981   SC   1675] or   where   acquittal   rests   merely   in   exaggerated devotion  to the  rule of benefit of doubt in favour of the   accused.   [Gurbachan   v.   Satpal   Singh,   AIR 1990 SC 209] . g) Where   the   High   Court   acquitted   the   accused   on the   ground   that   he   had   no   adequate   motive   to commit   the   offence,   although,   in   the   said   case, there   was   strong   direct   evidence   establishing   the guilt   of   the   accused,   thereby   making   it 25 unnecessary   on   the   part   of   the   prosecution   to establish   ‘motive.’   [State   of   AP   v.   Bogam Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899] ii) Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice: a) Where   the   findings   of   the   High   Court, disconnecting   the   accused   persons   with   the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of   evidence,   [State   of   UP   v.   Pheru   Singh,   AIR 1989   SC   1205]   or   based   on   extenuating circumstances   which   were   purely   based   in imagination   and   fantasy.   [State   of   Uttar Pradesh v. Pussu 1983 AIR 867 (SC)]  b) Where   the   accused   had   been   acquitted   on ground   of   delay   in   conducting   trial,   which   delay was   attributable   not   to   the   tardiness   or indifference   of   the   prosecuting   agencies,   but   to the   conduct   of   the   accused   himself;   or   where accused   had   been   acquitted   on   ground   of   delay 26 in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature.  [State of Maharashtra v. ChampalalPunjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675] [Source   :   Durga   Das   Basu   –   “The   Criminal   Procedure Code, 1973” Sixth Edition Vol.II Chapter XXIX] 31.  Bearing   in   mind   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   shall consider the evidence on record. 32.  PWs­1, 3, 4 and 7  are related  to each other  and they  are the   son­in­law,   cousin   and   sons   of   the   deceased   Chhote   Lal Mahto,   respectively.   PW­1   in   his   examination­in­chief   has stated that on 10.03.2005 at about 05.00 p.m., he saw Munna Ram,   Mahendra   Ram,   Upendra   Ram,   Dappu   Ram   and   other persons   come   near   his   shop   and   started   abusing   Chhote   Lal Mahto (deceased) and his son Rajesh Prasad, appellant herein. That Munna Ram threw a bomb on Chhote Lal Mahto and as a result,   he   died.   O.P.   Verma   also   died   as   a   result   of   Mahendra Ram  throwing a bomb at him. The third bomb was  thrown on the street and it did not injure anybody. At the same time, 20 to 25 people came to the spot, caught hold of a person, namely 27 Ashok  Yadav   and  started   beating   him,   as  a  result  of  which,   it was   “heard”   that   he   had   died.   However,   in   his   cross­ examination,   PW­1   has   stated   that   the   accused   and   other persons were abusing each other. He has also stated that he is not   aware   whether   the   police   lodged   a   case   before   Rajesh Prasad (PW­7) or not. He has feigned ignorance about anything that happened before the incident. He has also stated that the deceased   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   is   his   father­in­law.   He   has deposed   that   due   to   the   explosion   of   the   bomb,   the   area   was covered with smoke and the Betel shop was not visible.  He has also admitted that in his statement to the Police, he had stated that Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram and Dhappu Ram came to his   shop   and   started   abusing   his   father­in­law.     Chhote   Lal Mahto   pleaded   not   to   do   so   and   also   not   to   sell   illicit   liquor. That  after   abusing,   they   went  away  and   returned  ten   minutes later.     However,   he   has   admitted   that   he   does   not   remember whether   he   has   stated   before   the   Police   that   Upendra   Ram started shouting and directed Mahendra Ram to get hold of the deceased and after that, Mahendra Ram threw a bomb.  He has further stated that it is wrong to suggest that his father­in­law and   other   persons   died   due   to   hurling   of   bombs   by   Ashok Yadav and other unknown persons.  28 33. PW­2/Prabhat Kumar Singh has stated that he runs a PCO (Public   Call   Office)   booth   and   on   10.03.2005   at   about   05.00 p.m.,   he   was   at   the   booth.     That   there   was   an   altercation between   Rajesh   Prasad   (PW­7)   and   Mahendra   Ram,   Upendra Ram   and   Dhappu   Ram.     That   Munna   Ram   threw   a   bomb   at Chhote Lal Mahto's betel shop which hit him on his head and as   a   result   of   which   his   head   was   blown   off.   That   PW­2   also came in contact with the splinters of the bomb and was injured as   a   result   of   the   same.   That   he   was   baffled   after   seeing   the dead   body   of   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   and   left   the   spot   after   closing his   shop.   However,   during   cross   examination   he   has   stated that he left the spot thirty minutes after the explosion.  34. He   has   also   admitted   that   he   is   under   police   security   as he   has   been   threatened   by   the   accused   that   if   he   deposes against them, he must be ready to face the consequences. That is   why   he   went   to   the   police   station   the   previous   evening   and has deposed under police security. He has stated that he does not   recognise   Uday   Prakash   Mandal   who   was   present   in   the Court.     PW­2   has   stated   that   he   is   a   tenant   in   the   house   of Rajesh, the informant and that he signed the affidavit that was prepared   based   on   his   statements   which   he   had   made   as 29 “advised”   by   his   advocate.   He   has   also   admitted   that   he   had not seen Rajesh, Naresh or any of their family members beating Ashok Yadav.  That the people left the scene of occurrence after the   altercation   amongst   them   ended.   He   has   stated   that   after the occurrence, an associate of Munna Ram had caught hold of him.   That   Chandrabhanu   Prasad’s   family   helped   Munna   Ram flee from the spot.  35. PW­3 / Naresh Prasad @ Naresh Mahto has stated that on 10.03.2005,   he   saw   Munna   Rai   (to   be   read   as   “Munna   Ram”) along   with   unknown   persons   hurling   abuses   in   front   of   his betel   shop,   stating   that   he   would   destroy   anyone   who interfered with his business. His brother Rajesh Prasad (PW­7) came   out   of   his   house   and   tried   to   pacify   Munna   Rai   but   he threatened   that   he   would   blow   off   his   entire   family   with   the bomb.     After   such   threat,   he   left   the   spot   only   to   return   after ten minutes along with Mahendra Rai, Upendra Rai (to be read as   “Upendra   Ram”)   and   Happu   Rai   (to   be   read   as   “Dhappu Ram”).   That   Munna   Rai   threw   a   bomb   at   the   betel   shop   in which   his   father   was   sitting,   as   a   result   of   which   his   father's head was blown away and he died on the spot.   Another bomb was   blasted   by   Munna   Rai   and   a   pedestrian,   namely,   O.P. Verma   died.   That   he   went   near   his   father   and   started   crying. 30 He   does   not   know   what   happened   thereafter.     He   is   also   not aware   as   to   who   else   signed   the   seizure   list   on   which   his signature   was   found.     While   he   identified   the   accused   Munna Rai,   Mahendra   Rai,   Upendra   Rai,   Happu   Rai,   Bhanu   Ji (Chandrabhanu   Prasad),   he   did   not   recognise   another   person, who   was   one   among   the   accused.   He   had   already   stated   that he   did   not   see   Chandrabhanu   Prasad   at   the   place   of   the occurrence.   36. In   his   cross­examination,   he   has   stated   that   there   is   no personal enmity with the accused and his family members.   In fact,   there   was   " Nyota   Pehani"   (invites   exchanged)   between their   families.     He   has   also   denied   that  there   was   any   quarrel between him and Ashok Yadav and others such as Munna Rai. He   has   also   denied   that   he   and   his   family   members   beat   up Ashok   Yadav   and   others,   as   a   result   of   which   they   came   and threw a bomb in anger.   He has also denied Happu's tea shop was looted on the day of occurrence.   He has also denied that the police came at the place of occurrence within five minutes. That the Station House Officer, Kotwali P.S. did not record his Fardbayan   at   that   time,   but   he   took   statement   of   Rajesh, Umesh,   other   villagers   and   PW­3.     That   the   Daroga   did   not write   Fardbayan   in   his   presence,   but   took   his   signature   on   a 31 plain   paper   and   he   does   not   know   what   was   written   in   the application   on   the   same.     He   has   also   stated   that   he   is   not aware   of   what   was   written   in   the   application   to   register   FIR given   by   his   brother   as   he   was   asleep   when   such   an application was made.     That,   in   his   statement   to   the   police,   he   has   stated   that Munna Rai  and unknown persons  came to  his betel shop and started hurling abuses. That he does not remember whether he had told the Police that bombs were blasted by the accused.  37. Umesh   Prasad   Rai   is   PW­4   who   has   spoken   about   the abuses   of   Mahendra   Rai,   Upendra   Rai,   Munna   Rai,   Dhappu Rai   to   the   effect   that   whoever   interfered   with   or   obstructed their illegal work would be blown away by a bomb.  Munna Rai then threw a bomb at the betel shop in which Chota Lal Mahto was   sitting   and   as   a   result   of   which,   his   head   blew   up. Mahendra Rai then threw a second bomb which hit a passerby, O.P.   Verma   who   was   standing   near   M/s.   Aditya   Electronics and  the third  bomb was blasted by  Upendra Rai which  fell on the   road   and   exploded.     Thereafter,   he   went   near   the   body   of Chhote   Lal   Mahto   and   kept   crying.     On   hearing   the   sound   of the bombs, several people gathered at the place of occurrence. 32 That  the   inquest  report  of  Chhote  Lal  Mahto   was  made  before him and he had signed it.  38. In   his   cross­examination,   he   has   stated   that   Chhote   Lal Mahto was his uncle.  He has stated that before the occurrence abuses   were   hurled   but   he   has   no   knowledge   of   any   pre­ existing   scuffle   between   the   accused   and   his   brothers   Rajesh and   Naresh   (sons   of   the   deceased).   That   he   had   not   informed the   nearby   police   station   after   seeing   the   incident,   but information was sent by someone else to the Police officers who arrived   after   ten   minutes.     The   police   did   not   record   his statement on the day of the occurrence.   He has also admitted that   his   Fardbayan   was   not   in   his   handwriting   and   that though he is an advocate, before signing the   Fardbayan  he did not read it.    He  has  stated  that there was no  dispute between Rajesh and Ashok relating to illicit liquor and it is not true that it   was   in   the   course   of   such   dispute   that   there   was   a   scuffle and   unknown   persons   blasted   bombs   in   which   his   uncle   and another person died.   He has stated that no bomb was thrown at   the   residence   of   Naresh   and   Rajesh   or   at   his   house.     That after   two   months   and   twenty   days   after   the   occurrence,   he went to get his statement recorded because no officer came to record   his   statement.     That,   when   the   first   bomb   was   blasted 33 there was a stampede and he does not remember whether  the shop   keepers   started   shutting   down   their   shops   as   there   was much darkness.   That he has not read the supervision note of SP   and   DSP.     He   has   no   knowledge   that   SP   had   given directions for recovering illicit liquor from the house of Rajesh, etc.  39. PW­7/Rajesh   Prasad   is   the   informant   who   is   the   son   of the   deceased   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   and   the   appellant   herein.     In his   examination­in­chief,   he   has   stated   that   on   10.03.2005   at about 05.00 p.m., he was at the door of his house and he saw Mahendra   Rai,   Upendra   Rai   and   Munna   Rai   and   other unknown   persons   come   near   his   house,   threatening   that   they would   blow   up   his   entire   family   with   a   bomb.     Immediately, Munna Rai threw a bomb carried by him on his father Chhote Lal   Mahto   who   was   sitting   in   his   betel   shop   and   the   back portion   of   his   father's  head  blew  away  resulting  in   his   instant death.     Thereafter,   Mahendra   Rai   threw   another   bomb   near M/s.   Aditi   Electronics   which   hit   O.P.Verma,   a   passerby,   as   a result   of   which   his   head   blew   away   and   he   also   died   on   the spot.  Then Upendra Rai threw the bomb which fell on the road and   exploded.     The   accused   threatened   them   once   again   and fled the scene.  That the reason behind the incident is that the 34 accused were carrying on illegal business of liquor and he and his family members opposed the same and hence, there was a conspiracy and a common intention in pursuance of which his father   was   killed.   That   he   filed   a   written   complaint   under   his signature   at   the   police   station   (Exhibit   No.2/2).     The   Death Review   Report   of   the   dead   body   of   his   father   was   prepared   in his   presence   and   he   had   signed   it   (Exhibit   No.4/1).     He   also identified six accused persons present in the Court.  40. In   his   cross­examination,   he   has   stated   that   he   did   not see Chandrabhanu Prasad at the place of the incident.   He did not   see   Dhappu   Rai   from   the   start   to   the   end   of   the   incident. That   the   written   complaint   which   he   had   prepared   was   read over   and   some   of   it   was   heard.   He   did   not   read   it   completely. The complaint was made in the police station in the evening at 06.00   p.m.     That   he   had   engaged   a   private   lawyer   to   present his case.  That the first information report was not read over to him. That he does not know completely as to what is written in the first information report.  He also does not know as to what he had mentioned in the protest petition.   That his lawyer had given   him   the   first   information   report,   so   written   and   he   had just signed the protest petition and he had not gone through it 35 and  understood  it.  That  none  of  his  brothers  or  relatives  have ever read the case diary, supervision note and protest petition.  41. He   has   also   admitted   that   there   was   no   dispute   or litigation   between   the   family   of   Mahendra,   Upendra,   Munna, and his family.   That on the date of the alleged incident, some heated   exchanges   between   his   father   and   Munna   took   place, but   he   does   not   know   whether   he   has   stated   the   said   fact   in the   first  information   report   or   in   his   protest   petition   or   before the   Police.     He   has   also   denied   that   there   were   any   disputes between   them   before   the   incident.     He   also   does   not   know whether   the   police   was   informed   immediately   after   the incident.     That   the   police   came   at   the   scene   of   the   crime   at about   05.00   and   05.30   p.m.,   but   he   does   not   know   which particular police officer  came there. He has also no knowledge as to whether the inspector recorded the  Fardbayan  or whether the statements of Upendra, his brother  or his family members were   recorded   by   the   police   on   the   same   day   or   not,   but   his statement was recorded.  42. Further,   in   his   cross­examination,   PW­7   has   further denied   that   he   had   made   any   statement   before   the   inspector, SP   or   DSP   that   before   the   incident   at   about   04.00   to   04.30 36 p.m.,   the   accused   abused   the   villagers   in   un­parliamentary language   and   when   they   could   not   tolerate   it   any   more,   they came   out   of   the   house   and   abused   them.     The   accused threatened   and   went   away.   He   also   denied   making   any statement   to   the   effect   that   Upendra   Rai   exploded   the   bomb which   blew   up   after   striking   the   road.   He   has   confirmed   the statement   he   made   before   the   Inspector,   SP   and   DSP   that   a bomb   was   exploded   by   Mahendra   Rai   near   M/s.   Aditi Electronics,   which   hit  O.P.   Verma,   a  passerby   and   he   died   on the spot.  He had also admitted that he does not recall whether he had got recorded in his  Fardbayan  with the police that while running   away,   one   of   the   accused   was   caught   hold   of   by   the people   and   was   nearly   beaten   to   death.   He   has   further   stated that he does not recall any other aspect of the case. For better appreciation   of   the   same,   it   would   be   useful   to   extract paragraph 21 of his deposition as under: “21. I   do   not  recall   that  whether   I   had   got   recorded in my Fard Beyan with the Police that while running away,   one   accused   was   caught   by   the   people   and after   giving   him   beatings   put   him   almost   to   death.   I do   not   recall   that   I   gave   the   statement   to   the   Police that   I   pulled   up   my   sock   and   caught   the   hold   of Munna   Rai,   who   was   freed   by   Chandrabhan   and brother   of   Munna   Rai   and   he   ran   away.     I   do   not recall   that   I   had   stated   that   then   Chandrabhan   and Tappu   said   that   our   work   is   finished   now   and   they ran   away   from   there.     It   is   not   like   that   Mahendra, Upendra   and   Munna   have   not   committed   the 37 incident and therefore,  I  am  saying  every time  that I do not know." Further, in paragraph Nos.25 and 26, PW­7 the informant (the appellant) has stated as under: "25. It   is   not   like   that   my   brother,   brother­in­law, Umesh   and   I   together   beat   up   the   unknown criminals very badly near junction turn and they got annoyed and one of them said that just stay here we are   coming   back   in   few   minutes   and   then   they exploded the bombs.   It is not like that just minutes after,   criminals   came   there   with   bombs   and   while abusing   to   kill   me,   my   brother,   Umesh   and   brother­ in­law   and   then   we   ran   towards   our   house   to   save our   life   and   then   they   threw   the   bomb,   which   fell near Aditi Electronics and we succeeded  in escaping from there and closed ourselves inside the house and when   they   could   not   find   us,   unknown   criminals exploded the bomb on our father in our Pan Shop.  It is   not   like   that   when   the   accused   persons   after exploding   the   bomb   started   running   away,   people   of the   village   raised   the   alarm   and   then   all   people gathered  and  managed  to   catch   one  of  the  criminals and beat up him to death.  It is not like that when we heard   the   noise   of   the   villagers   that   ­­­   illegible   ­­­, we  came  out  after  opening  the  door   and  we   together beat up the unknown criminal.   It is not like that we did not say in the loud voice before the people of the village   that   he   works   on   the   shop   of   Tappu   Rai   and Munna Rai,  rob  him  and  then   we  looted  the  shop  of Tappu   Rai   and   Munna   Rai   and   destroyed   it.     Tappu Rai has no shop. 26. Tappu Rai has the tea shop at crossing in front of the Court of CJM, which has now destroyed.   It is not   like   that   when   we   asked   the   people   to   rob   and damage   the   shop   of   Tappu   Rai   and   Munna   Rai, Mahendra   and   Upendra   of   his   family   and   other members   of   his   family   came   and   they   opposed   our above  intention and  then  we hatched the  conspiracy 38 and   prepared   a   new   application   and   submitted   it with the Police Station in night at 9.00 pm in order to implicate them." In   his   further   cross­examination,   in   paragraph   29,   PW­7 he has stated as under: "29. …… I could not say that any pellet of the bomb hit any passerby and person in traffic.  It just hurt O. P.   Verma   only.     I   did   not   make   any   such   statement before   the   Police   and   DCP   that   in   total   five   bombs were exploded.   It is not like that I  said that in total five bombs were exploded." With   regard   to   his   statements   before   the   DSP,   PW­7   has categorically stated as under: "31. My statement was not recorded before the DSP Sahab.     Again   stated   that   I   do   not   know   whether   I made  the  statement before  the DSP Sahab  or  not.    I do   not   know   that   I   request   the   SP   in   the   protest petition   to   handover   the   investigation   to   some Superior Officer.  SP had gone for supervision or not, I cannot tell anything in this regard. 32. It   is   not   like   that   on   the   order   of   DIG,   SP   had carried   out   the   inspection   of   the   scene   of   crime personally.  I cannot tell anything in this regard.  It is not   like   that   in   order   to   conceal   the   truth   of   the incident,   I   am   stating   that   I   am   illiterate   and concealing   the   fact   regarding   inspection   carried   out by SP Sahab. 33. It   is   not   like   that   I   made   the   statement   to   the SP   that   Naresh,   Bablu,   Aatish   and   I   beat   up   Ashok Yadav   very   badly   and   when   Munna   came   for   his rescue,   we   also   beat   up   him   and   then   he   ran   away from there to save his life. (Objected to)." 39 With regard to the aspect of bombs being hurled, PW­7 at paragraphs 35 and 36 has stated as under: "35. It is incorrect to state that when first bomb   exploded,   stampede   took   place   in   the traffic   and   people   started   concealing themselves   in   order   to   save   their   life   and shop started closing and we after saving our life   ran   away   from   there.     It   is   incorrect   to state   that   thereafter   Ashok   Yadav   threw   the bomb   on   my   Pan   Shop   in   its   explosion   my father   had   died   and   thereafter   people   of   the village   caught   the   hold   of   Ashok   Yadav   and beat up him till he died. 36.   It   is   incorrect   to   state   that   quarrel   took place   with   Ashok   Yadav   on   demanding balance amount from him and he was beaten up and due to above reason, he exploded the bombs." 43. PW­9/Mani   Lal   Sahwas   was   the   Sub­Inspector   posted   at P.S.   Kotwali,   Munger,   on   10.03.2005.     He   has   stated   that   he received   information   through   telephone   about   the   incident   at about 17.15 hours and he, along with Sub­Inspector Md. Azhar and K.K. Gupta, along with an armed force left for Bhadeopur Gola   Road   and   reached   there   at   17.20   hours.     On   arriving there,   Rajesh   Prasad,   S/o.   Late   Chhote   Lal   Mahto   gave   a written   application   (Exhibit   3/3)   about   the   cognizable   offence. On   the   basis   of   the   said   application,   he   took   up   the investigation of the case at the place of occurrence and during the course of investigation, the statement of the informant was 40 taken again and a case was registered.  Thereafter, the inquest report of Chhote Lal Mahto was prepared (Exhibit 4/2), so also the   inquest   report   of   the   deceased   O.P.Verma   was   prepared. Their   bodies   were   sent   for   post   mortem   at   19.30   hours   to Sadar   Hospital,   Munger   along   with   a   constable.     The   remains of   the   bomb   were   collected   and   seizure   list   was   prepared (Exhibit   1/2),   so   also   the   blood   stained   soil   was   collected   and the   seizure   list   is   at   Exhibit   No.8.     That   the   dead   body   of Chhote   Lal   Mahto   was   brought   out   of   the   betel   shop   by   the relatives   of   the   deceased.     Inside   the   Betel   shop,   there   was blood   and   flesh   scattered   as   the   head   and   upper   neck   of   the deceased Chhote Lal Mahto was blown away. The occurrence of second   blast   was   approximately   40   to   45   yards   towards   the north   of   the   betel   shop   of   the   deceased,   near   M/s.   Aditya Electronics   on   the   footpath.     The   deceased   was   identified   as Om Prakash Verma, a tea seller.  Similar seizures were made at the scene of occurrence.  44. He   further   stated   that   Santosh   Kumar   Patil   and   Anil Mahto   gave   their   statements   on   the   same   day.     The   accused were   absconding.     On   the   same   day,   the   statements   of   other persons were recorded and on 12.03.2005 at about 06.40 a.m., the   accused   Munna   Rai   and   Dhappu   Rai   were   arrested. 41 Subsequently, on 18.04.2005, the investigation was transferred to another officer.   45. In his cross­examination, the said witness has stated that Rajesh   Prasad,   the   informant,   did   not   state   about   Mahendra Rai   and   Uppendra   Rai   blasting   bombs.     Referring   to   the Fardbayan   that was recorded at the place of occurrence, PW­9 has stated as follows: That the informant’s statement does not record   that   Mahendra   Rai,   Uppendra   Rai,   Dhappu   Rai   were present;  Instead,  he  has  stated  that  Munna  Rai  went home  to bring bombs and at that time, his brother was also there. That Umesh Prasad did not say that he was  at  his gate at the  time when   Munna   Rai,   Mahendra   Rai,   Uppendra   Rai   and   Dhappu Rai   were   abusing   and   saying   that   whoever   objects   to   their illegal activity would be blown up. That Umesh Prasad did not mention in his statement that the second bomb was blown by Mahendra   Rai   which   hit   a   passerby   by   name   O.P.Verma   who was   standing   near   M/s.   Aditya   Electronics   and   his   head   was blown   away.     Similarly,   there   was   no   statement   that   third bomb   was   blasted   by   Mahendra   Rai,   which   fell   on   the   street and made a loud noise. 42 46. Also, in the  Fardbayan  as well as in his statement, Rajesh Prasad,   the   appellant   herein,   had   not   stated   that   Munna   Rai, Uppendra   Rai,   Mahendra   Rai   and   Dhappu   Rai   came   near   his father's betel shop and started abusing and upon retaliation by his  father,  there   was   heated   argument  and   they  threatened  to blow him up with a bomb. 47. PW­8   /Santosh   Kumar   Patel,   in   his   examination­in­chief has   stated   that   on   10.03.2005   at   about   05.00   p.m.   he   was standing near his gate and he saw the accused and Chhote Lal Mahto engaged in indecent and foul abuses and heard threats of the accused to blow up the family of Chhote Lal Mahto with bombs   and   further,   that   Chhote   Lal   Mahto's   head   was   blown up   by   Munna   Rai.   That   O.P.   Verma   died   in   another   bomb attack.   But   in   his   cross   examination,   he   has   stated   that   he could   not   have   seen   the   occurrence   of   the   incident   from   his house which is 100 yards away.  He has further stated that his statement was recorded by the police at the place of occurrence and on the day of occurrence at 08.00 in the night.  But he had not told the police that the third bomb was thrown on the road which   did   not   hit   anyone.     Soon   thereafter,   the   people   of   the area gathered and the people got aggressive and tried to catch hold   of   both   the   miscreants.   He   has   further   admitted   that   he 43 did not state that the bomb was thrown at Rajesh's shop where his father was sitting and the bomb hit him. 48. On a consideration of the aforesaid evidence, we find that PW­7,   who   is   the   informant   in   his   evidence,   has   resiled   from what he had initially stated to the Police even though he claims to be an eye­witness to the occurrence. It has been established that Chandra Bhanu Prasad, though a resident of the locality, was   not   present   during   the   occurrence   of   the   incident. Similarly, the presence of Dhappu Ram and Fantush Mandal is doubted by PW­8.  In fact, the Investigating Officer / PW­9 has also   corroborated   the   fact   that   PW­7   had   not   stated   anything about   the   bombs   being   thrown   by   Mahendra   Ram,   Upendra Ram   and   that   there   was   no   mention   of   Dhappu   Ram.     In   the deposition   of   PW­3,   there   has   been   no   mention   of   Dhappu Ram, Munna Ram and Mahendra Ram as also in the evidence of PW­2.  Further, PW­4 who is an advocate and who is said to have   prepared   the   written   report,   has   not   been   categorical   in his evidence.  It is denied by PW­8 who is also an advocate and an   attesting   witness   to   the   written   report,   that   the   bomb   was thrown  at the informant’s shop and that it hit the informant’s father who died as a result of the same.  44 49. On   the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   evidence,   the   High   Court, during   the   course   of   its   reasoning,   has   come   to   the   following conclusions:  a) The written report is specific but it attributes a trivial role   to   Chandrabhanu   Prasad   who   was   accompanied by   Dhappu   Ram   and   others.   On   the   orders   of Chandrabhanu   Prasad,   three   bombs   were   thrown. Chandrabhanu   Prasad   freed   co­accused   Munna   Ram when he was apprehended.  b) PW­7,   the   informant,   was   an   eyewitness   to   the occurrence.   In   his   cross   examination,   he   stated   that he   had   never   seen   Chandrabhanu   Prasad   and Dhappu Ram, who were residents of the same locality and   were   well   known   to   him,   present   at   any   time throughout the occurrence. He also refused to identify Fantus   Mandal   whose   name   arose   during investigation.  c) PW­2   stated   that   Chandrabhanu   Prasad   was   a resident of the locality and was known to him but was not present during the entire occurrence. To the same effect   is   the   statement   of   PW­3   and   PW­4.   PW­8   also 45 stated that Dhappu Ram and Fantus Mandal were not present.  d) However, PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 spoke about the presence of   Dhappu   Ram   and   gave   his   name   in   their statements under section 161 of Cr.PC.  e) PW­9,   the   Investigating   Officer,   has   stated   that   the informant   in   his   statement   under   section   161   Cr.PC had   not  stated   anything  about  throwing   of   bombs   by Mahendra Ram and Upendra Ram and neither had he named Dhappu Ram.  f)     That   during   the   course   of   the   trial,   PW­3   had   not named   Dhappu   Ram,   Munna   Ram   and   Mahendra Ram and PW­2 had likewise not named Munna Ram, Mahendra Ram, Upendra Ram and Dhappu Ram.  g) PW­7   had   not   stated   anything   about   any   accused being apprehended and beaten up. In his restatement also,   he   did   not   state   that   Munna   Ram,   Mahendra Ram,   Upendra   Ram   and   Dhappu   Ram   had   come   to the shop of his father and indulged in abuse.  h) Likewise,  PW­8  had  also  not  made  any  statement,  as was being deposed in Court.  In view of the above, the High Court held as under : 46 “The   contradiction   in   the   statement   of   the prosecution   witnesses   as   stated   during   investigation and   in   the   trial   having   been   pointed   out   to   them   in the   manner   provided   for   in   section   145   of   the Evidence   Act,   and   corroborated   by   the   Investigating Officer,   under   section   157   of   the   Evidence   Act   lends credence   to   the   allegation   of   the   defence   that   an entirely  new  case  was  sought to  be  made   out by  the prosecution   for   what   was   essentially   a   different manner and sequence of events.” i)    The police stated that they had arrived at the place of occurrence   within   20   minutes   of   the   incident   i.e.   at 5.20   pm   which   fact   has   been   corroborated   by   PW­7, the informant and other prosecution witnesses. PW­7 denied any written report given to the police station at 9.00   pm.   He   stated   that   he   had   signed   the   written report   prepared   by   PW­4   but   was   not   aware   of   its contents. j)   According to PW­7, PW­4, who is an advocate and is a cousin   of   PW­7,   prepared   a   written   report.   PW­7 admitted that he is an attesting witness to the FIR but denied   full   knowledge   or   reading   of   the   same   before signing.  k)   Similar is the denial by PW­8, a relative of PW­7. PW­8 is   also   an   advocate   and   an   attesting   witness   to   the written report.  47 50. On   the   aforesaid   evidence   the   High   Court   observed   as under : “They   were   not   rustic   witnesses   but   were   practicing advocates   fully   aware   of   the   nature   and   importance of the documents they were signing. It is not possible to   accept   their   contention   that   they   signed   it unaware of the full contents. It raises serious doubts that they were attempting to conceal something.”  51. With   regard   to   the   written   report,   the   High   Court   has noted from the evidence as under : “There   is   no   explanation   for   this   delay,   though   he could be presumed to be present at the Police Station when   the   written   report   was   handed   over   to   the police.”  52. The High Court has also noted flaws in the investigation of the   case   and   in   the   evidence   of   the   prosecution   witnesses which are culled out as under:  (i) PW­7   said   that   PW­4   drew   up   the   written   report while PW­4 denied the same.  (ii) While   PW­1   and   PW­3   were   related   to   the   deceased and   signed   the   seizure   list   immediately   after   the occurrence,   yet   PW­3   had   stated   that   he   was   not aware of the other signatory to the seizure list.  (iii) The   statement   of   PW­1,   who   was   a   witness   to   the seizure list as well as an eyewitness , was recorded 48 by   the   police   one   and   half   months   later   with   no explanation either by the witness or by the police.  (iv) Similarly,   statement   of   PW­4   who   is   an   eyewitness and   a   witness   to   the   inquest   report   of   the   deceased and   who   is   stated   to   have   drawn   up   the   written report given to the police, was recorded by the police after   two   months   and   twenty   days.   The   High   Court has noted that there is no explanation for the delay, though   he   could   be   presumed   to   be   present   at   the Police   Station   when   the   written   report   was   handed over to the Police.  (v) PW­2,   the   shop   owner   of   the   PCO   booth   adjoining the   betel   shop   of   the   deceased,   was   also   allegedly injured during the occurrence but there is no injury report.  (vi) The   contradiction   in   the   evidence   of   PW­3   is   noted as under : ”That   PW­3   has   stated   that   the   police came   within   20   to   25  minutes   and   took the statement of the informant, PW3 and others, but he has stated that PW­7 gave written   report   to   the   police   at   9   p.m., that   he   was   sleeping   at   that   time   and unaware   about   it   yet   he   stated   that   the report may have been given at 8.30 p.m. PW­7 on the other hand has stated that the written report was given to the police 49 at   6   p.m.,   at   the   police   station   and   had denied  of having given any  report  to the police at 9 p.m. On the other hand, PW­ 9   who   is   IO   in   the   matter   stated   that PW­7   gave   him   the   written   report immediately   after   he   reached   the   place of occurrence.”  (vii) While the prosecution witnesses alleged throwing of three   or   more   bombs,   the   Investigating   Officer stated   that   he   found   signs   only   of   two   explosions; first one being at the betel shop of the deceased and the second one near M/s Aditya Electronics, located 40­45 yards north of the site of the first explosion.  53. With regard to explosions which took place on the date of incident, the High Court has considered the evidence of PW­7, PW­1, and PW­9 and observed as under: “This Court on consideration of the aforesaid material and   nature   of   evidence   is   satisfied   that   the allegations   against   the   accused   cannot   be   stated   to have been proved beyond  all reasonable doubts. The several   inconsistencies,   contradictions   in   the statement   of   the   witnesses   and   other   necessary materials   leave   this   Court   satisfied   that   they   have attempted  to  conceal  more  than  they have sought to reveal   of   the   occurrence.   A   different   manner   and sequence   of   the   occurrence   appears   to   have   been presented by the prosecution for their convenience in a   truncated   manner   implicating   those   desired   and exonerating those against whom the allegations were originally  made  also.  There is not a semblance  of  an explanation   for   exonerating   those   earlier   accused with a primal role and those with regard to whom no 50 statement   was   made   before   the   Police.   All   these factors cast a serious doubt on the prosecution case. The   informant,   in   Court,   has   given   up   the   entire genesis and the  manner  of occurrence  when the two co­accused   have   been   exonerated.   The   informant having   implicitly   accepted   false   implication,   cannot be trusted of telling the truth. The principle of   falsus in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus   has   no   application   in   the facts   of   the   case,   when   the   prosecution   has   itself knocked   out   the   basis   edifice   of   its   own   case   as distinct from peripheral issues. The prosecution despite the nature of evidence given by  its  witnesses,  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to   re­ examine them under Section 137 of the Evidence Act or   cross­examine   them   under   Section   154   of   the same. The   illicit   liquor   trade   rivalry   revealed   during   trial between   the   two   sides,   leaves   this   Court   satisfied that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the charge cannot be stated to have been proved beyond all   reasonable   doubt.   On   the   contrary,   the prosecution   has   created   a   cobweb   for   itself   and enmeshed itself, the benefit of which has to go to the accused. Unfortunately,   the   trial   court   ignoring   all   these crucial   issues   inverted   the   law   to   hold   that   the defence   was   based   on   surmises   and   conjectures   to hold the appellants guilty and there could not be two views   of   the   occurrence   to   grant   any   benefit   to   the accused. And all this, while unquestionably granting acquittal   to   Chandra   Bhanu,   Dhappu   Ram   and Fantus   as   a   case   of   no   evidence.   This   Court   finds   it difficult   to   uphold   the   conviction   let   alone   the   death sentence. The   manner   in   which   the   trial   proceeded   as   noticed above,   leaves   the   impression   that   the   prosecution witnesses   considered   the   court   room   as   a   playing field   for   a   friendly   match.   Unfortunately,   the   trial court   assumed   the   role   of   a   referee   forgetting   the 51 important role that it had to play in the dispensation of   justice   dealing   with   the   serious   issue   of   a   death sentence and life imprisonment affecting not only the liberty but also the life of a citizen. The   subversion   of   the   legal   maxim   presumed innocent   till   proved   guilty   to   say   the   least   was unfortunate. We are satisfied that the present case is a fit case for initiating   proceedings   of   perjury   against   P.W.7, Rajesh   Prasad   son   of   Late   Chhote   Lal   Prasad.   We, accordingly   direct   the   trial   court   to   initiate proceedings, hold inquiry in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders.”  54. We   have   extracted   the   observations   made   by   the   High Court   while   reversing   the   judgment   of   conviction   giving categorical reasons for doing so. We also observe that the Fast Track Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of PWs­1, 3, 4 and   7   in   their   proper   perspective   and   has   further   failed   to recognise the fact that PW­7/the appellant herein did not at all support   the   case   of   the   prosecution   although   he   was   the informant   and   hence,   erroneously   convicted   the   accused   and sentenced   two   of   them   with   death   penalty   and   the   third accused   with   imprisonment   for   life.     In   our   view,   the   High Court   was,   therefore,   justified   in   reversing   the   judgment   and order of conviction passed by the Fast­Track Court. 52 55. It   is   also   noted   that   the   State   has   not   filed   any   appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court.  56. Having   re­appreciated   the   evidence   of   the   witnesses,   we find   that   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   reversing   the judgment of conviction and sentencing the two of the accused, namely   Munna   Ram   and   Mahendra   Ram   with   death   penalty and imposing Upendra Ram to  undergo life imprisonment and instead acquitting all the accused.   57.  Further,   the   High   Court   has   stated   that   this   is   a  fit   case for initiating proceedings of perjury against the appellant (PW­ 7)   herein.   No   doubt,   the   appellant   herein   who   was   the informant   did   not   at   all   support   the   case   of   the   prosecution during   trial   and   as   a   result,   the   High   Court   acquitted   the accused.     However,   having   regard   to   the   facts   and circumstances   of   these   cases   and   bearing   in   mind   that   there were   two   deaths   in   the   incident   that   occurred   on   10 th   March, 2005 which has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, we set aside only that portion of the impugned judgment and order directing   the   trial   court   to   initiate   proceedings   of   perjury 53 against   the   appellant   herein.   We   affirm   the   rest   of   the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the High Court.  58. The   appeals   are   allowed   in   part   to   the   aforesaid   extent only. ……………………………..J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …………………………….J. [B.R. GAVAI] ……………………………J. [B.V. NAGARATHNA] NEW DELHI; 7 th  JANUARY, 2022.