/2022 INSC 0028/
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36 OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.4062 OF 2020)
MANOJ KUMAR KHOKHAR            …..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.           ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J. 
This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the
informant­appellant   assailing   Order   dated   7 th
  May,   2020
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   of   Rajasthan,   at
Jaipur,   in   S.B.   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Bail   Application   No.
3601/2020,   whereby   bail   has   been   granted   to   the   accused
who   is   the   second   respondent   in   the   instant   appeal,   in
connection with FIR No. 407/2019 Police Station Kalwar. 
2.   According to the appellant, he is the son of the deceased,
Ram Swaroop Khokhar and is the person who lodged the First
Information Report being FIR No. 407/2019 on 8 th
  December,
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2019   for   the   offence   of   murder   of   his   father,   under   Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”   for   the   sake   of   brevity)   against   the   second   respondent­
accused herein viz. Ram Narayan Jat.
 
3. The said FIR dated 8 th
 December, 2019 had been lodged by
the appellant herein between 23:00 hrs and 23:30 hrs in the
night stating that earlier on that day, at about 16:00 hrs, his
father, aged about 55 years, was attacked by the respondent­
accused, at the Lalpura Pachar bus stand, with the intention
of   killing   him.   That   the   respondent­accused   pinned   the
deceased   to   the   ground,   sat   on   his   chest   and   forcefully
strangled him, thereby causing his death. Some associates of
the   respondent­accused   who   were   present   at   the   spot   of   the
incident,   helped   him   in   attacking   and   killing   the   deceased.
The   informant­appellant   further   stated   in   the   FIR   that   there
was   a   pre­existing   rivalry   between   the   respondent­accused,
his   brothers   namely,   Arjun,   Satyanarayn   and   Okramal   and
the deceased. That the deceased had previously informed the
appellant and certain family members about such rivalry and
had communicated that he was apprehensive about his safety
owing  to the  same.  That even  on  the day  of the  incident,  the
respondent­accused   along   with   one   of   his   brothers,   Okramal
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had   gone   to   the   appellant’s   house   in   the   morning   and   had
abused   the   deceased.   The   report   of   the   post­mortem
examination   conducted   on   9 th
  December,   2019   has   recorded
that   the   deceased   had   died   as   a   result   of   “asphyxia   due   to
ante mortem strangulation.”
4.     The   respondent­accused   was   arrested   in   connection   with
the said FIR  No.  407/2019  on  10 th
  December, 2019 and  was
sent   to   judicial   custody.   The   respondent­accused   remained
under judicial custody for a period of nearly one year and five
months   till   he   was   granted   bail   by   the   High   Court   vide
impugned order.
 
5.     A   charge   sheet   was   submitted   by   the   police   before   the
Court   of   the   Additional   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Jaipur   after
conducting   an   investigation   in   relation   to   the   aforesaid   FIR.
The   Additional   Metropolitan   Magistrate   by   Order   dated   12 th
March,   2020   took   cognizance   of   the   offence   and   committed
the   case   to   the   District   and   Sessions   Court   for   trial   and
adjudication.
 
6.  The respondent­accused had earlier preferred applications
seeking   bail,   under   Section   437   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure,   1973   (for   short,   the   “CrPC”)   before   the   Court   of
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Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan,
Jaipur,   on   two   occasions.   The   same   came   to   be   rejected   by
orders   dated   23 rd
  January,   2020   and   6 th
  March,   2020.   The
accused   had   also   preferred   a   bail   application   under   Section
439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional
Sessions Judge No.5, Jaipur Metropolitan by order dated 12 th
March,   2020   having   regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences
alleged   against   the   accused.   The   respondent­accused
preferred   another   bail   application   before   the   High   Court   and
by   the   impugned   order   dated   7 th
  May,   2020,   the   High   Court
has enlarged him on bail. Being aggrieved by the grant of bail
to   the   respondent­accused,   the   informant­appellant   has
preferred the instant appeal before this Court.
 
7.   We   have   heard   Sri.   Basant   R.,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for
the   appellant   and   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned
Counsel   for   respondent­accused   and   have   perused   the
material on record.
 
8.   Learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that
the   deceased   had   been   elected   in   2015   as   the   Deputy
Sarpanch   of   Mandha   Bhopawaspachar   village,   Jhotwara
Tehsil,   Jaipur,   Rajasthan.   That   he   was   elected   to   such   post
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despite opposition from  the  accused and his family. That the
family   of   the   accused   exercised   significant   influence   in   the
village   and   were   trying   to   dissuade   the   deceased   from
contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch, to be held in
February   2020.   Owing   to   such   political   enmity,   the
respondent­accused   along   with   his   brothers   Arjun,
Satyanarayn and Okramal  had gone to the appellant’s house
in   the   morning   on   8 th
  December,   2019   and   abused   the
deceased and later on the same day, the deceased was killed.
According   to   the   appellant,   the   deceased   was   suffering   from
54% permanent physical impairment of both his legs and had
therefore   been   overpowered   by   the   respondent­accused   who
had pinned him to the ground, sat on his chest and throttled
his neck, resulting in his death.
 
9.  Further it was urged that the High Court has not exercised
its   discretion   judiciously   in   granting   bail   to   the   respondent­
accused.   That   the   High   Court   has   not   taken   into
consideration  the gravity  of  the offence  alleged and  the grave
manner in which the offence was committed against a person
incapable of defending himself owing to physical impairment.
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10.   It   was   submitted   that   the   factum   of   previous   enmity
between   the   family   of   the   accused   and   the   deceased   has   not
been   taken   into   consideration   by   the   High   Court   in   the
context   of   the   allegations   against   the   accused   with   regard   to
the grant of bail. That the possibility of respondent­accused, a
person exercising high political influence in Bhopawaspachar
village, absconding or threatening the witnesses or the family
of   the   deceased,   thereby   having   a   bearing   on   the   trial,   if
released  on  bail  could  not  be  ruled  out.  That  the   police  were
initially   reluctant   to   even   register   an   FIR   against   the
respondent­accused. In fact, the accused was arrested by the
police on 10 th
  December, 2019 only as a result of the protest
(dharna)   carried   out   by   the   family   members   of   the   deceased
outside the police station. It was contended that the accused,
being   a  very   influential   person   in   the   village,   could   influence
the course of trial by tampering with evidence and influencing
the witnesses. 
According   to   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the
appellant, the High Court has not assigned reasons for grant
of   bail   in   the   instant   case   wherein   commission   of   a   heinous
crime   has   been   alleged   against   the   accused,   for   which,   the
accused, if convicted, could be sentenced to life imprisonment
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or   even   death   penalty.   That   the   High   Court   in   a   very   cryptic
order,   de   hors   any   reasoning   has   granted   bail   to   the
respondent­accused. It was urged that the grant of bail to the
respondent­accused   was   contrary   to   the   settled   principles   of
law   and   the   judgments   of   this   Court.   It   was   submitted   on
behalf   of   the   appellant,   who   is   the   son   of   the   deceased,   that
this   appeal   may   be   allowed   by   setting   aside   the   impugned
order. 
11. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for
the   appellant   placed   reliance   on   certain   decisions   of   this
Court which shall be referred to later.
 
12.   Per   contra,   Sri.   Aditya   Kumar   Choudhary,   learned
counsel for respondent­accused submitted that the impugned
order   does   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity   warranting   any
interference   by   this   Court.   That   the   informant­appellant   has
narrated   an   untrue   version   of   events   in   order   to   falsely
implicate   the   accused.   Existence   of   past   enmity   between   the
families   of   the   deceased   and   the   accused   has   been
categorically   denied.   It   has   been   stated   that   the   two   families
maintained   cordial   relations,   which   fact   is   evidenced   by   the
findings   in   the   charge   sheet   dated   7 th
  February   2020,   which
records   that   the   deceased   and   the   respondent­accused
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belonged   to   the   same   village   and   they   used   to   play   cards
together   at   the   Lalpura   bus   stand   every   day   since   their
retirement   and   there   is   no   evidence   which   is   suggestive   of
enmity   between   them.   That   the   sudden   scuffle   between   the
deceased   and   the   accused   on   8 th
  December,   2019   was   an
isolated   incident   and   was   not   in   connection   with   or   in
continuation of any pre­existing dispute between them. 
It   was   further   submitted   that   there   was   a   considerable
and   unexplained   delay   by   the   informant­appellant   in   lodging
the FIR which is proof of the fact that the same was lodged as
an   afterthought   and   therefore   does   not   bring   out   the   true
narration of facts. In support of his submission as to the false
nature   of   the   appellent’s   version   of   the   incident,   learned
counsel   for   the   respondent­accused   has   relied   on   the
statements   of   the   eye­witnesses   to   the   incident   stating   that
there   was   a   sudden   scuffle   between   the   deceased   and   the
respondent­accused   on   the   date   of   the   incident   and   the
accused   throttled   the   neck   of   the   deceased.   After   being
separated,   the   deceased   sat   on   a   bench   in   the   bus­stop   but
later   became   unconscious   and   was   immediately   taken   to   the
hospital where he died. It has further been stated by an eye­
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witness,   namely,   Mangalchand   that   the   brothers   of   accused
were not present at the time of the incident. 
Learned counsel for the respondent­accused referred to
Niranjan Singh and Anr. vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote
and Ors , [1980] 2 SCC 559  to contend that a court deciding
a bail application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits
of the case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial  stage
is bound to prejudice fair trial. 
Further,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent­accused
submitted   that   the   investigation   in   relation   to   FIR   No.
407/2019   is   complete   in   all   respects   and   charge   sheet   has
been   submitted.   Therefore,   there   arises   no   question   as   to
influencing any witness or tampering with the evidence. That
the   accused   has   deep   roots   in   society   and   will   therefore   not
attempt   to   abscond.   Also,   the   accused   has   no   criminal
antecedents and the incident in question occurred as a result
of   a   sudden   scuffle   and   therefore,   prima   facie,   offence   under
section   300   of   the   IPC   has   not   been   made   out   against   the
accused.   Hence,   the   impugned   order   granting   bail   to   the
respondent­accused   does   not   call   for   interference   by   this
Court.
 
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13. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Basant R., learned
Senior Counsel for the informant­appellant that the impugned
order granting bail to the respondent­accused is bereft of any
reasoning   and   that   such   order   is   casual   and   cryptic,   we
extract the portion of the impugned order dated 7 th
 May, 2020
passed   by   the   High   Court   which   is   the   “reasoning”   of   the
Court for granting bail, as under: 
“I   have   considered   the   submissions   and
perused   the   challan   papers   and   the   post­
mortem   report,   but   without   expressing   any
opinion on the merits and demerits of the case,
I   deem   it   appropriate   to   enlarge   the   accused­
petitioner on bail.
 
Therefore, this bail application is allowed and it
is directed that accused­petitioner namely, Ram
Narayan   Jat   S/o   Shri   Bhinva   Ram   shall   be
released   on   bail   under   section   439   Cr.P.C.   in
connection   with   aforesaid   FIR,   provided   he
furnishes   a   personal   bond   in   the   sum   of   Rs.
50,000/­   together   with   one   surety   in   the   like
amount   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   concerned
Magistrate   with   the   stipulation   that   he   shall
comply with all the conditions laid down under
Section 437 (3) Cr.P.C.”
14.   Before   proceeding   further,   it   would   be   useful   to   refer   to
the   judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   matter   of   granting   bail   to
an accused as under:
a) In   Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public
Prosecutor,   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   ­­   (1978)   1
SCC 240 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content
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of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in   the   context   of
liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key
factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail,
which are extracted as under:
“7.   It   is   thus   obvious   that   the   nature   of   the
charge   is   the   vital   factor   and   the   nature   of   the
evidence   also   is   pertinent.   The   punishment   to
which   the   party   may   be   liable,   if   convicted   or
conviction   is   confirmed,   also   bears   upon   the
issue.
8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the
course of justice would be thwarted by him who
seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to
be freed for the time being.
9.   Thus   the   legal   principles   and   practice
validate   the   Court   considering   the   likelihood   of
the   applicant   interfering   with   witnesses   for   the
prosecution   or   otherwise   polluting   the   process
of justice. It is not only traditional but rational,
in  this context,  to enquire into the antecedents
of   a   man   who   is   applying   for   bail   to   find
whether   he   has   a   bad   record   –   particularly   a
record   which   suggests   that   he   is   likely   to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard
to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological   history
that   a   thoughtless   bail   order   has   enabled   the
bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict
further   about   the   criminal   record   of   a
defendant,   is   therefore   not   an   exercise   in
irrelevance.”
b) In   Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS   –
(2001)   4   SCC   280   this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects
which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an
application   seeking   bail.   The   same   may   be   extracted   as
follows: 
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“The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be
exercised  on the  basis  of  well  settled  principles
having regard to the circumstances of each case
and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting
the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character,
behavior,   means   and   standing   of   the   accused,
circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the
accused,   reasonable   possibility   of   securing   the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being   tampered
with,   the   larger   interests   of   the   public   or   State
and  similar  other   considerations.   It   has  also  to
be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of
granting   the   bail   the   Legislature   has   used   the
words   "reasonable   grounds   for   believing"
instead of "the evidence" which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
as   to   whether   there   is   a   genuine   case   against
the   accused   and   that   the   prosecution   will   be
able to produce prima facie evidence in support
of the charge.”
c) This   Court   in   Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan
Singh –  (2002) 3 SCC 598,  speaking through Banerjee, J.,
emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of
bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting
that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course, bereft of
cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: 
“3.   Grant   of   bail   though   being   a   discretionary
order — but, however, calls for exercise of such
a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a
matter   of   course.   Order   for   bail   bereft   of   any
cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to
record,   however,   that   the   grant   of   bail   is
dependent   upon   the   contextual   facts   of   the
matter   being   dealt   with  by   the   court   and   facts,
however,   do   always   vary   from   case   to   case.
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While   placement   of   the   accused   in   the   society,
though   may   be   considered   but   that   by   itself
cannot   be   a   guiding   factor   in   the   matter   of
grant   of   bail   and   the   same   should   and   ought
always   to   be   coupled   with   other   circumstances
warranting   the   grant   of   bail.   The   nature   of   the
offence is one of the basic considerations for the
grant   of   bail   —   more   heinous   is   the   crime,   the
greater   is   the   chance   of   rejection   of   the   bail,
though,   however,   dependent   on   the   factual
matrix of the matter.”
d)   In   Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias
Pappu   Yadav   &   Anr.   –   (2004)   7   SCC   528 ,   this   Court
held   that   although   it   is   established   that   a   court
considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed
examination   of   evidence   and   an   elaborate   discussion   on
the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the
prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 
e) In   Prasanta   Kumar   Sarkar   vs.   Ashis   Chaterjee   ­­
(2010) 14 SCC 496  this Court observed that where a High
Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would
suffer from the vice of non­application of mind, rendering it
illegal.   This   Court   held   as   under   with   regard   to   the
circumstances under which an order granting bail may be
set   aside.   In   doing   so,   the   factors   which   ought   to   have
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guided   the   Court’s   decision   to   grant   bail   have   also   been
detailed as under: 
“It   is   trite   that   this   Court   does   not,   normally,
interfere   with   an   order   passed   by   the   High
Court   granting   or   rejecting   bail  to  the   accused.
However, it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court   to   exercise   its   discretion   judiciously,
cautiously   and   strictly   in   compliance   with   the
basic   principles   laid   down   in   a   plethora   of
decisions   of   this   Court   on   the   point.   It   is   well
settled that,
among   other   circumstances,   the   factors   to   be
borne in mind while considering  an application
for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie
or   reasonable   ground   to   believe   that   the
accused   had   committed   the   offence;   (ii)   nature
and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the
punishment   in   the   event   of   conviction;   (iv)
danger   of   the   accused   absconding   or   fleeing,   if
released   on   bail;   (v)   character,   behaviour,
means,   position   and   standing   of   the   accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii)
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced;   and   (viii)   danger,   of   course,   of
justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”
f) Another   factor   which   should   guide   the  courts’   decision  in
deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody.
However,   as   noted   in   Ash   Mohammad   vs.   Shiv   Raj
Singh   @   Lalla   Bahu   &   Anr.   –   (2012)   9   SCC   446 ,   the
period   of   custody   has   to   be   weighed   simultaneously   with
the   totality   of   the   circumstances   and   the   criminal
antecedents   of   the   acused,   if   any.   Further,   the
circumstances which may justify the grant of bail are to be
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considered   in   the   larger   context   of   the   societal   concern
involved   in   releasing   an   accused,   in   juxtaposition   to
individual liberty of the accused seeking bail. 
g) In  Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr.  – (2016) 15 SCC
422,   after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court
on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while
deciding   to   grant   bail,   observed   through   Dipak   Misra,   J.
(as   His   Lordship   then   was)   in   paragraphs   15   and   18   as
under: 
“15. This being the position of law, it is clear as
cloudless   sky   that   the   High   Court   has   totally
ignored   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the
accused. What has weighed with the High Court
is   the   doctrine   of   parity.   A   history­sheeter
involved in the nature of crimes which we have
reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences
so that he is not to be retained in custody, but
the   crimes   are   of   heinous   nature   and   such
crimes,   by   no   stretch   of   imagination,   can   be
regarded   as   jejune.   Such   cases   do   create   a
thunder   and   lightening   having   the   effect
potentiality   of   torrential   rain   in   an   analytical
mind.   The   law   expects   the   judiciary   to   be   alert
while   admitting   these   kind   of   accused   persons
to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on
exercise   of   discretion   judiciously   and   not   in   a
whimsical manner. 
x x x 
18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat
with   profit   that   it   is   not   an   appeal   for
cancellation   of   bail   as   the   cancellation   is   not
sought   because   of   supervening   circumstances.
The annulment of the order passed by the High
Court   is   sought   as   many   relevant   factors   have
15

not   been   taken   into   consideration   which
includes   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the
accused   and   that   makes   the   order   a   deviant
one.   Therefore,   the   inevitable   result   is   the
lancination of the impugned order.”
h) In   Anil  Kumar   Yadav   vs.   State   (NCT  of   Delhi)   –   (2018)
12 SCC 129 , this Court, while considering an appeal from
an  order  of cancellation  of bail, has  spelt out some of the
significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be
mindful,   in   deciding   whether   to   grant   bail.   In   doing   so,
this   Court   has   stated   that   while   it   is   not   possible   to
prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to
guide   a   court   in   deciding   a   bail   application,   the   primary
requisite of an order granting bail, is that it should result
from   judicious   exercise   of   the   court’s   discretion.   The
findings of this Court have been extracted as under: 
“17.   While   granting   bail,   the   relevant
considerations   are:   (i)   nature   of   seriousness   of
the   offence;   (ii)   character   of   the   evidence   and
circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the
accused;   and   (iii)   likelihood   of   the   accused
fleeing   from   justice;   (iv)   the   impact   that   his
release may make on the prosecution witnesses,
its   impact   on   the   society;   and   (v)   likelihood   of
his   tampering.   No   doubt,   this   list   is   not
exhaustive.   There   are   no   hard­and­fast   rules
regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has
to be  considered  on  its own  merits.  The  matter
always   calls   for   judicious   exercise   of   discretion
by the Court.”
16

i) In   Ramesh   Bhavan   Rathod   vs.   Vishanbhai   Hirabhai
Makwana Makwana (Koli) and Ors.,  (2021) 6 SCC 230
this   Court   after   referring   to   a   catena   of   judgments
emphasized   on   the   need   and   importance   of   assigning
reasons   for   the   grant   of   bail.   This   Court   categorically
observed   that   a   court   granting   bail   could   not   obviate   its
duty to apply its judicial mind and indicate reasons as to
why bail has been granted or refused. The observations of
this Court have been extracted as under: 
“ 35.   We   disapprove   of   the   observations   of   the
High   Court   in   a   succession   of   orders   in   the
present   case   recording   that   the   Counsel   for   the
parties   "do   not   press   for   a   further   reasoned
order".   The   grant   of   bail   is   a   matter   which
implicates the liberty of the Accused, the interest
of   the   State   and   the   victims   of   crime   in   the
proper   administration   of   criminal   justice.   It   is   a
well   settled   principle   that   in   determining   as   to
whether  bail should be  granted,  the High  Court,
or   for   that   matter,   the   Sessions   Court   deciding
an application Under  Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal   Procedure   would   not   launch   upon   a
detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a
criminal   trial   is   still   to   take   place.   These
observations   while  adjudicating   upon   bail  would
also   not   be   binding   on   the   outcome   of   the   trial.
But   the   Court   granting   bail   cannot   obviate   its
duty   to   apply   a   judicial   mind   and   to   record
reasons, brief as they may be, for the purpose of
deciding   whether   or   not   to   grant   bail.   The
consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the
High   Court   to   indicate   its   reasons   why   it   has
either   granted   or   refused   bail.   This   is   for   the
reason that the outcome of the application has a
significant   bearing   on   the   liberty   of   the   Accused
on one hand as well as the public interest in the
due enforcement of criminal justice on the other.
The rights of the victims and their families are at
17

stake as well. These are not matters involving the
private   rights   of   two   individual   parties,   as   in   a
civil   proceeding.   The   proper   enforcement   of
criminal   law   is   a   matter   of   public   interest.   We
must,   therefore,   disapprove   of   the   manner   in
which   a   succession   of   orders   in   the   present
batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the
"respective   parties   do   not   press   for   further
reasoned   order".   If   this   is   a   euphemism   for   not
recording   adequate   reasons,   this   kind   of   a
formula   cannot   shield   the   order   from   judicial
scrutiny. 
36. Grant  of bail Under  Section 439 of  the  Code
of   Criminal   Procedure   is   a   matter   involving   the
exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion
in granting or refusing bail­as in the case of any
other   discretion   which   is   vested   in   a   court   as   a
judicial institution­is not unstructured. The duty
to   record   reasons   is   a   significant   safeguard
which   ensures   that   the   discretion   which   is
entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious
manner.   The   recording   of   reasons   in   a   judicial
order   ensures   that   the   thought   process
underlying   the   order   is   subject   to   scrutiny   and
that   it   meets   objective   standards   of   reason   and
justice.”
j) Recently   in   Bhoopendra   Singh   vs.   State   of   Rajasthan
& Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021),   this Court
made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate
power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid
reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for
cancellation   of   bail.   i.e.   this   Court   distinguished   between
setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis
cancellation   of   bail   on   the   ground   that   the   accused   has
misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts
18

requiring such cancellation.   Quoting   Mahipal vs. Rajesh
Kumar   ­   (2020)   2   SCC   118,   this   Court   observed   as
under:
“16. The considerations that guide the power of
an  appellate   court   in  assessing  the   correctness
of   an   order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different
footing from an assessment of an application for
the   cancellation   of   bail.   The   correctness   of   an
order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of
whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary
exercise   of   the   discretion   in   the   grant   of   bail.
The   test   is   whether   the   order   granting   bail   is
perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other
hand,   an   application   for   cancellation   of   bail   is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence
of   supervening   circumstances   or   violations   of
the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail
has been granted.” 
k) Learned   counsel   for   the   accused­respondent   has   relied
upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Myakala
Dharmarajam   and   Ors.   vs.   The   State   of   Telangana
and   Ors.   –   (2020)   2   SCC   743   to   contend   that   elaborate
reasons need not be assigned for the grant of bail. What is
of   essence   is   that   the   record   of   the   case   ought   to   have
been   perused   by   the   court   granting   bail.   The   facts   of   the
said   case   are   that   a   complaint   was   lodged   against   fifteen
persons   for   offences   under   Sections   148,   120B,   302   read
with   Section   149   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860.   The
accused   therein   moved   an   application   seeking   bail   before
the   Principal   Sessions   Judge,   who,   after   perusal   of   the
19

case   diary,   statements   of   witnesses   and   other   connected
records,   released   the   accused   on   bail   through   an   order
which   did   not   elaborately   discuss   the   material   on   record.
The High Court cancelled the bail bond on the ground that
the   Principal   Sessions   Judge   had   not   discussed   the
material on record in the order granting bail. In an appeal
preferred   by   the   accused   before   this   Court,   the   order
granting   bail   was   restored   and   the   following   observations
were   made   as   to   the   duty   of   the   court   to   record   reasons
and discuss the material on record before granting bail:
“10.   Having   perused   the   law   laid   down   by   this
Court on the scope of the power to be exercised
in   the   matter   of   cancellation   of   bails,   it   is
necessary to examine whether the order passed
by   the   Sessions   Court   granting   bail  is   perverse
and  suffers  from  infirmities  which  has  resulted
in   the   miscarriage   of   justice.   No   doubt,   the
Sessions  Court  did  not  discuss the material  on
record in detail, but there is an indication from
the   orders   by   which   bail   was   granted   that   the
entire material was perused before grant of bail.
It   is   not   the   case   of   either   the   complainant­
Respondent   No.   2   or   the   State   that   irrelevant
considerations have been taken into account by
the   Sessions   Court   while   granting   bail   to   the
Appellants.   The   order   of   the   Sessions   Court   by
which   the   bail   was   granted   to   the   Appellants
cannot   be   termed   as   perverse   as   the   Sessions
Court   was   conscious   of   the   fact   that   the
investigation   was   completed   and   there   was   no
likelihood   of   the   Appellant   tampering   with   the
evidence.
11.   The   petition   filed   for   cancellation   of   bail   is
both   on   the   grounds   of   illegality   of   the   order
passed   by   the   Sessions   Court   and   the   conduct
of   the   Appellants   subsequent   to   their   release
20

after   bail   was   granted.   The   complaint   filed   by
one   Bojja   Ravinder   to   the   Commissioner   of
Police,   Karimnagar   is   placed   on   record   by
Respondent   No.  2.  It   is  stated  in  the  complaint
that   the   Appellants   were   roaming   freely   in   the
village   and   threatening   witnesses.   We   have
perused   the   complaint   and   found   that   the
allegations made therein are vague. There is no
mention   about   which   Accused   out   of   the   15
indulged   in   acts   of   holding   out   threats   to   the
witnesses   or   made   an   attempt   to   tamper   with
the evidence.
12. After  considering  the  submissions made on
behalf of the parties and examining the material
on   record,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   High
Court was not right in cancelling the bail of the
Appellants.   The   orders   passed   by   the   Sessions
Judge   granting   bail   cannot   be   termed   as
perverse.   The   complaint   alleging   that   the
Appellants   were   influencing   witnesses   is   vague
and   is   without   any   details   regarding   the
involvement of the Appellants in threatening the
witnesses.   Therefore,   the   Appeals   are   allowed
and   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   set
aside.”
However,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   said   decision   is
not   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   instant   case   for   the
following reasons:
Firstly, this Court in the aforecited decision restored
the   order   granting   bail   to   the   accused   on   the   ground   that
although no discussion was made by the Sessions Court as
to the material on record, in the order granting bail, it was
apparent   in   the   order   of   the   Sessions   Court   whereby   bail
was   granted,   that  the   decision   to   grant   bail   was   arrived   at
after   perusal   of   the   entire   material   on   record.   While   the
21

material   may   not   have   been   specifically   referred   to,   the
order   granting   bail   was   indicative   of   the   fact   that   it   had
been   arrived   at   after   thorough   consideration   thereof.
However,   in   the   instant   case,   no   such   indication   can   be
observed   in   the   impugned   orders   of   the   High   Court   which
would be suggestive  of the fact that the material on record
was perused before deciding to grant bail.
Secondly,   the   case   referred   to   by   the   accused
concerned   an   offence   which   was   allegedly   committed   by
fifteen   persons.   The   complainant   therein   had   not
specifically assigned roles to each of such fifteen persons. It
was  thus  found that the  allegations being  vague, no  prima
facie case could be made out, justifying the grant of bail to
the accused therein. However, in the instant case, only one
accused   has   been   named   by   the   appellant­informant   and
the role attributed to him is specific. Therefore, the facts of
the   case   relied   upon,   being   significantly   different   from   the
one before us, we find that the judgment relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondent­accused would be of no
assistance to his case.
l) The   most   recent   judgment   of   this   Court   on   the   aspect   of
application  of  mind  and  requirement  of  judicious   exercise
22

of   discretion   in   arriving   at   an   order   granting   bail   to   the
accused   is   in   the   case   of   Brijmani   Devi   vs.   Pappu
Kumar   and   Anr.   –   Criminal   Appeal   No.   1663/2021
disposed   of   on   17 th
  December,   2021,   wherein   a   three­
Judge   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   setting   aside   an
unreasoned   and   casual   order   of   the   High   Court   granting
bail to the accused, observed as follows: 
“While   we   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that
liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at
the  same time  while  considering   an application
for   bail   Courts   cannot   lose   sight   of   the   serious
nature   of   the   accusations   against   an   accused
and   the   facts   that   have   a   bearing   in   the   case,
particularly,   when   the   accusations   may   not   be
false,   frivolous   or   vexatious   in   nature   but   are
supported   by   adequate   material   brought   on
record   so   as   to   enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a
prima   facie   conclusion.   While   considering   an
application   for   grant   of   bail   a   prima   facie
conclusion   must   be   supported   by   reasons   and
must   be   arrived   at   after   having   regard   to   the
vital   facts   of   the   case   brought   on   record.   Due
consideration must  be given  to  facts  suggestive
of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents
of   the   accused,   if   any,   and   the   nature   of
punishment   that   would   follow   a   conviction   vis­
à­vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.”
15.  On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision
arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial
authority,   it   would   be   useful   to   refer   to   a   judgment   of   this
Court   in   Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited   &   Anr.   vs.
Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors.   – (2010) 9 SCC 496 , wherein
23

after   referring   to   a   number   of   judgments   this   Court
summarised   at   paragraph   47   the   law   on   the   point.   The
relevant   principles   for   the   purpose   of   this   case   are   extracted
as under: 
“(a)  Insistence on recording of reasons is meant
to   serve   the   wider   principle   of   justice   that
justice   must   not   only   be   done   it   must   also
appear to be done as well.
(b)  Recording   of   reasons   also   operates   as   a
valid   restraint   on   any   possible   arbitrary
exercise   of   judicial   and   quasi­judicial   or   even
administrative power.
(c)  Reasons   reassure   that   discretion   has   been
exercised   by   the   decision­maker   on   relevant
grounds   and   by   disregarding   extraneous
considerations.
(d)   Reasons   have   virtually   become   as
indispensable   a   component   of   a   decision­
making   process   as   observing   principles   of
natural   justice   by   judicial,   quasi­judicial   and
even by administrative bodies.
(e)  The   ongoing   judicial   trend   in   all   countries
committed   to   rule   of   law   and   constitutional
governance   is   in   favour   of   reasoned   decisions
based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is   virtually   the
lifeblood   of   judicial   decision­making   justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(f)  Judicial   or   even   quasi­judicial   opinions
these days can be as different as the judges and
authorities   who   deliver   them.   All   these
decisions   serve   one   common   purpose   which   is
to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is
important   for   sustaining   the   litigants'   faith   in
the justice delivery system.
(g)  Insistence   on   reason   is   a   requirement   for
both judicial accountability and transparency.
24

(h)  If a judge or a quasi­judicial authority is not
candid   enough   about   his/her   decision­making
process   then   it   is   impossible   to   know   whether
the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(i)  Reasons   in   support   of   decisions   must   be
cogent,   clear   and   succinct.   A   pretence   of
reasons   or   “rubber­stamp  reasons”   is  not   to  be
equated with a valid decision­making process.
(j)  It   cannot   be   doubted   that   transparency   is
the   sine   qua   non   of   restraint   on   abuse   of
judicial   powers.   Transparency   in   decision­
making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and
decision­makers   less   prone   to   errors   but   also
makes   them   subject   to   broader   scrutiny.   (See
David   Shapiro   in   Defence   of   Judicial
Candor   [(1987)   100   Harvard   Law   Review   731­
37)
(k)  In   all   common   law   jurisdictions   judgments
play a vital role in setting up precedents for the
future.   Therefore,   for   development   of   law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of   the   essence   and   is   virtually   a   part   of   “due
process”.
Though   the   aforesaid   judgment   was   rendered   in   the
context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order
by   the   National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,
reliance could be placed on the said judgment on the need to
give reasons while deciding a matter.
16.   The   Latin   maxim   “ cessante   ratione   legis   cessat   ipsa   lex ”
meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason
25

of   any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also
apposite. 
17.  We   have   extracted   the   relevant  portions   of   the  impugned
order   above.   At   the   outset,   we   observe   that   the   extracted
portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning”
of   the   High   court   while   granting   bail.   As   noted   from   the
aforecited   judgments,   it   is   not   necessary   for   a   Court   to   give
elaborate   reasons   while   granting   bail   particularly   when   the
case  is  at the  initial  stage  and  the allegations of the  offences
by   the   accused   would   not   have   been   crystalised   as   such.
There   cannot   be   elaborate   details   recorded   to   give   an
impression   that   the   case   is   one   that   would   result   in   a
conviction   or,   by   contrast,   in   an   acquittal   while   passing   an
order   on   an   application   for   grant   of   bail.   However,   the   Court
deciding   a   bail   application   cannot   completely   divorce   its
decision   from   material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the
allegations   made   against   the   accused;   severity   of   the
punishment   if   the   allegations   are   proved   beyond   reasonable
doubt   and   would   result   in   a   conviction;   reasonable
apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being   influenced   by   the
accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of
the   prosecution;   criminal   antecedents   of   the   accused;   and   a
26

prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge
against the accused. 
18.   Ultimately ,   the   Court   considering   an   application   for   bail
has   to   exercise   discretion   in   a   judicious   manner   and   in
accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to
the crime alleged to be committed by the accused on the one
hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other. 
19.   Thus,   while   elaborate   reasons   may   not   be   assigned   for
grant   of   bail   or   an   extensive   discussion   of   the   merits   of   the
case   may   not   be   undertaken   by   the   court   considering   a   bail
application,   an   order   de   hors   reasoning   or   bereft   of   the
relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case
the   prosecution   or   the   informant   has   a   right   to   assail   the
order   before   a   higher   forum.   As   noted   in   Gurcharan   Singh
vs.   State   (Delhi   Admn.)   ­   1978   CriLJ   129,   when   bail   has
been   granted   to   an   accused,   the   State   may,   if   new
circumstances   have   arisen   following   the   grant   of   such   bail,
approach   the   High   Court   seeking   cancellation   of   bail   under
section 439 (2) of the CrPC. However, if no new circumstances
have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer
an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that
27

the   same   is   perverse   or   illegal   or   has   been   arrived   at   by
ignoring   material   aspects   which   establish   a   prima­facie   case
against the accused. 
20.  In  view  of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider
the   facts   of   the   present   case.   The   allegations   against
respondent­accused   as   well   as   the   contentions   raised   at   the
Bar have been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of
the same, the following aspects of the case would emerge: 
a)   The   allegation   against   the   respondent­accused   is   under
section   302   of   the   IPC   with   regard   to   the   murder   of   the
deceased   Ram   Swaroop   Khokhar,   the   father   of   the
informant­appellant who was a disabled person. Thus, the
offence   alleged   against   the   respondent­accused   is   of   a
grave nature. 
b) The accusation against the accused is that he overpowered
the   deceased   who   was   suffering   from   impairment   of   both
his   legs,   pinned   him   to   the   ground,   sat   on   him   and
throttled his neck. As per the postmortem report, the cause
of death was ante­mortem strangulation.
c)   It   is   also   the   case   of   the   appellant   that   the   respondent­
accused   is   a   person   exercising   significant   political
influence in the Bhopawaspachar village and that owing to
28

the   same,   the   informant   found   it   difficult   to   get   an   FIR
registered against him. That the accused was arrested only
following   a   protest   outside   a   police   station   demanding   his
arrest.   Thus, the possibility of the accused threatening or
otherwise   influencing   the   witnesses,   if   on   bail,   cannot   be
ruled out. 
d) That   the   respondent­accused   had   earlier   preferred
applications   seeking   bail,   under   section   437   of   the   CrPC
before the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate,
Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by
orders dated 23 rd
  January, 2020 and 6 th
  March, 2020. The
accused had also preferred a bail application under section
439   of   the   CrPC   which   was   rejected   by   the   Additional
Sessions   Judge,   Jaipur   Metropolis   by   order   dated   12 th
March,   2020   having   regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences
alleged against the accused.
e) The High Court in the impugned order dated 7 th
 May, 2020
has   not   considered   the   aforestated   aspects   of   the   case   in
the context of the grant of bail.
 
21. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case
in   light   of   the   judgments   cited   above,   we   do   not   think   that
this   case   is   a   fit   case   for   grant   of   bail   to   the   respondent­
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accused,   having   regard   to   the   seriousness   of   the   allegations
against   him.   Strangely,   the   State   of   Rajasthan   has   not   filed
any appeal against the impugned order. 
22.   The   High   Court   has   lost   sight   of   the   aforesaid   material
aspects   of   the   case   and   has,   by   a   very   cryptic   and   casual
order,   de   hors   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the
accused.   We   find   that   the   High   Court   was   not   right   in
allowing   the   application   for   bail   filed   by   the   respondent­
accused.   Hence   the   impugned   order   dated   7 th
  May,   2020   is
set aside. The appeal is allowed. 
23.   The   respondent   accused   is   on   bail.   His   bail   bond   stands
cancelled   and   he   is   directed   to   surrender   before   the
concerned   jail   authorities   within   a   period   of   two   weeks   from
today. 
……………………………J 
M.R. SHAH 
……………………….…..J
B.V. NAGARATHNA
NEW DELHI;
11 th
 JANUARY, 2022. 
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