/2022 INSC 0030/
REPORTABLE
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.11015­11016 OF 2017  
Velagacharla Jayaram Reddy & Ors.             .…Appellant(s)
Versus
  M.Venkata Ramana & Ors .Etc.              ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The   respondents   No.4,   6   and   7   in   W.P.
No.6212/2006 are before this Court in this appeal. They
claim   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   20.04.2010
passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh
at   Hyderabad.   By   the   said   order,   the   learned   Division
Bench of the High Court has allowed the writ petition and
quashed   the   award   dated   28.01.2004   passed   by   the
Divisional   Co­operative   Officer,   Cuddapah   acting   as   an
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Arbitrator   in   deciding   the   dispute   raised   under   Section
61(1)   (b)   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Co­operative   Societies
Act,   1964   (“APCS   Act”   for   short).   The   said   award   had
been   affirmed   by   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Co­operative
Tribunal   at   Hyderabad,   through   its   judgment   dated
27.02.2006. 
2. The   facts   necessary   to   be   noted   for   disposal   of
these appeals are as follows:­ The Government of Andhra
Pradesh   through   its   G.O.   Ms.   No.956,   Revenue
Department,   dated   22.08.1970,   allotted   land   situate   in
Sy.No.752/2   and   91/1,   Kondayapalli   Tank   bund   to   the
N.G.O. Co­operative Building Society Ltd. for the purpose
of  formation  of Layout and  to allot  sites to  its members.
The   area   was   within   the   jurisdiction   of   Chinnachowk,
Gram   Panchayat   at   that   point   in   time.   The   said
Panchayat   was   later   on   merged   in   the   Municipal
Corporation,   Kadapa,   which   presently   has   jurisdiction
over the area.
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3. There   is   not   much   dispute   to   the   fact   that   in   the
said   land   a   layout   was   formed   and   625   members   were
allotted plots. The layout also consisted of specific areas
earmarked for parks, playground, school, religious place,
shopping   area   and   parking   place.   The   instant   appeal
relates  to  the  respective  plots  which  were  allotted  to  the
respondents No.1 in C.A.No.11015 and 11016/2017. The
respondent   No.1   in   C.A.   No.11016/2017   who   died
subsequently,   was   deleted   from   the   array   of   parties.   As
such, the entire consideration in this appeal is limited to
the   plot   measuring   3.2   cents   allotted   to   the   respondent
No.1   (Mr.   M.V.   Ramana)   in   C.A.   No.11015/2017.   Since
there   has   been   an   amendment   to   the   cause   title   and
certain   parties   who   were   parties   to   the   original
proceedings   before   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer
have been deleted, henceforth the parties will be referred
to   in   the   rank   they   were   arrayed   in   the   original
proceedings for completeness and clarity.
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4. The   plaintiffs   before   the   Divisional   Co­operative
Officer raised a grievance with regard to the allotment of
plot   to   defendant   No.2   therein   (Mr.   M.V.   Ramana)
alleging   that   the   said   plot   was   reserved   as   parking   area
in   the   layout   plan.   The   plaintiffs   were,   a   Welfare
Association which was a part of the same layout, former
President and Vice­President of the N.G.O Society  which
allotted   the   plot   and   a   couple   i.e.   plaintiff   Nos.4   and   5
who   own   shop   premises   in   the   layout   which   is   situated
opposite the plot in issue. The said plaintiffs No.4 and 5
are   not   members   but   were   persons   who   were   interested
in   purchasing   the   same   plot   that   was   allotted   to
defendant No.2, ostensibly to retain the same as parking
area in front of their shops on plot Nos.27, 35 and 36. 
5. The   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer,   on   perusal   of
the   material   and   evidence,   noted   the   said   plot   to   be   a
vacant commercial plot as denoted in the plan. However,
on providing his own analysis, he has proceeded to term
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the plot in issue as a ‘parking area’ and has accordingly
passed   the   award   dated   28.01.2004   in   favour   of   the
plaintiffs.   The   defendants,   more   particularly,   the
respondent   herein   (Mr.   M.V.   Ramana)   filed   an   appeal
before   the   Andhra   Pradesh   Co­operative   Tribunal   at
Hyderabad,   which   affirmed   the   award   through   its
judgment   dated  27.02.2006.  The   respondent   filed   a   writ
petition   before   the   High   Court   assailing   the   order   dated
24.04.2010   in   W.P.No.212/2006.   The   High   Court   on   a
detailed   consideration,   more   particularly   with   regard   to
maintainability   of   a   proceeding   of   the   present   nature
before   the   Co­operative   Officer,   held   it   against   the
appellants herein, allowed the writ petition and set aside
the   award   of   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer   as   also
the   order   of   the   Co­operative   Tribunal.   The   appellants
are   therefore   aggrieved   by   the   order   passed   by   the   High
Court.
6. We   have   heard   Mr.   B.   Narayana   Reddy,   learned
senior   counsel   for   appellants,   Mr.   Annam   D.N.   Rao,
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learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   No.1   and   Mr.   K.
Ravindra   Kumar,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   for
respondent   No.5   and   perused   the   materials  available   on
record.
7.  From a perusal of the proceedings, it is noted that
the   appellant   along   with   the   others   had   raised   the
dispute   before   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer
invoking  Section  61  of the  APCS  Act.  The said provision
reads as hereunder:
“61.   Disputes   which   may   be   referred   to   the
Registrar: ­
(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   in   any   law   for   the
time   being   in   force,   if   any   dispute   touching   the
constitution,   management   or   the   business   of   a
society, other than a dispute regarding disciplinary
action   taken   by   the   society   or   its   committee
against a paid employee of the society, arises­
(a)   among   members,   past   members   and   persons
claiming   through   members,   past   members   and
deceased members; or (b) between a member, past
member   or   person   claiming   through   a   member,
past member or deceased member and the society,
its   committee   or   any   officer,   agent   or   employee   of
the   society;   or   (c)   between   the   society   or   its
committee,   and   any   past   committee,   any   officer,
agent   or   employee,   or   any   past   officer,   past   agent
or   past   employee   or   the   nominee,   heir   or   legal
representative   of   any   deceased   officer,   deceased
agent   or   deceased   employee   of   the   society;   or   (d)
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between   the   society   and   any   other   society,   such
dispute   shall   be   referred   to   the   Registrar   for
decision.
Explanation: ­ For the purposes of this sub­section
a dispute shall include­ (i) a claim by a society for
any debt or other amount due to it from a member,
past   member,   the   nominee,   heir   or   legal
representative   of   a   deceased   member,   whether
such debt or other amount be admitted or not; 
(ii)   a   claim   by   surety   against   the   principal   debtor
where   the   society   has   recovered   from   the   surety
any amount in respect of any debt or other amount
due   to   it   from   the   principal   debtor   as   a   result   of
the   default   of   the   principal   debtor   whether   such
debt or other amount due to be admitted or not;
  (iii)   a   claim   by   a   society   against   a   member,   past
member,   or   the   nominee,   heir   or   legal
representative   of   a   deceased   member   for   the
delivery   of   possession   to   the   society   of   land   or
other immovable property resumed by it for breach
of   the   conditions   of   assignment   or   allotment   of
such land or other immovable property;
(xxx)
(2)   If   any   question   arises   whether   a   dispute
referred   to   the   Registrar   under   this   section   is   a
dispute touching  the constitution, management  or
the   business   of   a   society,   such   question   shall   be
decided by the Registrar.
[(3)   Every   dispute   relating   to,   or   in   connection
with, any election to a committee of a society shall
be   referred   for   decision   to   the   Tribunal   having
jurisdiction over the place where the main office of
the   society   is   situated,   whose   decision   thereon
shall be final.]
(4) Every dispute relating to, or in connection with
any election 2 [shall be referred under sub­section
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(3) only after the date of declaration of the result of
such election.]”
8. The Act has made a provision for members of a Co­
operative   Society   to   approach   the   co­operative   Officer
designated,   when   there   is   a   dispute   amongst   the
members   of   a   society   or   the   member/members   against
the Society etc.
9.  In the instant case, at this stage before this Court,
certain parties have been deleted as indicated supra and
the   appellant   who   was   a  former   President   of   the  Society
is   alone   prosecuting   these   appeals.   However,   what   will
have to be noted is the frame of the dispute, the parties
to the dispute at the point in time when it was raised and
the   context   in   which   it   was   done.   Defendant   No.2,   a
member of the society who was allotted a plot in another
layout   formed   by   the   N.G.O.   Society,   sought   for   an
exchange of the plot. Accordingly, the earlier allotted plot
was surrendered to the Society by the defendant No.2. In
lieu thereof, the Society allotted the plot measuring 3.25
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cents   to   defendant   No.2   and   a   sale   deed   dated
07.04.2000   was   also   executed   and   registered.   Former
office   bearers   of   the   Society   who   were   members   of   the
N.G.O   society,   were   amongst   the   plaintiffs.   Jayanagar
Housing   Welfare   Society   was   a   society   in   the   larger
layout plan and therefore seeking to sustain the facilities
available   in   the   layout   by   contending   that   the   plot
allotted to the defendant No.2 was a vacant area reserved
as   parking   area.   Plaintiffs   No.4   and   5   were   however   not
the   members   of   the   Society   but   were   purchasers   of
commercial   plots   bearing   No.   27,   35,   36   and   had
constructed   shops   thereon.   The   plot   allotted   to   the
defendant No.2 is located in front of the shops belonging
to   the   plaintiffs   No.4   and   5   in   plots   No.27,   35   and   36.
Though  they   contend   that  it  is  a  vacant  plot   retained  in
the layout as parking area and are seeking to espouse a
cause, their conduct needs to be noted. They had earlier
requested   the   NGO   Society   to   allot   the   plot   in   their
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favour   but   are   presently   aggrieved   when   it   is   allotted   to
another claimant. 
10. Plaintiffs No.4 and 5 however seek to explain their
conduct by stating that they had sought to purchase the
plot and retain it as a parking area. Such an explanation
cannot   be   accepted   on   face   value.   If   in   fact   a   plot   was
earmarked in the layout plan as a parking area, it is the
bounden   duty   of   the   authorities   concerned   to   maintain
the  same  as such.  It  is  difficult  to  fathom   that  a private
individual   who   owns   shop   premises   in   the   layout   would
invest money and purchase the vacant plot to retain it as
a   parking   area   for   the   benefit   of   the   general   public.   If
that   be   so,   plaintiffs   No.4   and   5   apart   from   being   non­
members   who   could   not   have   invoked   the   provisions   of
the APCS Act, were also rival claimants and competitors
for allotment of the same plot which is the subject matter
of   dispute.   The   members   i.e.   former   office   bearers   had
made   a   common   case   with   the   non­members   who   were
otherwise   interested   in   allotment   of   the   same   plot.   In
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furtherance   of   the   same,   the   plaintiffs   had   sought   for   a
declaratory relief to declare the registered sale deed dated
07.04.2000   as   null   and   void.   Hence,   keeping   in
perspective the subject matter, the relief sought and the
parties   involved,   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   its
conclusion.
11. Be   that   as   it   may,   whether   it   was   before   the
authorities   under   the   A.P.C.S   Act   or   if   the   parties   were
relegated   to   the   jurisdictional   Court   under   the   Civil
Procedure Code, grant of relief would have arisen only if
there   was   definite   material   to   indicate   that   the   plot   in
question   was   reserved   as   a   parking   area   in   the   layout
plan   and   that   the   same   therefore   being   a   civic   amenity
area,   had   on   formation   of   the   layout,   vested   in   the
Municipal   Corporation   along   with   the   roads,   drains   and
open   areas   for   the   purpose   of   retaining   it   as   such   and
maintaining   the   same.   There   is   no   such   document   on
record.   Secondly,   the   person   seeking   relief   from   the
Court   should   approach   the   Court   with   clean   hands,   as
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per   well­established   legal   norms.   In   the   instant   case,
plaintiffs   No.4   and   5   had   made   attempts   to   secure
allotment of the same plot allotted to the defendant No.2,
in   their   favour   though   presently,   it   is   sought   to   be
explained   that   it   was   to   be   retained   for   parking,   which,
as   already   indicated   above,   is   an   explanation   which
cannot be accepted. Therefore, the challenge by the said
plaintiffs   to   the   allotment   made   in   favour   of   the
defendant   and   the   same   cause   being   supported   by   the
other plaintiffs, cannot be considered to be bonafide.
12. That   apart,   as   noted,   there   is   no   definite   material
to   delineate   from   the   layout   plan   that   it   was   a   parking
area.   As   per   the   case   set   up   and   also   the   finding
recorded   by   the   original   authority,   the   plot   has   been
shown   as   commercial   plot/vacant   plot.   Keeping   in   view
the  location  of the property  owned by  the plaintiffs No.4
and 5, the original authority had deemed it fit to keep the
disputed   plot   vacant   for   being   maintained   as   a   parking
area   which   is   only   an   assumption   based   on   the   own
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analogy   of   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer   and
amounts   to   modifying   the   approved   layout   plan.   The
consideration   in   that   regard   made   by   the   original
authority, based on the said assumption is as hereunder:
­
“(27)   In   order   to   conclude   that   the   vacant   site
shown   as   the   southern   boundary   was   meant   only
to   be   a   parking   place   although   recited   as   vacant
place the following points may well be appreciated.
a)   On   the   southern   side   of   the   shop   rooms,
particularly   for   the   plots   27,   36   and   35
there   is   no   other   place   to   connect   with
the road. 
b)   For   visitors   coming   to   the   shopping
complex   by   bicycles,   scooters,   or   cars
there   must   be   some   space   for   parking
the   vehicles,   particularly   because   it   is
obviously   a   commercial   area.   Vacant
site   viewed   in   the   proper   context   and
from   a   correct   perspective   means
necessarily   a   parking   place   because
parking   place   is   a   ‘must’   in   a
commercial area.
c)     The   Sub­Divisional   Cooperative   officer
who   was   the   inspecting   authority
prepared   a   defect   sheet   which   is   worth
perusal   in   this   context.   In   para   5   of   the
said   sheet   the   said   officer   had   clearly
made   a   note   that   the   society   sold   away
site   for   parking   place   to   the   Second
defendant   i.e.,   M.   Venkata   Ramana.   The
said Venkata Ramana is a member of the
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Society   and   had   taken   a   plot   in   the
satellite   city   of   the   NGO's   Cooperative
House   Building   Society   Ltd.,   Kadapa   on
dip system on 26.10.1996. The Society is
also   having   surplus   plots   near
Kondayapalli   village.   The   present
managing   committee   of   the   D1   Society
has cancelled his  plot  in  the  satellite  city
and executed the impugned reg. sale deed
in   favour   of   M.   Venkata   Ramana   for   3.2.
cents   which   is   the   parking   place   in
question. 
d)   What is important to note in this context
is that the first defendant Society has not
taken   any   prior   permission   from   the
Divisional   Cooperative   officer,
Cuddapah/District   Cooperative   Officer,
Cuddapah   during   the   year   1998/1999
and 1999/2000 to effect sale in favour of
the   2nd   defendant.   The   society   has
regularized   the   several   encroachments
made   by   some   members,   taking
permission   duly   from   the   Cooperative
Dept.   But   the   two   cases   relating   to   the
plaintiffs 4 and 5 were not brought to the
notice   of   the   Divisional   Cooperative
Officer,   Cuddapah   /District.   Cooperative
Officer,   Cuddapah,   appropriate   action
was also recommended in the defect sheet
to   be   taken   against   the   managing
committee. 
e)   One   more   important   factor   to   be
appreciated   in   this   context   is   that   the
southern   boundary   is   mentioned   only
as   a   vacant   site   but   not   as   the   vacant
site   of   the   1st   defendant   Society.   If
really   the   1st   default   Society   retained
its ownership on the vacant site on the
southern   side   it   would   not   have   failed
to   mention   that   the   said   vacant   side
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belonged   to   itself.   It   is   significant   to
note   that   the   boundaries   on   the   other
three   sides   show   to   whom   the
properties belonged.
 
f)     It is therefore but reasonable to opine
that   plot   No.   27,   35   &   36   were
purchased   only   under   the   impression
that   the   vacant   site   in   question   was
meant   for   parking   of   vehicles.
According   to   the   principles   of   town
planning   there   must   be   parking   place
in   any   commercial   area.   In   this   context
the   judgment   of   the   learned   IV   ADJ,
Cuddapah   in   O.S.   No.   477   of   1996   and
the   Judgment   of   the   learned   1st
ADJ/Cuddapah   in   O.S.   No.   44/98
deserve to be considered with great care.
(28)   In   the   residential   area,   a   site   of   two   cents
being   part   of   a   larger   area   earmarked   for   public.
park   and   playground   was   sold   by   the   1st
defendant   building   society   to   one   of   the   members
of the said society consequently Jayanagar Welfare
association   filed   0.S   No.   477   of   1996   in   public
interest   and   succeeded   in   getting   a   decree.   The
contention   in   the   suit   was   that   the   extent   of   2
cents   being   part   of   the   area   earmarked   for   play
ground   the   sale   was   illegal.   In   the   instant   case,
the   extent   of   3.2   cents   is   a   vacant   site   left
obviously for the purpose of parking of vehicles
on   the  southern   side  of  plots 27,   36,  35  in  the
commercial   complex   and   so   the   analogy   holds
good.  
(29)   Plaintiffs   2   and   3   are   no   doubt   ex­presidents
of   the   1st   Defendant   building   society   but   they   are
now   members   of   the   welfare   association,   which   is
the 1st defendant in the arbitration reference. The
1st   plaintiff   Kotla   Rama   Subbaiah   was   the   1st
president   of   the   Society.   The   very   fact   that   the
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plaintiffs   l   to   3   who   are   ex­presidents   of   D­1
building   Society   have   filed   this   dispute   shows
that 3.2 cents must be a parking place because
they   are   well   acquainted   with   all   the   relevant
facts   from   the   beginning.   There   is   no   selfish
interest   for   them   in   questioning   the   sale   in
favour of  the second defendant otherwise. ”
        (Emphasis supplied)
13. Notwithstanding   the   above   analogy   based   on   an
assumption which is unsustainable, in order to render a
quietus to the issue, this Court through the order dated
29.10.2021,   had   sought   for   a   report   from   the   District
Judge,   Kadapa   on   the   whole   conspectus   of   the   matter.
An   exhaustive   Report   dated   06.11.2021   has   been
submitted   on   all   aspects   of   the   matter   which   we   have
carefully   perused.   The   said   Report   nowhere   indicates
that the plot in question was reserved or earmarked as a
parking area. On the other hand, it has been referred to
as   the   area   earmarked   for   commercial   purpose.   It   is
stated that as per the given layout plan it is in one of the
commercial   areas   out   of   three   slots   allotted   for
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commercial purpose. Hence, the said report coupled with
the   discussion   by   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer
extracted   supra,   will   disclose   that   it   was   not   earmarked
as   a   parking   area   in   the   layout   plan   but   was   only
deduced   so   by   the   Divisional   Co­operative   Officer   in   the
course of his discussion in the award.
14. Insofar   as   the   allotment   of   the   plot   made   to   the
defendant   No.2   (Mr.   M.V.   Ramana)   is   concerned,   the
learned District Judge has noted that the defendant No.2
was a member of the Society and Rule 42 relating to the
allotment   procedure   has   been   noted   in   detail.   The
procedure  followed in  that regard by  seeking   permission
from the Divisional Co­operative Officer vide letter  dated
07.05.1999   and   the   permission   accorded   to   proceed   in
terms   of   Rule   42   (4)   of   the   Society   Rules   is   referred.
Pursuant   to   the   same,   the   Board   of   Directors   held   a
meeting  on  06.04.2000,  wherein allotment was  made  by
passing   a   resolution   to   that   effect.   The   decision   to   allot
was   made   after   cancelling   the   allotment   of   plot   No.3354
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which had been made earlier in favour of the defendant.
Since   Rule   42   (4)   required   that   Board   Resolution   be
approved   by   General   Body   and   the   resolutions   for   the
years   1995­2000   were   not   traced,   it   has   been
commented   in   the   Report   that   the   Board   resolution   is
without authorisation.
15. In   our   view,   non­availability   of   the   General   Body
resolution   at   this   juncture,   as   observed   by   the   Learned
District Judge, cannot be held to be fatal in the facts and
circumstances   of   this   case.   That   is   for   the   reason   that
the   competent   authority   in   appropriate   proceedings   has
not   referred   to   this   aspect.   The   undisputed   position   is
also   that   the   defendant   No.2   (respondent   herein­   M.V.
Ramana) is a member of the Society and being entitled to
allotment of a plot, had earlier been allotted plot No­3354
at   another   location.   It   is   on   surrender   of   that   plot   that
the present allotment was made in his favour, though the
plot   is   of   a   slightly   bigger   dimension.   The   order   of   the
Divisional Co­operative Officer indicates that the price for
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allotment   was   fixed   keeping   in   view   the   market   value.
The   allotment   being   of   the   year   2000,   construction   has
also been raised. More than two decades have elapsed by
now. Any  intervention or  action  at this juncture will not
be justified for all the afore­stated reasons.
16. Therefore,   taking   a   holistic   view   of  the   matter,   the
appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. 
 
….…………………….CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
 
..……………………….J.
                                       (A.S. BOPANNA)
          …….……………………J.
  (HIMA KOHLI)
New Delhi,
January 11, 2022 
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