/2022 INSC 0045/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.78 OF 2022
Geeta Devi                ..Appellant(S)
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.                     ..Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   dated   06.12.2019   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   Lucknow   Bench   in
Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2019 by which the High Court
has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the victim of the
offence,   which   was   filed   against   the   judgment   and   order
dated   13.09.2019   passed   by   the   learned   Special   Court,
acquitting the respondent accused under Sections 354, 504,
506 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled
Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes   (Prevention   of   Atrocities)
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Act,   1989,   the   victim   –   original   appellant   has   preferred   the
present appeal. 
     
2. That   the   learned   Special   Court/Trial   Court   convicted
respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 452, 323/34 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal
Code,   however,   acquitted   them   for   the   offences   punishable
under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC, Section 3(1)(x) and
3(1)(xi)   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes
(Prevention   of   Atrocities)   Act,   1989.   Feeling   aggrieved   and
dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
learned Special Court acquitting the respondents – accused
for   the   aforesaid   offences,   the   victim   preferred   an   appeal
before the High Court by way of Criminal Appeal No.2356 of
2019   and   by   the   impugned   one   page/paragraph   judgment
and   order,   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said   appeal,
which is the subject matter of the present appeal before this
Court.  
3. We have heard Shri T.V. George, learned counsel appearing
on   behalf   of   the   appellant,   Shri   Adarsh   Upadhyay,   learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the State – Respondent No.1
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and   Shri   Shahid   Anwar,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused. 
4. Number   of   submissions   have   been   made   by   the   learned
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respective   parties.
However,   for   the   reasons   stated   hereinbelow   we   propose   to
remand  the matter  to  the  High  Court and  hence  we refrain
from   dealing   with   any   of   the   submissions   made   by   the
learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respective
parties   on   merits   as   any   observation   made   by   this   Court
may affect either the prosecution or the defence.
5. We   have   gone   through   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by
the High Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the victim
–   appellant.   As   already   noted,   the   impugned   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court   as   such   is   one
page/paragraph   order.   After   observing   in   paragraph   3   that
“I   have   gone   through   the   judgment   of   the   learned   Trial
Court   carefully”   thereafter   without   further   elaborate   re­
appreciation of the entire evidence on record the High Court
has   dismissed   the   appeal   by   observing   in   paragraph   4   as
under: ­ 
“4.   Trial   Court   has   considered   the   statement   of   P.W.­2
carefully   and   has   found   that   the   testimony   of   P.W.­2
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cannot   be   relied   on   for   offence   under   Sections   354,   504,
506   IPC,   3(1)(x)   and   3(1)(xi)   S.C./S.T.   Act.   There   is   no
corroboration   to   the   testimony   of   P.W.­2   when   the   trial
Court   itself   has   found   the   testimony   of   P.W.2   doubtful.
There   is   no   ground   to   interfere   with   the   well   considered
judgment   of   trial   Court   and,   therefore,   I   find   this   appeal
without   merit   and   substance.   The   appeal   is   thus,
dismissed.”
6. We are constrained to observe that this is not the manner in
which   the   High   Court   should   have   dealt   with   the   appeal
against an order of acquittal which as such is a first appeal
against   the   order   of   acquittal.   The   High   Court   has   only
made general observations  on the  deposition of the witness
examined. However, there is no re­appreciation of the entire
evidence   in   detail   which   exercise   ought   to   have   been   made
by   the   High   Court   while   dealing   with   the   judgment   and
order   of   acquittal.   The   High   Court   ought   to   have   re­
appreciated   the   entire   evidence   on   record   as   it   was   dealing
with a first appeal. Being the first appellate court, the High
Court   was   required   to   re­appreciate   the   entire   evidence   on
record   and   also   the   reasoning   given   by   the   learned   Trial
Court. How to deal with and decide an appeal in the case of
an acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is dealt with
in   the   case   of   Umedbhai   Jadavbhai   Vs.   The   State   of
Gujarat  (1978) 1 SCC 228. It was observed therein and held
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by this Court that  once the appeal is entertained against the
order of acquittal, the High Court is entitled to re­appreciate
the   entire   evidence   independently   and   come   to   its   own
conclusion.   Ordinarily,   the   High   Court   would   give   due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same
were   arrived   at   after   a   proper   appreciation   of   the   evidence.
Against   an  order  of   acquittal   passed  by   the   Trial   Court   the
High   Court   would   be   justified   on   re­appreciation   of   the
entire   evidence   independently   and   come   to   its   own
conclusion   that   acquittal   is   perverse   and   manifestly
erroneous.
6.1 How to deal with, decide and dispose of the criminal appeal
against   an   acquittal   under   Section   378   Cr.PC   has   been
elaborately   dealt   with   by   this   Court   and   after   considering
the   earlier   catena   of   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Guru   Dutt   Pathak   Vs.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   (2021)   6
SCC   116,   in   paragraphs   15   to   20   it   has   been   observed   as
under: ­
15.   In   Babu   v.   State   of   Kerala   [ Babu   v.   State   of   Kerala ,
(2010) 9 SCC 189, this Court has reiterated the principles
to   be   followed   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal   under
Section   378   CrPC.   In   paras   12   to   19,   it   is   observed   and
held as under: (SCC pp. 196­199)
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“ 12 . This Court time and again has laid down
the   guidelines   for   the   High   Court   to   interfere
with the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the trial court. The appellate court should not
ordinarily   set  aside  a  judgment   of  acquittal in  a
case   where   two   views   are   possible,   though   the
view   of   the   appellate   court   may   be   the   more
probable   one.   While   dealing   with   a   judgment   of
acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the
entire   evidence   on   record,   so   as   to   arrive   at   a
finding as to whether the views of the trial court
were   perverse   or   otherwise   unsustainable.   The
appellate court is entitled to consider whether in
arriving   at   a   finding   of   fact,   the   trial   court   had
failed   to   take   into   consideration   admissible
evidence   and/or   had   taken   into   consideration
the   evidence   brought   on   record   contrary   to  law.
Similarly, wrong  placing  of  burden of proof  may
also   be   a   subject­matter   of   scrutiny   by   the
appellate   court.   (Vide   Balak   Ram   v.   State   of
U.P.   [ Balak   Ram   v.   State   of   U.P. ,   (1975)   3   SCC
219],   Shambhoo   Missir   v.   State   of
Bihar   [ Shambhoo   Missir   v.   State   of   Bihar ,   (1990)
4   SCC   17]   ,   Shailendra   Pratap   v.   State   of
U.P.   [ Shailendra   Pratap   v.   State   of   U.P. ,   (2003)   1
SCC   761],   Narendra   Singh   v.   State   of
M.P.   [ Narendra   Singh   v.   State   of   M.P. ,   (2004)   10
SCC   699],   Budh   Singh   v.   State   of   U.P.   [ Budh
Singh   v.   State   of   U.P. ,   (2006)   9   SCC   731],   State
of   U.P.   v.   Ram   Veer   Singh   [ State   of   U.P.   v.   Ram
Veer   Singh ,   (2007)   13   SCC   102],   S.   Rama
Krishna   v.   S. Rami Reddy   [ S. Rama Krishna   v.   S.
Rami   Reddy ,   (2008)   5   SCC   535],   Arulvelu
v.   State   [ Arulvelu   v.   State ,   (2009)   10   SCC
206],   Perla   Somasekhara   Reddy   v.   State   of
A.P.   [ Perla   Somasekhara   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P. ,
(2009)   16   SCC   98]   and   Ram   Singh   v.   State   of
H.P.   [ Ram   Singh   v.   State   of   H.P. ,   (2010)   2   SCC
445)
13 .   In   Sheo   Swarup   v.   King   Emperor   [ Sheo
Swarup   v.   King   Emperor ,   1934   SCC   OnLine   PC
42],   the   Privy   Council   observed   as   under:   (SCC
OnLine PC)
‘…   the   High   Court   should   and   will   always
give   proper   weight   and   consideration   to   such
matters   as  ( 1 )  the   views   of   the   trial  Judge   as  to
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the   credibility   of   the   witnesses;   ( 2 )   the
presumption   of   innocence   in   favour   of   the
accused,   a   presumption   certainly   not   weakened
by   the   fact   that   he   has   been   acquitted   at   his
trial; ( 3 ) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any   doubt;   and   ( 4 )  the   slowness   of   an  appellate
court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a   Judge   who   had   the   advantage   of   seeing   the
witnesses.’
14 .   The   aforesaid   principle   of   law   has
consistently   been   followed   by   this   Court.
(See   Tulsiram   Kanu   v.   State   [ Tulsiram
Kanu   v.   State ,   AIR   1954   SC   1   :   1954   Cri   LJ
225]   ,   Balbir   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab   [ Balbir
Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   AIR   1957   SC   216   :
1957   Cri   LJ   481]   ,   M.G.   Agarwal   v.   State   of
Maharashtra   [ M.G.   Agarwal   v.   State   of
Maharashtra , AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ
235]   ,   Khedu   Mohton   v.   State   of   Bihar   [ Khedu
Mohton   v.   State   of   Bihar ,   (1970)   2   SCC   450   :
1970   SCC   (Cri)   479]   ,   Sambasivan   v.   State   of
Kerala   [ Sambasivan   v.   State   of   Kerala ,   (1998)   5
SCC   412   :   1998   SCC   (Cri)   1320]   ,   Bhagwan
Singh   v.   State of M.P.   [ Bhagwan Singh   v.   State of
M.P. ,   (2002)   4   SCC   85   :   2002   SCC   (Cri)   736]
and   State   of   Goa   v.   Sanjay   Thakran   [ State   of
Goa   v.   Sanjay   Thakran ,   (2007)   3   SCC   755   :
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)
15 .   In   Chandrappa   v.   State   of
Karnataka   [ Chandrappa   v.   State   of   Karnataka ,
(2007)   4   SCC   415]   ,   this   Court   reiterated   the
legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42)
‘ 42 . … (1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2)   The   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973
puts   no   limitation,   restriction   or   condition   on
exercise of such power and an appellate court on
the   evidence   before   it   may   reach   its   own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial
and   compelling   reasons”,   “good   and   sufficient
grounds”,   “very   strong   circumstances”,
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“distorted   conclusions”,   “glaring   mistakes”,   etc.
are   not   intended   to   curtail   extensive   powers   of
an   appellate   court   in   an   appeal   against
acquittal.   Such   phraseologies   are   more   in   the
nature   of   “flourishes   of   language”   to   emphasise
the   reluctance   of   an   appellate   court   to   interfere
with   acquittal   than   to   curtail   the   power   of   the
court   to   review   the   evidence   and   to   come   to   its
own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind   that   in   case   of   acquittal,   there   is   double
presumption   in   favour   of   the   accused.   Firstly ,
the presumption of innocence is available to him
under   the   fundamental   principle   of   criminal
jurisprudence   that   every   person   shall   be
presumed   to   be   innocent   unless   he   is   proved
guilty by a competent court of law.   Secondly , the
accused   having   secured   his   acquittal,   the
presumption   of   his   innocence   is   further
reinforced,   reaffirmed   and   strengthened   by   the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on   the   basis   of   the   evidence   on   record,   the
appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.’
16 .   In   Ghurey   Lal   v.   State   of   U.P.   [ Ghurey
Lal   v.   State of U.P. , (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1
SCC   (Cri)   60]   ,   this   Court   reiterated   the   said
view,   observing   that   the   appellate   court   in
dealing   with   the   cases   in   which   the   trial   courts
have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind
that   the   trial   court's   acquittal   bolsters   the
presumption   that   he   is   innocent.   The   appellate
court must give due weight and consideration to
the   decision   of   the   trial   court   as   the   trial   court
had   the   distinct   advantage   of   watching   the
demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better
position   to   evaluate   the   credibility   of   the
witnesses.
17 .   In   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Naresh   [ State   of
Rajasthan   v.   Naresh ,   (2009)   9   SCC   368   :   (2009)
3   SCC   (Cri)   1069]   ,   the   Court   again   examined
the   earlier   judgments   of   this   Court   and   laid
down that : (SCC p. 374, para 20)
8

‘ 20 .   …   An   order   of   acquittal   should   not   be
lightly   interfered   with   even   if   the   Court   believes
that   there   is   some   evidence   pointing   out   the
finger towards the accused.”
18 .   In   State   of   U.P.   v.   Banne   [ State   of
U.P.   v.   Banne , (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri)   260]   ,   this   Court   gave   certain   illustrative
circumstances   in   which   the   Court   would   be
justified   in   interfering   with   a   judgment   of
acquittal   by   the   High   Court.   The   circumstances
include   :   ( Banne   case   [ State   of   U.P.   v.   Banne ,
(2009)   4   SCC   271   :   (2009)   2   SCC   (Cri)   260]   ,
SCC p. 286, para 28)
‘ 28 .   …   ( i )   The   High   Court's   decision   is   based
on   totally   erroneous   view   of   law   by   ignoring   the
settled legal position;
( ii ) The High Court's conclusions are contrary
to evidence and documents on record;
( iii )  The  entire  approach  of  the  High  Court  in
dealing   with   the   evidence   was   patently   illegal
leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
( iv )   The   High   Court's   judgment   is   manifestly
unjust   and   unreasonable   based   on   erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case;
( v ) This Court must always give proper weight
and   consideration   to   the   findings   of   the   High
Court;
( vi )   This   Court   would   be   extremely   reluctant
in   interfering   with   a   case   when   both   the
Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court   have
recorded an order of acquittal.’
A   similar   view   has   been   reiterated   by   this
Court   in   Dhanapal   v.   State   [ Dhanapal   v.   State ,
(2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] .
19 .   Thus,   the   law   on   the   issue   can   be
summarised   to   the   effect   that   in   exceptional
cases where there are compelling circumstances,
and   the   judgment   under   appeal   is   found   to   be
perverse,   the   appellate   court   can   interfere   with
the   order   of   acquittal.   The   appellate   court
9

should   bear   in   mind   the   presumption   of
innocence   of   the   accused   and   further   that   the
trial   court's   acquittal   bolsters   the   presumption
of   his   innocence.   Interference   in   a   routine
manner  where  the  other   view  is possible  should
be   avoided,   unless   there   are   good   reasons   for
interference
16.   When the findings of fact recorded by  a court can be
held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in
para 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under :
( Babu   case   [ Babu   v.   State   of   Kerala ,   (2010)   9   SCC   189   :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , SCC p. 199)
“ 20 .   The   findings   of   fact   recorded   by   a   court
can   be   held   to   be   perverse   if   the   findings   have
been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material   or   by   taking   into   consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible   material.   The   finding
may   also   be   said   to   be   perverse   if   it   is   “against
the   weight   of   evidence”,   or   if   the   finding   so
outrageously   defies   logic   as   to   suffer   from   the
vice   of   irrationality.   (Vide   Rajinder   Kumar
Kindra   v.   Delhi   Admn.   [ Rajinder   Kumar
Kindra   v.   Delhi Admn. , (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985
SCC   (L&S)  131]  ,   Excise   & Taxation  Officer­cum­
Assessing   Authority   v.   Gopi   Nath   &   Sons   [ Excise
&   Taxation   Officer­cum­Assessing
Authority   v.   Gopi   Nath   &   Sons ,   1992   Supp   (2)
SCC   312]   ,   Triveni   Rubber   &
Plastics   v.   CCE   [ Triveni Rubber & Plastics   v.   CCE ,
1994 Supp (3) SCC 665] ,   Gaya Din   v.   Hanuman
Prasad   [ Gaya   Din   v.   Hanuman   Prasad ,   (2001)   1
SCC   501]   ,   Arulvelu   v.   State   [ Arulvelu   v.   State ,
(2009)   10   SCC   206   :   (2010)   1   SCC   (Cri)   288]
and   Gamini   Bala   Koteswara   Rao   v.   State   of
A.P.   [ Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao   v.   State of A.P. ,
(2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”
It   is   further   observed,   after   following   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   Kuldeep
Singh   v.   Commr.   of   Police   [ Kuldeep
Singh   v.   Commr.   of   Police ,   (1999)   2   SCC   10   :
1999   SCC   (L&S)   429],   that   if   a   decision   is
arrived   at   on   the   basis   of   no   evidence   or
thoroughly   unreliable   evidence   and   no
reasonable   person   would   act   upon   it,   the   order
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would be perverse. But if there is some evidence
on   record   which   is   acceptable   and   which   could
be   relied   upon,   the   conclusions   would   not   be
treated   as   perverse   and   the   findings   would   not
be interfered with.
17.   In   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Vijay   Mohan
Singh   v.   State of Karnataka   [Vijay   Mohan Singh   v.   State of
Karnataka , (2019)  5 SCC  436 : (2019)  2 SCC  (Cri)  586]  ,
this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of
Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court
in   an   appeal   against   acquittal.   This   Court   considered   a
catena   of   decisions   of   this   Court   right   from   1952
onwards.   In   para   31,   it   is   observed   and   held   as   under:
( Vijay Mohan Singh case , SCC pp. 447­49)
“ 31 .   An   identical   question   came   to   be
considered   before   this   Court   in   Umedbhai
Jadavbhai   [ Umedbhai   Jadavbhai   v.   State   of
Gujarat , (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108]
.   In   the   case   before   this   Court,   the   High   Court
interfered   with   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by
the   learned   trial   court   on   reappreciation   of   the
entire   evidence   on   record.   However,   the   High
Court,   while   reversing   the   acquittal,   did   not
consider   the   reasons   given   by   the   learned   trial
court   while   acquitting   the   accused.   Confirming
the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   this   Court
observed and held in para 10 as under : (SCC p.
233)
‘ 10 .   Once   the   appeal   was   rightly   entertained
against   the   order   of   acquittal,   the   High   Court
was   entitled   to   reappreciate   the   entire   evidence
independently   and   come   to   its   own   conclusion.
Ordinarily,   the   High   Court   would   give   due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if   the   same   were   arrived   at   after   proper
appreciation   of   the   evidence.   This   rule   will   not
be   applicable   in   the   present   case   where   the
Sessions   Judge   has   made   an   absolutely   wrong
assumption   of   a   very   material   and   clinching
aspect   in   the   peculiar   circumstances   of   the
case.’
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31.1 .   In   Sambasivan   v.   State   of
Kerala   [ Sambasivan   v.   State   of   Kerala ,   (1998)   5
SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , the High Court
reversed   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the
learned   trial   court   and   held   the   accused   guilty
on   reappreciation   of   the   entire   evidence   on
record,   however,   the   High   Court   did   not   record
its   conclusion   on   the   question   whether   the
approach   of   the   trial   court   in   dealing   with   the
evidence   was   patently   illegal   or   the   conclusions
arrived   at   by   it   were   wholly   untenable.
Confirming   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court
convicting   the   accused   on   reversal   of   the
acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after
being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed
by   the   learned   trial   court   was   perverse   and
suffered   from   infirmities,   this   Court   declined   to
interfere   with   the   order   of   conviction   passed   by
the   High   Court.   While   confirming   the   order   of
conviction passed by  the High Court, this Court
observed in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416)
‘ 8 .   We   have   perused   the   judgment   under
appeal to ascertain  whether  the  High Court   has
conformed   to   the   aforementioned   principles.   We
find   that   the   High   Court   has   not   strictly
proceeded   in   the   manner   laid   down   by   this
Court   in   Ramesh   Babulal   Doshi   v.   State   of
Gujarat   [ Ramesh   Babulal   Doshi   v.   State   of
Gujarat , (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972]
viz. first recording its conclusion on the question
whether   the   approach   of   the   trial   court   in
dealing  with  the evidence  was patently  illegal or
the   conclusions   arrived   at   by   it   were   wholly
untenable,   which   alone   will   justify   interference
in   an   order   of   acquittal   though   the   High   Court
has   rendered   a   well­considered   judgment   duly
meeting  all the contentions raised  before it. But
then   will   this   non­compliance   per   se   justify
setting   aside   the   judgment   under   appeal?   We
think,   not.   In   our   view,   in   such   a   case,   the
approach   of   the   court   which   is   considering   the
validity   of   the   judgment   of   an   appellate   court
which has reversed the order of acquittal passed
by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the
approach   of   the   trial   court   in   dealing   with   the
evidence   was   patently   illegal   or   conclusions
12

arrived   at   by   it  are  demonstrably   unsustainable
and whether the judgment of the appellate court
is   free   from   those   infirmities;   if   so   to   hold   that
the  trial court  judgment   warranted  interference.
In such a case, there is obviously no reason why
the   appellate   court's   judgment   should   be
disturbed.   But   if   on   the   other   hand   the   court
comes   to   the   conclusion   that   the   judgment   of
the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity,
it cannot but be held that the interference by the
appellate court in the order of acquittal was not
justified;   then   in   such   a   case   the   judgment   of
the appellate court has to be set aside as of the
two   reasonable   views,   the   one   in   support   of   the
acquittal   alone   has   to   stand.   Having   regard   to
the   above   discussion,   we   shall   proceed   to
examine   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   in   this
case.’
31.2 .   In   K.   Ramakrishnan   Unnithan   v.   State
of   Kerala   [ K.   Ramakrishnan   Unnithan   v.   State   of
Kerala , (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] ,
after   observing   that   though   there   is   some
substance   in   the   grievance   of   the   learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that
the   High   Court   has   not   adverted   to   all   the
reasons given by the trial Judge for according an
order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside
the order of conviction passed by the High Court
after   having   found   that   the   approach   of   the
Sessions   Judge   in   recording   the   order   of
acquittal   was   not   proper   and   the   conclusion
arrived   at   by   the   learned   Sessions   Judge   on
several   aspects   was   unsustainable.   This   Court
further observed that as the Sessions Judge was
not   justified   in   discarding   the   relevant/material
evidence   while   acquitting   the   accused,   the   High
Court,   therefore,   was   fully   entitled   to
reappreciate   the   evidence   and   record   its   own
conclusion.   This   Court   scrutinised   the   evidence
of   the   eyewitnesses   and   opined   that   reasons
adduced   by   the   trial   court   for   discarding   the
testimony   of   the   eyewitnesses   were   not   at   all
sound.   This   Court   also   observed   that   as   the
evaluation   of   the   evidence   made   by   the   trial
court   was   manifestly   erroneous   and   therefore   it
was the duty of the High Court to interfere with
13

an   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   learned
Sessions Judge.
31.3 . In   Atley   v.   State of U.P.   [ Atley   v.   State of
U.P. ,   AIR   1955   SC   807   :   1955   Cri  LJ  1653]   ,  in
para 5, this Court observed and held as under :
(AIR pp. 809­10)
‘ 5 . It has been argued by the learned counsel
for   the   appellant   that   the   judgment   of   the   trial
court   being   one   of   acquittal,   the   High   Court
should   not   have   set   it   aside   on   mere
appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution   unless   it   came   to   the   conclusion
that   the   judgment   of   the   trial   Judge   was
perverse.   In   our   opinion,   it   is  not   correct   to  say
that   unless   the   appellate   court   in   an   appeal
under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion
that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was
perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is
open to the High Court on an appeal against an
order   of   acquittal   to   review   the   entire   evidence
and   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion,   of   course,
keeping   in   view   the   well­established   rule   that
the   presumption   of   innocence   of   the   accused   is
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment
of  acquittal  passed  by  the  trial court  which  had
the   advantage   of   observing   the   demeanour   of
witnesses   whose   evidence   has   been   recorded   in
its presence.
It is also well­settled that the court of appeal
has   as   wide   powers   of   appreciation   of   evidence
in   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   as   in
the   case   of   an   appeal   against   an   order   of
conviction,   subject   to   the   riders   that   the
presumption   of   innocence   with   which   the
accused   person   starts   in   the   trial   court
continues   even   up   to   the   appellate   stage   and
that   the   appellate   court   should   attach   due
weight   to   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court   which
recorded the order of acquittal.
14

If   the   appellate   court   reviews   the   evidence,
keeping   those   principles   in   mind,   and   comes   to
a   contrary   conclusion,   the   judgment   cannot   be
said   to   have   been   vitiated.   (See   in   this
connection   the   very   cases   cited   at   the   Bar,
namely,   Surajpal   Singh   v.   State   [ Surajpal
Singh   v.   State ,   1951   SCC   1207]   ;   Wilayat
Khan   v.   State   of   U.P.   [ Wilayat   Khan   v.   State   of
U.P. , 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no
substance   in   the   contention   raised   on   behalf   of
the   appellant   that   the   High   Court   was   not
justified   in   reviewing   the   entire   evidence   and
coming to its own conclusions.’
31.4.   In   K.   Gopal   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P.   [ K.
Gopal Reddy   v.   State of A.P. , (1979) 1 SCC 355 :
1979   SCC   (Cri)   305]   ,   this   Court   has   observed
that where the trial court allows itself to be beset
with   fanciful   doubts,   rejects   creditworthy
evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of
the   evidence   which   is   but   barely   possible,   it   is
the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in
the interest  of justice, lest  the administration  of
justice be brought to ridicule.”
18.   In   Umedbhai   Jadavbhai   [ Umedbhai
Jadavbhai   v.   State   of   Gujarat ,   (1978)   1   SCC   228   :   1978
SCC   (Cri)   108]   ,   in   para   10,   it   is   observed   and   held   as
under : (SCC p. 233)
“ 10 .   Once   the   appeal   was   rightly   entertained
against   the   order   of   acquittal,   the   High   Court
was   entitled   to   reappreciate   the   entire   evidence
independently   and   come   to   its   own   conclusion.
Ordinarily,   the   High   Court   would   give   due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge
if   the   same   were   arrived   at   after   proper
appreciation   of   the   evidence.   This   rule   will   not
be   applicable   in   the   present   case   where   the
Sessions   Judge   has   made   an   absolutely   wrong
assumption   of   a   very   material   and   clinching
aspect   in   the   peculiar   circumstances   of   the
case.”
15

19.   In   Atley   v.   State   of   U.P.   [ Atley   v.   State   of   U.P. ,   AIR
1955   SC   807   :   1955   Cri   LJ   1653]   ,   this   Court   has
observed and held as under : (AIR pp. 809­10, para 5)
“ 5 . It has been argued by the learned counsel
for   the   appellant   that   the   judgment   of   the   trial
court   being   one   of   acquittal,   the   High   Court
should   not   have   set   it   aside   on   mere
appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the
prosecution   unless   it   came   to   the   conclusion
that   the   judgment   of   the   trial   Judge   was
perverse.   In   our   opinion,   it   is  not   correct   to  say
that   unless   the   appellate   court   in   an   appeal
under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion
that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was
perverse it could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is
open to the High Court on an appeal against an
order   of   acquittal   to   review   the   entire   evidence
and   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion,   of   course,
keeping   in   view   the   well­established   rule   that
the   presumption   of   innocence   of   the   accused   is
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment
of  acquittal  passed  by  the  trial court  which  had
the   advantage   of   observing   the   demeanour   of
witnesses   whose   evidence   has   been   recorded   in
its presence.
It is also well­settled that the court of appeal
has   as   wide   powers   of   appreciation   of   evidence
in   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   as   in
the   case   of   an   appeal   against   an   order   of
conviction,   subject   to   the   riders   that   the
presumption   of   innocence   with   which   the
accused   person   starts   in   the   trial   court
continues   even   up   to   the   appellate   stage   and
that   the   appellate   court   should   attach   due
weight   to   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court   which
recorded the order of acquittal.
If   the   appellate   court   reviews   the   evidence,
keeping   those   principles   in   mind,   and   comes   to
a   contrary   conclusion,   the   judgment   cannot   be
said   to   have   been   vitiated.   (See   in   this
connection   the   very   cases   cited   at   the   Bar,
namely,   Surajpal   Singh   v.   State   [ Surajpal
16

Singh   v.   State ,   1951   SCC   1207]   ;   Wilayat
Khan   v.   State   of   U.P.   [ Wilayat   Khan   v.   State   of
U.P. , 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no
substance   in   the   contention   raised   on   behalf   of
the   appellant   that   the   High   Court   was   not
justified   in   reviewing   the   entire   evidence   and
coming to its own conclusions.”
20.   In   K.   Gopal   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P.   [ K.   Gopal
Reddy   v.   State of A.P. , (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
305]  ,  this Court   has observed  that   where the  trial court
allows   itself   to   be   beset   with   fanciful   doubts,   rejects
creditworthy   evidence   for   slender   reasons   and   takes   a
view of the evidence which is but barely  possible , it is the
obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest
of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to
ridicule.”
7. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions of this Court to the facts of the case on hand and
while considering the impugned judgment and order passed
by   the   High   Court,   we   find   the   same   is   unsustainable.   On
perusal of the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, we find that decision of the High Court is totally
erroneous   as   it   has   ignored   the   settled   legal   position.   As
observed   hereinabove,   the   High   Court   has   not   at   all
discussed   and/or   re­appreciated   the   entire   evidence   on
record.   In   fact,   the   High   Court   has   only   made   the   general
observations   on   the   deposition   of   the   witnesses   examined.
However,   there   is   no   re­appreciation   of   entire   evidence   on
17

record in detail, which ought to have been done by the High
Court,   being   a   first   appellate   court.   Under   the
circumstances   on   the   aforesaid   ground   alone,   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   deserves   to
be   quashed   and   set  aside   and   the  same   is  to   be   remanded
back   to   the   High   Court   to   decide   the   appeal   afresh   in
accordance with law and on its own merits being mindful of
the observations made hereinabove.
8. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above   and
without   expressing   anything   on   the   merits   of   the   case,   the
present   appeal   is   allowed.   The   impugned   judgment   and
order passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.2356
of 2019 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal before
the   High   Court   is   ordered   to   be   restored   to   its   original   file.
The   High   Court   to   decide   and   dispose   of   the   appeal   in
accordance with law and on its own merits, bearing in mind
the   observations   made   hereinabove.   The   High   Court   is
requested   to   decide   and   dispose   of   the   appeal   on   merits   at
the earliest.             
…………………………………J.
    (M. R. SHAH)
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…………………………………J.
  (B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
January, 18 th
 2022
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