/2022 INSC 0050/
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NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.76  OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 6329 OF 2020)
JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
MEHARBAN & ANR.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77  OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 1337 OF 2021)
JAIBUNISHA                  …..APPELLANT(S) 
VERSUS
JUMMA & ORS.                        ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J. 
These   appeals   have   been   preferred   by   the   informant   ­
appellant   assailing   the   orders   dated   7 th
  October,   2020   and   17 th
November,   2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Allahabad   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Bail   Application   Nos.
29759 of 2020 and 39886 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has
been   granted   to   six   persons   accused   in   Sardhana   P.S.   Crime
Case No.955 of 2018. 

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2. It is the case of the appellant that she is the mother of the
deceased Yameen. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the attack
on   her   sons,   namely   Yameen   and   Mobin   and   her   husband,
Jamshed.   The   appellant   herein   is   the   person   who   lodged   the
First   Information   Report   being   FIR   No.   955/2018   for   offences
under   sections   147,   148,   452,   324,   307,   302,   504,   506   with
section   34   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (for   short,   the   ‘IPC’).   In   all
eleven accused were named in the FIR, being respondent no.1 in
Criminal Appeal No.76/2022, namely Meherban; respondent no.
1   to   5   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.77/2022,   namely   Jumma,
Hakmeen,   Yaseen,   Arshad   and   Firoz,   and   five   more   persons
namely, Bhoora, Shahid, Sullad, Yamin and Dev. 
3. That   FIR   No.   955/2018   dated   27 th
  August,   2018   is   stated
to have been filed by the appellant herein at around 21:05 hrs in
the   night   stating   that   at   around   18:00   hrs   of   the   same   day   the
accused,   armed   with   swords   and   knives   entered   appellant’s
house   with   a   common   intention   to   attack   and   kill   Yameen   and
Mobin, sons of the appellant and Jamshed, appellant’s husband.
That   on   entering   the   house,   they   started   hurling   abuses   and
attacked   the   sons   and   husband   of   the   appellant,   attempting   to
kill them. The neighbours of the appellant came to their rescue.

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However,   as   a   result   of   such   assault,   Yameen   died   and   Mobin
and   Jamshed   sustained   serious   injuries.   The   informant­
appellant   has   further   stated   that   there   was   a   pre­existing
dispute   between   the   deceased   and   Bhoora,   one   among   the
accused,   which   was   settled   by   the   residents   of   their   locality.
However,   the   accused,   in   continuation   of   the   said   dispute
attacked   the   sons   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant   and   killed
one of her sons, namely, Yameen. 
4. Appellant’s son, Mobin was medically examined on the date
of   the   incident   and   the   medical   report   records   that  that   incised
wounds   were   found   on   his   hand,   which   could   be   caused   by   a
sharp edged object. The injury report of Jamshed described three
injuries,   i.e.   an   incised   wound   on   the   scalp,   abrasion   and
contusion on the back and arm. 
5. After   conducting   an   investigation,   the   Police   filed   a
charge­sheet only against three accused, namely, Sullad, Bhoora
alias   Shadab   and   Yamin.   They   were   subsequently   arrested   by
the   Police.   The   accused­respondents   in   the   instant   appeals   are
the   eight   other   accused   named   in   the   FIR   but   were   not
charge­sheeted. 

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6. The appellant filed an application under section 319 of the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“CrPC”   for   the   sake   of   brevity)   for   summoning   the   accused­
respondents   herein   who   were   not   charge   sheeted   by   the   Police.
The   accused­respondents   were   summoned   by   the   Additional
Sessions Judge by order dated 21 st
 September, 2019. 
7. On the date of commencement of trial before the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, the accused Sullad, Bhoora
alias Shadab and Yamin were presented before the Court by the
Police.   However,   the   accused­respondents   summoned   under
section   319   of   the   CrPC,   failed   to   appear   before   the   trial   court.
Therefore,   the   Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   by   order
dated   15 th
  October,   2019   issued   Non­Bailable   Warrants   against
the respondents herein. 
8. On   the   next   date   fixed   for   trial,   the   accused­respondents
against whom Non­Bailable Warrants were issued, again failed to
appear before the court and it was reported by the Police that the
said accused were absconding and were not found even at their
residences. The Additional District and Sessions Judge by order
dated   4 th
  November,   2019   issued   a   proclamation   under   section
82 of the CrPC against the accused­respondents. 

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9. In   the   meantime,   the   accused­respondents   summoned   by
the Sessions Court preferred an application under section 482 of
the   CrPC   before   the   High   Court,   praying   for   an   order   to   quash
the   order   dated   21 st
  September,   2019   whereby   the   respondents
had been summoned to appear before the Additional District and
Sessions   Judge,   Meerut.   By   order   dated   11 th
  November,   2019,
the   High   Court   dismissed   the   said   application   and   granted   30
days’   time   to   the   accused   to   surrender   before   the   Trial   Court.
The accused­respondents assailed the said order by preferring a
Special   Leave   Petition,   being   SLP   (Crl.)   No.   10947/2019,   before
this   Court,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   order   dated   6 th
December 2019. 
10. On 8 th
 January, 2020, the next date on which the sessions
trial   was   presented,   the   accused­respondents   once   again   failed
to   appear   notwithstanding   the   direction   by   this   Court   to
surrender.   Hence   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Meerut,   by
order   dated   8 th
  January,   2020,   directed   that   proceedings   for
attachment   of   property   of   the   accused­respondents   be   initiated
under section 83 of the CrPC. 
11. The accused­respondents were arrested by the Police on 5 th
February,   2020   and   remained   in   judicial   custody   till   they   were

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enlarged on bail by the impugned orders of the High Court dated
7 th
 October, 2020 and 17 th
 November 2020. 
12. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before   the   Court   of   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Meerut.   The
same   came   to   be   rejected   by   order   dated   8 th
  July,   2020.
Similarly, the bail applications preferred by accused­respondents
Jumma, Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz were also rejected
by   a   separate   order   dated   8 th
  July,   2020,   having   regard   to   the
seriousness of the offences alleged against the respondents. 
13. Accused­respondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before   the   High   Court   and   the   same   was   allowed   by   the
impugned order dated 7 th
 October 2020 with a direction that the
accused   be   released   on   bail.   Subsequently,   the   bail   application
preferred   by   the   accused­respondents   Jumma,   Hakmeen,
Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz was also allowed by the High Court by
impugned   order   dated   17 th
  November   2020   by   relying   on   the
order granting bail to co­accused Meherban. Being aggrieved, the
appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court. 
14. We have heard Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned counsel for
the   appellant,   Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for

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accused­   respondents   and   Sri.   R.K.   Raizada,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   for   the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   perused
the material on record. 
15. The   Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   contended   that   the
impugned   orders   of   the   High   Court   have   been   passed   without
exercising  jurisdiction in  a judicious  manner.  In support  of  this
contention,   it   was   submitted   that   the   accused­respondents   had
failed   to  appear   before  the  Trial  Court notwithstanding  multiple
directions   issued   by   the   Trial   Court,   High   Court   and   even   this
Court to that effect. That they were under judicial custody for a
period   less   than   nine   months   and   had   earlier   absconded   but
have   now   been   granted   bail   by   the   High   Court   contrary   to   the
settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. That by
directing   that   the   accused   be   released   on   bail,   the   High   Court
has   invited   the   risk   of   them   absconding   again   and   that   this
would prove to be prejudicial to the investigation and trial. 
It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the
possibility of the accused ­respondents tampering with evidence
and/or influencing witnesses while on bail, cannot be ruled out. 
16. Further it was urged that the High Court has not assigned
reasons for the grant of bail in the instant cases. That the High

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Court   could   not   have   granted   bail   to   the   accused   having   scant
regard   to   the   gravity   of   the   offences   alleged   against   them.
According   to   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   the   High
Court in a very cryptic order   de hors   any reasoning has granted
bail   to   the   accused­respondents.   It   was   submitted   on   behalf   of
the   mother   of   the   deceased,   that   the   instant   appeals   may   be
allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court.
In   support   of   his   submission,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant
has   relied   upon   certain   judgments   of   this   Court   which   shall   be
referred to later. 
17. Per   contra,   Ms.   Kanishka   Prasad,   learned   counsel   for
accused­   respondents   supported   the   impugned   orders   and
submitted   that   the   same   do   not   suffer   from   any   infirmity
warranting   interference   by   this   Court.   That   the   informant­
appellant   has   narrated   an   untrue   version   of   events   in   order   to
falsely   implicate   the   accused.   The   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents   has   stated   that   there   was   a   scuffle   between   the
sons   and   the   husband   of   the   appellant,   and   the   accused­
respondents on  the day  of  the alleged incident. That four  of  the
accused   have   also   been   seriously   injured   as   a   result   of   the
attack   by   appellant’s   husband   and   sons.   That   an   FIR   in   this
regard   had   been   lodged   against   the   appellant,   her   sons   and

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husband,   in   connection   with   which   case   the   said   persons   have
been   granted   bail   by   the   competent   court.   That   no   prima   facie
case   has   been   made   out   against   the   accused   and   this   is
evidenced by the fact that they were not charge­sheeted. 
It   has   further   been   submitted   that   the   accused­
respondents   have   no   criminal   antecedents   and   therefore,   the
High   Court   acted   in   accordance   with   law   in   enlarging   the
accused­respondents on bail. 
It   has   also   been   contended   that   a   court   deciding   a   bail
application   should   avoid   elaborate   discussion   on   merits   of   the
case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage is bound
to prejudice fair trial. 
It   was   submitted   that   the   allegations   against   the
respondent­accused are false and hence the impugned orders of
the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals. 
18. Having regard to the contention of   Sri. Ronak Karanpuria,
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the   impugned   orders
granting   bail   to   the   accused   respondents   are   bereft   of   any
reasoning   and   they   are   cryptic   and   bail   has   been   granted   in   a
casual   manner,   we   extract   those   portions   of   the   impugned
orders dated 7 th
  October, 2020 and 17 th
  November, 2020 passed

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by the High Court which provide the “reasoning” of the Court for
granting bail, as under: 
Impugned Order dated     7   th
    October, 2020
“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the
merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the
nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of
punishment   in   case   of   conviction   and   the
nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable
apprehension   of   tampering   of   the   witnesses
and   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in
support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is
entitled to be released on bail in this case. 
Let the applicant Meharban involved in Case
Crime   No.   955   of   2018   under   sections   147,
148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C.,
police   station   Sardhana,   District   Meerut   be
released on bail on his furnishing a personal
bond of Rs. One lac with two sureties (out of
which   one   should   be   of   his   family   member)
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of
the   court   concerned   with   the   following
conditions.
(i) The applicant shall file an undertaking
to the effect that he shall not seek any
adjournment   on   the   dates   fixed   for
evidence   when   the   witnesses   are
present   in   court.   In   case   of   default   of
this   condition,   it   shall   be   open   for   the
trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty
of   bail   and   pass   orders   in   accordance
with law.
(ii) The   applicant   shall   remain   present
before   the   trial   court   on   each   date
fixed,   either   personally   or   through   his
counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may   proceed   against   him   under
Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code.

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(iii) In   case,   the   applicant   misuses   the
liberty  of  bail  during  trial  and  in  order
to   secure   his   presence   proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the applicant fails to appear before the
court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such
proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court
shall   initiate   proceedings   against   him,
in   accordance   with   law,   under   Section
174­A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The   applicant   shall   remain   present,   in
person,   before   the   trial   court   on   the
dates   fixed   for   (i)   opening   of   the   case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court
absence   of   the   applicant   is   deliberate
or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it
shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
It is further directed that the identity, status
and   residence   proof   of   the   sureties   be
verified   by   the   authorities   concerned   before
they are accepted. In case of breach of any of
the   above   conditions,   the   trial   court   will   be
liberty to cancel the bail.”
Impugned Order dated 17    th
    November, 2020
“Without   expressing   any   opinion   on   the
merits   of   the   case   and   considering   the
nature   of   accusation   and   the   severity   of
punishment   in   case   of   conviction   and   the
nature   of   supporting   evidence,   reasonable
apprehension   of   tampering   of   the   witnesses
and   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in
support   of   the   charge,   the   applicant   is
entitled to be released on bail in this case.

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Let   the   applicants­   Jumma,   Hakmeen,
Yaseen,   Arshad,   and   Firoz   involved   in
aforesaid   case   crime   be   released   on   bail   on
his   furnishing   a   personal   bond   and   two
sureties   each   in   the   like   amount   to   the
satisfaction   of   the   court   concerned   with   the
following   conditions   which   are   being
imposed in the interest of justice:­
(i) The   applicants   shall   file   an
undertaking   to   the   effect   that   they
shall not seek any adjournment on the
dates   fixed   for   evidence   when   the
witnesses are present in court. In case
of   default   of   this   condition,   it   shall   be
open   for   the   trial   court   to   treat   it   as
abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders
in accordance with law.
(ii) The   applicants   shall   remain   present
before   the   trial   court   on   each   date
fixed,   either   personally   or   through   his
counsel.   In   case   of   his   absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may   proceed   against   him   under
Section   229­A   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code.
(iii) In   case,   the   applicants   misuses   the
liberty  of  bail  during  trial  and  in  order
to   secure   his   presence   proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the   applicants   fails   to   appear   before
the   court   on   the   date   fixed   in   such
proclamation,   then,   the   trial   court
shall   initiate   proceedings   against   him,
in   accordance   with   law,   under   Section
174­A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The applicants shall remain present, in
person,   before   the   trial   court   on   the
dates   fixed   for   (i)   opening   of   the   case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If   in   the   opinion   of   the   trial   court
absence   of   the   applicant   is   deliberate
or   without   sufficient   cause,   then   it

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shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
(v) The party shall file computer generated
copy   of   such   order   downloaded   from
the   official   website   of   High   Court   of
Allahabad.
(vi) The   computer   generated   copy   of   such
order   shall   be   self   attested   by   the
counsel of the party concerned.
(vii) The   concerned/Authority/Official   shall
verify   the   authenticity   of   such
computerized   copy   of   the   order   from
the   official   website   of   High   Court   of
Allahabad   and   shall   make   a
declaration   of   such   verification   in
writing.
In   view   of   the   extraordinary   situation
prevailing   in   the   State   due   to   Covid­19,   the
directions   of   this   Court   dated   6.4.2020
passed   in   Public   Interest   Litigation   No.   564
of 2020 (In re vs. State of U.P.), shall also be
complied.
The order read thus:
Looking   to   impediments   in   arranging
sureties because of lockdown, while invoking
powers   under   Article   226   and   227   of   the
Constitution of India, we deem it appropriate
to   order   that   all   the   accused­applicants
whose bail application came to be allowed on
or after 15 th
  March, 2020 but have not been
released due to non­availability of sureties as
a consequence  to  lockdown  may  be released
on   executing   personal   bond   as   ordered   by
the   Court   or   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   jail
authorities   where   such   accused   is
imprisoned, provided the accused­applicants
undertakes   to   furnish   required   sureties
within   a   period   of   one   month   from   the   date
of his/her actual release.”

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19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
judgments   of   this   Court   in   the   matter   of   granting   bail   to   an
accused as under:
a) In   Gudikanti   Narasimhulu   &   Ors.   vs.   Public
Prosecutor,   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   ­­   (1978)   1
SCC 240,  Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content
of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in   the   context   of
liberty   of   a   person   under   trial,   has   laid   down   the   key
factors   that   have   to   be   considered   while   granting   bail,
which are extracted as under:
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent.   The   punishment   to   which   the   party   may
be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8.   Another   relevant   factor   is   as   to   whether   the
course   of   justice   would   be   thwarted   by   him   who
seeks   the   benignant   jurisdiction   of   the   Court   to   be
freed for the time being.
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the
Court   considering   the   likelihood   of   the   applicant
interfering   with   witnesses   for   the   prosecution   or
otherwise   polluting   the   process   of   justice.   It   is   not
only   traditional   but   rational,   in   this   context,   to
enquire   into   the   antecedents   of   a   man   who   is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record
–   particularly   a   record   which   suggests   that   he   is
likely   to   commit   serious   offences   while   on   bail.   In
regard   to   habituals,   it   is   part   of   criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee   to   exploit   the   opportunity   to   inflict   further
about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore
not an exercise in irrelevance.”

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b) In   Prahlad   Singh   Bhati   vs.   NCT   of   Delhi   &   ORS   –
(2001)   4   SCC   280   this   Court   highlighted   the   aspects
which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an
application   seeking   bail.   The   same   may   be   extracted   as
follows: 
“The   jurisdiction   to   grant   bail   has   to   be
exercised   on   the   basis   of   well   settled   principles
having regard to the circumstances of each case
and not in an  arbitrary manner. While granting
the   bail,   the   court   has   to   keep   in   mind   the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support   thereof,   the   severity   of   the   punishment
which   conviction   will   entail,   the   character,
behavior,   means   and   standing   of   the   accused,
circumstances   which   are   peculiar   to   the
accused,   reasonable   possibility   of   securing   the
presence  of  the   accused  at   the   trial,  reasonable
apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being   tampered
with,   the   larger   interests   of   the   public   or   State
and   similar   other   considerations.   It   has   also   to
be   kept   in   mind   that   for   the   purposes   of
granting   the   bail   the   Legislature   has   used   the
words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead
of "the evidence" which means the court dealing
with   the   grant   of   bail   can   only   satisfy   it   as   to
whether   there   is   a   genuine   case   against   the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce   prima   facie   evidence   in   support   of   the
charge.”
c) This   Court   in   Ram   Govind   Upadhyay   vs.   Sudarshan
Singh –  (2002) 3 SCC 598,  speaking through Banerjee, J.,
emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of

16
bail,   has   to   undertake   the   same   judiciously.   This   Court
highlighted   that   bail   cannot   be   granted   as   a   matter   of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning. 
d)  In   Kalyan   Chandra   Sarkar   vs.   Rajesh   Ranjan   alias
Pappu Yadav & Anr.  – (2004) 7 SCC 528,  this Court held
that   although   it   is   established   that   a   court   considering   a
bail   application   cannot   undertake   a   detailed   examination
of   evidence   and   an   elaborate   discussion   on   the   merits   of
the   case,   the   court   is   required   to   indicate   the   prima   facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail. 
e) In  Prasanta  Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee  ­­ (2010)
14 SCC 496   this Court observed that where a High Court
has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer
from   the   vice   of   non­application   of   mind,   rendering   it
illegal.   This   Court   has   enumerated   the   circumstances
under which an order granting bail may be set aside. 
f) Another   factor   which   should   guide   the   courts’   decision   in
deciding   a   bail   application   is   the   period   of   custody.
However, as noted in  Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh
@ Lalla Bahu & Anr. –  (2012) 9  SCC 446 , the period of

17
custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality
of   the   circumstances   and   the   criminal   antecedents   of   the
accused,   if   any.   Further,   the   circumstances   which   may
justify   the   grant   of   bail   are   to   be   considered   in   the   larger
context   of   the   societal   concern   involved   in   releasing   an
accused,   in   juxtaposition   to   individual   liberty   of   the
accused seeking bail. 
g) In  Neeru Yadav vs.  State of UP & Anr.  – (2016) 15 SCC
422,   after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court
on   the   considerations   to   be   placed   at   balance   while
deciding   to   grant   bail,   observed   through   Dipak   Misra,   J.
(as His Lordship then was) in paragraph18 as under:   
18.   Before   parting   with   the   case,   we   may   repeat
with   profit   that   it   is   not   an   appeal   for   cancellation
of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of
supervening   circumstances.   The   annulment   of   the
order  passed by   the  High  Court  is  sought  as many
relevant   factors   have   not   been   taken   into
consideration   which   includes   the   criminal
antecedents   of   the   accused   and   that   makes   the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result
is the lancination of the impugned order.”
h) In  Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)  – (2018) 12
SCC 129,   this Court, while considering an appeal from an
order   of   cancellation   of   bail,   has   spelt   out   some   of   the
significant   considerations   of   which   a   court   must   be

18
mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this
Court   has   stated   that   while   it   is   not   possible   to   prescribe
an   exhaustive   list   of   considerations   which   are   to   guide   a
court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of
an   order   granting   bail,   is   that   it   should   result   from
judicious exercise of the court’s discretion. 
i) Recently in  Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr.   –   2021   SCC   Online   SC   1020 ,   this   Court   made
observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power
to   determine   whether   bail   has   been   granted   for   valid
reasons   as   distinguished   from   an   application   for
cancellation   of   bail.   i.e.   this   Court   distinguished   between
setting   aside   a   perverse   order   granting   bail   vis­a­vis
cancellation   of   bail   on   the   ground   that   the   accused   has
misconducted   himself   or   because   of   some   new   facts
requiring   such   cancellation.   Quoting   Mahipal   vs.   Rajesh
Kumar  ­ (2020) 2 SCC 118 , this Court observed as under:
“16.   The   considerations   that   guide   the   power   of
an appellate court in assessing the correctness of
an   order   granting   bail   stand   on   a   different
footing from an assessment of an application for
the   cancellation   of   bail.   The   correctness   of   an
order   granting   bail   is   tested   on   the   anvil   of
whether   there   was   an   improper   or   arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The
test   is   whether   the   order   granting   bail   is
perverse,   illegal   or   unjustified.   On   the   other
hand,   an   application   for   cancellation   of   bail   is
generally   examined   on   the   anvil   of   the   existence

19
of supervening circumstances or violations of the
conditions   of   bail   by   a   person   to   whom   bail   has
been granted.” 
j) The   most   recent   judgment   of   this   Court   on   the   aspect   of
application   of   mind   and   requirement   of   judicious   exercise
of   discretion   in   arriving   at   an   order   granting   bail   to   the
accused   is   Brijmani   Devi   v.   Pappu   Kumar   and   Anr.   –
Criminal   Appeal   No.   1663/2021,   wherein   a   three   Judge
Bench   of   this   Court,   while   setting   aside   an   unreasoned
and   casual   order   of   the   High   Court   granting   bail   to   the
accused, observed as follows: 
“While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same
time   while   considering   an   application   for   bail
Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of
the accusations against an accused and the facts
that   have   a   bearing   in   the   case,   particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous
or   vexatious   in   nature   but   are   supported   by
adequate   material   brought   on   record   so   as   to
enable   a   Court   to   arrive   at   a   prima   facie
conclusion.   While   considering   an   application   for
grant   of   bail   a   prima   facie   conclusion   must   be
supported   by   reasons   and   must   be   arrived   at
after   having   regard   to   the   vital   facts   of   the   case
brought   on   record.   Due   consideration   must   be
given   to   facts   suggestive   of   the   nature   of   crime,
the   criminal   antecedents   of   the   accused,   if   any,
and  the nature  of  punishment  that   would  follow
a   conviction   vis­à­vis   the   offence/s   alleged
against an accused.”
20.     On   the   aspect   of   the   duty   to   accord   reasons   for   a   decision
arrived   at   by   a   court,   or   for   that   matter,   even   a   quasi­judicial

20
authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court
in   Kranti   Associates   Private   Limited   &   Anr.   Vs.   Masood
Ahmed   Khan   &   Ors.   –   (2010)   9   SCC   496,   wherein   after
referring   to   a   number   of   judgments   this   Court   summarised   at
paragraph   47   the   law   on   the   point.   The   relevant   principles   for
the purpose of this case are extracted as under: 
(a) Insistence   on   recording   of   reasons   is   meant   to   serve   the
wider   principle   of   justice   that   justice   must   not   only   be
done it must also appear to be done as well.
(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any   possible   arbitrary   exercise   of   judicial   and   quasi­
judicial or even administrative power.
(c) Reasons   reassure   that   discretion   has   been   exercised   by
the   decision­maker   on   relevant   grounds   and   by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(d) Reasons   have   virtually   become   as   indispensable   a
component   of   a   decision­making   process   as   observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi­judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) The   ongoing   judicial   trend   in   all   countries   committed   to
rule   of   law   and   constitutional   governance   is   in   favour   of
reasoned   decisions   based   on   relevant   facts.   This   is
virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(f) Judicial or even quasi­judicial opinions these days can be
as   different   as   the   judges   and   authorities   who   deliver
them.   All   these   decisions   serve   one   common   purpose
which   is   to   demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important
for   sustaining   the   litigants'   faith   in   the   justice   delivery
system.

21
(g) Insistence   on   reason   is   a   requirement   for   both   judicial
accountability and transparency.
(h) If   a   judge   or   a   quasi­judicial   authority   is   not   candid
enough   about   his/her   decision­making   process   then   it   is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to   the   doctrine   of   precedent   or   to   principles   of
incrementalism.
(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons”
is not to be equated with a valid decision­making process.
(j) It   cannot   be   doubted   that   transparency   is   the   sine   qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in   decision­making   not   only   makes   the   judges   and
decision­makers less prone to errors but also makes them
subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in   Defence
of   Judicial   Candor   [(1987)   100   Harvard   Law   Review   731­
37)
(k)  In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role
in   setting   up   precedents   for   the   future.   Therefore,   for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision   is   of   the   essence   and   is   virtually   a   part   of   “due
process”.
Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context
of   a   dismissal   of   a   revision   petition   by   a   cryptic   order   by   the
National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,   reliance
could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons
while deciding a matter.
21. The   Latin   maxim   “ cessante   ratione   legis   cessat   ipsa   lex ”
meaning “reason is  the soul of the law, and when the reason of

22
any   particular   law   ceases,   so   does   the   law   itself”,   is   also
apposite.
22. We   have   extracted   the   relevant   portions   of   the   impugned
orders   above.   At   the   outset,   we   find   that   the   extracted   portions
are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High
court while granting  bail. As evident from the judgments of this
Court   referred   to   above,   a   court   deciding   a   bail   application
cannot   grant   bail   to   an   accused   without   having   regard   to
material   aspects   of   the   case   such   as   the   allegations   made
against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations
are   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   would   result   in   a
conviction;   reasonable   apprehension   of   the   witnesses   being
influenced   by   the   accused;   tampering   of   the   evidence;   the
frivolity   in   the   case   of   the   prosecution;   criminal   antecedents   of
the   accused;   and   a   prima   facie   satisfaction   of   the   Court   in
support of the charge against the accused. 
While we are conscious of the fact that it is not necessary
for   a   Court   to   give   elaborate   reasons   while   granting   bail
particularly   when   the   case   is   at   the   initial   stage   and   the
allegations   of   the   offences   by   the   accused   may   not   have   been
crystalised  as  such, an  order   de   hors   any  reasoning whatsoever
cannot   result   in   grant   of   bail.   If   bail   is   granted   in   a   casual

23
manner,   the   prosecution   or   the   informant   has   a   right   to   assail
the order before a higher forum. As noted in   Gurcharan Singh
vs. State (Delhi Admn.)   ­ 1978 CriLJ 129,   when bail has been
granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have
arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court
seeking   cancellation   of   bail   under   section   439   (2)   of   the   CrPC.
However,   if   no   new   circumstances   have   cropped   up   since   the
grant   of   bail,   the   State   may   prefer   an   appeal   against   the   order
granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal
or   has   been   arrived   at   by   ignoring   material   aspects   which
establish a prima­facie case against the accused. 
23. In   view  of  the  aforesaid  discussion,  we   shall  now  consider
the   facts   of   the   present   cases.   The   allegations   against   accused­
respondents   as   well   as   the   contentions   raised   at   the   Bar   have
been   narrated   in   detail   above.   On   a   consideration   of   the   same,
the following aspects of the case would emerge: 
a)   The   allegations   against   the   accused­respondents   are   under
147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the
IPC,   with   regard   to   murder   of   the   deceased,   Yameen   and
attempt   to   murder   Mobin   and   Jamshed.   Thus   the   offences
alleged   against   the   accused   are   of   grave   and   heinous   nature

24
inasmuch   as   there   was   death   of   appellant’s   son   and   serious
injuries caused to her husband and another son.
b)   That   allegedly   the   accused­respondents   attacked   with   deadly
weapons such as swords and knives. 
c)   That   there   was   allegedly   a   pre­existing   enmity   between   the
deceased   and   Bhoora,   one   of   the   accused,   which   apparently
had been settled by the local residents. 
d)  The  accused­respondents  were  summoned   by  the  Trial   Court
by   order   dated   21 st
  September,   2019.   The   accused   preferred
an   application   under   section   482   CrPC   praying   for   an   order
quashing   the   order   dated   21 st
  September,   2019.   By   an   order
dated 11 th
 November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said
application   and   granted   30   days’   time   to   the   accused   to
surrender   before   the   Trial   Court.   The   accused­respondents
assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition,
being   SLP   (Crl.)   No.   10947/2019,   before   this   Court,   which
came to be dismissed by order dated 6 th
 December 2019. 
e)   The   accused­respondents   resisted   arrest   for   a   period   of
approximately   three   and   a   half   months   as   they   were
absconding.   The   accused   failed   to   surrender   before   the   Trial
Court   in   gross   violation   of   the   directions   of   the   Additional
District   and   Sessions   Judge,   the   High   Court   and   even   this

25
Court.   This   is   a   glaring   instance   of   gross   violation   of   the
courts’ orders and rule of law. 
f) The accused­respondents had preferred applications before the
Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   which   came   to   be
rejected by separate orders dated 8 th
 July, 2020. 
g)   The   chances   of   the   accused   absconding   are   grave   having
regard   to   their   previous   conduct,   if   they   are   on   bail.   This
would   delay   commencement   and   conclusion   of   the   trial   and
consequently have an adverse impact on the cause of justice. 
h)   The   propensity   of   accused­respondents   tampering   with   the
evidence and influencing the witnesses is an important factor
to   be   borne   in   mind   in   such   cases.   As   a   result,   the   accused
being beneficiaries of the same cannot be ruled out.  
i) The High Court in the impugned orders has failed to consider
the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant
of bail and has granted bail to the accused by cryptic orders.  
24. Having   considered   the  aforesaid   facts  of  the   present  cases
in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that these
cases   are  fit  cases  for  grant  of  bail   to  the   accused­respondents,
having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against them
as well as the aforesaid reasons. 

26
25. The   High   Court   has   lost   sight   of   the   aforesaid   material
aspects   of   the   cases   and   has,   by   a   very   cryptic   and   casual
orders,   de   hors   any   coherent   reasoning,   granted   bail   to   the
accused­respondents. We find that the High Court was not right
in   allowing   the   applications   for   bail   filed   by   the   accused­
respondents.   Hence   the   impugned   orders   dated   7 th
  May,   2020
and 17 th
 November, 2020 are set aside. The appeals are allowed. 
26. The   accused­respondents   are   on   bail.   Their   bail   bonds
stand   cancelled   and   they   are   directed   to   surrender   before   the
concerned   jail   authorities   within   a   period   of   two   weeks   from
today. 
……………………………J. 
(M.R. SHAH) 
……………………….…..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI; 
18 TH
 JANUARY, 2022.