/2022 INSC 0063/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 404  OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21428 of 2019]
RENAISSANCE HOTEL HOLDINGS INC.    ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
B. VIJAYA SAI AND OTHERS        ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   challenges   the   judgment   and   order   dated
12 th
 April 2019 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 1462
of   2012,   thereby   allowing   the   appeal   filed   by   the
respondents­defendants   herein   and   setting   aside   the
judgement   and   decree   of   the   Principal   District   Judge,
Bangalore   Rural   District,   Bangalore   (hereinafter   referred   to
1

as the “trial court”), dated 21 st
 June 2012 passed in O.S. No.
3 of 2009, in favour of the appellant­plaintiff herein.
3. The facts in  brief  giving  rise to  the  filing   of the  present
appeal are as under:
The   appellant­plaintiff   filed   a   suit   being   O.S.   No.   3   of
2009   before   the   trial   court   claiming   a   decree   of   permanent
injunction to restrain the respondents­defendants from using
the trade mark “SAI RENAISSANCE” or any other trade mark
identical   with   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark
“RENAISSANCE”,   and   from   opening,   operating,   managing,
franchising, licensing, dealing directly or indirectly in hotels,
restaurant   or   hospitality   services   of   any   manner   under   the
trade   mark   “RENAISSANCE”,   and   to   deliver   all   the   goods,
label   or   any   other   printed   material   bearing   the   impugned
mark   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”   or   “RENAISSANCE”   and   for
damages   amounting   to   Rs.3,50,000/­   for   having   used   its
trade mark.
4. It   is   the   case   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   that   it   is   a
company   incorporated   under   the   laws   of   the   State   of
Delaware, United States of America.   It is the further case of
2

the   appellant­plaintiff   that   it   is   the   holder   and   proprietor   of
the trade mark and service mark “RENAISSANCE” in relation
to   hotel,   restaurant,   catering,   bar,   cocktail   lounge,   fitness
club, spa services, etc.  It is the further case of the appellant­
plaintiff   that   the   trade   mark   “RENAISSANCE”   has  also   been
used in relation to a wide variety of goods commonly found in
the   appellant­plaintiff’s   hotels   such   as   bath   robes,   slippers,
shirts, hats, matchboxes, writing paper, candies, etc.   These
products   are   imprinted   with   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade
mark “RENAISSANCE”. It is the case of the appellant­plaintiff
that the trade mark “RENAISSANCE” has been used by it for
its   hospitality   business   throughout   the   world   since   the   year
1981.  That it is one of the world’s largest and leading chains
of hotels.  That it is using the trade mark “RENAISSANCE” in
India since 1990.  It is the case of the appellant­plaintiff that
it also runs a hotel and convention centre in Mumbai and in
Goa.     That   it   also   owns   a   registration   for   the   domain   name
www.renaissancehotels.com   and   spends   about   US$   14
million   annually   for   worldwide   advertisements   and
promotional activities.
3

5. It is the further case of the appellant­plaintiff that it has
the   registration   for   the   trade   mark   and   service   mark
“RENAISSANCE”   in   India,   under   Registration   No.   610567   in
Class   16   for   “printed   matter,   periodicals,   books,   stationery,
manuals,   magazines,   instructional   and   teaching   materials
and office requisites” and Registration No. 1241271 in Class
42   for   “hotel,   restaurant,   catering,   bar   and   cocktail   lounge
services, provisions of facilities for meetings, conferences and
exhibitions,   reservation   services   for   hotel   accommodations”,
respectively.
6. According   to   the   appellant­plaintiff,   it   came   across   a
website   at   www.sairenaissance.com   through   which   it
discovered   that   the   respondents­defendants   were   operating
one hotel in Bangalore and another one in Puttaparthi under
the   impugned   name   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”,   which   wholly
incorporates   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   well­known   trade   mark
and   service   mark   “RENAISSANCE”.   The   appellant­plaintiff
immediately   instructed   that   an   investigation   be   carried   out
and   sought   legal   advice   with   regard   to   the   violation   of   its
intellectual   property.     Upon   investigation,   it   was   revealed
4

that   the   respondents­defendants   were   running   one   hotel   at
Kadugodi,   near   Whitefield   Railway   Station,   Bangalore   and
another   one   at   By­Pass   Road,   Puttaparthi.     It   was   further
revealed   that   the   respondents­defendants   were   copying
appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark   “RENAISSANCE”,   its   stylized
representation, signage and business cards and leaflets.  It is
the case of the appellant­plaintiff that this was done in such
a   manner   so   as   to   suggest   an   affiliation,   association,   nexus
or   connection   with   the   business   of   the   appellant­plaintiff.
The appellant­plaintiff, therefore, claimed infringement  of its
registered trade mark “RENAISSANCE” in Class 16 and Class
42.     The   appellant­plaintiff   further   contended   that   a   similar
suit instituted by it at Kochi being C.S. No. 5 of 2005 before
the   District   Court   at   Ernakulam   was   decreed   in   its   favour
vide judgment dated 31 st
 January 2008.
7. The   respondents­defendants   resisted   the   claim   of   the
appellant­plaintiff   by   filing   their   written   statement.   It   was
contended   that   the   suit   was   liable   to   be   dismissed   on
account   of   delay,   laches   and   acquiescence.     It   was   further
contended   that   “RENAISSANCE”   is   a   generic   word   and   no
5

such exclusive rights can be claimed over  it in  India as it is
neither   a   well­known   mark,   nor   it   has   any   reputation   built
up   by   the   appellant­plaintiff.   It   is   the   case   of   the
respondents­defendants   that   they   are   ardent   devotees   of   Sri
Shirdi Sai Baba and Sri Puttaparthi Sai Baba.  It is the belief
of   all   the   devotees   of   Sri   Sai   Baba   including   the   first
respondent­defendant   that   Sri   Puttaparthi   Sai   Baba   is   the
reincarnation   of   Sri   Shirdi   Sai   Baba   and   therefore,   the   first
respondent­defendant   used   the   dictionary   word
“RENAISSANCE”   after   the   name   of   Sri   Shirdi   Sai   Baba   and
adopted the name “SAI RENAISSANCE”. It is the case of the
first   respondent­defendant   that   he   has   been   running   the
hotel for the last 15 years.  According to the first respondent­
defendant,   the   hotel   at   Kadugodi   near   Whitefield   was
established   in   the   year   2001   near   the   Ashram   of   Sri   Sai
Baba.     It   is   the   case   of   the   first   respondent­defendant   that
the   hotel   was   established   so   as   to   provide   facilities   to   the
devotees of Sri Sai Baba. The respondents­defendants further
submitted   that   even   the   first   respondent­defendant   was   not
aware   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   had   established   any   such
6

hotel by incorporating the word “RENAISSANCE” in its name
till he received suit summons in the said case.
8. It is contended by the respondents­defendants that the
word   “RENAISSANCE”   is   commonly   found   in   the   dictionary
and   is   used   by   a   large   number   of   people   and   therefore,   the
trade mark “RENAISSANCE” has not become distinctive with
the appellant­plaintiff as claimed by it. It is submitted by the
respondents­defendants   that   “RENAISSANCE”   is   neither   a
coined   word   nor   an   inventive   mark.   It   is   further   the   case   of
the   respondents­defendants   that   the   appellant­plaintiff’s
mark   “RENAISSANCE”   registered   under   Class   42   is   subject
to   rectification   proceedings,   and   as   such,   the   appellant­
plaintiff cannot claim that they are the registered proprietors
of the said trade mark “RENAISSANCE”.
9. It is the further case of the respondents­defendants that
the   class   of   customers   to   which   they   were   catering   was
totally   different   from   the   class   of   customers   to   which   the
appellant­plaintiff   was   catering.     It   is   their   case   that   the
services   provided   by   them   and   the   appellant­plaintiff   were
also totally different. It was contended that the respondents­
7

defendants did not provide non­vegetarian food and alcoholic
drinks   to   its   customers.     It   was   therefore   contended   that
there   was   no   possibility   of   confusion   being   created   in   the
minds   of   the   customers   that   the   hotel   of   the   respondents­
defendants   belonged   to   or   was   affiliated   to   the   appellant­
plaintiff.
10. The trial court framed the following issues: 
“1. Whether   the   Plaintiff   is   the   registered
proprietor   of   the   trade   mark/service   mark
“RENAISSANCE”   under   the   Trade   Mark   Act
1999?
2. Whether   the  plaintiff is the  proprietor   of trade
mark/service   mark   “Renaissance”   on   account
of  prior   adoption   and  use   in  relation   to   hotels
and hospitality business?
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant
is infringing the trade mark of the plaintiff?
4. Whether   the   plaintiff  proves   that   the   action   of
defendant is one of passing off?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an order for
delivery   of   goods,   labels   or   any   other   printed
materials?
6. Whether   plaintiff   is   entitled   for   rendition   of
accounts and damages?
7. To   what   reliefs   and   decree   the   parties   are
entitled for?
Additional Issues
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1. Whether  the   suit  is  not  maintainable  for  want
of   signing   and   verification   of   the   plaint   by
person having locus standi?
2. Whether   the   defendants   prove   that   they   have
been   honestly   and   continuously   using   the
trade mark Hotel SAIRenaissance?”
11. The trial court answered the aforesaid issues as under:
“12. My answer to the above issues are as under:
Issue No.1: Affirmative
Issue No.2: Affirmative
Issue No.3: Affirmative
Issue No.4: Negative
Issue No.5: Negative
Issue No.6: negative 
Additional   Issue
No.1: Affirmative
Additional   Issue
No.2: does not arise for
consideration”
12. The trial court after considering the evidence on record
and   contentions   raised   on   behalf   of   the   parties,   partly
decreed   the   suit   by   restraining   the   respondents­defendants
from using the trade mark “SAI RENAISSANCE” or any other
trade mark which incorporates the appellant­plaintiff’s trade
mark   “RENAISSANCE”   or   is   deceptively   similar   thereto   in
relation   to   or   upon   printed   matter,   periodicals,   books,
instructional   and   teaching   materials,   stationery,   manuals,
9

magazines and office requisites amounting to infringement of
the appellant­plaintiff’s registered trade mark No. 610567 in
Class 16 and for hotel, restaurant, catering, bar and cocktail
lounge   services,   provision   of   facilities   for   meetings,
conferences   and   exhibitions,   reservation   services   for   hotel
accommodations amounting to infringement of the appellant­
plaintiff’s   registered   trade   mark   No.   1241271   in   Class   42.
The trial court further restrained the respondents­defendants
from   opening,   operating,   managing,   franchising,   licensing,
dealing   directly   or   indirectly   in   hotels,   restaurant,   or
hospitality   services   of   any   manner   under   the   trade   mark   or
service   mark   “RENAISSANCE”   or   any   deceptively   similar
mark   “RENAISSANCE”   or   any   deceptively   similar   mark
including   on   the   internet   as   a   domain   name
www.sairenaissance    .com   or  in   any   manner   so  as to  pass off
their   services   as   those   of   or   concocted   with   the   appellant­
plaintiff.     The   trial   court,   however,   rejected   the   claim   of   the
appellant­plaintiff   for   damages.   Being   aggrieved  thereby,   the
respondents­defendants appealed before the High Court.
10

13. The High Court observed that the evidence produced by
the   appellant­plaintiff   did   not   disclose   that   a   trans­border
reputation was earned by it to uphold its plea in that regard.
The   High   Court   further   observed   that   the   appellant­plaintiff
is a 5 Star hotel but the respondents­defendants’ hotel is not
of   that   standard.     The   High   Court   further   observed   that   no
evidence was produced by the appellant­plaintiff to show that
the   respondents­defendants   were   taking   unfair   advantage   of
its   trade   mark   or   that   the   use   of   the   word   “SAI
RENAISSANCE”   was   detrimental   to   the   distinctive   character
or reputation of the appellant­plaintiff’s trade mark.
14. Insofar as the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the
case   of   M/s   The   RENAISSANCE,   Cochin   v.   M/s
RENAISSANCE   Hotels   Inc.   Marriotr 1
  in   which   injunction
was   granted   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   against   the   Hotel
(RENAISSANCE,   COCHIN)   is   concerned,   the   High   Court
observed   that   the   said   judgment   was   not   applicable   to   the
facts   of   the   present   case.     It   was   observed   that   in   the   said
case, one of the customers had claimed that he was misled to
1   RFA No. 235 of 2008 dated 28 th
 April, 2009
11

believe that “The RENAISSANCE, COCHIN” was a part of the
plaintiff’s   hotel   chain   and   therefore,   he   resided   there.     The
High   Court   observed   that   in   the   present   case,   none   of   the
customers had made such a claim.   It further observed that
the   witness   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   had   admitted   that   the
respondents­defendants   serve   only   vegetarian   food   without
liquor   and   that   he   had   no   idea   that   the   respondents­
defendants had established two hotels exclusively for serving
the   devotees   of   Satya   Sai   Baba   at   Puttaparthi   and
Bengaluru,   respectively.     The   High   Court   further   observed
that   the   evidence   on   record   shows   that   the   respondents­
defendants   have   not   taken   unfair   advantage,   or   that   its
existence   was   detrimental   to   the   distinctive   character   or
reputation   of   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark.     The   High
Court, therefore, observed that there was no infringement of
trade   mark,   and   as   such,   allowed   the   appeal   filed   by   the
respondents­defendants   herein   by   setting   aside   the
judgement   and   decree   dated   21 st
  June   2012   passed   by   the
trial court and dismissed the suit.   Being  aggrieved thereby,
the appellant­plaintiff has approached this Court.
12

15. We   have   heard   Shri   K.V.   Viswanathan,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   and
Shri B.C. Sitarama Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents­defendants. 
16. Shri   Viswanathan   submitted   that   the   test   under
Sections 29(1), 29(2) and 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
(hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) would be applicable
in   the   present   case,   where   the   class   of   goods   or   services   is
identical   or   similar.   He   submitted   that,   however,   the   High
Court   has   grossly   erred   in   applying   the   test   as   provided
under   Section   29(4)   of   the   said   Act.     The   learned   Senior
Counsel  submitted  that  the   High  Court   has  further  erred  in
only   referring   to   the   condition   stipulated   in   clause   (c)   of
Section   29(4)   of   the   said   Act.     He   submitted   that   Section
29(4) of the said Act would be applicable only if all the three
conditions specified therein are satisfied.  The learned Senior
Counsel   further   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   also
failed   to   take   into  consideration   that   since   the   respondents­
defendants   were   using   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   registered
trade mark “RENAISSANCE” as a part of their trade name for
13

the   hotels   and   as   a   part   of   the   name   of   their   business
concern, it squarely falls under sub­section (5) of Section 29
of   the   said   Act   and   therefore,   the   respondents­defendants
were liable for infringement of registered trade mark.
17. Shri   Viswanathan   further   submitted   that   merely
because   the   respondents­defendants   were   using   the   prefix
“SAI”   before   the   registered   trade   mark   of   the   appellant­
plaintiff,   it   would   not   save   them   from   an   action   for
infringement   of   the   registered   trade   mark.     He   further
submitted that the High Court, even after observing that the
appellant­plaintiff was a prior  user and registered proprietor
in respect of the mark “RENAISSANCE” and having held that
the respondents­defendants had adopted and had been using
the   registered   trade   mark   of   the   appellant­plaintiff
“RENAISSANCE” along with the prefix “SAI” and that both of
them   are   in   the   hotels   and   hospitality   business,   has   totally
erred   in   holding   that   there   was   no   infringement   of   the
appellant­plaintiff’s trade mark.   The learned Senior Counsel
in support of this proposition, relies on the judgment of this
14

Court   in   the   case   of   Laxmikant   V.   Patel   v.   Chetanbhai
Shah and Another 2
.
18. Shri   Viswanathan   further   submitted   that   the   test   of
deception or confusion has been wrongly applied by the High
Court inasmuch as, in an action for infringement, where the
respondents­defendants’   trade   mark   is   identical   with   the
appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark,   such   a   test   would   not   be
applicable.     In   support   of   this   proposition,   he   relies   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Ruston   &   Hornsby
Limited v. Zamindara Engineering Co. 3
.
19. Shri   Viswanathan   submitted   that   in   an   action   for
infringement, where the similarity between the plaintiff’s and
the defendant’s mark is close either visually, phonetically  or
otherwise, and once it is found by the Court that there is an
imitation,   no   further   evidence   is   required   to   establish   that
the   plaintiff’s   rights   are   violated.   Reliance   in  this   respect  is
placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of   Kaviraj
2   (2002) 3 SCC 65
3   (1969) 2 SCC 727
15

Pandit   Durga   Dutt   Sharma   v.   Navaratna
Pharmaceutical Laboratories 4
.
20. The   learned   Senior   Counsel   further   submitted   that   the
High Court, while reversing the judgement and decree passed
by   the   trial   court,   has   not   applied   the   law   correctly,   as   laid
down by this Court in the case of  Midas Hygiene Industries
(P) Limited and Another v. Sudhir Bhatia and Others 5
.
21. Shri Sitarama Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of   the   respondents­defendants,   submitted   that   the   very   suit
filed   by   the   appellant­plaintiff   itself   was   not   maintainable
inasmuch as the appellant­plaintiff was not a legal person.  It
is   further   submitted   that   “RENAISSANCE”   is   a   generic
English   word   and   the   appellant­plaintiff   cannot   claim
monopoly   of   the   same.     He   submitted   that   the   respondent
No. 1 was named “Vijaya Sai” by his parents as they believed
that   he   was   born   as   a   result   of   the   prayers   made   to   Sri   Sai
Baba.     It   is   further   submitted   that   “RENAISSANCE”   means
“re­birth”   and   that   the   name   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”   was
4   [1965] 1 SCR 737
5   (2004) 3 SCC 90
16

adopted for his hotel to signify the birth of Sri Puttaparthi Sai
Baba  as a reincarnation of Sri Shirdi Sai  Baba and that the
use   of   mark   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”   amounts   to   honest
concurrent use under Section 12 of the said Act.   He further
submitted   that   the   appellant­plaintiff   acquiesced   to   the
respondents­defendants’   use   of   the   mark   inasmuch   as   the
suit came to be filed after a long time gap.
22. Shri   Sitarama   Rao   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has
rightly held that the respondents­defendants’ use   was honest
and  that  the  reasoning  given  by  them  for  adopting  the  word
“SAI   RENAISSANCE”   was   justifiable.     He   further   submitted
that   the   High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   the   class   of
customers   to   which   the   appellant­plaintiff   and   the
respondents­defendants   were   catering   was   totally   different,
and   as   such,   had   rightly   allowed   the   appeal   and   dismissed
the suit.
23. The   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents­defendants relies on the judgments of this Court
in   the   cases   of   Khoday   Distilleries   Limited   (Now   known
as   Khoday   India   Limited)   v.   Scotch   Whisky   Association
17

and Others 6
,   Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative
Milk   Producers   Federation   Limited 7
,   Corn   Products
Refining   Co.   v.   Shangrila   Food   Products   Limited 8
  and
Neon   Laboratories   Limited   v.   Medical   Technologies
Limited and Others 9
.
24. Shri   Viswanathan,   in   rejoinder,   has   placed   certain
documents   on   record   to   show   that   the   respondents­
defendants   have   already   discontinued   the   use   of   the   term
“RENAISSANCE”   from   the   name   of   their   hotel,  signage,  etc.,
and   as   such,   accepted   that   their   use   of   the   term
“RENAISSANCE” amounted to infringement of the appellant­
plaintiff’s trade mark.
25. For   appreciation   of   the   rival   controversy,   it   will   be
appropriate   to   briefly   refer   to   the   legislative   scheme   with
regard to the trade mark laws.  
26. On  the  day   when  India  attained  independence, the   law
with   regard   to   registration   and   effective   protection   of   trade
6   (2008) 10 SCC 723
7   (2018) 9 SCC 183
8   [1960] 1 SCR 968
9   (2016) 2 SCC 672
18

marks   was   governed   by   The   Trade   Marks   Act,   1940
(hereinafter referred to as the “1940 Act”).   Section 21 of the
1940 Act provided for the right conferred by registration and
the exclusive right to use of the trade mark to the registered
proprietor   of   the   trade   mark   and   infringement   thereof.
Section 21 of the 1940 Act reads thus:
“ 21. Right conferred by registration .—   (1) Subject
to   the   provisions   of   Sections   22,   25   and   26,   the
registration of a person in the register as proprietor
of a trade mark in respect of any goods shall   give to
that   person   the   exclusive   right   to   the   use   of   the
trade   mark   in   relation   to   those   goods   and,   without
prejudice   to   the   generality   of   the   foregoing
provision, that right shall be deemed to be infringed
by   any   person   who,   not   being   the   proprietor   of   the
trade mark or a registered user thereof using by way
of   the   permitted   use,   uses   a   mark   identical   with   it
or   so   nearly   resembling  it   as  to   be  likely   to   deceive
or   cause   confusion,   in   the   course   of   trade,   in
relation   to   any   goods   in   respect   of   which   it   is
registered, and in such manner as to render the use
of the mark likely to be taken either—
( a ) as being used as a trade mark; or
( b )   to   import   a   reference   to   some   person
having   the   right   either   as  a  proprietor  or
as   registered   user   to   use   the   trade   mark
or  to  goods with  which  such a  person  as
aforesaid   is   connected   in   the   course   of
trade.”
19

27. The   legislature   noticed   that   the   1940   Act   was   enacted
prior   to   attaining   independence,   and   after   attaining
independence, the development in the field of commerce and
industry   was   quite   rapid,   and   it   was   found   that   the   law
relating to trade marks was not adequate enough to meet the
growing   demands.   Accordingly,   The   Trade   and   Merchandise
Marks   Act,   1958   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “1958   Act”)
was   enacted.   Section   29   of   the   1958   Act   dealt   with   the
infringement of trade marks, which reads thus:
“ 29.   Infringement   of   trade   marks . —(1)   A
registered trade mark is infringed by a person who,
not being the registered proprietor of the trade mark
or   a   registered   user   thereof   using   by   way   of
permitted   use,   uses   in   the   course   of   a   trade   mark
which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the
trade   mark,   in   relation   to   any   goods   in   respect   of
which   the   trade   mark   is   registered   and   in   such
manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be
taken as being used as a trade mark.
(2)   In   an   action   for   infringement   of   a   trade   mark
registered in  Part B  of  the register  an  injunction  or
other relief shall not be granted to the plaintiff if the
defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the court
that   the   use   of   the   mark   of   which   the   plaintiff
complains is not likely to deceive or cause confusion
or   to   be   taken   as   indicating   a   connection   in   the
course   of   trade   between   the   goods   in   respect   of
which the trade mark is registered and some person
having   the   right,   either   as   registered   proprietor   or
as registered user, to use the trade mark.”
20

28. Thereafter,   in   view   of   the   developments   in   trading   and
commercial   practices,   increasing   globalization   of   trade   and
industry,   the   need   to   encourage   investment   flows   and
transfer   of   technology,   and   the   need   for   simplification   and
harmonization   of   trade   mark   management   systems,   it   was
found   necessary   by   the   Parliament   to   repeal   the   1958   Act
and enact a new Act, i.e., the said Act.   It will be relevant to
refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act:
“The   Trade   and   Merchandise   Marks   Act,   1958   has
served its purpose over the last four decades.  It was
felt that a comprehensive review of the existing  law
be   made   in   view   of   developments   in   trading   and
commercial   practices,   increasing   globalization   of
trade   and   industry,   the   need   to   encourage
investment   flows   and   transfer   of   technology,   need
for   simplification   and   harmonization   of   trade   mark
management systems and to give effect to important
judicial   decisions.     To   achieve   these   purposes,   the
present   Bill   proposes   to   incorporate,   inter   alia   the
following, namely:­ 
…..
(j) prohibiting   use   of   someone   else’s   trade   marks
as   part   of   corporate   names,   or   name   of   business
concern;
……”
21

29. The   Trade   Marks   Bill   of   1999   was   passed   by   both   the
Houses   of   Parliament   and   the   assent   of   the   President   was
received   on   30 th
  December   1999.     It   came   into   force   on   15 th
September   2003.     It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   Sections   28
and 29 of the said Act:
“ 28. Rights conferred by registration .—(1) Subject
to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of
a   trade   mark   shall,   if   valid,   give   to   the   registered
proprietor   of   the   trade   mark   the   exclusive   right   to
the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or
services   in   respect   of   which   the   trade   mark   is
registered   and   to   obtain   relief   in   respect   of
infringement   of   the   trade   mark   in   the   manner
provided by this Act.
(2)   The   exclusive   right   to   the   use   of   a   trade   mark
given   under   sub­section   (1)   shall   be   subject   to   any
conditions and limitations to which the registration
is subject.
(3)   Where   two   or   more   persons   are   registered
proprietors of trade marks, which are identical with
or nearly resemble each other, the exclusive right to
the use of any of those trade marks shall not (except
so   far   as   their   respective   rights   are   subject   to   any
conditions or limitations entered on the register) be
deemed   to   have   been   acquired   by   any   one   of   those
persons   as   against   any   other   of   those   persons
merely   by   registration   of   the   trade   marks   but   each
of   those   persons   has   otherwise   the   same   rights   as
against   other   persons   (not   being   registered   users
using  by  way  of permitted use) as he would  have  if
he were the sole registered proprietor.
29.   Infringement   of   registered   trade   marks .—(1)
A   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a   person
22

who,   not   being   a   registered   proprietor   or   a   person
using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of
trade, a mark which is identical with, or deceptively
similar   to,   the   trade   mark   in   relation   to   goods   or
services   in   respect   of   which   the   trade   mark   is
registered and in such manner as to render the use
of   the   mark   likely   to   be   taken   as   being   used   as   a
trade mark.
(2)   A   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a
person   who,   not   being   a   registered   proprietor   or   a
person   using   by   way   of   permitted   use,   uses   in   the
course of trade, a mark which because of—
( a )   its   identity   with   the   registered   trade
mark   and   the   similarity   of   the   goods   or
services  covered by  such  registered trade
mark; or
( b ) its similarity to the registered trade mark
and the identity or similarity of the goods
or   services   covered   by   such   registered
trade mark; or
( c ) its identity with the registered trade mark
and   the   identity   of   the   goods   or   services
covered by such registered trade mark,
is   likely   to   cause   confusion   on   the   part   of   the
public, or which is likely to have an association with
the registered trade mark.
(3)   In   any   case   falling   under   clause   ( c )   of   sub­
section   (2),   the  court   shall   presume   that   it  is   likely
to cause confusion on the part of the public.
(4)   A   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a
person   who,   not   being   a   registered   proprietor   or   a
person   using   by   way   of   permitted   use,   uses   in   the
course of trade, a mark which—
( a )   is   identical   with   or   similar   to   the
registered trade mark; and
23

( b )   is   used   in   relation   to   goods   or   services
which   are   not   similar   to   those   for   which
the trade mark is registered; and
( c )   the   registered   trade   mark   has   a
reputation   in   India   and   the   use   of   the
mark   without   due   cause   takes   unfair
advantage   of   or   is   detrimental   to,   the
distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the
registered trade mark.
(5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person
if  he   uses   such   registered   trade  mark,   as   his   trade
name   or   part   of   his   trade   name,   or   name   of   his
business   concern   or   part   of   the   name,   of   his
business   concern   dealing   in   goods   or   services   in
respect of which the trade mark is registered.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses a
registered mark, if, in particular, he—
( a )   affixes   it   to   goods   or   the   packaging
thereof;
( b )   offers   or   exposes   goods   for   sale,   puts
them   on   the   market,   or   stocks   them   for
those purposes under the registered trade
mark, or offers or supplies services under
the registered trade mark;
( c )   imports   or   exports   goods   under   the
mark; or
( d )   uses   the   registered   trade   mark   on
business papers or in advertising.
(7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person
who   applies   such   registered   trade   mark   to   a
material   intended   to   be   used   for   labelling   or
packaging   goods,   as   a   business   paper,   or   for
advertising goods or services, provided such person,
when   he   applied   the   mark,   knew   or   had   reason   to
believe   that   the   application   of   the   mark   was   not
duly authorised by the proprietor or a licensee.
24

(8)   A   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   any
advertising of that trade mark if such advertising—
( a ) takes unfair advantage of and is contrary
to   honest   practices   in   industrial   or
commercial matters; or
( b ) is detrimental to its distinctive character;
or
( c )   is   against   the   reputation   of   the   trade
mark.
(9)   Where   the   distinctive   elements   of   a   registered
trade   mark   consist   of   or   include   words,   the   trade
mark   may   be   infringed   by   the   spoken   use   of   those
words as well as by  their  visual representation  and
reference   in  this   section   to  the   use  of  a  mark  shall
be construed accordingly.”
30. Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   28   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   subject   to   the   other   provisions   of   the   said   Act,   the
registration   of   a   trade   mark   shall,   if   valid,   give   to   the
registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive right to
the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or services
in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain
relief   in   respect   of   infringement   of   the   trade   mark   in   the
manner provided by the said Act.   Sub­section (2) of Section
28 of the said Act provides that the exclusive right to the use
of a trade mark given under  sub­section  (1) of  Section 28 of
the   said   Act   shall   be   subject   to   any   conditions   and
25

limitations   to   which   the   registration   is   subject.     The
provisions   of   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   28   of   the   said   Act
would not be relevant for the purpose of the present case.
31. Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   a   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a   person   who,
not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of
permitted  use,   uses  in   the   course  of   trade,   a   mark   which  is
identical   with,   or   deceptively   similar   to,   the   trade   mark   in
relation   to   goods   or   services   in   respect   of   which   the   trade
mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use
of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark.
Sub­section  (2) of  Section  29 of  the  said  Act provides  that  a
registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being
a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted
use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of its
identity   with   the   registered   trade   mark   and   the   similarity   of
the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark;
or its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity
or   similarity   of   the   goods   or   services   covered   by   such
registered trade mark; or its identity with the registered trade
26

mark   and   the   identity   of   the   goods   or   services   covered   by
such   registered   trade   mark,   is   likely   to   cause   confusion   on
the   part   of   the   public,   or   which   is   likely   to   have   an
association with the registered trade mark. Sub­section (3) of
Section 29 of the said Act is of vital importance.   It provides
that in any case falling under clause ( c ) of sub­section (2) of
Section 29 of the said Act, the court shall presume that it is
likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. 
32. A perusal of sub­section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act
would reveal that a registered trade mark would be infringed
by   a   person,   who   not   being   a   registered   proprietor   or   a
person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of
trade,   a   mark   which   because   of   the   three   eventualities
mentioned   in   clauses   (a),   (b)   and   (c),   is   likely   to   cause
confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have
an   association   with   the   registered   trade   mark.     The   first
eventuality   covered   by   clause   (a)   being   its   identity   with   the
registered   trade   mark   and   the   similarity   of   the   goods   or
services covered by such registered trade mark.   The second
one covered by clause (b) being its similarity to the registered
27

trade   mark   and   the   identity   or   similarity   of   the   goods   or
services   covered   by   such   registered   trade   mark.     The   third
eventuality stipulated in clause (c) would be its identity with
the   registered   trade   mark   and   the   identity   of   the   goods   or
services covered by such registered trade mark.  
33. It   is,   however,   pertinent   to   note   that   by   virtue   of   sub­
section (3) of Section 29 of the said Act, the legislative intent
insofar   as   the   eventuality   contained   in   clause   (c)   is
concerned, is clear.  Sub­section (3) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that in any case falling under clause (c) of sub­
section   (2)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act,   the   Court   shall
presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the
public.  
34. Sub­section   (4)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   a   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a   person   who,
not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of
permitted  use,   uses  in   the   course  of   trade,   a   mark   which  is
identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and is
used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those   for   which   the   trade   mark   is   registered;   and   the
28

registered trade mark has  a  reputation in India and the  use
of  the   mark   without  due   cause   takes  unfair  advantage  of   or
is   detrimental   to,   the   distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the
registered trade mark. 
35. Sub­section   (5)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   a   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a   person   if   he
uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of
his   trade   name,   or   name   of   his   business   concern   or   part   of
the   name,   of   his   business   concern   dealing   in   goods   or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
36. Sub­section   (6)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   for   the   purposes   of   this   section,   a   person   uses   a
registered mark, if, in particular, he affixes it to goods or the
packaging thereof; offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them
on the market, or stocks them for those purposes under the
registered   trade   mark,   or   offers   or   supplies   services   under
the   registered   trade   mark;   imports   or   exports   goods   under
the   mark;   or   uses   the   registered   trade   mark   on   business
papers or in advertising. 
29

37. Sub­section   (7)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that   a   registered   trade   mark   is   infringed   by   a   person   who
applies such registered trade mark to a material intended to
be   used   for   labelling   or   packaging   goods,   as   a   business
paper,   or   for   advertising   goods   or   services,   provided   such
person,   when   he   applied   the   mark,   knew   or   had   reason   to
believe   that   the   application   of   the   mark   was   not   duly
authorized by the proprietor or a licensee.
38. Sub­section   (8)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that a registered trade mark is infringed by any advertising of
that trade mark if such advertising takes unfair advantage of
and   is   contrary   to   honest   practices   in   industrial   or
commercial   matters;   or   is   detrimental   to   its   distinctive
character; or is against the reputation of the trade mark.
39. Sub­section   (9)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   provides
that where the distinctive elements of a registered trade mark
consist of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed
by   the   spoken   use   of   those   words   as   well   as   by   their   visual
30

representation   and   reference   in   this   section   to   the   use   of   a
mark shall be construed accordingly.
40. Section 30 of the said Act deals with the limits on effect
of   registered   trade   mark.     Section   30   of   the   said   Act,   which
would   also  be  of   vital   importance   in  the  present   case,  reads
thus:
“ 30.   Limits  on  effect  of  registered  trade  mark .—
(1)   Nothing   in   Section   29   shall   be   construed   as
preventing the use of a registered trade mark by any
person   for   the   purposes   of   identifying   goods   or
services as those of the proprietor  provided the use
—
( a ) is in accordance with honest practices
in industrial or commercial matters, and
( b )   is   not   such   as   to   take   unfair
advantage   of   or   be   detrimental   to   the
distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the
trade mark.
(2) A registered trade mark is not infringed where—
( a ) the use in relation to goods or services
indicates   the   kind,   quality,   quantity,
intended   purpose,   value,   geographical
origin, the time of production of goods or
of   rendering   of   services   or   other
characteristics of goods or services;
( b )   a   trade   mark   is   registered   subject   to
any   conditions   or   limitations,   the   use   of
the trade mark in any manner in relation
to goods to be sold or otherwise traded in,
in any place, or in relation to goods to be
31

exported   to   any   market   or   in   relation   to
services for use or available or acceptance
in   any   place   or   country   outside   India   or
in   any   other   circumstances,   to   which,
having   regard   to   those   conditions   or
limitations,   the   registration   does   not
extend;
( c ) the use by a person of a trade mark—
( i )   in   relation   to   goods   connected   in
the   course   of   trade   with   the
proprietor or a registered user of the
trade mark if, as to those goods or a
bulk   or   which   they   form   part,   the
registered   proprietor   or   the
registered   user   conforming   to   the
permitted use  has  applied  the  trade
mark   and   has   not   subsequently
removed   or   obliterated   it,   or   has   at
any   time   expressly   or   impliedly
consented   to   the   use   of   the   trade
mark; or
( ii )   in   relation   to   services   to   which
the   proprietor   of   such   mark   or   of   a
registered   user   conforming   to   the
permitted use has applied the mark,
where   the   purpose   and   effect   of   the
use   of   the   mark   is   to   indicate,   in
accordance with the fact, that those
services have been performed by the
proprietor or a registered user of the
mark;
( d ) the use of a trade mark by a person in
relation to goods adapted to form part of,
or   to   be   accessory   to,   other   goods   or
services   in   relation   to   which   the   trade
mark   has   been   used   without
infringement   of   the   right   given   by
registration   under   this   Act   or   might   for
32

the   time   being   be   so   used,   if   the   use   of
the trade mark is reasonably necessary in
order   to   indicate   that   the   goods   or
services   are   so   adapted,   and   neither   the
purpose   nor   the   effect   of   the   use   of   the
trade mark is to indicate, otherwise than
in accordance with the fact, a connection
in the course of trade between any person
and   the   goods   or   services,   as   the   case
may be;
( e )   the   use   of   a   registered   trade   mark,
being   one   of   two   or   more   trade   marks
registered   under   this   Act   which   are
identical   or   nearly   resemble   each   other,
in  exercise  of  the  right  to  the   use  of  that
trade   mark   given   by   registration   under
this Act.
(3) Where the goods bearing a registered trade mark
are   lawfully   acquired   by   a   person,   the   sale   of   the
goods   in   the   market   or   otherwise   dealing   in   those
goods by that person or by a person claiming under
or   through   him   is   not   infringement   of   a   trade   by
reason only of *
—
( a ) the registered trade mark having been
assigned   by   the   registered   proprietor   to
some   other   person,   after   the   acquisition
of those goods; or
( b )   the   goods   having   been   put   on   the
market   under   the   registered   trade   mark
by the proprietor or with his consent.
(4) Sub­section (3) shall not apply where there exists
legitimate   reasons   for   the   proprietor   to   oppose
further   dealings   in   the   goods   in   particular,   where
the   condition   of   the   goods,   has   been   changed   or
impaired after they have been put on the market.”
33

41. Section 31 of the said Act is also relevant in the present
case, which reads thus:
“ 31.   Registration   to   be   prima   facie   evidence   of
validity .—(1)   In   all   legal   proceedings   relating   to   a
trade   mark   registered   under   this   Act   (including
applications   under   Section   57),   the   original
registration of the trade mark and of all subsequent
assignments   and   transmissions   of   the   trade   mark
shall be   prima facie   evidence of the validity thereof.
(2) In all legal proceedings, as aforesaid a registered
trade   mark   shall   not   be   held   to   be   invalid   on   the
ground   that   it   was   not   a   registrable   trade   mark
under   Section   9   except   upon   evidence   of
distinctiveness   and   that   such   evidence   was   not
submitted to the Registrar before registration, if it is
proved that the trade mark had been so used by the
registered proprietor or his predecessor in title as to
have become distinctive at the date of registration.”
42. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   in   all   legal   proceedings
relating   to   trade   mark   registered   under   the   said   Act,   the
original registration of the trade mark and of all subsequent
assignments   and   transmissions   of   the   trade   mark   shall   be
prima facie  evidence of the validity thereof.  
43. The   legislative   scheme   is   clear   that   when   the   mark   of
the   defendant   is   identical   with   the   registered   trade   mark   of
the plaintiff and the goods or  services covered are similar to
34

the   ones   covered   by   such   registered   trade   mark,   it   may   be
necessary to prove that it is likely to cause confusion on the
part   of   the   public,   or   which   is   likely   to   have   an   association
with   the   registered   trade   mark.     Similarly,   when   the   trade
mark of the plaintiff is similar to the registered trade mark of
the   defendant   and   the   goods   or   services   covered   by   such
registered trade mark are identical or similar to the goods or
services covered by such registered trade mark, it may again
be  necessary  to  establish that  it is likely  to  cause confusion
on the part of the public.   However, when the trade mark of
the   defendant   is   identical   with   the   registered   trade   mark   of
the   plaintiff   and   that   the   goods   or   services   of   the   defendant
are identical with the goods or services covered by registered
trade mark, the Court shall presume that it is likely to cause
confusion on the part of the public.  
44. Having   considered   the   legislative   scheme   as   has   been
elaborately   provided   in   the   said   Act,   it   will   be   apposite   to
refer   to   the   observations   of   this   Court,   while   considering
Section   21   of   The   Trade   Marks   Act,   1940   in   the   case   of
Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma  (supra):  
35

“ 28.   The other ground of objection that the findings
are   inconsistent   really   proceeds   on   an   error   in
appreciating   the   basic   differences   between   the
causes   of   action   and   right   to   relief   in   suits   for
passing   off   and   for   infringement   of   a   registered
trade   mark   and   in   equating   the   essentials   of   a
passing off action with those in respect of an action
complaining of an infringement of a registered trade
mark. We have already pointed out that the suit by
the respondent complained both of an invasion of a
statutory   right   under   Section   21   in   respect   of   a
registered   trade   mark   and   also   of   a   passing   off   by
the   use   of   the   same   mark.   The   finding   in   favour   of
the appellant to which the learned counsel drew our
attention   was   based   upon   dissimilarity   of   the
packing  in   which  the  goods  of  the  two  parties  were
vended, the difference in the physical appearance of
the   two   packets   by   reason   of   the   variation   in   the
colour   and   other   features   and   their   general   get­up
together   with   the   circumstance   that   the   name   and
address   of   the   manufactory   of   the   appellant   was
prominently   displayed   on   his   packets   and   these
features   were   all   set   out   for   negativing   the
respondent's claim that the appellant had passed off
his goods as those of the respondent. These matters
which   are   of   the   essence   of   the   cause   of   action   for
relief on the ground of passing off play but a limited
role   in   an   action   for   infringement   of   a   registered
trade   mark   by   the   registered   proprietor   who   has   a
statutory   right   to   that   mark   and   who   has   a
statutory remedy for the event of the use by another
of that mark or a colourable imitation thereof. While
an  action  for   passing  off  is  a  Common   Law  remedy
being   in   substance   an   action   for   deceit,   that   is,   a
passing off by a person of his own goods as those of
another,   that   is   not   the   gist   of   an   action   for
infringement.   The   action   for   infringement   is   a
statutory   remedy   conferred   on   the   registered
proprietor   of   a   registered   trade   mark   for   the
vindication   of   the   exclusive   right   to   the   use   of   the
36

trade mark in relation to those goods” (Vide Section
21 of the Act). The use by the defendant of the trade
mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an action for
passing off, but is the sine qua non in the case of an
action   for   infringement.   No   doubt,   where   the
evidence in respect of passing off consists merely of
the   colourable   use   of   a   registered   trade   mark,   the
essential features of both the actions might coincide
in   the   sense   that   what   would   be   a   colourable
imitation   of   a   trade   mark   in   a   passing   off   action
would also be such in an action for infringement of
the same trade mark. But there the correspondence
between   the   two   ceases.   In   an   action   for
infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out
that   the   use   of   the   defendant's   mark   is   likely   to
deceive,   but   where   the   similarity   between   the
plaintiff's   and   the   defendant's   mark   is   so   close
either   visually,   phonetically   or   otherwise   and   the
court   reaches   the   conclusion   that   there   is   an
imitation,   no   further   evidence   is   required   to
establish   that   the   plaintiff's   rights   are   violated.
Expressed   in   another   way,   if   the   essential   features
of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted
by   the   defendant,   the   fact   that   the   get­up,   packing
and   other   writing   or   marks   on   the   goods   or   on   the
packets   in   which   he   offers   his   goods   for   sale   show
marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin
different from that of the registered proprietor of the
mark   would   be   immaterial;   whereas   in   the   case   of
passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he
can   show   that   the   added   matter   is   sufficient   to
distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff.”
45. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   pointed   out
the   distinction   between   the   causes   of   action   and   right   to
relief   in   suits   for   passing   off   and   for   infringement   of
37

registered trade mark.  It has been held that the essentials of
a   passing   off   action   with   those   in   respect   of   an   action
complaining   of   an   infringement   of   a   registered   trade   mark,
cannot   be   equated.     It   has   been   held   that   though   an   action
for passing off is a Common Law remedy being an action for
deceit, that is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as
those   of   another;   the   action   for   infringement   is   a   statutory
right   conferred   on   the   registered   proprietor   of   a   registered
trade   mark   for   the   vindication   of   the   exclusive   rights   to   the
use of the trade mark in relation to those goods. The use by
the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is a   sine qua
non   in   the   case   of   an   action   for   infringement.   It   has   further
been   held   that   if   the   essential   features   of   the   trade   mark   of
the   plaintiff   have   been   adopted   by   the   defendant,   the   fact
that   the   get­up,   packing   and   other   writing   or   marks   on   the
goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale
show   marked   differences,   or   indicate   clearly   a   trade   origin
different   from   that   of   the   registered   proprietor   of   the   mark,
would   be   immaterial   in   a   case   of   infringement   of   the   trade
mark,   whereas   in   the   case   of   a   passing   off,   the   defendant
38

may  escape liability if he can show that the added matter  is
sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff.
46. Again, while considering the provisions of Section 21 of
the   1940   Act,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Ruston   &   Hornsby
Limited  (supra), observed thus:
“ 4.   It   very   often   happens   that   although   the
defendant   is   not   using   the   trade   mark   of   the
plaintiff, the get up of the defendant's goods may be
so   much   like   the   plaintiff's   that   a   clear   case   of
passing   off   would   be   proved.   It   is   on   the   contrary
conceivable   that   although   the   defendant   may   be
using   the   plaintiff's   mark   the   get   up   of   the
defendant's   goods   may   be   so   different   from   the   get
up   of   the   plaintiff's   goods   and   the   prices   also   may
by so different that there would be no probability of
deception   of   the   public.   Nevertheless,   in   an   action
on the trade mark, that is to say, in an infringement
action,   an   injunction   would   issue   as   soon   as   it   is
proved   that   the   defendant   is   improperly   using   the
plaintiff's mark.
5.   The action for infringement is a statutory right. It
is   dependent   upon   the   validity   of   the   registration
and   subject   to   other   restrictions   laid   down   in
Sections   30,   34   and   35   of   the   Act.   On   the   other
hand the gist of a passing off action is that   A   is not
entitled to represent his goods as the goods of   B   but
it   is   not   necessary   for   B   to   prove   that   A   did   this
knowingly or with any intent to deceive. It is enough
that   the   get­up   of   B 's   goods   has   become   distinctive
of them and that there is a probability of confusion
between them and the goods of   A.   No case of actual
deception nor any actual damage need be proved. At
common   law   the   action   was   not   maintainable
39

unless   there   had   been   fraud   on   A 's   part.   In   equity,
however,   Lord   Cottenham,   L.C.,
in   Millington   v.   Fox   [3 My & Cr 338] held that it was
immaterial   whether   the   defendant   had   been
fraudulent or not in using the plaintiff's trade mark
and granted an injunction accordingly. The common
law   courts,   however,   adhered   to   their   view   that
fraud   was   necessary   until   the   Judicature   Acts,   by
fusing   law   and   equity,   gave   the   equitable   rule   the
victory over the common law rule.
6.   The   two   actions,   however,   are   closely   similar   in
some respects. As was observed by the Master of the
Rolls   in   Saville   Perfumery   Ltd.   v.   June   Perfect
Ltd.   [58 RPC 147 at 161] :
“The   statute   law   relating   to   infringement
of   trade   marks   is   based   on   the   same
fundamental   idea   as   the   law   relating   to
passing­off. But it differs from that law in
two   particulars,   namely   (1)   it   is
concerned   only   with   one   method   of
passing­off,   namely,   the   use   of   a   trade
mark,   and   (2)   the   statutory   protection   is
absolute in the sense that once a mark is
shown   to   offend,   the   user   of   it   cannot
escape   by   showing   that   by   something
outside   the   actual   mark   itself   he   has
distinguished his goods from those of the
registered   proprietor.   Accordingly,   in
considering   the   question   of   infringement
the   Courts   have   held,   and   it   is   now
expressly   provided   by   the   Trade   Marks
Act,   1938,   Section   4,   that   infringement
takes place not merely by exact imitation
but   by   the   use   of   a   mark   so   nearly
resembling   the   registered   mark   as   to   be
likely to deceive.””
40

47. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   again   reiterated
that   the question to be asked   in an infringement action   is  as
to whether the defendant is using a mark which is same as,
or which is a colourable imitation of the plaintiff’s registered
trade mark.   It has further been held that though the get up
of   the   defendant’s   goods   may   be   so   different   from   the
plaintiff’s goods and the prices may also be so different that
there   would   be   no   probability   of   deception   of   the   public,
nevertheless   even   in   such   cases,   i.e.,   in   an   infringement
action, an injunction would be issued as soon as it is proved
that the defendant is improperly using the plaintiff’s mark.  It
has been reiterated that no case of actual deception nor any
actual damage needs to be proved in such cases. This Court
has   further   held   that   though   two   actions   are   closely   similar
in   some   respects,   in   an   action   for   infringement,   where   the
defendant’s   trade   mark   is   identical   with   the   plaintiff’s   trade
mark, the Court will not enquire whether the infringement is
such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
41

48. In   the   present   case,   both   the   trial   court   and   the   High
Court have come to the conclusion that the trade mark of the
respondents­defendants   is   identical   with   that   of   the
appellant­plaintiff   and   further   that   the   services   rendered   by
the   respondents­defendants   are   under   the   same   class,   i.e.,
Class   16   and   Class   42,   in   respect   of   which   the   appellant­
plaintiff’s   trade   mark   “RENAISSANCE”   was   registered.     In
such circumstances, the trial court had rightly held that the
goods   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   would   be   covered   by   Section
29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) of the said Act. 
49. However,   the   High   Court,   while   reversing   the   decree   of
injunction   granted   by   the   trial   court,   has   held   that   the
appellant­plaintiff had failed to establish that the trade mark
has reputation in India and that the respondents­defendants’
use   thereof   was   honest   and   further   that   there   was   no
confusion likely to be created in the minds of the consumers
inasmuch as the class of consumers was totally different.   It
appears   that   the   High   Court  has   relied   only   on   clause   (c)   of
sub­section (4) of Section 29 of the said Act to arrive at such
a conclusion.  
42

50. We find that the High Court has totally erred in taking
into consideration only clause (c) of sub­section (4) of Section
29   of   the   said   Act.     It   is   to   be   noted   that,   whereas,   the
legislature has used the word ‘or’ after clauses (a) and (b) in
sub­section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act, it has used the
word   ‘and’   after   clauses   (a)   and   (b)   in   sub­section   (4)   of
Section   29   of   the   said   Act.     It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the
legislative   intent   is   very   clear.     Insofar   as   sub­section   (2)   of
Section   29   of   the   said   Act   is   concerned,   it   is   sufficient   that
any   of   the   conditions   as   provided   in   clauses   (a),   (b)   or   (c)   is
satisfied.  
51. It is further clear that in case of an eventuality covered
under clause (c) of sub­section (2) of Section 29 in view of the
provisions of sub­section (3) of Section 29 of the said Act, the
Court   shall   presume   that   it   is   likely   to   cause   confusion   on
the part of the public. 
52. The perusal of sub­section (4) of Section 29 of the said
Act   would   reveal   that   the   same   deals   with   an   eventuality
when the impugned trade mark is identical with or similar to
43

the registered trade mark and is used in relation to goods or
services   which   are   not   similar   to   those   for   which   the   trade
mark   is   registered.   Only   in   such   an   eventuality,   it   will   be
necessary   to   establish   that   the   registered   trade   mark   has   a
reputation   in   India   and   the   use   of   the   mark   without   due
cause   takes   unfair   advantage   of   or   is   detrimental   to,   the
distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the   registered   trade   mark.
The   legislative   intent   is   clear   by   employing   the   word   “and”
after clauses (a) and (b) in sub­section (4) of Section 29 of the
said Act.   Unless all the three conditions are satisfied, it will
not be open to the proprietor of the registered trade mark to
sue for infringement when though the impugned trade mark
is   identical   with   the   registered   trade   mark,   but   is   used   in
relation   to   goods   or   services   which   are   not   similar   to   those
for   which   the   trade   mark   is   registered.     To   sum   up,   while
sub­section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act deals with those
situations   where   the   trade   mark   is   identical   or   similar   and
the   goods   covered   by   such   a   trade   mark   are   identical   or
similar,   sub­section   (4)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   deals
with situations where though the trade mark is identical, but
44

the   goods   or   services   are   not   similar   to   those   for   which   the
trade mark is registered.  
53. Undisputedly,   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark
“RENAISSANCE”   is   registered   in   relation   to   goods   and
services   in   Class   16   and   Class   42   and   the   mark   “SAI
RENAISSANCE”,   which   is   identical   or   similar   to   that   of   the
appellant­plaintiff’s   trade   mark,   was   being   used   by   the
respondents­defendants in relation to the goods and services
similar to that of the appellant­plaintiff’s. 
54. In   these   circumstances,   we   are   of   the   considered   view
that it was not open for the High Court to have entered into
the   discussion   as   to   whether   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade
mark   had   a   reputation   in   India   and   the   use   of   the   mark
without   due   cause   takes   unfair   advantage   of   or   is
detrimental   to,   the   distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the
registered trade mark.  We find that the High Court has erred
in   entering   into   the   discussion   as   to   whether   the
respondents­defendants   and   the   appellant­plaintiff   cater   to
different   classes   of   customers   and   as   to   whether   there   was
45

likely to be confusion in the minds of consumers with regard
to   the   hotel   of   the   respondents­defendants   belonging   to   the
same   group   as   of   the   appellant­plaintiff’s.     As   held   by   this
Court in the case of   Ruston & Hornsby Limited   (supra), in
an   action   for   infringement,   once   it   is   found   that   the
defendant’s   trade   mark   was   identical   with   the   plaintiff’s
registered trade mark, the Court could not have gone into an
enquiry   whether   the   infringement   is   such   as   is   likely   to
deceive   or   cause   confusion.     In   an   infringement   action,   an
injunction   would   be   issued   as   soon   as   it   is   proved   that   the
defendant is improperly using the trade mark of the plaintiff.
55. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   appellant­plaintiff’s   trade
mark   “RENAISSANCE”   is   registered   under   Class   16   and
Class   42,  which   deals   with   hotels   and   hotel   related   services
and   goods.     It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the   mark   and   the
business   name   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”,   which   was   being   used
by the respondents­defendants, was also in relation to Class
16   and   Class   42.   As   such,   the   use   of   the   word
“RENAISSANCE” by the respondents­defendants as a part of
46

their trade name or business concern, would squarely be hit
by sub­section (5) of Section 29 of the said Act.
56. It is further to be noted that the words “RENAISSANCE”
and “SAI RENAISSANCE” are phonetically as well as visually
similar.  As already discussed hereinabove, sub­section (9) of
Section 29 of the said Act provides that where the distinctive
elements   of   a   registered   trade   mark   consist   of   or   include
words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken use of
those   words   as   well   as   by   their   visual   representation.     As
such,   the   use   of   the   word   “SAI   RENAISSANCE”   which   is
phonetically   and   visually   similar   to   “RENAISSANCE”,   would
also   be   an   act   of   infringement   in   view   of   the   provisions   of
sub­section (9) of Section 29 of the said Act.
57. It is pertinent to note that, the High Court has relied on
Section   30(1)(b)   of   the   said   Act   in   paragraph   (18)   of   the
impugned judgment.  It will be relevant to refer to paragraph
(18), which reads thus:
“18.   Section 30(1)(b) of the Act has also contextual
application. This Section reads as follows:­
“ 30.     Limits   of   effect   of   registered
trade   mark.­     (1)     Nothing   in   section   29
47

shall   be   construed   as   preventing   the   use
of a registered trade mark by  any person
for   the   purposes   of   identifying   goods   or
services   as   those   of   the   proprietor
provided the use­
(a) xxxxxxxxxxx
(b) is   not   such   as   to   take   unfair
advantage   of   or   be   detrimental   to
the   distinctive   character   or   repute
of the trade mark.””
58. The   glaring   mistake   that   has   been   committed   by   the
High   Court   is   the   failure   to   notice   the   following   part   of
Section 30(1) of the said Act:
“(a)   is   in   accordance   with   honest   practices   in
industrial or commercial matters, and”
59. The perusal of Section 30(1) of the said Act would reveal
that for availing the benefit of Section 30 of the said Act, it is
required   that   the   twin   conditions,   i.e.,   the   use   of   the
impugned   trade   mark   being   in   accordance   with   the   honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters, and that such
a   use   is   not   such   as   to   take   unfair   advantage   of   or   be
detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the trade
mark, are required to be fulfilled.  It is again to be noted that
48

in   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   30   of   the   said   Act,   after   clause
(a),   the   word   used   is   ‘and’,   like   the   one   used   in   sub­section
(4)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act,   in   contradistinction   to   the
word ‘or’ used in sub­section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act.
The High Court has referred only to the condition stipulated
in   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   30   of   the   said   Act
ignoring the fact that, to get the benefit of sub­section (1) of
Section   30   of   the   said   Act,   both   the   conditions   had   to   be
fulfilled.   Unless   it   is   established   that   such   a   use   is   in
accordance   with   the   honest   practices   in   industrial   or
commercial matters, and is not to take unfair advantage or is
not   detrimental   to   the   distinctive   character   or   repute   of   the
trade mark, one could not get benefit under Section 30(1) of
the said Act. As such, the finding in this regard by the High
Court is also erroneous. 
60. We   find   that   the   High   Court   has   failed   to   take   into
consideration two important principles of interpretation.  The
first   one   being   of   textual   and   contextual   interpretation.     It
will  be  apposite   to   refer   to   the  guiding   principles,   succinctly
summed up by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in the judgment of this
49

Court   in   the   case   of   Reserve   Bank   of   India   v.   Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others 10
:
“ 33.   Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context.   They   are   the   bases   of   interpretation.   One
may   well   say   if   the   text   is   the   texture,   context   is
what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both
are   important.   That   interpretation   is   best   which
makes   the   textual   interpretation   match   the
contextual.   A   statute   is   best   interpreted   when   we
know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the
statute   must   be   read,   first   as   a   whole   and   then
section   by   section,   clause   by   clause,   phrase   by
phrase  and   word by   word.  If  a  statute  is  looked  at,
in   the   context   of   its   enactment,   with   the   glasses   of
the   statute­maker,   provided   by   such   context,   its
scheme,   the   sections,   clauses,   phrases   and   words
may take colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses provided by
the context. With these glasses we must look at the
Act as a whole and discover what each section, each
clause,   each   phrase   and   each   word   is   meant   and
designed   to   say   as   to   fit   into   the   scheme   of   the
entire   Act.   No   part   of   a   statute   and   no   word   of   a
statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have
to be construed so that every word has a place and
everything   is   in   its   place.   It   is   by   looking   at   the
definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act
and   by   reference   to   what   preceded   the   enactment
and   the   reasonsfor   it   that   the   Court   construed   the
expression   “Prize   Chit”   in   Srinivasa   [(1980)   4   SCC
507 : (1981) 1 SCR 801 : 51 Com Cas 464] and we
find   no   reason   to   depart   from   the   Court's
construction.”
10   (1987) 1 SCC 424
50

61. It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions
of   a   statute,   it   is   necessary   that   the   textual   interpretation
should be matched with the contextual one.  The Act must be
looked   at   as   a   whole   and   it   must   be   discovered   what   each
section,   each   clause,   each   phrase   and   each   word   is   meant
and   designed   to   say   as   to   fit   into   the   scheme   of   the   entire
Act.     No   part   of   a   statute   and   no   word   of   a   statute   can   be
construed in isolation.  Statutes have to be construed so that
every   word   has   a   place   and   everything   is   in   its   place.     As
already   discussed   hereinabove,   the   said   Act   has   been
enacted   by   the   legislature   taking   into   consideration   the
increased   globalization   of   trade   and   industry,   the   need   to
encourage   investment   flows   and   transfer   of   technology,   and
the  need  for  simplification  and   harmonization  of  trade  mark
management   systems.     One   of   the   purposes   for   which   the
said Act has been enacted is prohibiting the use of someone
else’s   trade   mark   as   a   part   of   the   corporate   name   or   the
name of business concern.   If the entire scheme of the Act is
construed as a whole, it provides for the rights conferred by
registration   and   the   right   to   sue   for   infringement   of   the
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registered   trade   mark   by   its   proprietor.     The   legislative
scheme   as   enacted   under   the   said   statute   elaborately
provides   for   the   eventualities   in   which   a   proprietor   of   the
registered trade mark can bring an action for infringement of
the trade mark and the limits on effect of the registered trade
mark.   By picking up a part of the provisions in sub­section
(4) of Section 29 of the said Act and a part of the provision in
sub­section   (1)   of   Section   30   of   the   said   Act   and   giving   it   a
textual meaning without considering the context in which the
said provisions have to be construed, in our view, would not
be   permissible.     We   are  at   pains   to   say   that   the   High  Court
fell in error in doing so.  
62. Another   principle   that   the   High   Court   has   failed   to
notice is that a part of a section cannot be read in isolation.
This   Court,   speaking   through   A.P.   Sen,   J.,   in   the   case   of
Balasinor   Nagrik   Cooperative   Bank   Ltd.   v.   Babubhai
Shankerlal Pandya and Others 11
, observed thus:  
“ 4.  …..It is an elementary rule that construction of a
section is to be made of all parts together. It is not
permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle
11   (1987) 1 SCC 606
52

that the statute must be read as a whole is equally
applicable to different parts of the same section…..”
This principle was reiterated by this Court in the case of
Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai and Others 12
:
“ 6.  ….. It is well settled that a section has to be read
in   its   entirety   as   one   composite   unit   without
bifurcating it or ignoring any part of it…..”
63. Ignoring   this   principle,   the   High   Court   has   picked   up
clause   (c)   of   sub­section   (4)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act   in
isolation   without   even   noticing   the   other   provisions
contained in the said sub­section (4) of Section 29 of the said
Act.     Similarly,   again   while   considering   the   import   of   sub­
section (1) of Section 30 of the said Act, the High Court has
only   picked   up   clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   30   of
the   said   Act,   ignoring   the   provisions   contained   in   clause   (a)
of the said sub­section (1) of Section 30 of the said Act.
64. That   leaves   us   with   the   reliance   placed   by   the   High
Court   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Midas
12   (1991) 3 SCC 410
53

Hygiene Industries (P) Limited  (supra). The High Court has
relied   on   the   following   observations   of   this   Court   in   the
aforementioned case :
“ 5.   The law on the subject is well settled. In cases of
infringement   either   of   trade   mark   or   of   copyright,
normally   an   injunction   must   follow.   Mere   delay   in
bringing   action   is   not   sufficient   to   defeat   grant   of
injunction   in   such   cases.   The   grant   of   injunction
also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that
the adoption of the mark was itself dishonest.
[emphasis supplied by me]”
65. The   emphasis   has   been   placed   by   the   High   Court
on   the   observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Midas
Hygiene Industries (P) Limited  (supra) to the effect that the
grant   of   injunction   also   becomes   necessary   if   it   prima   facie
appears   that   the   adoption   of   the   mark   was   itself   dishonest.
The   High   Court   has   relied   upon   the   said   observations   to
reverse the order of injunction on the ground that there is no
dishonesty   in   the   respondents­defendants’   adoption   of   the
mark and therefore, they cannot be said to have infringed the
trade   mark.     In   our   considered   view,   the   aforesaid
observations   are  made   out   of   context.     In   the   said   case,   the
54

suit   was   filed   for   passing   off   or   for   infringement   of   the
copyright.     In   the   said   case,   the   Single   Judge   of   the   High
Court   had   granted   injunction   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   from
manufacturing,   marketing,   distributing   or   selling
insecticides,   pesticides   as   well   as   insect   repellent   under   the
name   ‘LAXMAN   REKHA’.     The   Division   Bench   had   vacated
the   injunction   on   the   ground   that   there   was   delay   and
laches.     This   Court   found   that   at   least   from   1991,   the
plaintiff   was   using   the   mark   ‘LAXMAN   REKHA’   and   the
plaintiff was having a copyright in the marks ‘KRAZY LINES’
and  ‘LAXMAN  REKHA’  with  effect  from   19 th
  November  1991.
It   was   also   found   that   the   respondent   worked   with   the
plaintiff   prior   to   launching   his   business.     In   the   said   case,
this   Court   observed   that   the   grant   of   injunction   becomes
necessary   if   it   prima   facie   appears   that   the   adoption   of   the
mark   was   itself   dishonest.     However,   the   said   judgment
cannot   be   used   as   a   ratio   for   the   proposition   that,   if   the
plaintiff fails to prove that the defendant’s use was dishonest,
an   injunction   cannot   be   granted.   On   the   contrary,   the   High
Court   has   failed   to   take   into   consideration   the   observations
55

made  in the  very  same paragraph  to  the effect  that  in  cases
of infringement, either of a trade mark or copyright, normally
an injunction must follow.
66. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for
the respondents­defendants on the judgment of this Court in
the   case   of   Khoday   Distilleries   Limited   (supra)   is
concerned , the said case arose out of an application filed by
the applicants on 21 st
  April 1986 with regard to rectification
of   the   trade   mark.   In   the   said   case,   the   manufacture   of   the
product was started by the company in May 1968.   The said
company   filed   an   application   for   registration   of   its   mark
before   the   competent   authority.     The   manufacturer   was
informed that its application was accepted and it was allowed
to   proceed   with   the   advertisement   and   the   trade   mark   was
subsequently   registered   inasmuch   as   there   was   only   one
opposition,   and   as   such,   the   trade   mark   came   to   be
registered.   The   applicants   had   not   filed   any   opposition
application.   They came to know of the manufacturer’s mark
on  or  about 20 th
  September  1974.   They  filed an application
for   rectification   of   the   said   trade   mark   on   21 st
  April   1986.
56

The question of acquiescence was considered in the said case
since   it   was   noticed   that   though   the   product   was   being
manufactured   since   1968   and   though   the   applicants   who
sought rectification application came to know about the same
on   or   around   20 th
  September   1974,   the   rectification
application   came   to   be   filed   only   in   the   year   1986.   The
present   case   arises   out   of   an   action   for   infringement   of   a
trade mark.   As such, ratio in   Khoday Distilleries Limited
(supra) ,   would   not   be   applicable   to   the   present   case.     It   is
further   to   be   noted   that   this   Court   in   paragraph   (84)   of   the
said judgment has specifically observed that the said Act had
no application in the said case, which reads thus:
“ 84.   So   far   as   the   applicability   of   the   1999   Act   is
concerned,   having   regard   to   the   provisions   of
Sections 20(2) and 26(2), we are of the opinion that
the 1999 Act will have no application.”
67. In   that   view   of   the   matter,   reliance   placed   by   the
respondents­defendants on the judgment of this Court in the
case of  Khoday Distilleries Limited  (supra)  is misplaced.
57

68. Insofar as reliance placed on the judgment of this Court
in the case of   Nandhini Deluxe   (supra)   is concerned,   in the
said   case,   the   marks   for   consideration   were   “Nandhini”   and
“Nandini”.   It   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following
observations of this Court in the said case:
“ 30.   Applying the aforesaid principles to the instant
case, when we find that not only visual appearance
of   the   two   marks   is   different,   they   even   relate   to
different   products.   Further,   the   manner   in   which
they are traded by the appellant and the respondent
respectively,   highlighted   above,   it   is   difficult   to
imagine   that   an   average   man   of   ordinary
intelligence   would   associate   the   goods   of   the
appellant as that of the respondent.”
69. It could thus be seen that in the facts of the said case,
not   only   the   visual   appearance   of   the   two   marks   were
different,   but   they   even   related   to   different   products.   As
such, the said judgment would also be of no assistance to the
case of the respondents­defendants in the present case.
70. Insofar   as   the   reliance   placed   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Neon   Laboratories   Limited   (supra)   is
concerned,   the   said   case   arose   out   of   the   proceedings   for
grant   of   temporary   injunction   under   Order   XXXIX   Rules   1
58

and   2   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908.     The   trial   court
had   granted   an   injunction   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   finding
that   the   plaintiff   had,   with   prima   facie   material,   established
that it was using their  trade mark well before the attempted
use   of   an   identical   or   closely   similar   trade   mark   by   the
appellant­defendant.  The said injunction was affirmed by the
Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court.     Confirming   the   concurrent
orders, this Court held that the plaintiff would be entitled to
a   temporary   injunction   in   light   of   the   “first   in   the   market”
test. As such, the said judgment would also not be applicable
to the facts of the present case.
71. We   are,   therefore,   of  the   considered   view   that   the   High
Court fell in error on various counts.  The present case stood
squarely   covered   by   the   provisions   of   Section   29(2)(c)   read
with   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   29   of   the   said   Act.     The
present   case   also   stood   covered   under   sub­sections   (5)   and
(9) of Section 29 of the said Act.  The High Court has erred in
taking   into   consideration   clause   (c)   of   sub­section   (4)   of
Section 29 of the said Act in isolation without noticing other
parts of the said sub­section (4) of Section 29 of the said Act
59

and the import thereof. The High Court has failed to take into
consideration  that in  order  to avail the benefit of Section 30
of   the   said   Act,   apart   from   establishing   that   the   use   of   the
impugned   trade   mark   was   not   such   as   to   take   unfair
advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character or
repute of the trade mark, it is also necessary to establish that
such   a   use   is   in   accordance   with   the   honest   practices   in
industrial   or   commercial   matters.   As   such,   we   have   no
hesitation   to   hold   that   the   High   Court   was   not   justified   in
interfering with the well­reasoned order of the trial court. 
72. Therefore,   we   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the   High
Court fell in error by interfering with the well­reasoned order
of   the   trial   court   and   so,   the   present   appeal   deserves   to   be
allowed.  
73. In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed   and   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 12 th
 April 2019 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No.
1462 of 2012 is quashed and set aside.   The judgement and
decree dated 21 st
 June 2012 passed by the trial court in O.S.
No. 3 of 2009 is maintained. 
60

74. No   order   as   to   cost.     Pending   application(s),   if   any,   are
disposed of in the above terms.
……....….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
..…....….......................J.
      [B.R. GAVAI]
                                       ….…….........................J.
  [B.V. NAGARATHNA]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 19, 2022.
61