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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2564 OF 2012
K. ARUMUGA VELAIAH                           APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
P.R. RAMASAMY AND ANR.                           RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA J. 
The plaintiff in Original Suit No. 101 of 2004 has assailed the
judgment and decree passed in Second Appeal No. 92 of 2007 by
the   Madurai   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   of   Madras
dated   6th   August,   2007   by   which,   the   judgment   and   decree
passed in Appeal Suit No. 38 of 2005 by the First Appellate Court
i.e.   Court   of   the   Subordinate   Judge,   Devakottai,   affirming   the
dismissal   of   the   aforesaid   suit   by   the   District   Munsiff   Court,
Devakottai has been sustained.  

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2. For   the   sake   of   convenience   the   parties   herein   shall   be
referred   to   in   terms   of   their   rank   and   status   before   the   Trial
Court.  
3. The case of the Plaintiff in a nutshell is stated as under : 
(i)  Periyaiya   Servai   and   Muthu   Servai,   were   the   sons   of
Marimuthu Servai. Periyaiya Servai had three sons, being the
first and second defendants and Marimuthu, who is no longer
alive   and   whose   wife   Poomayil   has   also   died.   The   plaintiff,
first   and   second   defendants   and   late   Marimuthu   have   one­
fourth   share   each   in   the   joint   family   properties.   That
Periyaiya   Servai   through   his   first   wife,   Veeramakali   Ammal
(since deceased) had four daughters and a son, being the first
defendant, namely, P.R. Ramasamy. Through his second wife,
Kaliammal,   Periyaiya   Servai   had   two   sons,   being   second
defendant,   namely,  P.R.  Kasilingam   and  Marimuthu.   Second
defendant’s son, K. Arumuga Velaiya is the plaintiff.
 
(ii)  According   to   the   plaintiff,   Periyaiya   Servai   had   executed   a
registered   will   dated   26th   January,   1994,   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff  in   relation   to  his  share   of   the   properties   of  the  joint
family. Thus, the joint family properties had to be divided into
four   shares   of   which   the   plaintiff   was   entitled   to   one   share,
bequeathed in his favour by his grandfather, Periyaiya Servai

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under   the   will.   Further,   Poomayil,   on   the   death   of   her
husband   Marimuthu   had   bequeathed   his   share   in   the
property to the first defendant. Hence the first defendant has
become entitled to half share in the joint family property and
the   remaining   half   has   to   be   equally   divided   between   the
second   defendant   and   the   plaintiff.   That   the   first   defendant
sent   a   legal   notice   objecting   to   plaintiff’s   share   in   the   suit
schedule   properties,   which   are   joint   family   properties.
Therefore, the plaintiff has been constrained to file a suit for
partition and separate possession.
 
(iii)  Plaintiff has averred that he has a right to one­fourth share of
Periyaiya   Servai   under   the   will   dated   26th   January,   1994,
which   came   into   operation   on   25th   March,   2003,   on   the
demise of Periyaiya Servai. With  the aforesaid  averments  the
plaintiff   has   sought   partition   and   separate   possession   of   his
one­fourth share in the suit schedule properties.  
4. In   response   to   the   plaint,   first   defendant   filed   his   written
statement which is encapsulated as under:­ 
(i)  First   defendant   has   admitted   that   the   suit   schedule
properties   were   joint   family   properties   but   they   had   since
been   divided.   The   fact   that   Periyaiya   Servai   had   executed   a

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will dated 26th January, 1994 (the written statement filed by
the first defendant before the Trial Court mentions the date of
the  will   as  24th  January,  1994)  in  a good  state  of  mind  and
health has been denied. It is averred that late Periyaiya Servai
had a share in the suit properties but the fact that they were
bequeathed to the plaintiff by a will, is false. It is averred that
Periyaiya Servai and     his brother Muthu Servai were living as
a   joint   family   and   Periyaiya   Servai   was   the   Karta   of   the
family.   That   from   the   income   of   the   undivided   ancestral
properties, several properties were purchased in the name of
Periyaiya Servai as he was the Karta of the family. There was
a partition  between the  brothers under a registered partition
deed.   The   coparcerners   then   became   divided.   That   in   1964
Periyaiya   Servai   in   turn   partitioned   his   share   of   the   joint
family   properties   in   three   parts,   i.e.   between   the   first   and
second   defendants   and   late   Marimuthu   and   they   have   been
enjoying the properties since then. In that partition, no share
was   allotted   to   Periyaiya   Servai.   An   agreement   for
maintenance   of   Periyaiya   Servai   during   his   life   was   also
made.   Marimuthu   died   suddenly   and   his   share   in   the
properties was being enjoyed by his wife Poomayil. 

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(ii)  Periyaiya   Servai   was   93   years   old   in   1991   and   was   not   in   a
position   to   take   decisions   on   his   own   due   to   his   old   age.   He
was acting according to the will of the second defendant and
Kaliammal   who   was   Periyaiya   Servai’s   second   wife.   The
second defendant, taking advantage of the age and ill health
of his father tried to acquire properties of late Poomayil. O.S.
No. 347 of 1991 was filed in the name of Periyaiya Servai, on
the file of the District Munsiff Court, Devakottai, on false and
frivolous   grounds.   In   that   suit   he   had   shown   joint   family
properties   as   independent   properties   of   late   Periyaiya   Servai
and stated that the said properties were purchased out of the
personal   income   of   Periyaiya   Servai.   In   that   suit,   the
possession and enjoyment of the joint Hindu family ancestral
properties   by   late   Periyaiya   Servai   and   his   brother,   as   also
the   partition   between   them   was   suppressed.   It   was   further
suppressed in the said suit that in the year 1964 a partition
took   place   before   the   panchayatdars   and   the   partitioned
properties were enjoyed by late Periyaiya Servai, the first and
second   defendants   and   Marimuthu.   In   the   aforementioned
suit,   the   widow   of   Marimuthu,   Poomayil   also   contested   but
the  District Munsiff  Court,  without taking   into  consideration
the   said   partition   held   that   the   properties   were   undivided

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ancestral   joint   family   properties.   Aggrieved   by   the   same   the
second defendant preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 37 of 1993.
Late Poomayil had also filed a cross appeal in A.S. No. 37 of
1993.   The   said   suit   was   remanded   to   the   lower   court   in   the
year 1995.
(iii)  Against the order of remand a second appeal was filed before
the High Court of Madras which remanded the matter to the
Sub­court, Devakottai, by restoring A.S. No. 37 of 1993. The
said   appeal   was   disposed   on   23rd   March,   1999   by   giving   a
finding   that   the   suit   properties   were   ancestral   properties
which   were   partitioned   between   the   first   and   second
defendants   herein   and   late   Marimuthu   and   they   were
enjoying   the   same   separately.   That   after   the   death   of
Marimuthu,   Poomayil   was   in   possession   of   the   properties.
The said judgment has attained finality.  
(iv) It was also contended that since the suit properties had been
partitioned   equally   between   the   first   and   second   defendants
and   late   Marimuthu   in   1964,   they   also   had   the   right   of
prescription   against   each   other   and   were   in   adverse
possession.   That   Poomayil   had   died   bequeathing   her
husband’s   properties   to   the   first   defendant   under   a   will   and
he was enjoying the properties after her death. 

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(v)  That   on   26th   December,   1988   Periyaiya   Servai   wrote   two
Inam   settlement   deeds   in   respect   of   properties   in   Sr.   No.
181/1 and 181/3 in Sathyamangalam  Village.  That O.S. No.
376   of   1991   was   filed   by   the   plaintiff   herein   against   the
settlement   deed,   on   the   file   of   the   District   Munsiff   Court,
Devakottai.   The   said   suit   was   dismissed   and   the   judgment
and   decree   in   the   said   suit   was   confirmed   in   A.S.   No.   38   of
1994. 
(vi)  That   since   the   plaintiff   herein   had   not   benefited   under   the
said   suit,   he   prepared   the   disputed   will   with   the   help   of   the
second defendant as if it was the will of Periyaiya Servai. That
during the period when the will is said to have been executed,
Periyaiya Servai was bed ridden and was not sane and was a
prisoner.   That   Periyaiya   Servai   was   disqualified   by   virtue   of
the   doctrine   of   ouster,     from   making   the   will   in   respect   of
ancestral   properties,   particularly   after   the   judgment   in   O.S.
No. 347/1991. That the suit had been filed vexatiously when
the   first   defendant   raised   objection   for   the   transfer   of   the
Patta on the basis of a concocted will. 
(vii)  As late Periyaiya Servai was not sane and healthy and he was
treated   as   a   prisoner   by   the   family   of   the   plaintiff   and   the
second defendant a habeas corpus petition in HCP No. 457 of

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2003 was filed by the first defendant before the Madras High
Court.   Before   the   petition   was   heard,   Periyaiya   Servai   died
and   the   same   was   dismissed   as   not   pressed   by   the   first
defendant. 
(viii)   That   the   plaint   in   the   instant   suit   was   filed   with   a   view   to
extort   monies   from   the   first   defendant.   The   first   defendant
prayed   before   the   Trial   Court   that   the   suit   for   partition   and
separate possession filed by the plaintiff be dismissed.  
5. The District Munsiff Court, Devakottai by its judgment and
decree   dated   7th   April,   2005   dismissed   the   suit   being   O.S.   No.
101 of 2004.   The salient findings of the Trial Court are as under:  
(i) The Trial Court noted that the defendant had filed O.P. No. 7
of   1992   on   the   file   of   the   District   Munsiff   Court,   Devakottai
praying  for a declaration that the partition  deed stated to be
executed   in   the   year   1964   between   Periyaiya   Servai,   the
defendants   and   Marimuthu   was   invalid.   The   said   suit   was
decreed as prayed for, with a declaration to the effect that the
partition deed stated to be executed in the year 1964 was an
unregistered document and therefore, invalid.  
(ii)  The Trial Court also noted that in O.S. No. 347 of 1991 filed
by   Periyaiya   Servai,   the   District   Munsiff   Court,   Devakottai
decreed   that   out   of   the   properties   belonging   to   Periyaiya

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Servai, his three sons, being the defendants therein and late
Marimuthu, would each be entitled to one­third share. In an
appeal   from   the   judgment   and   decree   in   O.S.   No.   347   of
1991,   the   first   appellate   court   in   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993   held
that   a   valid   partition   had   been   carried   out   in   the   year   1964
whereby   it   was   decided   that   no   share   was   to   be   retained   by
Periyaiya   Servai   and   each   of   his   sons   was   entitled   to   one­
third share in the suit properties.
Given   the   contradictory   decrees   passed   in   O.P.   No.   7   of
1992 and in A.S. No. 37 of 1993, the Trial Court held that the
latter decree would alone be enforceable.
 
(iii)  That   the   partition   deed   executed   in   the   year   1964   was   valid
in the eye of law and such validity was confirmed by the Sub­
Court,   Devakottai   in   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993.   Since   questions
surrounding   the   validity   of   the   partition   deed   were   finally
settled, the suit was barred by the principle of  res judicata .
 
(iv)   According   to   the   decision   in   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993,   Periyaiya
Servai   had   not   been   allotted   any   share   in   the   property   and
the same was divided in three equal parts in favour of the two
defendants   and   Marimuthu.   That   Periyaiya   Servai,   following
the   partition   in   the   year   1964   had   no   right   over   the   said

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property   and   consequently   had   no   right   to   execute   a   will   in
respect of the suit properties, in favour of the Plaintiff.  
(v)  That   the   plaintiff   is   not   entitled   to   one­fourth   share   in   the
suit   properties   as   prayed   by   him.   That   the   defendants   were
entitled to enjoy their share of the suit properties without any
restraint by virtue of the partition effected in 1964.  
6. Being   aggrieved,   the   plaintiff   preferred   A.S.   No.   38   of   2005
before   the   first   appellate   court.   By   Judgment   dated   17th
February, 2006, the appeal and cross appeal were dismissed and
the   judgment   of   the   Trial   Court   referred   to   above   was
affirmed.   The   relevant   findings   of   the   first   appellate   court   are
encapsulated as under:
i) The   first   appellate   court   considered   the   evidence   of   the   first
defendant   as   DW­1.   In   his   cross­examination   DW­1   had
stated   that   a   partition   had   been   effected   in   the   year   1964,
wherein   the   suit   properties   were   divided   among   the   three
sons  of  Periyaiya Servai   i.e.,  the  first and  second  defendants
and Marimuthu. That the patta was not obtained individually
by the sons of Periyaiya Servai following the execution of the
partition   deed,   however   they   had   been   paying   kist   in
connection   with   their   respective   properties.     In   the
circumstance, the first appellate court held that the fact that

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the defendants had not obtained pattas individually for their
respective shares in the suit properties, could not result in a
conclusion that Periyaiya Servai  had  not partitioned  the suit
properties in favour of his sons.  
ii) That   the   kist   receipts   paid   by   the   first   defendant   from   the
year 1964, in relation to his share of the suit properties led to
the   conclusion   that   the   first   defendant   was   enjoying   the
properties   allotted   to   him   by   way   of   the   partition   effected   in
the year 1964.  
iii) Since partition was effected between Periyaiya Servai and his
sons   in   the   year   1964,   whereby   the   suit   schedule   properties
were divided among the first and second defendants and late
Marimuthu,   and   no   property   was   apportioned   in   favour   of
Periyaiya   Servai,   he   had   no   right   to   execute   a   will
subsequently, in relation to the suit properties. Therefore the
will dated 26th January, 1994 is not a valid document.  
iv) That   the   plaintiff   could   not   claim   title   over   one­fourth   share
of   the   suit   properties   on   the   basis   of   the   will   dated   26th
January, 1994 and therefore the Trial Court rightly dismissed
the suit filed by the plaintiff.  
7. Being   aggrieved,   the  plaintiff  preferred   second   appeal   No.   92
of   2007   before   the   Madurai  bench  of  the   Madras   High   Court.   By

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judgment   dated   6th   August,   2007,   the   second   appeal   was
dismissed   by   holding   that   the   following   substantial   questions   of
law sought to be raised by the Plaintiff could not be considered: 
i) Whether   the   Courts   below   are   justified   in   holding   that
the suit is barred in view of the decision in Appeal Suit
No.   37   of   1993   dated   23.03.1999   in   as   much   as   there
was   a   specific   direction   by   the   High   Court,   Madras   in
the order of remand to the subordinate judge to consider
only whether the properties are joint family properties or
self acquisitions of Periyaiah Servai?
ii) Whether   the   courts   below   are   justified   in   holding   that
the suit is barred in view of the decision in Appeal Suit
No.   37   of   1993   on   the   file   of   Sub­Court,   Devakottai
without considering whether the principles laid down in
section 11 of the Code of Civil procedure are applicable?
iii) Whether   the   courts   below   are   justified   in   not
considering   the   decision   in   Original   Petition   No.   7   of
1972   on   the   file   of   the   Sub­Court,   Devakottai   where
under original of exhibit B­10 was held to be invalid and
unenforceable?
iv) Whether   the   courts   below   are   justified   in   not
considering   the   admissions   of   DW­1   that   Periyaiah

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Servai   was   entitled   to   a   share   in   the   joint   family
properties?
v) Whether the findings of courts below which are perverse
and   not   supported   by   any   materials   and   against
available materials on record can be sustained?
The following findings were recorded by the High Court in the
impugned judgment:  
(i)  That it had already been held in Appeal Suit No. 37 of 1993
that   all   the   joint   family   properties   had   been   divided   into   three
shares   in   favour   of   the   sons   of   Periyaiya   Servai.   Against   the   said
decision,   no   appeal   had   been   preferred   and   hence   the   finding
regarding the partition had attained finality. Therefore, the instant
suit was barred by the principle of  res judicata .
  (ii)  The second appeal was dismissed at the stage of admission
on the ground that the substantial questions of law raised by the
plaintiff were not legally tenable.
The   unsuccessful   plaintiff   has   approached   this   Court
challenging the three judgments referred to above.  
8.  We have heard Sri. V. Prabhakar, learned advocate for the
appellant   and   Sri.   K.K.   Mani,   learned   advocate   for   respondents
and perused the material on record.
 

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9.  Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­plaintiff   at   the   outset
contended   that   the   High   Court   as   well   as   the   courts   below   were
not   right   in   dismissing   the   suit  filed   by   the   appellant­plaintiff   by
holding that there was a prior partition between the parties in the
year   1964   and   hence   the   instant   suit   for   partition   and   separate
possession was not maintainable. Elaborating the said contention
it was  submitted that the so called  partition  of the  suit schedule
properties in the year 1964 was as per an award. The said award
was not registered as per section 17 (1) (e) of the Registration Act,
1908  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  Act”   for  the  sake  of  brevity).
Section 49 of the Act was also pressed into service to contend that
in the absence of registration of the arbitration award effecting the
partition between members of the family, the award does not have
any   validity   in   the   eye   of   law   and   hence   it   is   not   binding   on   the
parties.   Since   the   said   award   had   no   effect   in   law,   the   family
continued   to   remain   joint   and   the   suit   schedule   properties   were
joint ancestral properties.   Hence, the suit for partition filed by the
appellant was maintainable.
10. In   this   context   it   was   brought   to   our   notice   that   O.S.   No.
347  of  1991  was   filed  by   Periyaiya  Servai,   the   grandfather   of   the
plaintiff   seeking   declaration   of   title   and   consequential   relief   and
the said suit was dismissed against which A.S. No. 37 of 93 was

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filed. In the said appeal there was an order of remand to the Trial
Court.   The   remand   order   was   challenged   before   the   High   Court.
The High Court remanded the matter to the first appellate court to
decide the  appeal  and to  give  a finding  only  on the  nature  of the
properties.   Reliance   was   placed   on   the   finding   given   by   the   first
appellate court on remand from the High Court to  the effect that
the   suit   schedule   properties   are   joint   ancestral   properties.
However,   the   first   appellate   court   even   in   the   absence   of   any
mandate of the High Court being given in the remand order went
ahead to hold that there was a partition between the members of
the   family   in   the   year   1964   and   hence   the   suit   for   partition   was
not   maintainable.   Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   contended
that   such   a   finding   could   not   have   been   given   by   the   first
appellate court transgressing the contours of the order of remand
made by the High Court which was to  determine only the nature
of   the   suit   schedule   properties   and   not   whether   there   was   a
partition of the same between the members of the family. That the
decision   of   the   first   appellate   court   in   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993   was
erroneous in so far as it travelled beyond the scope of the remand
made   to   it   by   the   High   Court   and   hence   the   said   finding   is   not
binding on the parties.   

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11. It   was   contended   that   the   High   Court   in   passing   the
impugned judgment, could not have dismissed the second appeal
on   the   basis   of   an   erroneous   finding   given   by   the   first   appellate
Court as the said finding was also not binding on the High Court.
It was contended that the principle of   res judicata   does not apply
in the  instant case.  Hence,  the judgments  of  the  High  Court and
the Courts below may be set aside and the suit may be decreed.
 
12. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following
judgments in support of his submissions:
a) Shiromani   and   Ors.   v.   Hem   Kumar   and   Ors .,   [1968]   3
SCR 639. 
b) Satish   Kumar   and   Ors.   v.   Surinder   Kumar   and   Ors .,
[1969] 2 SCR 244 . 
c) Lachhman Dass v. Ram Lal , [1989] 3 SCC 99. 
d) Asrar   Ahmed   v.   Durgah   Committee,   Ajmer ,   AIR   1947   PC
1. 
13.  Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported
the   impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court   to   contend   that
registration  of  the  arbitral  award  making  a  partition   between  the
parties   was   not   compulsory.   It   was   urged   that   partition   of   joint
family   properties   is   not   a   transfer   inter   vivos.   A   partition   only
crystallises   the   share   of   the   coparceners   in   the   joint   family   or

17
ancestral   properties.   That   so   long   as   the   parties   are   not   allotted
shares pertaining to specific assets under a partition deed such a
document   does   not   create   any   right,   title   or   interest   in   any
specific   property   as   such.   Therefore,   registration   of   the   arbitral
award   in   the   instant   case   as   such   is   not   a   mandatory
requirement.
14.  Alternatively,  it was  contended that the  finding  of the first
appellate court in A.S. No. 37 of 1993, regarding the partition and
division   of   the   ancestral   joint   family   properties   in   the   year   1964
has   attained   finality.   The   said   finding   is   binding   on   the   parties.
Hence   a   fresh   suit   seeking   partition   and   separate   possession   of
the   properties   was   not   at   all   maintainable.   This   is   because   the
aforesaid finding shall be presumed to be accepted by the parties
as there has been no challenge to the same and hence principle of
res judicata  would apply.
15.  It was further contended that even if it is assumed for the
sake   of   argument   that,   on   remand,   the   first   appellate   court   had
passed   an   erroneous   judgment   by   giving   a   finding   on   a   point
beyond   the   scope   of   remand,   i.e.,   on   the   aspect   of   the   arbitral
award   having   partitioned   the   suit   schedule   properties,   such   a
finding is binding on the parties as it has not been interfered with
by   the   High   Court.   That   nothing   prevented   the   appellant   from

18
assailing the said finding before the High Court by filing a second
appeal. Instead the appellant filed a fresh suit for partition which
is   an   instance   of   abuse   of   process   of   law   as   it   is   hit   by   the
principle of  res judicata .
16.  In   the   above   backdrop   it   was   contended   that   the   High
Court   was   right   in   dismissing   the   second   appeal   as   well   as   the
suit   filed   by   the   appellant   plaintiff   and   there   is   no   merit   in   this
appeal. Hence the same may be dismissed.  
Learned   counsel   for   respondents   relied   upon   the   following
three decisions to buttress his submissions:
a) Kale   and   Ors.   v.   Deputy   Director   of   Consolidation ,
[1976] 3 SCC 119 . 
b) Bhoop   Singh   v.   Ram   Singh   Major   and   Ors .,   [1995]   5
SCC 709. 
c) Ravinder   Kaur   Grewal   and   Ors.   v.   Manjit   Kaur   and
Ors ., [2020] 9 SCC 706. 
d) Ripudaman   Singh   v.   Tikka   Maheshwar   Chand ,   [2021]
7 SCC 446.
17.  Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   respective   parties   the
only point which arises for our consideration is, whether, the suit
filed by the plaintiff is barred in view of the judgment and decree

19
passed in A.S. No. 37 of 1993 dated 23rd March, 1999, wherein it
was held that a partition had been affected in relation to the joint
family   properties   between   the   first   and   second   defendants   and
late Marimuthu in the year 1964.  
18.  The following undisputed facts may be noted:­ 
(a)  The   relationship   between   the   parties   is   not   in   dispute.
Periyaiya   Servai   through   his   first   wife   had   begotten   the   first
defendant,   P.R.   Ramaswamy   and   through   his   second   wife
had   two   sons,   namely,   P.R.   Kasilingam   ­   second   defendant
and late Marimuthu. The appellant­plaintiff is the son of P.R.
Kasilingam.
(b)  Appellant   has   also   claimed   that   his   grandfather   Periyaiya
Servai had executed a will in his favour and therefore he had
one­fourth share in the suit property. 
(c)   It is also not in dispute that O.S. No. 347 of 1991 was filed on
the file of the District Munsiff Court, Devakottai by Periyaiya
Servai   for   declaration   of   title   and   permanent   injunction,
wherein all the suit properties had been shown as joint family
properties.   Against   the   dismissal   of   the   said   suit   a
preliminary   decree   was   passed   granting   one­fourth   share   to
the   plaintiff   therein   in   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993   preferred   against
the dismissal of the suit. 

20
(d)  In   A.S.   No.   37   of   1993   it   was   held   that   the   suit   properties
were joint family properties and in the year 1964 there was a
partition   between   the   members   of   the   joint   family.   The   said
judgment was not assailed by any of the parties. 
(e)  However,   the   appellant   herein   instituted   a   fresh   suit   being
O.S. No. 101 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsiff Court,
Devakottai   which   was   dismissed,   against   which   A.S.   No.
38/2005   was   filed   before   the   Subordinate   Judge,   Devakottai
wherein it was observed that the finding given in A.S. No. 37
of 1993 to the effect that there was a partition in the family in
the year 1964, had attained finality. 
(f)  Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, second appeal being
S.A. No. 92 of 2007 was filed before the Madurai Bench of the
Madras   High   Court,   which   has   also   dismissed   the   same   by
the impugned judgment.    
19. The   main   plank   of   argument   of   the   appellant   is   that   the
suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff­appellant   herein   could   not   have   been
dismissed  on the  principle  of   res  judicata   by holding  that in A.S.
No. 37 of 1993 there was already a clear finding to the effect that
there was a partition of the suit properties between the members
of   the   joint   family   and   hence   a   fresh   suit   for   partition   and
separate  possession   vis­a­vis   the  same   properties   could   not  have

21
been filed by the plaintiff as it is not maintainable. In this regard
the   contention   of   the   appellant­plaintiff   is   that   the   aforesaid
finding   was   contrary   to   the   mandate   of   remand   and   hence   was
not   binding   on   the   parties.     Contrarily,   respondents   have
contended   that   the   finding   that   the   suit   properties   were   joint
family properties which had been partitioned by the parties in the
year 1964, not having been challenged at all by the plaintiff, had
attained finality and hence the plaintiff was estopped from filing a
fresh suit claiming partition and separate possession.  
20.  In   the   aforesaid   context   another   contention   raised   by   the
learned counsel for  the appellant was that the so­called partition
which   took   place   in   the   year   1964   was   by   virtue   of   an   award
passed   by   the   panchayatdars   (arbitrators)   and   the   same,   not
having   been   registered,   was   not   made   a   rule   of   the   court   and
hence   had   no   validity   in   the   eye   of   law.   The   counter   to   the
aforesaid argument by learned counsel for the respondent is that
the said award did not require registration at all. 
21. We   shall   at   the   outset   consider   the   following   judgments
relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant:  
a)     In   Shiromani   and   Ors.   v.   Hem   Kumar   and   Ors .,   [1968]   3
SCR 639 , one of the questions raised was whether the validity

22
of   a   partition   deed   could   be   challenged   as   being   inadmissible
in   evidence   on   the   ground   that   it   had   not   been   registered   as
mandated   under   Section   17   (1)   (b)   of   the   Act.   In   that   case   it
was   held   that   under   the   recitals   of   exhibit   D­4   considered
therein, there was allotment of specific properties to individual
coparceners   and   the   document   therefore   fell   within   the
mischief   of   Section   17   (1)   (b)   of   the   Act   as   it   required
registration.   Hence,   the   said   document   was   not  admissible   in
evidence to prove the title of the coparceners to any particular
property or to prove that any particular property had ceased to
be   joint   property.   However,   document   exhibit   D­4   considered
therein was held to be admissible to prove an intention on the
part   of   the   coparceners   to   become   divided   in   status;   in   other
words,   to   prove   that   the   parties   ceased   to   be   joint   from   the
date   of   the   instrument   vide   Nanni   Bai   v   Gita   Bai ,   [1959]   1
SCR   479 .   The   said   judgment   is   not   applicable   to   the   facts   of
this case.
b) In   Satish   Kumar   and   Ors.   v.   Surinder   Kumar   and   Ors .,
[1969]   2   SCR   244 ,   a   similar   question   on   registration   of   an
award   for   partition   of   joint   family   property   being   compulsory
under   Section   17   (1)   (b)   read   with   section   49   of   the   Act   was
emphasised.   In   that   case   an   award   for   partition   was   made

23
under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the question was whether
such   an   award   on   a   private   reference   required   registration   if
the   award   effected   partition   of   immovable   property   exceeding
the   value   of   Rs.   100.   The   majority   (2:1)   held   that   an   award
made  by  an  arbitrator  which   affected   right,  title  or   interest  of
the   value   of   more   than   Rs.   100   in   immovable   property   would
require  registration.  However,  it  was  held  that  the  filing  of  an
unregistered   award   under   Section   49   of   the   Act   is   not
prohibited;   what   is   prohibited   is   that   it   cannot   be   taken   into
evidence   so   as   to   affect   right,   title   or   interest   in   immovable
property   as   per   Section   17   of   the   Act.   For   this   proposition
reliance   was   place   on   Champalal   vs.   Mst.   Samarth   Bai ,
[1960] 2 SCR 810 . 
Also   reliance   was   placed   on   Kashinathsa   Yamosa
Kabadi v.  Narsinga Bhaskarsa  Kabadi,   [1961] 3 SCR 792
wherein this court had observed as under: 
"The   records   made   by   the   Panchas   about   the
division   of   the   properties,   it   is   true,   were   not
stamped nor were they registered. It is however
clear that if the record made by the Panchas in
so   far   as   it   deals   with   immovable   properties   is
regarded   as   a   non­testamentary   instrument
purporting   or   operating   to   create,   declare,
assign,   limit   or   extinguish   any   right,   title   or
interest   in   immovable   property,   it   was
compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the

24
Registration   Act,   and   would  not   in  the  absence
of registration be admissible in evidence." 
The minority opinion voiced through K.S. Hegde J. in the
aforesaid   case   was   that   an   arbitrator’s   award   does   create
rights in property but those rights cannot be enforced without
further   steps.   For   the   purpose   of   Section   17(1)   (b)   of   the   Act,
all   that   is   to   be   seen   is   whether   the   award   in   question
purports   or   operates   to   create   or   declare,   assign,   limit   or
extinguish,   whether   in   present   or   future   any   right,   title   or
interest,   whether   vested   or   contingent   of   the   value   of   one
hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property. If it
does, it is compulsorily registerable. 
c) In   Lachhman  Dass v. Ram Lal ,  [1989]  3 SCC 99,   the issue
was that the arbitrator’s award had not been properly stamped
and   as   such   could   not   be   made   the   rule   of   the   Court.   It   was
also contended that the award was unregistered and as such it
could   not   be   made   the   rule   of   the   Court   as   it   affected
immovable property of more than Rs. 100. The said contention
was accepted by the Trial Court but in second appeal the High
Court   observed   that   the   award   was   stamped   properly   and   it
did   not   require   any   registration   as   the   award   did   not   create
any right as such in the immovable property; it only admitted

25
the   already   existing   rights   between   the   parties   and   hence
registration   was   not   required.   Hence   the   question   considered
was   whether   the   Court   could   have   looked   into   the   award   for
the   purpose   of   pronouncing   judgment   upon   the   award.   On   a
construction   of   the   award   questioned   therein   the   decision   of
the High Court was reversed. In doing so, this Court took into
consideration   section   17   (1)   (e)   of   the   Act   as   well   as   sections
23,   25   and   49   of   the   Act.   Further,   reliance   was   placed   on   a
decision   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court   in
Ramaswamy Ayyar and Anr. v. Tirpathi Naik , ILR 27 Mad
43 ,   wherein   it   was   observed   that   it   is   necessary   to   read   a
document   in   order   to   ascertain,   not   what   the   document
intends   to   convey   really   but   what   it   purports   to   convey.   In
other   words,   it   is   necessary   to   examine   not   so   much   what   it
intends   to   do,   but   what   it   purports   to   do.   It   was   further
observed in paragraph 14 as under: 
“14. The real purpose of registration is to secure
that   every   person   dealing   with   the   property,
where such document requires registration may
rely with confidence upon statements contained
in the register as a full and complete account of
all   transactions   by   which   title   may   be   affected.
Section   17   of   the   said   Act   being   a   disabling
section,   must   be   construed   strictly.   Therefore,
unless a document is clearly brought within the
provisions   of   the   section,   its   non­registration
would   be   no   bar   to   its   being   admitted   in
evidence.” 

26
Reliance   was   also   placed   on   Ratan   Lal   Sharma   v.
Purushottam   Harit ,   [1974]   3   SCR   109   to   hold   that   the
arbitration award in the said case did not just seek to assign a
share of the respondent to the appellant therein, but made an
exclusive   allotment   of   the   partnership   assets   including   the
factory   and   liabilities   to   the   appellant   therein.   Therefore,   the
award   in   express   words   purported   to   create   rights   in
immovable property worth a sum above Rs. 100/­ in favour of
the   appellant   therein.   It   was   accordingly   held   that   it   would
mandatorily require registration under section 17 of the Act. 
22.  We   shall   now   consider   the   citations   relied   upon   by   the
respondents:  
a)   Kale and Ors. v. Deputy Director of consolidation , [1976]
3 SCC 119 , is a case which had a checkered history in which
a   discussion   on   the   effect   and   value   of   family   arrangements
entered   into   between   the   parties   with   a   view   to   resolve
disputes   once   and   for   all,   came   up   for   consideration.   It   was
observed that in the case of a family settlement, usually there
would be an agreement which is implied from a long course of
dealing,   but   such   an   agreement   would   be   embodied   or
effectuated   in   a  deed   to   which   the   term   “family   arrangement”
is   applied.   Such   a   family   arrangement   is   not   applicable   to

27
dealings   between   strangers   but   is   in   the   context   of
maintaining   the   interest   and   peace   of   the   members   of   the
family.   In   paragraph   10   of   the   said   judgment,   this   Court   has
adumbrated   on   the   essentials   of   a   family   settlement   which
could be usefully extracted as under:
“ 10.   In   other   words   to   put   the   binding   effect
and   the   essentials   of   a   family   settlement   in   a
concretized   form,   the   matter   may   be   reduced
into the form of the following propositions:
 
(1) The   family   settlement   must   be   a   bona   fide
one   so   as   to   resolve   family   disputes   and   rival
claims   by   a   fair   and   equitable   division   or
allotment   of   properties   between   the   various
members of the family;
 
(2) The   said   settlement   must   be   voluntary   and
should   not   be   induced   by   fraud,   coercion   or
undue influence;
(3) The   family   arrangements   may   be   even   oral
in which case no registration is necessary;
(4) It   is   well   settled   that   registration   would   be
necessary   only   if   the   terms   of   the   family
arrangement   are   reduced   into   writing.   Here
also,   a   distinction   should   be   made   between   a
document containing the terms and recitals of a
family   arrangement   made   under   the   document
and   a   mere   memorandum   prepared   after   the
family   arrangement   had   already   been   made
either   for   the   purpose   of   the   record   or   for
information   of   the   Court   for   making   necessary
mutation.   In   such   a   case   the   memorandum
itself does not create or extinguish any rights in
immoveable   properties   and   therefore   does   not
fall   within   the   mischief   of   Section   17(2)   (sic)
(Section 17(1)(b)?) of the Registration Act and is,
therefore, not compulsorily registrable;
(5) The   members   who   may   be   parties   to   the
family arrangement must have some antecedent

28
title,   claim   or   interest   even   a   possible   claim   in
the   property   which   is   acknowledged   by   the
parties   to   the   settlement.   Even   if   one   of   the
parties to the settlement has no title but under
the arrangement the other party relinquishes all
its   claims   or   titles   in   favour   of   such   a   person
and   acknowledges   him   to   be   the   sole   owner,
then the antecedent title must be assumed and
the family arrangement will be upheld, and the
Courts will find no difficulty in giving  assent to
the same;
 
(6) Even   if   bona   fide   disputes,   present   or
possible, which may not involve legal claims are
settled by a bona fide family arrangement which
is   fair   and   equitable   the   family   arrangement   is
final   and   binding   on   the   parties   to   the
settlement.”  
After   reviewing   several   judgments  of  this  Court,  the  Privy
Council   and   other   High   Courts,   this   Court   in   paragraph   20
indicated the following propositions:
“We would, therefore return the reference with a statement
of the following general propositions: 
(1) A family arrangement can be made orally. 
(2)  If made orally, there being no document, no question of
registration arises. 
(3)   If  though   it   could   have   been   made   orally,   it   was   in   fact
reduced to the form of a "document" registration (when the
value is Rs. 100 and upwards) is necessary. 
(4)   Whether   the  terms  have   been  "reduced  to  the  form   of   a
document"   is   a   question   of   fact   in   each   case   to   be
determined   upon   a   consideration   of   the   nature   and
phraseology   of   the   writing   and   the   circumstances   in   which
and the purpose with which it was written. 
(5)   If   the   terms   were   not   "reduced   to   the   form   of   a
document", registration was not necessary (even though the
value is Rs. 100 or upwards); and, while the writing cannot

29
be used as a piece of evidence for what it may be worth, e.g.
as corroborative of other evidence or as an admission of the
transaction or as showing or explaining conduct. 
(6)   If   the   terms   were   "reduced   to   the   form   of   a   document"
and,   though  the  value  was  Rs.   100  or   upwards,  it   was  not
registered, the absence of registration makes the document
inadmissible   in   evidence   and   is   fatal   to   proof   of   the
arrangement embodied in the document.”
Ultimately, this Court held that the family arrangement in
the nature of a compromise which was considered in that case
did not require registration. It was further held that since the
existence of the family arrangement was admitted in that case,
the same was binding on the principle of estoppel. Also, even if
the   family   arrangement   could   not   be   registered   it   could   be
used   for   collateral   purpose,   i.e.   to   show   the   nature   and
character   of   possession   of   the   parties   in   pursuance   of   the
family settlement and also for the purpose of applying the rule
of estoppel which flowed from the conduct of the parties, who,
having   taken   benefit   under   the   settlement   for   seven   years,
later tried to resile from the settlement. 
b) In   Bhoop   Singh   v.   Ram   Singh   Major   and   Ors .,   [1995]   5
SCC 709 ,   this Court stated the legal position in the context of
registration of documents under section 17 (2) (vi) of the Act in
the following words, so as to distinguish the same from section
17 (2) (v):

30
“18.   The   legal   position   qua   Clause   (vi)   can,   on
the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   be
summarised as below:
 
(1) Compromise   decree   if   bona   fide,   in   the
sense   that   the   compromise   is   not   a   device   to
obviate   payment   of   stamp   duty   and   frustrate
the   law   relating   to   registration,   would   not
require   registration.   In   a   converse   situation,   it
would require registration.
 
(2) If  the  compromise decree  were to  create  for
the   first   time   right,   title   or   interest   in
immovable   property   of   the   value   of   Rs.   100   or
upwards   in   favour   of   any   party   to   the   suit   the
decree or order would require registration.
(3) If   the   decree   were   not   to   attract   any   of   the
clauses of Sub­ section (1) of Section 17, as was
the   position   in   the   aforesaid   Privy   Council   and
this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree
would not require registration.
(4) If  the   decree  were   not   to  embody   the  terms
of   compromise,   as   was   the   position   in   Lahore
case,   benefit   from   the   terms   of   compromise
cannot   be   derived,   even   if   a   suit   were   to   be
disposed   of   because   of   the   compromise   in
question.
(5) If   the   property   dealt   with   by   the   decree   be
not   the   "subject­   matter   of   the   suit   or
proceeding", Clause (vi) of Sub­section (2) would
not   operate,   because   of   the   amendment   of   this
Clause   by   Act   21   of   1929,   which   has   its   origin
in   the   aforesaid   decision   of   the   Privy   Council,
according   to   which   the   original   Clause   would
have   been   attracted,   even   if   it   were   to
encompass property not litigated.”
c) In   Ravinder   Kaur   Grewal   and   Ors.   v.   Manjit   Kaur   and
Ors .,   [2020]   9   SCC   706   considering   both   the   aforesaid
judgments,   this   Court   opined   that   when   a   family   settlement
arrived  at between  the  parties  has  been  acted  upon  then  it is

31
not open to resile from the same and the parties are estopped
from contending to the contrary.
d)   The   facts   in   Ripudaman   Singh   v.   Tikka   Maheshwar
Chand ,   [2021]   7   SCC   446   were   that,   the   parties   being
brothers, had entered into a compromise in respect of a land
dispute.   Plaintiff,   therein,   on   the   basis   of   the   compromise
decree applied for mutation of land in his favour, which was
allowed. In  appeal  there was a direction  to  Naib Tehsildar  to
decide   the   mutation   afresh.   Subsequently,   the   Divisional
Commissioner   dismissed   the   appeal   filed   against   the   said
order.   A   suit   was   filed   which   was   dismissed   but   the   appeal
preferred   by   the   appellant   was   allowed.   However,   the   High
Court in the second appeal, set aside the judgment of the first
appellate court and dismissed the suit on the ground that the
land,   even   though   was   a  subject   matter   of   compromise,   was
not   the   subject   matter   of   the   suit   and   therefore,   the
compromise decree required registration under the provisions
of   the   Act.   This   Court   while   allowing   the   appeal   and   setting
aside   the   decree   of   the   High   Court   held   that   when   a   pre­
existing right in the property is being recognised by way of a
settlement in a Court proceeding and no new right is created
for the first time when the parties entered into a compromise

32
in   the   civil   court,   there   is   no   requirement   of   compulsory
registration. In other words, a compromise recognising a pre­
existing   right   in   a   property   amongst   heirs   does   not   require
registration   under   the   Act.   In   this   case   the   distinction
between   section   17   (2)   (v)   and   (vi)   was   brought   out   by
referring to the aforementioned judgments.
23. In   order   to   answer   the   aforesaid   twin   questions,   at   the
outset   we   have   to   consider   the   award   dated   13th   June,   1964
passed   by   the   panchayatdars   which   has   been   produced   as
Annexure P­10 by learned counsel for the appellant. The award is
in the form of a resolution on the strength of the statement given
by   Periyaiya   Servai   and   the   consent   statement   given   by   P.R.
Ramaswamy and P.R. Kasilingam, the two major sons of Periyaiya
Servai. There are details as to how the properties had to be dealt
with.   The   parties   had   also   stated   that   they   had   read   the   above
resolution   and   had   agreed   wholeheartedly   to   obey   the   provisions
thereof.   For   a   better   appreciation   of   the   nature   of   the   award
passed   by   the   panchayatdars,     it   would   be   useful   to   extract
Annexure P­10 as under:  
“ RESOLUTION   PASSED   BY   THE
PANCHAYATDARS  ON 20 TH
  DAY  OF  THE  MONTH
OF   PANGUNI   OF   TAMIL   SOBAKRITHU   YEAR   IN
REGARD   TO   PARTITION   BETWEEN   THE   THREE
SONS   OF   M.   PERIYAYYA   SERVAI   VIZ.   (1)
RAMASAMY,   (2)   KASILINGAM   AND   (3)
MARIMUTHAN .

33
DETAILS
The said M. Periyayya Servai had two wives
1) Veerayakli – First Wife
2) Kaliyamma – Second Wife
The   Son   born   through   first   wife   is   Ramasamy.   The
Sons   born   through   second   wife   are   Kasilingam   and
Marimuthan.
We   have   passed   the   following   Resolutions   on   the
strength   of   the   statement   given   by   the   said   M.
Periyayya   Servai   in   front   of   us   and   the   consent
statement given by Ramasamy and Kasilingam, after
perusal of the above statement.
DETAILS OF RESOLUTIONS
1. The   nanjai,   punjai   and   accessories   viz
Thitthuthidal,   cattle,   chickens,   vessels   and   all
other   household   articles   are   to   be   divided   into
three equal shares.
2. As   the   Panchayatdars   unanimously   decide   that
the   three   acres   of   land   out   of   the   total   common
Nanjai   lands   are   to   be   left   to   the   care   of
Ramasamy,   the   eldest   Son,   the   said   three   acres
of Nanjai Lands are to be accordingly given away
to Ramasamy.
3. We,   the   Panchayatdars   RESOLVE   to   cancel   the
expenses incurred in connection with the actions
revolving   round   partition   as   per   the   amount
contained   in   the   statements   given   by   both   the
parties,   besides   cancelling   the   difference   in
expenses   of   the   marriages   of   Ramasamy   and
Kasilingam,   and   the   marriage   of   one   Ms.
Patharammal  is to  be  performed  from  out  of the
amounts from the  share  of both Kasilingam and
Marimuthan,   on   the   statement   made   by
Kaslingam that  a Minor  Chain  weighing about 3
his   marriage   and   the   same   could   not   be   traced
out, in spite of search, Kasilingam shall give the
expenses amounting to Rs.300/­ in common.
4. It was  RESOLVED   that   Marimuthan   shall
conduct his marriage on his own from his share
and   Marimuthan   shall   have   no   responsibility
towards   either   amounts   receivable,   payable   or
loans concerning the common family.

34
5. It was  RESOLVED   that   the   PANCHAYATDARS  
having   decided   that   on   the   approval   of
Kasilingam,   Bangalore   M.   Sethuraman,   for
having taken limestone valued at Rs.20,000/­ in
regard   to   kiln   for   bricks,   since   Kasilingam
permitted   the   above   person   to   take   Rs.340/­
(Rupees   three   hundred   forty   only)   on   his   own
volition without the approval of his father, it was
RESOLVED   that   Kasilingam   shall   bear   the   said
sum of Rs.340/­ from out of his pocket.
6. The school at Bangalore shall be valued for sale,
taking   into   account   all   the   goods/things   and
accessories   available   in   the   said   school   and   the
said   school   shall   be   taken   over   either   by
Ramasamy   or   Kasilingam   depending   upon   the
one coming out successful in the paper token to
be   tossed   over   and   both   of   them   agree   to   the
above proposal. The value of the said school has
been unanimously arrived at Rs.3,000/­ (Rupees
three   thousand   only)   by   the   Panchatdars.   The
person   who   takes   up   the   responsibility   of   the
said   school   shall   pay   the   above   sum   of
Rs.3000/­   to   their   father   M.   Periyayya   with
liberty   to   be   spent   by   him   as   he   wishes,   for   his
personal   use.   It   is   RESOLVED     by   the
Panchayatdars,   the   three   sons   shall   not   have
any right over the aforesaid sum of Rs.3,000/­.
7. It is further  RESOLVED   that   the   Savukkai
house   along   with   the   fenced   compound   shall   be
given to Periyayya and to leave the two properties
viz one comprised in S.No.181/1 measuring 1.40
cent and another house comprised in giving him
the   right   to   deal   with   the   properties   as   he   may
desire.   It   is   also   RESOLVED   to   give   him   a   cart
and   two   bullocks   for   his   use   besides   a   cow   for
meeting his requirement for milk.
8. In   his   statement   Periyayya   had   stated   that   a
sum   of   Rs.1,000/­   or   land   equal   to   its   value
shall   be   given   to   his   sister   Lakshmi.   We,   the
Panchayatdars, have today RESOLVED  that   a
sum   of   Rs.1,000/­   or   land   equal   to   its   value
ought to be given to the said Lakshmi.
9. As is found in the statement that in order to give
a   house   to   Karuvarividan   of   Sathamangalam,   it
is   RESOLVED   that   the   lower   layer   of   the   first
farm shall be given to the above person. There is
no   time   for   performing   charitable   activities   for
the   three   partners.   It   has   been   decided   that   the

35
three   shares   in   the   same   can   hereafter   be   done
together under the supervision of Ramasamy.
10. As   found   in   the   statement   of   Sri   Periyayya
Servai,   wherein   it   has   been   written   that
considering   the   value   of   all   the   Kalluppatti
properties   at   Rs.800/­   shall   be   sold   to   his
daughter   Segappi,   it   has   been   decided   that   the
said   properties   shall   be   sold   for   the   above   said
value   itself   and   the   said   decision   has   been
endorsed by us, the Panchayatdars.
11. The   house   may   be   divided   into   two   by   using
coconut matai and shall be taken by Kasilingam
and   Marimuthan.   For   the   share   going   to
Marimuthan  the  vacant site  also is  to be  added.
The   Nattavali   house   shall   be   held   and   used   in
common. It has been decided as above.
12. It   has   been   RESOLVED   as   regards   the   common
family honour of Lance, that in line with the age
old   customs,   after   the   life   time   of   Periyayya
Servai,   his   eldest   Son,   Ramasamy   is   considered
to be due for the said honour.
13. All   the   above   have   been   unanimously
RESOLVED by us, the Panchayatdars.
PANCHAYATDARS
1. S. Appasamy Servai, Unchanai
2. Bhootha Thiru Muthaiyyan Servai,
Ethappadivayal
3. M. Muthiah Servai of Umbiyur
Iruppukkudi
4. Ana. Anamugappan
5. S.V. Durai Servai, Sathamangalam.
We   have   read   the   above   RESOLUTIONS.   We   agree
with   the   above.   We   shall   wholeheartedly   obey   the
above.
Sd/­ M. Periyayya Servai
Sd/­ Ramasamy
Sd/­ Kasilingam
Resolution   written   by   and   I   am   also   one   of   the
Panchayathars.
Sd/­
(illegible)”
 

36
On   a   perusal   of   the   award   which   is   in   the   form   of   a
resolution,   it   is   clear   that   there   was   no   right   created   in   any
specific  item   or  asset of  the  joint  family  properties  in  any  person
but the parties resolved to take certain actions in pursuance of a
family   arrangement.   Therefore   under   Annexure   P­10   (Ex.   B­13)
there   was   no   right   created   in   favour   of   any   party   in   any   specific
item  of  joint family  property.  The said  document  which  has been
styled   as   an   award   is,   in   our   view,   only   a   memorandum   of
understanding/family   arrangement   to   be   acted   upon   in   future.
Hence,   in   our   considered   view,   the   said  document  did   not  create
rights   in   specific   properties   or   assets   of   the   family,   in   favour   of
specific   persons.   Therefore,   the   same   did   not   require   registration
under section 17 (1) (e) of the Act. The said document was in the
nature   of   a   document   envisaged   under   section   17   (2)   (v)   of   the
Act.     For a better understanding of the same it would be useful to
refer to section 17 (1) (e) and 17 (2) (v) as under:  
“17.   Documents   of   which   registration   is
compulsory.—(l)   The   following   documents   shall
be   registered,   if   the   property   to   which   they
relate   is   situate   in   a   district   in   which,   and   if
they have been executed on or after the date on
which,   Act   No.   XVI   of   1864,   or   the   Indian
Registration   Act,   1866,   or   the   Indian
Registration   Act,   1871,   or   the   Indian
Registration   Act,   1877,   or   this   Act   came   or
comes into force, namely:—
xxx  xxx xxx
(b)   other   non­testamentary   instruments   which
purport   or   operate   to   create,   declare,   assign,

37
limit   or   extinguish,   whether   in   present   or   in
future,   any   right,   title   or   interest,   whether
vested   or   contingent,   of   the   value   of   one
hundred   rupees   and   upwards,   to   or   in
immovable property;
xxx  xxx xxx
(2)   Nothing  in clauses (b) and (c) of sub­section
(l) applies to:—
xxx  xxx xxx
(v)   any   document   other   than   the   documents
specified   in   sub­section   (1A)   not   itself   creating,
declaring,   assigning,   limiting   or   extinguishing
any   right,   title   or   interest   of   the   value   of   one
hundred   rupees   and   upwards   to   or   in
immovable property, but merely creating a right
to   obtain   another   document   which   will,   when
executed,   create,   declare,   assign,   limit   or
extinguish any such right, title or interest.”
24.  Having   regard   to   the   aforesaid   provisions   of   law   it   can   be
safely concluded that the said award was a mere arrangement to
divide   the   properties   in   future   by   metes   and   bounds   as
distinguished from an actual deed of partition under which there
is   not   only   a   severance   of   status   but   also   division   of   joint   family
properties   by   metes   and   bounds   in   specific   properties.   Hence   it
was exempted from registration under Section 17 (2) (v) of the Act.
A document of partition which provides for effectuating a division
of   properties   in   future   would   be   exempt   from   registration   under
section 17 (2) (v). The test in such a case is whether the document
itself   creates   an   interest   in   a   specific   immovable   property   or
merely   creates   a   right   to   obtain   another   document   of   title.   If   a
document   does   not   by   itself   create   a   right   or   interest   in
immovable property, but merely creates a right to obtain another

38
document, which will, when executed create a right in the person
claiming relief, the former document does not require registration
and   is   accordingly   admissible   in   evidence   vide   Ranjangam   Iyer
v. Ranjangam Iyer , AIR 1922 PC 266 . 
25.  In   the   instant   case   exhibit   B­13   award   is   more   in   the
nature of a memorandum of understanding, a mere agreement of
the   steps   to   be   taken   in   future   for   the   division   of   the   properties.
Hence,   the   said   document   did   not   require   registration   under
Section   17   (1)   (b)   of   the   Act   as   under   the   said   document   no
creation   of   rights   in   any   specific   joint   family   property   was
effected.    Hence the second limb of the contention of the appellant
is accordingly answered. 
26.  Thus, in our view the judgment in O.P. No. 7 of 1972 which
was a petition filed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
praying to receive the award passed by the arbitrators and to pass
a judgment  thereon,  wherein  it was  held  that the  award  was  not
registered   as   mandated   under   Section   17   (1)   (b)   of   the   Act   and
hence could not be made a rule of the Court, is wholly incorrect.
In our view, the award was not a document of title to the property
hence   it   did   not   require   registration.   Therefore,   the   Order
dated 22 nd
 August, 1975 passed in O.P. No. 7 of 1972 holding that

39
the   award   was   inadmissible   in   evidence   as   it   was   not   registered
and hence a decree could not be passed, is incorrect. 
27.  In our view, exhibit B­13 did not require registration.
28. The   next   question   that   arises   for   our   consideration   is
whether,   the   finding   of   the   first  appellate   court   in   A.S.   No.   37   of
1993 that the suit properties were partitioned in the year 1964 is
binding on the parties and hence a fresh suit filed by the Plaintiff
seeking the very same relief was not maintainable. In A.S. No.37,
on   considering   the   oral   and   documentary   evidence   on   record   it
was opined as under: 
“ From   his   evidence   it   is   clear   that   there   is   a
partition   in   the   year   1964   and   the   list   of   the
apportionment   and   they   have   also   written   a
Muchallikka   before   the   panchayat.   It   is
undoubtfully known that since there was a joint
possession,   the   partition   was   effected   to   the
plaintiff’s   3   sons   in   1964   by   plaintiff   by
accepting   that   the   suit   properties   were   joint
properties,   it   is   not   right   on   the   part   of   the
plaintiff   to   claim   that   the   properties   are   his
individual,   self­acquired   properties   and   it   is
also unbelievable.”  
This finding is sought to be questioned before us by placing
reliance   on   a   judgment   of   the   Apex   Court   in   Asrar   Ahmed   v.
Durgah   Committee,  Ajmer ,  AIR 1947  PC  1   to  contend  that  the
plea   of   res   judicata   does   not   arise   in   the   instant   case.   We   have
perused the same.  Learned Counsel for the appellant placed heavy
reliance   on   this   judgment   contend   that   when   a   finding   has   been

40
given   by  a  lower  court based  on  sufficient  evidence,  if  erroneous,
is   not   binding   between   the   parties   to   the   said   proceeding   on   the
principle   of   res   judicata .     The   said   judgment   is   not   applicable   to
the present case.
29.  Having regard to the fact that in the instant case there has
been   no   challenge   to   the   finding   of   partition   between   the   parties
till   date   and   the   same   has   attained   finality   we   do   not   think   that
the  appellant  can   seek  to  rely  on  the  judgment in   Asrar  Ahmed
(Supra) .   Hence,   the   partition   of   the   ancestral/joint   family
properties having found to have taken place in  the 1964 and the
same   having   been   acted   upon,   a   fresh   suit   for   partition   and
separate   possession   of   the   suit   properties   was   not   at   all
maintainable. The principle of   res judicata  squarely applies in the
present case.
30. In   this   context,   following   judgments   could   be   cited   with
regard to the operation of the principles of   res judicata   in respect
to the previous proceeding and judgment: ­
a) In   Mathura   Prasad   Sarjoo   Jaiswal   v.   Dossibai   N.B.
Jeejeebhoy   (AIR   1971   SC   2355) ,   it   was   observed   as   under:  
“ 10.   It   is   true   that   in   determining   the   application   of
the   rule   of   res   judicata   the   Court   is   not   concerned
with   the   correctness   or   otherwise   of   the   earlier
judgment.   The   matter   in   issue,   if   it   is   one   purely   of
fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent
Court   must   in   a   subsequent   litigation   between   the

41
same   parties   be   regarded   as   finally   decided   and
cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact
determined   in   the   earlier   proceeding   between   the
same   parties   may   not,   for   the   same   reason,   be
questioned   in   a   subsequent   proceeding   between   the
same   parties.   But,   where   the   decision   is   on   a
question   of   law   i.e.   the   interpretation   of   a   statute,   it
will   be   res   judicata   in   a   subsequent   proceeding
between the same parties where the cause of action is
the  same,  for   the expression  “the  matter  in  issue”  in
Section   11   of   the   Code   of   Civil  Procedure   means   the
right   litigated   between   the   parties   i.e.   the   facts   on
which   the   right   is   claimed   or   denied   and   the   law
applicable to the determination of that  issue. Where,
however,   the   question   is   one   purely   of   law   and   it
relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of
the   Court   sanctioning   something   which   is   illegal,   by
resort   to   the   rule   of   res   judicata   a   party   affected   by
the   decision   will   not   be   precluded   from   challenging
the   validity   of   that   order   under   the   rule   of   res
judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the
law of the land.”
b) In   Mohanlal   Goenka   v.   Benoy   Kishna   Mukherjee   (AIR
1953   SC   65),   the   second   round   of   litigation   was   admittedly
in   respect   of   same   property   and   between   the   same   parties,
after the earlier litigation had attained finality even up to the
stage   of   execution.     It   was   held   that   later   on   the   judgment
debtor   was   precluded   from   raising   the   plea   of   jurisdiction   in
view   of   principles   of   constructive   res   judicata .   In   Paragraph
23 it was as under :­
“ “23. There is ample authority for the proposition that
even   an   erroneous   decision   on   a   question   of   law
operates   as   ‘res   judicata’   between   the   parties   to   it.
The   correctness   or   otherwise   of   a   judicial   decision
has   no   bearing   upon   the   question   whether   or   not   it
operates as ‘res judicata.”

42
c) In  State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee
(AIR   1966   SC   1061) ,   the   main   issue   related   to   the   Special
Court   to   try   a   Criminal   offence,   in   asmuch   as   an   incorrect
decision cannot be equated with a decision rendered without
jurisdiction.   Even   a   wrong   decision   can   be   superseded   only
through   appeals   to   higher   tribunals   or   Courts   or   through
review, if provided by law.  
31. We   accordingly   hold   that   the   High   Court   was   justified   in
affirming the judgments of the First Appellate Court as well as the
Trial   Court   dismissing   the   suit   filed   by   the   appellant   herein.   We
have no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.  
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.  
Having regard to the relationship between the parties, they
shall bear their own costs.  
……………………………..J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…………………………….J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
……………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]
NEW DELHI;
27 TH
 JANUARY, 2022.