/2022 INSC 0085/
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.797 OF 2021
ASHISH SHELAR & ORS.  ...PETITIONERS
VERSUS
THE MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY & ANR.     …RESPONDENTS
WITH
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.807 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.800 OF 2021
AND
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.808 OF 2021
JUDGMENT
A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. The   petitioners   have   been   duly   elected   as   members   of   the
current Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (2019­2024).  They
got   elected   from   different   constituencies   in   the   State   of
Maharashtra.     They   belong   to   the   Bharatiya   Janata   Party 1
,
the principal Opposition Party in the Maharashtra Legislative
1   for short, “BJP”

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Assembly.     The   Ruling   Party   is   a   coalition   between   the   Shiv
Sena,   the   Nationalist   Congress   Party   (NCP)   and   the   Indian
National Congress (INC) christened as “Maha Vikas Aghadi”.
2. This   lis   emanates   from   the   events   as   unfolded   during   the
Monsoon Session of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on
5.7.2021.     The   proceedings   of   the   House   witnessed   heated
exchanges between the members of the Opposition Party and
the   Ruling   Party   due   to   an   impression   formed   by   the   former
that   the   business   of   the   House   was   being   conducted   in
unilateral   manner,   with   conscious   and   engineered   effort   to
suppress   voice   of   the   Opposition   Party.     In   that,   even   the
Leader of Opposition was denied an opportunity to speak on a
crucial motion under consideration.  At the relevant time, the
House   was   presided   over   by   the   Chairman   nominated   under
Rule   8   of   the   Maharashtra   Legislative   Assembly   Rules 2
,   who
according   to   the   petitioners,   denied   opportunity   to   the
Opposition   Party   to   speak   including   to   the   Leader   of
Opposition.
2   for short, “Rules” 

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3. It   is   alleged   that   in   the   meeting   of   the   Business   Advisory
Committee,   which   preceded   the   actual   Assembly   Session,
there was  a concerted  effort  on  behalf  of  the members of the
Ruling Party to cut short the Assembly Session for a period of
two days especially when the State was facing unprecedented
situation   owing   to   pandemic,   which   needed   elaborate
deliberation in the House.  The concerted effort was to strip of
all   legislative   tools   available   to   the   Opposition   Party   so   as   to
make sure that voice of opposition is muffled and suppressed.
4. The   Chair   of   the   Speaker   of   the   House   was   vacant   at   the
relevant   time   due   to   stepping   down   by   the   incumbent.     The
election for appointing a new Speaker of the Assembly was yet
to   be   conducted.     As   per   Rule   8   of   the   Rules,   in   such   a
situation   other   nominated   member   of   the   House   had   to
preside   on   5.7.2021.     As   aforesaid,   a   general   feeling   had
developed amongst the members of the Opposition Party that
the   business   of   the   House   was   not   being   transacted   in
congenial   manner   and   they   were   prevented   from   raising
important   questions   and   express   their   views   on   matters   of
public   importance.     To   wit,   when   the   Minister   was   moving   a

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resolution in relation to the empirical data pertaining to OBC,
the   Leader   of   Opposition   wanted   to   object   to   the   same.
However, he was denied that opportunity.  That eventually led
to heated exchanges between the members of both sides and
consequently, the House was adjourned.  
5. Thereafter,   some   of   the   members   of   the   Opposition   went   to
meet   the   Deputy   Speaker   in   his   chamber   to   vent   out   their
grievance   regarding   the   unfair   manner   of   conducting
proceedings by the nominated Chairman.   At that time, some
members of the Ruling Party (Shiv Sena) arrived and engaged
in   heated   exchanges.     When   the   House   resumed,   the
nominated Chairman referred to the fact that some members
of the Shiv Sena were present in the chamber and involved in
heated   exchanges,   but   no   action   was   being   taken   against
them   as   both   the   sections   had   apologised   to   each   other.
According   to   the   petitioners,   when   the   House   resumed,   by
way of courtesy a sincere apology was graciously tendered by
the   Leader   of   Opposition   to   the   Chairman   for   the   earlier
incident   while   adverting   to   the   fact   that   none   of   the   MLAs
belonging   to   the   Opposition   Party   (BJP)   including   the

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petitioners   herein   had   abused   the   Chairman.     Soon
thereafter,   to   the   utter   surprise   of   the   petitioners   (and   other
members   of   the   Opposition   Parties),   the   Minister   for
Parliamentary   Affairs   moved   a   resolution   for   initiating   action
against 12 MLAs of the BJP for having committed contempt of
the   House.     That   motion   was   tabled   in   the   House   and   the
Chairman was called upon to do the needful.   The Chairman
then called upon the House to pass the said resolution.   The
House in turn passed that resolution by majority votes after it
was put to vote at 14:40 hours on 5.7.2021.  The same reads
thus:
“P.H.: Contempt of the House by objectionable behavior
M.H.:   Resolution   of   Minister   for   Parliamentary   Affairs
regarding   suspension   of   M.L.A.s   for   Contempt   of
the House due to objectionable behavior.
1) Dr. Sanjay Kute,
2) Adv. Ashish Shelar,
3) Shri Abhimanyu Pawar
4) Shri Girish Mahajan
5) Shri Atul Bhatkhalkar
6) Adv. Parag Alavani,
7) Shri Harish Pimple
8) Shri Ram Satpute,
9) Shri Jaikumar Rawal,
10) Shri Yogesh Sagar,
11) Shri Narayan Kuche,
12) Shri Kritikumar @ Bunty Bhangdiya, M.L.A.

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Adv.   Anil   Parab   (Minister   for   Parliamentary   Affairs):
Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   wish   to   move   the   following
resolution with your kind permission.
“On 5 th
 July 2021 when the business of the House was
being conducted, Hon’ble M.L.As Dr. Sanjay Kute, Adv.
Ashish   Shelar,   Sarvashree   Abhimanyu   Pawar,   Girish
Mahajan,   Atul   Bhatkhalkar,   Adv.   Parag   Alvani,
Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute,   Jaikumar
Rawal,   Yogesh   Sagar,   Narayan   Kuche,   Kirtikumar   @
Bunty   Bhangdia   misbehaved   in   the   House,   addressed
the  Chairman  in  the  Speaker’s  Chair   unparliamentary
language,   tried   to  take   the   mike   and   Rajdand,   despite
repeated   warnings,   all   these   members   misbehaved   in
the   chamber   of   the   Hon’ble   Speaker   even   after   the
House was adjourned and abused and manhandled the
Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair.     Due   to   the
indisciplined   and   unbecoming   behavior   resulting   in
maligning the dignity of the House, this House resolves
to   suspend   the   membership   of   Sarvashree   Dr.   Sanjay
Kute,   Adv.   Ashish   Shelar,   Sarvashree   Abhimanyu
Pawar,   Girish   Mahajan,   Atul   Bhatkhalkar,   Adv.   Parag
Alvani,   Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute,
Jaikumar   Rawal,   Yogesh   Sagar,   Narayan   Kuche,
Kirtikumar @ Bunty Bhangdia for a period of one year.
Similarly, during the period of suspension they may be
restrained   from   entering   into   the   premises   of   Vidhan
Bhawan at Mumbai and Nagpur.”
Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   request   the   House   to   pass   this
resolution.
Resolution has been tabled.
Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair:   Now   I   put   this
resolution to vote.
Resolution has been passed after putting it to vote.”
6. According   to   the   petitioners,   the   Leader   of   Opposition
thereafter   wrote   four   letters   to   the   Deputy   Speaker   on
7.7.2021   for   furnishing   relevant   information   including   CCTV

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footage, video  recording  of  the  entire  proceedings  and  a  copy
of   the   verbatim   proceedings   of   the   record   of   the   Legislative
Assembly   dated   5.7.2021   and   6.7.2021.     Thereafter,   the
petitioners also sent letters to the Deputy Speaker requesting
him  to furnish relevant material of the proceedings including
recording of the proceedings in the House dated 5.7.2021 and
6.7.2021.
7. Eventually,   on   22.7.2021,   the   petitioners   approached   this
Court   by   way   of   these   writ   petitions   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution   of   India,   for   issuing   appropriate   writ,   order   or
direction   so   as   to   quash   and   set   aside   the   impugned
resolution   dated   5.7.2021   passed   by   the   Maharashtra
Legislative Assembly being unconstitutional and grossly illegal
and   for   enforcement   of   their   fundamental   rights   as
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
8. It   is   urged   that   the   impugned   resolution   dated   5.7.2021   has
been passed in undue haste and is politically motivated.  It is
primarily   intended   to   adversely   impact   the   numbers   of   the
Opposition   Party   in   the   House.     It   has   been   passed   without

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giving an opportunity  of hearing  to the petitioners much less
calling   upon   them   to   offer   written   explanation.     To   buttress
this   ground,   reliance   has   been   placed   on   a   decision   of   two­
Judge Bench of this Court in   Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj &
Ors. vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly & Anr. 3
.
9. It   is   urged   that   the   events,   as   unfolded,   on   the   face   of   it,
would   indicate   the   undue   haste   in   which   the   impugned
resolution   came   to   be   passed   within   a   matter   of   hours,   that
too,   without   granting   opportunity   to   the   petitioners   to   meet
the case against them.  This was grossly and patently violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution.  For, there was absolutely no
material before  the  Chairman  or  the  Minister  to  substantiate
the   need   for   suspending   the   petitioners,   that   too   for   such   a
long period.
10. Further,   even   the   impugned   resolution   dated   5.7.2021
does   not   refer   to   any   material   on   the   basis   of   which   such
extreme   step   of   suspension   had   been   taken   against   these
petitioners.  There is no indication in the resolution as to how
3   (2016) 6 SCC 82

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the   12   members   (petitioners   herein)   were   identified   from   a
huge crowd of people and singled out for initiating the action
of   suspension.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   impugned   resolution
itself   alludes   to   unruly   behaviour   on   the   floor   of   the   House
and outside the chamber of the Speaker.  The video footage of
the alleged incident, which is in public domain, shows a large
crowd of  people and  there is absolutely   no  way  of  identifying
the   12   MLAs   (petitioners   herein)   who   have   been   suspended
and   singled   out.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   Minister   who
brought   the   motion   was   not   even   present   in   the   chamber   of
the   Speaker.     In   a   similar   situation,   this   Court   in
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj 4
  had to quash the resolution for
lack   of   evidence   to   identify   the   suspended   members   of   the
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.
11. In   the   present   case,   the   impugned   resolution   makes   no
reference to any material much less video footage, etc., which
has   been   relied   upon   before   bringing   an   action   for
suspension.     Moreover,   it   is   amply   clear   from   the   impugned
resolution   that   the   action   against   the   petitioners   was   for
4  s upra at Footnote No.3

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alleged   unruly   behaviour/misconduct   and   not   for   breach   of
privilege that is covered by an independent dispensation.   As
regards suspension of a member of the House, as per Rule 53
of   the   Rules   such   action   could   be   initiated   “only”   by   the
Speaker after complying with the principles of natural justice
and fair play.  The provision, such as Rule 53, is engrafted to
put   a   check   on   the   majoritarian   attitude   of   the   Government.
The Speaker is expected to act fairly, in particular during the
conduct   of   proceedings   in   the   House   towards   both   sides,
namely,   members   of   the   Ruling   Party   as   well   as   of   the
Opposition   Party.     So   to   speak,   he   exercises   quasi­judicial
function.
12. It   is   urged   that   a   motion   for   unruly   behaviour   in   the
House can never  be a subject matter  of voting since it would
enable   the   political   party   in   power   to   virtually   wipe   out   the
opposition for some trivial acts committed by their  members,
by   suspending   as   many   members   of   the   Opposition   Party.
The   decision   of   suspension,   therefore,   must   rest   with   the
Speaker   and   not   the   House.     Notably,   Rule   53   of   the   Rules
prescribes   a   maximum   period   of   suspension   not   exceeding

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remainder   of   the   Sessions.     Thus,   suspension   of   the
petitioners for a period of one year is grossly unconstitutional
and illegal.  If the impugned resolution was allowed to prevail,
nothing   would   prevent   the   political   party   in   power   (in
majority) to resort to such mechanism and to suspend a large
number   of   members   of   Opposition   Party   upto   five   years   or
remainder of the term of the Legislative Assembly by resorting
to voting in the House.
13. It   is   also   urged   that   the   erstwhile   Speaker   had   stepped
down, as a result of which, he ceased to be the Chairman.  As
such, heated exchanges allegedly occurring between him and
the   petitioners   outside   the   House,   would   not   invite   action   of
suspension, inasmuch as after stepping down as Speaker, he
would   continue   only   as   an   ordinary   MLA.     Further,   the
Chairman   nominated   under   Rule   8   of   the   Rules   is   not
empowered to exercise powers under Rule 53, considering the
fact that there was a Deputy Speaker of the House who could
have   discharged   the   functions   of   the   Speaker   after   his
stepping down or during his absence as per Article 180 of the
Constitution.     In   that   sense,   the   impugned   resolution   dated

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5.7.2021   is   nullity   and   non   est   in   the   eyes   of   law,   having
passed without authority of law.
14. These writ petitions came up for preliminary hearing on
14.12.2021.   After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners
and   for   the   State   of   Maharashtra,   the   Court   passed   the
following order:
“We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners
and for the State of Maharashtra.
These   matters   involve   issues   of   moment   for   a
Westminster form of Democracy.
It   is   urged   by   the   petitioners   that   the   impugned
resolution by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly dated
05.07.2021 suffers from the vice of denial of opportunity
of   being   heard   and   adherence   to   the   rules   of   natural
justice.
It is also urged that the resolution neither follows the
procedure   prescribed   under   Rule   53   of   the   Maharashtra
Legislative   Assembly   Rules   (for   short   "The   Rules"),
namely,   for   suspension   of   member   of   the   House   by   the
Speaker   nor   predicated   in   Part   XVIII   including   Rule   273
to take action against the member for breach of privilege
of the House.
It is also urged that the power of Legislative Assembly
though absolute in certain respects, the decision reached
by   the   House   can   always   be   questioned   on   the   settled
principles   amongst   others   being   manifestly   grossly
arbitrary   or   irrational,   violating   the   fundamental   rights
and   such   other   grounds,   as   may   be   permissible   and
delineated   in   the   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of
this   Court   in   Raja   Rampal   Vs.   Hon'ble   Speaker,   Lok
Sabha   &   Ors.   reported   in   (2007)   3   SCC   184,   including
the   two   Judge   decision   of   this   Case   in   Alagaapuram   R.
Mohan Raj & Ors. Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly &
Anr. reported in (2016) 6 SCC 82. Further, for the nature

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of impugned resolution, it not only abridges the rights of
as   many   as   twelve   members,   as   guaranteed   to   them
under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, but also of
the constituencies represented by each of them by merely
invoking   the   route   of   majority   opinion   of   the   House,   an
unprecedented   and   unconventional   move   not   backed   by
any   similar   precedent.   In   any   case,   the   period   of
suspension of one year is unconscionable and manifestly
arbitrary and irrational.
On the other hand, it is urged by the learned counsel
for   the   State   that   Article   212(1)   of   the   Constitution   of
India makes it amply clear that it is not open to the Court
to explore the argument of proper procedure not followed
by   the   House.   Further,   it   is   not   open   to   the   Court   to   do
judicial   review   of   the   final   decision   on   the   basis   of
abstract arguments and grounds urged before this Court;
and even if a sui generis procedure has been adopted by
the   House,   it   is   the   absolute   prerogative   of   the   House   to
regulate its business.
It   is   also   urged   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   State
that   the   petitioners   have   not   refuted   the   case   made   out
against   them   about   misbehaviour   in   the   House   and
outside   the   House   as   well.   Indeed,   this   plea   has   been
countered   by   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
petitioners.
All   these   are   debatable   issues   and   would   require
deeper consideration.
As a  result,  we  deem  it  appropriate to issue  a formal
notice to the respondents, returnable on 11.01.2022. 
Mr.   Sachin   Patil,   Advocate   waives   notice   for
respondent No. 2­State.
Additionally, the petitioner is permitted to serve dasti
notice on the respondent No.1.
Needless   to   observe   that   pendency   of   these   petitions
will not come in the way of the petitioners to explore the
possibility   of   urging   upon   the   House   to   show   leniency
and   reconsider   the   decision   impugned   in   these   writ
petitions,   at   least,   to   the   extent   of   reducing   the   term
specified therein. That is a matter to be considered by the
House appropriately.”

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By   this   order,   the   Court   had   expressed   a   sanguine   hope   that   the
matter would get resolved in the ensuing Session scheduled in the
following week.   Presumably, no effective headway had been made
in that regard.
15. It   appears   that   notice   sent   to   respondent   No.1,   as   per
office   report,   has   been   duly   served.     We   have   been   informed
by the learned counsel appearing for the State as well as the
petitioners   that   respondent   No.1   would   not   be   appearing   in
the   present   proceedings.     The   respondent­State,   however,   is
defending   the   impugned   resolution   by   filing   counter   affidavit
dated 7.1.2022 sworn by         Mr. Satish Baban Waghole, In
Charge   Secretary,   Parliamentary   Affairs   Department.     The
reply   affidavit   amongst   others   points   out   that   the   issues
raised   by   the   petitioners   are   essentially   the   matters
concerning   procedure   in   the   House   of   the   Legislative
Assembly and at best regarding some procedural irregularities
committed during the proceedings.   That cannot be the basis
to invoke jurisdiction of this Court which is constricted by the
mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution, as it concerns the

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powers and privileges of the House.  Thus, the petitioners are
not entitled for any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution.
16. It is urged that the suspension for unruly conduct in the
House   is   not   solely   referrable   to   Rule   53   of   the   Rules.
Whereas, it is open to the Legislature to depart from the Rules
and take a decision which could exceed the period prescribed
in   the   Rules.     The   period   of   one   year   suspension   cannot   be
said   to   be   arbitrary   or   disproportionate   as   such   when   the
Legislature has the prerogative to reprimand or admonish its
members,   independent   of   the   power   of   the   Speaker   of   the
House to order withdrawal of members under the Rules.   The
House   has   the   power   to   take   suitable   action   against   its
members who transgress the limits laid down in Article 194(1)
of   the   Constitution,   being   its   inherent   power   and   it   is   not
open   to   the   Judicature   to   have   a   second­guess   approach   in
that regard.
17. It is urged that from the averments in the writ petitions
itself,   it   is   conceded   that   the   Leader   of   Opposition   had   to
apologise   for   the   unruly   behaviour   of   the   members   of   the

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Opposition   including   that   of   the   petitioners.     The   petitioners
had   committed   acts   which   resulted   in   undermining   and
maligning   the   dignity   of   the   House   in   the   face   of   the   House
and   for   which   reason,   the   House   decided   to   suspend   the
petitioners.     In   such   a   situation,   there   is   no   question   of
granting   any   opportunity  of   hearing  or   for   furnishing   written
explanation,   being   a   case   of   contempt   of   the   House   on   the
face   of   it   while   it   was   in   Session.     The   reply   affidavit
essentially   rebuts   the   legal   arguments   of   the   petitioners   and
reiterates   the   factual   position   emanating   from   the   impugned
resolution   itself   and   urges   this   Court   to   dismiss   the   writ
petitions being devoid of merits.
Submissions ­ Petitioners:
18. The   petitioners   are   represented   by   Mr.   Mahesh
Jethmalani,   Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and
Mr.   Siddharth   Bhatnagar,   learned   senior   counsel.     The   sum
and   substance   of   their   submission   is   as   follows.     First,   the
impugned   resolution   passed   by   the   House   is   without
jurisdiction.     For,   the   power   to   suspend   as   per   applicable

17
Rules is bestowed “only” upon the Speaker of the House and
as  the Office of  the Speaker  was  vacant  at the  relevant  time,
upon   the   Deputy   Speaker   as   per   Article   180   of   the
Constitution.  Further, the exercise of power by the Speaker is
a  quasi­judicial decision  which  must, therefore,  precede  with
a   formal   inquiry,   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   member
concerned   and   recording   of   satisfaction   about   the   nature   of
misdeeds committed by the member concerned amounting to
grossly   disorderly   conduct.     In   short,   the   House   had   no
jurisdiction   to   pass   the   impugned   resolution   much   less   the
manner   in   which   it   has   been   passed,   in   undue   haste.
Second, no known or prescribed procedure has been followed
to   order   withdrawal   of   the   members   from   the   Assembly.
Thus,   a   gross   illegality   has   been   committed   by   the   House.
The   House   is   bound   to   adhere   to   the   Rules   framed   by   it   for
that   purpose   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     The
applicable Rules provide for different dispensation.  The power
to order withdrawal of its member, is provided in Rule 53 and
regarding breach of its Privileges is governed by  Part XVIII  of
the Rules (vide Rules 273 to 289).  A 15 days’ notice regarding

18
the   motion   introduced   in   the   House   is   required   to   be   given
under Part XII of the Rules being Rule 106 of the Rules.  None
of   these   have   been   followed   in   tabling   of   the   subject   motion
and   in   passing   the   impugned   resolution.     Thus,   it   is   not   a
case   of   mere   procedural   irregularity,   but   of   being
unconstitutional,   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution
adopted   by   the   House   including   the   direction   to   the
petitioners   to   withdraw   from   the   House   for   one   year   vide
impugned resolution.   Thirdly, there has been gross violation
of   principles   of   natural   justice.     In   that,   no   opportunity
whatsoever was afforded to the petitioners much less a formal
notice calling upon them to offer their explanation.  Had such
an opportunity been given, it would have been possible for the
petitioners   to   demonstrate   that   they   were   not   part   of   the
unruly   mob   which   had   indulged   in   activities   amounting   to
grossly disorderly conduct.
18.(a) It   is   also   urged   that   at   any   rate   the   impugned
resolution suspending the petitioners for a period of one year
cannot   be   countenanced   in   law   being   unconstitutional,
grossly illegal and irrational.   Inasmuch as, Rule 53 provides

19
for   a   graded   approach   to   be   adopted   by   the   Speaker   for
ensuring   orderly   conduct   of   business   in   the   House   by
directing withdrawal of a member, who in his opinion, had or
was creating obstruction in that regard.   Inasmuch as, if it is
his   first   instance   of   such   type,   the   Speaker   could   order   his
withdrawal for the remainder of the day’s meeting.  In case of
repeat   misconduct   during   the   same   Session,   the   Speaker
could  order  withdrawal of  such  member  for  the  remainder  of
the   Session.     Had   it   been   a   case   of   exercise   of   power   under
Rule   53,   the   member   so   directed   to   be   absent   shall,   during
the   period   of   such   absence,  is   deemed   to   be   absent   with   the
permission   of   the   Assembly   within   the   meaning   of   clause   (4)
of   Article   190   of   the   Constitution.     However,   the   impugned
resolution makes no reference to this aspect at all.
18.(b) On the stated position taken by the respondents that the
power has been exercised by the House and is not ascribable
to Rule 53, but the inherent power of the House, even in that
case,   the   suspension   of   the   member   of   the   House   cannot   go
beyond   the   ongoing   Session.     Inasmuch   as,   excess   and
unnecessary   period   of   suspension   of   the   member   from   the

20
House   is   not   only   undesirable   in   the   matter   of   democratic
values   enunciated   in   the   Constitution,   but   substantively   or
grossly   illegal   and   irrational,   if   not   bordering   on   perversity.
For, longer  period  of  suspension  beyond  the  ongoing   Session
would not only be unnecessary, but nearer to being arbitrary,
irrational and perverse.  Taking any other view would entail in
validating   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution   of   the
House.     To   buttress   this   argument,   support   is   drawn
additionally   from   the   dispensation   predicated   in   the
concerned   Standing   Order   of   the   United   Kingdom   regarding
the   Parliamentary   Procedure   as   well   as   extracts   from   Sir
Thomas   Erskine   May’s   Treatise   on   The   Law,   Privileges
Proceedings   and   Usage   of   Parliament.     It   is   urged   that   the
consequence   of   absence   of   suspended   member   of   the   House
beyond   sixty   days   would   entail   in   vacation   of   the   seat
occupied   by   him/her,   as   predicated   in   Article   190(4);   and   in
which   case,   in   law,   the   concerned   constitutional   Authority
would be obliged to initiate process to fill in the vacant seat(s)
not   later   than   six   months   from   the   date   of   such   vacancy   in

21
terms   of   Section   151A 5
  of   the   Representation   of   the   People
Act,   1951 6
.     This   is   essential   also   to   ensure   that   the
concerned constituency does not remain unrepresented in the
Legislative   Assembly   for   more   than   six   months   owing   to   the
action   against   its   duly   elected   representative   by   the   House.
Had it been a case of expulsion, it would not have resulted in
punishment   either   to   the   concerned   member   or   the
constituency represented by him.  For, the member concerned
in that case could get re­elected to occupy the vacant seat not
later   than   six   months.     Thus   understood,   the   timeline   of
suspension   of   the   petitioners   prescribed   in   the   impugned
resolution is worst and operates as inflicting penalty upon the
petitioners   as   well   as   the   constituency   represented   by   them.
In other words, it is worse than expulsion of a member of the
House. 
5   151A. Time limit for filling vacancies referred to in sections 147, 149, 150 and 151 .—
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 147, section 149, section 150 and section 151,
a bye­election for filling any vacancy referred to in any of the said sections shall be held within
a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy:
       Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply if—
(a) the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy is less than
one year; or 
(b)   the   Election   Commission   in   consultation   with   the   Central   Government
certifies that it is difficult to hold the bye­election within the said period.
6   for short, “1951 Act”

22
18.(c) In   the   present   case,   learned   counsel   contends   that   the
House   had   to   assemble   for   only   two   days   of   the   ongoing
Session.     The   suspension,   therefore,   ideally   could   not   have
been   for   a   period   more   than   the   remainder   of   the   Session   in
terms  of  Rule  53 of  the  Rules.    Moreover,  as  the  motion   was
introduced   in   the   House   for   initiating   contempt,   it   ought   to
have proceeded only under Part XVIII of the Rules by following
procedure   prescribed   therein   which   includes   giving
opportunity of hearing to the member before the Committee of
Privileges.     If   it   was   to   be   regarded   as   an   ordinary   motion,
then   the   procedure   under   Rule   106   of   the   Rules   would   have
required 15 clear days’ notice.   Further, Rule 110 7
  postulates
that the resolution if moved by the Minister, it should precede
with   seven   days’   notice.     Even   this   requirement   had   been
violated.  In either case, the impugned resolution suffers from
the vice of denial of principles of natural justice, besides being
arbitrary,   perfunctory   and   founded   on   unsubstantiated
allegations   against   the   petitioners.     To   buttress   this
7   110.   Government   Resolutions.—   (1)   The   provisions   of   rule   106   shall   not   apply   to
resolutions of which notice is given by a Minister or the Advocate General.
(2)  Seven days’ notice shall be necessary  in respect of such resolutions
(emphasis supplied)

23
submission,   reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   dictum   in
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj 8
.  
18.(d) It   is   then   urged   that   at   any   rate   the   time   period   of
suspension   as   specified   in   the   impugned   resolution   is   manifestly
arbitrary and grossly disproportionate and excessive, besides being
grossly illegal and unconstitutional being hit by Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution.  For, the impugned resolution entails in denial
of   representation   even   to   the   concerned   constituency   for   such   a
long   time,   much   less     beyond     the     period     specified     in     the
Constitution   [Article   190(4)]     and     the     mandate     of     conducting
elections     not     later     than     six     months       from       the       date       of
vacancy       vide       Sections     150     and     151A     of     the     1951     Act.
Reliance  is   placed   on    Barton   vs.   Taylor 9
,   Sushanta   Kumar
Chand     &     Ors.     vs.     The     Speaker,     Orissa   Legislative
Assembly     and     Anr. 10
,     M.S.M.     Sharma     vs.     Sri   Krishna
Sinha     &     Ors. 11
,   Special     Reference     No.1     of    1964 12
,   Jagjit
Singh  vs.  State  of  Haryana  &                  Ors. 13
, Raja Ram
8  s upra at Footnote No.3 (paras 38 to 42)
9   (1886) 11 AC 197
10  AIR  1973 Ori 111 (Division Bench)
11   AIR 1959 SC 395 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 25,26,28 and 29)
12   AIR 1965 SC 745 (7­Judge Bench) (paras 31,32,35,36,39 to 41,56,60,61,124 and 125)
13   (2006) 11 SCC 1 (3­Judge Bench) (para 44)

24
Pal   vs.   Hon’ble   Speaker,   Lok   Sabha   &   Ors. 14
    and   Amarinder
Singh vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha & Ors. 15
.
18.(e) It   was   also   argued   that   suspension   of   members   beyond
the   period  specified  in  Rule 53  tantamounts  to  deviation  from   the
logic   stated   therein.     And   being   a   case   of   deviation   from   the
applicable   Rules,   it   was   essential   to   first   suspend   Rule   53.     That
could be done by way of a motion under Rule 57 16
.   Moreover, the
general   powers   of   the   Speaker   have   been   constricted   in   terms   of
Rule 58 17
, namely, limited to matters not specifically provided for in
the rules.
Submissions – Respondent (State of Maharashtra):
19. Mr.   C.   Aryama   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing for the State of Maharashtra, however, would urge
that   much   argument   of   the   petitioners   is   founded   on
untenable   assumption   that   the   Rules   were   binding   on   the
14   (2007) 3 SCC 184 (5­Judge Bench)
15   (2010) 6 SCC 113 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 47,62,64 and 65)
16   57. Suspension of rules.—  Any member may, with the consent of the Speaker, move that
any rule may be suspended in its application to a particular motion before the House; and if
the motion is carried, the rule in question shall be suspended for the time being.
17   58.   General   Powers   of   Speaker.—   All   matters   not   specifically   provided   for   in   these
rules   and   all   questions   relating   to   the   detailed   working   of   these   rules   shall   be   regulated   in
such manner as the Speaker may, from time to time direct.
(emphasis supplied)

25
House;   and   it   was   not   open   to   the   House   to   proceed   dehors
the   rules   formulated   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.
He   submits   that   it   is   open   to   the   Legislature   to   deviate   from
the   Rules,   even   if   framed   under   Article   208.     Such   rules   are
only   akin   to   the   byelaws   of   the   society   which   are   not
enforceable   nor   can   it   be   regarded   as   statutory   rules.
Further, grounds of challenge set forth by  the petitioners are
essentially   questioning   the   procedure   adopted   by   the   House
in   adopting   the   impugned   resolution.     Such   a   challenge
cannot   be   maintained  nor   could   be   entertained  by   the   Court
in   light   of   bar   under   Article   212(1)   in   particular.     It   is   not
open to the Court to question the decision of the House on the
ground of irregularities in the procedure.  For, the House has
the   prerogative   to   adopt   its   own   procedure   even   dehors   the
rules framed under Article 208.  In a given situation, the rules
being   procedural   rules   can   be   deviated   by   the   House,   if   the
need so arises.   The Court can only enquire into the question
as   to   whether   the   House   had   jurisdiction   to   adopt   such   a
resolution and no further.

26
19.(a) He   further   submits   that   it   is   cardinal   that   the   powers
and   privileges   of   the   House   of   Legislatures   as   delineated   in
Article   194   of   the   Constitution   are   non­justiciable,   forming
part   of   Chapter   III   (the   State   Legislature)   in   Part   VI   of   the
Constitution.     It   is   so   mandated   by   Article   212(1)   of   the
Constitution.     That   gives   enough   room   to   the   Legislature   to
adopt   its   own   procedure   for   upholding   the   privileges   of   the
House   of   Legislature   and   its   members   which   includes
proceeding   against   even   non­member   in   case   of   breach.
Thus,   it   is   not   open   to   even   remotely   suggest   that   the
Legislature lacks jurisdiction.
19.(b) He   submits   that   the   fact   that   Rule   53   of   the   Rules
provides   for   exercise   of   power   by   the   Speaker   to   order
withdrawal   of   member   in   graded   manner,   that   does   not   and
cannot   prevent   the   House   from   passing   a   resolution   to   even
expel   the   erring   member.     Thus,   the   House   can   certainly
direct   suspension   of   its   member   for   a   period   beyond   the
remainder   term   of   the   Session.     The   Legislature   while
adopting   such   resolution   is   not   required   to   give   any   reason.
For, no judicial review of reasons which had weighed with the

27
Legislature   to   pass   the   resolution   is   permissible,   unless   it   is
further   shown   that   the   resolution   adopted   by   the   House   is
unconstitutional.  In the present case, the House had adopted
resolution   which   is   self­eloquent.     In   that,   it   mentions   the
necessity   for   passing   such   a   resolution   of   suspension   of   the
petitioners   for   a   term   of   one   year.     The   power   has   been
exercised by the Legislature, which is inherent in it especially
regarding   the   conduct   of   its   business.     The   impugned
resolution,   therefore,   is   not   unconstitutional.     He   would
submit   that   in   the   guise   of   asserting   that   the   impugned
resolution   is   irrational,   the   petitioners   in   effect   are
questioning   the   proportionality   of   the   period   of   suspension.
This enquiry by the Court is impermissible.  For, the decision
of  the  House regarding  quantum  or   the period of  suspension
is non­justiciable
19.(c) He   vehemently   urged   that   this   Court   ought   not   to
venture   into   the   factual   matrix   and   have   a   second­guess
approach regarding the opinion expressed by the House in the
impugned   resolution.     To   buttress   his   submissions,   he   has
placed   reliance   on   the   decision   of   the   Gujarat   High   Court   in

28
Jagdishbhai   Thakore   &   Anr.   vs.   Chandrikaben
Chudasma   &   Ors. 18
,   which   follows   the   exposition   of   the
Division   Bench   of   the   same   High   Court   in   Chhabildas
Mehta,   M.L.A.   vs.   The   Legislative   Assembly,   Gujarat
State 19
.     He   has   also   placed   reliance   on   K.A.   Mathialagan
vs. P. Srinivasan & Ors. 20
,   A.M. Paulraj vs. The Speaker,
Tamil   Nadu   Legislative   Assembly,   Madras   &   Anr. 21
,   K.
Anbazhagan   &   Ors.   vs.   The   Secretary,   The   Tamil   Nadu
Legislative   Assembly,   Madras   &   Ors. 22
,   V.C.   Chandhira
Kumar, Member of Legislative Assembly & Ors. vs. Tamil
Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat & Anr. 23
, Special
Reference   No.1   of   1964 24
,     Kihota   Hollohon   vs.   Zachilhu
&   Ors. 25
,   M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 25A
,   Raja
Ram Pal 26
  and   Amarinder Singh 27
.
18   2007 SCC OnLine Guj 402 (para 8):  2007 (48) 4 GLR 2998 (Single Judge Bench)
19  ( 1970) 11 GLR 729 (Division Bench) (paras 14 to 16)
20   AIR 1973 Madras 371 (Full Bench)
21   AIR 1986 Madras 248 (Full Bench)
22   1987 SCC OnLine Mad 89 (Division Bench) (paras 87 to 92, 101, 108 to 110 and 160)
23   2013 (6) CTC 506 (Division Bench) (paras 4.19 to 4.30)
24   supra at Footnote No.12 (paras 31,34,35 and 39 to 41)
25   AIR 1993 SC 412:1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (5­Judge Bench) 
25A 
(1999) 6 SCC 237 (paras 18 to 21)  
26   s upra at Footnote No.14 (paras 125, 160 to 162, 163, 271 to 300, 451 to 453, 530, 531,
534, 536, 598 and 696 to 705)
27  s upra at Footnote No.15 (paras 54 and 66)

29
20. He   would   further   submit   that   the   Maharashtra
Legislative   Assembly   even   in   the   past   on   more   than   one
occasion   had   passed   similar   resolution   to   suspend   its
member   for   one   year   period.     That   is   the   legitimate   inherent
power   of   the   House   in   the   matter   of   upholding   its   privilege.
Article 190(3) prescribes no limitation in this regard.  Further,
the invocation of Article 190(4) and Section 151A of the 1951
Act   by   the   petitioners,   is   completely   misplaced.     For,   Article
190(4)  has   no  application   unless   the   absence   of   the   member
concerned is voluntary and without permission of the House.
Article 190(4) cannot override the powers and privileges of the
Legislature   endowed   in   Article   190(3).     Article   190(4)   is   an
enabling   provision   envisaging   occurrence   of   vacancy   only   if
the Legislature so resolves/decides, unlike   ipso facto   vacancy
occurring in situations referred to in Article 190(1) to 190(3).
For issuing declaration under Article 190(4) that vacancy has
arisen,   it   ought   to   be   done   by   the   Legislature   if   such
recommendation is made by the Committee constituted under
Rule   229   of   the   Rules   known   as   Committee   on   Absence   of
Members from the Sittings of the House.  The functions of the

30
stated   Committee   are   spelt   out   in   Rule   230.     The   procedure
noted   in   Rules   231   and   232   is   clearly   indicative   of   the   fact
that   the   absence   of   the   member   must   be   voluntary   and
without   permission   of   the   House.     In   fact,   the   period   of
absence noted in Article 190(4) is sixty days 28
 of meetings and
not   English   calendar   days.     In   this   case,   only   seven   days   of
meetings   had   been   conducted   so   far.     Thus,   invocation   of
Article   190(4)   in   the   fact   situation   of   the   present   case   is
unavailable.   Further, in the case of absence of member from
the   House   owing   to   his/her   suspension   by   the   House
presupposes   that   the   House   itself   has   restricted   the   entry   of
the   concerned   member   during   the   meetings   and   it   can   be
safely   regarded   as   deemed   permission   of   the   House   for
absence   for   the   relevant   period.     Similarly,   the   constituency
cannot   complain   about   its   non­representation   in   the   House
having   elected   someone   who   conducts   himself/herself
inappropriately  in  the  meetings.   In   Raja  Ram  Pal 29
, similar
plea   had   been   negatived.     Concededly,   suspended   elected
representative   continues   to   represent   the   constituency   from
28   Out of total 98­100 days in a year in three Sessions, namely, Budget, Monsoon and Winter
altogether.
29  s upra at Footnote No.14

31
where   he/she   has   been   elected   for   all   other   purposes   except
attending   the   meetings   owing   to   suspension.     The   argument
of   the   petitioners   is   more   fixed   on   the   basis   of   morality
approach.  That cannot be countenanced.  As a matter of law,
the   House   has   inherent   powers   to   direct   suspension   of   its
member   for   one   year   period   and   there   is   no   express   bar   or
restriction provided for by the Constitution or by virtue of any
statutory  provision.    In  substance,  it  is urged  that  the  Court
cannot enquire into the grievances as made, essentially being
about the irregularity of procedure in adopting the impugned
resolution by the House.
21. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners   and
the   respondent­State.     As   aforesaid,   respondent   No.1   has
chosen not to appear despite service.
Consideration:
22. The   moot   question   is   about   the   maintainability   of   the
challenge   in   respect   of   the   stated   resolution   adopted   by   the
Legislative Assembly.   The scope of interference by  the Court
has   been   well­delineated   in   successive   decisions   of   the

32
Constitution Bench of this Court.  This Court has consistently
expounded   that   the   judicial   scrutiny   regarding   exercise   of
legislative   privileges   (including   power   to   punish   for   contempt
of the House) is constricted and cannot be  stricto sensu  on the
touchstone of judicial review as generally understood in other
situations.   In that, there is complete immunity from judicial
review   in   matters   of   irregularity   of   procedure.     The
Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Raja   Ram   Pal 30
delineated   the   principles   on   the   basis   of   catena   of   decisions
noted in the said decision as follows:
“ Summary   of   the   principles   relating   to   parameters
of   judicial   review   in   relation   to   exercise   of
parliamentary provisions
431.   We   may   summarise   the   principles   that   can   be
culled out from the above discussion. They are:
( a )   Parliament   is   a   coordinate   organ   and   its   views   do
deserve   deference   even   while   its   acts   are   amenable   to
judicial scrutiny;
( b )   The   constitutional   system   of   government   abhors
absolutism   and   it   being   the   cardinal   principle   of   our
Constitution that no one, howsoever lofty, can claim to
be   the   sole   judge   of   the   power   given   under   the
Constitution, mere coordinate constitutional status, or
even   the   status   of   an   exalted   constitutional
functionaries,   does   not   disentitle   this   Court   from
exercising   its   jurisdiction   of   judicial   review   of   actions
which   partake   the   character   of   judicial   or   quasi­
judicial decision;
30  s upra at Footnote No.14

33
( c ) The expediency and necessity of exercise of power or
privilege by the legislature are for the determination of
the   legislative   authority   and   not   for   determination   by
the courts;
( d )   The   judicial   review   of   the   manner   of   exercise   of
power of contempt or privilege does not mean the said
jurisdiction is being usurped by the judicature;
( e )   Having   regard   to   the   importance   of   the   functions
discharged   by   the   legislature   under   the   Constitution
and the majesty and grandeur of its task, there would
always   be   an   initial   presumption   that   the   powers,
privileges,   etc.   have   been   regularly   and   reasonably
exercised,   not   violating   the   law   or   the   constitutional
provisions, this presumption being a rebuttable one;
( f )   The   fact   that   Parliament   is   an   august   body   of
coordinate   constitutional   position   does   not   mean
that   there   can   be   no   judicially   manageable
standards to review exercise of its power;
( g )   While   the   area   of   powers,   privileges   and
immunities of the legislature being exceptional and
extraordinary   its   acts,   particularly   relating   to
exercise   thereof,   ought   not   to   be   tested   on   the
traditional   parameters   of   judicial   review   in   the
same   manner  as   an   ordinary   administrative   action
would be tested, and the Court would confine itself
to   the   acknowledged   parameters   of   judicial   review
and   within   the   judicially   discoverable   and
manageable   standards,   there   is   no   foundation   to
the   plea   that   a   legislative   body   cannot   be
attributed jurisdictional error;
( h )   The   judicature   is   not   prevented   from   scrutinising
the  validity   of   the   action   of  the  legislature   trespassing
on the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens;
( i )  The   broad   contention   that   the   exercise   of   privileges
by   legislatures   cannot   be   decided   against   the
touchstone of fundamental rights or the constitutional
provisions is not correct;

34
( j )  If  a  citizen,   whether   a  non­Member   or   a   Member   of
the  legislature,  complains  that   his   fundamental  rights
under Article 20 or 21 had been contravened, it is the
duty   of   this   Court   to   examine   the   merits   of   the   said
contention,   especially   when   the   impugned   action
entails civil consequences;
( k )   There   is   no   basis   to   the   claim   of   bar   of   exclusive
cognizance or absolute immunity to the parliamentary
proceedings in Article 105(3) of the Constitution;
( l )   The   manner   of   enforcement   of   privilege   by   the
legislature   can   result   in   judicial   scrutiny,   though
subject   to   the   restrictions   contained   in   the   other
constitutional   provisions,   for   example   Article   122   or
212;
( m ) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) displace the broad
doctrine   of   exclusive   cognizance   of   the   legislature   in
England   of   exclusive   cognizance   of   internal
proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the case­
law   that   emanated   from   courts   in   that   jurisdiction;
inasmuch   as   the   same   has   no   application   to   the
system   of   governance   provided   by   the   Constitution   of
India;
( n ) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) prohibit the validity
of   any   proceedings   in   legislature   from   being   called   in
question   in   a   court   merely   on   the   ground   of
irregularity of procedure;
( o ) The truth or correctness of the material will not be
questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy
of the material or substitute its opinion for that of the
legislature;
( p )   Ordinarily,   the   legislature,   as   a   body,   cannot   be
accused  of  having   acted  for   an  extraneous   purpose   or
being   actuated   by   caprice   or   mala   fide   intention,   and
the   court   will   not   lightly   presume   abuse   or   misuse,
giving  allowance for  the fact that  the legislature is the
best   judge  of  such  matters,  but  if  in  a  given  case,  the
allegations   to   such   effect   are   made,   the   court   may

35
examine   the   validity   of   the   said   contention,   the   onus
on the person alleging being extremely heavy;
( q )   The   rules   which   the   legislature   has   to   make   for
regulating   its   procedure   and   the   conduct   of   its
business   have   to   be   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the
Constitution;
( r )   Mere   availability   of   the   Rules   of   Procedure   and
Conduct   of   Business,   as   made   by   the   legislature   in
exercise  of  enabling   powers  under   the Constitution,  is
never a guarantee that they have been duly followed;
( s )   The   proceedings   which   may   be   tainted   on
account   of   substantive   or   gross   illegality   or
unconstitutionality  are   not  protected  from  judicial
scrutiny;
( t ) Even if some of the material on which the action is
taken   is   found   to   be   irrelevant,   the   court   would   still
not interfere so long as there is some relevant material
sustaining the action;
( u )   An   ouster   clause   attaching   finality   to   a
determination   does   ordinarily   oust   the   power   of
the court to review the decision but not on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for some
reason   such   as   gross   illegality,   irrationality,
violation   of   constitutional   mandate,   mala   fides,
non­compliance   with   rules   of   natural   justice   and
perversity. ”
(emphasis supplied)
23. These   principles   have   been   restated   by   the   subsequent
Constitution Bench in   Amarinder Singh 31
, in paragraphs 53
and   54.     Further,   it   would   be   useful   to   advert   to   the
observations in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the same decision in
31  s upra at Footnote No.15

36
the   context   of   the   concerns   about   the   intrusion   into   the
powers of the Legislature.  The same reads thus:
“ Concerns   about   intrusion   into   the   executive   and
judicial domain
87.   The   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers   is   an
inseparable   part   of   the   evolution   of   parliamentary
democracy   itself .   Renowned   French   philosopher
Montesquieu   had   drawn   the   attention   of   political
theorists  to the  dangers inherent  in  the concentration  of
legislative, executive and judicial powers in one authority
and stressed on the  necessity  of  checks  and  balances  in
constitutional   governance.   Our   institutions   of
governance   have   been   intentionally   founded   on   the
principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   the
Constitution   does   not   give   unfettered   power   to   any
organ.   All   the   three   principal   organs   are   expected   to
work   in   harmony   and   in   consonance   with   the   spirit
and   essence   of   the   Constitution.   It   is   clear   that   a
legislative   body   is   not   entrusted   with   the   power   of
adjudicating   a   case   once   an   appropriate   forum   is   in
existence under the constitutional scheme .
88.   It   would   be   pertinent   to   cite   the   following
observations made by M.H. Beg, J. (as His Lordship then
was) in   Indira Nehru Gandhi   v.   Raj Narain 32
: (SCC p. 149,
para 392)
       “ 392 . …   One of these basic principles seems to me
to   be   that,   just   as   courts   are   not   constitutionally
competent   to   legislate   under   the   guise   of
interpretation,   so  also   neither  our   Parliament  nor
any State Legislature, in the purported exercise of
any   kind   of   law­making   power,   perform   an
essentially   judicial   function   by   virtually
withdrawing   a   particular   case,   pending   in   any
court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it
by   an   application   of   law   or   its   own   standards   to
the   facts   of   that   case .   This   power   must   at   least   be
first   constitutionally   taken   away   from   the   court
concerned   and   vested   in   another   authority   before   it
32   1975 Supp SCC 1

37
can be lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is
not   a   necessary   or   even   a   natural   incident   of   a
‘constituent power’. As Hans Kelsen points out, in his
‘ General   Theory   of   Law   and   the   State ’   (see   p.   143),
while   creation   and   annulment   of   all   general   norms,
whether   basic   or   not   so   basic,   is   essentially   a
legislative   function,   their   interpretation   and
application   to   findings   reached,   after   a   correct
ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case,
by   employing   the   judicial   technique,   is   really   a
judicial   function.   Neither   of   the   three
constitutionally   separate   organs   of   State   can,
according to the basic scheme of our Constitution
today,   leap   outside   the   boundaries   of   its   own
constitutionally   assigned   sphere   or   orbit   of
authority into that of the other. This is the logical
meaning   of   the   principle   of   supremacy   of   the
Constitution .””
(emphasis supplied)
24. To   the   same   end,   dictum   of   the   Constitution   Bench   in
Sub­Committee   on   Judicial   Accountability   vs.   Union   of
India   &   Ors. 33
  may   be   apposite.     In   paragraph   61   of   the
reported decision, the Court observed thus:
“ 61.   But   where,   as   in   this   country   and   unlike   in
England,   there   is   a   written   Constitution   which
constitutes   the   fundamental  and  in  that   sense  a   “higher
law”   and   acts   as   a   limitation   upon   the   legislature   and
other   organs   of   the   State   as   grantees   under   the
Constitution,   the   usual   incidents   of   parliamentary
sovereignty   do   not   obtain   and   the   concept   is   one   of
‘limited   government’.   Judicial   review   is,   indeed,   an
incident   of   and   flows   from   this   concept   of   the
fundamental and the higher law being the touchstone
of   the   limits   of   the   powers   of   the   various   organs   of
the State which derive power and authority under the
Constitution   and   that   the   judicial   wing   is   the
33   (1991) 4 SCC 699 (5­Judge Bench)

38
interpreter  of   the   Constitution   and,   therefore,   of   the
limits   of   authority   of   the   different   organs   of   the
State .   It   is   to   be   noted   that   the   British   Parliament   with
the   Crown   is   supreme   and   its   powers   are   unlimited   and
courts have no power of judicial review of legislation.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court then noted that this doctrine is in one sense the doctrine
of   ultra vires   in the constitutional law and in a federal set up, the
judiciary becomes the guardian of the Constitution.   It enunciated
that   the   rule   in   Bradlaugh   vs.   Gossett 34
  was   inapplicable   to
proceedings   of   colonial   legislature   governed   by   the   written
Constitution.  In paragraph 66, the Court expounded as follows:
“ 66.   The   principles   in   Bradlaugh 35
  is   that   even   a
statutory   right   if   it   related   to   the   sphere   where
Parliament  and  not  the  courts  had  exclusive  jurisdiction
would  be   a  matter   of  the   Parliament's   own   concern.   But
the principle cannot be extended where the matter is
not   merely   one   of   procedure   but   of   substantive   law
concerning   matters   beyond   the   parliamentary
procedure.   Even   in   matters   of   procedure   the
constitutional   provisions   are   binding   as   the
legislations are enforceable . Of the interpretation of the
Constitution  and as to what law is the courts have the
constitutional   duty   to   say   what   the   law   is .   The
question whether the motion has lapsed is a matter to be
pronounced   upon   the   basis   of   the   provisions   of   the
Constitution   and   the   relevant   laws.   Indeed,   the   learned
Attorney General submitted that the question whether as
an   interpretation   of   the   constitutional   processes   and
laws,   such   a   motion   lapses   or   not   is   exclusively   for   the
courts to decide.”
(emphasis supplied)
34   (1884) 12 QBD 271:  50 LT 620
35  s upra at Footnote No.34

39
25. In the Indian context, the power of the Legislature is not
absolute,   as   noted   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Raja   Ram
Pal 36
  in paragraph 398.  The same reads thus:
“ 398.   We   are   of   the   view   that   the   manner   of   exercise   of
the   power   or   privilege   by   Parliament   is   immune   from
judicial   scrutiny   only   to   the   extent   indicated   in   Article
122(1), that is to say the court will decline to interfere if
the grievance brought before it is restricted to allegations
of   “irregularity   of   procedure”.   But   in   case   gross
illegality   or   violation   of   constitutional   provisions   is
shown, the judicial review will not be inhibited in any
manner   by   Article   122,   or   for   that   matter   by   Article
105 .   If   one   was   to   accept   what   was   alleged   while
rescinding the resolution of expulsion by the Seventh Lok
Sabha with the conclusion that it was “inconsistent with
and violative of the well­accepted principles of the law of
parliamentary   privilege   and   the   basic   safeguards
assured   to   all   enshrined   in   the   Constitution”,   it
would be a partisan action in the name of exercise of
privilege . We are not going into this issue but citing the
incident as an illustration.”
(emphasis supplied)
After   having   said   as   above,   the   Court   proceeded   to   examine   the
extent   of   circumspection   to   be   observed   by   the   courts.     That   had
been exposited in following words:
“ 414.   In   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Union   of   India 37
  while
dealing   with  the  issues  arising   out   of   communication  by
the  then  Union  Home  Minister  to the  nine  States  asking
them   to  advise  their   respective  Governors   to  observe  the
36  s upra at Footnote No.14
37   (1977) 3 SCC 592 : AIR 1977 SC 1361

40
Legislative   Assemblies   and   therefore   seek   mandate   from
the   people,   this   Court   observed   in   para   40   as   under:
(SCC p. 616)
“40.   This   Court   has   never   abandoned   its
constitutional   function   as   the   final   judge   of
constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done
under   the   authority   of   the   Constitution .   It   has   not
refused   to   determine   questions   either   of   fact   or   of
law so long as it has found itself possessed of power
to   do   it   and   the   cause   of   justice   to   be   capable   of
being   vindicated   by   its   actions.   But,   it   cannot
assume   unto   itself   powers   the   Constitution   lodges
elsewhere   or   undertake   tasks   entrusted   by   the
Constitution to other departments of State which may
be better equipped to perform them . The scrupulously
discharged   duties   of   all   guardians   of   the
Constitution   include   the   duty   not   to   transgress   the
limitations of their own constitutionally circumscribed
powers   by   trespassing   into   what   is   properly   the
domain   of   other   constitutional   organs .   Questions   of
political   wisdom   or   executive   policy   only   could   not
be   subjected   to   judicial   control.   No   doubt   executive
policy must also be subordinated to constitutionally
sanctioned   purposes.   It   has   its   sphere   and
limitations.   But,   so   long   as   it   operates   within   that
sphere,   its   operations   are   immune   from   judicial
interference.   This   is   also   a   part   of   the   doctrine   of   a
rough separation of powers under the supremacy of
the   Constitution   repeatedly   propounded   by   this
Court and to which the Court unswervingly adheres
even   when   its   views   differ   or   change   on   the   correct
interpretation   of   a   particular   constitutional
provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
415.   We   reaffirm   the   said   resolve   and   find   no   reason
why   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   at   hand   this
Court   should   take   a   different   view   so   as   to   abandon
its   constitutional   functions   as   the   final   judge   of
constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done
under   the   authority   of   the   Constitution,   though   at
the  same   time   refraining   from   transgressing   into  the
sphere that is properly the domain of Parliament.

41
416.   Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   submits   that
in   U.P.   Assembly   case   (Special   Reference   No.   1   of
1964) 38
  the Court had placed reliance on Articles 208 and
212 which contemplate that  rules can be framed by the
legislature   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the
Constitution   which   in   turn   implies   that   such   rules
are   compliant   with   the   fundamental   rights
guaranteed   by   Part   III.   He   submits   that   if   the   rules
framed   under   Article   118   (which   corresponds   to
Article   208)   are   consistent   with   Part   III   of   the
Constitution   then   the   exercise   of   powers,   privileges
and   immunities   is   bound   to   be   a   fair   exercise   and
Parliament can be safely attributed such an intention .
417.   While   it   is   true   that   there   is   no   challenge   to   the
Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of   Business   in   Lok
Sabha   and   the   Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of
Business   in   the   Council   of   States,   as   made   by   the   two
Houses   of   Parliament   in   exercise   of   enabling   powers
under   Article   118(1),   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   mere
availability   of   rules   is   never   a   guarantee   that   they
have   been   duly   followed .   What   we   are   concerned   with,
given   the   limits   prescribed   in   Article   122(1),   is   not
“irregularity   of   procedure”   but   illegalities   or
unconstitutionalities.”
(emphasis supplied in bolds)
26. From   the   exposition   in   these   successive   Constitution
Bench   decisions   referred   to   above,   it   is   not   possible   to
countenance   the   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent­State   that   the   enquiry   must   be   limited   to   one   of
the parameters specified in  Raja Ram Pal 39
  and, in this case,
only   clause   (s)   –   “ The   proceedings   which   may   be   tainted   on
38  s upra at Footnote No.12
39  s upra at Footnote No.14

42
account   of   substantive   or   gross   illegality   or
unconstitutionality   are   not   protected   from   judicial   scrutiny ”.
On  the other  hand, we lean  in favour  of taking  the view that
each  of  the   parameters   is   significant   and   permissible   area   of
judicial   review   in   relation   to   exercise   of   parliamentary
privileges including  clauses (f), (g), (s) and (u).   In one sense,
clause   (u)   is   a   comprehensive   parameter   articulated   by   the
Constitution   Bench   in   Raja   Ram   Pal 40
,   as   it   predicates   that
“an   ouster   clause   attaching   finality   to   a   determination   does
ordinarily   oust   the   power   of   the   court   to   review   the   decision
but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity
for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation
of   constitutional   mandate,   mala   fides,   non­compliance   with
rules of natural justice and perversity” . 
27. The   Constitution,   by   itself,   does   not   specify   the
limitation   on   the   privileges   of   the   Legislature,   but,
indubitably,   those   privileges   are   subject   to   the   provisions   of
the   Constitution   (as   is   predicated   in   the   opening   part   of
Article 194(1) as also in Article 208(1) requiring the House of
40  s upra at Footnote No.14

43
the   Legislature   to   make   rules   for   regulating   its   procedure),
which   ought   to   include   the   rights   guaranteed   to   the   citizens
under   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.     The   moment   it   is
demonstrated that it is a case of infraction of any of the rights
under   Para   III   of   the   Constitution   including   ascribable   to
Articles   14   and   21   of   the   Constitution,   the   exercise   of   power
by   the   Legislature   would   be   rendered   unconstitutional.     For
attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, it is open to
the   petitioner   to   demonstrate   that   the   action   of   the
Legislature   is   manifestly   arbitrary.     The   arbitrariness   can   be
attributed to different aspects.  Applying that test, it could be
a case of irrationality of the resolution/decision of the House.
Indeed,   in   this   case,   the   Court   is   not   called   upon   to   enquire
into the proportionality of such a resolution/decision.
28. There   is   marked   distinction   between   the   expression
“rational”   and   “proportional”.     The   expression   “proportion”   is
derived   from   a   latin   word   “ proportio”   or   “ proportionalis” .     It
means corresponding in size or amount to something else.  To
wit,   the   punishment   should   be   proportional   to   the   crime   —
whereas,   expression   “rational”   is   derived   from   a   latin   word

44
“ ratio”   or   “rationalis” .     It   means   action   is   based   on   or   in
accordance   with   the   reason   or   logic   or   so   to   say   sensible   or
logical.     The   rationality   of   action   can   be   tested,   both   on   the
ground   of   power   inhering   in   the  Legislature  and   the   exercise
of that power.  
29. Keeping the stated principles in mind, we must proceed
to   analyse   the   grounds   of   challenge   in   these   petitions.     The
foremost   ground   is   that   it   is   imperative   for   the   House   to
adhere to the procedure prescribed in the Rules framed by the
House under Article 208 of the Constitution.
30. The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   M.S.M.
Sharma 41
  had  occasion  to   deal  with   the  efficacy   of  the  rules
so   framed   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     In
paragraph 29 42
, the Court noted that Article 194(3) read with
41  s upra at Footnote No.11
42   (29)   Seeing that the present proceedings have been initiated on a petition under Art. 32 of
the Constitution and as the petitioner may not be entitled, for reasons stated above, to avail
himself   of   Art.   19(1)( a )   to   support   this   application,   learned   advocate   for   the   petitioner   falls
back   upon   Art.   21   and   contends   that   the   proceedings   before   the   Committee   of   Privileges
threaten   to   deprive   him   of   personal   liberty   otherwise   than   in   accordance   with   procedure
established   by   law.   The   Legislative   Assembly   claims   that   under   Art.   194(3)   it   has   all   the
powers,   privileges   and   immunities   enjoyed   by   the   British   House   of   Commons   at   the
commencement of our Constitution. If it has those powers, privileges and immunities, then it
can certainly enforce the same, as the House of Commons can do.  Article 194(3) confers on
the Legislative Assembly those powers, privileges and immunities and Art. 208 confers
power on it to frame rules. The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in exercise

45
rules   framed   under   Article   208   had   laid   down   the   procedure
for  enforcing  its powers, privileges and immunities.   Further,
the   Legislative   Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and
immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner  is
deprived of his personal liberty as a result of the proceedings
before the Committee of Privileges, such deprivation will be in
accordance   with   procedure   established   by   law   and   the
petitioner   cannot   complain   of   the   breach,   actual   or
threatened,   of   his   fundamental   right   under   Article   21.     This
dictum presupposes that action taken under the rules framed
under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution   and   in   conformity
therewith   is   compliance   of   the   procedure   established   by   law
for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution.  
of its powers under that Article. It follows, therefore, that Art. 194(3) read with the rules
so   framed   has   laid   down   the   procedure   for   enforcing   its   powers,   privileges   and
immunities.   If,   therefore,   the   Legislative   Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and
immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived of his
personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges, such
deprivation will be in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioner
cannot   complain   of   the   breach,   actual   or   threatened,   of   his   Fundamental   Right   under
Art. 21.
(emphasis supplied)

46
31. In   Ratilal   Bhanji   Mithani   vs.   Asstt.   Collector   of
Customs, Bombay & Anr. 43
,  the Constitution Bench restated
the aforenoted position in the following words:
“…..   As   explained   in   Pandit   Sharma’s   case 44
,   these
powers and the procedure prescribed by the rules has
the sanction of enacted law and an order of committal
for   contempt   of   the   Assembly   is   according   to
procedure   established   by   law .   Das,   C.J.,   speaking   for
four learned Judges said at page 861: “Art. 194(3) confers
on   the   Legislative   Assembly   those   powers,   privileges   and
immunities   and   Art.   208   confers   power   on   it   to   frame
rules. The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in
exercise   of   its   powers   under   that   Article.   It   follows,
therefore,   that   Art.   194(3)   read   with   the   rules   so   framed
has   laid   down   the   procedure   for   enforcing   its   powers,
privileges   and   immunities.   If,   therefore,   the   Legislative
Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and   immunities   of
the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually
deprived   of   his   personal   liberty   as   a   result   of   the
proceedings   before   the   Committee   of   Privileges,   such
deprivation   will   be   in   accordance   with   procedure
established by law  and the petitioner  cannot  complain of
the breach, actual or threatened, of his fundamental right
under Art. 21.” Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment in
that   case   and   the   Court   in   Special   Reference   No.   1   of
1964 45
 did not say anything to the contrary on this point.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. It   is   settled   law   that   even   rules   made   to   exercise   the
powers   and   privileges   of   State   Legislature   constitute   law
within the meaning of Article 13.  This is exposited in  Special
43   (1967) 3 SCR 926 (at p. 929)
44  s upra at Footnote No.11
45  s upra at Footnote No.12

47
Reference   No.1   of   1964 46
.     It   is   held   that   when   the   State
Legislatures   purport   to   exercise   this   power,   they   will
undoubtedly   be   acting   under   Article   246   read   with   Entry   39
of List II.  The enactment of such a law will, therefore, have to
be treated as a law within the meaning of                                 Article
13.
33. In the backdrop of these observations, the plea taken by
the   State   that   the   rules   are   neither   statutory   rules   nor
binding   on   the   House   will   be   of   no   avail.     Indeed,   the
Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Sub­Committee   on
Judicial Accountability 47
  in paragraph 94 noted as follows:
“ 94.   Second  view   is  to  be   preferred.   It   enables   the   entire
process of removal being regulated by a law of Parliament
—   ensures   uniformity   and   reduces   chances   of
arbitrariness.   Article   118   is   a   general   provision
conferring  on each  House  of  Parliament the  power to
make  its  own   rules  of   procedure.   These   rules   are   not
binding on the House and can be altered by the House
at   any   time.   A   breach   of   such   rules   amounts   to   an
irregularity   and   is   not   subject   to   judicial   review   in
view of Article 122 .”
(emphasis supplied)
46   supra at Footnote No.12
47  supra at Footnote No.33

48
These   observations   have   been   noted   while   deliberating   over   the
legal question as to whether the law made by the Parliament in the
matter of removal of a judge of the High Court ought to prevail over
the Rules framed by the House under Article 118 (corresponding to
Article   208,   applicable   to   State   Legislative   Assembly).     This   Court
held   that   the   parliamentary   law   is   of   higher   quality   and   efficacy
than the Rules under Article 118.   This, however, had not whittled
down the legal exposition that the Rules framed by  the Legislative
Assembly   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution   is   the   procedure
established by law for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution.
34. Be   that   as   it   may,   it   is   well­settled   that   the   rules   so
framed   can   be   altered   by   the   House   at   any   time.     Until   the
rules  are  altered,   however,   the   House  is  ordinarily   guided   by
the   procedure   prescribed   in   the   rules   framed   under   Article
208 of the Constitution.  At the same time, proceedings inside
the   Legislature   cannot   be  called  into   question   on   the   ground
that   the   same   have   not   been   carried   on   in   accordance   with
the rules of business as restated in  Kihota Hollohon 48
.    It is,
however,   enough   for   the   present   to   observe   that   the   rules
48  s upra at Footnote No.25 (para 42)

49
framed   under   Article   208   acquire   the   status   of   procedure
established   by   law   for   the   purpose   of   Article   21   of   the
Constitution   as   noticed   in   M.S.M.   Sharma 49
.     This
observation   has   been   quoted   with   approval   by   another
Constitution   Bench   again   in   Raja   Ram   Pal 50
,   inter   alia,   in
paragraphs 53, 167, 338, 416 and 417.
35. Viewed   thus,   even   though   the   Legislature   has   the
prerogative   to   deviate   from   the   rules   including   to   alter   the
rules; until then, and even otherwise, it is expected to adhere
to   the   “express   substantive   stipulation”   (which   is   not   mere
procedure)   in   the   rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the
Constitution   and   the   principle   underlying   therein,   being
procedure established by law.  
36. As   aforesaid,   the   dispensation   prescribed   under   the
Rules   to   exercise   power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member
(suspension) is ascribable to Rule 53 of the Rules which reads
thus:
“ 53.   Power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member. —   The
Speaker may direct any member who refuses to obey his
49  s upra at Footnote No.11
50  s upra at Footnote No.14

50
decision,   or   whose   conduct   is,   in   his   opinion,   grossly
disorderly ,   to   withdraw   immediately   from   the   Assembly
and   any   member   so   ordered   to   withdraw   shall   do   so
forthwith and shall absent himself during the   remainder
of   the   day’s   meeting .   If   any   member   is   ordered   to
withdraw   a   second   time   in   the   same   Session ,   the
Speaker   may   direct   the   member   to   absent   himself   from
the meetings of the Assembly   for any period not longer
than the remainder of the Session , and the member so
directed shall absent himself accordingly. The member so
directed   to   be   absent   shall,   during   the   period   of   such
absence,   be   deemed   to  be   absent   with   the   permission   of
the   Assembly   within   the   meaning   of   clause   (4)   of   Article
190 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
This   Rule   not   only   speaks   about   the   procedure   to   be   adopted   for
passing   the   drastic   order   of   withdrawal   of   a   member   from   the
House but also about the substantive disciplinary or the rationality
of   the   self­security   measure   to   be   taken   in   a   graded   (objective
standard)   manner.     The   non­compliance   of   or   deviation   from   the
former   (procedure)   may   be   non­justiciable.     However,   in   regard   to
the   substantive   disciplinary   or   the   rationality   of   the   self­security
measure   inflicted   upon   the   erring   member,   is   open   to   judicial
review   on   the   touchstone   of   being   unconstitutional,   grossly   illegal
and irrational or arbitrary.
37. In   terms   of   above   Rule,   the   power   is   exercised   by   the
Speaker being a quasi­judicial order directing  the member  to

51
withdraw from the meetings of the Assembly.   The Speaker is
expected to exercise this power only in case of conduct of the
member   being   “grossly   disorderly”   and   in   a   graded   objective
manner.     The   raison   d’etre   is   to   ensure   that   the   business   of
the   House   on   the   given   day   or   the   ongoing   Session,   as   the
case   may   be,   can   be   carried   on   in   an   orderly   manner   and
without   any   disruption   owing   to   misconduct   of   one   or   more
members.   The expression used in the stated Rule is “grossly
disorderly”.
38. The expression “grossly disorderly” has not been defined
in   the   Rules.     The   meaning   of   expression   “gross”   as   given   in
the Black’s Law Dictionary 51
 reads thus:
“ gross,   adj.   (14c)   1.   Conspicuous   by   reason   of   size   or
other   attention­getting   qualities;   esp.,   obvious   by   reason
of   magnitude   <a   gross   Corinthian   column>.   2.
Undiminished by deduction; entire <gross profits>.  3.  Not
specific or detailed; general <a gross estimate>.  4.  Coarse
in   meaning   or   sense   <gross   slang>.   5.   Repulsive   in
behavior   or   appearance;   sickening   <a   gross   fellow   with
gross habits>.  6.  Beyond all reasonable measure; flagrant
<a gross injustice>.”
“Grossly”, is an adverb and indicative of relatively higher degree of
misconduct or so to say extremely wrong and deviant.  
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52
39. The   expression   “disorder”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law
Dictionary 52
 is as follows:
“ disorder.   (1877)   1.   A   lack   of   proper   arrangement
<disorder   of   the   files>.   2.   An   irregularity   <a   disorder   in
the   proceedings>.   3.   A   public   disturbance;   a   riot.     See
CIVIL DISORDER.  4.  A disturbance in mental or physical
health <an emotional disorder> <a liver disorder>.”
 
The   expression   “disorderly”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law   Dictionary 53
is as follows:
“ Disorderly .     Contrary   to   the   rules   of   good   order   and
behavior;   violative   of   the   public   peace   or   good   order;
turbulent, riotous, or indecent.”
In the Concise Oxford Dictionary 54
, the expression “disorderly” has
been defined thus:
“ disorderly   adj.   1   untidy;   confused.   2   irregular;   unruly;
riotous. 3 Law contrary to public order or morality.”
The   expression   “disorderly   conduct”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law
Dictionary 55
 is as follows:
“ disorderly conduct.  See CONDUCT
Conduct,   n.   (15c)   Personal   behavior,   whether   by   action
or   inaction,   verbal   or   nonverbal;   the   manner   in   which   a
person behaves; collectively, a person’s deeds.      Conduct
does not include the actor’s natural death or a death that
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results   from   behavior   consciously   engaged   in   but   not
reasonably expected to have this result. —  conduct,  vb. ”
40. Taking   the   totality   of   the   meaning   of   expressions
“grossly”   and   “disorderly”,   it   must   follow   that   the   conduct   of
the   member   is   such   that   it   was   impeding   the   smooth   or
orderly   functioning   of   the   House,   and   may   also   be   of   such   a
nature that it is likely to bring disrepute to the House.  It may
involve   varied   situations   and,   therefore,   implied   exercise   of
rational corrective mechanism is quintessential.  The action of
suspension   or   directing   withdrawal   of   a   member   from   the
meetings of the Assembly is in the nature of self­security and
is   essentially   directed   to   ensure   that   the   House   can   then
protect   itself   against   obstruction,   or   disturbance   of   its
ongoing   proceedings   owing   to   the   misconduct   of   any   of   its
members.   That power is different from the privilege to inflict
punishment   on   a   member,   which   may   require   higher   degree
of  deprivation  of  the   member   over  and  above  participating  in
the  proceedings of  the House during  the  Session.   In a given
case,   it   can   be   in   the   form   of   expulsion   being   the   highest
degree   of   exclusion   of   the   member   from   the   House.     Yet

54
another   would   be   penal,   in   case   of   ordering   imprisonment
owing to act of contempt of the House.  We shall elaborate on
this   aspect   a   little   later   while   dealing   with   the   challenge   on
the ground of impugned resolution being grossly irrational.
41. Suffice   it   to   observe   that   Rule   53   of   the   Rules   provides
for  a graded (rational and objective standard) approach to be
adopted   by   the   Speaker   for   ensuring   orderly   conduct   of   the
business   of   the   House.     In   the   present   case,   however,   the
Minister for  Parliamentary Affairs introduced a motion in the
House   for   initiating   action   for   contempt   of   the   House,   which
the   Chairman   allowed   it   to   be   put   to   vote   instantly   at   14:40
hours   on   the   same   day   and   it   was   passed   by   the   House   by
majority in no time.  Indeed, if it is a case of grossly disorderly
behaviour   in   the   House,   the   Speaker/Chairman   himself   is
free to take instantaneous decision to order withdrawal of the
member   from   the   meetings   of   the   Assembly   during   the
remainder   of   the   day’s   meeting   and   if   it   is   a   case   of   repeat
misconduct   in   the   same   Session   —   for   the   remainder   of   the
Session.  

55
42. Concededly,   there   is   nothing   in   the   constitutional
scheme   or   the   rules   framed   under   Article   208   to   prevent   a
member   of   the   House   to   move   a   motion   for   directing
withdrawal   of   a   member   on   the   ground   of   his   grossly
disorderly   conduct.     Further,   if   the   Speaker   can   suo   motu
direct   the   member   to   withdraw   from   the   Assembly   on   the
same   day   instantly   to   secure   smooth   functioning   of   the
proceedings, for the same logic, even the House could pass a
resolution itself on a motion being moved by a member of the
House instantly with the concurrence of the Speaker on such
a motion.
43. In   the   present   case,   the   Chairman   entertained   the
subject   motion   and   called   upon   the   House   to   vote   thereon,
which   had   the   effect   of   giving   tacit   consent   if   not   explicit
concurrence   to   the   same.     In   that   sense,   it   is   not   a   case   of
resolution   passed   by   the   House   (to   suspend   its   members)   as
being  without jurisdiction.   It is a different matter  that  if the
Speaker/Chairman was to do so, it could be only under Rule
53   in   a   graded   manner   for   the   remainder   of   the   day   and   for
repeat   misconduct   in   the   same   Session   —   for   the   remainder

56
of the Session.  That would be a logical and rational approach
consistent with the constitutional tenets.
44. If the House takes upon itself to discipline its members,
it is expected to adopt the same graded (rational and objective
standard) approach on the lines predicated in Rule 53.   That
would be a case of rational action taken by the House as per
the procedure established by law.  The expression “rational” is
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 56
 as follows:
“ rational ,   adj.   (14c)   1.   Endowed   with   the   faculties   of
cognition   traditionally   thought   to   distinguish   humans
from   the   brutes   <man   as   a   rational  being>.   2.   Based   on
logic   rather   than   emotion;   attained   through   clear
thinking; not absurd, preposterous, foolish, or fanciful <a
rational conclusion>.  3.  (Of a person) able to think clearly
and sensibly; clear­headed and right­minded <Jones was
rational at the time of the woman’s death>.”  
As opposed to a rational decision, it would be a case of irrational or
preposterous   approach.     The   expression   “irrational”   as   defined   in
Black’s Law Dictionary 57
 is as follows:
“ irrational ,   adj.   (16c)   Not   guided   by   reason   or   by   a   fair
consideration   of   the   facts   <an   irrational   ruling>.     See
ARBITRARY.
arbitrary,   adj.   (15c)   1.   Depending   on   individual
discretion;   of,   relating   to,   or   involving   a   determination
made   without   consideration   of   or   regard   for   facts,
circumstances,   fixed   rules,   or   procedures.   2.   (Of   a
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57
judicial   decision)   founded   on   prejudice   or   preference
rather than on reason or fact.
   This   type   of   decision   is   often   termed   arbitrary   and
capricious.  Cf. CAPRICIOUS. —  arbitrariness,  n.”
45. A   priori,   if   the   resolution   passed   by   the   House   was   to
provide   for   suspension   beyond   the   period   prescribed   under
the   stated   Rule,   it   would   be   substantively   illegal,   irrational
and   unconstitutional.     In   that,   the   graded   (rational   and
objective   standard)   approach   predicated   in   Rule   53   is   the
benchmark   to   be   observed   by   the   Speaker   to   enable   him   to
ensure smooth working of the House, without any obstruction
or impediment and for keeping the recalcitrant member away
from the House for a period maximum upto the remainder of
the entire Session.
46. Inflicting   suspension   for   a   period   “beyond   the   period
necessary” than to ensure smooth working/functioning of the
House   during   the   Session   “by   itself”;   and   also,   as   per   the
underlying   objective   standard   specified   in   Rule   53,
indubitably,   suffer   from   the   vice   of   being   grossly   irrational
measure   adopted   against   the   erring   member   and   also
substantively illegal and unconstitutional.

58
47. It   is   a   different   matter   if   the   House   had   ended   up   with
resolution of expulsion of the member, which power in a given
situation  it  could   legitimately   exercise,   as   held   in   Raja   Ram
Pal 58
.     That   action   would   not   visit   the   member   with
disqualification  and  also   allow  him  to  get  re­elected from   the
same   constituency   within   the   statutory   period   of   six   months
from the date of vacation of his seat.   However, if it is a case
of   suspension   for   a   period   beyond   the   remainder   of   the
Session,   it   would   entail   in   unnecessary   (unessential)
deprivation.   And longer or excessive deprival would not only
be   regarded   as   irrational,   but   closer   to   or   bordering   on
perversity.     Resultantly,   such   an   action   would   be   violative   of
procedure   established   by   law   and   also   manifestly   arbitrary,
grossly   irrational   and   illegal   and   violative   of   Articles   14   and
21 of the Constitution.
48. Be   it   noted   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder
period   of   the   ongoing   Session   would   not   only   be   grossly
irrational   measure,   but   also   violative   of   basic   democratic
values   owing   to   unessential   deprivation   of   the   member
58   supra at Footnote No.14

59
concerned   and   more   importantly,   the   constituency   would
remain unrepresented in the Assembly.   It would also impact
the   democratic   setup   as   a   whole   by   permitting   the   thin
majority   Government   (coalition   Government)   of   the   day   to
manipulate the numbers of the Opposition Party in the House
in   an   undemocratic   manner.     Not   only   that,   the   Opposition
will   not   be   able   to   effectively   participate   in   the
discussion/debate in the House owing to the constant fear of
its members being suspended for longer period.   There would
be   no   purposeful   or   meaningful   debates   but   one   in   terrorem
and   as   per   the   whims   of   the   majority.     That   would   not   be
healthy for the democracy as a whole.  
49. It   is   well­established   that   fundamental   rights   are
guaranteed   by   Part   III   of   the   Constitution,   out   of   which
Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the most frequently invoked to test
the validity of the executive as well as legislative actions when
these   actions   are   subjected   to   judicial   scrutiny.     Different
Articles   in   the   Constitution   under   chapter   Fundamental
Rights and the Directive Principles in Part IV ought to be read
as   an   integral   and   incorporeal   whole   with   possible

60
overlapping with the subject matter of what is to be protected
by its various provisions particularly  the fundamental rights.
The   sweep   of   Article   21   is   expansive   enough   to   govern   the
action   of   dismembering   a   member   from   the   House   of   the
Legislative Assembly in the form of expulsion or be it a case of
suspension   by   directing   withdrawal   from   the   meeting   of   the
Assembly for the remainder of the Session.
50. Be   that   as   it   may,   it   is   evident   from   the   impugned
resolution that it has been passed by the majority votes in the
House immediately  after  it was put to vote by  the Chairman.
It  was   in   fact   introduced  as   a  motion   for   initiating   action   for
having   committed   contempt   of   the   House   which   ordinarily
ought to have proceeded under Part XVIII of the Rules dealing
with   Privileges.     That   would   have   required   constitution   of   a
Committee   of   Privileges   to   enquire   into   the   entire   matter   by
giving   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   persons   concerned.
Instead of  adopting   that  procedure, the  House itself chose to
direct   withdrawal   of   the   petitioners   from   the   meetings   of   the
Assembly for a period of one year — which direction is neither

61
ascribable  to  the dispensation prescribed  in  Part  XVIII   of the
Rules or Rule 53 enabling the Speaker to do so.
51. As   aforementioned,   it   is   not   a   case   of   procedural
irregularity   as   such.     Whereas,   the   decision   taken   by   the
House in this case, is one of substantive illegality in directing
suspension  beyond  the period of remainder  of the Session  in
which   the   motion   was   presented.     We   say   so   because,   the
period of suspension in excess of the period essential to do so
much   less   in   a   graded   manner   including   on   principle
underlying   Rule   53,   would   be   antithesis   to   rational   or
objective   standard   approach   for   ensuring   orderly   functioning
of the House during the ongoing Session.
52. Reverting   to   the   challenge   to   the   impugned   resolution
being   grossly  irrational.    As  noticed  earlier,  Rule  53 provides
for  a graded (rational and objective standard) approach.   The
timeline as specified in Rule 53 is with a view to address the
immediate concern of the House for ensuring orderly conduct
of the business of the House in the given Session.  This action
is  implied  on   the  doctrine  of  necessity.    The  Speaker  and  for

62
that matter, even the House as a whole or by majority, would
be   within   its   power   to   resort   to   such   a   mechanism   being
rational   measure.     Exceeding   the   stated   timeline   is   a
substantive   matter   and   not   a   procedural   irregularity.     It
would   raise   a   basic   question   as   to   what   purpose   would   be
served   by   withdrawing   the   member   from   the   House   for
successive   Sessions   falling   within   that   period   of   one   year.
Indeed, if the conduct of the member  is gross warranting  his
removal   from   the   Assembly   even   beyond   the   period   of   sixty
days [Article 190(4)] or six months (Section 151A of the 1951
Act),   the   House   is   capable   of   invoking   its   inherent   power   of
expulsion of such a member, which is a greater power.
53. Indubitably, suspension for a day or for the remainder of
the   Session,   would   be   of   a   lesser   degree   of   exercise   of   that
power.     However,   it   is   not   open   to   contend   that   the   higher
degree of power would include power to suspend the member
beyond   the   period   essential   to   keep   him/her   away   from   the
Assembly for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the
House.   As expounded in   Amarinder Singh 59
, the important
59  s upra at Footnote No.15 (paras 47 and 66)

63
consideration   for   scrutinising   the   exercise   of   legislative
privileges   is   whether   the   same   is   necessary   to   safeguard   the
integrity   of   the   legislative   functions.     This   Court   had
recognised   that   the   Legislature’s   power   to   punish   for   its
contempt   was   not   untrammelled.     That   power   of   legislative
chamber   to   punish   for   its   own   contempt   must   coincide   with
the   Legislature’s   interest   in   protecting   the   integrity   of   its
function.   In   other   words,   the   suspension   of   a   member   must
be   preferred   as   a   short­term   or   a   temporary   measure   for
restoring  order   in the  functioning   of the  concerned Assembly
Session   for   completing   its   scheduled   business   within   time
and   by   way   of   disciplinary   measure   against   the   incorrigible
member(s).
54. The   word   “suspension”   is   necessarily   linked   to
attendance   of   the   member   in   the   House.     Thus,   the
suspension   may   be   resorted   to   merely   for   ensuring   orderly
conduct   of   the   business   of   the   House   during   the   concerned
Session.     Anything   in   excess   of   that   would   be   irrational
suspension.     This   is   so   because   the   member   represents   the
constituency from where he has been duly elected and longer

64
suspension would entail in deprivation of the constituency to
be represented in the House.   It is true that right to vote and
be represented is integral to our democratic process and it is
not  an   absolute  right.    Indeed,  the  constituency   cannot  have
any   right   to   be   represented   by   a   disqualified   or   expelled
member.    However, their  representative  cannot  be  kept  away
from   the   House   in   the   guise   of   suspension   beyond   the
necessary   (rational)   period   linked   to   the   ongoing   Assembly
Session, including the timeline referred to in Article 190(4) of
the Constitution and Section 151A of the 1951 Act.
55. Be   that   as   it   may,   suspension   is   essentially   a
disciplinary   measure.     It   must   follow   that   suspension   for   a
period   of   one   year   would   assume   the   character   of   punitive
and   punishment   worse   than   expulsion.     For,   suspension   for
long period and beyond the Session has the effect of creating
a   de   facto   vacancy   though   not   a   de   jure   vacancy.     The
argument   of   the   State   that   despite   suspension   from   the
House,   the   members   would   continue   to   discharge   all   other
functions   outside   the   House   as   an   elected   representative.
This   plea,   in   our   view,   is   tenuous.     For,   the   effect   of   such

65
suspension   is   visited   not   only   on   the   constituency   that   goes
unrepresented   for   potentially   long   and   unessential   time,   but
also   on   the   functioning   of   the   Assembly   itself.     Apart   from   a
role in bringing to light the special needs or difficulties of the
constituency, a member also plays a role in various motions,
debates,   votes,   etc. 60
.     In   any   case,   this   plea   cannot   whittle
down   the   logic   requiring   limited   action   essential   for   orderly
functioning   of   the   House   on   the   given   day   or   at   best,   the
Session   for   completion   of   its   scheduled   business   for   the
relevant Session.  
56. Suffice   it   to   observe   that   one­year   suspension   is   worse
than “expulsion”, “disqualification” or “resignation” — insofar
as   the   right   of   the   constituency   to   be   represented   before   the
House/Assembly   is   concerned.     In   that,   long   suspension   is
60  Some of the functions of the elected representative in the House/Assembly (taken from the
Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules) would indicate that the member would not be able to
take part in following matters, if suspended:
(a) Moving of a motion which requires decision by the Assembly, including by Division
( Rules 23, 40, 41 ); (b) Taking part in a debate on a motion including speeches ( Rules 33,34 );
(c)   Asking   Questions   on   Statements   made   by   Ministers   ( Rule   47 );   (d)   Making   of   personal
explanations ( Rule 48 ); (e) Questions on matters of public concern from Ministers ( Rule 68 );
(f)   Short   Notice   questions   for   immediate   reply   on   questions   of   urgent   nature   ( Rule   86 );   (g)
Private   member   bills   ( Rule   111 );   (h)   Discussions   on   matters   of   sufficient   public   importance
( Rule 94 );                                  (i) No confidence motions ( Rule 95 ); (j) Adjournment motions
( Rule   97 );   (k)   Participation   as   members   of   Committees,   including   the   Committee   for
consideration of matters of public importance, Business Advisory Committee, Public Accounts
Committee, Committee on Estimates, etc ( Part XV of the Rules ).

66
bound   to   affect   the   rights   harsher   than   expulsion   wherein   a
mid­term election is held within the specified time in terms of
Section   151A   of   the   1951   Act,   not   later   than   six   months.
Thus,   the   impugned   resolution   is   unreasonable,   irrational,
and arbitrary and liable to be set aside.  
57. Having   said   this,   we   may   now   turn   to   two   decisions   of
the   Privy   Council   referred   to   and   discussed   by   the
Constitution Bench in  Raja Ram Pal 61
,   in paragraphs 284 to
293.  The same reads thus:
“ 284.   Finally,   in   Barton 62
  it  involved  the  suspension  of  a
Member   from   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   New   South
Wales. The power of suspension for an indefinite time was
held   to   be   unavailable   to   the   Legislative   Assembly   as   it
was   said   to   have   trespassed   into   the   punitive   field.   The
judgment was delivered by the Earl of Selborne. Referring
to   Kielley 63
 and   Doyle 64
  the Court observed:
“It   results   from   those   authorities   that   no   powers   of
that   kind   are   incident   to   or   inherent   in   a   Colonial
Legislative   Assembly   (without   express   grant),   except
‘such as are necessary to the existence of such a body,
and   the   proper   exercise   of   the   functions   which   it   is
intended to execute’.
Powers   to   suspend   toties   quoties,   sitting   after
sitting, in case of repeated offences (and, if may be, till
submission   or   apology),   and   also   to   expel   for
aggravated   or   persistent   misconduct,   appear   to   be
sufficient   to   meet   even   the   extreme   case   of   a   Member
whose   conduct   is   habitually   obstructive   or   disorderly .
61  s upra at Footnote No.14
62  s upra at Footnote No.9
63  Edward  Kielley vs. William Carson , (1842) 4 Moore PC 63 : 13 ER 225
64  Thomas William  Doyle vs. George Charles  Falconer, (1865­67) LR 1 PC 328 : 36 LJPC 33 :
15 WR 366

67
To   argue   that   expulsion   is   the   greater   power,   and
suspension   the   less,   and   that   the   greater   must
include   all   degrees   of   the   less,   seems   to   their
Lordships   fallacious.   The   rights   of   constituents
ought not, in a question of this kind, to be left out
of   sight.   Those   rights   would   be   much   more
seriously   interfered   with   by   an   unnecessarily
prolonged   suspension   than   by   expulsion,   after
which a new election would immediately be held .”
(emphasis supplied)
285.   The   Court   went   on   to   examine   what   is   necessary
and   found   that   an   indefinite   suspension   could   never   be
considered necessary.
286.   The   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners   have   relied
on   the   above   distinction   and   submitted   that   the   limited
power  does  not  envisage  expulsion  and  can  only  be  used
for   ex facie   contempts.
287.   We   are   not   persuaded   to   subscribe   to   the
propositions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Even if
we   were   to   accept   this   distinction   as   applicable   to   the
Indian   Parliament,   in   our   opinion,   the   power   to   expel
would be available.
288.   Firstly,   Barton 65
  which   allows   only   a   limited
power to punish for contempt, finds that even though
the   Legislative   Assembly   does   not   have   the   power   to
indefinitely   suspend,   as   that   was   punitive   in   nature,
the   Assembly   would   have   the   power   to   expel,
considering expulsion a non­punitive power. Secondly,
the   objection   that   the   limited   power   could   only   deal
with   ex facie   contempt, is not tenable .
289.   In   the   above   context,   reference   may   be   made
to   Harnett   v.   Crick 66
.   This   case   involved   the   suspension
of   a   Member   of   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   New   South
Wales until the verdict of the jury in the pending criminal
trial   against   the   Member   had   been   delivered.   The
65  s upra at Footnote No.9
66   Lawrence Joseph Harnett vs. William Patrick Crick, 1908 AC 470 : 78 LJPC 38 : 99 LT 601
(PC)

68
suspension   was   challenged.   When   the   matter   came   up
before the Privy Council, the respondents argued that:
“The   Legislative   Assembly   had   no   inherent   power   to
pass   [the   Standing   Order].   Its   inherent   powers   were
limited to protective and defensive measures necessary
for the proper exercise of its functions and the conduct
of   its   business.   They   did   not   extend   to   punitive
measures in the absence of express statutory power in
that   behalf,   but   only   to   protective   measures.   …   The
fact   that   a   criminal   charge   is   pending   against   the
respondent   does   not   affect   or   obstruct   the   course   of
business   in   the   Chamber   or   relate   to   its   orderly
conduct.”
290.   This argument was rejected and the House of Lords
allowed   the   appeal.   Lord   MacNaghten,   delivering   the
judgment, initially observed that:
“…   no   one   would   probably   contend   that   the   orderly
conduct   of   the   Assembly   would   be   disturbed   or
affected   by   the   mere   fact   that   a   criminal   charge   is
pending against a Member of the House.” (475)
291.   But he found that certain peculiar circumstances of
the   case   deserved   to  be   given   weight.  The   Court   went   on
to hold thus:
“If   the   House   itself   has   taken   the   less   favourable
view of the plaintiff's attitude [an insult and challenge
to   the   House],   and   has   judged   that   the   occasion
justified   temporary   suspension,   not   by   way   of
punishment, but in self­defence, it seems impossible for
the Court to declare that the House was so wrong in its
judgment ,   and   the   Standing   Order   and   the   resolution
founded   upon   it   so   foreign   to   the   purpose
contemplated by the Act, that the proceedings must be
declared invalid.”(476)
(emphasis supplied)
292.   The   above   case   thus   establishes   that  even   if   the
House of legislature has limited powers, such power is
not   only   restricted   to   ex   facie   contempts,   but   even
acts   committed   outside   the   House.   It   is   open   to   the
Assembly   to   use   its   power   for   “protective”   purposes,
and   the   acts   that   it   can   act   upon   are   not   only   those
that   are   committed   in   the   House,   but   upon   anything

69
that   lowers   the   dignity   of   the   House .   Thus,   the
petitioners' submission that House only has the power to
remove   obstructions   during   its   proceedings   cannot   be
accepted.
293.   It   is   axiomatic   to   state   that   expulsion   is   always   in
respect   of   a   Member.   At   the   same   time,   it   needs   to   be
borne in mind that a Member is part of the House due to
which   his   or   her   conduct   always   has   a   direct   bearing
upon   the   perception   of   the   House.   Any   legislative   body
must   act   through   its   Members   and   the   connection
between   the   conduct   of   the   Members   and   the   perception
of   the   House   is   strong.   We,   therefore,   conclude   that
even   if   Parliament   had   only   the   limited   remedial
power   to   punish   for   contempt,   the   power   to   expel
would   be   well   within   the   limits   of   such   remedial
contempt power .”
(emphasis supplied in bolds)
The   two   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council   ( Barton 67
  and   Lawrence
Joseph Harnett 68
)   were pressed into service in that case to answer
the plea that the Legislature has inherent limited remedial power to
punish   for   contempt   by   way   of   suspension   of   its   member   and
cannot resort to expulsion of the member.  The Constitution Bench
noticed   that   even   these   two   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council,
recognised   inherent   power   of   the   Legislature   to   expel   its   member
and, thus, negatived the plea of the petitioner in that regard.   This
Court   after   analysing   the   said   decisions   concluded   that   the
Legislatures   established   in   India   by   the   Constitution,   including
67  s upra at Footnote No.9
68   supra at Footnote No.66

70
Parliament   under   Article   105(3),   need   not   be   denied   the   claim   to
the power of expulsion arising out of remedial power of contempt.
58. What   emerges   from   the   stated   conclusion   is   that   the
Constitution   Bench   declared   that   the   inherent   power   of   the
Legislature   is   not   absolute,   but   limited   remedial   power   to
punish   for   contempt   and   to   take   such   measures   as   are
necessary   for   orderly   functioning   of   the   proceedings   of   the
House.
59. The   case   of   Barton 69
  has   been   noticed   in   paragraph
284, which in turn had dealt with suspension of the member
from   the   Legislative   Assembly   of   the   New   South   Wales.     In
that case, the resolution passed by the House did not mention
about the time frame of suspension of the member.  That was
challenged   by   the   aggrieved   member   being   irrational   and
unnecessary.   That plea was considered by  the Privy Council
keeping in mind its earlier decisions in  Edward   Kielley 70
  and
Thomas   William   Doyle 71
.     (These   decisions   have   been
adverted   to   in   paragraph   283   by   the   Constitution   Bench   as
69   supra at Footnote No.9
70   supra at Footnote No. 63
71  supra at Footnote No.64 

71
well).     After   noticing   these   decisions,   the   Privy   Council   in
Barton 72
  noted that those authorities had dealt with situation
that   no   powers   of   that   kind   are   incident   to   or   inherent   in   a
Colonial   Legislative   Assembly   (without   express   grant),   except
such   as   are   necessary   to   the   existence   of   such   a   body,   and
the   proper   exercise   of   the   functions   which   it   is   intended   to
execute.
60. It   must   follow   that   in   absence   of   any   express   provision
bestowing   power   in   the   Legislature  to   suspend   its  member(s)
beyond the term of the ongoing Session, the inherent power of
the   Legislature   can   be   invoked   only   to   the   extent   necessary
and   for   proper   exercise   of   the   functions   of   the   House   at   the
relevant   point   of   time.     No   more.     For   that   purpose,   it   could
resort   to   protective   and   self­defensive   powers   alone   and   not
punitive   at   all.     This   logic   is   reinforced   from   the   dictum   in
Barton 73
  wherein the Privy Council noted as follows:
“…“If a member of a Colonial House of Assembly is guilty
of   disorderly   conduct   in   the   House   while   sitting,   he   may
be   removed   or   excluded   for   a   time,   or   even   expelled   ….
The right to remove for self­security is one thing, the right
to inflict punishment is another …. If the good sense and
72   supra at Footnote No.9
73   supra at Footnote No.9

72
conduct   of   the   members   of   Colonial   Legislatures   prove
insufficient to secure order and decency of debate, the law
would   sanction   the   use   of   that   degree   of   force   which
might   be   necessary   to   remove   the   person   excluded   from
the place of meeting, and to keep him excluded.”” 74
61. The   Privy   Council   in   the   same   decision   then   proceeded
to observe as follows:
“…   The principle on which the implied power is given
confines it within the limits of what is required by the
assumed   necessity.   That   necessity   appears   to   their
Lordships   to   extend   as   far   as   the   whole   duration   of
the   particular   meeting   or   sitting   of   the   Assembly   in
the   course   of   which   the   offence   may   have   been
committed.   It   seems   to   be   reasonably   necessary   that
some   substantial   interval   should   be   interposed
between   the   suspensory   resolution   and   the
resumption   of   his   place   in   the   Assembly   by   the
offender,   in   order   to   give   opportunity   for   the
subsidence   of   heat   and   passion,   and   for   reflection   on
his  own   conduct  by   the   person   suspended;   nor   would
anything   less   be   generally   sufficient   for   the
vindication   of   the   authority   and   dignity   of   the
Assembly . …”
(emphasis supplied)
These   observations   are   significant   and   apposite   in   the   context   of
the   issue   under   consideration.     And   we   must   lean   in   favour   of
adopting   the   same.     Inasmuch   as   this   exposition   recognises   the
fact   that   implied   or   inherent   power   of   the   Legislature   must   be
reckoned   to   the  extent   only   to   what  is   required   to  be   done   by  the
House   for   effective   and   orderly   functioning   of   its   business   during
74  1  L.R, P.C. 340

73
the   ongoing   Session   and   not   beyond.     This   is   more   emphatically
expounded by the Privy Council in the following words:
“The   power,   therefore,   of   suspending   a   member   guilty   of
obstruction or disorderly conduct during the continuance
of   any   current   sitting,   is,   in   their   Lordships'   judgment,
reasonably   necessary   for   the   proper   exercise   of   the
functions  of  any   Legislative  Assembly  of  this  kind; and  it
may   very   well   be,   that   the   same   doctrine   of   reasonable
necessity would authorize a suspension until submission
or   apology   by   the   offending   member;   which,   if   he   were
refractory,   might   cause   it   to   be   prolonged   (not   by   the
arbitrary discretion of the Assembly, but by his own wilful
default) for some further time. …”
Again, it went on to observe as follows:
“… If these are the limits of the inherent or implied power,
reasonably   deducible   from   the   principle   of   general
necessity,   they   have   the   advantage   of   drawing   a   simple
practical   line   between   defensive   and   punitive   action   on
the   part   of   the   Assembly.   A   power   of   unconditional
suspension,   for   an   indefinite   time,   or   for   a   definite
time depending only on the irresponsible discretion of
the Assembly itself, is more than the necessity of self­
defence seems to require, and is dangerously liable, in
possible cases, to excess or abuse . …”
(emphasis supplied)
62. The   essence   of   the   analysis   done   in   Barton 75
  is   about
the   logic   and   rationality   behind   the   need   to   suspend   a
member.      It unambiguously  held  that  the  same be  regarded
as   temporary   by   way   of   self­protective   mechanism   of   the
Legislature   to   ensure   orderly   conduct   of   its   business   in   the
House   during   the   sitting.     For   that   very   reason,   Rule   53
75   supra at Footnote No.9

74
provides   for   a   graded   corrective   action,   namely,   on   the   first
occasion,   the   Speaker   may   suspend   the   member   for   the
remainder   of   the   day   and   if   the   misbehaviour   is   repeated   in
the   same   Session   —   for   the   remainder   of   the   Session.     The
observations in   Barton 76
  would reinforce this logic of need to
adhere to a graded approach, which reads thus:
“   …“Suspension”   must   be   temporary;   the   words,
“suspended   from   the   service   of   the   House,”   may   be
satisfied   by   referring   them   to   the   attendance   of   the
member in the House   during that particular sitting. So
much   as   this   is   necessary   to   make   the   suspension
effective, more is not . …”
(emphasis supplied)
63. In light of this decision, it must follow that only a graded
approach   is   the   essence   of   a   rational   and   logical   approach;
and only such action of the Legislature which is necessary for
orderly   conduct   of   its   scheduled   business   of   the   ongoing
Session   can   be   regarded   as   rational   approach.     Suspension
beyond the Session would be bordering on punishing not only
the   member   concerned,   but   also   inevitably   impact   the
legitimate   rights   of   the   constituency   from   where   the   member
had been elected.
76   supra at Footnote No.9

75
64. In the case of  Lawrence Joseph Harnett 77
,  the question
was   about   the   challenge   to   the   Standing   Order   which
provided as follows:
“Whenever   it   shall   have   been   ruled   or   decided   (whether
before   or   after   the   approval   of   this   Standing   Order)   that
the   House   may   not   proceed   on   a   matter   which   has   been
initiated in the House affecting the alleged misconduct of
a   Member,   because   thereby   the   said   member   may   be
prejudiced   in   a   criminal   trial   then   pending   on   charges
founded   on   such   misconduct,   the   House   may   suspend
such   member   from   the   service   of   the   House   until   the
verdict of the jury has been returned, or until it is further
ordered.”
This   Standing   Order   was   approved   by   the   Governor.     In   that
context, the Privy Council observed that it seems impossible for the
Court to declare that the House was so wrong in its judgment, and
the   Standing   Order   and   the   resolution   founded   upon   it   so   foreign
to   the   purpose   contemplated   by   the   Act,   so   as   to   declare   the
proceedings against the member invalid.   In other words, the Privy
Council was considering a written Standing Order and its efficacy.
65. In  the  present   case,  the  House  has   already   adopted  the
Rules   for   conduct   of   its   business   and   Rule   53   of   the   Rules
expressly provides for the mechanism regarding suspension of
its member.   Indubitably, the source of powers and privileges
77  s upra at Footnote No.66

76
of  Legislatures   in  India   is   derived   from   Article   105(3)  in   case
of   Parliament   and   Article   194(3)   concerning   the   State
Legislature.     In   absence   of   a   law   to   define   such   powers   and
privileges,   as   of   now,   it   can   only   exercise   those   powers   as
existed in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United
Kingdom at the commencement of the Constitution.
66. In   the   celebrated   treatise   of   Sir   Thomas   Erskine   May 78
dealing   with   the   Parliamentary   privileges,   it   is   noted   as
follows:  
“if for a subsequent occasion, in default of an order by the
House that the suspension of the member shall terminate
when   the   House   orders   that   it   shall   do   so,   the
suspension shall be for the remainder of the Session .”
(emphasis supplied)
He   then   noted   that   the   first   or   subsequent   occasion   would   mean
the first or the subsequent occasion in the same session.
67. Further,   the   position   as   obtained   in   United   Kingdom   at
the   relevant   time   to   suspend   its   members   was   governed   by
the   House   of   Commons   Standing   Order   Relative   to   Public
78   The   Law,   Privileges   Proceedings   and   Usage   of   Parliament,   Fifteenth   (1950)   Edition   (See
Chapter   VII   under   the   heading   “Proceedings   upon   the   naming   of   a   Member”   at   pages   451­
452.)

77
Business 1948. The relevant Standing Order is No. 22 (1 to 4)
as reproduced hereunder:
“22. Order in debate.— (1) Whenever a Member shall have
been   named   by   Mr.   Speaker   or   by   the   chairman,
immediately   after   the   commission   of   the   offence   of
disregarding   the   authority   of   the   chair,   or   of   persistently
and   willfully   obstructing   the   business   of   the   House   by
abusing the rules of the House, or otherwise, then, if the
offence   has   been   committed   by   such   Member   in   the
House, Mr. Speaker shall forthwith put the question, on a
motion   being   made,   no   amendment,   adjournment,   or
debate   being   allowed,   “That   such   Member   be   suspended
from the service of the House”; and if the offence has been
committed   in   a   committee   of   the   whole   House,   the
chairman  shall   forthwith   suspend   the   proceedings   of   the
committee   and   report   the   circumstances   to   the   House;
and Mr. Speaker shall on a motion being made forthwith
put   the   same   question,   no   amendment,   adjournment,   or
debate   being   allowed,   as   if   the   offence   had   been
committed in the House itself.
(2)   If   any   member   be   suspended   under   this   order,   his
suspension   on   the   first   occasion   shall   continue   until  the
fifth  day, and on the second occasion  until  the  twentieth
day, on which the House shall sit after the day on which
he was suspended, but on any subsequent occasion until
the   House   shall   resolve   that   the   suspension   of   such
Member do terminate.
(3)     Not   more   than   one   Member   shall   be   named   at   the
same   time,   unless   two   or   more   members,   present
together,   have   jointly   disregarded   the   authority   of   the
chair.
(4)   If   a   Member,   or   two   or   more   Members   acting   jointly,
who   have   been   suspended   under   this   order   from   the
service of the House, shall refuse to obey  the direction of
Mr.   Speaker,   when   severally   summoned   under   Mr.
Speaker’s   orders   by   the   Serjeant   at   Arms   to   obey   such
direction,   Mr.   Speaker   shall   call   the   attention   of   the
House   to   the   fact   that   recourse   to   force   is   necessary   in
order   to   compel   obedience   to   his   direction,   and   the
Member   or Members named by   him  as having   refused to
obey   his   direction   shall   thereupon   and   without   any

78
further question being put be suspended from the service
of the House during the remainder of the session.”
On   conjoint   reading   of   sub­clause   (2)   and   (4)   of   the   above­cited
Standing Order No. 22, it is seen that suspension of a member on
the first occasion can be for a period of five days or the remainder
of   the   session   whichever   is   earlier.   Even   for   the   second   occasion
the   period   of   suspension   is   only   twenty   days   or   remainder   of   the
Session,   whichever   is   earlier.   On   any   subsequent   occasion   the
period of suspension shall be until the House shall resolve that the
suspension of such member do terminate.  
 
68. The   Orissa   High   Court   in   Sushanta   Kumar   Chand 79
had   occasion   to   deal   with   a   case   of   warrant   issued   by   the
Speaker   of   the   Assembly   to   detain   the   contemnor   for   seven
days’   simple   imprisonment.     It   was   urged   that   as   the
unexpired   period   of   sentence   was   beyond   the   term   of   the
Session of the House, the same had lapsed in law.   The High
Court answered the challenge in favour of the petitioners after
noticing   passage   from   Sir   Thomas   Erskine   May   and
Halsbury’s   Laws   of   England.     The   Sir   Thomas   Erskine   May’s
79  s upra at Footnote No.10

79
Parliamentary Practice relied upon in that decision, expounds
thus:
“Persons   committed   by   the   Commons,   if   not   sooner
discharged   by   the   House,   are   immediately   released   from
their   confinement   on   a   prorogation,   whether   they   have
paid   the   fees   or   not.   If   they   were   held   longer   in   custody,
they   would   be   discharged   by   the   Courts   upon   a   writ   of
habeas corpus.”
And   Halsbury’s   Law   of   England   relied   upon   in   the   same   decision
observes thus:
“The Lords claim to have power to commit an offender for
a   specified   period   even   beyond   the   period   of   a   session.
This   course   was   also   formerly   pursued   by   the   Commons
but   was   later   abandoned;   and   it   would   now   seem   that
they no longer have power to keep offenders in prison
beyond the period of session ……………”
(emphasis supplied)
The   rationale   for  limiting   all   remedies   for   breach  of  privilege,   as  a
rule, to a Session in which the House takes action for such breach
is the effect of prorogation. According to Erskine May’s Treatise 80
, it
is stated as under:
“The   effect   of   a   prorogation   is   at   once   to   suspend   all
business   until   Parliament   shall   be   summoned   again.
Not only are the sittings of Parliament at an end, but
all   proceedings   pending   at   the   time   are   quashed ,
except   impeachments   by   the   Commons,   and   appeals
before   the   House   of   Lords.   Every   bill   must   therefore   be
renewed   after   a   prorogation,   as   if   it   had   never   been
introduced.”
(emphasis supplied)
80   1950 Edition at page 32 under the heading “Effect of a Prorogation”

80
69. A   priori,   if   the   Legislature   intended   to   depart   from
mechanism predicated in Rule 53, it ought to have expressly
provided for that dispensation.  If it had done that by a law or
in   the   form   of   Rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the
Constitution,   the   legality   and   constitutionality   thereof   could
have   been   tested.     Suffice   it   to   note,   in   absence   thereof,   it
would   inevitably   be   exercise   of   power   without   an   express
grant   in   that   regard.     In   such   a   case,   the   exercise   of   power
can   only   be   implied   or   inherent   and   limited   to   the   logic   of
general   necessity   by   way   of   self­protective   or   self­defensive
action   reasonably   necessary   for   proper   exercise   of   the
functions of the House during the ongoing Session.  Anything
in   excess   then   for   a   day   or   the   remainder   of   the   ongoing
Session,   would   not   be   necessary   much   less   rational   exercise
of   inherent   power   of   the   Assembly.     Even,   Rule   53   bestows
authority   in   the   Speaker   to   take   action   against   the   member
only   for   ensuring   orderly   functioning   of   the   House.     Same
logic  must  apply   to  the  exercise of   inherent  limited  power  by
the House, even if it may not be  de facto  under Rule 53.

81
70. Be   it   noted,   had   it   been   a   case   of   expulsion   of   the
member   by   the   House   in   terms   of   Section   151A   of   the   1951
Act,   the   Election   Commission   would   move   into   action   and
rather be obliged to take steps not later than six months to fill
in   the   vacancy   so   caused   subject   to   the   situation   referred   to
in   the   proviso   therein   —   so   that   the   constituency   could   be
duly   represented   in   the   House   at   the   earliest   opportunity.
Concededly,   the   Legislative   Assembly   is   a   conglomeration   of
members   chosen   by   direct   election   from   the   territorial
constituencies   in   the   State   (as   per   Article   170).     That
presupposes   that   all   territorial   constituencies   must   be   duly
represented in the Assembly in   continuum .   In any case, their
representation   cannot   be   deprived   for   longer   period   than
necessary for the orderly functioning of the House during the
Session.     For   that   reason,   the   statutory   mandate   postulated
vide   Parliamentary   law 81
  (which   must   be   regarded   as   higher
law   and   acts  as  a   limitation   upon   the   Legislature   as  well,  as
expounded   in   Sub­Committee   on   Judicial
81   Section 151A of the 1951 Act

82
Accountability 82
),   the   constituency   cannot   be   denied
representation   in   the   House   beyond   a   limited   period   due   to
fortuitous situation.  Moreover, the expelled member would be
free   to   contest   the   mid­term   election   and   get   re­elected   from
the   same   constituency.     In   that,   the   member   does   not   incur
any   disqualification   due   to   expulsion   or   even   removal   by   the
House.  In case of suspension beyond the period of remainder
of   the   Session   or   sixty   days   or   six   months,   as   the   case   may
be,   even   though   is   not   a   case   of   disqualification   incurred   by
the   member,   it   would   entail   in   undue   deprivation   of   the
constituency   to   be   represented   in   the   House   by   their   duly
elected   representative.     It   is,   therefore,   a   drastic   measure
trenching   upon   imposing   penalty   more   than   disciplinary   or
corrective measure, beyond the limited inherent powers of the
House.
71. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   had   invited   our
attention to the judgments of the Gujarat High Court wherein
it   had   been   held   that   the   rules   framed   under   Article   208   of
the   Constitution   are   neither   statutory   nor   binding   on   the
82  supra at Footnote No.33 (para 61)

83
Legislative Assembly.   Those decisions have not taken note of
the   efficacy   of   the   observations   made   by   the   Constitution
Bench of this Court in   M.S.M. Sharma 83
  as back as in 1959
— that the rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution
would have the effect of procedure established by  law for the
purpose   of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   and   which   dictum
has   been   consistently   followed   in   subsequent   decisions
including   by   the   Constitution   Bench   which   dealt   with   the
case   of   Raja   Ram   Pal 84
.     Accordingly,   the   decisions   pressed
into   service   by   the   respondents   cannot   take   the   matter   any
further.     The   respondents   have   relied   upon   other   decisions
including  of  this Court  which, however, has had no occasion
to   deal   with   the   legality   and   efficacy   of   direction   or   order
issued   by   the   House   such   as   vide   impugned   resolution   of
suspending   duly   elected   members   for   a   period   of   one   year
instead of maximum period of remainder of the same Session.
Indeed, the decision of Madras High Court in  V.C. Chandhira
Kumar,   Member   of   Legislative   Assembly 85
  held   the
83   supra at Footnote No.11
84  s upra at Footnote No.14
85  s upra at Footnote No.23

84
resolution of the Assembly reducing the original period of one
year   to   six   months   as   valid,   however,   for   the   view   that   we
have taken, the said decision will be of no avail.
72. Resultantly,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   concluding   that
the   impugned   resolution   suffers   from   the   vice   of   being
unconstitutional, grossly illegal and irrational to the extent of
period  of   suspension   beyond   the   remainder   of  the   concerned
(ongoing) Session.  Further, it is not a case of mere procedural
irregularity  committed  by  the  Legislature  within  the  meaning
of Article 212(1) of the     Constitution.
73. Although   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   parties   had
raised  diverse  contentions,  we  need   not   dilate  further   having
opined   that   in   exercise   of   inherent   power   of   the   House,   the
suspension   of   the   members   could   not   have,   in   any   case,
exceeded   the   remainder   period   of   the   ongoing   Session.     The
concerned Session having concluded long back in July 2021,
the petitions ought to succeed and could be disposed of with a
declaration   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder   of   the
ongoing   Session   in   which   the   resolution   was   passed,   is

85
nullity,   unconstitutional   and   grossly   illegal   and   irrational.
The   same   cannot   be   given   effect   to   beyond   the   remainder
period of the concerned Session and must be regarded as  non
est   in the eyes of law beyond that period.   For that reason, it
is unnecessary for us to dilate on other aspects of the matter.
Thus, we do not wish to examine the same.
Epilogue:
74. It   is   unnecessary   to   underscore   that   Parliament   as   well
as   the   State   Legislative   Assembly   are   regarded   as   sacred
places,   just   as   the   Judicature   as   temple   of   justice.     As   a
matter of fact, the first place where justice is dispensed to the
common   man   is   Parliament/Legislative   Assembly   albeit   by   a
democratic process.   It is a place where policies and laws are
propounded   for   governing   the   citizenry.     It   is   here   that   the
entire range of activities concerning the masses until the last
mile,   are   discussed   and   their   destinies   are   shaped.     That,   in
itself,   is   the   process   of   dispensing   justice   to   the   citizens   of
this   country.     These   are   places   where   robust   and
dispassionate debates and discussion inspired by the highest

86
traditions   of   truth   and   righteousness   ought   to   take   place   for
resolving the burning issues confronting the nation/State and
for   dispensing   justice   —   political,   social   and   economic.     The
happenings   in   the   House   is   reflection   of   the   contemporary
societal   fabric.     The   behavioural   pattern   of   the   society   is
manifested or mirrored in the thought process and actions of
the members of the House during the debates.   It is in public
domain   (through   print,   electronic   and   social   media)   that   the
members of the Parliament or Assembly/Council of the State,
spend   much   of   the   time   in   a   hostile   atmosphere.     The
Parliament/Legislative   Assembly   are   becoming   more   and
more   intransigent   place.     The   philosophical   tenet,   one   must
agree   to   disagree   is   becoming   a   seldom   scene   or   a   rarity
during   the   debates.   It   has   become   common   to   hear   that   the
House   could   not   complete   its   usual   scheduled   business   and
most   of   the   time   had   been   spent   in   jeering   and   personal
attacks against each other instead of erudite constructive and
educative debates consistent with the highest tradition of the
august   body.     This   is   the   popular   sentiment   gaining   ground
amongst   the   common   man.     It   is   disheartening   for   the

87
observers.     They   earnestly   feel   that   it   is   high   time   that
corrective   steps   are   taken   by   all   concerned   and   the   elected
representatives would do enough to restore the glory and the
standard of intellectual debates of the highest order, as have
been   chronicled   of   their   predecessors.     That   legacy   should
become more prominent  than  the rumpus caused very  often.
Aggression   during   the   debates   has   no   place   in   the   setting   of
country  governed by   the  Rule  of  Law.    Even  a  complex  issue
needs  to  be  resolved  in  a  congenial   atmosphere  by  observing
collegiality   and   showing   full   respect   and   deference   towards
each   other.     They   ought   to   ensure   optimum   utilisation   of
quality  time  of  the  House,  which   is very  precious,  and  is  the
need of the hour especially when we the people of India that is
Bharat,   take   credit   of   being   the   oldest   civilisation   on   the
planet   and   also   being   the   world’s   largest   democracy
(demographically).     For   becoming   world   leaders   and   self­
dependant/reliant,   quality   of   debates   in   the   House   ought   to
be   of   the   highest   order   and   directed   towards   intrinsic
constitutional and native issues confronting the common man
of   the   nation/States,   who   are   at   the   crossroad   of   semi­

88
sesquicentennial or may  we say  platinum  or  diamond jubilee
year   on   completion   of   75   years   post­independence.     Being
House   of   respected   and   honourable   members,   who   are
emulated   by   their   ardent   followers   and   elected   from   their
respective   constituency,   they   are   expected   to   show
statesmanship   and   not   brinkmanship.     In   the   House,   their
goal   is   and   must   be   one   —   so   as   to   ensure   the   welfare   and
happiness of we the people of this nation.   In any case, there
can   be   no   place   for   disorderly   conduct   in   the   House   much
less   “grossly   disorderly”.     Such   conduct   must   be   dealt   with
sternly   for   ensuring   orderly   functioning   of   the   House.     But,
that   action   must   be  constitutional,  legal,  rational   and   as  per
the   procedure   established   by   law.     This   case   has   thrown   up
an   occasion   for   all   concerned   to   ponder   over   the   need   to
evolve and adhere to good practices befitting the august body;
and   appropriately   denounce   and   discourage   proponents   of
undemocratic   activities   in   the   House,   by   democratically
elected representatives.  We say no more.
Conclusion:

89
75. In   conclusion,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   allowing   these
writ   petitions   and   to   declare   that   the   impugned   resolution
directing   suspension   of   the   petitioners   beyond   the   period   of
the remainder of the concerned Monsoon Session held in July
2021 is  non est  in the eyes  of  law ,  nullity,  unconstitutional,
substantively     illegal     and   irrational.         The       impugned
resolution       is,   thus,       declared     to     be
ineffective in law, insofar as the period beyond the remainder
of   the   stated   Session   in   which   the   resolution   came   to   be
passed.
Order:
76. As  a result  of  the stated  declaration, the  petitioners are
entitled for all consequential benefits of being members of the
Legislative Assembly,  on  and  after   the expiry  of the period  of
the   remainder   of   the   concerned   Session   in   July   2021.       The
writ petitions are allowed in the above terms.   No order as to
costs.
Postscript:
77. While parting, we need to express a word of appreciation
for the able assistance given by the learned counsel appearing

90
for the concerned parties enabling us to deal with the complex
issues   on   hand.     That   they   did   despite   the   handicaps   and
uncertainty of online interaction in virtual Court hearing.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
..……………………………J.
          (A.M. Khanwilkar)
………………………………J.
          (Dinesh Maheshwari)
………………………………J.
          (C.T. Ravikumar)
New Delhi;
January 28, 2022.