/2022 INSC 0092/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 7517 OF 2012
SUBHASH CHANDER & ORS.  ……Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/S BHARAT PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION LTD.(BPCL) & ANR. .….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. The   instant   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the
appellants/plaintiffs   assailing   the   judgment   dated   8 th
  July,   2009,
upholding   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the   Court   of   appeal   dated
28 th
  March, 2006 holding that the Civil   Court has no jurisdiction
to   entertain   and   try   the   suit   for   possession   in   reference   to   the
subject   property   and   the   appropriate   remedy   available   with   the
appellants is to initiate proceedings for eviction of the suit property
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under   the   provisions   of   the   Haryana   (Control   of   Rent   &   Eviction)
Act, 1973 (hereinafter called as “Act 1973”).   
2. The   brief   facts   of   the   case   manifest   from   the   record   are   that
the   appellants   filed   a   suit   on   the   averment   that   their   predecessor
in interest Sh. Vinod Kumar was owner of the subject plot of land
admeasuring   10,000   sq.   feet   in   municipal   limits,   Kaithal   bearing
Municipal No.657/10.     Undisputedly, the Act 1973 applies to the
suit property in question.   
3. The subject property was given on lease by late Vinod Kumar
to M/s Burmah Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company  Ltd. for  a
fixed period of 20 years at the rate of Rs.35/­ per month vide lease
dated   4 th
  June,   1958   with   effect   from   1 st
  April,   1958.       The   lease
period   initially   was   for   20   years   and   clause   10   of   the   lease
contemplated renewal of the lease once for another 20 years.   The
lease   period   commenced   from   1 st
  April,   1958   for   a   period   of   20
years   expired   on   1 st
  April,   1978   and   in   terms   of   clause   10   of   the
lease deed, one extension was permissible and that renewal option
for   another   period   of   20   years   was   availed   and   that   lease   period
also expired on 1 st
 April, 1998.
4. At   this   stage,   the   appellants   served   a   legal   notice   on   the
respondents   dated   30 th
  January,   1998   in   which   although   Section
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106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has not been specifically
mentioned,   but   in   pith   and   substance   the   notice   was   served   for
terminating   tenancy   of   the   respondents   and   later   filed   a   civil   suit
for possession of the subject land on 7 th
 August, 1998.  
5. The   preliminary   objection   was   raised   by   the   respondents
regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court in entertaining the suit and
the defence throughout was that the Act 1973 is applicable on the
subject property and they can be evicted only under the provisions
of the Act 1973.  It is not disputed that the subject land admittedly
falls within the area administered by Municipal Committee, Kaithal
and the rented land is situated within the urban area and covered
under the provisions of the Act 1973. 
6. That   before   expiry   of   the   period   of   lease   of   20   years,   the
Central   Government   enacted   Burmah   Shell   (Acquisition   of
Undertakings)   Act,   1976   (hereinafter   called   as   “Act   1976”),
pursuant   to   which   the   leasehold   rights   were   taken   over   by   the
respondents/defendants.     The   option   of   renewal   of   lease   for
another period of 20 years was availed by the respondents in terms
of   clause   10   of   the   lease   deed   dated   4 th
  June,   1958.     The   case   of
the   appellants   was   that   after   lease   expired   on   1 st
  April,   1998,   the
possession   of   the   respondents   on   the   suit   property   became
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unauthorised and without consent of the appellants and since the
respondents failed to vacate the suit property despite a legal notice
dated   30 th
  January,   1998   being   served,   the   appellants   since
required the suit property for their personal bonafide necessity for
expanding their business, although had earlier filed an application
under   the   Act   1973,   as   alleged   on   the   wrong   premise.     It   was
pleaded that at least the provisions of the Act 1973 do not apply to
the suit property as it is governed by the special Act enacted by the
Central   Government   being   Act   1976.     In   the   alternative,   it   was
pleaded   by   the   appellants   that   respondent   no.1   had   sub­let   the
suit property to respondent no.2 without consent of the appellants
and   hence   the   appellants   are   entitled   to   possession   of   the   suit
property   and   also   claimed   mesne   profits   during   pendency   of   the
suit   at   the   market   rate,   in   addition   to   three   years   rent   prior   to
lapse of the renewal period and prayed for a decree for possession
and recovery of mesne profits.  
7. The   respondents   filed   written   statement   and   it   was   admitted
that the suit property had been leased out by late Vinod Kumar to
M/s   Burmah   Shell   Oil   Storage   Distributing   Company   Ltd.     and
later   by   the   Act   1976,   the   leasehold   rights   were   transferred   to
respondent   no.1.     It   was   also   admitted   that   they   exercised   their
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renewal option in terms of clause 10 of the lease for a period of 20
years.     At the same time, it was also averred that on expiry of the
lease   period,   the   respondents   became   the   statutory   tenant   of   the
suit  property  and  the appellants  had  been  receiving  rent  from  the
respondents without any demur and further averred that the Civil
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit as the same
is specifically barred by the provisions of the Act 1973.   
8. It was further stated that there was a relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties and the suit land is a rented land
as   defined   under   Section   2(h)   of   the   Act   1973   and   the   disputes
between   landlord   and   tenant   are   to   be   adjudicated   in   accordance
with   the   provisions   of   the   Act   1973   and   the   respondents   being   in
possession   as   a   statutory   tenant   of   the   suit   property,   cannot   be
evicted   except   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   Section   13   of
the   Act   1973   and   that   apart   the   appellants   had   earlier   filed   a
petition   for   ejectment   against   the   respondents   before   the   Rent
Controller on the ground of subletting and personal necessity and
that has been dismissed by the Rent Controller by  order dated  3 rd
May, 1986.  An appeal against the same also came to be dismissed
by the appellate authority by order dated 18 th
 March, 1987. 
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9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
Court by a judgment and decree dated 13 th
  March, 2002 held that
the   respondents   are   in   unauthorised   possession   over   the   suit
property w.e.f. 1 st
 April, 1998 after notice dated 30 th
 January, 1998
under  Section  106  of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882 has  been
served for vacating the suit property holding the appellants entitled
for restoration of possession of the suit land in question.      
10. On   appeal   being   preferred   by   the   respondents,   the   Court   of
Appeal set aside the  judgment  and decree of the trial Court  dated
13 th
  March,   2002   by   the   judgment   dated   28 th
  March,   2006   and
held   that   the   Civil   Court   has   no   jurisdiction   to   entertain   and   try
the suit and the respondents are in possession of the suit property
as statutory tenant and can be evicted from the suit property only
under the provisions of the Act 1973.     The said order came to be
challenged by the appellants/plaintiffs in second appeal before the
High   Court   and   that   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   impugned
judgment   dated   8 th
  July,   2009,   being   the   subject   matter   of
challenge in appeal before us.
  
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11. The dispute between the parties pertains to as to whether the
jurisdiction   of   the   Civil   Court   is   barred   and   the   petition   for
possession filed by the appellants/plaintiffs will lie before the Rent
Controller under the Act 1973.   
12. Counsel   for   the   appellants,   Shri   Manoj   Swarup,   Senior
Advocate, submits that before the term of initial lease period of 20
years   came   to   be   expired   on   1 st
  April,   1978,   the   Central
Government   came   with   a   special   legislation,   namely,   the   Burmah
Shell   (Acquisition   of   Undertakings)   Act,   1976   and   the   High   Court
has failed to consider the effect of Section 11 of the Act 1976 which
has   an   overriding   effect   and   that   excludes   all   other   laws
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act 1976, including the Act
1973   and   further   submits   that   the   finding   which   has   been
recorded of the respondents being a statutory tenant under the Act
1973 is in contravention of Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 and in the
absence  of  any  fresh  lease  being  executed  by  the   parties  only  one
renewal   as   per   the   lease   deed   originally   executed   dated   4 th
  June,
1958, was permissible in law and that being  availed and the term
had   expired   on   1 st
  April,   1998,   no   further   extension   was
permissible   in   law  and   the   respondents    became   trespassers  after
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expiry   of   the   lease   period   and   the   only   remedy   available   with   the
appellants was to file a suit for possession of the suit property and
in support of his submissions placed reliance on the judgments of
this Court in  Depot Superintendent, H.P. Corpn. Ltd. and Another v.
Kolhapur  Agricultural  Market  Committee, Kolhapur 1
, Ram  Bharosey
Lal   Gupta(Dead)   by   LRs   and   Others   v.   Hindustan   Petroleum
Corporation   Limited   and   Another 2
,   Bharat   Petroleum   Corporation
Limited v. Rama Chandrashekhar Vaidya and Another 3
.
13. Per   contra,   counsel   for   the   respondents,   Shri   V.   Giri,   Senior
Advocate,   while   supporting   the   findings   recorded   under   the
impugned   judgment   conceded   that   only   one   term   of   extension   of
lease of 20 years was permissible and that indeed was availed and
stood   expired   on   1 st
  April,   1998,   but   further   submits   that   the
respondents   became   statutory   tenant   thereafter   under   the   Act
1973 and they could be evicted only by invoking Section 13 of the
Act 1973 which undisputedly is applicable to the subject property
and thus in the given circumstances the Civil Court at least has no
jurisdiction   to   try   the   suit.       That   being   the   finding   recorded   by
the   first   appellate   Court   and   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   on
1   (2007) 6 SCC 159
2   (2013) 9 SCC 714
3   (2014) 1 SCC 657
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dismissal   of   second   appeal   preferred   at   the   instance   of   the
appellants   under   the   impugned   judgment   being   supported   by   the
judgment   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   V.   Dhanapal
Chettiar   v.   Yesodai   Ammal 4
  followed   in   Shyam   Lal   v.   Deepa   Dass
Chela   Ram   Chela   Garib   Dass 5
,   what   is   being   urged   by   learned
counsel   for   the   appellants   is   without   substance   and   the   finding
with   regard   to   the   jurisdiction   being   supported   by   the   settled
principles of law needs no further indulgence of this Court.
14. It may be relevant to note that in the interregnum period, title
deed   of   the   subject   property   in   question   was   mortgaged   with   the
Punjab   National   Bank   creating   security   interest   and   after   the
account   of   the   appellants   became   NPA,   proceedings   under   the
SARFAESI   Act,   2002   were   initiated   against   the   appellants   and
public notice (symbolic) was issued by the secured creditor (Punjab
National   Bank)   for   securing   possession   of   the   subject   property   on
14 th
  August,   2018.       Pursuant   thereto,   a   letter   was   sent   from   the
office of  Bharat Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd. on 12 th
  October, 2018
for   withdrawal   of   the   possession   notice   (symbolic)   dated   14 th
August,   2018   but   what   steps   have   been   taken   inter   se   is   not   on
record.  However, this Court is not concerned with this controversy
4   (1979) 4 SCC 214
5   (2016) 7 SCC 572
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in   the   instant   proceedings,   but   since   the   documents   have   been
placed on record, the same are being noticed only for completion of
the facts. 
15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.
16. It   is   not   disputed   that   the   appellants   are   the   owners   of   the
suit   property   which   is   a   plot   admeasuring   10,000   square   feet
situated within the municipal limits of Kaithal.    Their predecessor
in   interest,   late   Vinod   Kumar   son   of   Tilaj   Raj   had   leased   out   the
subject   plot   to   M/s   Burmah   Shell   Oil   Storage   Distributing
Company Ltd. for a period of 20 years pursuant to lease deed dated
4 th
  June,   1958   and   before   the   expiry   of   the   lease   period,   the
Central Government  came out  with a legislation, namely, Burmah
Shell   (Acquisition   of   Undertakings)   Act,   1976   and   took   over   the
rights   of   the   lessee   and   transferred   the   same   to   M/s   Bharat
Petroleum   Corporation   Ltd.   in   exercise   of   its   power   under   Section
5(2) read with Section 7(3) of the Act 1976.  
17. It is also not disputed that the subject land is situated within
the   municipal   limits   of   Kaithal   and   is   governed   by   the   Act   1973
and the term “tenant” defined under Section 2(h) includes “rented
land”   in   question.     At  the   same   time,   in  terms   of  Section   3   of   the
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Act   1976,   on   the   appointed   day   the   right,   title   and   interest   of
Burmah   Shell   in   relation   to   its   undertaking   in   India   stood
transferred   and   vested   in   the   Central   Government   and   by   a   legal
fiction   the   Central  Government   stepped  into  the   shoes   of  Burmah
Shell and became the lessee in the lease deed dated 4 nd
 June, 1958
and in terms of Section 5(2) read with Section 7(3) of the Act 1976,
the statutory rights stood conferred on the respondents in terms of
clause 10 of lease deed/agreement for another term of 20 years on
the   same   terms   and   conditions   as   were   operating   and/or   existing
on   the   date   of   enactment   of   the   said   Act   1976.       As   such,   upon
vesting by virtue of the provisions of the Act 1976, the respondents
became   the   lessee   in   respect   of   the   subject   land   in   terms   of   the
provisions   of   the   Act   which   has   an   overriding   effect   by   virtue   of
Section 11 of the Act 1976.
18. Sections   3,   5,   7   and   11   of   the   Act   1976,   relevant   for   the
purpose, are reproduced hereunder:
“3. Transfer   and   vesting   in   the   Central   Government   of   the
undertakings of Burmah Shell in India.   ­ On the appointed day,
the   right,   title   and   interest   of   Burmah   Shell,   in   relation   to   its
undertakings in India, shall stand transferred to, and shall vest in,
the Central Government.
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5. Central Government to be lessor or tenant under certain
circumstances.   ­   (1)   Where   any   property   is   held   in   India   by
Burmah Shell  under  any  lease or  under   any  right  of  tenancy, the
Central   Government   shall,   on   and   from   the   appointed   day,   be
deemed to have become the lessee or tenant, as the case may be,
in respect of such property as if the lease or tenancy in relation to
such   property   had   been   granted   to   the   Central   Government,   and
thereupon   all   the   rights   under   such   lease   or   tenancy   shall   be
deemed   to   have   been   transferred   to,   and   vested   in,   the   Central
Government.
(2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to
in sub­section (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the
Central   Government,   be   renewed   on   the   same   terms   and
conditions   on   which   the   lease   or   tenancy   was   held   by   Burmah
Shell immediately before the appointed day.
7.   Power   of   Central   Government   to   direct   vesting   of   the
undertakings of the Burmah Shell in a Government company. ­
(1)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained  in sections 3,  4  and  5,
the   Central   Government   may,   if   it   is   satisfied   that   a   Government
company   is   willing   to   comply,   or   has   complied,   with   such   terms
and conditions as that Government may think fit to impose, direct
by   notification,   that   the   right,   title   and   interest   and   the   liabilities
of   Burmah   Shell   in   relation   to   any   of   its   undertakings   in   India
shall,   instead   of   continuing   to   vest   in   the   Central   Government,
vest   in   the   Government   company   either   on   the   date   of   the
notification or on such earlier or later date (not being a date earlier
than the appointed day) as may be specified in the notification.
(2)   Where   the   right,   title   and   interest   and   the   liabilities   of
Burmah   Shell   in   relation   to   its   undertakings   in   India   vest   in   a
Government   company   under   sub­section   (1),   the   Government
company shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to
have   become   the   owner,   tenant   or   lessee,   as   the   case   may   be,   in
relation   to  such   undertakings,   and   all  the   rights   and   liabilities   of
the Central Government in relation to such undertakings shall, on
and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the
rights and liabilities, respectively, of the Government company.
(3)   The provisions of sub­ section (2) of section 5 shall apply to
a lease or tenancy, which vests in a Government company, as they
apply to a lease or tenancy vested in the Central Government, and
reference   therein   to   the"   Central   Government"   shall   be   construed
as a reference to the Government company.
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11.   Effect of Act on other laws.  The provisions of this Act shall
have   effect   notwithstanding   anything   inconsistent   therewith
contained   in   any   other   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   or   in   any
instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act or
in any decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority.”
                                                                              [Emphasis Supplied]
19. By   virtue   of   the   statutory   enactment   of   Act   1976,   the   pre­
existing   tenancy   rights   held   by   Burmah   Shell   with   the   appellants
stood   transferred   and   vested   with   the   Central   Government   and
thereafter   by   operation   of   Section   7,   the   said   rights   in   turn   stood
transposed   and   vested   in   the   Government   Company   (Bharat
Petroleum   Corporation   Ltd.)   as   the   Government   Company
statutorily   became   the   tenant   of   the   appellants/plaintiffs.   The
Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   V.   Dhanapal   Chettiar   (supra)
had an occasion to examine the controversy as to whether in order
to   get   a   decree/order   of   eviction   against   the   tenant   in   the   State
Rent Control Act, it is necessary to give a notice under Section 106
of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act,   1882   and   taking   note   of   various
State   enactments   of   the   Act   1973,   L.N.   Untwalia,   J.,   speaking   for
the Bench, observed in para 18 as under:
“ Lastly   our   attention   was   drawn   to   the   decision   of   this   Court
in   Firm   Sardarilal   Vishwanath   v.   Pritam   Singh   [(1978)   4   SCC   1.
The   lease   in   that   case   had   come   to   an   end   by   efflux   of   time.   A
tenant continued in possession and became a so­called statutory
tenant.   The   argument   put   forward   before   this   Court   that   a   fresh
notice   under   Section   106   of   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act   was
necessary was rejected on the ground: (SCC p. 10, para 18)
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“Having examined the matter on authority and precedent it
must   be   frankly   confessed   that   no   other   conclusion   is
possible   on   the   first   principle.   Lease   of   urban   immovable
property   represents   a   contract   between   the   lessor   and   the
lessee.   If   the   contract   is   to   be   put   to   an   end   it   has   to   be
terminated   by   a   notice   to   quit   as   envisaged   under   Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act. But it is equally clear as
provided by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act that
the   lease   of   immovable   property   determines   by   various
modes   therein   prescribed.   Now,   if   the   lease   of   immovable
property   determines   in   any   one   of   the   modes   prescribed
under   Section   111,   the   contract   of   lease   comes   to   an   end,
and the landlord can exercise his right of re­entry. The right
of   re­entry   is   further   restricted   and   fettered   by   the
provisions   of   the   Rent   Restriction   Act.   Nonetheless   the
contract   of   lease   had   expired   and   the   tenant   lessee
continues   in   possession   under   the   protective   wing   of   the
Rent   Restriction   Act   until   the   lessee   loses   protection.   But
there is no question of terminating the contract because the
contract comes to an end once the lease determines in any
one   of   the   modes   prescribed   under   Section   111.   There   is,
therefore,   no   question   of   giving   a   notice   to   quit   to   such   a
lessee who continued in possession after the determination
of the lease i.e. after the contract came to an end under the
protection   of   the   Rent   Restriction   Act.   If   the   contract   once
came   to   an   end   there   was   no   question   of   terminating   the
contract over again by a fresh notice.”
If   we   were   to   agree   with   the   view   that   determination   of   lease   in
accordance   with   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act   is   a   condition
precedent to the starting of a proceeding under the State Rent Act
for eviction of the tenant, we could have said so with respect that
the view  expressed in the above passage is quite correct because
there was no question of determination of the lease again once it
was determined by efflux of time. But on the first assumption we
have   taken   a   different   view   of   the   matter   and   have   come   to   the
conclusion   that   determination   of   a   lease   in   accordance   with   the
Transfer   of   Property   Act   is   unnecessary   and   a   mere   surplusage
because  the  landlord  cannot  get  eviction  of  the tenant  even  after
such   determination.   The   tenant   continues   to   be   so   even
thereafter.   That   being   so,   making   out   a   case   under   the  Rent   Act
for   eviction   of   the   tenant   by   itself   is   sufficient   and   it   is   not
obligatory   to   found   the   proceeding   on   the   basis   of   the
determination   of   the   lease   by   issue   of   notice   in   accordance   with
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. ”
                                                                  [Emphasis Supplied]
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20. It has been held that even if the lease period is determined by
forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, still the tenant
continues to be a tenant that is to say that there is no forfeiture in
the eyes of law and the tenant becomes liable to be evicted and the
forfeiture   comes   into   play   only   if   he   has   incurred   a   liability   to   be
evicted   under   the   State   Rent   Act   and   not   otherwise   and   further
held that even after the expiry of the period of contractual tenancy,
the   tenant   can   be   evicted   only   in   terms   of   provisions   of   the   State
Rent   Act   which   is   applicable   in   reference   the   subject   property   in
question.
21. A   perusal   of   the   scheme   of   the   Act   1976   would   show   that
from   the   appointed   day,   right,   title   and   interest   of   Burmah   Shell
with   effect   to   Section   5(1)   stood   transferred   and   vested   with   the
Central   Government   and   by   virtue   of   Section   7(2),   the   vesting   of
tenancy   rights   with   the   Central   Government   stood   further
transposed   and   vested   in   Bharat   Petroleum   Corporation   Ltd.   and
that became a statutory tenant by virtue of Section 7(3) of the Act.
To that extent, Section 11 of the Act has an overriding effect to the
provisions of other laws.  That being so, the jurisdiction indeed of a
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civil Court is impliedly barred from the field covered specifically by
the   provisions   of   the   Act   1973   and   that   being   the   complete   code
determining the rights of a tenant/landlord to the exclusion of the
other   laws,   we   find   no   error   in   the   view   expressed   by   the   High
Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   holding   that   the   jurisdiction   of
the   Civil   Court   is   held   to   be   barred   and   remedial   mechanism   for
ejectment   could   be   possible   only   under   the   provisions   of   the   Act
1973. 
22. The   judgments   on   which   the   counsel   for   the   appellants   has
placed reliance are of no assistance.  In  Depot Superintendent, H.P.
Corpn.   Ltd.   and   Another(supra) ,   the   question   arose   for
consideration   as   to   whether   the   company   was   entitled   for   second
renewal invoking  the provisions of the Act 1976.     It was declined
by   this   Court   holding   that   there   is   no   option   for   further   renewal
which can be claimed independently under the Act 1976.
23. In   Ram   Bharosey   Lal   Gupta(Dead)   by   LRs   and   Others (supra),
the   substantial   question   of   law   was   as   to   whether   under   clause
3(d) of the lease deed executed between the parties, (the lessor) was
under a legal obligation to renew the lease term for a further period
of   20   years   and   it   was   not   the   case   where   the   lease   has   been
determined or the renewal of lease term has either been availed or
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expired.       In   the   given   situation,   certain   observations   have   been
made by this Court in para 28 of the judgment that may not be of
any assistance in the given facts and circumstances. 
24. The   counsel   further   placed   reliance   on   Bharat   Petroleum
Corporation Limited  (supra).  The question under consideration was
as   to   whether   if   one   term   of   lease   has   been   extended   under   the
lease   deed,   whether   automatic   renewal   of   lease   is   permissible   by
virtue of Section 5(2) of the Act 1976 and it has been held by this
Court   that   only   one   extension   was   permissible   in   terms   of   the
conditions   of   lease   deed   and   Section   5(2)   of   the   Act   1976   will   not
be available for a further renewal.
25. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered view that
no   error   was   committed   by   the   High   Court   in   arriving   to   a
conclusion that even after the expiry of the lease term of the lease
deed,   the   respondents   became   a   statutory   tenant   and   jurisdiction
of   the   Civil   Court   is   impliedly   barred   and   could   be   evicted   only
under the provisions of the Act 1973.  
26. The appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. 
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27. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
………………………….J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
………………………….J.
(ABHAY S. OKA)
NEW DELHI
January 28, 2022. 
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