/2022 INSC 0106/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.         34 OF 2022
State of U.P.                 ..Appellant(S)
Versus
Veerpal & Anr.              ..Respondent(S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   dated   30.05.2020   passed   by   the
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in   Criminal   Appeal   No.   4658   of   2015   by   which   the   High
Court   has   allowed   the   said   appeal   preferred   by   the
respondents herein – original accused and has acquitted the
accused   for   the   offences   under   Section   302   read   with
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Section   34   of   the   IPC,   the   State   has   preferred   the   present
appeal. 
2. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeal   in   nutshell   are   as
under:­
2.1  That   PW­1   Bengali   Babu   gave   the   First   Information   Report
which   was   registered   as   Crime   No.1144/11   initially   for   the
offences   under   Section   326   of   the   IPC   to   the   effect   that   on
20.12.2011   at   about   2:30   pm,   he   got   a   call   from   Radha   –
daughter of the deceased that her mother had got burnt. He
immediately reached the hospital and at that time SDM was
taking   the   deceased’s   statement.   According   to   him,   the   girl
told that her father­in­law and mother­in­law demanded the
money   and   when   she   refused   there   was   an   assault   and
thereafter they poured kerosene over her and with a burning
matchstick   burnt   her.   The   Investigating   Officer   started   the
investigation.   He   recorded   the   statements   of   the   relevant
witnesses   and   collected   the   necessary   evidence   including
the   medical   evidence.   After   completion   of   investigation,
Investigating   Officer   filed   the   charge­sheet   against   the
accused   for   the   offences   under   Section   302   read   with
Section   34   of   the   IPC.   The   learned   Trial   Court   framed   the
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charge   against   the   accused   for   the   aforesaid   offences.   The
accused   denied   the   charge   and   pleaded   not   guilty.
Therefore, they claimed to be tried by the Trial Court for the
aforesaid offences. 
2.2     To   prove   the   charge   against   the   accused,   the   prosecution
examined   as   many   as   10   witnesses.   PW­5   turned   hostile.
The   prosecution   also   brought   on   record   documentary
evidences including two dying declarations, one recorded by
the   police   officer   and   another,   recorded   by   the
Magistrate/SDM.   On   appreciation   of   evidence   and
considering   two   dying   declarations,   the   learned   Trial   Court
believed the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate on
22.12.2011 and further observed that the defence put forth
on   behalf   of   the   accused   that   the   deceased   herself   poured
the   kerosene   on   her   is   not   believable   considering   the
medical   evidence   on   record.   Thereafter   the   learned   Trial
Court  convicted  the  accused  for   the  offences  under  Section
302   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and   sentenced   the
accused to undergo life imprisonment.
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3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and
order of conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court,
the   accused   preferred   the   appeal   before   the   High   Court
being   Criminal   Appeal   No.4658/2015.   By   the   impugned
judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   has   acquitted   the
accused   mainly   on   the   ground   that   there   were   two   dying
declarations,   one   recorded   on   20.12.2011   and   another
recorded   on   22.12.2011   and   there   was   a   gap   of   two   days
between the two dying declarations. The High Court instead
of relying on the dying declaration recorded by SDM/Deputy
Commissioner   of   Agra   and   by   disbelieving   both   the   dying
declarations   has   acquitted   the   accused   by   observing   that
according   to   the   deceased   when   she   was   forced   to   give   the
money   and   when   she   refused,   the   accused   tried   to   assault
and   she   ran   away   and   under   the   pressure   she   might   have
poured the kerosene on her. 
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   acquitting
the   accused   for   the   offences   under   Section   302   read   with
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Section   34   of   the   IPC,   the   State   has   preferred   the   present
appeal.
5. Ms. Garima Prashad, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf   of   the   State   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   High   Court   has
committed   a   grave   error   in   acquitting   the   accused   for   the
serious  offences under  Section  302 read with  Section  34  of
the IPC. 
5.1 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   that   in   the   present   case,
the   High   Court   ought   to   have   relied   upon   and   considered
the dying declaration recorded by the competent magistrate.
5.2 It   is   submitted   that   as   such   cogent   reasons   were   given   by
the   Trial   Court   on   appreciation   of   evidence   that   the
statement   before   the   IO   which   was   considered   to   be   first
dying   declaration   on   20.12.2011   does   not   inspire   any
confidence.   It   is   submitted   that   the   aforesaid   finding
recorded   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   was   on   appreciation   of
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available   evidence   on   record   more   particularly   the   medical
evidence.
5.3 It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   ought   to   have
appreciated   that   the   dying   declaration   recorded   by   a
competent Magistrate would stand on a higher footing than
the   declaration   made   to   IO   under   Section   161   of   Cr.PC.
Reliance   is   placed   upon   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the
cases of  Ravi Chander & Ors. V. State of Punjab (1998) 9
SCC 303 (para 6); Harjit Kaur V. State of Punjab (1999) 6
SCC 545, (para 6); Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. V. State of
Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC 562 (para 8); Vikas & Ors. V. State
of   Maharashtra   (2008)   2   SCC   516   (para   48);   Laxman   V.
State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 and Jagbir Singh
V. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 8 SCC 779 (para 21). 
5.4 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   as   such   the   High
Court   has   specifically   observed   that   both   the   dying
declarations   cannot   be   believed   and   it   is   not   safe   to   rely
upon   multiple   dying   declarations   of   the   deceased.   It   is
submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   observed   that   it   would
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not   be   safe   to   rely   upon   multiple   dying   declarations   of   the
deceased in the absence of any corroborative evidence. It is
submitted that the aforesaid is contrary to the law laid down
by this Court in the cases of   Amol Singh V. State of M.P.,
(2008)   5   SCC   468   (para   13);   Kundula   Bala
Subrahmanyam   &   Anr.   V.   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh
(1993) 2 SCC 684 (para 18); Munnu Raja & Anr. V. State
of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 (para 6) . It is submitted that as
held   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid   decisions   there   can   be
conviction   on   the   basis   of   a   dying   declaration   of   the
deceased without there being any corroborative evidence on
record.
5.5 It is submitted that in the present case, the High Court has
erred   in   not   relying   upon   the   dying   declarations   more
particularly   the   dying   declaration   recorded   by   the
Magistrate/SDM without any cogent reason. It is submitted
that as such the High Court has not doubted the credibility
and/or has not observed anything with regard to malice on
the   part   of   the   executive   magistrate   who   recorded   the
statement on 22.12.2011. It is submitted therefore the High
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Court ought to have upheld the conviction relying upon the
dying   declaration   recorded   by   the   Magistrate/SDM   on
22.12.2011. 
5.6 It   is   hence   submitted   that   the   impugned   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court   is   not   sustainable   and   the
impugned  judgment   and   order   deserves  to   be  quashed  and
set aside and the judgment and order passed by the learned
Trial   Court   convicting   the   accused   under   Section   302   read
with Section 34 of the IPC deserves to be upheld/restored.
6.  The   present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   P.S.
Khurana,   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respondents   –   original   accused.   It   is   vehemently   submitted
by   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original
accused that in the facts and circumstances of the case and
in   view   of   multiple   dying   declarations,   the   High   Court   has
rightly acquitted the accused. 
6.1 It   is   submitted   that   as   rightly   observed   by   the   High   Court
once the dying declaration was recorded by the police officer
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on   20.12.2011,   thereafter   there   was   no   reason   to   record
another dying declaration on 22.12.2011. 
6.2 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   first   dying   declaration   recorded
on   20.12.2011   she   stated   that   out   of   fear   of   father­in­law,
she  committed  suicide  and   the  role assigned  to  respondent
No.1   –   father­in­law   in   her   first   dying   declaration   dated
20.12.2011 was only  of chasing  her for beating  and not for
burning,   and   in   the   second   dying   declaration   recorded   by
the   Magistrate,   there   was   a   somersault   and   the   victim   –
deceased   implicated   all   other   family   members,   the   High
Court has rightly refused to rely upon the dying declaration
recorded by the Magistrate/SDM on 22.12.2011.
6.3 It   is   submitted   that   on   appreciation   of   evidence,   the   High
Court has observed that the deceased was mentally weak. It
is   submitted   that   therefore   in   such   a   state   of   mind   and
because   of   the   fear   of   her   father­in­law   that   she   will   be
beaten when she refused to give the money, she committed
suicide   by   pouring   kerosene   on   herself;   no   case   of   murder
has been made out and therefore, the High Court has rightly
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acquitted   the   accused   for   the   offences   punishable   under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 
7. Making   the   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the
present appeal. 
8. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
the respective parties at length. 
9. At the outset, it is required to be noted in the present case,
there are two dying declarations, one recorded by the Police
Officer   on   20.12.2011   and   another   recorded   by   the
Magistrate/SDM   recorded   on   22.12.2011.   Even   in   the
impugned judgment and order, the High Court has as such
specifically   observed   that   none   of   the   dying   declarations
inspire   confidence.   The   High   Court   has   not   believed   the
dying   declaration   recorded   by   the   Magistrate/SDM   on
22.12.2011   mainly   on   the   ground   that   when   the   dying
declaration   was   already   recorded   by   the   Police   Officer   on
20.12.2011, there was no reason to record the second dying
declaration.   However,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   what
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was   recorded   by   the   Police   Officer   on   20.12.2011   was   the
statement   under   Section   161   Cr.PC.   Therefore,   it   was
thought   fit   to   record   the   dying   declaration   of   the   deceased
by the Magistrate and that is why SDM was called to record
the dying declaration of deceased on 22.12.2011. At the cost
of   repetition,   it   is   observed   that   even   the   High   Court   has
specifically   observed   that   the   first   statement/dying
declaration   recorded   by   the   Police   on   20.12.2011   does   not
inspire   any   confidence.   In   that   view   of   the   matter,   it   is
required   to   be   considered   whether   the   dying   declaration
recorded   by   the   Magistrate   on   22.12.2011   is   to   be   believed
or   not   and   whether   on   the   basis   of   such   dying   declaration
recorded   by   the   Magistrate/SDM,   the   accused   can   be
convicted or not. 
9.1 While   considering   the   aforesaid   question/issue   a   few
decisions   of   this   Court   on   the   credibility   of   the   dying
declaration   recorded   by   the   Magistrate   are   required   to   be
referred to. 
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9.1.1 In   the   case   of   Laxman   (supra)   after   referring   to   and
considering   the   earlier   decisions   on   the   credibility   of   the
dying   declaration   recorded   by   the   Magistrate,   it   was
observed that  the   Magistrate  being  a disinterested witness
and a responsible officer and there being no circumstances
or material to suspect that the Magistrate had any animus
against   the   accused   or   was   in   any   way   interested   for
fabricating   a   dying   declaration,   question   of   doubt   on   the
declaration, recorded by the Magistrate does not arise.  
9.1.2 In   the   case   of   Jagbir   Singh   (supra)   this   Court   had   an
occasion   to   consider   the   law   relating   to   the   dying
declaration and the problem of multiple dying declarations
in   detail.   It   was   observed   and   held   that   merely   because
there   are   two/multiple   dying   declarations,   all   the   dying
declarations   are   not   to   be   rejected.   It   was   observed   and
held   that   when   there   are   multiple   dying   declarations   the
case   must   be   decided   on   the   facts   of   each   case   and   the
court   will   not   be   relieved   of   its   duty   to   carefully   examine
the   entirety   of   the   material   on   record   as   also   the
circumstances   surrounding   the   making   of   the   different
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dying declarations. Ultimately, in paragraph 32, this Court
concluded as under: ­
“ Our   conclusion   on   multiple   dying
declarations
32  We would think that on a conspectus of the
law as laid down by this Court, when there are
more   than   one   dying   declaration,   and   in   the
earlier   dying   declaration,   the   accused   is   not
sought   to   be   roped   in   but   in   the   later   dying
declaration,   a   somersault   is   made   by   the
deceased, the case must be decided on the facts
of each case. The court will not be relieved of its
duty   to   carefully   examine   the   entirety   of
materials   as   also   the   circumstances
surrounding   the   making   of   the   different   dying
declarations.   If   the   court   finds   that   the
incriminatory   dying   declaration   brings   out   the
truthful   position   particularly   in   conjunction
with the capacity of the deceased to make such
declaration, the voluntariness with which it was
made   which   involves,   no   doubt,   ruling   out
tutoring   and   prompting   and   also   the   other
evidence   which   support   the   contents   of   the
incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted
upon. Equally, the circumstances which render
the   earlier   dying   declaration,   worthy   or
unworthy of acceptance, can be considered.”
                
    Similar views have been expressed by this Court in the
case of   Ravi Chander & Ors.   (supra),   Harjit Kaur   (supra),
Koli   Chunilal   Savji   &   Anr.   (supra)   and   Vikas   &   Ors.
(supra).
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10. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions   to   the   facts  of   the  case  on  hand,  it   is  required  to
be considered whether the dying declaration recorded by the
Magistrate on 22.12.2011 is to be believed or not. Nothing is
on   record   with   regard   to   any   allegation   against   the
Magistrate/SDM   to   the   effect   that   he   was   biased   or
interested   in   recording   the   dying   declaration   against   the
accused.   He   was   summoned   during   the   course   of
investigation   and   during   the   course   of   investigation   he
recorded   the   dying   declaration   and   the   statement   of
deceased. Even the High Court as such has not doubted the
credibility   of   the   dying   declaration   recorded   by   the
Magistrate/SDM   on   the   ground   of   malice.   The   reasoning
given   by   the   High   Court   to   not   rely   upon   the   dying
declaration recorded by the Magistrate/SDM is not germane
and   cannot   be   accepted.   We   see   no   reason   to   doubt   the
dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate on 22.12.2011
in   which   the   deceased   specifically   stated   that   at   11:00   am
due   to   the   feud   over   demanding   money,   respondents   –
accused   have   burned   her   after   pouring   kerosene   over   her.
Therefore, in the statement of dying declaration recorded by
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the   Magistrate   on   22.12.2011,   the   respondents   –   original
accused   are   specifically   named   and   it   is   specifically   stated
that   they   poured   kerosene   on   her.   At   this   stage,   it   is
required to be noted that in so far as the statement recorded
by the IO on 20.12.2011, it was recorded that the father­in­
law  demanded  money   and  started beating  her  with   a  stick,
she ran away and she locked the door from inside and out of
anger she poured the kerosene available in the room and set
herself   on   blaze   is   concerned,   considering   the   medical
evidence   on   record   the   said   statement/   dying   declaration
recorded   by   the   Police   Officer   on   20.12.2011   does   not
inspire   any   confidence.   Medical   evidence   does   not   support
the   version   stated   in   the   said   dying   declaration.   It   is   to   be
noted that even according to the accused, the father­in­law
took  her   to   hospital.   If  statement   of  deceased   in  first   dying
declaration that she locked the door from inside and out of
anger she poured kerosene is accepted, in that case it is not
explained   by   the   accused   as   to   how   she   was   taken   to   the
hospital,   as   nothing   is   on   record   that   the   door   was
broken/opened   by   the   father­in­law   –   accused   and
thereafter   she   was   taken   to   hospital.   Even   considering   the
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medical   evidence   on   record   and   the   injuries   sustained   by
the deceased, it is found that there were no injuries at all on
the   chest   and   injuries   were   found   on   the   head   and   on   the
backside.   As   rightly   observed   by   the   Trial   Court   if   she   had
committed   suicide   by   pouring   kerosene   there   would   have
been injuries on the chest as well as injuries would not have
been   on   the   head   and   on   the   backside.   In   our   view,   such
injuries   as   found   on   the   body   of   the   deceased   could   have
been possible only if somebody had poured kerosene on her
from   behind   her.   The   aforesaid   aspect   has   not   at   all   been
considered by the High Court.
10.1 Now, on the aspect, whether in absence of any corroborative
evidence,   there   can   be   a   conviction   relying   upon   the   dying
declaration   only   is   concerned,   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
the case of  Munnu Raja & Anr.  (supra) and the subsequent
decision in the case of   Paniben  (Smt) V.  State  of  Gujarat,
(1992)   2   SCC   474   are   required   to   be   referred   to.   In   the
aforesaid decisions, it is specifically observed and held that
there   is   neither   a   rule   of   law   nor   of   prudence   to   the   effect
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that   a   dying   declaration   cannot   be   acted   upon   without   a
corroboration.   It   is   observed   and   held   that   if   the   Court   is
satisfied   that   the   dying  declaration   is   true   and   voluntary   it
can base its conviction on it, without corroboration. Similar
view has also been expressed in the cases of   State of Uttar
Pradesh   V.   Ram   Sagar   Yadav   &   Ors.   (1985)   1   SCC   552
and   Ramawati Devi V. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211.
Therefore,   there   can   be   a   conviction   solely   based   upon   the
dying declaration without corroboration.
10.2   Kushal   Rao   V.   State   of   Bombay,   AIR   1958   SC   22:1958
SCR   552   is   a   watershed   judgment   on   the   law   on   the
evidentiary value of dying declarations. This Court laid down
the   following   principles   as   to   the   circumstances   under
which   a   dying   declaration   may   be   accepted,   without
corroboration: ­
“ 16.   On a review of the relevant provisions of the
Evidence  Act  and of the decided cases  in  the  different
High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come
to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the
Full   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court,   aforesaid,   ( 1 )
that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law
that   a  dying  declaration  cannot  form  the  sole  basis  of
conviction unless it is corroborated; ( 2 ) that each case
must   be   determined   on   its   own   facts   keeping   in   view
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the circumstances in which the dying  declaration was
made;   ( 3 )   that   it   cannot   be   laid   down   as   a   general
proposition   that   a   dying   declaration   is   a   weaker   kind
of   evidence   than   other   pieces   of   evidence;   ( 4 )   that   a
dying   declaration   stands   on   the   same   footing   as
another  piece  of evidence  and  has to  be judged in the
light of surrounding circumstances and with reference
to   the   principles   governing   the   weighing   of   evidence;
( 5 )   that   a   dying   declaration   which   has   been   recorded
by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that
is   to   say,   in   the   form   of   questions   and   answers,   and,
as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the
declaration,   stands   on   a   much   higher   footing   than   a
dying   declaration   which   depends   upon   oral   testimony
which   may   suffer   from   all   the   infirmities   of   human
memory and human character, and ( 6 ) that in order to
test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has
to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity
of the dying man for observation, for example, whether
there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at
night;   whether   the   capacity   of   the   man   to   remember
the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he
was   making   the   statement,   by   circumstances   beyond
his   control;   that   the   statement   has   been   consistent
throughout if he had several opportunities of making a
dying   declaration   apart   from   the   official   record   of   it;
and  that  the  statement   had been  made  at  the  earliest
opportunity   and   was   not   the   result   of   tutoring   by
interested parties.” 
The   relevant   facts   of   the   said   case   are   that   the
deceased   therein   had   given   three   successive   dying
declarations   within   a   span   of   two   hours,   which   were,   to   a
certain   degree  contradictory   to   each   other.  However,  one  of
the aspects that remained common and was narrated by the
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deceased   in   all   three   dying   declarations   was   that   he   was
attacked by two persons, namely Kushal Rao and Tukaram
with swords and spears. This Court, relying on the common
thread   running   through   all   dying   declarations,   which   was
consistent   with   medical   evidence   revealing   punctured   and
incised  wounds  on   various   parts  of   the   body,   held  that   the
said   declarations   could   be   relied   upon   in   convicting   the
accused   who   had   been   named   in   all   three   dying
declarations. 
Co­relating   the   said   facts   to   the   facts   of   the   instant
case,   we   have   noted   that   although   the   accused   was   not
specifically   named   by   the   deceased   in   her   statement
recorded under section 161 of the Cr.PC, as the person who
set the deceased on fire, he has been so named in her dying
declaration.   Even   in   the   statement   recorded   under   section
161   of   the   Cr.PC,   the   deceased   has   stated   that   her   father­
in­law had attacked her with a stick with an intention to kill
her and as a result, she locked herself in the room and set
herself ablaze. Therefore, we find that there runs a common
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thread   in   the   statements   of   the   deceased,   being   that   she
was   attacked   by   the   accused­respondent   herein.   Further,
we   also   find   that   the   statements   made   by   the   deceased   in
her   dying   declaration   are   consistent   with   medical   evidence
which reveals that there were burns on all parts of the body
except chest and sides of the abdomen and back. The burns
are   at   such   parts   as   could   have   resulted   when   a   person,
other   than   the   deceased   poured   kerosene   and   set   fire.   As
already   noted,   if   the   deceased   had   set   herself   on   fire,   her
chest   ought   to   have   been   burnt.   In   light   of   the   aforesaid
discussion and the decision in   Kushal Rao   (supra), we find
that   the   medical   evidence   is   consistent   with   the   dying
declaration, thereby allowing this Court to place reliance on
the declarations. 
The   Trial   Court   has   rightly   observed   as   to   the   weight
and reliance that must be placed on the dying declaration of
the   deceased.   There   was   no   reason   for   the   High   Court   to
disregard   the   dying   declaration   of   the   deceased.   It   is   noted
that   the   dying   declaration   was   made   by   the   deceased   to
Sub­Divisional   Magistrate   (SDM)   Bal   Kishan   Agarwal,   who
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was   also   examined   as   a   prosecution   witness   (PW­6)   before
the   Trial   Court.  His  statement   reveals  that  the   deceased  at
the time of making the statements, was fully conscious and
capable   of   comprehending   the   questions   put   forth   by   the
officer   to   whom   the   declaration   was   made.   The   evidentiary
value   of   the   dying   declaration   is   further   enhanced   by   the
fact   that   it   was   accompanied   by   a   certificate   from   the
physician who was treating the deceased prior to her death,
stating   that   the   deceased   remained   fully   conscious   while
making   the   statement.   The   Trial   Court   rightly   placed
reliance   on   the   dying   declaration   having   due   regard   to   the
statements   made   by   the   physician   as   to   the   medical
condition   of   the   deceased   while   making   such   declaration.
The Trial Court has also rightly noted that the statements of
the SDM and the physician, being independent witnesses in
the   trial,   has   added   weight   to   the   prosecution   case   as   the
same could not be motivated by malice.   
11. Therefore, considering the dying declaration recorded by the
SDM/Magistrate   on   22.12.2011   the   accused   can   be
convicted for  which  they  were  tried. Hence  in our   view,  the
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High   Court   has   committed   a   grave   error   in   acquitting   the
accused.   The   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
High   Court   acquitting   the   accused   for   the   offences
punishable   under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   of   the
IPC  is unsustainable and  the  same deserves to  be quashed
and set aside.
12. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the
present   appeal   is   allowed.   The   impugned   judgment   and
order   acquitting   the   accused   for   the   offences   punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC is hereby
quashed   and   set   aside.   The   judgment   and   order   passed   by
the   learned   Trial   Court   convicting   the   accused   for   the
offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
of   the   IPC   is   hereby   restored.   Respondent   Nos.   1   &   2   –
original  accused are held guilty  for  the offences punishable
under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and
sentenced   to   undergo   imprisonment   for   life   and   a   fine   of
Rs.10,000/­   each   as   awarded   by   the   learned   Trial   Court.
Accused   to   surrender   before   concerned   court   or   jail
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authority   to   undergo   life   sentence   forthwith.   The   present
appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
…………………………………J.
    (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
  (B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
01.02.2022
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