/2022 INSC 0120/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.813 OF 2022
M/s Bombay Chemical Industries       ..Appellant (S)
VERSUS
Deputy Labour Commissioner & Anr.                  ..Respondent (S)
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 14.11.2018 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.33482
of   2018,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said
writ   petition   preferred   by   the   appellant   herein   and   has
confirmed   the   order   passed   by   the   Presiding   Officer,
Labour Court IV, U.P., Kanpur Nagar, under Section 33(C)
1

(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the   original   writ
petitioner has preferred the present appeal. 
2. That   respondent   No.2   herein   moved   an   application   before
the   Labour   Court   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial
Disputes   Act   in   Misc.   Case   No.26   of   2012   demanding   the
difference   of   wages   from   01.04.2006   to   31.03.2012.   The
said   application   was   contested   by   the   appellant   herein
denying any relationship of employee­employer. It was the
categorical   stand   of   the   appellant   that   respondent   No.2
herein   was   never   engaged   by   it.   Before   the   Labour   Court
respondent No.2 herein relied upon the documents exhibit
W­1   to   W­6   in   support   of   his   case   that   he   had   worked   in
the   establishment   as   a   salesman.   That   by   order   dated
28.11.2017   the   learned   Presiding   Officer,   Labour   Court
allowed   the   said   application   and   directed   the   appellant
herein   to   pay   the   difference   of   wages   from   01.04.2006   to
31.03.2012 as claimed in the application.
2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order
passed   by   the   learned   Presiding   Officer,   Labour   Court
under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the
2

appellant   herein   preferred   a   writ   petition   before   the   High
Court.   By   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   the   High
Court has dismissed the said writ petition which has given
rise to the present appeal. 
3. Shri Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the   appellant   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the   facts
and circumstances of the case the High Court has erred in
dismissing   the   writ   petition   and   confirming   the   order
passed  by   the  Labour   Court  under  Section   33(C)(2)  of   the
Industrial Disputes Act.
3.1 It   is   submitted   by   Shri   Yadav   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellant   that   the   High   Court   ought   to   have   appreciated
that when there was a serious issue raised with respect to
the   employer­employee  relationship  between  the   appellant
and   respondent   No.2   and   that   it   was   seriously   disputed
that   respondent   No.2   was   at   any   point   of   time   in
employment as a salesman, the Labour Court ought not to
have   entertained/allowed   the   application   under   Section
33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act   as   the   same   could
have been decided in the reference under Section 10 of the
3

Industrial   Disputes   Act.   It   is   therefore   submitted   that   the
order   passed   by   the   Labour   Court   is   completely   without
jurisdiction.     Therefore,   the   High   Court   ought   to   have   set
aside the same. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this
Court   in  the   case  of   Municipal   Corporation   of  Delhi   Vs.
Ganesh Razak and Anr. , (1995) 1 SCC 235 and   Union of
India   and   another   Vs.   Kankuben   (Dead)   By   Lrs.   and
Others,   (2006) 9  SCC   292,  in  support  of  his  submissions
that   in   a   proceeding   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the
Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the   Labour   Court   cannot
adjudicate   the   dispute   of   entitlement   or   the   basis   of   the
claim and it can only interpret the award or settlement on
which the claim is based. 
3.2 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   on   the   above
decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.      
    
4. The   present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Dr.   Vinod
Kumar Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent(s). 
4

4.1 It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   respondent   No.2
placed on record voluminous record namely exhibit W­1 to
W­6   to   show   that   respondent   No.2   was   working   as   a
salesman   with   the   appellant.   It   is   submitted   that   the
appellant   came   out   with   a   false   case   to   get   out   of   the
obligation difference in salary to be paid as claimed in the
application.   It   is   therefore   submitted   that   when   on
appreciation   of   evidence   and   considering   the   material
available on record the Labour Court held that respondent
No.2  was  employed  as a  salesman  and  thereafter   directed
the   appellant   to   pay   the   difference   of   wages   it   cannot   be
said that the Labour Court exceeded in its jurisdiction. 
4.2 It   is   submitted   that   when   on   the   face   of   the   record
available   it   was   found   by   the   Labour   Court   that
respondent No.2 was in employment of the  appellant  as a
salesman, and in the claim  before the Labour  Court there
was   found   a   difference   in   the   salary/pay   for   the   period
from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012, the Labour Court has not
committed any error. The High Court has rightly dismissed
the writ petition.
5

5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length. 
 
6. At   the   outset   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   respondent
No.2   herein   filed   an   application   before   the   Labour   Court
under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,
demanding   difference   of   wages   from   01.04.2006   to
31.03.2012.   It   was   thus   the   case   on   behalf   of   respondent
No.2   that   he   was   working   with   the   appellant   as   a
salesman.   However,   the  appellant   had   taken   a   categorical
stand   that   respondent   No.2   was   never   engaged   by   the
appellant.   It   was   specifically   the   case   on   behalf   of   the
appellant   that   respondent   No.2   had   never   worked   in   the
establishment   in   the   post   of   salesman.   Therefore,   once
there   was   a   serious   dispute   that   respondent   No.2   had
worked   as   an   employee   of   the   appellant   and   there   was   a
very   serious   dispute   raised   by   the   appellant   that
respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as
claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for
the   Labour   Court   to   entertain   disputed   questions   and
adjudicate   upon   the   employer­employee   relationship
6

between   the   appellant   and   respondent   No.2.   As   per   the
settled proposition of law, in an application under Section
33(C)(2)   of   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   the   Labour   Court
has   no   jurisdiction   and   cannot   adjudicate   dispute   of
entitlement   or   the   basis   of   the   claim   of   workmen.     It   can
only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim
is   based.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Ganesh
Razak   and   Anr.   (supra),   the   labour   court’s   jurisdiction
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like
that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of
law   without   prior   adjudication   or   recognition   of   the
disputed   claim   of   the   workmen,   proceedings   for
computation   of   the   arrears   of   wages   and/or   difference   of
wages   claimed   by   the   workmen   shall   not   be   maintainable
under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.   (See
Municipal Corporation of  Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr.
(1995) 1 SCC 235).
In   the   case   of   Kankuben   (supra),   it   is   observed   and
held   that   whenever   a   workman   is   entitled   to   receive   from
his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
7

being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled
to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit
can  approach  Labour  Court under   Section  33­C  (2)  of the
ID Act.  It is further observed that the benefit sought to be
enforced under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily
a   pre­existing   benefit   or   one   flowing   from   a   pre­existing
right.     The   difference   between   a   pre­existing   right   or
benefit   on   one   hand   and   the   right   or   benefit,   which   is
considered   just   and   fair   on   the   other   hand   is   vital.     The
former   falls   within   jurisdiction   of   Labour   Court   exercising
powers under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act while the latter
does not.
7. Applying   the   law   laid   down  by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was
no   prior   adjudication   on   the   issue   whether   respondent
No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed
by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute
raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a
salesman   and   the   documents   relied   upon   by   respondent
No.2   were   seriously   disputed   by   the   appellant   and   it   was
8

the   case   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   those   documents
are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought
not   to   have   proceeded   further   with   the   application   under
Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour
Court   ought   to   have   relegated   respondent   No.2   to   initiate
appropriate   proceedings   by   way   of   reference   and   get   his
right   crystalized   and/or   adjudicate   upon.   Therefore,   the
order   passed   by   the   Labour   Court   was   beyond   the
jurisdiction   conferred   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of   the
Industrial   Disputes   Act.   The   High   Court   has   not
appreciated   the   aforesaid   facts   and   has   confirmed   the
same   without   adverting   to   the   scope   and   ambit   of   the
jurisdiction   of   the   Labour   Court   under   Section   33(C)(2)   of
the Industrial Disputes Act.  
8. In   view   of  the   above   and  for  the  reasons   stated  above  the
present   appeal   succeeds.   The   impugned   judgment   and
order passed by the High Court as well as that of the order
passed  by   the  Labour   Court  under  Section   33(C)(2)  of   the
Industrial   Disputes   Act   in   Misc.   Case   No.26   of   2012   are
hereby   quashed   and   set   aside.   Respondent   No.2   is
9

relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available
under   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   including   that   of
reference   to   adjudicate   his   right   as   an   employee   of   the
appellant   as   claimed   by   him.   As   and   when   such
proceedings   are   initiated   the   same   to   be   considered   in
accordance with law and on its own merits and without in
anyway   being   influenced   by   the   present   order,   as   this
Court has not expressed anything in favour of either of the
parties   on   the   aspect   of   employer­employee   relationship
between   the   appellant   and   respondent   No.2.   The   present
appeal   is   allowed   with   the   above   observations   and   to   the
aforesaid extent. No costs.   
…………………………………J.
                   (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
February,  04 2022.
10