/2022 INSC 0139/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1137 OF 2018
MS. X          ...PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF 
MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER      ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The petitioner has approached this Court in the instant
writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
seeking the following reliefs:
a. “Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the
nature   of   mandamus   to   quash   and   set   aside   the   order
dated   11.01.2018   of   Chief   Justice   of   the   High   Court
communicated   on   25.1.18   of   Madhya   Pradesh   passed
after   the   Full   Court   Meeting,   rejecting   the   application
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for   reinstatement   as   violative   of   Articles   14,   15,   16,   21
r/w.   233,   235   &   311   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and
Natural Justice; 
b. Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the
nature   of   mandamus   declaring   that   the   Petitioner's
resignation   from   the   post   of   Additional   District   Judge
VIII, Gwalior dated 15.07.2014 amounts to   constructive
dismissal   due   to   the   employer's   conduct   which   applies
in   the   Statutory   context   where   the   term
"Dismissal/dismissed" is used; 
c. Issue   an   appropriate   writ,   order   or   direction   in   the
nature of mandamus directing the reinstatement of the
Petitioner as an Additional District and Sessions Judge
from   the   date   of   her   resignation   i.e.   15.07.2014,   with
continuity   in   service   at   S.No   134   of   the   list   of   District
Judges(Selection Grade) of the Gradation List according
to   Clause   4   of   the   Madhya   Pradesh   Higher   Judicial
Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
2017,   back   wages   according   to   Clause   3(b)   of   the
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Madhya   Pradesh   Higher   Judicial   Services   (Recruitment
and   Conditions   of   Service)   Rules,   2017   and   all   service
benefits and all consequential reliefs;”
2. The   bare   minimum   facts,   necessary   for   adjudication   of
the present petition are as under:
The   petitioner   was   selected   in   the   competitive
examination   of   Madhya   Pradesh   Higher   Judicial   Services   at
District   Entry   Level   (direct   recruitment   from   Bar)   conducted
in the year 2011, and stood 2 nd
  in the said examination.   On
her   selection,   the   petitioner   was   posted   as   a   2 nd
  to   1 st
Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge   (hereinafter   referred
to  as the  “AD &  SJ”) at  Gwalior   on  1 st
  August  2011.   On  1 st
October   2012,   the   petitioner   was   posted   as   VIII th
  AD   &   SJ,
Gwalior.     In   the   1 st
  Annual   Confidential   Report   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   the   “ACR”)   of   the   petitioner,   assessed   in
January,   2013   by   the   then   District   and   Sessions   Judge
(hereinafter referred to as the “D & SJ”) and approved by the
then   Portfolio/Administrative   Judge   (hereinafter   referred   to
as   “Justice   ‘A’”)   of   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   at
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Gwalior   Bench   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “MP   High
Court”), she was  given  ‘C/good’  grading.   The  petitioner  was
assigned various additional responsibilities in the year 2013.
In  her   2 nd
  ACR,  assessed  in   the   month   of   January,  2014   by
the   then   D   &   SJ   and   endorsed   by   Justice   ‘A’,   the   petitioner
was graded ‘B/very good’.  
3. It   is   the   case   of   the   petitioner   that   thereafter,   she   was
sexually   harassed   by   Justice   ‘A’.     It   is   further   her   case   that
due   to   the   said   sexual   harassment   and   at   the   instance   of
Justice ‘A’, the then D & SJ addressed a complaint dated 3 rd
July 2014 against her to the MP High Court.  It is further her
case that on 7 th
 July 2014, the Transfer Committee of the MP
High  Court  comprising  of  two Judges of the  MP High  Court,
approved the transfer of the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi.
The said transfer order was conveyed to the petitioner on 8 th
July   2014.     On   9 th
  July   2014,   the   petitioner   sent   her   first
representation   to   the   then   Registrar   General   (hereinafter
referred to as the “RG”) of the MP High Court, praying for an
extension   of   8   months   in   Gwalior   so   that   her   daughter
(studying in Class 12 th
) completes her academic session. The
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same came to be rejected on 11 th
  July 2014.   The petitioner,
who   was   unaware   about   the   rejection   of   her   first
representation,   sent   her   second   representation   on   11 th
  July
2014,   seeking   alternative   posting   to   4   cities   namely   Sehore,
Raisen, Dewas or Ujjain so that her daughter could continue
with   her   education,   which   also   came   to   be   rejected   on   14 th
July 2014.
4. The   petitioner   tendered   her   resignation   on   15 th
  July
2014,   which   was   accepted   by   the   Government   of   Madhya
Pradesh, Law and Legislative Affairs Department on 17 th
 July
2014.     The   petitioner   was   informed   about   the   acceptance   of
her resignation on 18 th
 July 2014.
5. The   petitioner   thereafter   on   1 st
  August   2014   sent   a
representation   to   Hon’ble   the   President   of   India,   the   Chief
Justice   of   India,   with   a   copy   to   Chief   Justice   of   MP   High
Court, with the following prayer:
(i) Appropriate action be taken, after fact­finding;
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(ii) Re­consider   circumstances   under   which   petitioner
was   coerced   &   exerted   duress   upon,   until   the   only
option she had was to resign;
(iii) Institute   an   appropriate   mechanism   for   redressal   of
grievances   like   the   above,   of   sub­ordinate   services
judicial officers.
6. Between   1 st
  August   2014   and   18 th
  December   2014,
certain  events took  place  with  regard  to the Inquiry  into the
alleged   conduct   of   Justice   ‘A’,   which   culminated   in   the
judgment   passed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Additional
District   and   Sessions   Judge   ‘X’.   v.   Registrar   General,
High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   and   Others 1
.     The   said
events are duly recorded in the said judgment and therefore,
it is not necessary to refer to them in detail.
7. In   pursuance   to   the   aforesaid   judgment   of   this   Court,
the Chief Justice of India sought a preliminary inquiry report
from the then Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court and
on   receipt   thereof,   constituted   an   In­House   Committee
1   (2015) 4 SCC 91
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headed   by   the   then   Chief   Justice   of   Allahabad   High   Court.
The   said   In­House   Committee   submitted   its   report   on   2 nd
July   2015.     In   the   meantime,   a   Notice   of   Motion   for   the
removal   of   Justice   ‘A’   was   moved   by   58   Members   of
Parliament   in   the   Rajya   Sabha.     The   said   Motion   was
admitted   by   the   Chairman,   Rajya   Sabha,   the   then   Hon’ble
Vice­President   of   India   on   25 th
  March   2015.     Accordingly,   a
Judges   Inquiry   Committee   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“JIC”) came to be constituted under Section 3 of the Judges
(Inquiry)   Act,  1968   (hereinafter   referred  to   as  the   “said  Act”)
comprising   of   a   sitting   Judge   of   this   Court,   the   then   Chief
Justice   of   the   Karnataka   High   Court   and   a   Senior   Advocate
of   this   Court.   Subsequently,   in   place   of   the   Judge   of   this
Court, who was the Presiding Officer of JIC, another Judge of
this Court was made part of the JIC as the Presiding Officer.
The   JIC   submitted   its   report   on   15 th
  December   2017,   which
was   tabled   before   the   Rajya   Sabha,   and   the   Rajya   Sabha
cleared Justice ‘A’ of all charges.
8. However,   the   JIC   found   that   the   transfer   of   the
petitioner  was irregular  and it was further  found that in the
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circumstances   prevailing   then,   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner
to   Sidhi   had   become   unbearable   for   her   to   continue   in
service,   resulting   in   her   resignation.   The   JIC,   therefore,
expressed   its   opinion   that   in   the   interest   of   justice,   the
petitioner   should   be   re­instated   in   service,   in   case   she
intends   to   re­join   the   service.     The   JIC   clarified   that   it   was
not within the purview of the Reference made to them.
9. Pursuant   to   the   recommendation   of   the   JIC,   the
petitioner   addressed   a   representation   to   the   then   Chief
Justice of MP High Court on 21 st
  December 2017 for her re­
instatement in service.   On 25 th
  January  2018, the MP High
Court   through   its   RG   communicated   the   rejection   of   the
petitioner’s representation by a Full Court in its meeting held
on   11 th
  January   2018.     The   petitioner   thereafter   filed   the
present   petition   for   the   reliefs   which   have   already   been
reproduced hereinabove.
10. During the pendency of this petition, this Court passed
an   order   on   13 th
  February   2019,   requesting   the   MP   High
Court for reconsideration of the issue of re­instatement of the
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petitioner   in   service.     The   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High   Court
rejected   the   said   representation   in   its   meeting   held   on   15 th
February 2019.   The Bench of this Court, which had passed
the   order   dated   13 th
  February   2019,   vide   order   dated   21 st
February   2019,   expressed   that   the   said   Bench   should   not
deal with the matter on merits and directed the matter to be
placed before another Bench. It appears that thereafter again
suggestions   were   made   by   this   Court   to   the   parties   to
amicably   settle   the   matter.     It   appears   that   at   one   point   of
time,   this   Court   also   suggested   that   the   respondent   No.1
should re­consider the issue of petitioner’s re­instatement in
service   and   that   after   re­instatement,   she   could   be   sent   on
deputation   outside   the   State   or   she   could   be   adjusted   in
some other State.  It is the case of the petitioner that though
the said suggestion was acceptable to her, the MP High Court
re­iterated   its   stand.     In   this   background,   the   matter   has
come up before us.
11. At   the   outset,   it   is   to   be   noted   that,   counsel   for   the
petitioner   clarified   that   the   petitioner   is   not   pressing   the
present   matter   on   the   ground   of   sexual   harassment   by
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Justice ‘A’, but is limiting her submissions with regard to the
transfer   order   being   illegal   and   mala   fide ,   and   the
consequent resignation amounting to constructive dismissal.
We   have   therefore   refrained   ourselves   from   making   any
reference to the allegations of sexual harassment made in the
petition.     We   have   also   refrained   ourselves   from   mentioning
the name of Justice ‘A’ or any  of the Judges of the MP High
Court, who on the administrative side, had some role to play
in the matter, so also the Members of the District Judiciary,
who were directly or indirectly involved in the present case.
12. We   have   heard   Ms.   Indira   Jaising,   the   learned   Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Tushar
Mehta,   the   learned   Solicitor   General   of   India   appearing   on
behalf of the respondents.
13. Smt.   Indira   Jaising   submitted   that   the   MP   High   Court
was   bound   by   the   Transfer   Guidelines/Policy   of   the   High
Court of Madhya Pradesh incorporated on 12 th
 January 2012
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “Transfer   Policy”).     She
submitted   that   as   per   the   Transfer   Policy,   the   annual
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transfers normally take place by 15 th
 of March every year and
the   Judicial   Officers  transferred  are  given   time   to   join   up  to
1 st
  of   April   so   as   to   coincide   with   the   academic   session   in
schools.   It is submitted that as per  the  Transfer  Policy, the
normal tenure of a Judicial Officer  at a particular posting  is
of 3 years, and a period of 6 months or more is to be treated
as   a   full   year.     Accordingly,   the   petitioner   could   have   been
transferred   in   March   2014   as   she   had   already   completed
more   than   2   years   and   6   months   till   then.     It   is   submitted
that however, the petitioner was transferred mid­term on 7 th
July   2014.   It   is   submitted   that   the   mid­term   transfer   as
provided under Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy can be made
on   the   limited   grounds   mentioned   therein.     Smt.   Jaising
submitted that  none of the grounds as mentioned in Clause
22   of   the   Transfer   Policy   were   available   in   the   case   of   the
petitioner.
14. Smt. Jaising further submitted that as per the Transfer
Policy   if   a   daughter   of   a   Judicial   Officer   is   studying   at   the
place of his/her current posting and is in the final year of the
Board   Examination   or   University   Examination   and   the
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Educational Institution where the daughter is studying, does
not   have   hostel   facility   for   girls,   the   said   Judicial   Officer   is
permitted   to   stay   over   the   prescribed   period.     She   further
submitted   that   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner   was   also
violative   of   Clause   16   of   the   Transfer   Policy   inasmuch   as   a
Judicial Officer is required to first go from Category ‘A’ city to
‘B’   city,   from   ‘B’   to   ‘C’,   from   ‘C’   to   ‘D’   and   from   ‘D’   to   ‘A’.
However,   the   petitioner   was   directly   transferred   from
Category   ‘A’   city   to   ‘C’   city.     The   learned   Senior   Counsel
submitted   that   the   JIC,   in   its   report,   had   clearly   found   the
petitioner’s transfer to be contrary to the Transfer Policy.
15. Smt.   Jaising  further   submitted   that   from   the  record,   it
is   clear   that   the   petitioner’s   transfer   was   not   made   on
administrative grounds, but on the grounds of the complaint
made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.   It is submitted that the
JIC   had   also   found   that   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner   was
made   on   the   basis   of   the   complaint   made   by   the   then   D   &
SJ,   Gwalior.   It   is   submitted   that   the   JIC   had   further   found
from   the   evidence   of   the   then   Judge,   MP   High   Court,   who
was   a   Member   of   the   Transfer   Committee   that,   the   transfer
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was   made   solely   on   the   basis   of   the   complaint   made   by   the
then D & SJ, Gwalior.
16. Smt.   Jaising   further   submitted   that   from   the   evidence
of the then Judge on the Transfer Committee recorded by the
JIC,   it   was   clear   that   the   representations   of   the   petitioner
were   also   not   considered   by   the   Transfer   Committee   in   the
right earnest.
17. Smt. Jaising submitted that the petitioner’s resignation
was   an   outcome   of   the   circumstances,   in   which   she   had   no
other  option but to tender  her resignation and as such, was
not   a   resignation   in   law   but   a   forced   resignation,   which
amounts   to   constructive   discharge.   She   relies   on   the
following   judgments   of   the   Court   of   Appeal   of   United
Kingdom in support of this proposition:
Western Excavating (E.C.C) Ltd. v. Sharp 2
;
Lewis v. Motorworld Garage 3
2   1978 I.C.R. 22
3   1985 WL 311068
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She further relied on the following judgments of the US
Court of  Appeals, Third Circuit  to  assert  the  point  of hostile
work environment and institutional failure:
Goss v. Exxon 4
;
Pennsylvania State Police v. Nancy Drew Suders 5
18. Smt. Jaising submitted that Article 11 of Convention on
the   Elimination   of   All   Forms   of   Discrimination   Against
Women (CEDAW) to which India is a signatory, provides that
a woman should be able to work and discharge family duties
at   the   same   time.     She   submitted   that   the   petitioner’s
transfer was at such a place, where she could not have been
able   to   simultaneously   discharge   her   duties   as   a   Judicial
Officer and her duties towards the family.   As such, the said
transfer order was in violation of Article 11 of CEDAW.
19. Smt.   Jaising   further   submitted   that   the   Full   Court   of
the MP High Court has failed to give justice to the petitioner
inasmuch   as   her   grievance   was   not   considered.     She
submitted that immediately after the petitioner had tendered
4   747 F 2 nd
 885
5   542 US 129
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her   resignation,   she   had   made   a   representation   within   a
fortnight   i.e.   on   1 st
  August   2014   to   Hon’ble   the   President   of
India as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the
Chief   Justice   of   the   MP   High   Court   for   reconsidering   the
entire   issue.     She   further   submitted   that,   as   suggested   by
this   Court,   the   petitioner   is   foregoing   her   claims   towards
back   wages   and   is   only   interested   in   serving   the   august
institution   of   Judiciary.     She   therefore   prayed   that   the
petition   be   allowed   and   the   petitioner   be   re­instated   in
service with continuity.
20. Per   contra,   Shri   Tushar   Mehta,   the   learned   Solicitor
General   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondents   submitted
that   the   allegations   made   by   the   petitioner   with   regard   to
sexual   harassment   are   found   to   be   not   established   by   the
JIC.     He   submitted   that   the   said   findings   were   recorded   as
back as on 15 th
  December 2017, which were not challenged,
and   in   any   case,   cannot   be   questioned   or   assailed   in
ancillary proceedings like the present one.  
15

21. Shri Mehta further submitted that though, the findings
of   the   JIC   with   regard   to   transfer   of   the   petitioner   being
irregular, are beyond the scope of its “Terms of Reference”, at
best,   the   transfer   could   be   construed   to   be   irregular.     He
submitted   that   assuming   that   the   transfer   order   of   the
petitioner was irregular and even   mala fide , the same having
not been challenged at the relevant point of time, the validity
thereof cannot be challenged in the present proceedings.   He
submitted   that   the   concept   of   “coercion   resulting   into
resignation”   is   a   concept,   which  is   developed   in  the   western
countries   with   regard   to   labour   jurisprudence,   and   that   in
any case, such reliefs can be granted only  when such a fact
is duly established by leading evidence.
22. The   learned   Solicitor   General   submitted   that   the   only
contention   of   the   petitioner   with   regard   to   coercion   is   that
she had to resign on account of mid­term transfer order.  He
submitted   that   a   transfer   is   an   incidence   of   service.   He
submitted   that   a   mid­term   transfer   cannot   be   said   to   be
“coercion” so as to force a person to resign from the service.
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He  submitted   that   for   establishing   a  case  of   coercion,   it   will
be   necessary   for   a   person   to   establish,   by   leading   cogent
evidence,   that   not   only   unbearable   pressure   was   built   but
such   a   pressure   was   intended   not   just   to   trouble   an
employee or  to victimize an employee but to ensure that the
employee   quits   the   job.     He   submitted   that   neither   such
circumstances are pleaded nor asserted by the petitioner. In
any case, he submitted that in the proceedings under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, it will not be possible to arrive
at such a finding.  
23. Shri   Mehta   submitted   that   in   any   case,   such   a   plea
would   not   be   available   to   a   Judicial   Officer,   who   is
discharging the sovereign function of dispensing  justice.   He
submitted   that   the   Judicial   Officers   are   trained   to   be
independent,   fearless,   non­impulsive   and   to   act   in
accordance with law and as such, the concept which applies
to   a   workman   cannot   be   applied   to   a   Judicial   Officer.     He
further submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner
with   regard   to   sexual   harassment   were   made   only   after   she
resigned from the service.
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24. Shri   Mehta   submitted   that   any   decision   in   the   present
proceedings   will   have   far­reaching   effects   in   the   future.   He
submitted   that   if   a   mere   circumstance   of   mid­term   transfer
coupled   with   inconvenient   family   circumstances   is
considered   by   this   Court   to   be   “coercion”   to   resign   from
service,   it   will   open   the   floodgates   of   litigations.     It   is
submitted   that   if   such   a   view   is   taken   by   this   Court,   all
similarly situated Judicial Officers would come up with such
a   plea,   inasmuch   as   every   Judicial   Officer   is   bound   to   have
some   or   the   other   inconvenient   family   problems.   He
submitted   that   if   such   a   view   is   taken,   it   will   have   far­
reaching   effects   on   the   administration   of   the   District
Judiciary.
25. Shri   Mehta   submitted   that   the   Full   Court   of   the   MP
High   Court   has   taken   a   unanimous   decision   on   more   than
one   occasion   to   reject   the   petitioner’s   representation
regarding   re­instatement   in   service.     He   submitted   that   the
observations   made   by   the   JIC   with   regard   to   the   re­
instatement   of   the   petitioner   were   beyond   the   scope   of   its
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“Terms   of  Reference”   and   as   such,   the   Full   Court   of   the   MP
High   Court   has   rightly   rejected   the   representation   of   the
petitioner.  He submitted that if a unanimous decision taken
by the Full Court of the MP High Court is interfered with by
this Court, it will not only stigmatize the individuals manning
the institution but the entire institution. 
26. Shri Mehta submitted that the submissions, which he is
making are not on the instructions of the MP High Court, but
are   being   made   by   him   as   an   Officer   of   the   Court.     He
submitted that what is sought to be urged by the petitioner is
that   the   whole   of   the   MP   High   Court   as   an   Institution
connived together and ensured to create such circumstances,
that   she   had   no   other   option   but   to   tender   her   resignation.
He submitted that if the petitioner’s contention is accepted, it
will have catastrophic effects. 
27. Shri   Mehta   submitted   that   the   scope   of   judicial   review
by this Court of a decision of the Full Court of a High Court,
is very limited.  He submitted that this Court cannot sit in an
appeal   over   the   decision   of   the   Full   Court   of   a   High   Court.
19

An interference would be permitted only in the rarest of rare
cases.   He   relies   on   the   following   judgments   of   this   Court   in
support of this proposition:
Syed  T.A.   Naqshbandi  and   Others   v.  State  of  Jammu  &
Kashmir and Others 6
;
Registrar   General,   High   Court   of   Patna   v.   Pandey
Gajendra Prasad and Others 7
;
Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs and Others v.
Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and Others 8
28. He therefore prays for dismissal of the petition.
29. Before we consider the rival submissions, we clarify that
we   are   not   examining   the   correctness   or   otherwise   of   the
decisions   of   the   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High   Court   dated   11 th
January 2018 and 15 th
  February 2019.   We are conscious of
the fact that  the scope of  judicial  review  of  a decision  of the
Full   Court   of   a   High   Court   is   extremely   narrow   and   we
cannot sit in an appeal over the decision of the Full Court of
6   (2003) 9 SCC 592
7   (2012) 6 SCC 357
8   (2011) 10 SCC 1
20

a   High   Court.   There   could   be   various   factors   and   reasons
which could have weighed with the Full Court of the MP High
Court   while   rejecting   the   representation   made   by   the
petitioner in its resolutions dated 11 th
 January 2018 and 15 th
February 2019.   We have full respect for the authority of the
Full Court of the MP High Court to arrive at such a decision.
30. We therefore clarify  that we are restricting  the scope of
enquiry   in   the   present   matter   only   to   examine   the   following
issues,   on   the   basis   of   the   factual   scenario   as   has   come   on
record in the present matter:
(i) As   to   whether   the   order   transferring   the   petitioner
from Gwalior to Sidhi dated 8 th
 July 2014 is legal;
(ii) As to whether the orders of the MP High Court dated
11 th
  July   2014   and   14 th
  July   2014,   rejecting   the
petitioner’s   representations   dated   9 th
  July   2014   and
11 th
 July 2014 respectively, were legal; and
(iii) As to whether  the  resignation  of the petitioner  dated
15 th
  July   2014   can   be   considered   to   be   voluntary   or
the one which has been forced due to circumstances.
21

31. Though,   the   issue   directly   involved   in   the   present
petition   is   only   the   issue   No.   (iii),   we   find   that   it   will   be
necessary to consider issue Nos. (i) and (ii) inasmuch as our
findings on the  said issues will  have a direct bearing  on  the
finding on issue No. (iii). 
32. We   further   clarify   that   we   are   examining   the   present
matter   purely   considering   it   as   a   lis   between   an   employee
and an employer, without in any way being influenced by the
fact that one of the parties to the lis is the MP High Court on
the administrative side, and the other one a Judicial Officer.
We are of the considered view that the legal principles, which
would   govern   the   dispute   between   an   employer   who   is   a
State and an employee, will have to be equally applied in the
present case, irrespective of the fact that one of the parties is
a High Court and the other one is a Judicial Officer. 
33. Though, arguments have been advanced before us with
regard to constructive discharge and the reliance is placed on
the   judgments   of   Courts   in   United   Kingdom   and   United
States, we do not find it necessary to go into that issue.   We
22

are of the considered view that the law as enunciated by this
Court with regard to scope of judicial review of a State action,
would squarely cover the issue.
34. With   this   note,   we   proceed   to   examine   the   facts   in   the
present matter.
35. No   doubt   that   the   JIC,   in   its   Report   dated   15 th
December 2017, has come to a clear finding that the transfer
of   the   petitioner   was   in   contravention   of   the   Transfer   Policy
laid down by the MP High Court and as such, was irregular.
The  JIC   has  also   come  to   a   finding   that   the   representations
made by the petitioner were not appropriately considered by
the   MP   High   Court.     The   JIC   further   came   to   a   finding   that
Justice   ‘A’   had   interfered   with   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner
and   also   had   a   role   to   play   in   the   rejection   of   her
representations.  The JIC has also come to a finding that the
basis of the petitioner’s transfer was the complaint dated 3 rd
July   2014,   made   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior.     The   JIC
further   found   that   though,   it   was   the   stand   of   the   MP   High
Court   that   the   transfer   of   the   petitioner   was   on
23

administrative grounds in view of the provisions of Clause 22
of the Transfer Policy, the same was not established.  The JIC
has further come to a finding that the circumstances became
unbearable   for   the   petitioner,   resulting   in   her   resignation
from service.
36. However, it is sought to be urged vehemently on behalf
of the respondents that the aforesaid findings of the JIC were
beyond   the   scope   of   “Terms   of   Reference”   made   to   it.     Per
contra,   it   is   strenuously   argued   by   Smt.   Jaising   that   the
aforesaid observations are very much within the scope of the
“Terms   of   Reference”   made   to   the   JIC.   Without   going   into
that controversy, we find it apposite to re­examine the issue,
independent of the findings of the JIC.
37. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   Transfer   Policy   has   been
incorporated   by   the   MP   High   Court   on   12 th
  January   2012.
The   Preamble   of   the   said   Transfer   Policy   states   that   an
attempt   will   be   made   to   effect   the   transfer   and   posting   of
Judicial   Officers   in   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in
accordance with the said Guidelines and Policy, and that the
24

same   is   not   enforceable   in   law.   However,   it   states   that
notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the   said   Policy,   the
interest   of   the   Judicial   System   and   Establishment   in   the
State   are   paramount   consideration   for   transfers   and
postings.   The salient features of the said Transfer Policy are
as under:
(i) In accordance with Clause 3 of the Transfer Policy,
the   places   available   for   posting   are   divided   into   4
Categories mentioned as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’, which
are mentioned in Annexure­A;
(ii) In accordance with Clause 4 of the Transfer Policy,
the   annual   transfer   of   Judicial   Officers   shall   be
effected   normally   by   the   15 th
  of   March   every   year
and   that   the   Judicial   Officers   shall   be   given   time
for   joining   up   to   the   first   day   of   April   of   the
relevant   year   so   as   to   coincide   with   the   academic
session; 
25

(iii) In accordance with Clause 5 of the Transfer Policy,
the   normal   approximate   tenure   of   posting   at   a
place shall be three years;
(iv) In accordance with Clause 7 of the Transfer Policy,
for   computing   the   tenure   of   posting   of   an   Officer
posted   at   a   particular   place,   the   period   of   6
months  or  above  shall be rounded off and  treated
as full year;
(v) Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   carves   out   the
exceptions   in   cases   where   an   extension   of   tenure
can   be   granted.   Sub­clause   (a)   of   Clause   9
specifies   a   ground,   that   such   an   extension   would
be available if a daughter (not son) of the Judicial
Officer   is   studying   at   the   place   of   his   current
posting,   and   is   in   the   Final   Year   of   a   Board
Examination   or   University   Examination,   and   the
educational   Institution   where   such   daughter   is
studying,   does   not   have   hostel   facility   for   girls.   It
further   provides   that   the   said   criteria   are   for   the
26

Officers seeking over­stay in Category ‘A’ places.  It
further  clarifies that insofar as Category  ‘B’, ‘C’ or
‘D’ places are concerned, the said facility would be
available irrespective of the ward being  a son or a
daughter and further provides that the availability
of   hostel   facility   will   not   be   essential.     It   further
provides   that   the   request   on   the   said   ground   can
be   considered   only   if   the   facts   with   regard   to
education   of   the   daughter   and   non­availability   of
hostel facility in the Institution are certified by the
District Judge concerned, after proper verification,
and   further  that   the  District   Judge   as   well   as   the
Portfolio   Judge   have   no   objection   to   the   over­stay
of   the   Officer.     Sub­clause   (b)   of   Clause   9   deals
with   the   cases   where   over­stay   is   sought   on   the
ground   of   illness   of   a   Judicial   Officer,   his   spouse
or   children   or   aged   parents.     Sub­clause   (c)   of
Clause 9 is a residuary clause, which enables such
exceptions   on   substantial   reasons,   which   in   the
27

opinion   of   the   District   Judge,   the   Portfolio   Judge
or the Chief Justice, are justified;
Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   further
provides   that   if   any   Judicial   Officer   submits   such
a   representation   covered   by   sub­clause   (a),   (b)   or
(c), to his District Judge for being forwarded to the
Registrar   General,   it   will   be   obligatory   for   the
District   Judge   to   send   the   representation   along
with   his   comments   within   one   week   of   its   receipt
after   the   necessary   verifications.     The   Registry
thereafter   is   required   to   place   the   matter   before
the concerned Portfolio Judge within a week of the
last   date   of   the   receipt   of   the   representation,   and
the   Portfolio   Judge   is   required   to   return   the   file
with   his   comments/opinion   within   a   week
thereafter;
(vi) Clause   10   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that   all
such   Judicial   Officers   who   are   seeking   their
extension,   shall   also   simultaneously   forward
28

minimum   three   and   maximum   five   options
regarding   the   place   of   the   permissible   category   or
lower category, where they would like to be posted
in case the representation is not allowed;
(vii) Clause   13   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that
extension   of   a   posting   after   the   tenure   period
would   be   granted   only   in   exceptional
circumstances.     The   said   Clause   13   further
provides that the decision regarding extension will
be taken by the Chief Justice, or on his behalf, by
a Committee of two Judges nominated by the Chief
Justice,   within   three   weeks   of   the   last   date   of
receipt of representations mentioned above;
(viii) Clause  14  of the  Transfer  Policy  provides that  the
Judicial   Officer,   who   is   on   deputation   or   holding
an ex­cadre post, would be required to come back
to   the   parent   department   after   completing   a
maximum   period   of   three   years   on   such   posting.
It further provides that no extension on deputation
29

shall   be   granted   after   a   period   of   three   years.
However,   the   power   of   Chief   Justice   to   grant
extension of one year in exceptional circumstances
is reserved;
(ix) In   accordance   with   Clause   16   of   the   Transfer
Policy,   a   transfer   takes   place   normally   from
Category   ‘A’   to   ‘B’,   from   ‘B’   to   ‘C’,   from   ‘C’   to   ‘D’
and from ‘D’ to ‘A’ or lower Category places;
(x) In   accordance   with   Clause   17   of   the   Transfer
Policy,   the   Registrar   General   shall,   by   15 th
  of
February each year, prepare a list of Officers, who
will be completing their tenure/posting.   It further
provides   that   the   Judicial   Officers   whose   request
for   over­stay   has   been   allowed   will   be   excluded
from   that   list   and   the   Officers   whose   request   for
pre­mature   transfer   has   been   allowed,   will   be
added to that list.  The said Clause also requires to
prepare   a   chart   mentioning   therein   the   details   as
required   under   the   said   Clause.     The   purpose
30

appears  to  be,  to  ensure  an  equitable  distribution
of judicial work for Officers all over the State;
(xi) Clause   18   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that   an
attempt should be made to post the husband and
wife   at   the   same   place,   if   both   are   working   as
Judicial   Officers   in   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh.
It  further   provides  that,  if   that   is  not   possible,  an
attempt   should   be   made   to   post   them   at   nearby
places;
(xii) Clause   19   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that
whenever   a   close   relative   of   a   Judicial   Officer   is
suffering   from   a   serious   ailment,   he   shall   be
granted   preference  by   posting   in   a   place   where   or
near   which   proper   treatment   facilities   for   these
ailments are available;
(xiii) Clause   20   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that
Judicial   Officers,   who   are   suffering   from   any
physical   disability,   which   is   certified   to   be   more
than 40% by the appropriate Medical Board, would
31

be   granted   preference   in   the   matter   of   their
posting  to such place where they  are not required
to travel frequently;
(xiv) Clause   21   of   the   Transfer   Policy   requires   that
Judicial   Officers,   who   have   undergone   posting   for
a period of two years or more in outlying Courts or
in   ‘D’   Category   places,   will   be   given   preference   in
the   transfer   of   their   posting   at   District
Headquarters only;
(xv) Clause   22   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that   a
Judicial   Officer   may   be   transferred   even   before
completion of the prescribed tenure or in mid­term
in   case   his   performance   is   found   to   be   below   the
norms   prescribed   or   if   grounds   exist   for   initiating
inquiry   against   him.     It   further   provides   that   he
may   also   be   transferred   before   completing   the
prescribed   tenure   in   public   interest   or   in   the
interest of administration if so decided by the High
Court;
32

(xvi) In   accordance   with   Clause   23   of   the   Transfer
Policy, a Judicial Officer, who has a year or less to
retire as on first day of April, is entitled to posting
of   his   choice   at   a   place,   where   or   near   which,   he
proposes to settle after his retirement;
(xvii) Clause   24   of   the   Transfer   Policy   which   could   be
construed   as   a   residuary   clause   reserves   the
power   of   the   Chief   Justice   to   issue   general   or
particular   directions   which   are   not   specifically
covered   by   the   Policy.   It   further   provides   that   in
case   of   any   doubt   with   regard   to   Policy   or   its
implementation,   the   clarification   issued   by   the
Chief Justice will be treated as part of the Policy;
(xviii) Clause   25   of   the   Transfer   Policy   provides   that   no
representation   against   transfers   ordered   by   the
High Court will normally be entertained except on
a  serious  ground,  which   did   not   exist   on   the  date
of the issuance of the order of transfer;
33

(xix) Clause   26   of   the   Transfer   Policy   which   is   a   non­
obstante   clause   provides   that   notwithstanding
anything contained therein, the Chief Justice or on
his   behalf,   a   Committee   of   two   senior   Judges
nominated   by   the   Chief   Justice,   will   have
overriding  powers to  pass any  order  regarding  the
transfer   or   posting   of   any   Judicial   Officer   at   any
time;
(xx) Clause 28 of the Transfer Policy enables the Chief
Justice   to   delegate   his   powers   to   any   other
Judge/Officer or Committee of Judges/Officers for
implementation of the Policy/Guidelines.
38. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   Transfer   Policy
incorporated   by   the   MP   High   Court   has   provided   in   detail,
the   procedure   that   is   required   to   be   followed   with   regard   to
effecting the transfer of the Judicial Officers, their tenure at a
particular   posting,   the   circumstances   in   which   the   case
should   be   considered   for   permitting   the   Judicial   Officers   to
34

stay  beyond the  prescribed period  and the manner  in which
the representation is to be considered etc.
39. No   doubt   that   the   said   Transfer   Policy   is   only   a   set   of
Guidelines   for   internal   administration   of   the   District
Judiciary   issued   by   the   MP   High   Court.   However,   while
exercising   its   functions   on   the   administrative   side,   the   MP
High   Court   would   also   be   a   State   within   the   meaning   of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India.  We may gainfully refer
to the following observations made by this Court in the case
of   Food   Corporation   of   India   v.   M/s   Kamdhenu   Cattle
Feed Industries 9
:
“ 8.   The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of
a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a
distinct   enforceable   right,   but   failure   to   consider
and   give   due   weight   to   it   may   render   the   decision
arbitrary,   and   this   is   how   the   requirement   of   due
consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part
of   the   principle   of   non­arbitrariness,   a   necessary
concomitant   of   the   rule   of   law.   Every   legitimate
expectation   is   a   relevant   factor   requiring   due
consideration   in   a   fair   decision­making   process.
Whether   the   expectation   of   the   claimant   is
reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question
of   fact   in   each   case.   Whenever   the   question   arises,
it   is   to   be   determined   not   according   to   the
9   (1993) 1 SCC 71
35

claimant's   perception   but   in   larger   public   interest
wherein   other   more   important   considerations   may
outweigh   what   would   otherwise   have   been   the
legitimate   expectation   of   the   claimant.   A   bona   fide
decision   of   the   public   authority   reached   in   this
manner   would   satisfy   the   requirement   of   non­
arbitrariness   and   withstand   judicial   scrutiny.   The
doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in
the   rule   of   law   and   operates   in   our   legal   system   in
this manner and to this extent.
9.   In   Council   of   Civil   Service   Unions   v.   Minister   for
the Civil Service   [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935
(HL)]   the   House   of   Lords   indicated   the   extent   to
which   the   legitimate   expectation   interfaces   with
exercise   of   discretionary   power.   The   impugned
action   was   upheld   as   reasonable,   made   on   due
consideration   of   all   relevant   factors   including   the
legitimate  expectation   of  the  applicant,   wherein  the
considerations   of   national   security   were   found   to
outweigh that which otherwise would have been the
reasonable   expectation   of   the   applicant.   Lord
Scarman   pointed   out   that   “the   controlling   factor   in
determining   whether   the   exercise   of   prerogative
power   is   subject   to   judicial   review   is   not   its   source
but its subject­matter”. Again in   Preston ,   in re   [1985
AC 835 : (1985) 2 All ER 327] it was stated by Lord
Scarman   that   “the   principle   of   fairness   has   an
important   place   in   the   law   of   judicial   review”   and
“unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can
be   such   that   it   is   an   abuse   or   excess   of   power”.
These decisions of the House of Lords give a similar
indication   of   the   significance   of   the   doctrine   of
legitimate   expectation.   Shri   A.K.   Sen   referred
to   Shanti   Vijay   and   Co.   v.   Princess   Fatima
Fouzia   [(1979) 4 SCC 602 : (1980) 1 SCR 459] which
36

holds   that   court   should   interfere   where
discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and
in good faith.”
40. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that mere
reasonable   or   legitimate   expectation   of   a   citizen   may   not   by
itself be a distinct enforceable right.  It is further held that the
failure   to   consider   and  give   due   weight   to   it   may   render   the
decision  arbitrary.   It  has been  held that  the  requirement of
due   consideration   of   a   legitimate   expectation   forms   part   of
the   principle   of   non­arbitrariness,   which   is   a   necessary
concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is
a   relevant   factor   requiring   due   consideration   in   a   fair
decision­making   process.   Whether   the   expectation   of   the
claimant   is   reasonable   or   legitimate   in   the   context   is   a
question   of  fact  in  each  case.  Whenever  the  question  arises,
it   is   to   be   determined   not   according   to   the   claimant's
perception   but   in   larger   public   interest   wherein   other   more
important   considerations   may   outweigh,   what   would
otherwise   have   been   the   legitimate   expectation   of   the
37

claimant.   It   has   been   held   that   a   bona   fide   decision   of   the
public   authority   reached   in   this   manner   would   satisfy   the
requirement   of   non­arbitrariness   and   withstand   judicial
scrutiny.   It   has   been   held   that   the   principle   of   fairness   has
an   important   place   in   the   law   of   judicial   review   and   that
unfairness   in   the   purported   exercise   of   power   can   be   such
that it is abuse or excess of power. The court should interfere
where discretionary power is not exercised reasonably and in
good faith.
41. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   though   the   Transfer   Policy
may not be enforceable in law, but when the Transfer Policy
has been framed by the MP High Court for administration of
the   District   Judiciary,   every   Judicial   Officer   will   have   a
legitimate expectation that such a Policy should be given due
weightage, when the cases of Judicial Officers for transfer are
being considered.
42. In   this   background,   we   will   examine   the   undisputed
facts.  Undisputedly, in the chart which was prepared by the
38

then RG for ensuring the general transfers, which were to be
effected   in   the   month   of   March   2014,   the   petitioner’s   name
did not figure.
43. It   is   further   clear   that   in   the   agenda   prepared   for
consideration   of   mid­term   transfers   to   be   effected   in   the
month   of   July   2014,   again   the   petitioner’s   name   did   not
appear.     It   can   further   be   seen   from   the   depositions   of   the
then Judge of the MP High Court, who was a Member of the
Transfer Committee and that of the then RG of the MP High
Court   before   the   JIC,   that   the   basis   for   the   transfer   of   the
petitioner  was  the  complaint dated  3 rd
  July  2014,  addressed
by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   within
days,   the   decision   regarding   transferring   the   petitioner   to
Sidhi,   which   is   about   507   kms.   away   from   Gwalior,   was
taken  by  the  Transfer  Committee on  7 th
  July   2014, and  was
approved by the Competent Authority on the very same day.
The said transfer order was conveyed to the petitioner on the
next day that is on 8 th
 July 2014.
39

44. The   petitioner,   on   coming   to   know   about   her   transfer
order, made a representation on the very next day i.e., on 9 th
July   2014.   In   the   said   representation,   the   petitioner   had
categorically   stated   that   her   elder   daughter   was   a   brilliant
child, studying in Class 12 th
 and was preparing for her Board
and   Competitive   Exams   at   FIITJEE   Coaching   Centre,
Gwalior.     She   further   stated   that   her   husband,   due   to
compelling   circumstances   and   for   looking   after   his   aged
parents, had to stay in Delhi and practically, she had to play
the role of both a father and a mother for her daughters and
had to draw a balance between her profession and dependent
children.     She   further   made   a   request   to   the   Competent
Authority   to   allow   her   to   stay   in   Gwalior   till   her   daughter
completes   her   Class   12 th
  examination.   The   said
representation was rejected within two days i.e. on 11 th
  July
2014.   The   then   RG   made   an   endorsement   to   the   following
effect: 
“Hon’ble the transfer Committee in its meeting
held on 7.7.2014 has recommended transfer of Smt.
Madan   from   Gwalior   to   Sidhi   on   administrative
40

ground, after considering the request of D&S Judge,
Gwalior with regard to her conduct and behavior.  It
is   gathered   that   adequate   educational   facilities
including CBSE School are available at Sidhi.
Therefore,   the   matter   is   submitted   for   kind
consideration and order.”
The   then   Judge   of   the   Transfer   Committee   of   the   MP
High   Court   made   the   following   endorsement   on   the   same
day: 
“The   representation   may   be   rejected   as   it   does   not
call for any consideration.”
45. After   rejection  of  her  first  representation,  the  petitioner
made another representation to the respondent No.1 on 11 th
July   2014,   through   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior.     In   the   said
representation,   she   had   requested   for   her   transfer   either   to
Sehore,   Raisen,   Dewas   or   Ujjain   so   that   her   daughter   could
continue   with   her   education.     The   then   RG,   on   14 th
  July
2014,  placed  the   said  representation  of   the   petitioner  before
the Transfer Committee with the following endorsement: 
41

“Kind   attention   is   invited   to   another   representation
(dated   11 th
  July,   2014)   submitted   by   Ms.   ‘X’,   8 th
A.D.J., Gwalior regarding her transfer from Gwalior
to   Sidhi,   almost   on   identical   grounds   pertaining   to
education of her daughters.
The   Committee   has   already   considered   the
representation   dated   9 th
  July,   2014   of   Ms.   ‘X’   and
has been pleased to reject the same.
The   matter   is   submitted   again   for   kind
consideration   and   orders   in   view   of   the   repeat
representation dated 11 th
 July, 2014.”
The   then   Judge   of   the   Transfer   Committee   of   the   MP
High   Court   made   the   following   endorsement   on   the   same
day:
“In   view   of   the   order   already   passed   on   the
representation   no   further   reconsideration   is   to   be
made.”
46. It could thus be seen that the transfer of the petitioner
was effected mid­term though she could have very well been
transferred in general transfers, to be effected in March­April,
2014.     Even  in   the   agenda   of   the   mid­term  transfers,  which
were to be effected on various grounds, petitioner’s name was
not   included.   It   was   only   after   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior
42

addressed   a   complaint   to   the   then   RG,   seeking   her   transfer
out of Gwalior, the matter was placed immediately before the
Transfer Committee within days and the Transfer Committee
approved the transfer of the petitioner.  Immediately after the
receipt   of   the   transfer   order,   the   petitioner   made   a
representation   on   9 th
  July   2014,   specifically   pointing   out
therein that her daughter was studying in Class 12 th
 and also
undergoing   FIITJEE   coaching.   The   said   representation   was
rejected   within   two   days.   The   petitioner   had   a   legitimate
expectation   of   her   representation   being   considered
specifically in view of Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy.   The
Transfer   Policy   provides   that   on   such   representation   being
made,   the   RG   shall   obtain   the   comments   of   the   District
Judge   within   a   week   and   on   receiving   his   comments   after
necessary   verifications,   it   was   required   that   the   matter
should be placed before the concerned Portfolio Judge within
a week, who was required to return the file within a period of
one week thereafter, with his comments/opinion.
43

47. Undisputedly,   neither   the   procedure   as   prescribed
under   Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy   of   obtaining   the
comments   from   the   District   Judge   and   the   Portfolio   Judge
were   complied   with,   nor   the   Transfer   Committee   considered
the provisions of Clause 9(a) of the Transfer Policy.
48. When   sub­clause   (a)   of   Clause   9   of   the   Transfer   Policy
provided, that the case of a Judicial Officer  for an extension
should be considered if such Judicial Officer’s daughter (not
son) was to appear for the final year of Board Examination or
University   Examination,   and   when   such   educational
Institution   where   such   daughter   is   studying,   does   not   have
hostel   facility   for   girls,   the   petitioner   had   a   legitimate
expectation   that   the   MP   High   Court   would   consider   her
request   in   accordance   therewith.     Not   only   that,   such   a
concession of extension would have been available only if the
District   Judge   certified   that   there   is   no   hostel   facility
available   in   such   educational   Institution.     It   also   further
required   the   comments   to   be   obtained   by   the   RG   from   the
District Judge and the Portfolio Judge of the MP High Court.
44

From the perusal of the Transfer Policy, it is clear that total 3
weeks’   period   is   provided   between   the   date   of   the   receipt   of
the representation and the decision thereon.  However, in the
present   case,   within   two   days   from   the   submission   of   the
representation,   the   Transfer   Committee   rejected   the   same
without considering sub­clause (a) of Clause 9 of the Transfer
Policy.   It   is   a   different   matter   that   inviting   comments   from
the   District   Judge   would   have   been   just   a   formality,
inasmuch as the transfer was effected on his complaint itself.
49. The matter does not end here.   On rejection of her first
representation,   the   petitioner   addressed   her   second
representation,   requesting   that   she   be   posted   at   any   of   the
four   cities   mentioned   in   the   said   representation   so   that   her
daughter   could   continue   with   her   education.     However,   the
then   RG   made   an   endorsement   that   the   said   representation
is   on   similar   ground   as   mentioned   in   the   earlier
representation   dated   9 th
  July   2014,   which   has   already   been
rejected.     The   Transfer   Committee   endorsed   that   in   view   of
the   order   already   passed   in   the   earlier   representation   dated
45

9 th
 July 2014, no further reconsideration is to be made.  Both
the   representations   of   the   petitioner   are   made   with   different
requests.     Whereas   the   first   representation   requests   for   her
retention   at   Gwalior   for   a   period   of   8   months   so   that   her
daughter   could   continue   with   her   education   at   Gwalior;   in
the second representation, she had requested to be posted at
either   of   the   4   places,   where   her   daughter   could   continue
with her education.  However, the second representation was
rejected   on   the   ground   that   the   earlier   representation   made
on similar ground also stands rejected.  
50. The   petitioner   had   a   legitimate   expectation   in   view   of
Clause 10 of the Transfer Policy to have her case considered
for posting at any of the 4 places in the event her request for
retention at the then present posting was not considered and
as   such,   she   made   the   second   representation.     We   are   at
pains   to   say   that   the   rejection   of   the   second   representation
depicts total non­application of mind by the then RG as well
as the then Judge of the Transfer Committee of the MP High
Court.     The   proposal   of   the   then   RG   was   made   in   a   casual
46

manner   and   accepted   by   the   then   Judge   on   the   Transfer
Committee in a mechanical manner.
51. The   transfer   is   sought   to   be   justified   in   view   of   Clause
22  of  the   Transfer   Policy.     One  of  the  grounds  on  which  the
transfer could be made in mid­term, is that the performance
of   such   Judicial   Officer   is   found   to   be   below   the   norms
prescribed.     The   same   is   admittedly   not   available   in   the
present case. The petitioner’s performance in the assessment
made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior on 15 th
  January 2014 for
the assessment year 2013, has been found to be ‘very good’.
That   leaves   us   with   the   second   ground   available   under
Clause 22 of the Transfer Policy, that a transfer can be made
if   the   grounds   exist   for   initiating   an   inquiry   against   such   a
Judicial Officer.  The same is also not the case here.
52. It   is   sought   to   be   urged   that   the   transfer   of   the
petitioner was made in the public interest or in the interest of
the   administration   inasmuch   as   there   was   a   requirement   of
an   Additional   Judge   at   Sidhi.     The   then   Judge   on   the
47

Transfer   Committee   has   specifically   admitted   in   his
deposition   before   the   JIC   that   at   the   relevant   point   of   time,
the   pendency   at   the   4   places   which   were   mentioned   by   the
petitioner   in   her   second   representation,   was   much   higher
than at Sidhi.  He has further admitted that though the posts
were   vacant   at   the   said   4   places,   there   was   no   vacancy   at
Sidhi.     As   per   the   Transfer   Policy,   a   Judicial   Officer   is
required   to   be   transferred   from   Category   ‘A’   city   to   Category
‘B’   city,   from   ‘B’   to   ‘C’,   from   ‘C’   to   ‘D’   and   from   ‘D’   to   ‘A’.
However,   in   the   case   of   the   petitioner,   the   petitioner   was
directly transferred from Gwalior, which is Category ‘A’ city to
Sidhi, which is Category ‘C’ city. The 4 cities which have been
mentioned by the petitioner in her second representation are
‘B’   Category   cities.   Coupled   with   the   admission   that   the
transfer   of   the   petitioner   was   effected   on   the   basis   of   the
complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior, it is difficult to
accept   the   contention   on   behalf   of   the   MP   High   Court   that
the transfer of the petitioner was made in the public interest
or in the interest of the administration.
48

53. The   learned   Solicitor   General   argued   that   vide   the
impugned transfer order dated 8 th
  July 2014, as many as 26
Judicial Officers were transferred and not just the petitioner.
The   perusal   of   the   said   transfer   order   would   reveal   that   in
many   cases,   the   Judicial   Officers   who   were   either   on
deputation   or   ex­cadre   posts,   have   been   brought   in   main
stream.     It   is   also   found   that   many   of   the   Judicial   Officers
covered   by   the   said   transfer   order   were   posted   at   the   same
place inasmuch as from the posting on deputation, they have
been   brought   in   the   main   stream.   In   any   case,   it   is   not
pointed out as to whether the said Judicial Officers were also
facing   the   same   difficulty,   as   was   being   faced   by   the
petitioner.     It   is   also   not   brought   on   record   as   to   whether
those   Judicial   Officers   had   made   any   representation   and
their representations were rejected in an identical manner.  
54. At   this   juncture,   we   may   refer   to   the   following
observations   made   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Kumari
49

Shrilekha   Vidyarthi   and   Others   v.   State   of   U.P.   and
Others 10
:
“ 33.   No doubt, it is true, as indicated by us earlier,
that   there   is   a   presumption   of   validity   of   the   State
action and the burden is on the person who alleges
violation   of   Article   14   to   prove   the   assertion.
However,   where   no   plausible   reason   or   principle   is
indicated   nor   is   it   discernible   and   the   impugned
State   action,   therefore,   appears   to   be   ex   facie
arbitrary,   the   initial   burden   to   prove   the
arbitrariness   is   discharged   shifting   onus   on   the
State   to   justify   its   action   as   fair   and   reasonable.   If
the State is unable to produce material to justify its
action   as   fair   and   reasonable,   the   burden   on   the
person   alleging   arbitrariness   must   be   held   to   be
discharged. The scope of judicial review is limited as
indicated   in   Dwarkadas   Marfatia   case   [(1989)   3
SCC 293] to oversee the State action for the purpose
of   satisfying   that   it   is   not   vitiated   by   the   vice   of
arbitrariness and no more. The wisdom of the policy
or   the   lack   of   it   or   the   desirability   of   a   better
alternative   is   not   within   the   permissible   scope   of
judicial review in such cases. It is not for the courts
to   recast  the  policy   or   to  substitute   it  with   another
which   is   considered   to   be   more   appropriate,   once
the   attack   on   the   ground   of   arbitrariness   is
successfully repelled by showing that the act which
was done, was fair  and reasonable in the facts and
circumstances of the case. As indicated by Diplock,
L.J., in   Council of Civil Service Unions   v.   Minister for
the   Civil   Service   [(1984)   3   All   ER   935]   the   power   of
judicial review is limited to the grounds of illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the case
10   (1991) 1 SCC 212
50

of   arbitrariness,   the   defect   of   irrationality   is
obvious.”
55. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that there
is   a   presumption   of   validity   of   the   State   action   and   the
burden is on the person who alleges violation of Article 14 of
the   Constitution   of   India   to   prove   the   assertion.   It   has   been
further   held   that   where   no   plausible   reason   or   principle   is
indicated nor is it discernible and the impugned State action
appears   to   be   arbitrary,   the   initial   burden   to   prove   the
arbitrariness   is   discharged,   thereby   shifting   onus   on   the
State to justify  its action as fair  and reasonable. If the State
is unable to produce material to justify its action as fair and
reasonable,   the   burden   on   the   person   alleging   arbitrariness
must be held to be discharged.   The limited scope of judicial
review is only to satisfy that the State action is not vitiated by
the   vice   of   arbitrariness   and   no   more.     It   is   equally   settled
that   it   is   not   for   the   courts   to   recast   the   policy   or   to
substitute   it   with   another   which   is   considered   to   be   more
appropriate.   It has been held that the attack on the ground
of   arbitrariness   is   successfully   repelled   by   showing   that   the
51

act which was done, was fair and reasonable in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
56. We have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has
established   that   her   transfer   order   was   in   contravention   of
the   Transfer   Policy   and   that   the   rejection   of   her   two
representations, in addition of being contrary to the Transfer
Policy,   were   also   arbitrary.     As   such,   the   petitioner   has
discharged   her   burden   and   the   onus   is   shifted   on   the
respondent   No.1   to   show   that   the   petitioner’s   transfer   order
was fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the
case.   We find that the respondent No.1 has utterly failed to
discharge its burden.  On the contrary, the admissions made
before the JIC by the then Judge on the Transfer Committee
clearly show that the transfer was made solely on the basis of
the   complaint   made   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior   without
verifying the veracity thereof.   Not only this, but it is evident
that   the   then   Judge   had   not   looked   into   the   annexures
attached   with   the   representation,   which   included   the   fee
receipts etc. of the petitioner’s daughter.  
52

57. We   may   gainfully   refer   to   the   following   observations
made by this Court in the case of   Kalabharati Advertising
v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Others 11
:
“ 25.   The   State   is   under   obligation   to   act   fairly
without ill will or  malice — in fact or in law. “Legal
malice”   or   “malice   in   law”   means   something   done
without   lawful   excuse.   It   is   an   act   done   wrongfully
and   wilfully   without   reasonable   or   probable   cause,
and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and
spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights
of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it
can   never   be   a   case   of   personal   ill   will   or   spite   on
the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with
an   oblique   or   indirect   object.   It   means   exercise   of
statutory   power   for   “purposes   foreign   to   those   for
which   it   is   in   law   intended”.   It   means   conscious
violation   of   the   law   to   the   prejudice   of   another,   a
depraved inclination on the part of the authority  to
disregard   the   rights   of   others,   which   intent   is
manifested   by   its   injurious   acts.   (Vide   ADM,
Jabalpur   v.   Shivakant   Shukla   [(1976)   2   SCC   521   :
AIR 1976 SC 1207] ,   S.R. Venkataraman   v.   Union of
India   [(1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR
1979   SC   49]   ,   State   of   A.P.   v.   Goverdhanlal
Pitti   [(2003)   4   SCC   739   :   AIR   2003   SC   1941]   ,   BPL
Ltd.   v.   S.P.   Gururaja   [(2003)   8   SCC   567]   and   W.B.
SEB   v.   Dilip Kumar Ray   [(2007) 14 SCC 568 : (2009)
1 SCC (L&S) 860] .)
26.   Passing   an   order   for   an   unauthorised   purpose
constitutes   malice   in   law.   (Vide   Punjab   SEB
Ltd.   v.   Zora   Singh   [(2005)   6   SCC   776]   and   Union   of
11   (2010) 9 SCC 437
53

India   v.   V. Ramakrishnan   [(2005) 8 SCC  394 : 2005
SCC (L&S) 1150].)”
58. It   is   trite   that   the   State   is   under   the   obligation   to   act
fairly   without   ill   will   or   malice   —   in   fact   or   in   law.   “Legal
malice”   or   “malice   in   law”   means   something   done   without
lawful   excuse.   It   is   an   act   done   wrongfully   and   wilfully
without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an
act done from ill feeling and spite. Where malice is attributed
to the State, it can never be a case of malice or spite on the
part  of  the   State.   It   would   mean   exercise   of   statutory   power
for “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”.
It   means   conscious   violation   of   the   law   to   the   prejudice   of
another,   a   depraved   inclination   on   the   part   of   the   authority
to disregard the rights of others.
59. No doubt that it is strenuously argued on behalf of the
petitioner   that   the   transfer   order   is   mala   fide   and   issued   at
the  instance  of Justice ‘A’, we  do not  find  it necessary   to  go
into that aspect of the matter.  
54

60. It   will   also   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following
observations   made   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Somesh
Tiwari v. Union of India and Others 12
:
“ 16.   Indisputably   an   order   of   transfer   is   an
administrative   order.   There   cannot   be   any   doubt
whatsoever   that   transfer,   which   is   ordinarily   an
incident   of   service   should   not   be   interfered   with,
save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part
of the authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds
—one   malice   in   fact   and   the   second   malice   in   law.
The order in question would attract the principle of
malice   in   law   as   it   was   not   based   on   any   factor
germane for passing an order of transfer and based
on an irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made
against   the   appellant   in   the   anonymous   complaint.
It is one thing to say that the employer is entitled to
pass   an   order   of   transfer   in   administrative
exigencies   but   it   is   another   thing   to   say   that   the
order   of   transfer   is   passed   by   way   of   or   in   lieu   of
punishment. When an order of transfer is passed in
lieu   of   punishment,   the   same   is   liable   to   be   set
aside being wholly illegal.”
61. This Court has held that normally an order of transfer,
which is an incident of service should not be interfered with,
unless   it   is   found   that   the   same   is   mala   fide .     It   has   been
held that   mala fide  is of two kinds — one ‘malice in fact’ and
the   second   ‘malice   in   law’.     When   an   order   is   not   based   on
any   factor   germane   for   passing   an   order   of   transfer   and
12   (2009) 2 SCC 592
55

based   on   an   irrelevant   ground,   such   an   order   would   not   be
sustainable in law.  
62. At   the   cost   of   repetition,   we   may   say   that   though   it   is
the case of the respondent No.1 that the transfer order of the
petitioner   dated   8 th
  July   2014,   was   on   the   ground   of
administrative exigencies, the material placed on record and
particularly,   the   depositions   of   the   then   Judge   on   the
Transfer   Committee   and   the   then   RG,   would   clearly   show
that it was on the basis of the complaint made by the then D
& SJ, Gwalior.  It is a different aspect that the JIC had come
to   a   specific   finding   of   fact,   that   the   evidence   on   record
clearly   shows   that   Justice   ‘A’   had   a   role   to   play   in   the
transfer   of   the   petitioner   and   the   rejection   of   her   two
representations.  We are therefore of the considered view that
the   transfer   order   dated   8 th
  July   2014,   would   squarely   be
covered by ‘malice in law’ inasmuch as it was passed without
taking   into   consideration   the   Guidelines   provided   in   the
Transfer   Policy   but   on   the   basis   of   unverified   allegations
made in the complaint made by the then D & SJ, Gwalior.
56

63. That   leaves   us   with   the   next   issue   as   to   whether   the
orders   of   the   Transfer   Committee   dated   11 th
  July   2014   and
14 th
  July   2014,   rejecting   the   petitioner’s   representations
dated 9 th
  July 2014 and 11 th
  July 2014, were valid in law or
not.
64. It   could   be   seen   that   as   per   Clause   9   of   the   Transfer
Policy,   the   petitioner   is   entitled   to   make   a   representation   to
the MP High Court for retaining her at the same posting, and
for posting at alternate places of her choice in view of Clause
10 of the Transfer Policy.   When the Transfer Policy provides
for   making   a   representation,   the   petitioner   had   a   legitimate
expectation that the said representation would be considered
in accordance with  it. Consideration  of representation  is not
a   formality.     We   are   not   saying   for   a   moment   that   prior   to
rejection of the petitioner’s representations, she should have
been   heard   or   that   the   reasons   ought   to   have   been
communicated   for   such   rejection.   However,   the   least   that   is
expected is that the representation is considered in the right
earnest.   When  the Transfer   Policy   provides for  a  ground on
which the representation is to be made, then the least that is
57

expected is that the matter should be considered in reference
to   the   provisions   made   in   the   Transfer   Policy.     In   her   first
representation, the petitioner had specifically contended that
she   should   be   retained   at   Gwalior   on   the   ground   of   her
daughter’s   education.     There   was   a   legitimate   expectation
that   the   respondent   No.1   ought   to   have   considered   as   to
whether   her   case   fits   in   Clause   9(a)   of   the   Transfer   Policy.
The   petitioner   was   entitled   for   consideration   of   her   case   on
the ground that her daughter was to appear in the final year
of Board Examination.   The petitioner had specifically stated
that   her   daughter   was   also   undergoing   FIITJEE   coaching.
She   had   further   clearly   stated   that   after   her   daughter
completes the academic year, she was willing to abide by the
transfer order.  However, in the noting of the then RG, it was
mentioned   that   “it   is   gathered   that   adequate   educational
facilities including CBSE School are available at Sidhi”.   It is
further   stated   that   the   Transfer   Committee,   in   its   meeting
held on 7 th
  July 2014, had recommended the transfer of the
petitioner   on   administrative   grounds   after   considering   the
request   of   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior   with   regard   to   conduct
58

and   behaviour   of   the   petitioner.     On   the   said   proposal,   the
then   Judge   on   the   Transfer   Committee   had   directed   the
representation   of   the   petitioner   to   be   rejected.     As   such,   it
could be seen that the respondent No. 1 had not at all taken
into   consideration   as   to   whether   the   petitioner’s   case   was
required   to   be   considered   under   Clause   9(a)   of   the   Transfer
Policy or not.  
65. Insofar   as   the   second   representation   dated   11 th
  July
2014 is concerned, the petitioner had specifically stated that
since her daughter was preparing for Board and Competitive
Exams   and   also   taking   FIITJEE   coaching,   she   may   be
transferred   to   such   places   as   Sehore,   Raisen,   Dewas   or
Ujjain,   where   her   daughter   could   continue   with   her
education.     It   could   thus   be   seen   that,   whereas   in   the   first
representation,   the   petitioner   had   sought   retention   at
Gwalior, in the second representation, she had requested for
posting   at   any   of   the   4   places   as   aforesaid.     However,   the
then RG made an endorsement on the file on 14 th
  July 2014
to   the   effect   that   “the   said   representation   was   made   almost
on   identical   grounds   as   were   made   in   the   first
59

representation,   which   was   already   rejected   on   11 th
  July
2014”.   The then Judge on the Transfer Committee made an
endorsement  that “in  view of the  order  dated 11 th
  July  2014
already   passed   in   the   earlier   representation,   no   further
reconsideration   is   to   be   made”.   It   can   thus   be   seen   that
though the second representation of the petitioner dated 11 th
July   2014   is   with   a   request   to   post   her   at   any   of   the   4
alternate   places,   the   noting   that   “the   representation   on
identical   grounds   had   already   been   rejected”,   is   factually
incorrect.   Whereas   the   first   representation   of   the   petitioner
was   for   retention   at   Gwalior,   the   second   one   was   for   a
posting   at   alternate   place,   where   her   daughter   could
continue   with   her   education.     In   view   of   Clause   10   of   the
Transfer Policy, the petitioner had a legitimate expectation of
being considered for an alternate posting, in case her prayer
for retention was not to be considered.
66. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   respondent   No.1   has
failed   to   take   into   consideration   the   factors,   which   were
required   to   be   considered,   while   deciding   the   representation
of the petitioner and had taken into consideration the factors
60

which   were   not   relevant.     The   then   Judge   on   the   Transfer
Committee,   in   his   deposition   before   the   JIC,   had   clearly
admitted   that   he   had   not   gone   into   the   annexures,   which
were attached with the representation of the petitioner.  Non­
consideration   of   the   relevant   material   and   consideration   of
the   extraneous   material   would   come   into   the   realm   of
irrationality.   An   action   which   is   arbitrary,   irrational   and
unreasonable   would   be   hit   by   Article   14   of   the   Constitution
of   India.   We,   therefore,   find   that   the   rejection   of   the
representations of the petitioner dated 9 th
 July 2014 and 11 th
July 2014, would also not stand the scrutiny of law.
67. That   leaves   us   with   the   next   issue   as   to   whether   the
petitioner’s   resignation   dated   15 th
  July   2014,   could   be
considered as a voluntarily one.  
68. The resignation of the petitioner reads thus:  
“It   is   most   respectfully   submitted   that   I   am
unable   to   continue   my   services   as   Additional
District and Sessions Judge.
As I have been transferred to Sidhi, in the mid
academic session of my daughters studying in Class
III and Class XII, it affected mostly the crucial stage
of   career   of   my   class   XII   daughter.     Therefore   I   am
left with no option but to resign from my post.
61

I   hereby   resign   from   the   post   of   Additional
District   and   Sessions   Judge   and   I   am   ready   to
submit   my   salary   as   per   rules   and   clear   all   my
dues, if any.
I   humbly   request   your   kind   self   to   please
accept   my   resignation   and   relieve   me   with
immediate affect and oblige.”
69. It   is   sought   to   be   urged   on   behalf   of   the   respondent
No.1,   that   the   said   resignation   is   voluntary,   acted   upon   by
the   authority   and   thus,   there   was   severance   of   relationship
between the employer and employee.
70. The   learned   Solicitor   General   submitted   that   it   was   an
impulsive   decision   to   resign   only   on   account   of   mid­term
transfer.  He submitted that, to hold that a mid­term transfer
would   amount   to   coercion   resulting   into   resignation,   would
be catastrophic. He further submitted that such a plea would
not be available to a Judicial Officer, who is discharging the
sovereign function of dispensing justice and who is trained to
be   independent,   fearless,   non­impulsive   and   to   act   in
accordance with law.  
62

71. No   doubt,   that   a   Judicial   Officer   while   discharging
his/her   duties,   is   expected   to   be   independent,   fearless,
impassionate   and   non­impulsive.   But   a   Judicial   Officer   is
also   a   human   being.     A   Judicial   Officer   is   also   a   parent.
He/she   could   be   a   father   or   a   mother.   The   question   would
be,   whether   a   Judicial   Officer,   while   taking   a   decision   in
his/her   personal   matter   as   a   human   being,   in   his/her
capacity   of   a   father   or   mother,   would   be   required   to   be
guided by the same yardsticks.
72. For   considering   as   to   whether   the   resignation   in   the
present   matter   could   be   construed   as   voluntary   or   not,   the
resignation   cannot   be   considered   in   isolation,   but   all   the
attendant   circumstances   will   have   to   be   taken   into
consideration.  
73. Let   us   consider   the   facts   from   the   perspective   of   the
petitioner.
74. Insofar   as   the   career   of   the   petitioner   is   concerned,   till
8 th
  July   2014,   there   were   no   issues.     She   was   posted   at
Gwalior   as   AD   &   SJ   on   1 st
  August   2011.   On   15 th
  January
2013, she was assessed for  the period from 3 rd
  May  2012 to
63

31 st
  December   2012   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who
assessed   her   grading   as   ‘good’,   which   was   approved   by   the
then   Portfolio/Administrative   Judge   of   the   MP   High   Court.
Between  December   2013   and   June   2014,   the   petitioner   was
entrusted   with   various   additional   responsibilities.     On   15 th
January 2014, she was assessed for the period from 8 th
 April
2013   to   31 st
  December   2013   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior ,
who  assessed her  grading  as ‘very  good’. The same was  also
endorsed   by   the   then   Portfolio/Administrative   Judge   of   the
MP   High   Court.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   the   then   D   &   SJ,
Gwalior,   who   had   assessed   the   petitioner’s   performance   for
the   assessment   year   2012   was   a   different   one   than   the   one
who   had   assessed   her   performance   for   the   assessment   year
2013.
75. On   the   personal   front,   both   the   petitioner’s   daughters
were taking education at Gwalior.   One of them was in Class
3 rd
 and the other one was studying in Class 12 th
 and was also
undergoing   FIITJEE   coaching.     Since   her   husband   was
required   to   be   in   Delhi   on   account   of   professional   and
personal commitments and also that he had to look after his
64

aged   parents,   the   petitioner   had   to   draw   a   balance   between
her duties as a Judicial Officer and as a mother.
76. Till   8 th
  July   2014,   everything   was   smooth   but   on   the
said   date,   came   the   transfer   order   transferring   her   to   Sidhi,
which was at a far away distance of 507 Kms. from Gwalior.
Taking   shelter   under   Clause   9(a)   of   the   Transfer   Policy,   the
petitioner made a representation to the MP High Court on the
very   next   day,   requesting   the   respondent   No.   1   that   she   be
retained   at   Gwalior,   at   least   till   her   daughter   completes   her
Class   12 th
  education,   but   the   same   was   rejected   within   a
short   period   of   two   days.   She   made   her   second
representation on 11 th
  July 2014, requesting  the respondent
No.1   to   give   her   alternate   posting   at   any   of   the   4   cities
mentioned   therein,   where   her   daughter   could   continue   with
her   education.   All   the   4   cities   were   Category   ‘B’   cities.     In
normal circumstances, a Judicial Officer, who is in Category
‘A’   city,   is   required   to   be   transferred   to   Category   ‘B’   city.
However,   to   her   utter   shock,   the   same   was   also   rejected
within three days.
65

77. One   cannot   imagine   the   trauma   which   the   petitioner
must   have   faced   during   this   short   period   of   time.     She   was
also not aware that she was being transferred on the ground
of   the   complaint   made   by   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who
himself appears to have joined at Gwalior sometime in 2014,
after   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who   had   assessed   the
petitioner for the year 2013, was transferred.   She had come
to know about the complaint at a much later point of time. In
her   first   representation   dated   9 th
  July   2014,   the   petitioner
elaborated   in   detail,   her   precarious   situation   inasmuch   as
she   was   required   to   be   both   a   mother   and   father   to   her
children and draw a balance between her professional duties
and duties towards her daughters. She stated that on receipt
of   her   transfer   order,   her   elder   daughter   had   become   meek
with fear and anxiety, as she faced an emotional trauma and
a bleak prospect.  The petitioner stated that at the cost of her
career,   she   could   not   disturb   the   right   of   her   daughter   to
decent education and curb her prospects for an inspirational
life.   The   petitioner   only   appealed   that   in   order   to   avoid   the
emotional   trauma   and   to   support   her   daughter   to   complete
66

her   Class   12 th
,   she   should   be   continued   at   Gwalior   for   a
short   period.     She   also   assured   that   after   her   daughter
completes   Class   12 th
,   she   would   move   on   to   whichever
posting   allocated   to   her.     However,   the   same   was   rejected
within two days i.e. on 11 th
  July 2014, without following the
procedure prescribed under the Transfer Policy.
78. The petitioner made another representation on the very
same   day   i.e.   11 th
  July   2014,   requesting   for   an   alternate
posting   either   to   Sehore,   Raisen,   Dewas   or   Ujjain.     She
reiterated   the   traumatic   situation   through   which   her
daughter was undergoing.   She reiterated that at the cost of
her career, she could not disturb the right of her daughter to
decent education.   However, the same was again rejected on
14 th
 July 2014, within a period of four days.
79. The petitioner   was a  Judicial Officer  and  a  mother  too.
The Judicial Officer  in her  must have been battling with the
mother   in   her.   On   one   hand,   was   her   career   as   a   Judicial
Officer;   on   the   other   hand,   was   the   possibility   of   her
daughter’s   educational   prospects   and   career   coming   into
jeopardy,   if   she   shifted   to   the   place   of   posting   at   Sidhi.     A
67

possibility of her mind engrossed with a feeling, that she was
subjected   to   injustice   by   the   very   Institution   of   Judiciary,
cannot be ruled away.  What was she asking for?  A retention
at   Gwalior   for   a   period   of   8   months   till   her   daughter
completes her Class 12 th
.  In the alternative, posting at any of
the 4 cities, which were admittedly in Category ‘B’, where her
daughter   could   have   better   education   facilities,   and   where
the vacancies existed. 
80. Denial   of   her   legitimate   expectation   could   have   led   to
desperation, exasperation and frustration.  The frustration of
the petitioner is evident from the language used by her in her
resignation   letter.     She   stated   that   as   she   had   been
transferred   to   Sidhi   in   the   mid­academic   session   of   her
daughter’s Class 12 th
, it had mostly affected the crucial stage
of career of her daughter.  She stated that therefore, she was
left   with   no   other   option   but   to   resign   from   her   post.   It
appears   that   in   a   gruesome   battle   between   a   mother   and   a
Judicial   Officer,   the   Judicial   Officer   lost   the   battle   to   the
mother.
68

81. Reaction   of   a   person   to   a   particular   situation   would
depend   from   person   to   person.     No   two   individuals   can   be
expected to respond identically to a same situation. It is quite
possible   that   some   other   person   in   the   petitioner’s   place,
would   have   chosen   to   pursue   one’s   own   career   without
bothering   about   the   daughter’s   education   and   prospects   of
good career.
82. On   the   very   next   day   of   submission   of   resignation,   the
MP   High   Court   forwarded   her   resignation   with   the
recommendation   to   accept   the   same   and   thereafter,
immediately   on   the   very   next   day,   the   respondent   No.   2
accepted the same.  
83. It will be apposite  to  refer   to  the following   observations
of this Court in the case of  Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P.
and Others 13
:
“ 7.   The   only   question   that   mainly   requires   to   be
considered   is   as   to   whether   the   letter   dated   9­1­
1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a
letter   of   resignation   or   merely   an   expression   of   her
intention   to   resign,   if   her   claims   in   respect   of   the
13   (2003) 1 SCC 701
69

alleged   lapse   are   not   viewed   favourably.   Rule   9   of
the   Hospital   Service   Rules   provided   for   resignation
or   abandonment   of   service   by   an   employee.   It   is
stated   therein   that   a   permanent   employee   is
required   to   give   three   months'   notice   of   resignation
in   writing   to   the   appointing   authority   or   three
months'   salary   in   lieu   of   notice   and   that   he/she
may be required to serve the period for such notice.
In   case   of   non­compliance   with   the   above,   the
employee   concerned   is   not   only   liable   to   pay   an
amount   equal   to   three   months'   salary   but   such
amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of
the  employee  lying  with   the  hospital.   In   Words   and
Phrases   (Permanent   Edn.)   Vol.   37,   at   p.   476,   it   is
found stated that:
“To   constitute   a   ‘resignation’,   it   must   be
unconditional   and   with   an   intent   to
operate   as   such.   There   must   be   an
intention   to   relinquish   a   portion   of   the
term   of   office   accompanied   by   an   act   of
relinquishment. It is to  give back, to  give
up in a formal manner, an office.”
At p. 474 of the very same book, it is found stated:
“Statements   by   club's   President   and   corresponding
Secretary   that   they   would   resign,   if   constant
bickering   among   members   did   not   cease,
constituted merely threatened offers, not tenders, of
their   resignations.”   It   is   also   stated   therein   that   “A
‘resignation’ of a public office to be effective must be
made   with   an   intention   of   relinquishing   the   office
accompanied   by   an   act   of   relinquishment.”   In   the
ordinary   dictionary   sense,   the   word   “resignation”
was   considered   to   mean   the   spontaneous
relinquishment   of   one's   own   right,   as   conveyed   by
70

the   maxim:   Resignatio   est   juris   proprii   spontanea
refutatio   ( Black's   Law   Dictionary ,   6th   Edn.).
In   Corpus   Juris   Secundum ,   Vol.   77,   p.   311,   it   is
found stated:
“It   has   been   said   that   ‘resignation’   is   a
term   of   legal   art,   having   legal
connotations which describe certain legal
results.   It   is   characteristically,   the
voluntary   surrender   of   a   position   by   the
one resigning, made freely and not under
duress   and   the   word   is   defined   generally
as  meaning  the  act  of  resigning  or   giving
up, as a claim, possession or position.”
8.   In   P.K.   Ramachandra   Iyer   v.   Union   of
India   [(1984) 2 SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] this
Court   had   an   occasion   to   consider   the   nature   and
character of a letter written by one of the petitioners
in   that   case   who   after   stating   in   the   letter   that   he
has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal
of   his   grievance,   yet   justice   has   not   been   done   to
him and
“as such, after showing so much patience
in the matter, I am sorry to decide that I
should   resign   from   the   membership   of
the   Faculty   in   protest   against   such   a
treatment   and  against  the  discrimination
and   victimization   shown   to   me   by   the
Head   of   the   Division   in   the   allotment   of
students   of   1968   and   1969   batches   and
departmental   candidates”.   (SCC   p.   172,
para 34)
71

In that context, this Court observed that the callous
and   heartless   attitude   of   the   Academic   Council   in
seizing  an   opportunity   to   get   rid  of  him   by   treating
the   said   letter   to   be   a   letter   of   resignation   when
really   he   was   all   along   making   representations
seeking   justice   to   him   and   out   of   exasperation   the
said   person   wrote   that   letter   stating   that   the   only
honourable   course   left   open   to   him   was   to   resign
rather than suffer (SCC p. 173, para 34).
In   Moti   Ram   v.   Param   Dev   [(1993)   2   SCC   725]   this
Court   observed   as   hereunder:   (SCC   pp.   735­36,
para 16)
“ 16 .   As   pointed   out   by   this   Court,
‘resignation’   means   the   spontaneous
relinquishment   of   one's   own   right   and   in
relation to an office, it connotes the act of
giving   up   or   relinquishing   the   office.   It
has been held that in the general juristic
sense,   in   order   to   constitute   a   complete
and   operative   resignation   there   must   be
the intention  to give up or  relinquish the
office   and   the   concomitant   act   of   its
relinquishment. It has also been observed
that   the   act   of   relinquishment   may   take
different   forms   or   assume   a   unilateral   or
bilateral   character,   depending   on   the
nature   of   the   office   and   the   conditions
governing   it. (See:   Union  of  India   v.   Gopal
Chandra Misra   [(1978) 2 SCC  301 : 1978
SCC   (L&S)   303]   .)   If   the   act   of
relinquishment  is  of  unilateral  character,
it   comes   into   effect   when   such   act
indicating   the   intention   to   relinquish   the
office   is   communicated   to   the   competent
72

authority. The authority to whom  the act
of relinquishment is communicated is not
required   to   take   any   action   and   the
relinquishment takes effect from the date
of   such   communication   where   the
resignation   is   intended   to   operate   in
praesenti.   A   resignation   may   also   be
prospective   to   be   operative   from   a   future
date and in that event it would take effect
from   the   date   indicated   therein   and   not
from the date of communication. In cases
where   the   act   of   relinquishment   is   of   a
bilateral character, the communication of
the   intention   to   relinquish,   by   itself,
would   not   be   sufficient   to   result   in
relinquishment   of   the   office   and   some
action   is   required   to   be   taken   on   such
communication   of   the   intention   to
relinquish,   e.g.,   acceptance   of   the   said
request   to   relinquish   the   office,   and   in
such   a   case   the   relinquishment   does   not
become   effective   or   operative   till   such
action   is   taken.   As   to   whether   the   act   of
relinquishment   of   an   office   is   unilateral
or   bilateral   in   character   would   depend
upon   the   nature   of   the   office   and   the
conditions governing it.”
9.   In   traversing   the   contention   on   behalf   of   the
appellant that the letter in question dated 9­1­1999
could not be construed as a letter of resignation, on
behalf   of   the   respondent   hospital   authorities   it   is
strenuously   contended   that   such   a   letter   coming
from  the appellant in the teeth of suspension order
and   proposed  domestic  enquiry  expressing   a  desire
to   tender   resignation   and   that   too   with   immediate
effect,   cannot   but   be   a   resignation   outright   and
73

simpliciter   to   avoid   facing   disciplinary   proceedings
and   that,   therefore,   the   competent   authority   acted
well   within   its   rights   in   treating   it   to   be   a
resignation   and   accepting   the   same   forthwith   and
as   a   consequence   thereof,   directing   further   not   to
proceed with  the  domestic enquiry  already  ordered.
Finally,   it   has   been   submitted   that   if   this   Court   is
pleased   to   interfere   in   the   matter   the   right   of   the
hospital   authorities   to   pursue   the   disciplinary
action   already   initiated   from   the   stage   at   which   it
stood   on   the   date   of   acceptance   of   the   resignation
should   not   be   jeopardized   and   liberty   may   be
granted in this regard.
10.   We   have   carefully   considered   the   submissions
of   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   either   side,   in
the   light   of   the   materials   and   principles,   noticed
supra.   This   is   not   a   case   where   it   is   required   to
consider   as   to   whether   the   relinquishment
envisaged under the rules and conditions of service
is   unilateral   or   bilateral   in   character   but   whether
the letter dated 9­1­1999 could be treated or held to
be   a   letter   of   resignation   or   relinquishment   of   the
office,   so   as   to   sever   her   services   once   and   for   all.
The   letter   cannot   be   construed,   in   our   view,   to
convey   any   spontaneous   intention   to   give   up   or
relinquish   her   office   accompanied   by   any   act   of
relinquishment.   To   constitute   a   “resignation”,   it
must   be   unconditional   and   with   an   intention   to
operate as such. At best, as observed by this Court
in   the   decision   in   P.K.   Ramachandra   Iyer   [(1984)   2
SCC 141 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 214] it may amount to a
threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to
resign on account of a feeling of frustration born out
of   an   idea   that   she   was   being   harassed
unnecessarily   but   not,   at   any   rate,   amounting   to   a
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resignation,   actual   and   simple.   The   appellant   had
put in about two decades of service in the hospital,
that she was placed under suspension and exposed
to   disciplinary   proceedings   and   proposed   domestic
enquiry and she had certain benefits flowing to her
benefit,   if   she   resigns   but   yet   the   letter   dated   9­1­
1999   does   not   seek   for   any   of   those   things   to   be
settled   or   the   disciplinary   proceedings   being
scrapped   as   a   sequel   to   her   so­called   resignation.
The words “with immediate effect” in the said letter
could   not   be   given   undue   importance   dehors   the
context, tenor  of language used and  the purport as
well as the remaining portion of the letter indicating
the circumstances in which it was written. That the
management   of   the   hospital   took   up   such   action
forthwith,   as   a   result   of   acceptance   of   the
resignation   is   not   of   much   significance   in
ascertaining   the   true   or   real   intention   of   the   letter
written by the appellant on 9­1­1999. Consequently,
it   appears   to   be   reasonable   to   view   that   as   in   the
case   reported   in   P.K.   Ramachandra   Iyer   [(1984)   2
SCC   141   :   1984   SCC   (L&S)   214]   the   respondents
have   seized   an   opportunity   to   get   rid   of   the
appellant the moment they got the letter dated 9­1­
1999,   without   due   or   proper   consideration   of   the
matter   in   a   right   perspective   or   understanding   of
the  contents  thereof. The  High  Court also  seems to
have   completely   lost   sight   of   these   vital   aspects   in
rejecting the writ petition.”
84. The facts in the above case are somewhat similar to the
present case.   The present case is also not a case where it is
required   to   consider   as   to   whether   the   relinquishment
75

envisaged   under   the   Rules   and   Conditions   of   Service,   is
unilateral or bilateral in character.   In the present case also,
the   words   “with   immediate   effect”   in   the   resignation   letter
could   not   be   given   undue   importance,   dehors   the   context,
tenor of language used therein, indicating the circumstances
in which it was written. The resignation letter in the present
case, as has already been discussed hereinabove, appears to
be on account of exasperation   and frustration   actuated by a
thought,   that   injustice   was   being   meted   out   to   her   by   the
very Institution of Judiciary. 
85. We   further   find   that   the   breakneck   speed   at  which   the
events have taken place in the present matter, gives rise to a
suspicion,   that   there   is   something   more   than   which   meets
the   eye.     On   3 rd
  July   2014,   the   then   D   &   SJ,   Gwalior,   who
appears   to   have   joined   the   service   a   short   while   ago,
addressed   a   complaint   to   the   then   RG.   The   said   D   &   SJ,
Gwalior,   in   his   deposition   before   the   JIC,   has   clearly
admitted   that   the   instances   mentioned   in   the   complaint,
were   not   within   his   personal   knowledge,   but   were   on   the
basis   of   the   complaints   made   to   him   by   other   Judicial
76

Officers.   He   further   admitted   that   the   complaints   were   with
regard to the period, which was before his joining as D & SJ,
Gwalior.     He   further   admitted   that   there   were   no   written
complaints   by   the   Judicial   Officers   and   that   he   had
proceeded   to   write   the   complaint   on   the   basis   of   their   oral
complaints.     Within   days   of   the   said   complaint   being   made,
on 7 th
  July 2014, the Transfer Committee decided to transfer
the petitioner from Gwalior to Sidhi.   The transfer order was
issued   on   8 th
  July   2014.   The   petitioner   made   a
representation   on   the   very   next   day   i.e.   9 th
  July   2014,   and
the   same   was   rejected   within   two   days   i.e.   11 th
  July   2014.
On   11 th
  July   2014,   the   petitioner   made   another
representation.     However,   that   also   did   not   find   favour   with
respondent No. 1 and was rejected on 14 th
  July 2014, on the
ground   that   the   earlier   representation   on   identical   grounds
was   already   rejected.     It   is   to   be   noted   that   12 th
  July   2014
was a second Saturday, 13 th
 July 2014 was a Sunday and on
the   very   next   working   day   i.e.   14 th
  July   2014,   her   second
representation was rejected. On 15 th
 July 2014, the petitioner
tendered   her   resignation.     On   the   next   day   i.e.   16 th
  July
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2014,   the   MP   High   Court   with   the   recommendation   for
acceptance of the same, forwarded it to respondent No.2.  On
the   very   next   day   i.e.   17 th
  July   2014,   respondent   No.   2
accepted the same.
86. It will not be out of place to mention that in some High
Courts,   a   practice   is   followed,   that   whenever   a   Judicial
Officer having good track record tenders his/her resignation,
an attempt is made by the Senior Judges of the High Court to
counsel   and   persuade   him/her   to   withdraw   the   resignation.
Valuable   time   and   money   is   spent   on   training   of   a   Judicial
Officer.   Losing   a   good   Judicial   Officer   without   counselling
him/her   and   without   giving   him/her   an   opportunity   to
introspect   and   re­think,   will   not   be   in   the   interest   of   either
the Judicial Officer or the Judiciary.  We find that it will be in
the interest of judiciary that such a practice is followed by all
the High Courts. 
87. We   are   therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   in   the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s
resignation   dated   15 th
  July   2014,   could   not   be   construed   to
be voluntary.   In any case, immediately in a fortnight, on 1 st
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August   2014,   the   petitioner   had   made   a   representation   to
Hon’ble the President of India as well as the Chief Justice of
India, with a copy to the Chief Justice of the MP High Court
for   reconsideration   of   the   circumstances   under   which,   she
was left with no option but to resign.   Though, it may not be
possible   to   observe   that   the   petitioner   was   forced   to   resign,
however,   the   circumstances   enumerated   hereinabove,   would
clearly reveal that they were such, that out of frustration, the
petitioner was left with no other alternative.
88. It is contended on behalf of the MP High Court that the
petitioner,   who   was   on   probation,   had   voluntarily   tendered
her   resignation,   which   was   accepted   and   as   such,   led   to   an
irrevocable   severance   of   relationship   of   the   employer   and
employee. In this regard, it is to be noted that the petitioner
was initially appointed on probation for a period of two years
on   1 st
  August   2011.     Her   probation   was   completed   on   1 st
August 2013.  Admittedly, there has been no order extending
the period of probation of the petitioner from 1 st
 August 2013
onwards.   On   the   contrary,   she   was   assigned   with   various
additional   duties   in   the   year   2013.     Not   only   this,   but   her
79

assessment for the assessment year 2013, during which, she
would   be   deemed   to   be   confirmed,   was   ‘very   good’.     We
therefore   find   that   the   said   contention   is   nothing   but   an
after­thought.
89. Insofar   as   the   contention   with   regard   to   delay   is
concerned,   we   find   no   merit   in   the   said   contention   also.
Immediately   after   the   petitioner   resigned   on   15 th
  July   2014,
she   made   a   representation   to   Hon’ble   the   President   of   India
as well as the Chief Justice of India, with a copy to the Chief
Justice   of   the   MP   High   Court,   requesting   to   reconsider   the
circumstances   in   which   she   was   left   with   no   option   but   to
resign.     The   petitioner   thereafter   had   also   pursued   a   writ
petition   before   this   Court.     Thereafter,   she   had   participated
in the proceedings before the JIC and after the JIC expressed
its opinion, that it would be in the interest of justice that she
should   be   re­instated   in   service,   she   made   a   representation
to the MP High Court, for re­instatement in service.  After the
said   representation   was   rejected,   she   has   immediately
approached   this   Court   in   the   present   matter.     We   therefore
80

find that the petitioner cannot be denied the reliefs on the so­
called grounds of delay and laches.
90. That   leaves   us   with   the   last   submission   of   the   learned
Solicitor   General,   that   if   we   hold   the   resignation   in   the
present   case   to   be   actuated   by   coercion,   it   will   have   far­
reaching   implications   and   will   open   floodgates   to   the
similarly   situated   Judicial   Officers.     Another   submission
made   is   that,   if   a   decision   of   the   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High
Court   is   interfered   with,   it   will   stigmatize   the   entire
Institution and have catastrophic effects.  
91. We find the said submissions to be totally uncalled for.
At   the   outset,   we   have   clarified   that   we   are   only   examining
the   correctness   and   otherwise   of   the   order   of   transfer,   the
rejection   of   the   representations   and   the   question   as   to
whether   the   resignation   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case,
could be construed to be voluntary or not.  We have not at all
gone   into   the   question,   regarding   the   correctness   or
otherwise   of   the   decisions   of   the   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High
Court   with   regard   to   the   rejection   of   the   petitioner’s
representation.     As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   there
81

might be reasons and factors which might have weighed with
the   Full   Court   of   the   MP   High   Court   for   taking   such   a
decision.   At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that we have
full   respect   for   the   authority   of   the   Full   Court   to   arrive   at
such a decision. As such, there is no question of stigmatizing
the Full Court of the MP High Court.  It is a different matter,
that if the suggestions made by this Court on more than one
occasion   would   have   been   accepted,   the   exercise   of
examining the factual scenario, could have been avoided.   In
any   case,   we   have   restricted   our   inquiry   only   to   the   facts,
which   we   found   necessary   to   decide   the   present   case.     We
have   refrained   ourselves   from   going   into   the   details   of   the
findings   of   the   JIC,   so   as   to   protect   the   dignity   of   all
concerned.     We   have   refrained   ourselves   from   mentioning   a
single name in our judgment.
92. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned
Solicitor   General   with   regard   to   stigmatizing   the   MP   High
Court is without substance.  
93. Insofar   as   the   contention,   that   if   this   Court   holds   the
resignation in the present case to be coercive, it will have far­
82

reaching   effects   on   the   administration   of   judiciary   is
concerned,   the   same   is   also   without   substance.     It   will   be
apposite   to   refer   to   the   following   observations   made   by   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Union   of   India   and   Others   v.
Dhanwanti Devi and Others 14
:
“ 9.   ……..  It  is  not  everything  said  by  a  Judge  while
giving   judgment   that   constitutes   a   precedent.   The
only   thing   in   a   Judge's   decision   binding   a   party   is
the principle upon which the case is decided and for
this reason it is important to analyse a decision and
isolate   from   it   the   ratio   decidendi .   According   to   the
well­settled   theory   of   precedents,   every   decision
contains   three   basic   postulates—( i )   findings   of
material   facts,   direct   and   inferential.   An   inferential
finding   of   facts   is   the   inference   which   the   Judge
draws   from   the   direct,   or   perceptible   facts;   ( ii )
statements of the principles of law applicable to the
legal   problems   disclosed   by   the   facts;   and   ( iii )
judgment   based   on   the   combined   effect   of   the
above.   A   decision   is   only   an   authority   for   what   it
actually   decides.   What   is   of   the   essence   in   a
decision is its ratio and not every observation found
therein   nor   what   logically   follows   from   the   various
observations made in the judgment. Every judgment
must   be   read   as   applicable   to   the   particular   facts
proved,   or   assumed   to   be   proved,   since   the
generality   of   the   expressions   which   may   be   found
there   is   not   intended   to   be   exposition   of   the   whole
law,   but   governed   and   qualified   by   the   particular
facts   of   the   case   in   which   such   expressions   are   to
be found…… ”
14   (1996) 6 SCC 44
83

It   could   thus   be   seen   that   this   Court   has   held   that   a
decision   is   an   authority   only   for   what   it   actually   decides.
Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular
facts, proved or assumed to be proved.   The generality of the
expressions   found   there,   is   not   intended   to   be   exposition   of
the   whole   law,   but   governed   and   qualified   by   the   particular
facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.
94. This Court in  the  case of   The  Regional   Manager  and
Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey 15
  has succinctly  observed
thus:
“ 7.   …..Even   where   there   appears   to   be   some
conflict,   it   would,   we   think,   vanish   when   the   ratio
decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is
the rule deducible from the application of law to the
facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes
its   ratio   decidendi   and   not   some   conclusion   based
upon   facts   which   may   appear   to   be   similar.   One
additional   or   different   fact   can   make   a   world   of
difference   between   conclusions   in   two   cases   even
when   the   same   principles   are   applied   in   each   case
to similar facts.”
The   ratio   decidendi   is   a   rule   deducible   from   the
application   of   law   to   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   a   case
and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear
15   (1976) 3 SCC 334
84

to be similar. It has been held that one additional or different
fact   can   make   a   world   of   difference   between   conclusions   in
two cases even when the same principles are applied in each
case to similar facts.  
95. As   has   already   been   discussed   hereinabove,   we   may
reiterate that we have decided the present matter only on the
basis of the peculiar facts and circumstances, as are found in
the present matter.  We do hope, that in future, similar facts
would never arise for consideration, at least in a lis between
a High Court and a Judicial Officer. However, we may remind
ourselves   of   the   dictum   that   law   is   supreme   and   no   one   is
above law.  It would be apt to reproduce the words of Thomas
Fuller,   which   have   been   quoted   by   Lord   Denning,   “ Be   ye
never so high, the law is above you ”.
96. Before we part with the judgment, we find it our duty to
place   on   record   our   appreciation   for   the   valuable   assistance
rendered by Smt. Indira Jaising, learned Senior Counsel and
Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India.
97. In   the   result,   the   writ   petition   is   partly   allowed   in   the
following terms:
85

(i) We hold and declare that the petitioner’s resignation
from the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Gwalior dated 15 th
 July 2014, cannot be construed to
be   voluntary   and   as   such,   the   order   dated   17 th
  July
2014,   passed   by   the   respondent   No.   2,   thereby
accepting the resignation of the petitioner, is quashed
and set aside; and
(ii) The   respondents   are   directed   to   re­instate   the
petitioner   forthwith   as   an   Additional   District   &
Sessions Judge.   Though the petitioner would not be
entitled   to   back   wages,   she   would   be   entitled   for
continuity   in   service   with   all   consequential   benefits
with effect from 15 th
 July 2014.  
98. No order as to cost.  Pending application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of in the above terms.
……....….......................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
..…....….......................J.
      [B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 10, 2022.
86