/2022 INSC 0153/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1320 of 2022
(Arising out of SLP(C)NO.24702 of 2019)
COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE                      ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF 
ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS.                           ... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
Leave granted.
2. The   1 st
  respondent   herein   which   is   a   society   registered
under   the   Tamil   Nadu   Societies   Registration   Act,   1975   and
which has as its members, professional architects who claim to
be   teaching   faculty   in   institutions   imparting   education   in
Architecture, filed a writ petition on the file of the High Court of
Judicature   at   Madras,   praying   for   quashing   the   “Minimum
Standards   of   Architectural   Education   Regulations,   2017”
circulated   by   the   appellant   herein   vide   communications   dated
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31.10.2018   and   03.12.2018.   The   main   and   perhaps   the   only
ground   of   challenge   to   the   Regulations   was   that   the
Regulations   required   the   prior   approval   of   the   Central
Government   under   Section   45   of   The   Architects   Act,   1972,   (in
short referred to as ‘the Act’) before they are implemented and
that   no   such   prior   approval   was   obtained   before   issuing   the
impugned communications.
3. The   appellant   herein   took   umbrage   under   Section   21   of
the   Act.   The   appellant   also   questioned   the   locus   standi   of   the
1 st
  respondent   to   challenge   the   impugned   communications,
since   the   communications   were   addressed   to   institutions
teaching   Architecture,   none   of   which   had   come   forward   to
challenge the same.
4. Taking a view that Section 21 cannot be read in isolation
and that the provisions of Section 45 are mandatory, the High
Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   and   quashed   the   impugned
communications.  Hence, the appellant is before us.
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5. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
respective parties.
6. Before we consider the issue that arises for consideration,
we   must   take   note   of   one   important   subsequent   development.
After this Court ordered notice in the Special Leave Petition, a
Notification   bearing   F.No.CA/193/2020/MSAER   dated
11.08.2020   was   published   in   the   Government   Gazette,
notifying   the   “Council   of   Architecture   (Minimum   Standards   of
Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020”. These Regulations
were  directed to  come into  force with  effect from  the 1 st
  day  of
November, 2020. These Regulations have been issued, as seen
from   the   Notification,   in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by
clauses (e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 read
with   Section   21   of   the   Act.   They   have   been   issued   in
supersession of the 1983 Regulations.
7. Due   to   the   above   subsequent   development,   the   question
relating to the inter­play between Section 21 and Section 45 of
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the   Act   has   become   one   of   mere   academic   importance.
However,   Mr.   Naveen   R.   Nath,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellant   contended   that   the   question   of   law   is   of   importance
and advanced arguments.
8. Admittedly,   the   communication   dated   31.10.2018   issued
by   the   appellant   herein   drew   the   attention   of   the   educational
institutions   to   the   revised   eligibility   criteria   for   admission   to   5
year B.Arch. degree course and also to the Minimum Standards
for   Architectural   Education   prescribed   by   the   Council   to   be
followed   for   the   academic   session   2019­20.   The   second
impugned   communication   was   dated   03.12.2018   which   was
the “Approval Process” for 2019­20.
9. Both   the   communications   dated   31.10.2018   and
03.12.2018, impugned before the High Court, were not part of
any   Regulations   framed   by   the   appellant   in   exercise   of   the
power   conferred  by   Section  45(1)   of  the   Act.  The   requirements
of   prior   approval   and   the   notification   in   the   official   gazette   in
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terms of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of Regulations
and   not   in   respect   of   communications   such   as   the   ones
impugned   in   the   writ   petition.   This   is   why   an   argument   is
advanced on the inter­play between Sections 21 and 45 of the
Act. Section 21 reads as follows:­
“21.   Minimum   standard   of   architectural
education .­   The   Council   may   prescribe   the   minimum
standards   of   architectural   education   required   for
granting   recognised   qualifications   by   colleges   or
institutions in India.”
Section 45 reads as follows:­
“45 . Power of Council to make regulations. ­ (1) The
Council   may,   with   the   approval   of   the   Central
Government,   [by   notification   in   the   Official   Gazette],
make   regulations   not   inconsistent   with   the   provisions
of  this  Act,  or   the  rules  made  thereunder,  to carry  out
the purposes of this Act.
(2)   In   particular   and   without   prejudice   to   the
generalityof  the   foregoing   power,  such   regulations  may
provide for—
(a)   the   management   of   the   property   of   the  
Council;
(b)   the   powers   and   duties   of   the   President   and  
the Vice­President of the Council;
(c)   the   summoning   and   holding   of   meetings   of  
the  Council   and   the   Executive   Committee   or  
any  other   committee   constituted   under  
section 10,  the times and places at  which   such  
meetings  shall be held, the  conductof  
business thereat  and the number  of   persons  
necessary to  constitute a  quorum;
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(d)   the   functions   of   the   Executive   Committee  
or of  any   other   committee   constituted   under  
section 10;
(e)   the   courses   and   periods   of   study   and   of  
practical   training,   if   any,   to   be   undertaken,  
the  subjects   of   examinations   and   standards  
of  proficiency therein to be obtained in  any  
college  or   institution   for   grant   of  
recognised qualifications;
(f)   the   appointment,   powers   and   duties   of  
inspector;
(g)   the   standards   of   staff,   equipment,  
accommodation,   training   and   other   facilities  
for  architectural education;
(h)   the   conduct   of   professional   examinations,  
qualifications   of   examiners   and   the   conditions  
of  admission to such examinations;
(i)   the   standards   of   professional   conduct   and  
etiquette   and   code   of   ethics   to   be   observed   by  
architects;
(j)   any   other   matter   which   is   to   be   or   may   be  
provided   by   regulations   under   this   Act   and   in  
respect of which no rules have been made.
(3)   Every   regulation   made   under   this   section   shall   be
laid,   as   soon   as   may   be   after   it   is   made,   before   each
House   of   Parliament,   while   it   is   in   session,   for   a   total
period   of   thirty   days   which   may   be   comprised   in   one
session   or   in   two   or   more   successive   sessions,   and   if,
before   the   expiry   of   the   session   immediately   following
the   session   or   the   successive   sessions   aforesaid,   both
Houses   agree   in   making   any   modification   in   the
regulation   or   both   Houses   agree   that   the   regulation
should   not   be   made,   the   regulation   shall   thereafter
have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect,
as   the   case   may   be;   so,   however,   that   any   such
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to
the   validity   of   anything   previously   done   under   that
regulation.
10. It may be seen from sub­section (2) of Section 45 that it gives a
list of matters for which provision may be made in the Regulations,
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in   clauses  (a)   to  (j).   Clause   (a)  to   (d)  concern   the   management   and
administration of the Council of Architecture and its property. It is
only   clauses   (e),   (g)   and   (h)   of   sub­section(2)   of   Section   45   which
have a bearing on the Minimum Standards of Education. Clause (f)
relates   to   appointment   of   Inspectors   and   clause   (i)   relates   to
standards   of   professional   conduct   and   etiquette.   Clause   (j)   is   a
residuary clause.
11. Interestingly,   the   1983   Regulations   as   well   as   the   2020
Regulations   (now   issued   after   the   judgment   of   the   Madras   High
Court), are issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e),
(g), (h) and (j) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21.
If the stipulation contained in Section 21 is subsumed in one of the
clauses   of   Section   45(2),   there   was   no   necessity   for   invoking   the
power under Section 45(2)  read with Section 21   while issuing the
Regulations.   In   other   words,   if   the   minimum   standards   of
architectural education are covered by clauses (e), (g) and (h), or at
least   by  the   residuary   clause   (j)   of   sub­section   (2)  of   Section  45,   it
would  have   been   enough   for  the   appellant   to   issue   the   regulations
in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by   Section   45(2)   alone   without
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invoking Section 21 along with it. The reason why Section 21 is also
invoked along with Section 45(2) is not far to seek.
12. Clause (i) of sub­section (2) of Section 45 relates to standards
of   professional   conduct   and   code   of   ethics   to   be   observed   by
architects.   The   substantive   power   to   prescribe   the   code   of
professional conduct for architects, flows out of Section 22. It reads
as follows:­
“22.   Professional   conduct.­ (1    )   The   Council   may   by
regulations   prescribe   standar ds   of   professional
conduct   and   etiquette   and   a   code   of   ethics   for
architects.
(2    )   Regulations made by the Council under sub­section
(1)   may   specify   which   violations   thereof   shall
constitute   infamous   conduct   in   any   professional
respect,   that   is   to   say,   professional   misconduct,   and
such   provision   shall   have   effect   notwithstanding
anything   contained   in   any   law   for   the   time   being   in
force.”
13. Apparently,   Section   22   confers   substantive   power   upon   the
Council to prescribe standards of professional conduct and Section
45(2)(i)   deals   with   the   procedural   power.   But   Section   22   itself
makes   it   clear   that   the   prescription   of   standards   of   professional
conduct and code of ethics for architects could be done only by way
of regulations. This is in contrast to Section 21.
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14. To   put   it   differently,   Section   22(1)   confers   power   upon   the
Council   of   Architecture   to   prescribe   standards   of   professional
conduct   and   a   code   of   ethics,   only   by   way   of   regulations,   though
Section   45(2)(i)   takes   care   of   the   procedural   requirement.   But
Section   21   which   confers   substantive   power   upon   the   Council   to
prescribe   minimum   standards   of   architectural   education,   is   not
couched   in   the   same   language   as   Section   22(1).   In   other   words,
Section 21 does not contain a stipulation that, “the Council may by
regulation   prescribe   minimum   standards   of   architectural
education”. The words “may by regulation”, found in Section 22, are
conspicuous   by   their   absence   in   Section   21.   This   is   a   clear
indication of the fact,  (i)  that the Council is empowered to prescribe
minimum   standards   of   architectural   education,   not   necessarily   by
taking   recourse   to   Section   45(2);   and   (ii)   that   if   at   all,   such
minimum   standards   are   issued   otherwise   than   through
Regulations, they should not be in conflict with those found in the
Regulations.
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15. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act that the Council of
Architecture   may   prescribe   minimum   standards   of   architectural
education,   either  by   way  of   regulations   issued   under   Section  45(2)
or even otherwise. It is only in cases where the Council chooses to
prescribe standards in the form of regulations that the requirement
of   approval   of   the   Central   Government   under   Section   45(1)   would
become necessary.
16. It   is   interesting   to   see   that   the   communications   dated
31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018 issued by the appellant which were put
to   challenge   before   the   High   Court,   were   primarily   aimed   at
streamlining   the   institutions   imparting   architectural   education.
The 1 st
 respondent herein who challenged the communications, was
admittedly   a   society,   which   has   as   its   members,   the   teaching
faculty. This can be seen from paragraph 2 of the writ petition filed
by   the   1 st
  respondent   herein   before   the   High   Court,   the   relevant
portion of which reads as follows:­
“The members of the Society are professionalArchitects
who   have   engaged   themselves   as   teaching   faculty   and
the   society   recognises   four   kinds   of   members,   namely
(1)   Life   Member–   Professor   registered   with   COA   and
being   heads   of   institutions   with   Ten   years   of   teaching
experience,   (2)   Associate   /Affiliate   Member–Teachers
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registered   with   COA   having   less   than   Ten   years   of
teaching   experience,   (3)   Patron/Donor   Member   –
Accomplished   Academicians   and   Renowned   Teachers
registered   with   COA   involved   in   Architectural
Education   with   Twenty   years   of   experience   and   (4)
Institutional   Member   –representing   a   college   or   school
or institute of Architecture”.
17. In   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   appellant   before   the   High
Court,   a   specific   objection   was   taken   to   the   maintainability   of   the
writ   petition   on   the   ground   that   the   communications   impugned   in
the   writ   petition   were   addressed   to   the   institutions   imparting
architectural   education   and   that   individuals   who   claim   to   be
teaching   faculty   cannot  challenge   the   same.   It   was   also  contended
in the counter affidavit that the 1 st
  respondent (writ petitioner) was
attempting   to   espouse   the   cause   of   some   defaulting   educational
institutions   which   did   not   meet   the   minimum   standards.   Another
important issue raised in the counter affidavit filed by the appellant
herein before the High Court was that one of the members of the 1 st
respondent   Society   was   a   member   of   the   appellant   Council   which
approved the 2015 norms and that some of the members of the 1 st
respondent   Society   even   acted   as   Inspectors   and   inspected   the
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educational   institutions   to   find   out   whether   minimum   standards
are put in place.
18. But the above objections were not even considered by the High
Court. The High Court addressed itself merely to the question of the
requirement   of   approval   of   the   Central   Government   under   Section
45(1)   and   did   not   go   into   the   question   of   locus   standi   of   the   1 st
respondent.   The   High   Court   even   overlooked   the   fact   that   none   of
the   educational   institutions   imparting   architectural   education   ever
chose   to   challenge   the   communications   impugned   before   the   High
Court.   In   fact,   the   appellant   has   furnished   a   chart   extracting   the
provisions   of   the   1983   Regulations   in   Column   No.1,   the   2017
Prescriptions   in   Column   No.2,   and   the   area   of   difference   between
the two, in Column No.3. It is seen from the said chart that many of
the   changes   brought   forthwith   in   2018   were   in   relation   to,   (i)
duration   of   the   architecture   programme;   (ii)   admission   to
architecture   course;   (iii)   intake   and   migration;   (iv)   courses   and
periods   of   study;   (v)   professional   examination,   standards   of
proficiency   and   conditions   of   admissions   and   qualifications   of
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examiners; and   (vi)   standards  of staff, equipment,  accommodation,
training and other facilities.
19. If at all, the 1 st
  respondent­society (writ petitioner), due to the
nature   of   its   membership,   could   have   been   aggrieved   only   by   the
prescriptions   affecting   the   teaching   faculty.   The   1 st
  respondent
could not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are not
in   any   way   concerned.   Unfortunately,   the   High   Court   did   not
address itself to these important issues.
20. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugned
order   is   bound   to   be   set   aside.   Accordingly,   the   appeal   is   allowed,
the   impugned   order   of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside   and   the   writ
petition filed by the 1 st
 respondent before the High Court shall stand
dismissed. No costs.
……………………………..J.
(Hemant Gupta)
………………………………J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
February 14, 2022
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