/2022 INSC  0167/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2010
AZGAR BARID (D) BY LRS. AND OTHERS     ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MAZAMBI @ PYAREMABI AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 17 th
March   2009,   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at
Bangalore   in   Regular   Second   Appeal   No.   160   of   1995,   thereby
allowing the appeal filed by the respondents herein.
2. The facts in brief giving rise to filing of the present appeal
are as under:
1

A suit for partition being O.S. No. 388/77 came to be filed
by plaintiff Nos. 1 to 8, who are respondent Nos. 1 to 8 herein
before the Prl. Munshiff at Kolar  (hereinafter referred to as the
“trial   court”),   for   partition   and   separate   possession   of   the   suit
properties.     Vide   judgment   and   decree   dated   11 th
  September
1987, the said suit came to be decreed, in part, declaring that
plaintiff   No.   2   was   entitled   to   7/24 th
  share   and   plaintiff   No.3
was   entitled   to   1/8 th
  share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties.     It
was   further   held   that   the   plaintiffs   were   not   entitled   to   any
share in suit Item Nos. 7 to 9 and 22.   Vide the said judgment
and decree, the appellant herein­defendant No.1 was directed to
render accounts in respect of the receipt and expenditure of the
money incurred by him on the suit schedule properties for the
period  from  the  date  of  the  suit  till  the   date of  effecting   actual
partition   of   the   suit   schedule   properties.     It   was   further   held
that the appellant herein, who was defendant No.1, is liable to
divide   the   profits   earned   from   the   properties   in   favour   of
defendant   Nos.2   and   3   to   plaintiff   Nos.2   and   3   as   per   their
respective shares.
2

3. Being   aggrieved   by   the   said   judgment   and   decree   of   the
trial   court,   the   appellant­defendant   No.1   through   L.Rs.   had
filed Regular  Appeal No. 60 of  1988 before the Prl. Civil Judge
at Kolar  (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate Court”).
The said appeal was allowed by judgment and order dated 23 rd
November   1994,   by   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   decree
dated 11 th
 September 1987 passed by the trial court.  
4. The   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   First   Appellate
Court   came   to   be   challenged   before   the  Karnataka   High   Court
by   filing   Regular   Second   Appeal   No.   160   of   1995.     The   High
Court   vide   its   judgment   dated   18 th
  March   1998,   set   aside   the
judgment   and   order   dated   23 rd
  November   1994   passed   by   the
First   Appellate   Court   and   restored   the   judgment   and   decree
dated   11 th
  September   1987   passed   by   the   trial   court.     The
judgment   passed   by   the   High   Court   dated   18 th
  March   1998
came   to   be   challenged   before   this   Court   by   filing   Civil   Appeal
No. 6478 of 1998.   This Court vide its order dated 17 th
  August
2004,   found   that   the   High   Court   had   allowed   the   appeal
3

without framing the questions of law as required under Section
100   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   and   set   aside   the
judgment   dated   18 th
  March   1998,   passed   by   the   High   Court
and remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal afresh
in accordance with law.  
5. On   remand,   the   second   appeal   was   heard   afresh   and   the
High Court framed the following questions of law:
(1) Whether   the   plaintiffs   1   and   2   are   entitled   to
share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties,
particularly   when   Rehaman   Barid   through
whom   plaintiffs   1   and   2   claim   partition
predeceased   his   father   ­   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   ­
the propositus? 
(2) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in
negativing   the   case   of   the   plaintiffs   3   to   8   for
partition and separate  possession  after  having
found   that   the   documents   Exs.P­1   to   P­7
disclose the paternity of plaintiffs 4 to 8? 
4

(3) Whether the first Appellate Court is justified in
dismissing   the   suit   filed   by   plaintiffs   3   to   8
mainly   on   the   ground   that   the   Nikhanama
evidencing   the   marriage   of   plaintiff   No.3   with
Mohiyuddin Pasha is not produced? 
(4) Whether   the   properties   found   in   Mehar   Deed
Ex.D­1   executed   by   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   in
favour   of   first   wife   Noorabi   are   liable   to   be
divided among the parties to the present suit?
6. After   answering   the   aforesaid   questions   of   law,   the   High
Court   vide   the   impugned   judgment,   held   that   all   the   suit
schedule properties were required to be divided amongst Azgar
Barid   i.e.   appellant­defendant   No.1   and   plaintiff   Nos.3   to   8.
The   High   Court   also   held   that   plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   were   not
entitled   for   any   share   in   the   suit   schedule   properties   as
Rehaman Barid, husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff
No.2   predeceased   the   propositus   i.e.,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha.
Insofar   as   the   shares   of   the   parties   are   concerned,   the   High
5

Court held that the properties are liable to be divided amongst
the legal heirs of Mohiyuddin Pasha in the following proportion:
1. Plaintiff   No.3­Mazambi   @
Pyarembi is entitled to ­ 1/8 th
 share
2. Defendant   No.1­Azgar   Barid
is entitled to ­ 7/36 th
 share
3. Plaintiff   No.4­Syed   Rehman
Barid @ Sabulal is entitled to ­ 7/36 th
 share
4. Defendant   No.8­Rahiman
Barid   @   Ikbal   Pasha   is
entitled to ­ 7/36 th
 share
5. Plaintiff No.5­Shakila Begum
is entitled to ­ 7/72 nd
 share
6. Plaintiff   No.6­Zamila   Begum
is entitled to ­ 7/72 nd
 share
7. Plaintiff   No.7­Akhila   Begum
is entitled to ­ 7/72 nd
 share
7. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal is filed by the
appellant­defendant No.1­Azgar Barid, through L.Rs.
8. We   have   heard   Shri   Naresh   Kaushik,   learned   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant­defendant   No.1   and   Shri
Girish Ananthamurthy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents­plaintiffs.
6

9. Shri   Kaushik   submitted   that   the   trial   court   had   decreed
the suit only in favour of plaintiff Nos.2 and 3.  As such, in fact,
the trial court held that plaintiff Nos. 4 to 8 were not entitled to
any share in the suit schedule properties of Mohiyuddin Pasha.
The   said   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   court   was   not
challenged   by   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8.     The   same   was   only
challenged   by   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.     It   is
therefore   submitted   that   the   second   appeal   at   the   behest   of
plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   was   not   at   all   tenable.     He   therefore
submitted   that,   on   this   short   ground   alone,   this   appeal
deserves to be allowed.
10. Shri Kaushik further submitted that though on remand by
this   Court,   the   High   Court   framed   the   questions   of   law,   they
cannot be construed to be questions of law inasmuch as all the
said questions pertain to appreciation of evidence.  He therefore
submitted that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the well­
reasoned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   First   Appellate
Court deserves to be maintained.
7

11. Per   contra,   Shri   Ananthamurthy   submitted   that   the   trial
court had rightly appreciated the evidence.   However, the First
Appellate   Court   had   reversed   the   same   on   the   basis   of
conjectures and surmises.  The High Court has therefore rightly
interfered   with   the   same   while   reversing   the   judgment   of   the
First Appellate Court.   He further submitted that in a partition
suit, all the parties stand on a same pedestal and every party is
a plaintiff as well as a defendant.
12. We   will   first   deal   with   the   objection   of   the   appellant   that
since   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8,   whose   claim   was   denied   by   the   trial
court and  who  had  not  challenged the  same by  way  of appeal,
are not entitled to relief in the second appeal.  This Court in the
cases of   Bhagwan Swaroop and Others v. Mool Chand and
Others 1
  and   Dr.   P.   Nalla   Thampy   Thera   v.   B.L.   Shanker
and Others 2
, has held that in a suit for partition, the position
of the plaintiff and the defendant can be interchangeable.  Each
party   adopts   the   same   position   with   the   other   parties.     It   has
1   (1983) 2 SCC 132
2   1984 (Supp) SCC 631
8

been   further   held   that   so   long   as   the   suit   is   pending,   a
defendant can ask the Court to transpose him as a plaintiff and
a plaintiff can ask for being transposed as a defendant.  
13. This   Court   in   the   case   of   Chandramohan   Ramchandra
Patil   and   Others   v.   Bapu   Koyappa   Patil   (Dead)   Through
LRs and Others 3
, has held thus:  
“ 14.   Order 41 Rule 4 of the Code enables reversal of
the decree by the court in appeal at the instance of
one or some of the plaintiffs appealing and it can do
so   in   favour   of   even   non­appealing   plaintiffs.   As   a
necessary   consequence   such   reversal   of   the   decree
can   be   against   the   interest   of   the   defendants   vis­à­
vis   non­appealing plaintiffs. Order 41 Rule 4 has to
be   read   with   Order   41   Rule   33.   Order   41   Rule   33
empowers the appellate court to do complete justice
between the parties by passing such order or decree
which ought to have been passed or made although
not   all   the   parties   affected   by   the   decree   had
appealed.
15.   In our opinion, therefore, the appellate court by
invoking   Order   41   Rule   4   read   with   Order   41   Rule
33   of   the   Code   could   grant   relief   even   to   the   non­
appealing   plaintiffs   and   make   an   adverse   order
against   all   the   defendants   and   in   favour   of   all   the
plaintiffs. In such a situation, it is not open to urge
on   behalf   of   the   defendants   that   the   decree   of
3   (2003) 3 SCC 552
9

dismissal   of   suit   passed   by   the   trial   court   had
become   final   inter   se   between   the   non­appealing
plaintiffs and the defendants.”
14. In   that   view   of   the   matter,   we   find   that   the   contention
raised   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   with   regard   to   plaintiff   Nos.4
to   8   being   not   entitled   to   relief   in   the   second   appeal   on   the
ground that they have not challenged the judgment and decree
of   the   trial   court   before   the   First   Appellate   Court,   is   not
sustainable.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Chandramohan   Ramchandra   Patil   (supra) ,   the   trial   court
could grant relief even to the non­appealing plaintiffs and make
an adverse order against all the defendants and in favour of all
the   plaintiffs.     Merely   because   the   trial   court   had   not   granted
relief   in   favour   of   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8,   would   not   come   in   their
way in the High Court allowing their claim.
15. That leads us to the other contention of the appellant.   It
is sought to be urged by him that the High Court, in the second
appeal,   has   framed   questions   of   law,   which   are,   in   fact,   not
questions of law but questions of fact.  
10

16. In  this respect, it  will be relevant  to  refer   to the following
observations   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Municipal
Committee,   Hoshiarpur   v.   Punjab   State   Electricity   Board
and Others 4
:
“ 27.   There   is   no   prohibition   on   entertaining   a
second   appeal   even   on   a   question   of   fact   provided
the   court   is   satisfied   that   the   findings   of   fact
recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non­
consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an
erroneous   approach   to   the   matter   i.e.   that   the
findings   of   fact   are   found   to   be   perverse.   But   the
High   Court   cannot   interfere   with   the   concurrent
findings   of   fact   in   a   routine   and   casual   manner   by
substituting   its   subjective   satisfaction   in   place   of
that   of   the   lower   courts.   (Vide   Jagdish
Singh   v.   Natthu Singh   [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992
SC   1604]   ;   Karnataka   Board   of   Wakf   v.   Anjuman­E­
Ismail   Madris­Un­Niswan   [(1999)   6   SCC   343   :   AIR
1999   SC   3067]   and   Dinesh   Kumar   v.   Yusuf
Ali   [(2010) 12 SCC 740 : AIR 2010 SC 2679] .)
28.   If   a   finding   of   fact   is   arrived   at   by   ignoring   or
excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking   into
consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality   incurring   the   blame   of   being   perverse,
then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the
law.   If   the   findings   of   the   Court   are   based   on   no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable
4   (2010) 13 SCC 216
11

or  evidence  that suffers from  the  vice of procedural
irregularity   or   the   findings   are   such   that   no
reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those
findings,   then   the   findings   may   be   said   to   be
perverse. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit
of   the   Court   or   based   on   conjecture   and   surmises,
the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of
non­application   of   mind   and   thus,   stands   vitiated.
(Vide   Bharatha   Matha   v.   R.   Vijaya
Renganathan   [(2010)   11   SCC   483   :   AIR   2010   SC
2685] .)”
17. This Court in the case of  Illoth Valappil Ambunhi (D) By
LRs. v. Kunhambu Karanavan 5
, has observed thus:
“ 14.   It is now well settled that perversity in arriving
at   a   factual   finding   gives   rise   to   a   substantial
question   of   law,   attracting   intervention   of   the   High
Court under Section 100 of the CPC.”
18. Recently,   this   Court   in   the   case   of   K.N.   Nagarajappa
and Others v. H. Narasimha Reddy 6
, to which one of us (L.N.
Rao, J.) was a party, has observed thus:
“ 17.   In   a   recent   judgment   of   this   court,   Narayan
Sitaramji   Badwaik   (Dead)   Through   Lrs.   v.   Bisaram
2021   SCC   OnLine   SC   319,   this   court   observed   as
follows, in the context of High Courts' jurisdiction to
appreciate factual issues under Section 103 IPC:
5   2019 SCC OnLine SC 1336
6   2021 SCC OnLine SC 694
12

“11. A  bare  perusal  of   this  section clearly
indicates   that   it   provides   for   the   High
Court   to   decide   an   issue   of   fact,   provided
there   is   sufficient   evidence   on   record
before   it,   in   two   circumstances.   First,
when an issue necessary for the disposal
of the appeal has not been determined by
the   lower   Appellate   Court   or   by   both   the
Courts below. And second, when an issue
of   fact   has   been   wrongly   determined   by
the Court(s) below by virtue of the decision
on   the   question   of   law   under   Section   100
of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
18.   In the opinion of this court, in the present case,
the   High   Court   recorded   sound   and   convincing
reasons   why   the   first   appellate   court's   judgment
required   interference.   These   were   entirely   based
upon the evidence led by  the parties on the record.
The   appreciation   of   evidence   by   the   first   appellate
court   was   on   the   basis   of   it   having   overlooked
material facts, such as appreciation of documentary
and oral evidence led before the trial court, that the
execution of Ex.D­3 was denied……”
19. The   parties   have   claimed   through   Mohiyuddin   Pasha.
According   to   the   plaintiffs,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   had   earlier
married Noorbi, who died in 1944.  Out of the said wedlock, two
sons   namely   Rahaman   Barid   and   Azgar   Barid­appellant
(defendant   No.1)   were   born.   Rahaman   Barid   was   married   to
Rahamathunnisa­plaintiff   No.1.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock,
13

Noorjahan­plaintiff   No.2   was   born.   Rahaman   Barid   died   in
1945 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964.
20. According   to   the   plaintiffs,   after   the   death   of   Noorbi   in
1944, Mohiyuddin Pasha married Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff
No.3.   Out   of   the   said   wedlock,   five   children   namely   Syed
Rahaman   Barid   @   Sabulal­plaintiff   No.4,   Shakila   Begum­
plaintiff   No.5,   Zamila   Begum­plaintiff   No.6,   Akhila   Begum­
plaintiff  No.7 and  Rahiman  Barid @ Ikbal  Pasha­plaintiff  No.8,
were born.
21. The   appellant­defendant   No.1   has   not   disputed   that
Rahaman   Barid   was   his   brother.     However,   he   contended   that
plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   i.e.   wife   and   daughter   respectively,   of
Rahaman   Barid   were   not   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit
schedule   properties   inasmuch   as   Rahaman   Barid   had   died   in
1944 i.e. prior to Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964.
22. The  appellant­defendant   No.1  has   specifically  denied  that
Mazambi @ Pyarembi­plaintiff No.3 was married to Mohiyuddin
14

Pasha and that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were children of Mohiyuddin
Pasha.
23. It   is   further   contended   by   the   appellant­defendant   No.1
that Mohiyuddin Pasha had executed a Mehar Deed in favour of
his   first   wife   Noorbi,   which   was   registered   on   30 th
  July   1936,
and as such, the said properties ceased to be the properties of
Mohiyuddin Pasha.
24. The trial court, on the basis of the evidence recorded, had
come   to   a   specific   finding   that   after   the   death   of   his   first   wife
Noorbi,   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   had   married   Mazambi   @   Pyarembi­
plaintiff No.3 and plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were born out of the said
wedlock.     While   arriving   at   such   a   finding,   the   trial   court   has
relied on oral as well as documentary evidence.   The trial court
further came to a finding that from the judgment passed in an
earlier suit for partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, it was clear that
Mohiyuddin   Pasha   as   well   as   the   appellant   herein­defendant
No.1   had   taken   a   specific   stand  in   O.S.   No.514/1961   that   the
said Mehar Deed was a nominal one and was never acted upon.
15

It was also contended in the said suit that the properties were
never   handed   over   to   the   first   wife   Noorbi   and   that   it   was
created with a view to avoid the share to the first son Rahaman
Barid.
25. These findings of fact were reversed by the First Appellate
Court.     The   First   Appellate   Court   held   that   plaintiff   No.3   had
failed   to   prove   that   she   was   married   to   Mohiyuddin   Pasha,
since   she   had   failed   to   produce   any   documentary   evidence   in
support   thereof.     It   further   held   that   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   had
failed   to   establish   that   they   were   the   children   of   deceased
Mohiyuddin   Pasha.   It   was   held   that   neither   plaintiff   No.3   nor
plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8   were   entitled   to   any   share   in   the   suit
schedule   properties.     Insofar   as   plaintiff   Nos.1   and   2   are
concerned,  the  First   Appellate   Court  held   that   since  they  were
claiming through Rahaman Barid, who died in 1945 i.e. prior to
Mohiyuddin Pasha, who died in 1964, they are also not entitled
to any share in the suit schedule properties.
16

26. While holding that the finding of the First Appellate Court
that   Mazambi   @   Pyarembi­plaintiff   No.3   was   not   married   to
Mohiyuddin   Pasha   was   erroneous   in   law,   the   High   Court   has
mainly relied on the oral as well as the documentary evidence.
27. Syed Ahmed Ali­PW­1, who was aged 75 years at the time
of   giving   evidence,   was   the   brother   of   Noorbi,   first   wife   of
Mohiyuddin   Pasha.     As   such,   he   was   a   maternal   uncle   of   the
appellant   herein­defendant   No.1.   He   has   clearly   and
emphatically deposed that Mohiyuddin Pasha had two wives i.e.
Noorbi and Mazambi @ Pyarembi.  He has further deposed that
after   the   death   of   his   sister   Noorbi,   Mohiyuddin   Pashaa   took
Mazambi   @   Pyarembi   as   his   second   wife.     He   has   also
specifically   deposed   that   he   has   attended   the   marriage   of
Mazambi   @   Pyarembi­plaintiff   No.3   with   Mohiyuddin   Pasha.
The   High   Court   found   that   in   spite   of   searching   cross­
examination, nothing came on record to discard the evidence of
PW­1.     It   was   further   found   that   the   evidence   of   PW­1   was
supported   by   Nabi   Sab­PW­2,   who   was   also   an   independent
17

witness.     Appenna­PW­3,   who   was   also   an   independent
witness, supported the case of the plaintiffs.
28. The   High   Court   found   that   the   voluminous   documents   of
evidence   including   the   birth   certificates   of   plaintiff   Nos.4   to   8,
the   transfer   certificates   issued   by   the   Government   Higher
Primary   School,   Thadigol   and   Higher   Primary   Boys   School,
Thadigol, established that plaintiff Nos.4 to 8 were the children
born  to  Mohiyuddin  Pasha through Mazambi  @  Pyarembi.    We
are  of  the  view  that,  the   High  Court  rightly  interfered  with   the
findings as recorded by the First Appellate Court, inasmuch as
the   First   Appellate   Court   was   not   justified   in   reversing   the
findings   of   the   trial   court   in   that   regard   which   were   based   on
proper   appreciation   of   evidence.     We   are   of   the   view   that   the
First Appellate Court had failed in appreciating the evidence in
correct   perspective.     The   High   Court   was   justified   in   reversing
the same.
29. Similarly,   the   High   Court   found   that   the   Mehar   Deed   in
favour of deceased Noorbi, first wife of Mohiyuddin Pasha, was
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a nominal one and was not acted upon and the reversal of the
findings   of   the   trial   court   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   in   that
regard, was erroneous.   It will be relevant to note that the trial
court,   on   the   basis   of   the   proceedings   in   the   earlier   suit   for
partition i.e. O.S. No.514/1961, had found that in the said suit
for  partition,  deceased Mohiyuddin  Pasha  was defendant No.1,
whereas   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1   was   defendant
No.2.   In the said suit, the case pleaded by them  was that the
first   son   of   Noorbi   and   Mohiyuddin   Pasha,   namely   Rahaman
Barid, was demanding separate share in the properties and was
residing separately.  It was therefore contended by them in their
respective written statements that to avoid any share in the suit
schedule   properties,   deceased   Mohiyuddin   Pasha   had   created
the   Mehar   Deed   in   favour   of   his   first   wife   Noorbi.     The   High
Court found that in view of the findings arrived in the said O.S.
No.514/1961,   which   were   based   on   the   admission   of
Mohiyuddin   Pasha   and   the   appellant   herein­defendant   No.1
herein, it was not open for the appellant herein­defendant No.1
again   to   contend   that   the   properties   belonged   to   Noorbi
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exclusively as they were given to her in Mehar.  The High Court
further found that the appellant herein­defendant No.1 himself
had   produced   the   judgment   in   O.S.   No.514/1961   at   Ex.D­16
and   relied   upon   the   same   for   opposing   the   present   suit   for
partition.  
30. It could thus clearly be seen that in the present case, the
First Appellate Court had reversed the findings recorded by the
trial   court   which   were   based   upon   correct   appreciation   of
evidence.  The High Court has given sound and cogent reasons
as   to   why   an   interference   with   the   findings   of   the   First
Appellate   Court   was   required.   We   also   find   that   the   First
Appellate   Court   has   failed   to   take   into   consideration   the
voluminous oral as well as documentary evidence, on the basis
of which the trial court had recorded its findings.   The findings
as   recorded   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   are   based   on
conjectures   and   surmises.     As   such,   we   are   of   the   considered
view that the perverse approach of the First Appellate Court in
arriving at the findings would give rise to a substantial question
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of   law,   thereby   justifying   the   High   Court   to   interfere   with   the
same.  
31. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this
appeal.  Hence, this appeal is dismissed.
32. No   order   as   to   cost.     Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall
stand disposed of in the above terms.
….……..….......................J.
                                                       [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
    ………….........................J.       
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 21, 2022.
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