/2022 INSC  0169/
  REPORTABLE
                   
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.        OF 2022
       (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3113 of 2018)
M/s TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd.             .… Appellant(s)   
Versus
M/s SMS Asia Private Limited & Anr.          …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. Leave granted. 
2. The   appellant   is   assailing   the   judgment   dated
14.12.2017   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Orissa   at   Cuttack   in
CRLMC No.1210 of 2017. Through the said judgment, the High
Court   while   disposing   of   the   petition   has   quashed   the   order
dated 05.11.2015 passed by the learned SDJM, Jharsuguda by
which   cognizance   was   taken   and   summons   was   issued   in
I.C.C.   Case   No.422   of   2015.   The   appellant   who   is   the
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complainant   in   I.C.C.   Case   No.422   of   2015   is   therefore   before
this Court, claiming to be aggrieved by the said judgment.
3. The   brief   facts   are   that   the   respondent   herein   had
issued   seven   cheques   dated   13.03.2015,   in   all   amounting   to
Rs.1,10,00,000/­ (Rupees one crore ten lakhs) in favour of the
appellant   company.   On   presentation,   the   said   cheques   were
dishonoured by the Bank and returned with the endorsement,
‘account   closed’.   The   appellant   in   that   view   issued   notices
dated   14.04.2015   through   registered   post,   acknowledgement
due.   Though   the   notices   were   received   on   16.04.2015   as   per
the   postal   acknowledgement,   the   respondent   failed   to   comply
with   the   demand   or   respond   to   the   same.   In   that   view,   the
appellant   filed   the   complaint   before   the   learned
Sub­Divisional Judicial Magistrate, (‘SDJM’ for short) Panposh,
Uditnagar   Rourkela   under   Section   138   and   142   of   Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘N.I. Act’). The said complaint
was   registered   based   on   the   affidavit   filed   on   behalf   of   the
complainant,   in   lieu   of   oral   sworn   statement.   The   learned
SDJM   on   being   satisfied   that   there   is   sufficient   material   and
the   complaint   under   Section   138   of   N.I.   Act   against   the
accused   is   in   accordance   with   law,   took   cognizance   of   the
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complaint   and   directed   summons   to   the   respondent­accused,
vide order dated 05.11.2015.
4. The   respondent   herein   however   filed   a   petition   in
CRLMC   No.1210   of   2017   under   Section   482   of   the   Criminal
Procedure   Code   (for   short   ‘Cr.P.C.)   before   the   High   Court
claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   05.11.2015.   The
respondent,   in   the   said   petition   had   contended   that   the
complaint   filed   was   by   an   incompetent   person   without   the
requisite   averments   in   the   complaint,   despite   which   the
learned  SDJM  had  taken  cognizance  and  issued summons.  In
that   regard,   it   was   contended   that   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,
General   Manager   (Accounting)   who   had   filed   the   complaint
representing the complainant company, neither had knowledge
about the alleged transaction, nor had he witnessed the same.
In   that   light,   the   respondent   had   contended   that   the   order
taking cognizance and the summons issued to them, is liable to
be quashed. The High Court, accepting the said contention and
placing   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   A.C.
Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.  (2014) 11 SCC
790   has   held   that   there   is   no   mention   in   the   complaint   or
affidavit   as   to   when   and   in   what   manner   the   company   had
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authorized   its   General   Manager   (Accounting)   to   represent   the
company to file the complaint. It is further held that there is no
averment in the complaint as to whether the General Manager
(Accounting) had knowledge about the transaction or he was a
witness   to   the   transaction.   It   was   also   held,   neither   any
resolution   of   the   Board   of   Directors   of   the   complainant
company nor any authorisation of the company in favour of the
person representing it in the complaint was filed for perusal of
the   Magistrate.   Only   an   authorisation   letter   issued   by   the
Managing Director of the complainant company in favour of the
General   Manager   (Accounting)   was   produced   and   the   said
authorisation does not indicate whether the Board of Directors
had   authorised   the   Managing   Director   to   sub­delegate   his
powers   to   the   General   Manager   (Accounting)   to   file   the
complaint on behalf of the company.
5. Mr.   Ashok   K.   Parija,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing
on behalf of the appellant while assailing the judgment passed
by   the   High   Court,   would   contend   that   the   High   Court   has
utterly   misconstrued   the   principle   enunciated   in   A.C.
Narayanan   (supra)   to   non­suit   the   appellant.   It   is   contended
that   in   the   said   decision,   while   considering   the   nature   of   the
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complaint filed based on the power of attorney executed by one
individual in favour of another individual to conduct the case,
the  requirement  therein  has been  stated. Even in that context
the High Court has not properly appreciated the facts involved
in   the   instant   case   since   the   complaint   was   as   per   the
observations made in  A.C. Narayanan  (supra). It is contended
that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   SDJM   dated   05.11.2015
taking   cognizance   would   indicate   that   the   learned   Magistrate
having   perused   the   complaint   and   the   entire   record,   was
satisfied   that   there   is   sufficient   material   for   issuance   of
summons.   In   that   background,   the   list   of   documents   and   the
documents   are   referred   to.     The   agreement   dated   18.07.2014,
entered   into   between   the   appellant   and   respondent   would
disclose   that   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,   General   Manager
(Accounting)   who   had   represented   the   company   in   the
complaint,   was   a   witness   to   the   said   agreement.   He   had   also
signed   the   reconciliation   statement   and   has   despatched   the
notice to the respondent when the cheques were dishonoured.
In   that   view,   the   company   was   represented   by   a   competent
person   who   had   knowledge   of   the   transaction.   The   verifying
affidavit enclosed with the complaint also specified that he had
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knowledge   and   that   the   complaint   was   based   on   the   relevant
documents.   In   addition,   the   said   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,
General Manager (Accounting) in the affidavit filed as his sworn
statement,   had   explicitly   stated   that   he   is   the   authorized
representative   of   the   complainant   company   and   has   filed   the
complaint against the accused persons. Learned senior counsel
would also point out that in addition to the fact that he was a
Senior   Managerial   Officer   of   the   appellant   company,   Mr.
Subhasis   Kumar   Das   was   also   authorized   by   the   Managing
Director   on   23.05.2015,   to   initiate   the   legal   proceedings.   The
Managing   Director   on   the   other   hand,   was   authorized   by   the
Chairman   based  on   the   approval   of   the   Board   of   Directors.   In
that   view,   it   is   contended   that   the   complaint   was   filed   in
accordance with law and the learned Magistrate having applied
his   mind,   had   taken   cognizance   which   was   quashed   by   the
High Court without appropriately applying its mind.
6. Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent
would   however,   seek   to   sustain   the   judgment   passed   by   the
High   Court.   It   is   contended   that   the   High   Court   having   noted
the   judgment   in   A.C.   Narayanan   (supra)   and   also   the
judgments   of   the   Orissa   High   Court   had   arrived   at   the
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conclusion   that   the   complaint   filed   did   not   satisfy   the
requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act as the complaint was not
filed   by   a   person   who   was   authorized   by   the   company.   It   is
further   contended   that   in   A.C.   Narayanan   (supra)   this   Court
has   held   that   there   should   be   explicit   averment   to   the   effect
that   the   person   filing   the   complaint   is   authorized   by   the
complainant and has knowledge of the transaction in question
so as to maintain the complaint. It is contended that since the
High   Court   has   arrived   at   its   conclusion   by   relying   on   a
decision rendered by this Court, such a decision would not call
for interference in this appeal.
7.       Having   noted   the   sequence   of   events   and   the   rival
contentions   put   forth   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,
the solitary issue for consideration herein is as to whether the
complaint   filed   by   the   appellant   herein   under   Section   138   of
N.I.   Act   is   in   accordance   with   the   requirement   under   Section
142 of the N.I. Act. The relevant provision reads as hereunder:
­
“142.  Cognizance of offences .—[(1)] Notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under section 138 except upon a
complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, 
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as the case may be, the holder in due course
of the cheque;
(b)  xxxxxxxxxx
(c)  xxxxxxxxxx”
8. In   that   background,   a   perusal   of   the   complaint
(Annexure   P­14)   would   disclose   that   the   complainant   named
therein   is   M/s.   TRL   Krosaki   Refractories   Limited   through   its
General Manager (Accounting) Subhasis Kumar Das. A perusal
of   the   cheques   (Annexures   P­3   to   P­9)   which   are   the   subject
matter of the said complaint under Section 138 of NI Act would
disclose   that   the   “payee”   named   in   the   said   cheques   is   M/s.
TRL   Krosaki   Refractories   Limited.   If   that   be   the   position,   the
requirement   as   contemplated   under   Section   142   (1)   (a)   of   NI
Act that the complaint ought to be in writing and that it should
be   filed   by   the   payee   or   the   holder   in   due   course,   stands
satisfied.   The   issue   raised   is   that   the   complaint   filed   by   Mr.
Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager (Accounting) on behalf
of the company is not competent for want of authorisation and
that   there   is   no   averment   with   regard   to   his   knowledge   about
the transaction. On this aspect, strong reliance is placed by the
learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   on   A.C.   Narayanan
(supra).   Further,   the   judgment   passed   by   the   High   Court   is
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also   entirely   based   on   the   guidelines   laid   down   in   the   said
decision.
9. To place the matter in perspective, it would be necessary for
us   to   take   note   of   the   circumstances   under   which   the
consideration arose in  A.C. Narayanan  (supra). In that regard,
it   is   noticed   that   this   Court   while   considering   the   scope   of
Section 142 (1)(a) of N.I. Act in the case of   M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd.
vs.   Medchi   Chemicals   and   Pharma   (P}   Ltd.,   (2002)   1   SCC
234,   had   taken   note   of   an   earlier   decision   of   this   Court   in
Vishwa  Mitter  vs.   O.P.   Poddar , (1983)  4  SCC   701  wherein  it
was   held   that   anyone   can   set   the   criminal   law   in   motion   by
filing   a   complaint   of   facts   constituting   an   offence,   before   a
Magistrate   entitled   to   take   cognizance.   It   was   further   held   in
Vishwa   Mitter   (supra)   that   if   any   special   statute   prescribes
offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance
of   such   offences   under   the   statute,   then   the   complaint
requesting   the   Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   of   the   offence
must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by such statute.
In   that   circumstance,   it   was   held   that   the   only   eligibility
criteria   prescribed   by   Section   142   of   N.I.   Act   is   that   the
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complainant must be by the payee or the holder in due course.
However,   in   a   subsequent   decision   in   Janaki   Vashdeo
Bhojwani   &   Anr.   vs.   Indusind   Bank   Ltd.   &   Ors.   (2005)   2
SCC   217,   while   considering   the   right   of   a   power   of   attorney
holder to act on behalf of the principal in a civil proceeding, the
provision contained in Order III Rule 1 and 2 of CPC was kept
in view and it was held that if the power of attorney holder has
rendered  some  acts   in  pursuance   of  the   power   of   attorney,  he
may   depose   for   the   principal   in   respect   of   such   acts,   but   he
cannot   depose   for   the   principal   for   the   acts   done   by   the
principal   and   not   by   him.   Similarly,   he   cannot   depose   for   the
principal in respect of the matter of which only the principal is
entitled   to   be   cross­examined.   The   said   two   decisions   which
were   rendered   by   Division   Benches   were   assumed   to   be   in
conflict   with   each   other   by   another   Division   Bench   while
considering   A.C.   Narayanan   (supra)   and   therefore   it   desired
clarification.
10. In that view, the matter in  A.C. Narayanan  (supra) was
referred   to   a   Bench   of   three   Hon’ble   Judges.   The   said   Bench
after holding that the said two judgments of this Court are not
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in   conflict   with   each   other   has   considered   the   scope   and
requirement of Section 142 (1)(a) of N.I. Act and formulated the
questions   for   consideration   as   contained   in   para   21   of   the
judgment which read as hereunder: ­
“21.   In terms of the reference order, the following 
questions have to be decided by this Bench:
21.1.   Whether a power­of­attorney holder can sign and
file a complaint petition on behalf of the 
complainant? /Whether the eligibility criteria 
prescribed by Section 142( a ) of the NI Act would stand 
satisfied if the complaint petition itself is filed in the 
name of the payee or the holder in due course of the 
cheque?
21.2.   Whether a power­of­attorney holder can be 
verified on oath under Section 200 of the Code?
21.3.   Whether specific averments as to the knowledge 
of the power­of­attorney holder in the impugned 
transaction must be explicitly asserted in the 
complaint?
21.4.   If the power­of­attorney holder fails to assert 
explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can the 
power­of­attorney holder verify the complaint on oath 
on such presumption of knowledge?
21.5.   Whether the proceedings contemplated under 
Section 200 of the Code can be dispensed with in the 
light of Section 145 of the NI Act which was introduced
by an amendment in the year 2002?”
The consideration made in paras 29 to 30 would be relevant to be 
noted, which read as hereunder: ­ 
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“29.   From a conjoint reading of Sections 138, 142 and
145 of the NI Act as well as Section 200 of the Code,  it
is   clear   that   it   is   open   to   the   Magistrate   to   issue
process   on   the   basis   of   the   contents   of   the
complaint,   documents   in   support   thereof   and   the
affidavit   submitted   by   the   complainant   in   support
of   the   complaint.   Once   the   complainant   files   an
affidavit in support of the complaint before issuance of
the   process   under   Section   200   of   the   Code,   it   is
thereafter   open   to   the   Magistrate,   if   he   thinks   fit,   to
call   upon   the   complainant   to   remain   present   and   to
examine   him   as  to  the   facts   contained   in   the   affidavit
submitted   by   the   complainant   in   support   of   his
complaint. However, it is a matter of discretion and the
Magistrate   is   not   bound   to   call  upon   the   complainant
to remain present before the court and to examine him
upon   oath   for   taking   decision   whether   or   not   to   issue
process on  the  complaint  under  Section  138 of  the  NI
Act. For the purpose of issuing process under Section
200   of   the   Code,   it   is   open   to   the   Magistrate   to   rely
upon   the   verification   in   the   form   of   affidavit   filed   by
the   complainant   in   support   of   the   complaint   under
Section 138 of the NI Act.   It is only if and where the
Magistrate,   after   considering   the   complaint   under
Section   138  of   the   NI  Act,   documents  produced  in
support thereof and the verification in the form of
affidavit   of   the   complainant,   is   of   the   view   that
examination of the complainant or his witness(s) is
required,   the   Magistrate   may   call   upon   the
complainant   to   remain   present   before   the   court
and   examine   the   complainant   and/or   his   witness
upon   oath   for   taking   a   decision   whether   or   not   to
issue   process   on   the   complaint   under   Section   138
of the NI Act.
30.   In   the   light   of   the   discussion,   we   are   of   the   view
that   the   power­of­attorney   holder   may   be   allowed   to
file,   appear   and   depose   for   the   purpose   of   issue   of
process   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   138
of   the   NI   Act.   An   exception   to   the   above   is   when   the
power­of­attorney   holder   of   the   complainant   does   not
have   a   personal   knowledge   about   the   transactions
then   he   cannot   be   examined.   However,   where   the
attorney   holder   of   the   complainant  is   in   charge   of
the   business   of   the   complainant   payee   and   the
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attorney   holder   alone   is   personally   aware   of   the
transactions,   there   is   no   reason   why   the   attorney
holder   cannot   depose   as   a   witness.   Nevertheless,
an   explicit   assertion   as   to   the   knowledge   of   the
power­of­attorney   holder   about   the   transaction   in
question   must   be   specified   in   the   complaint.   On
this   count,   the   fourth   question   becomes
infructuous.”
The   answer   to   the   question   raised   for   consideration   is
contained in para 33 which read as hereunder: ­
33.   While   holding   that   there   is   no   serious   conflict
between   the   decisions   in   M.M.T.C.   and   Vashdeo
Bhojwani,   we   clarify   the   position   and   answer   the
questions in the following manner:
33.1.   Filing   of   complaint   petition   under   Section
138   of   the   NI   Act   through   power   of   attorney   is
perfectly legal and competent.
33.2.   The power­of­attorney holder can depose and
verify   on   oath   before   the   court   in   order   to   prove
the contents of the complaint. However, the power­
of­attorney   holder   must   have   witnessed   the
transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due
course or possess due knowledge regarding the said
transactions.
33.3.   It   is   required   by   the   complainant   to   make
specific   assertion   as   to   the   knowledge   of   the
power­of­attorney   holder   in   the   said   transaction
explicitly   in   the   complaint   and   the   power­of­
attorney   holder   who   has   no   knowledge   regarding
the   transactions   cannot   be   examined   as   a   witness
in the case.
33.4.   In   the   light   of   Section   145   of   the   NI   Act,   it   is
open  to the  Magistrate  to rely  upon  the  verification  in
the   form   of   affidavit   filed   by   the   complainant   in
support   of   the   complaint   under   Section   138   of   the   NI
Act   and   the   Magistrate   is   neither   mandatorily   obliged
to call upon the complainant to remain present before
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the   Court,   nor   to   examine   the   complainant   of   his
witness   upon   oath   for   taking   the   decision   whether   or
not   to   issue   process   on   the   complaint   under   Section
138 of the NI Act.
33.5.   The   functions   under   the   general   power   of
attorney   cannot   be   delegated   to   another   person
without   specific   clause   permitting   the   same   in   the
power   of   attorney.   Nevertheless,   the   general   power   of
attorney   itself   can   be   cancelled   and   be   given   to
another person.”
                  ( Emphasis supplied )
11. A   cumulative   perusal   of   the   facts   of   the   instant   case
would   indicate   that   the   requirement   as   indicated   in   A.C.
Narayanan ,   (supra)   are   in   fact   satisfied.   Firstly,   as   noted
above, the complaint was filed in the name of the company i.e.,
“the   payee”,   through   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,   General
Manager   (Accounting).   The   authorisation   dated   23.05.2015   by
the  Managing  Director  in his favour  (Annexure P­17) discloses
that Mr. Priyabrata Panda, Managing Director of the appellant
company   had   authorised   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,   General
Manager   (Accounting)   to   institute   criminal   proceedings,
including  proceedings under the provisions of the N.I. Act and
civil   proceedings   on   behalf   of   the   company   against   M/s.   SMS
Asia   Private   Limited   (respondent),   to   represent   the   company
and take all necessary actions in the matter in learned SDJM’s
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Court. The specimen signature of Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das has
also   been   attested   by   the   Managing   Director.   The   Managing
Director apart from himself being the key managerial personnel
of   the   appellant   company,   has   also   been   delegated   the   power
by   the   Board   of   Directors   through   the   document   dated
06.04.1998   (Annexure   P­16).   Through   the   said   document   the
Managing   Director   has   been   delegated,   in   general,   all   powers
necessary   for   the   management   and   operation   of   the   company
and   it   has  been   specified   among   others,   to   exercise  the   power
relating   to   important   issues   affecting   the   company’s   land   and
property. Through the said document, the Managing Director is
also empowered to delegate where necessary and to the extent
required,   any   of   the   powers   delegated   to   him,   to   his
subordinate   officers.   The   above   noted   documents   would
disclose that the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was filed
on behalf of the “payee” company with due authorisation.
12. The next aspect on which the High Court has interfered
is on accepting the contention that there is no averment in the
complaint as to whether the General Manager (Accounting) had
any   knowledge   about   the   transaction   or   he   was   a   witness   to
the   transaction.   On   the   said   aspect   it   is   noted   that   the
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transaction   between   the   parties   is   based   on   the   agreement
dated   18.07.2014   (Annexure   P­1).   The   said   document   depicts,
below   the   signature   of   the   executives   representing   the
appellant   and   the   respondent   company,   a   witness   each   from
either   side   have   appended   their   signatures.   The   witness   on
behalf   of   the   appellant   company   is   none   other   than   Mr.
Subhasis Kumar Das who was at that point in time, designated
as   General   Manager   (Commercial).   Further,   the   document   for
reconciliation of account spanning the period from 01.04.2011
to   30.09.2014,   as   carried   out   on   28.10.2014,   depicts   that   the
same   was   attested   by   the   representatives   of   both   the
companies.   The   appellant   company   is   represented   by   Mr.
Subhasis   Kumar   Das.   That   apart,   when   the   cheques   were
dishonoured,   it   was   Mr.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,   General
Manager (Accounting) who had issued the notices (Annexure P­
11,   12­13)   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   company,   to   the
respondent company. The said documents would indicate that
the   person   who   had   knowledge   of   the   transaction   and   was
witness   to   it,   has   been   authorized   and   has   instituted   the
complaint on behalf of the company.
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13. Apart   from   the   factual   aspects   as   stated   in   the
complaint,   relating   to   the   transaction,   the   complaint   as   also
the   affidavit   supporting   the   complaint   contain   averments
regarding authorization in favour of and knowledge on the part
of Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, which read as hereunder: ­
“That,   the   complainant   Company   incorporated   under
the   companies   Act   1956   and   having   registered   office
At/PO/PS­Belpahar,   Dist.­Jharsuguda,   (Odisha)
represent   through   its   General   Manager
(Accounting),  Shri Subhasis  Kumar Das,   aged about
47   years,   S/O   Shri   Gopal   Chandra   Das   and   also
authorize by the Company to file this complaint.”
The verifying affidavit reads as hereunder:­
“ I,   Sri.   Subhasis   Kumar   Das,   aged   about   47   years,
S/o.   Gopal   Chandra   Das   General   Manager
(Accounting)   of   M/s.   TRL   Krosaki   Refractories
Limited,   At   /   PO   /PS­   Belpahar,   Dist.­Jharsuguda
(Odhisa),   do   hereby   solemnly   affirm   and   state   as
follows:­
1. That,   I   am   the   General   Manager   (Accounting)
of   M/s.   TRL   Krosaki   Refractories   Limited,
At   /   PO   /   PS­   Belpahar,   Dist.­Jharsuguda
(Odisha)   and competent to file this complaint
petition.
2. That, facts stated above in this complaint   
petition from Para : 1 to 13 are true to the   
best of my knowledge, belief and basing on 
the relevant documents.”
In   addition,   the   affidavit   filed   in   lieu   of   the   oral   sworn
statement before the learned SDJM to enable cognizance to be
taken contains the averment as follows: ­
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“ That   I   am   the   authorized   representative   of   the
complainant   Company   incorporated   under   the
companies   Act   1956   and   having   registered   office
At/PO/PS­   Belpahar,   Dist.   Jharsuguda   (Odisha)   has
filed   this   complaint   petition   against   the   accused
person.”
      (Emphasis supplied)
14. A   meaningful   reading   of   the   above   would   indicate   that
the   company   having   authorized   the   General   Manager
(Accounting)   and   the   General   Manager   (Accounting)   having
personal knowledge had in fact been clearly averred. What can
be   treated   as   an   explicit   averment,   cannot   be   put   in   a
straitjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance
and   the   manner   in   which   it   has   been   averred   and   conveyed,
based   on   the   facts   of   each   case.   The   manner   in   which   a
complaint is drafted may vary from case to case and would also
depend on the skills of the person drafting the same which by
itself,   cannot   defeat   a   substantive   right.   However,   what   is
necessary to be taken note of is as to whether the contents as
available   in   the   pleading   would   convey   the   meaning   to   the
effect that the person who has filed the complaint, is stated to
be   authorized   and   claims   to   have   knowledge   of   the   same.   In
addition,   the   supporting   documents   which   were   available   on
the   record   by   themselves   demonstrate   the   fact   that   an
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authorized   person,   being   a   witness   to   the   transaction   and
having   knowledge   of   the   case   had   instituted   the   complaint   on
behalf   of   the   “payee”   company   and   therefore,   the   requirement
of   Section   142   of   N.I.   Act   was   satisfied.   In   Vinita   S.   Rao   vs.
Essen Corporate Services (P) Ltd.  (2015) 1 SCC 527, to which
one   of   us   (Hon’ble   CJI)   was   a   member   of   the   Bench   has
accepted the pleading of such a nature to indicate the power to
prosecute   the   complaint   and   knowledge   of   the   transaction   as
sufficient to maintain the complaint.
15. Despite our conclusion that the documents available on
record   would   on   facts   satisfy   the   requirement   relating   to
delegation   of   power   and   also   knowledge   of   the   transaction   by
the person representing the Company in the instant case, it is
also   necessary   for   us   to   keep   in   perspective   that   though   the
case in   A.C. Narayanan   (supra) has taken the center stage of
consideration,   the   facts   involved   therein   were   in   the
background   of   the   complainant   being   an   individual   and   the
complaint   filed   was   based   on   the   power   of   attorney   issued   by
the  “payee” who  was  also  an individual. In such an  event, the
manner   in   which   the   power   was   being   exercised   was   to   be
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explicitly   stated   so   as   to   establish   the   right   of   the   person
prosecuting   the   complaint,   to   represent   the   payee   i.e.,   the
complainant.   The   position   that   would   emerge   when   the
complainant is a company or a corporate entity will have to be
viewed   from   a   different   standpoint.   In   this   regard   in   Samrat
Shipping   Co.   Pvt.   Ltd.   Vs.   Dolly   George   (2002)   9   SCC   455,
while   disapproving   the   manner   in   which   cognizance   was
refused  to be taken  and  the  complaint had been dismissed by
the learned Magistrate at the threshold, this Court has held as
hereunder:
“3. Having   heard   both   sides   we   find   it   difficult   to
support   the   orders   challenged  before   us.   A  company
can   file   a   complaint   only   through   human   agency.
The person who presented the complaint on behalf
of the Company claimed that he is the authorized
representative   of   the   company.   Prima­facie ,   the
trial   court   should   have   accepted   it   at   the   time
when   a   complaint   was   presented.   If   it   is   a   matter
of   evidence   when   the   accused   disputed   the
authority   of   the   said   individual   to   present   the
complaint,  opportunity should  have  been  given  to
the   complainant   to   prove   the   same,   but   that
opportunity   need   be   given   only   when   the   trial
commences.   The   dismissal   of   the   complaint   at   the
threshold   on   the   premise   that   the   individual   has   not
produced certified copy of the resolution appears to be
too   hasty   an   action.   We,   therefore,   set   aside   the
impugned orders and direct the trial court to proceed
with the trial and dispose of it in accordance with law.
Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on
31.1.2000.”
 (Emphasis supplied)
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16. Further,   in   National   Small   Industries   Corporation
Ltd. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.  (2009) 1 SCC 407, this
Court   though   was   essentially   considering   the  issue   relating  to
the   exemption   available   against   examining   a   public   servant
keeping  in  view  the  scope under  Section  200 (a) of Cr.PC, has
exhaustively   considered   the   validity   of   a   complaint   under
Section 138 of N.I. Act and the satisfaction of the requirement
under   Section   142   thereof.   In   the   said   context   this   Court   has
held as hereunder: ­
“14.   The   term   “complainant”   is   not   defined   under   the
Code.   Section   142   of   the   NI   Act   requires   a   complaint
under Section 138 of that Act to be made by the payee
(or by the holder in due course). It is thus evident that
in   a   complaint   relating   to   dishonour   of   a   cheque
(which   has   not   been   endorsed   by   the   payee   in   favour
of   anyone),   it   is   the   payee   alone   who   can   be   the
complainant.  The NI   Act   only  provides  that  dishonour
of   a   cheque   would   be   an   offence   and   the   manner   of
taking   cognizance   of   offences   punishable   under
Section   138   of   that   Act.   However,   the   procedure
relating   to  initiation   of   proceedings,   trial   and   disposal
of   such   complaints,   is   governed   by   the   Code.   Section
200 of the Code requires that the Magistrate, on taking
cognizance   of   an   offence   on   complaint,   shall   examine
upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present
and   the   substance   of   such   examination   shall   be
reduced   to   writing   and   shall   be   signed   by   the
complainant   and   the   witnesses.   The   requirement   of
Section 142 of the NI Act that the payee should be
the   complainant,   is   met   if   the   complaint   is   in   the
name   of   the   payee.   If   the   payee   is   a   company,
necessarily   the   complaint   should   be   filed   in   the
name   of   the   company,   if   a   company   is   the
complainant.  A  company  can be  represented  by an
employee   or   even   by   a   non­employee   authorized
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and empowered to represent the company either by
a resolution or by a power of attorney.
16. Section 142 only requires that the complaint
should   be   in   the   name   of   the   payee.   Where   the
complainant   is   a   company,   who   will   represent   the
company and how the company will be represented
in   such   proceedings,   is   not   governed   by   the   Code
but   by   the   relevant   law   relating   to   companies.
Section   200   of   the   Code   mandatorily   requires   an
examination   of   the   complainant;   and   where   the
complainant is an incorporeal body, evidently only
an employee or representative can be examined on
its   behalf,   As   a   result,   the   company   becomes   a   de
jure   complainant   and   its   employee   or   other
representative,   representing   it   in   the   criminal
proceedings,   becomes   the   de   facto   complainant.
Thus in every complaint, where the complainant is
an   incorporeal   body,   there   is   a   complainant   –   de
jure,   and   a   complainant­de   facto.   Clause   (a)   of   the
proviso   to   Section   200   provides   that   where   the
complainant   is   a   public   servant,   it   will   not   be
necessary   to   examine   the   complainant   and   his
witnesses.   Where   the   complainant   is   an   incorporeal
body   represented   by   one   of   its   employees,   the
employee   who   is   a   public   servant   is   the   de   facto
complainant   and   in   signing   and   presenting   the
complaint,   he   acts   in   the   discharge   of   his   official
duties.   Therefore,   it   follows   that   in   such   cases,   the
exemption   under   clause   (a)   of   the   first   proviso   to
Section 200 of the Code will be available.
19.   Resultantly,   when   in   a   complaint   in   regard   to
dishonour of a cheque issued in favor of a company
or   corporation,   for   the   purpose   of   Section   142   of
the   NI   Act,   the   company   will   be   the   complainant,
and   for   purposes   of   Section   200   of   the   Code,   its
employee   who   represents   the   company   or
corporation,   will   be   the   de   facto   complainant.   In
such   a   complaint,   the   de   jure   complainant,
namely,   the   company   or   corporation   will   remain
the   same   but   the   de   facto   complainant   (employee)
representing such de jure complainant can change,
from time to time.   And if the   de facto   complainant is
a public servant, the benefit of exemption under clause
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(a)   of   the   proviso   to   Section   200   of   the   Code   will   be
available,   even   though   the   complaint   is   made   in   the
name of a company or corporation.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. In   that   view,   the   position   that   would   emerge   is   that
when a company is the payee of the cheque based on which a
complaint   is   filed   under   Section   138   of   N.I.   Act,   the
complainant   necessarily   should   be   the   Company   which   would
be represented by an employee who is authorized.   Prima­facie ,
in   such   a   situation   the   indication   in   the   complaint   and   the
sworn statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the effect that
the   complainant   (Company)   is   represented   by   an   authorized
person   who   has   knowledge,   would   be   sufficient.   The
employment   of   the   terms   “specific   assertion   as   to   the
knowledge of the power of attorney holder”   and such assertion
about   knowledge   should   be   “said   explicitly”   as   stated   in   A.C.
Narayanan   (supra)   cannot   be   understood   to   mean   that   the
assertion  should be in  any  particular  manner, much  less only
in the manner understood by the accused in the case. All that
is   necessary   is   to   demonstrate   before   the   learned   Magistrate
that the complaint filed is in the name of the “payee” and if the
person   who   is   prosecuting   the   complaint   is   different   from   the
23

payee,   the   authorisation   therefor   and   that   the   contents   of   the
complaint   are   within   his   knowledge.   When,   the
complainant/payee is a company, an authorized employee can
represent   the   company.   Such   averment   and   prima   facie
material   is   sufficient   for   the   learned   Magistrate   to   take
cognizance   and   issue   process.   If   at   all,   there   is   any   serious
dispute   with   regard   to   the   person   prosecuting   the   complaint
not   being   authorized   or   if   it   is   to   be   demonstrated   that   the
person   who   filed   the   complaint   has   no   knowledge   of   the
transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted
and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open for the accused
to   dispute   the   position   and   establish   the   same   during   the
course of the trial. As noted in  Samrat Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd.
(supra),   dismissal   of   a   complaint   at   the   threshold   by   the
Magistrate   on   the   question   of   authorisation,   would   not   be
justified.   Similarly,   we   are   of   the   view   that   in   such
circumstances   entertaining   a   petition   under   Section   482   to
quash the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate would be
unjustified   when   the   issue   of   proper   authorisation   and
knowledge can only be an issue for trial. 
24

18. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the
High   Court   was   not   justified   in   entertaining   the   petition   filed
under   Section   482   of   Cr.PC   and   quashing   the   order   dated
05.11.2015,   taking   cognizance   of   the   complaint   filed   by   the
appellant. 
        Accordingly, we pass the following order;
(i) The   judgment   dated   14.12.2017   passed   in   CRL.
MC. No. 1210 of 2017 by the High Court of Orissa,
Cuttack is set aside.
(ii) The   complaint   in   I.C.C   Case   No.   422   of   2015   is
restored   to   the   file   of   SDJM,   Jharsuguda   with   a
direction to list the case on 15.03.2022 as the first
date for appearance of the parties.
(iii)   The   respondent   who   has   appeared   herein   and   is
represented by a counsel shall appear on the said
date before the learned Magistrate in continuation
of   the   proceedings   wherein   summons   had   already
been   issued,   without   expecting   fresh   summons   to
be issued.
(iv) Keeping   in   view   the   fact   that   the   complaint   is   of
the   year   2015,   the   same   shall   be   proceeded   with
25

further expeditiously and be concluded in a period
not   later   than   six   months   from   the   first   date
indicated above.
(iv) The   appeal   is   accordingly   allowed   with   cost
quantified   at   Rs.   1,00,000/­   (Rupees   one   lakh
only) payable by the respondent to the appellant.
19. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
..………… ....................CJI.
       (N.V. RAMANA)
… ..…………....................J.
(A. S. BOPANNA)
 .…..………......................J.
       (HIMA KOHLI)
New Delhi;
February 22, 2022
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