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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11397 OF 2016
SHRIKANT G. MANTRI   ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK       .... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T  
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. The   present   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant­
complainant   challenges   the   judgment   and   order   dated   1 st
June,   2016,   passed   by   the   National   Consumer   Disputes
Redressal   Commission,   New   Delhi   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“the   Commission”)   in   Consumer   Complaint   No.55   of   2006,
thereby   holding   that   the   appellant­complainant   was   not   a
consumer   as   envisaged   under   Section   2(1)(d)   of   The
Consumer   Protection   Act,   1986   (hereinafter   referred   to   as

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“the   said   Act”).     As   such,   by   the   impugned   judgment   and
order,   the   complaint   of   the   appellant   has   been   dismissed
being not maintainable. 
2. The facts in the present case are not in dispute.  The
bare   necessary   facts   for   adjudication   of   the   present   appeal
are as under:
3. The   appellant­complainant   had   opened   an   account
with   erstwhile   Nedungadi   Bank   Limited   (hereinafter   referred
to as “the erstwhile Bank”) in the year 1998.  The appellant is
a   stock­broker   by   profession.     The   appellant   had   applied   for
an   overdraft   facility   on   25 th
  April,   1998,   in   connection   with
his   day­to­day   share   and   stock   transactions.     It   is   not   in
dispute that the said overdraft facility was sanctioned by the
erstwhile   Bank   to   the   appellant­complainant   initially   for   an
amount   of   Rs.1   crore,   for   which   the   appellant­complainant
had   pledged   certain   shares   worth   more   than   Rs.1   crore,   as
security   as   per   the   margin   requirements   specified   by   the
erstwhile   Bank.     Subsequently,   in   the   year   1999,   the

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appellant­complainant   applied   for   enhancement   of   the   said
overdraft facility.  The said overdraft facility was enhanced by
the   erstwhile   Bank   from   Rs.1   crore   to   Rs.   5   crore,   vide   its
letter dated 13 th
 December, 1999.    
4. Again,   in   March   2001,   the   appellant­complainant
approached the erstwhile Bank for temporary increase in the
overdraft limit.   The erstwhile Bank, vide its letter dated 17 th
March,   2001,   granted   the   request   of   the   appellant   and
temporarily enhanced the overdraft facility from Rs.5 crore to
Rs.6 crore, for a period of one week.
5. It appears that due to steep fall in the share market,
the erstwhile Bank, vide its letters dated 16 th
 and 17 th
 March,
2001,   called   upon   the   appellant­complainant   to   pledge
additional   shares   to   regularize   the   overdraft  account.    As  an
additional   security,   the   appellant­complainant   pledged
37,50,000   equity   shares   of   face   value   of   Rs.10/­   of   unlisted
company   Ansal   Hotels   Ltd.   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
said   shares”)   towards   the   dues   of   the   Bank,   vide   his   letter
dated   30 th
  March,   2001.     It   is   not   in   dispute   that

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subsequently, consequent  to  the merger   of Ansal  Hotels  Ltd.
with ITC Ltd., and the bonus and splitting of ITC shares, the
aforesaid   37,50,000   equity   shares   of   Ansal   Hotels   Ltd.
became equivalent to 3,75,000 shares of ITC Ltd.
6. It appears that during 2001, the overdraft account of
the appellant­complainant became irregular and as such, the
erstwhile   Bank   called   upon   the   appellant­complainant   to
regularise   the   overdraft   account.     As   the   appellant­
complainant   was   unable   to   regularise   the   overdraft   account,
the   erstwhile   Bank,   vide   letter   dated   14 th
  September,   2001,
called   upon   the   appellant­complainant   to   pay   a   sum   of
Rs.600.61 lakhs along with interest thereon.  
7. It   is   the   case   of   the   appellant­complainant   that
though he had advised the erstwhile Bank to sell the pledged
shares   in   December,   2001,   so   as   to   close   overdraft   account,
the   erstwhile   Bank   chose   not   to   sell   the   said   shares   at   that
point of time.  It is the case of the appellant­complainant that
the said shares were sold by the erstwhile Bank in November
2002, when the market value of the said pledged shares was

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at   the   lowest,   which   resulted   in   huge   loss   to   the   appellant­
complainant.  
8. After selling a part of the pledged shares for a sum of
Rs.2,69,66,215.79,   the   respondent   Bank,   the   successor­in­
interest of the erstwhile Bank, filed a Recovery Petition before
the   Debts  Recovery   Tribunal,  Mumbai  against  the  appellant­
complainant   for   recovery   of   the   balance   amount   due   as   on
26 th
  December,   2002.     The   said   petition   was   decreed   by   the
Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai, vide order dated 26 th
 May,
2004.     However,   the   matter   was   settled   between   the   parties
and   a   ‘One   Time   Settlement’   (“OTS”   for   short)   was   reached
between   them   on   payment   of   Rs.   2   crore.     As   such,   the
respondent­Bank   issued   a   ‘No   Dues   Certificate’   dated   14 th
May,   2005,   certifying   that   no   dues   were   left   outstanding
against the overdraft account of the appellant.  After the OTS,
the respondent­Bank withdrew the recovery proceedings filed
against the appellant. 
9. It   is   the   case   of   the   appellant   that   since   the
respondent­Bank   failed   to   return   the   said   shares   to   the

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appellant,   he   sent   a   notice   on   14 th
  June,   2005   to   the
respondent­Bank , seeking release of the said shares.  
10. It   appears   that   the   appellant   was   also   working   as   a
stock­broker   of   the   respondent­Bank.     With   regard   to   the
transactions   with   the   appellant   in   the   capacity   as   a   stock­
broker,   the   respondent­Bank   had   initiated   arbitration
proceedings   against   the   appellant   before   the   Arbitration
forum   of   the   Bombay   Stock   Exchange   (‘BSE”   for   short).
According to the appellant, the respondent­Bank failed in the
said arbitration proceedings, which have attained finality. 
11. In   this   background,   the   appellant   filed   a   complaint
before the Commission, alleging deficiency  in services on the
part of the respondent­Bank.   The main relief claimed in the
said complaint was for a direction to the respondent­Bank to
return   3,75,000   shares   of   ITC   Ltd.   (earlier   37,50,000   shares
of   Ansal   Hotel   Ltd.)   along   with   dividend   and   all   accretions
thereon.
12. In   the   said   proceedings,   on   being   served   with   the
notice,   the   respondent­Bank   raised   a   preliminary   objection
with   regard   to   maintainability   of   the   said   complaint,   on   the

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ground   that   the   appellant­complainant   was   not   a   consumer
as   envisaged   under   Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said   Act.     The
Commission, by the impugned order, held that the appellant
had   availed   the   services   of   the   respondent­Bank   for
‘commercial purpose’ and as such, he was not a consumer as
envisaged under Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act.  
13. Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   appellant­complainant
has approached this Court by way of the present appeal.   
14. We   have   heard   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior
Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   Shri
Dushyant Dave, learned Senior  Counsel  appearing   on  behalf
of the respondent. 
15. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on   behalf   of   the   appellant­complainant,   submitted   that   the
appellant had a dual relationship with the respondent­Bank.
In   the   first   capacity,   as   a   consumer,   he   had   taken   the
overdraft   facility   from   the   respondent­Bank   for   the   purposes
of   his   self­employment.     In   the   second   capacity,   he   was
working   as   the   stock­broker   for   the   respondent­Bank.     The
learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that   with   regard   to   the

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said   relationship,   though   there   were   certain   disputes,   the
claim of the respondent­Bank before the Arbitration Forum of
BSE   has   been   rejected   by   the   BSE   Arbitral   Tribunal,   which
has attained finality.
16. Shri Divan further submits that it is undisputed that
the said shares were pledged with the respondent­Bank only
as   a   security   towards   the   overdraft   facility.   He   submits   that
from the letter of the respondent­Bank dated 14 th
 May, 2005,
it   is   clear   that   there   were   no   dues   outstanding   in   the
overdraft   account   of   the   appellant­complainant,   which   stood
fully   and   finally   settled   through   compromise/OTS.     He
submitted   that   once   the   dues   of   the   respondent­Bank
towards the said overdraft facility stood cleared, there was no
reason   for   the   respondent­Bank   to   have   withheld   the   said
shares.     He   submitted   that   though   the   arbitration
proceedings   between   the   parties   had   reached   finality,   the
respondent­Bank had illegally withheld the said shares of the
appellant.  He submitted that in spite of repeated requests for
return of the said shares, the same were not returned and as

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such,   the   appellant   had   no   option   but   to   file   the   complaint
under the said Act. 
17. Shri   Divan   submitted   that   though   Section   2(1)(d)(ii)
of the said Act, excludes a person who avails of such services
for ‘any commercial purpose’, the Explanation thereto, which
could be construed as proviso to proviso, would include even
such a person if it is shown that the services availed by him
were exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
means of self­employment.  He submitted that the services of
the   overdraft   facility   were   taken   by   the   appellant   from   the
respondent­Bank for the purposes of his business as a stock­
broker. He submitted that since the appellant was engaged in
the   profession   of   stock­broker   and   since   the   services   of   the
said   overdraft   facility   were   taken   for   the   appellant’s
profession   as   a   stock­broker,   the   services   rendered   by   the
respondent­Bank were exclusively for the purposes of earning
his   livelihood.     Learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that   the
appellant   was   self­employed   as   a   stock­broker   and   as   such,
the   services   availed   were   exclusively   for   the   purpose   of

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earning his livelihood by means of self­employment.   He relies
on the dictionary meaning of the word ‘livelihood’ as provided
in Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition. H e submits that the
Commission has grossly erred in giving restricted meaning to
the term ‘earning his livelihood by means of self­employment’.
Learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that   merely   because   a
person has availed the services of the Bank for expanding his
business,   that   cannot   be   a   ground   to   give   a   restricted
meaning   to   the   said   term.     Relying   on   the   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Internet   and   Mobile   Association   of
India   vs.   Reserve   Bank   of   India 1
,   he   submits   that   the
services of the Bank provide lifeline for any business, trade or
profession.     He   submits   that   in   the   present   era,   it   is   unable
for   any   person   to   survive   without   availing   the   services   of   a
Bank.       Learned   Senior   Counsel   submits   that   the
Commission   has   erred  in   holding   that   the   appellant   is   not   a
consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the said
1   (2020) 10 SCC 274

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Act.  In support of his submissions, he relied on the following
judgments of this Court:
(i) Lilavati   Kirtilal   Mehta   Medical   Trust   vs.
Unique Shanti Developers and others 2
;
(ii) Paramount   Digital   Colour   Lab   and   others
vs. AGFA India Private Limited and others 3
; 
(iii) Sunil   Kohli   and   another   vs.   Purearth
Infrastructure Limited 4
; 
(iv) CBI,   AHD,   Patna   vs.   Braj   Bhushan   Prasad
and others 5
.
18. Shri   Dushyant   Dave,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent­Bank, on the contrary,
submits that the said Act is a special statute enacted with the
purpose   of   providing   a   speedy   and   simple   redressal   to
consumer   disputes.     Shri   Dave   submits   that   the   said   Act
provides   a   summary   procedure   so   that   the   consumer
disputes are settled without undue delay. He submitted that
if the definition of the word ‘consumer’ is expanded, so as to
include   in   it   a   person   who   avails   of   such   services   for   any
2   (2020) 2 SCC 265
3  (2018) 14 SCC 81
4   (2020) 12 SCC 235
5   (2001) 9 SCC 432

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commercial   purpose,   the   very   purpose   of   the   said   Act   would
be   defeated.       He   submits   that   if   any   commercial   dispute
between   the  service   provider   and   the   availer/recipient   of   the
service is included in the definition of the word ‘consumer’, it
will give rise to floodgates of complaints.   It is submitted that
if   such   an   interpretation   is   accepted,   apart   from   the   same
being   inconsistent   with   the   provisions  of   Section   2(1)(d)(ii)  of
the   said   Act,   it   will   defeat   the   very   purpose   of   providing
speedy  justice to the consumers. He, therefore, submits that
no interference is warranted in the finding of the Commission
and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.  
19. For   appreciating   the   rival   submissions,   it   will   be
necessary   to   refer   to   Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said   Act,   as   it
exists today, which is as follows: 
“2. Definition.­   (1)     In   this   Act,   unless   the
context otherwise requires,­
(a) ……………………………………………………
………………………………………
(d) “consumer” means any person who,—
(i)   buys   any   goods   for   a   consideration
which   has   been   paid   or   promised   or

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partly paid and partly promised, or un ­
der   any   system   of   deferred   payment
and   includes   any   user   of   such   goods
other   than   the   person   who   buys   such
goods   for   consideration   paid   or
promised   or   partly   paid   or   partly
promised,   or   under   any   system   of   de ­
ferred payment when such use is made
with   the   approval   of   such   person,   but
does not include a person who obtains
such   goods   for   resale   or   for   any   com ­
mercial purpose; or
(ii)     hires   or   avails   of   any   services   for   a
consideration   which   has   been   paid   or
promised   or   partly   paid   and   partly
promised,   or   under   any   system   of   de ­
ferred payment and includes any bene ­
ficiary   of   such   services   other   than   the
person   who   hires   or   avails   of   the   ser ­
vices   for   consideration   paid   or
promised,   or   partly   paid   and   partly
promised,   or   under   any   system   of   de ­
ferred   payment,   when   such   services
are   availed   of   with   the   approval   of   the
first mentioned person   but does not in ­
clude a person who avails of such ser ­
vices for any commercial purpose;
Explanation .—For   the   purposes   of   this
clause,   “commercial   purpose”   does   not
include   use   by   a   person   of   goods   bought
and   used  by  him  and  services  availed by
him   exclusively  for  the purposes of earn ­
ing   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­em ­
ployment;”

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20. The   short  question,   therefore,  that   would  have  to   be
answered   in   the   present   case   is,   as   to   whether   the   services
availed by the appellant from the  respondent­Bank  would fall
within   the   term   ‘commercial   purpose’.     The   other   question
that   would   also   have   to   be   answered   is,   as   to   whether   such
services   are   exclusively   availed   by   the   appellant   for   the
purposes   of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­
employment. 
21. For   considering   the   said   issues,  we   will   also  have   to
examine the object while enacting the said Act as well as the
legislative   history   as   to   how   Section   2(1)(d)   has   come   in   its
present   form.     The   legislature   found   that   though   there   were
various provisions contained in various enactments to protect
the   consumers   and   provide   relief   to   them,   yet   it   became
necessary to protect the consumers from the exploitation and
to   save   them   from   adulterated   and   sub­standard   goods   and
services and to safe guard the interests of the consumers.  In
order   to   provide   for   better   protection   of   the   interests   of   the

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consumer,   the   Consumer   Protection   Bill   was   introduced   in
the Parliament.  
22. Perusal of  the ‘Statement  of  Objects  and Reasons’  of
the said Act would show that the said Act seeks to provide for
better   protection   of   the   interests   of   consumers   and   for   that
purpose,   to   make   provision   for   the   establishment   of
Consumer   Councils   and   other   authorities   for   the   settlement
of   consumer   disputes   and   for   matters   connected   therewith.
One   of  the  objects  for   enacting  the   said  Act   was  the   right   to
be   heard   and   to   be   assured   that   consumers’   interests   will
receive   due   consideration   at   appropriate   forums.   To   provide
speedy   and   simple   redressal   to   consumer   disputes,   a   quasi­
judicial   machinery   was   sought   to   be   set   up   at   the   district,
State   and   Central   levels.     It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the
preamble of the said Act, which reads thus:
“An   Act   to   provide   for   better   protection   of
the   interests   of   consumers   and   for   that
purpose   to   make   provision   for   the
establishment   of   consumer   councils   and
other   authorities   for   the   settlement   of
consumers’   disputes   and   for   matters
connected therewith.”

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23. The definition of the term ‘consumer’ as contained in
Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said   Act,   as   it   existed   in   the   original
enactment of 1986, reads thus:
“( d ) “consumer” means any person who,—
( i )   buys   any   goods   for   a   consideration
which   has   been   paid   or   promised   or
partly paid and partly promised, or un ­
der   any   system   of   deferred   payment
and   includes   any   user   of   such   goods
other   than   the   person   who   buys   such
goods   for   consideration   paid   or
promised   or   partly   paid   or   partly
promised,   or   under   any   system   of   de ­
ferred payment when such use is made
with   the   approval   of   such   person,   but
does not include a person who obtains
such   goods   for   resale   or   for   any   com ­
mercial purpose; or
( ii )     hires any  services for  a consideration
which   has   been   paid   or   promised   or
partly paid and partly promised, or un ­
der   any   system   of   deferred   payment
and   includes   any   beneficiary   of   such
services   other   than   the   person
who   hires   the   services   for   considera ­
tion   paid   or   promised,   or   partly   paid
and partly promised, or under any sys ­
tem   of   deferred   payment,   when   such
services   are   availed   of   with   the   ap ­
proval of the first mentioned person”

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24. It could thus  be seen  that  Section 2(1)(d) of the said
Act is in two parts.  Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act deals with
buying   of   goods.     A   person   who   buys   any   goods   for   a
consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid
and   partly   promised,   or   under   any   system   of   deferred
payment would be a consumer within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d)(i)   of   the   said   Act.     It   also   includes   any   user   of   such
goods   other   than   the   person   who   buys   such   goods   for   a
consideration,   which   has   been   paid   or   promised   or   partly
paid   or   partly   promised,   or   under   any   system   of   deferred
payment,   when   such   use   is   made   with   the   approval   of   such
person.   However, Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act excludes a
person   who   obtains   such   goods   for   resale   or   for   any
commercial purpose.  
25. Section   2(1)(d)(ii)   of   the   said   Act   is   with   respect   to
hiring of services.  According to it, the term ‘consumer’ means
any person who hires any services for a consideration, which
has   been   paid   or   promised   or   partly   paid   and   partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment.     It also

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included   any   beneficiary   of   such   services   other   than   the
person   who   hires   the   services   as   is   provided   under   Section
2(1)(d)(i) of the said Act.  
26. It could thus be seen that as per the definition of the
term   ‘consumer’,   under   Section   2(1)(d)(ii)   of   the   said   Act,   as
enacted originally, even if a person who hires any services for
any   commercial   purpose,   he   could   still   be   included   in   the
definition   of   the   term   ‘consumer’.     It   is   relevant   to   note   that
Section   2(1)(d)(i)   of   the   said   Act   clearly   kept   a   person   who
obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose,
out   of   the   ambit   of   definition   of   the   term   ‘consumer’.
However,   insofar   as   hiring   of   services   is   concerned,   no   such
provision was made in the original enactment.  
27. The   legislature   noticed   various   deficiencies   and
inadequacies   in   the   said   Act.     Therefore,   in   order   to   plug
these   loopholes   and   enlarge   the   scope   of   areas   covered,   the
legislature   brought   certain   amendments   to   the   said   Act   by
the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as “1993 Amendment Act”).   One of the objects of

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the   said   Act   was   to   enable   the   consumers,   who   are   self­
employed,   to   file   complaints   before   the   redressal   agencies,
where   goods   bought   by   them   exclusively   for   earning   their
livelihood,   suffer   from   any   defect.   By   sub­section   (5)   of
Section   2   of   the   1993   Amendment   Act,   the   following
amendments   were   effected   to   the   definition   of   the   term
‘consumer’:
“(5) in clause  (d) ,­
(A)   in   sub­clause   (ii) ,   for   the   word
“hires”,   in   both   the   places   where   it
occurs,   the   words   “hires   or   avails   of”
shall be  substituted ;
(B) after   sub­clause   (ii) ,   the   following
Explanation  shall be  inserted  at the end,
namely:­
‘ Explanation .­   For   the   purposes   of
sub­clause   (i) ,   “commercial   purpose”
does   not   include   use   by   a   consumer
of   goods   bought   and   used   by   him
exclusively  for   the purpose of  earning
his   livelihood,   by   means   of   self­
employment’;”
28.   It could thus be seen  that by  the 1993 Amendment
Act,   insofar   as   services   are   concerned,   wherever   the   word
“hires”   was   used,   the   same   was   substituted   by   the   words

20
“hires or avails of”.  By the said 1993 Amendment Act, insofar
as   Section   2(1)(d)(i)   is   concerned,   an   Explanation   was
provided   to   the   effect   that   ‘commercial   purpose’   does   not
include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him
exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means
of   self­employment.     It   could   thus   be   seen   that   though   the
original   Act   of   1986   excluded   a   person   from   the   ambit   of
definition   of   the   term   ‘consumer’   whenever   such   purchases
were   made   for   commercial   purpose;   by   the   Explanation,
which is an exception to an exception, even if a person made
purchases   for   ‘commercial   purpose’,   he   was   included   in   the
definition of the term ‘consumer’, if such a person bought and
used   such   goods   exclusively   for   earning   his   livelihood   by
means of self­employment.  The legislative intent is clear, that
though the purchases for commercial purposes are out of the
ambit of the definition of the term ‘consumer’ in the said Act,
if a person buys and uses such goods exclusively for earning

21
his   livelihood   by   way   of   self­employment,   he   would   still   be
entitled to protection under the said Act.   
29. The   legislature   further   noticed   several   bottlenecks
and shortcomings in the implementation of various provisions
of the said Act and with a view to achieve quicker disposal of
consumer   complaints,   and   to   make   the   said   Act   more
effective   by   removing   various   lacunae,   the   legislature
amended   the   said   Act   by   the   Consumer   Protection
(Amendment)   Act,   2002   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   2002
Amendment   Act”).     One   of   the   objects   for   bringing   out   the
2002   Amendment   Act   was   “exclusion   of   services   availed   for
commercial   purposes   from   the   purview   of   the   consumer
disputes  redressal   agencies”.     It  could   thus   be   seen   that   the
legislature noticed the mischief, that though   Section 2(1)(d)(i)
of   the   said   Act   kept   out   of   its   purview   the   goods   purchased
for commercial purpose, the said restriction was not found in
Section   2(1)(d)(ii)   of  the   said  Act.     As  such,   in  order   to   bring
Section   2(1)(d)(ii)   at   par   with   Section   2(1)(d)(i) ,   the   following
amendment was effected to in clause (d):

22
“(c) in clause  (d) ,­
(i) in   sub­clause   (ii) ,   the   following
words   shall   be   inserted   at   the   end,
namely:­
“but   does   not   include   a   person   who
avails of such services for any commercial
purpose”;
(ii) for   the   Explanation,   the   following
Explanation   shall   be   substituted,
namely:­
‘Explanation .—For   the   purposes   of
this   clause,   “commercial   purpose”   does
not   include   use   by   a   person   of   goods
bought   and   used   by   him   and   services
availed   by   him   exclusively   for   the   pur ­
poses   of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means
of self­employment’;”
30. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   by   the   2002   Amendment
Act, the legislature clearly provided that a person, who avails
of such services for any commercial purpose would be beyond
the   ambit   of   definition   of   the   term   ‘consumer’.     The
Explanation,   which   is   an   exception   to   an   exception,   which
earlier excluded a person from the term ‘commercial purpose’,
if goods were purchased by such a person for the purposes of
earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­employment,   was

23
substituted and the Explanation was made applicable to both
clauses   (i)   and   (ii).       It   can   thus   clearly   be   seen   that   by   the
2002   Amendment   Act,   though   the   legislature   provided   that
whenever a person avails of services for commercial purposes,
he   would   not   be   a   consumer;   it   further   clarified   that   the
‘commercial   purpose’   does   not   include   use   by   a   person   of
goods   bought   and   used   by   him   and   services   availed   by   him
exclusively   for   the   purposes   of   earning   his   livelihood   by
means of self­employment.   
31. It is thus clear that by the 2002 Amendment Act, the
legislature   has   done   two   things.     Firstly,   it   has   kept   the
commercial   transactions,   insofar   as   the   services   are
concerned,   beyond   the   ambit   of   the   term   ‘consumer’   and
brought   it  in   parity   with   Section   2(1)(d)(i),  wherein  a   person,
who   bought   such   goods   for   resale   or   for   any   commercial
purpose, was already out of the ambit of the term ‘consumer’.
The   second   thing   that   the   legislature   did   was   that   even   if   a
person   availed   of   the   commercial   services,   if   the   services
availed   by   him   were   exclusively   for   the   purposes   of   earning

24
his livelihood by means of self­employment, he would still be
a ‘consumer’ for the purposes of the said Act.  Thus, a person
who availed of services for commercial purpose exclusively for
the   purposes   of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­
employment   was   kept   out   of   the   term   ‘commercial   purpose’
and brought into the ambit of ‘consumer’, by bringing him on
par   with   similarly   circumstanced   person,   who   bought   and
used   goods   exclusively   for   the   purposes   of   earning   his
livelihood   by   means   of   self­employment.     It   could   thus   be
seen   that   the   legislature’s   intent   is   clear.     If   a   person   buys
goods   for   commercial   purpose   or   avails   services   for
commercial   purpose,   though   ordinarily,   he   would   have   been
out   of   the   ambit   of   the   term   ‘consumer’,   by   virtue   of
Explanation, which is now common to both Sections 2(1)(d)(i)
and   2(1)(d)(ii),   he   would   still   come   within   the   ambit   of   the
term ‘consumer’, if purchase of such goods or availing of such
services   was   exclusively   for   the   purposes   of   earning   his
livelihood by means of self­employment.   With this legislative

25
history   in   background,   we   will   have   to   consider   the   present
case. 
32. The   purpose   of   the   said   Act   has   been   succinctly
described   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Laxmi   Engineering
Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute 6
,   which is as under:
“ 10.   A   review   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act
discloses that the quasi­judicial bodies/au ­
thorities/agencies   created   by   the   Act
known   as   District   Forums,   State   Commis ­
sions and the National Commission are not
courts   though   invested   with   some   of   the
powers of a civil court. They are quasi­judi ­
cial tribunals brought into existence to ren ­
der   inexpensive   and   speedy   remedies   to
consumers. It is equally clear that these fo ­
rums/commissions   were   not   supposed   to
supplant but supplement the existing judi ­
cial system. The idea was to provide an ad ­
ditional   forum   providing   inexpensive   and
speedy   resolution   of   disputes   arising   be ­
tween   consumers   and   suppliers   of   goods
and services. The forum so created is unin ­
hibited   by   the   requirement   of   court   fee   or
the formal procedures of a court. Any con ­
sumer   can   go   and   file   a   complaint.   Com ­
plaint   need   not   necessarily   be   filed   by   the
complainant   himself;   any   recognized   con ­
sumers' association can espouse his cause.
Where a large number of consumers have a
6  (1995) 3 SCC 583

26
similar   complaint,   one   or   more   can   file   a
complaint on behalf of all. Even the Central
Government   and   State   Governments   can
act   on   his/their   behalf.   The   idea   was   to
help   the   consumers   get   justice   and   fair
treatment   in   the   matter   of   goods   and   ser ­
vices   purchased   and   availed   by   them   in   a
market   dominated   by   large   trading   and
manufacturing   bodies.   Indeed,   the   entire
Act revolves round the consumer and is de ­
signed  to   protect  his   interest.   The  Act   pro ­
vides   for   “business­to­consumer”   disputes
and   not   for   “business­to­business”   dis ­
putes. This scheme of the Act, in our opin ­
ion, is relevant to and helps in interpreting
the words that fall for consideration in this
appeal.”
33. It could thus be seen that this Court has clearly held
that   the   idea   of   enacting   the   said   Act   was   to   help   the
consumers   get   justice   and   fair   treatment   in   the   matter   of
goods   and   services   purchased   and   availed   by   them   in   a
market   dominated   by   large   trading   and   manufacturing
bodies.     It   has   been   held   that   the   entire   Act   revolves   round
the   consumer   and   is   designed   to   protect   his   interest.   It
provides   for   “business­to­consumer”   disputes   and   not   for
“business­to­business”   disputes.       It   has   been   held   that

27
forums/commissions   provided   by   the   said   Act   are   not
supposed   to   supplant   but   supplement   the   existing   judicial
system.   The   idea   was   to   provide   an   additional   forum
providing   inexpensive   and   speedy   resolution   of   disputes
arising   between   consumers   and   suppliers   of   goods   and
services. 
34. In   the   case   of   Laxmi   Engineering   Works   (supra),
this Court, while considering the scope of the definition of the
expression ‘consumer’ with relation to   Section 2(1)(d)(i)   of the
said Act and the Explanation added by 1993 Amendment Act,
observed thus:
“ 11.   Now   coming   back   to   the   definition   of
the expression ‘consumer’ in Section 2( d ), a
consumer   means   insofar   as   is   relevant   for
the purpose of this appeal, ( i ) a person who
buys   any   goods   for   consideration;   it   is   im ­
material   whether   the   consideration   is   paid
or   promised,   or   partly   paid   and   partly
promised,   or   whether   the   payment   of   con ­
sideration   is   deferred;   ( ii )   a   person   who
uses   such   goods   with   the   approval   of   the
person who buys such goods for considera ­
tion; ( iii ) but does not include a person who
buys such goods for resale or for any com ­
mercial   purpose.   The   expression   ‘resale’   is

28
clear   enough.   Controversy   has,   however,
arisen   with   respect   to   meaning   of   the
expression   “commercial   purpose”.   It   is
also   not   defined   in   the   Act.   In   the   ab ­
sence   of   a   definition,   we   have   to   go   by
its   ordinary   meaning.   ‘Commercial’   de ­
notes   “pertaining   to   commerce”   (Cham ­
ber's   Twentieth   Century   Dictionary);   it
means   “connected   with,   or   engaged   in
commerce;   mercantile;   having   profit   as
the   main   aim”   (Collins   English   Dictio ­
nary)   whereas   the   word   ‘commerce’
means   “financial   transactions   espe ­
cially   buying   and   selling   of   merchan ­
dise,   on   a   large   scale”   (Concise   Oxford
Dictionary).   The   National   Commission   ap ­
pears to have been taking a consistent view
that where a person purchases goods “with
a view to  using  such goods for  carrying  on
any activity on a large scale for the purpose
of   earning   profit”   he   will   not   be   a   ‘con ­
sumer’ within the meaning of Section 2( d )( i )
of   the   Act.   Broadly   affirming   the   said   view
and   more   particularly   with   a   view   to   obvi ­
ate   any   confusion   —   the   expression   “large
scale”   is   not   a   very   precise   expression   —
Parliament   stepped   in   and   added   the
explanation   to   Section   2(d)(i)   by   Ordi ­
nance/Amendment   Act,   1993.   The   ex ­
planation   excludes   certain   purposes
from   the   purview   of   the   expression
“commercial   purpose”   —   a   case   of   ex ­
ception to an exception.  Let us elaborate:

29
a   person   who   buys   a   typewriter   or   a   car
and   uses  them  for   his  personal   use  is  cer ­
tainly a consumer but a person who buys a
typewriter   or   a   car   for   typing   others'   work
for  consideration   or   for   plying   the   car   as  a
taxi   can   be   said   to   be   using   the
typewriter/car   for   a   commercial   purpose.
The   explanation   however   clarifies   that   in
certain   situations,   purchase   of   goods   for
“commercial   purpose”   would   not   yet   take
the   purchaser   out   of   the   definition   of   ex ­
pression   ‘consumer’.   If   the   commercial
use   is   by   the   purchaser   himself   for   the
purpose   of   earning   his   livelihood   by
means   of   self­employment,   such   pur ­
chaser   of   goods   is   yet   a   ‘consumer’ .   In
the   illustration   given   above,   if   the   pur ­
chaser himself works on typewriter or plies
the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease
to   be   a   consumer.   In   other   words,   if   the
buyer   of   goods   uses   them   himself,   i.e.,   by
self­employment, for earning his livelihood,
it   would   not   be   treated   as   a   “commercial
purpose”   and   he   does   not   cease   to   be   a
consumer for the purposes of the Act.   The
explanation reduces the question, what
is   a   “commercial   purpose”,   to   a   ques ­
tion of fact to be decided in the facts of
each   case.   It   is   not   the   value   of   the
goods   that   matters   but   the   purpose   to
which the goods bought are put to. The
several   words   employed   in  the  explana ­
tion,   viz.,   “uses   them   by   himself”,   “ex ­
clusively for the purpose of earning his

30
livelihood”   and   “by   means   of   self­em ­
ployment” make the intention of Parlia ­
ment   abundantly   clear,   that   the   goods
bought   must   be   used   by   the   buyer   him ­
self,   by   employing   himself   for   earning
his   livelihood.   A   few   more   illustrations
would   serve   to   emphasise   what   we   say.   A
person who purchases an auto­rickshaw to
ply   it   himself   on   hire   for   earning   his   liveli ­
hood   would   be   a   consumer.   Similarly,   a
purchaser   of   a   truck   who   purchases   it   for
plying   it   as   a   public   carrier   by   himself
would   be   a   consumer.   A   person   who   pur ­
chases a lathe machine or other machine to
operate it himself for earning his livelihood
would   be   a   consumer.   (In   the   above   illus ­
trations, if such buyer takes the assistance
of one or two persons to assist/help him in
operating the vehicle or machinery, he does
not   cease   to   be   a   consumer.)   As   against
this a person who purchases an auto­rick ­
shaw,   a   car   or   a   lathe   machine   or   other
machine to be plied or operated exclusively
by   another   person   would   not   be   a   con ­
sumer.   This   is   the   necessary   limitation
flowing   from   the   expressions   “used   by
him”,   and   “by   means   of   self­employ ­
ment”   in   the   explanation.   The   ambigu ­
ity in the meaning of the words “for the
purpose of earning his livelihood” is ex ­
plained   and   clarified   by   the   other   two
sets of words.”
[Emphasis supplied]

31
35. It can thus be seen that this Court observed that the
National Commission was taking a consistent view that where
a   person   purchases   goods   “with   a   view   to   using   such   goods
for carrying on any activity on a large scale for the purpose of
earning profit” he will not be a ‘consumer’ within the meaning
of Section 2(d)(i) of the Act. This Court observed that in order
to obviate any confusion that the expression “large scale” was
not a very precise expression, the Parliament stepped in and
added   the   explanation   to   Section   2(d)(i)   by
Ordinance/Amendment Act, 1993. It has been held that that
the   explanation   excludes   certain   purposes   from   the   purview
of   the   expression   “commercial   purpose”.     Various   examples
have been given by this Court as to what would come within
the term of ‘self­employment’.   
36. One instance given is that a person who purchases a
typewriter and works on the typewriter himself, the purchase
would be for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means
of self­employment and he would not cease to be a ‘consumer’

32
for   the   purposes   of   the   said   Act.   Another   example   given   is
that,   if   a   person   who   purchases   an   auto­rickshaw   to   ply   it
himself on hire for earning his livelihood, he would still be a
consumer   too.     This   Court   held   that   the   question   as   to
whether the transaction is for the ‘commercial purpose’ or for
‘earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­employment’   is   a
question   of   fact   that   has   to   be   decided   in   the   facts   of   each
case.     It   has   been   held   that   it   is   not   the   value   of   the   goods
that   matters   but   the  purpose   to   which   the   goods   so   bought,
are   put   to.   It   has   been   held   that   several   words   used   in   the
explanation, viz., “uses them by himself”, “exclusively for the
purpose   of   earning   his   livelihood”   and   “by   means   of   self­
employment”   make   the   intention   of   the   Parliament
abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the
buyer himself, for earning his livelihood. 
37. In   the   case   of   Cheema   Engineering   Services   vs.
Rajan Singh 7
, this Court  held that the manufacture  and sale
of bricks in a commercial way may also be to earn livelihood.
7  (1997) 1 SCC 131

33
As   such,   the   question   as   to   whether   the   complainant   used
the   machinery   for   the   manufacture   of   bricks   alone   or   with
members   of   his   family   and   as   to   whether   the   same   was   for
earning his livelihood, were the questions of fact to be decided
on the basis of evidence.   
38. In   the   case   of   Kalpavruksha   Charitable   Trust   vs.
Toshniwal Brothers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. and another 8
, this
Court   considered   the   question   as   to   whether   the   machines
purchased   by   the   Charitable   Trust   for   use   in   the   Diagnostic
Centre   were   meant   for   ‘commercial   purpose’   or   not.   It   was
sought to be urged on behalf of the Trust that the Trust was
not   carrying   out   a   profit­making   activity   and   as   such,   the
purchase   of   diagnostic   machines   would   not   come   within   the
ambit   of   the   term   ‘commercial   purpose’.     It   was,   therefore,
sought   to   be   urged   that   it   would   fall   within   the   definition   of
the term ‘consumer’.    This Court held that the finding of the
National   Commission   that   the   machinery   was   installed   for
commercial   purpose   and   as   such,   the   Trust   was   not   a
8  (2000) 1 SCC 512

34
‘consumer’   within   the   meaning   of   the   said   Act,   required   no
interference.  
39. In   the   case   of   Paramount   Digital   Colour   Lab
(supra),   this   Court   was   considering   the   case   of   unemployed
graduates,   who   had   started   a   business   of   photography   in
partnership   for   self­employment   and   for   their   livelihood.   For
the   said   purpose,   they   had   purchased   an   advanced   photo
processing, developing and printing machine.  It was the case
of the appellants therein that the respondents, despite having
the   knowledge   that   the   machine   was   not   working   properly,
had   unfairly   and   carelessly   sold   the   same   to   the   appellants.
As   such,   the   appellants   were   required   to   file   a   complaint
under   the   said   Act.     The   State   Commission   had   allowed   the
complaint. In appeal, the National Commission held that the
appellants   were   not   the   consumers   as   envisaged   under
Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said   Act,   since   the   purchase   of   the
machine   was   for   commercial   purpose.     Reversing   the   view
taken   by   the   National   Commission   and   upholding   the   view
taken by the State Commission, this Court observed thus:

35
“ 12.   In   this   case,   since   the   appellants   have
purchased   the   machine,   Section   2(1)( d )   of
the Act is applicable. “Consumer” as defined
under Section 2(1)( d ) of the Act does not in ­
clude   a   person   who   obtains   goods   for   a
“commercial   purpose”.   The   Explanation
supplied   to   Section   2(1)( d )   clarifies   that
“commercial   purpose”   does   not   include   use
by   a   person   of   goods   bought   and   used   by
him  and services availed by him exclusively
for the purposes of earning his livelihood by
means   of   “self­employment”.   If   both   these
provisions   are   read   together,   it   leads   to   the
conclusion   that   if   a   person   purchased   the
goods for consideration not for any commer ­
cial   purpose,   but   exclusively   for   the   pur ­
poses   of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of
“self­employment”,   such   purchaser   will
come within  the  definition  of “consumer”. If
a   person   purchases   the   goods   for   a   “com ­
mercial   purpose”   and   not   for   the   purposes
of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   “self­
employment”, such purchaser will not come
within   the   definition   of   “consumer”.   It   is
therefore clear, that despite “commercial ac ­
tivity”,   whether   a   person   would   fall   within
the definition of “consumer” or not would be
a question of fact in every case. Such ques ­
tion  of fact  ought  to  be  decided in  the facts
and circumstances of each case.
13.   “Self­employment”   necessarily   includes
earning   for   self.   Without   earning   generally
there   cannot   be   “self­employment”.   Thus,   if

36
a person buys and uses the machine exclu ­
sively   for   the   purposes   of   earning   his   liveli ­
hood by means of “self­employment”, he def ­
initely   comes   within   the   definition   of   “con ­
sumer”.   In   the   matter   on   hand,   the   quality
of   ultimate   production   by   the   user   of   the
machine would depend upon the skill of the
person who uses the machine. In case of ex ­
igencies,   if   a   person   trains   another   person
to operate the machine so as to produce the
final product based on skill and effort in the
matter of photography and development, the
same   cannot   take   such   person   out   of   the
definition of “consumer”.”
40. This Court, on facts in the said case, found that the
appellants   therein   were   unemployed   graduates   and   had
bought   the   said   machine   for   their   own   utility,   personal
handling   and   for   their   small   venture,   which   they   had
embarked   upon   to   make   a   livelihood.       This   Court   further
found   that   this   was   distinct   from   large­scale   manufacturing
or   processing   activity   carried   on   for   huge   profits.   It   was,
therefore,   held   that   the   appellants   therein   would   be
consumers   within   the   meaning   of   Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said
Act.

37
41. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, strongly relied on the judgment of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Lilavati   Kirtilal   Mehta   Medical
Trust  (supra), wherein this Court after considering the earlier
judgments held thus:
“ 19.   To   summarise   from   the   above   discus ­
sion,   though   a   strait   jacket   formula   cannot
be   adopted   in   every   case,   the   following
broad principles can be culled out for deter ­
mining whether an activity or transaction is
“for a commercial purpose”:
19.1.   The question of whether a transaction
is   for   a   commercial   purpose   would   depend
upon   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each
case.   However,   ordinarily ,   “commercial   pur ­
pose”  is  understood  to  include  manufactur ­
ing/industrial   activity   or   business­to­busi ­
ness transactions between commercial enti ­
ties.
19.2.   The   purchase   of   the   good   or   service
should have a close and direct nexus with a
profit­generating activity.
19.3.   The identity of the person making the
purchase   or   the   value   of   the   transaction   is
not conclusive to the question of whether  it

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is   for   a   commercial   purpose.   It   has   to   be
seen   whether   the   dominant   intention   or
dominant   purpose   for   the   transaction   was
to   facilitate   some   kind   of   profit   generation
for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary.
19.4.   If   it   is   found   that   the   dominant   pur ­
pose  behind purchasing  the  good  or  service
was   for   the   personal   use   and   consumption
of the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or
is   otherwise   not   linked   to   any   commercial
activity, the question of whether such a pur ­
chase   was   for   the   purpose   of   “generating
livelihood   by   means   of   self­employment”
need not be looked into.”
42. It   is   thus   clear,   that   this   Court   has   held   that   the
question,   as   to   whether   a   transaction   is   for   a   commercial
purpose   would   depend   upon   the   facts   and   circumstances   of
each   case.   However,   ordinarily,   “commercial   purpose”   is
understood   to   include   manufacturing/industrial   activity   or
business­to­business   transactions   between   commercial
entities; that the purchase of the good or service should have
a close and direct nexus with a profit­generating activity; that
the identity of the person making the purchase or the value of
the transaction is not conclusive for determining the question

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as to whether it is for a commercial purpose or not.   What is
relevant   is   the   dominant   intention   or   dominant   purpose   for
the  transaction  and as  to  whether  the  same  was to  facilitate
some kind of profit generation for the purchaser and/or their
beneficiary.     It   has   further   been   held   that   if   the   dominant
purpose   behind   purchasing   the   good   or   service   was   for   the
personal   use   and   the   consumption   of   the   purchaser   and/or
their beneficiary, or is otherwise not linked to any commercial
activity,   then   the   question   of   whether   such   a   purchase   was
for   the   purpose   of   “generating   livelihood   by   means   of   self­
employment” need not be looked into.  
43. On facts, it was held that the purchase of flats by the
appellant   therein   had   no   direct   nexus   with   the   profit
generating   activities.     The   flats   were   not   occupied   for
undertaking   any   medical/diagnostic   facilities   within   the
hospital   but   for   accommodating   the   nurses   employed   by   the
hospital.   It was further held that the flats are being provided
to the nurses without any rent and that the appellant  therein

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was   not   generating   any   surplus   from   occupying   the   flats   or
engaging in buying and selling of flats.
44. Insofar   as   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Sunil   Kohli   (supra),   relied   upon   by   the   appellant,   is
concerned,   this   Court   on   the   basis   of   the   evidence,   clearly
found that the complainants wanted to dispose of property in
Denmark   and   wanted   to   come   down   to   Delhi   to   start   a
business. It has further been found that for this purpose, the
premises in question were booked. As such, the said case was
a case wherein the commercial premises were booked by the
appellants   therein ,   who   had   left   their   employment   in
Denmark  and  purchased  the  premises  only   for  the  purposes
of   starting   their   business   for   earning   their   livelihood   by   way
of   self­employment.     Therefore,   the   said   case   was   a   case
wherein   the   appellants   therein   had   availed   of   the   services
exclusively   for   earning   their   livelihood   by   means   of   self­
employment.  
45. It   could   thus   be   seen,   that   when   a   person   avails   a
service for a commercial purpose, to come within the meaning

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of   ‘consumer’   as   defined   in   the   said   Act,   he   will   have   to
establish   that   the   services   were   availed   exclusively   for   the
purposes   of   earning   his   livelihood   by   means   of   self­
employment.     There   cannot   be   any   straitjacket   formula   and
such   a   question   will   have   to   be   decided   in   the   facts   of   each
case, depending upon the evidence placed on record. 
46. In   the   present   matter,   it   is   not   in   dispute   that   the
appellant   was   already   engaged   in   the   profession   of   stock­
broker,   much   before   he   availed   of   service   of   the   overdraft
facility   from   the   respondent­Bank .     It   is   also   not   in   dispute
that he was also acting as a stock­broker for the  respondent­
Bank .   It   is   also   not   in   dispute   that   the   appellant   took   the
overdraft   facility   and   also   sought   enhancement   of   the   same
from   time   to   time   in   furtherance   of   his   business   as   a   stock­
broker   and   for   the   purpose   of   enhancing   the   profits   therein.
As   already   held   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Laxmi
Engineering   Works   (supra),   the   terms   “services   availed   by
him”,   “exclusively   for   the   purpose   of   earning   his   livelihood”
and   “by   means   of   self­employment”   will   have   to   be   given   its

42
meaning, as intended by the legislature.   The said terms will
have   to   be   construed   in   context   with   the   purpose   for   which
the   said   Act   is   enacted.     We   have   elaborately   discussed   the
legislative   history   as   to     how   Section   2(1)(d)   of   the   said   Act
has   come   in   its   present   form   from   the   original   form.     The
amendments   incorporated   by   the   1993   Amendment   Act   as
well as by the 2002 Amendment Act would clearly show that
the   legislative   intent   is   to   keep   the   commercial   transactions
out   of   the   purview   of   the   said   Act   and   at   the   same   time,   to
give benefit of the said Act to a person who enters into such
commercial transactions, when he uses such goods or avails
such   services   exclusively   for   the   purposes   of   earning   his
livelihood by means of self­employment.  
47. In   the   present   case,   the   Commission   has   come   to   a
finding   that   the   appellant   had   opened   an   account   with   the
respondent­Bank ,   took   overdraft   facility   to   expand   his
business   profits,   and   subsequently   from   time   to   time   the
overdraft   facility   was   enhanced   so   as   to   further   expand   his
business and increase his profits.   The relations between the

43
appellant   and   the   respondent   is   purely   “business   to
business”   relationship.     As   such,   the   transactions   would
clearly   come   within   the   ambit   of   ‘commercial   purpose’.     It
cannot be said that the services were availed “exclusively  for
the   purposes   of   earning   his   livelihood”   “by   means   of   self­
employment”.   If the interpretation as sought to be placed by
the   appellant   is   to   be   accepted,   then   the   ‘business   to
business’   disputes   would   also   have   to   be   construed   as
consumer   disputes,   thereby   defeating   the   very   purpose   of
providing speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes. 
48. We,   therefore,   find   no   error   with   the   findings   of   the
Commission.   In   any   case,   the   Commission   has   already
granted   liberty   to   the   appellant   to   avail   of   his   remedy   by
approaching the appropriate forum, having jurisdiction. 
49. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.  There shall be
no   order   as   to   costs.     All   pending   applications,   if   any,   shall
stand disposed of. 
…............................J.
                             [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

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......................J.       
                                                  [B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 22, 2022