/2022 INSC 0202/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1984 OF 2022
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4080 of 2022]
SHYAM SEL AND POWER LIMITED 
AND ANOTHER             ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHYAM STEEL INDUSTRIES LIMITED    ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order passed by
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Calcutta   dated   24 th
December 2019, arising out of the order passed by the learned
1

Single Judge of the High Court dated 2 nd
  April 2019, by which
the   learned   Single   Judge   had   granted   time   to   the   appellants­
defendants   to   file   affidavit­in­opposition   and   directed   to   post
the   matter   after   three   weeks.     By   the   said   order,   the   learned
Single   Judge   also   directed   the   appellants­defendants   to
maintain   weekly   accounts   of   sale   of   the   products   covered   by
Class 6, which are sold under the mark ‘SHYAM’.
3. The   facts   in   the   present   case   are   not   much   in   dispute.
The respondent­plaintiff had filed a suit against the appellants­
defendants for infringement of trade mark and passing off.  It is
the   case   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   that   it   has   trade   mark
registration   in   respect   of   the   word   ‘SHYAM’   and   diverse   label
marks   wherein   the   word   ‘SHYAM’   features   prominently.     Both
the   respondent­plaintiff   and   the   appellants­defendants
manufacture   and   sell,   inter   alia,   Thermo­Mechanically   treated
bars (hereinafter referred to as “TMT bars”).  It is the case of the
respondent­plaintiff that in the year 2015, it came to know that
the   appellants­defendants   were   using   the   mark   ‘SHYAM’   in
2

their   products.     The   respondent­plaintiff   therefore,   through   its
advocate,   objected   to   such   use.     It   is   the   case   of   the
respondent­plaintiff   that   the   appellants­defendants   agreed   to
phase   out   the   products   that   they   had   manufactured   with   the
mark  ‘SHYAM’  and  not  to  use  the  said  mark  ‘SHYAM’ on  their
products in future.
4. It   is   further   the   case   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   that   the
appellants­defendants   had   applied   for   registration   of   the   mark
‘SHYAM INFRA’.  The respondent­plaintiff had filed its objection
to it.   It is further its case that since the appellants­defendants
did not file their counter­statement, the application lapsed and
was treated as abandoned. 
5. It   is   further   the   case   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   that
towards   the   end   of   2018,   the   appellants­defendants   started   to
use   the   word   ‘SHYAM   METALICS’   on   the   packaging   of   their
TMT   bars.     According   to   respondent­plaintiff,   though   the
appellants­defendants   had   used   the   word   ‘SHYAM’   on   their
invoices   and   stationeries,   they   had   not   used   the   said   word
3

‘SHYAM’   on   their   wrappers   in   which   their   TMT   bars   were
packed.  According to the respondent­plaintiff, this was done by
the appellants­defendants only to take advantage of the growing
and expanding business of the respondent­plaintiff and with an
intention   that   the   products   manufactured   and   sold   by   the
appellants­defendants   could   be   passed   off   as   those   of   the
respondent­plaintiff.   In   this   background,   the   respondent­
plaintiff   filed   a   civil   suit   being   CS   No.   63   of   2019   before   the
learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Calcutta,   claiming
infringement   of   their   registered   trade   mark   ‘SHYAM’   and   its
variants and also for passing off by the appellants­defendants.
6. Along   with   the   suit,   an   application   being   GA   No.857   of
2019   in   CS   No.   63   of   2019   for   temporary   injunction   under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “CPC”)   came   to   be   filed.     The   said
application basically claimed an order of injunction restraining
the   appellants­defendants   from   infringing   the   respondent­
plaintiff’s   trade   mark   ‘SHYAM’   and   its   variants   and   in
4

particular,   trade   mark   registration   No.   987596.     The   said
ssapplication   sought   an   injunction   restraining   the   appellants­
defendants   from,   in   any   manner,   passing   off   and   enabling
others to  pass  off the  respondent­plaintiff’s products by  use of
trade   marks   comprising   the   word   ‘SHYAM’   or   any   other   trade
mark similar thereto.  
7. The said suit and the application for temporary injunction
came to be filed in the month of March, 2019.   The application
came   up   for   consideration   for   grant   of   ad­interim   injunction
before the learned Single Judge on 2 nd
 April 2019.  The learned
Single Judge made a prima facie observation that he was of the
view   that   ‘SHYAM’   being   a   part   of   the   business   name   of   the
appellants­defendants,   no   injunction   should   be   passed   to
restrain   the   appellants­defendants   from   using   the   said   word
‘SHYAM’ on their packaging.  The learned Single Judge deemed
it appropriate to grant time to the appellants­defendants to file
affidavit­in­opposition, which was directed to be filed within two
weeks from the date of the said order.  It was also clarified that
5

no   prayer   for   extension   of   time   shall   be   entertained.     The
learned Single Judge directed the matter to be listed after three
weeks.     Vide   the   said   order,   the   learned   Single   Judge   also
directed the appellants­defendants to maintain weekly accounts
of sale of the products covered by Class 6, which are sold under
the mark ‘SHYAM’.  The learned Single Judge also clarified that
the observation made by him in the said order was prima facie
for the purpose of passing an order at the ad­interim stage and
the   same   would   not   have   any   relevance   at   the   time   of
considering and deciding the said application after exchange of
affidavits.
8. Being   aggrieved   by   the   said   order   of   the   learned   Single
Judge,   the   respondent­plaintiff   filed   an   appeal   before   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court.     The   Division   Bench   of   the
High   Court   by   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   24 th
December   2019   though,   has   observed   that   “the   order   of   the
learned   Single   Judge   dated   2 nd
  April   2019   is   modified”,   but   in
effect,   has   allowed   the   appeal   and   granted   an   injunction
6

restraining   the   appellants­defendants   from,   in   any   way,
manufacturing, selling or advertising their goods with the mark
‘SHYAM’ or with a label or device containing the mark ‘SHYAM’
till   the   disposal   of   the   suit.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the
present appeal.
9. This   Court,   while   issuing   notice   on   16 th
  June   2020,   had
stayed   the   impugned   judgment   and   order.     The   respondent­
plaintiff   had   therefore   filed   an   application   for   vacating   stay.
However,   this   Court   found   it   appropriate   to   decide   the   main
appeal itself on merits.  As such, we have heard learned Senior
Counsel for the parties at length.
10. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellants­defendants   submitted   that   the   appeal
filed   by   the   respondent­plaintiff   before   the   Division   Bench   of
the High Court was not tenable.   Relying on the judgment of this
Court   in   the   case   of   Shah   Babulal   Khimji   v.   Jayaben   D.
Kania   and   Another 1
,   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that
1   (1981) 4 SCC 8
7

the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   dated   2 nd
  April
2019   could   not   be   construed   to   be   a   ‘judgment’   within   the
meaning   of   Clause   15   of   the   Letters   Patent   of   the   High   Court
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “Letters   Patent”)   and   as   such,   the
appeal   itself   was   not   maintainable.     He   submitted   that   vide
judgment and order impugned before the Division Bench of the
High Court, the learned Single Judge had only granted time to
file   the   reply   and   had   neither   granted   nor   refused   an   interim
injunction.     Shri   Rohatgi   submitted   that   the   order   of   the
learned   Single   Judge   is   neither   a   final   judgment   nor   a
preliminary   judgment   nor   an   intermediary/interlocutory
judgment. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the order
passed by the learned Single Judge would not fall in any of the
categories   carved   out   by   this   Court   in   para   (120)   of   its
judgment in the case of  Shah Babulal Khimji  (supra).
11. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that in any case, the view
taken by the learned Single Judge could not be construed to be
either   impossible   or   perverse,   warranting   interference.     The
8

learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of this Court in
the case of  Wander Ltd. and Another v. Antox India P. Ltd 2
.
Shri   Rohatgi   further   submitted   that   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High   Court   has   in   fact   usurped   the   jurisdiction   of   the   learned
Single Judge to decide an application under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 CPC.  Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case
of   Monsanto   Technology   LLC   Through   the   authorized
representative   Ms   Natalia   Voruz   and   Others   v.   Nuziveedu
Seeds   Limited   Through  Director   and   Others 3
,   he  submitted
that   it   was   impermissible   for   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court  to do so.
12. Shri   Neeraj   Kishan   Kaul,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   submitted   that
the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly interfered with
the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge.     He   submitted
that   it   is   a   settled   principle   of   law   that   an   order   of   injunction
would be issued wherever an infringement of a registered trade
2   1990 Supp SCC 727
3   (2019) 3 SCC 381
9

mark   is   established.     He   relies   on   the   recent   judgment   of   this
Court   in   the   case   of   Renaissance   Hotel   Holdings   Inc.   v.   B.
Vijaya Sai and Others 4
13. Insofar as the objection of the appellants­defendants with
regard   to   maintainability   of   the   appeal   before   the   Division
Bench of the High Court is concerned, Shri Kaul would submit
that the view taken by this Court in the case of   Shah Babulal
Khimji   (supra)   would   rather   support   the   case   of   the
respondent­plaintiff than that of the appellants­defendants.  He
submitted   that   since   a   vital   and   valuable   right   of   the
respondent­plaintiff   was   infringed   by   non­grant   of   ad­interim
order   by   the   learned   Single   Judge,   the   appeal   was   very   much
tenable.     He   submitted   that   it   is   not   in   dispute   that   the
respondent­plaintiff   is   the   registered   owner   of   the   trade   mark
‘SHYAM’.   As such, once the infringement thereof was brought
to   the   notice   of   the   learned   Single   Judge,   the   learned   Single
Judge   ought   to   have   granted   ad­interim   relief   restraining   the
4   2022 SCC OnLine SC 61 [Civil Appeal No.404 of 2022 dated 19.01.2022]
10

appellants­defendants   from   using   the   said   trade   mark   and
passing   off   their   goods   as   that   of   the   respondent­plaintiff.     He
therefore   submitted   that   no   interference   is   warranted   in   the
present appeal.
14. Though   both   the   parties   have   addressed   this   Court   at
length on merits of the matter and have also taken us through
voluminous   documents,   we   do   not   find   it   necessary   to   go   into
those issues.  The present appeal arises out of an order passed
by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   an   intra­court
appeal   challenging   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge vide which the learned Single Judge had granted time to
the   appellants­defendants   to   file   affidavit­in­opposition   and
postponed the hearing of the application seeking injunction.
15. We   are   of   the   considered   view   that   any   observation   on
merits by this Court would prejudice the rights of either of the
parties   and   therefore,   we   are   restricting   ourselves   to   consider
the question with regard to tenability of the appeal against the
11

order   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   the   correctness   of   the
approach of the Division Bench of the High Court.
16. An   intra­court   appeal   lies   to   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.  Clause 15 of
the   Letters   Patent   enables   a   party   to   appeal   to   the   Division
Bench of the  High  Court against an  order  of the Single Judge.
A three­Judge Bench of this Court in the case of  Shah Babulal
Khimji   (supra) had an occasion to consider the question as to
what would be meant by the term ‘judgment’ used in Clause 15
of the Letters Patent.   In the said case, the plaintiff had filed a
suit   on the original side of the Bombay High Court for  specific
performance   of   a   contract   and   prayed   for   an   interim   relief   by
appointing   a   receiver   of   the   suit­property   and   injuncting   the
defendant   from   disposing   of   the   suit­property   during   the
pendency of the suit. The Single Judge of the High Court after
hearing   the   notice   of   motion   had   dismissed   the   said
application.   The   plaintiff   therefore   filed   an   appeal   before   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court .     The   Division   Bench   of   the
12

High  Court   held  that  the  order  of  the   Single  Judge  refusing  to
appoint   a   receiver   and   to   grant   an   injunction   could   not   be
construed   to   be   a   ‘judgment’   as   contemplated   by   Clause   15   of
the   Letters   Patent.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   plaintiff   had
approached this Court.   Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, speaking
for himself and Justice Varadarajan, observed thus:
109.   Clause  15  makes  no  attempt  to  define  what  a
judgment is. As letters patent is a special law which
carves  out   its  own  sphere, it  would  not   be  possible
for   us   to   project   the   definition   of   the   word
“judgment” appearing in Section 2(9) of the Code of
1908,   which   defines   “judgment”   into   the   letters
patent:
“‘Judgment’   means   the   statement   given
by   the   Judge   of   the   grounds   of   a   decree
or order.”
110.   In   Mt. Shahzadi Begam , v.   Alak Nath   [AIR 1935
All   620   :   1935   ALJ   681   :   157   IC   347]   ,   Sulaiman,
C.J.,   very   rightly   pointed   out   that   as   the   letters
patent   were   drafted   long   before   even   the   Code   of
1882 was passed, the  word “judgment”  used in  the
letters   patent   cannot   be   relatable   to   or   confined   to
the   definition   of   “judgment”   as   contained   in   the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure   which   came   into   existence
long   after   the   letters   patent   were   given.   In   this
13

connection,   the   Chief   Justice   observed   [29   Cal   LJ
225] as follows:
“It has been held in numerous cases that
as   the   letters   patent   were   drafted   long
before  even   the   earlier   Code  of   1882   was
passed, the word ‘judgment’ used therein
does   not   mean   the   judgment   as   defined
in the existing Code of Civil Procedure. At
the   same   time   the   word   ‘judgment’   does
not   include   every   possible   order,   final,
preliminary   or   interlocutory   passed   by   a
Judge of the High Court.”
111.   We  find  ourselves in   complete  agreement  with
the observations made by the Allahabad High Court
on this aspect of the matter.
112.   The   definition   of   the   word   “judgment”   in   sub­
section (9) of Section 2 of the Code of 1908 is linked
with   the   definition   of   “decree”   which   is   defined   in
sub­section (2) of Section 2 thus:
“ ‘Decree’ means the formal expression of
an   adjudication   which,   so   far   as   regards
the   Court   expressing   it,   conclusively
determines   the   rights   of   the   parties   with
regard   to   all   or   any   of   the   matters   in
controversy in the suit and may be either
preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to
include   the   rejection   of   a   plaint   and   the
determination   of   any   question   within
Section   47   or   Section   144,   but   shall   not
include—
14

( a )   any   adjudication   from   which   an
appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
( b ) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation.— A   decree   is   preliminary
when   further   proceedings   have   to   be
taken   before   the   suit   can   be   completely
disposed   of.   It   is   final   when   such
adjudication   completely   disposes   of   the
suit.   It   may   be   partly   preliminary   and
partly final.”
113.   Thus,   under   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   a
judgment consists of the reasons and grounds for a
decree passed by a court. As a judgment constitutes
the   reasons   for   the   decree   it   follows   as   a   matter   of
course   that   the   judgment   must   be   a   formal
adjudication   which   conclusively   determines   the
rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the
matters in controversy.   The concept of a judgment
as   defined   by   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure   seems   to
be   rather   narrow   and   the   limitations   engrafted   by
sub­section   (2)   of   Section   2   cannot   be   physically
imported into  the  definition  of  the  word “judgment”
as   used   in   clause   15   of   the   letters   patent   because
the  letters patent has  advisedly  not used the terms
“order”   or   “decree”   anywhere.   The   intention,
therefore, of the givers of the letters patent was that
the   word   “judgment”   should   receive   a   much   wider
and   more   liberal   interpretation   than   the   word
“judgment”   used   in   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure.   At
the   same   time,   it   cannot   be   said   that   any   order
passed   by   a   trial   Judge   would   amount   to   a
judgment;   otherwise   there   will   be   no   end   to   the
number of orders which would be appealable under
the   letters   patent.   It   seems   to   us   that   the   word
15

“judgment” has undoubtedly a concept of finality in
a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words,
a judgment can be of three kinds:
(1)   A   final   judgment. —   A   judgment   which
decides   all   the   questions   or   issues   in
controversy   so   far   as   the   trial   Judge   is
concerned   and   leaves   nothing   else   to   be
decided.   This   would   mean   that   by   virtue
of   the   judgment,   the   suit   or   action
brought   by   the   plaintiff   is   dismissed   or
decreed   in   part   or   in   full.   Such   an   order
passed   by   the   trial   Judge   indisputably
and unquestionably is a judgment within
the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent   and
even   amounts   to   a   decree   so   that   an
appeal would lie from such a judgment to
a Division Bench.
(2)   A   preliminary   judgment.— This   kind   of
a   judgment   may   take   two   forms—( a )
where   the   trial   Judge   by   an   order
dismisses  the  suit  without  going  into  the
merits   of   the   suit   but   only   on   a
preliminary   objection   raised   by   the
defendant   or   the   party   opposing   on   the
ground that the suit is not maintainable.
Here   also,   as   the   suit   is   finally   decided
one way or the other, the order passed by
the   trial   Judge   would   be   a   judgment
finally   deciding   the   cause   so   far   as   the
Trial   Judge   is   concerned   and   therefore
appealable   to   the   larger   Bench.   ( b )
Another   shape   which   a   preliminary
judgment may take is that where the trial
Judge   passes   an   order   after   hearing   the
preliminary   objections   raised   by   the
defendant   relating   to   maintainability   of
16

the   suit,   e.g.,   bar   of   jurisdiction,   res
judicata ,   a   manifest   defect   in   the   suit,
absence   of   notice   under   Section   80   and
the like, and these objections are decided
by   the  trial  Judge  against  the  defendant,
the   suit   is   not   terminated   but   continues
and   has   to   be   tried   on   merits   but   the
order   of   the   trial   Judge   rejecting   the
objections   doubtless   adversely   affects   a
valuable right of the defendant who, if his
objections  are  valid,  is entitled  to  get  the
suit   dismissed   on   preliminary   grounds.
Thus, such an order even though it keeps
the   suit   alive,   undoubtedly   decides   an
important aspect of the trial which affects
a   vital   right   of   the   defendant   and   must,
therefore, be construed to  be a  judgment
so as to be appealable to a larger Bench.
(3)   Intermediary or interlocutory judgment.
— Most of the interlocutory orders which
contain   the   quality   of   finality   are   clearly
specified in clauses ( a ) to ( w ) of Order 43
Rule 1 and have already been held by us
to   be   judgments   within   the   meaning   of
the   letters   patent   and,   therefore,
appealable.   There   may   also   be
interlocutory   orders   which   are   not
covered   by   Order   43   Rule   1   but   which
also   possess   the   characteristics   and
trappings   of   finality   in   that,   the   orders
may   adversely   affect   a   valuable   right   of
the   party   or   decide   an   important   aspect
of   the   trial   in   an   ancillary   proceeding.
Before   such   an   order   can   be   a   judgment
the adverse effect on the party concerned
must   be   direct   and   immediate   rather
17

than   indirect   or   remote.   For   instance,
where   the   trial   Judge   in   a   suit   under
Order   37   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure
refuses the defendant leave to defend the
suit,   the   order   directly   affects   the
defendant   because   he   loses   a   valuable
right to defend the suit and his remedy is
confined   only   to   contest   the   plaintiff's
case   on   his   own   evidence   without   being
given a chance to rebut that evidence. As
such   an   order   vitally   affects   a   valuable
right of the defendant it will undoubtedly
be   treated   as   a   judgment   within   the
meaning   of  the   letters   patent   so  as   to  be
appealable   to   a   larger   Bench.   Take   the
converse case in a similar suit where the
trial Judge allows the defendant to defend
the   suit   in   which   case   although   the
plaintiff   is   adversely   affected   but   the
damage or prejudice caused to him is not
direct   or   immediate   but   of   a   minimal
nature and rather too remote because the
plaintiff   still   possesses   his   full   right   to
show   that   the   defence   is   false   and
succeed in  the suit. Thus, such  an order
passed   by   the   trial   Judge   would   not
amount   to   a   judgment   within   the
meaning of clause 15 of the letters patent
but  will be purely   an  interlocutory  order.
Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes
an order setting aside an ex parte decree
against   the   defendant,   which   is   not
appealable   under   any   of   the   clauses   of
Order   43   Rule   1   though   an   order
rejecting   an   application   to   set   aside   the
decree passed ex parte falls within Order
18

43   Rule   1   clause   ( d )   and   is   appealable,
the   serious   question   that   arises   is
whether   or   not   the   order   first   mentioned
is   a   judgment   within   the   meaning   of
letters patent. The fact, however, remains
that   the   order   setting   aside   the   ex   parte
decree   puts   the   defendant   to   a   great
advantage   and   works   serious   injustice  to
the plaintiff because as a consequence of
the order, the plaintiff has now to contest
the   suit   and   is   deprived   of   the   fruits   of
the   decree  passed   in   his  favour.  In   these
circumstances,   therefore,   the   order
passed   by   the   trial   Judge   setting   aside
the   ex   parte   decree   vitally   affects   the
valuable   rights   of   the   plaintiff   and   hence
amounts   to   an   interlocutory   judgment
and   is   therefore,   appealable   to   a   larger
Bench.”
114.   In   the  course   of   the   trial,   the   trial   Judge   may
pass   a   number   of   orders   whereby   some   of   the
various   steps   to   be   taken   by   the   parties   in
prosecution   of   the   suit   may   be   of   a   routine   nature
while   other   orders   may   cause   some   inconvenience
to one party or the other, e.g., an order refusing an
adjournment,   an   order   refusing   to   summon   an
additional   witness   or   documents,   an   order   refusing
to condone delay in filing documents, after the first
date   of   hearing   an   order   of   costs   to   one   of   the
parties   for   its   default   or   an   order   exercising
discretion in respect of a procedural matter against
one   party   or   the   other.   Such   orders   are   purely
interlocutory   and   cannot   constitute   judgments
because it will always be open to the aggrieved party
to make a grievance of the order passed against the
19

party   concerned   in   the   appeal   against   the   final
judgment passed by the trial Judge.
115.   Thus, in other words every interlocutory order
cannot   be   regarded   as   a   judgment   but   only   those
orders would be judgments which decide matters of
moment   or   affect   vital   and   valuable   rights   of   the
parties   and   which   work   serious   injustice   to   the
party   concerned.   Similarly,   orders   passed   by   the
trial   Judge   deciding   question   of   admissibility   or
relevancy   of   a   document   also   cannot   be   treated   as
judgments   because  the   grievance  on   this   score   can
be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against
the final judgment.
116.   We   might   give   another   instance   of   an
interlocutory order which amounts to an exercise of
discretion and which may yet amount to a judgment
within   the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent.   Suppose
the   trial   Judge   allows   the   plaintiff   to   amend   his
plaint   or   include   a   cause   of   action   or   a   relief   as   a
result   of   which   a   vested   right   of   limitation   accrued
to   the   defendant   is   taken   away   and   rendered
nugatory. It is manifest that in such cases, although
the   order   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   is   purely
discretionary   and   interlocutory,   it   causes   gross
injustice   to   the   defendant   who   is   deprived   of   a
valuable right of defence to the suit. Such an order,
therefore,   though   interlocutory   in   nature   contains
the   attributes   and   characteristics   of   finality   and
must  be  treated  as   a  judgment   within   the  meaning
of   the   letters   patent.   This   is   what   was   held   by   this
Court in   Shanti Kumar case   [(1974) 2 SCC 387 : AIR
1974   SC   1719   :   (1975)   1   SCR   550]   ,   as   discussed
above.
20

117.   Let us take another instance of a similar order
which may not amount to a judgment. Suppose, the
trial   Judge   allows   the   plaintiff   to   amend   the   plaint
by adding a particular relief or taking an additional
ground   which   may   be   inconsistent   with   the   pleas
taken   by   him   but   is   not   barred   by   limitation   and
does   not   work   serious   injustice   to   the   defendant
who   would   have   ample   opportunity   to   disprove   the
amended plea taken by plaintiff at the trial. In such
cases,   the   order   of   the   trial   Judge   would   only   be   a
simple   interlocutory   order   without   containing   any
quality   of   finality   and   would   therefore   not   be   a
judgment   within   the   meaning   of   clause   15   of   the
letters patent.
118.   The   various   instances   given   by   us   would
constitute   sufficient   guidelines   to   determine
whether or not an order passed by the trial Judge is
a judgment within the meaning of the letters patent.
We   must   however   hasten   to   add   that   instances
given   by   us   are   illustrative   and   not   exhaustive.   We
have already referred to the various tests laid down
by the Calcutta, Rangoon and Madras High Courts.
So   far   as   the   Rangoon   High   Court   is   concerned   we
have already pointed out that the strict test that an
order   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   would   be   a
judgment   only   if   it   amounts   to   a   decree   under   the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   is   legally   erroneous   and
opposed to the very tenor and spirit of the language
of   the   letters   patent.   We,   therefore,   do   not   approve
of   the   test   laid   down   by   the   Rangoon   High   Court
and   that  decision  therefore  has  to  be  confined  only
to   the   facts   of   that   particular   case   because   that
being   a   case   of   transfer,   it   is   manifest   that   no
21

question of any finality was involved in the order of
transfer.   We   would   like   to   adopt   and   approve   of
generally   the   tests   laid   down   by   Sir   White,   C.J.,
in   Tuljaram   Row   case   [ILR   35   Mad   1]   (which   seems
to   have   been   followed   by   most   of   the   High   Courts)
minus   the   broader   and   the   wider   attributes
adumbrated by Sir White, C.J., or more explicitly by
Krishnaswamy   Ayyar,   J.   as   has   been   referred   to
above.
119.   Apart   from   the   tests   laid   down   by   Sir   White,
C.J., the following considerations must prevail with
the court:
“(1)   That   the   trial   Judge   being   a   senior
court   with   vast   experience   of   various
branches   of   law   occupying   a   very   high
status   should   be   trusted   to   pass
discretionary  or  interlocutory   orders with
due regard to the well settled principles of
civil   justice.   Thus,   any   discretion
exercised or routine orders passed by the
trial Judge in the course of the suit which
may   cause   some   inconvenience   or,   to
some extent, prejudice to one party or the
other   cannot   be   treated   as   a   judgment
otherwise   the   appellate   court   (Division
Bench)   will   be   flooded   with   appeals   from
all   kinds   of   orders   passed   by   the   trial
Judge.   The   courts   must   give   sufficient
allowance   to   the   trial   Judge   and   raise   a
presumption that any discretionary order
which he passes must be presumed to be
correct   unless   it   is   ex   facie   legally
erroneous   or   causes   grave   and
substantial injustice.
22

(2)   That   the   interlocutory   order   in   order
to be a judgment must contain the traits
and   trappings   of   finality   either   when   the
order   decides   the   questions   in
controversy   in   an   ancillary   proceeding   or
in   the   suit   itself   or   in   a   part   of   the
proceedings.
(3) The tests laid down by Sir White, C.J.
as also by Sir Couch, C.J. as modified by
later decisions of the Calcutta High Court
itself   which   have   been   dealt   with   by   us
elaborately should be borne in mind.”
120.   Thus,   these   are   some   of   the   principles   which
might   guide   a   Division   Bench   in   deciding   whether
an   order   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   amounts   to   a
judgment   within   the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent.
We   might,   however,   at   the   risk   of   repetition   give
illustrations   of   interlocutory   orders   which   may   be
treated as judgments:
(1)   An   order   granting   leave   to   amend   the
plaint   by   introducing   a   new   cause   of
action which completely alters the nature
of the suit and takes away a vested right
of   limitation   or   any   other   valuable   right
accrued to the defendant.
(2) An order rejecting the plaint.
(3)   An   order   refusing   leave   to   defend   the
suit   in   an   action   under   Order   37,   of   the
Code of Civil Procedure.
23

(4)   An   order   rescinding   leave   of   the   trial
Judge granted by him under clause 12 of
the letters patent.
(5)   An   order   deciding   a   preliminary
objection   to   the   maintainability   of   the
suit  on  the  ground  of  limitation,  absence
of   notice   under   Section   80,   bar   against
competency   of   the   suit   against   the
defendant   even   though   the   suit   is   kept
alive.
(6) An order rejecting an application for a
judgment   on   admission   under   Order   12
Rule 6.
(7)   An   order   refusing   to   add   necessary
parties   in   a   suit   under   Section   92   of   the
Code of Civil Procedure.
(8)   An   order   varying   or   amending   a
decree.
(9)   An   order   refusing   leave   to   sue   in
forma pauperis.
(10) An order granting review.
(11)   An   order   allowing   withdrawal   of   the
suit with liberty to file a fresh one.
(12) An order holding that the defendants
are not agriculturists within the meaning
of the special law.
(13) An order staying or refusing to stay a
suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
(14) An order granting or refusing to stay
execution of the decree.
(15)   An   order   deciding   payment   of   court
fees against the plaintiff.”
24

121.   Here,   it   may   be   noted   that   whereas   an   order
deciding   the   nature   of   the   court   fees   to   be   paid   by
the   plaintiff   would   be   a   judgment   but   this   order
affects only the plaintiff or the Government and not
the   defendant.   Thus,   only   the   plaintiff   or   the
Government  as  the  case  may  be will  have  the  right
to   file  an   appeal  in   the  Division  Bench  and  not  the
defendant because the question of payment of court
fees   is   a   matter   between   the   Government   and   the
plaintiff   and   the   defendant   has   no   locus   in   this
regard.
122.   We   have   by   way   of   sample   laid   down   various
illustrative examples of an order which may amount
to   judgment   but   it   is   not   possible   to   give   such   an
exhaustive list as may cover all possible cases. Law
with   its   dynamism,   pragmatism   and   vastness   is
such a large ocean that it is well­nigh impossible for
us   to   envisage   or   provide   for   every   possible
contingency   or  situation   so  as  to  evolve  a  device  or
frame   an   exhaustive   formula   or   strategy   to   confine
and   incarcerate   the   same   in   a   strait­jacket.   We,
however,   hope   and   trust   that   by   and   large   the
controversy   raging   for   about   a   century   on   the
connotation of the term “judgment” would have now
been  settled  and  a  few  cases  which  may   have  been
left out, would undoubtedly be decided by the court
concerned in the light of the tests, observations and
principles enunciated by us.
123.   In   the   instant   case,   as   the   order   of   the   trial
Judge   was   one   refusing   appointment   of   a   receiver
and   grant   of   an   ad­interim   injunction,   it   is
undoubtedly   a  judgment   within   the   meaning   of  the
letters patent both because in view of our judgment.
25

Order   43   Rule   1   applies   to   internal   appeals   in   the
High Court and apart from it such an order even on
merits   contains   the   quality   of   finality   and   would
therefore   be   a   judgment   within   the   meaning   of
clause  15  of   the   letters   patent.  The   consistent   view
taken   by   the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   various
cases   noted   above   or   other   cases   which   may   not
have   been   noticed   by   us   regarding   the   strict
interpretation   of   clause   15   of   the   letters   patent   are
hereby   overruled   and   the   Bombay   High   Court   is
directed to decide the question in future in the light
of our decision.
124.   We,   therefore,   hold   that   the   order   passed   by
the trial Judge in the instant case being a judgment
within   the   meaning   of   clause   15   of   the   letters
patent,   the   appeal   before   the   Division   Bench   was
maintainable   and   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court was in error in dismissing the appeal without
deciding  it  on   merits.   We   have   already   directed   the
High   Court   to   decide   the   appeal   on   merits   by   our
formal order dated April 22, 1981.”
17. It could thus be seen that though this Court has held that
the term ‘judgment’ used in Letters Patent could not be given a
narrower   meaning   as   is   given   to   the   term   ‘judgment’   used   in
CPC  and  that it should  receive a much wider  and  more liberal
interpretation, however, at the same time, each and every order
passed   by   the   trial   judge   could   not   be   construed   to   be   a
26

‘judgment’  inasmuch   as there  will  be  no  end  to   the  number  of
orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent.   It
has   been   held   that   the   word   ‘judgment’   has   undoubtedly   a
concept of finality in a broader and not in a narrower sense.  It
has   been   held   that   where   an   order   vitally   affects   a   valuable
right   of   the   defendants,   it   will   undoubtedly   be   treated   as   a
‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Letters   Patent   so   as   to   be
appealable to a larger Bench.
18. It   has   been   held   that   most   of   the   interlocutory   orders
which   contain   the   quality   of   finality   are   clearly   specified   in
clauses   ( a )   to   (w)   of   Order   XLIII   Rule   1   CPC   and   would   be
‘judgments’   within   the   meaning   of   the   letters   patent   and,
therefore,   appealable.   However,   there   may   be   interlocutory
orders   which   are   not   covered   by   Order   XLIII   Rule   1   CPC   but
which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality
inasmuch as such orders may adversely affect a valuable right
of   the   party   or   decide   an   important   aspect   of   the   trial   in   an
ancillary proceeding. It has further been held that however, for
27

such an order to be a ‘judgment’, an adverse effect on the party
concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or
remote.   Various illustrations of interlocutory orders have been
given   by   this   Court   in   para   (120),   which   could   be   held   to   be
appealable.     This   Court   held   that   though   any   discretion
exercised   or   routine   orders   passed   by   the   trial   Judge   in   the
course   of   the   suit   may   cause   some   inconvenience   or,   to   some
extent,   prejudice   to   one   party   or   the   other,   they   cannot   be
treated   as   a   ‘judgment’   unless   they   contain   the   traits   and
trappings   of   finality.     This   Court   has   expressed   in   para   (122)
that   though   it   had,   by   way   of   sample,   laid   down   various
illustrative   examples   of   an   order   which   may   amount   to   a
judgment,   it   would   not   be   possible   to   give   such   an   exhaustive
list  as may   cover  all  possible areas.  This Court, in  the  facts  of
the   said   case,   held   that   an   order   of   the   Single   Judge   refusing
appointment of a receiver and grant of an ad­interim injunction
was   undoubtedly   a   ‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Letters
Patent, both because Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC applies to internal
28

appeals   in   the   High   Court   and   that   such   an   order   even   on
merits contains the quality of finality and would therefore be a
‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Clause   15   of   the   Letters
Patent.  
19. Justice A.N. Sen, while holding that the order in question
was   appealable   under   Section   104(1)   read   with   Order   XLIII
CPC,   did   not   find   it   necessary   to   go   into   the   question   as   to
whether such an order would be appealable under Clause 15 of
the   Letters   Patent.     It   will   be   apposite   to   refer   to   the   following
observations of the learned Judge:
“ 151.   ……In   my   opinion,   an   exhaustive   or   a
comprehensive   definition   of   ‘judgment’   as
contemplated   in   Clause   15   of   the   Letters   Patent
cannot   be   properly   given   and   it   will   be   wise   to
remember   that   in   the   Letters   Patent   itself,   there   is
no definition of the word ‘judgment’.  The expression
has   necessarily   to   be   construed   and   interpreted   in
each particular case.  It is, however, safe to say that
if any order has the effect of finally determining any
controversy   forming   the   subject­matter   of   the   suit
itself   or   any   part   thereof   or   the   same   affects   the
question   of   court’s   jurisdiction   or   the   question   of
limitation,   such   an   order   will   normally   constitute
‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Clause   15   of   the
Letters Patent…….”
29

20. Justice   Sen   reiterated   that   it   was   safe   to   say   that   if   any
order   has   the   effect   of   finally   determining   any   controversy
forming the subject­matter of the suit itself or any part thereof
or   the   same   affects   the   question   of   court’s   jurisdiction   or   the
question   of   limitation,   such   an   order   will   normally   constitute
‘judgment’   within   the   meaning   of   Clause   15   of   Letters   Patent.
He however observed that the expression has necessarily to be
construed and interpreted in each particular case.
21. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   both   the   judgments   of   Justice
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali as well as Justice A.N. Sen have a common
thread   that,   as   to   whether   an   order   impugned   would   be   a
‘judgment’   within   the   scope   of   Clause   15   of   Letters   Patent,
would   depend   on   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case.
However, for  such  an  order  to be construed as a ‘judgment’,  it
must have the traits and trappings of finality.   To come within
the   ambit   of   ‘judgment’,   such   an   order   must   affect   vital   and
valuable  rights  of the  parties, which  works  serious  injustice to
30

the party concerned.  Each and every order passed by the Court
during   the   course   of   the   trial,   though   may   cause   some
inconvenience   to   one   of   the   parties   or,   to   some   extent,   some
prejudice   to   one   of   the   parties,   cannot   be   treated   as   a
‘judgment’.  If such is permitted, the floodgate of appeals would
be open against the order of Single Judge.
22. In the light of this observation, we will have to consider as
to whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
2 nd
  April   2019,   could   be   construed   as   a   ‘judgment’   within   the
meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent.
23. What the learned Single Judge has done by the said order,
was   to   grant   two   weeks’   time   to   the   appellants­defendants   to
file   affidavit­in­opposition   and   postpone   the   issue   of   grant   of
ad­interim   injunction   by   three   weeks.     No   doubt,   that   the
learned   Single   Judge   has   at   one   place   observed   that   prima
facie,   he   was   of   the   view   that   ‘SHYAM’   being   a   part   of   the
business   name   of   the   appellants­defendants,   no   injunction
should   be   passed   to   restrain   the   appellants­defendants   from
31

using   the   said   word   ‘SHYAM’   on   their   packaging,   but   in   the
same   order,   he   has   clarified   that   all   the   observations   he   has
made   in   the   said   order   were   prima   facie   for   the   purpose   of
passing   an   order   at   the   ad­interim   stage   and   the   same   would
have   no   relevance   at   the   time   of   considering   and   deciding   the
said application after exchange of affidavits.  
24. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   order   in   fact   was
postponement   of   the   question   as   to   whether   the   respondent­
plaintiff was entitled to grant of an ad­interim injunction or not,
and that too, by merely three weeks.  The order was only giving
an   opportunity   to   the   appellants­defendants   to   file   their
affidavit­in­opposition within a period of two weeks.   The order
clarified   that   no   prayer   for   extension   of   time   shall   be
entertained.   The learned Single Judge therefore postponed the
issue   with   regard   to   consideration   of   the   prayer   of   the
respondent­plaintiff   for   grant   of   ad­interim   injunction   by   a
period of mere three weeks and that too only in order to afford
an   opportunity   to   the   appellants­defendants   to   file   their
32

affidavit­in­opposition.   While   doing   the   same,   the   respondent­
plaintiff’s   interest   was   also   protected,   inasmuch   as   the
appellants­defendants   were   directed   to   maintain   weekly
accounts   of   sale   of   their   products   covered   by   Class   6,   which
were sold under the mark ‘SHYAM’. 
25. It is thus clear that there was no adjudication with regard
to   the   rights   of   the   respondent­plaintiff   to   get   an   ad­interim
injunction   during   the   pendency   of   the   suit.     Though   by
postponement   of   the   issue   with   regard   to   grant   of   ad­interim
injunction,   the   order   might   have   caused   some   inconvenience
and   may   be,   to   some   extent,   prejudice   to   the   respondent­
plaintiff;   the   same   could   not   be   treated   as   a   ‘judgment’
inasmuch as there was no conclusive finding as to whether the
respondent­plaintiff   was   entitled   for   grant   of   ad­interim
injunction   or   not.   As   such,   the   order   passed   by   the   learned
Single Judge did not contain the traits and trappings of finality.
If   it   is   held   otherwise,   this   will   open   a   floodgate   of   appeals   for
parties   who   may   even   challenge   the   order   of   adjournment   or
33

grant of time to the other side to file affidavit­in­reply.   We are
therefore   of   the   considered   view   that   the   order   dated   2 nd
  April
2019   cannot   be   construed   to   be   a   ‘judgment’   within   the
meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent and as such, the appeal
to the Division Bench of the High Court was not tenable.  
26. We  clarify   that   as   held   in   Shah   Babulal   Khimji   (supra),
we   are   holding   so,   taking   into   consideration   the   facts   and
circumstances as they appear in the present matter.
27. With   this,   we   could   have   very   well   allowed   the   present
appeal   by   setting   aside   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   of
the   Division  Bench   of  the  High  Court.   However,  since we  find
that the approach of the Division Bench of the High Court was
totally contrary to the various well­settled principles of law, we
are required to consider the correctness of various findings and
observations   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the
impugned judgment and order.
28. The   learned   Single   Judge   passed   an   order   on   2 nd
  April
2019.     It  appears   that   the   appeal   to   the   Division  Bench   of  the
34

High   Court   was   filed   immediately   thereafter   in   the   month   of
April,   though   the   exact   date   of   filing   of   appeal   is   not   known.
The   judgment   and   order   impugned   herein   was   passed   after   a
gap of  about  8­9 months  from   the  date of the order   passed by
the   learned   Single   Judge.     The   perusal   of   the   judgment   and
order impugned herein would clearly reveal that the counsel for
the   appellants­defendants   had   specifically   submitted   that   the
appeal   was   against   an   ad­interim   order   and   therefore,   the
appellate   court   should   not   interfere   by   substituting   its   views
but   should   instead   direct   a   speedy   hearing   of   the   interim
application   of   the   respondent­plaintiff.   The   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   after   recording   the   said   submission,   observed
thus: 
“Before entering into a discussion with regard to the
merits of this case I say that all the facts and papers
which   were   necessary   for   deciding   the   prima   facie
case   of   the   parties   were   before   us.     On   these   facts
and   evidence   we   were   in   a   position   to   assess   their
respective   prima   facie   case   and   the   balance   of
convenience.
In those circumstances we propose to dispose of the
interlocutory   application   ourselves   instead   of
35

entering   a   prima   facie   finding   and   relegating   it   to
the   court   below   for   its   disposal.     That   would   be
unnecessary prolongation of the litigation and utter
wastage of time.”
29. It   is   difficult   to   appreciate   the   anxiety   on   the   part   of   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   to   itself   dispose   of   the
interlocutory   application   instead   of   relegating   it   to   the   court
below   for   its   disposal.     When   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court itself took 8­9 months to decide the appeal, it is difficult
to   understand   as   to   what   the   learned   Judges   of   the   Division
Bench of the High Court meant by “unnecessary prolongation of
the litigation and utter wastage of time”.   If the learned Judges
of   the   Division   Bench   were   so   much   concerned   with   the
prolongation   of   litigation,   they   could   have   very   well   requested
the   learned   Single   Judge   to   decide   the   injunction   application
within a stipulated period.  Instead of waiting for a period of 8­9
months,   this   could   have   been   done   by   them   at   the   very   first
instance when the appeal was listed.  The hierarchy of the trial
court   and   the   appellate   court   exists   so   that   the   trial   court
36

exercises   its   discretion   upon   the   settled   principles   of   law.     An
appellate court, after the findings of the trial court are recorded,
has   an   advantage   of   appreciating   the   view   taken   by   the   trial
judge   and   examining   the   correctness   or   otherwise   thereof
within   the   limited   area   available.     If   the   appellate   court   itself
decides   the   matters   required   to   be   decided   by   the   trial   court,
there would be no necessity to have the hierarchy of courts. As
observed  by  this  Court in   Monsanto  Technology  LLC   (supra),
the   appellate   court   cannot   usurp   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Single
Judge   to   decide   as   to   whether   the   tests   of   prima   facie   case,
balance  of convenience and irreparable injury  are made  out  in
the case or not.
30. Though   there   are   various   observations   made   by   the
Division Bench of the High Court, which in our view, are totally
unwarranted,   we   refrain   ourselves   to   refer   to   them   as   any
comment   thereon   would   unnecessarily   prejudice   the   rights   of
either   of   the   parties.     We   will   only   limit   ourselves   to   the
37

minimum   possible   observations   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High Court.  
31. Though the Division Bench of the High Court, referring to
the judgment of this Court in the case of  Wander Ltd.   (supra),
observes that the appellate court will not substitute its opinion
with   that   of   the   trial   court   in   an   interim   application   unless
there   is   a   perversity   in   the   order,   it   fails   to   discuss   as   to   how
the   view   taken   by   the   trial   judge   was   either   perverse   or
impossible.  At one place, the Division Bench of the High Court
observes that: 
“ Now,   the   question   is   whether   the   learned   single
judge   exercised   his   discretion   correctly   and   whether
this   court   should   interfere   with   that   exercise   of
discretion. ” 
and in the same breath observes that: 
“ Therefore, we have considered the case on the basis
of   the   petition   as   well   as   the   additional   evidence
before   us.     In   our   opinion,   this   court   is   not   called
upon   only   to   evaluate   whether   the   exercise   of
discretion   by   the   learned   trial   court   was   right   or
wrong. ”  
38

Then   immediately   thereafter,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court observes that:
“ This   court   is   duty   bound   to   pass   a   suitable   interim
order, pending trial of the suit. ”
32. We ask a question to ourselves that, in an appeal against
the   order   of   a   Single   Judge,   if   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court is not required to evaluate the question as to whether the
discretion exercised by the trial court was right or wrong, what
else  is  it   required  to   do.     We  are  unable  to   trace  the   source   of
the duty of the appellate court which makes it bound to pass a
suitable interim order pending the trial of the suit.  
33. The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   further   observes
that   for   doing   so,   it   has   to   put   itself   in   a   position   as   if   it   was
moved   to   pass   an   interim   order   in   the   suit.     At   the   cost   of
repetition,   we   reiterate   that   if   the   approach   of   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   is   to   be   upheld,   then   there   would   be
no   necessity   to   have   the   trial   courts   at   all.     Thereafter,   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   observes   that   the   case   was
39

different from   Wander Ltd.   (supra).  The Division Bench of the
High  Court  stops at  that.    It does  not  even take  the trouble  to
observe as to how the scope of the appeal before it was different
from   the   scope   as   defined   by   this   Court   in   Wander   Ltd.
(supra).     In   a   line   thereafter,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court observes that prima facie case on facts theoretically is in
favour of the appellant therein (plaintiff) and thereafter, passes
various directions including the injunction.   Though, in fact, it
allows   the   appeal   in   entirety   by   allowing   an   application   under
Order   XXXIX   Rules   1   and   2   CPC   pendente   lite   the   suit,   it
graciously   observes   in   the   ultimate   para   that   it   was   only
modifying the order dated 2 nd
  April 2019 passed by the learned
Single Judge.
34. The   learned   Judges   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court  have taken  pains to make a  mention  of the  judgment  of
this Court in the case of   Wander Ltd.   (supra).   This judgment
has   been   guiding   the   appellate   courts   in   the   country   for
decades while exercising their appellate jurisdiction considering
40

the   correctness   of   the   discretion   and   jurisdiction   exercised   by
the trial courts for grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.
In the said case, the learned Single Judge had refused an order
of   temporary   injunction   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   who   was
claiming   to   be   a   registered   proprietor   of   the   registered   trade
mark.   The Division Bench of the High Court had reversed the
order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   and   granted   interim
injunction.   Reversing   the   order   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High   Court   and   maintaining   the   order   of   the   learned   Single
Judge, this Court observed thus:
“ 14.   The   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   were
against   the   exercise   of   discretion   by   the   Single
Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not
interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court
of   first   instance   and   substitute   its   own   discretion
except where the discretion has been shown to have
been   exercised   arbitrarily,   or   capriciously   or
perversely   or   where   the   court   had   ignored   the
settled   principles   of   law   regulating   grant   or   refusal
of   interlocutory   injunctions.   An   appeal   against
exercise   of   discretion   is   said   to   be   an   appeal   on
principle.   Appellate   court   will   not   reassess   the
material   and   seek   to   reach   a   conclusion   different
from   the  one  reached  by  the  court  below  if  the  one
reached   by   that   court   was   reasonably   possible   on
the   material.   The   appellate   court   would   normally
41

not   be   justified   in   interfering   with   the   exercise   of
discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if
it   had   considered   the   matter   at   the   trial   stage   it
would   have   come   to   a   contrary   conclusion.   If   the
discretion   has   been   exercised   by   the   trial   court
reasonably   and   in   a   judicial   manner   the   fact   that
the   appellate   court   would   have   taken   a   different
view   may   not   justify   interference   with   the   trial
court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these
principles   Gajendragadkar,   J.   in   Printers   (Mysore)
Private   Ltd.   v.   Pothan   Joseph   [(1960)   3   SCR   713   :
AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)
“...   These   principles   are   well   established,
but   as   has   been   observed   by   Viscount
Simon   in   Charles   Osenton   &
Co.   v.   Jhanaton   [1942   AC   130]   ‘...the   law
as  to  the reversal by  a  court of  appeal  of
an   order   made   by   a   judge   below   in   the
exercise   of   his   discretion   is   well
established, and any difficulty that arises
is   due   only   to   the   application   of   well
settled principles in an individual case’.”
The   appellate   judgment   does   not   seem   to   defer   to
this principle.”
35. Though   the   learned   Judges   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High   Court   have   on   more   than   one   occasion   referred   to   the
judgment  of  this  Court  in   Wander   Ltd.   (supra), they  have  not
even, for namesake, observed as to how the discretion exercised
by   the   learned   Single   Judge   was   exercised   arbitrarily,
42

capriciously   or   perversely.     In   our   view,   having   waited   for   8­9
months after the learned Single Judge had passed the order, all
that   ought   to   have   been   done   by   the   learned   Judges   of   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   was   to   request   the   learned
Single Judge to decide the application for ad­interim injunction,
which   in   fact,   the   learned   Single   Judge   had   scheduled   to   do
after   three  weeks  from   2 nd
  April  2019.     In  our   view,   it  was   not
even necessary for the Division Bench of the High Court to have
waited till 24 th
  December 2019 and taken the pains of deciding
the application at first instance.   It could have very well, in the
month of April, 2019 itself, done the exercise of requesting the
learned Single Judge to decide the application as scheduled.  
36. In any event, though the Division Bench of the High Court
observes   that   for   deciding   the  question   with   regard   to   grant   of
interim injunction, it has to put itself in a position as if it was
moved to pass an interim order in the suit, it even fails to take
into   consideration   the   principles   which   a   court   is   required   to
take into consideration while deciding such an application. It is
43

a settled principle of law that while considering the question of
grant of interim injunction, the courts are required to consider
the three tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable   injury.   Besides   a   stray   observation   that   the
respondent­plaintiff   has   made   out   a   prima   facie   case,   there   is
no discussion as to how a prima facie case was made out by the
respondent­plaintiff.     In   any   case,   insofar   as   the   tests   of
balance   of   convenience   and   irreparable   injury   are   concerned,
there   is   not   even   a   mention   with   regard   to   these   in   the
impugned   judgment   and   order   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High Court. In our view, the approach of the Division Bench of
the   High  Court  was  totally  unwarranted  and  uncalled  for.   We
refrain ourselves from using any stronger words.  
37. We   find   that   it   is   high   time   that   this   Court   should   take
note   of   frivolous   appeals   being   filed   against   unappealable
orders   wasting   precious   judicial   time.   As   it   is,   the   courts   in
India   are   already   over­burdened   with   huge   pendency.   Such
unwarranted   proceedings  at   the   behest   of   the   parties   who   can
44

afford   to   bear   the   expenses   of   such   litigations,   must   be
discouraged. We therefore find that the present appeal deserves
to   be   allowed   with   token   costs.     The   respondent­plaintiff   shall
pay   a   token   cost   of   Rs.5   lakhs   to   the   Supreme   Court   Middle
Income Group Legal Aid Society (MIG).
38. In   the   result,   the   appeal   is   allowed.     The   impugned
judgment and order dated 24 th
  December 2019 is quashed and
set aside.   The learned Single Judge is requested to decide the
application filed by the respondent­plaintiff under Order XXXIX
Rules   1   and   2   CPC   as   expeditiously   as   possible   and   in   any
case,   within   a   period   of   six   weeks   from   the   date   of   this
judgment.   Till further orders are passed by the learned Single
Judge, the order passed by  the learned Single Judge dated 2 nd
April 2019 would continue to operate.
39. We clarify that we have not touched upon the merits of the
matter   and   none   of   the   observations   either   by   the   learned
Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court or by us,
would in any manner weigh with the learned Single Judge while
45

deciding the application for injunction filed by the respondent­
plaintiff. 
40. Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed   of   in
the above terms.
….……..….......................J.
                                                       [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
  ………….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 14, 2022.
46