/2022 INSC 0221/ 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 176 3-1764 of 2022 The State of Karnataka & Anr …. Appellants Versus Umesh …. Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chadrachud, J 1 The appeal s arise from a judgment dated 29 November 2017 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench. The High Court set aside the judgment of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal dated 25 Apri l 2016 directing the compulsory retirement of the respondent from service following a disciplinary enquiry on charges of bribery . 10 about his work, then DGO asked CW.1 whether he has brought the money which he had told yesterday, then CW.1 took the amount from his shirt pocket and handed over to DGO requesting to do his work, then DGO received the bribe amount from right hand and kept in his shirt pocke t and he observed the said transaction. Then CW.1 went and gave pre -arranged signal to the police. Then police and CW.3 came and CW. 1 showed DGO to the police, police washed both hands of DGO with some solution and said wash turned into pink colour and the same was collected in bottle and sealed. Then DGO took out the bribe amount from his shirt pocket and note numbers were compared with the numbers recorded and they were tallying. Then police seized the said amount. He also says that then by providing alt ernate shirt, police got removed the shirt of DGO and shirt pocket was washed in some solution and said wash turned into pink colour. Then police conducted mahazar as per Ex.P.5 PW. 3 is the Investigating Officer who corroborated the version of PW.2 about filing of complaint by PW.1 and conducting of pre- trap formalities in the presence of panchas and also about the trap formalities. He made clear in his evidence after conducting pre- trap procedure, he took CW.1 to 3 in their vehicle to the private office o f DGO. CW1 and 2 went inside the private office of DGO and after receipt of signal from CW.1, he and CW.3 went inside and CW.1 showed that DGO has accepted the bribe. Then he washed both hands of DGO in sodium carbonate solution seperately and the said was h turned into pink colour and same was collected in bottle and sealed. He has speaks about washing of shirt pocket of DGO with sodium carbonate solution and other formalities. On careful perusal of evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, it can be held that PW.1 (CW.1) has intentionally turned hostile and not supported the case of the disciplinary authority to held the DGO. The evidence of DW.1 appears to be a story created for the purpose of this case to escape from the clutches of law. PW.1 in his evidence has admitt ed the signature found on the complaint. If really DGO has not demanded any bribe and PW.1 returned the loan amount to DGO as stated by DW.1, there was no necessity for PW.1 to go Lokayukta office and give and sign the complaint. He was also present for the pre- trap and trap mahazars and put his signatures. PW.2 has made clear in his evidence that explanation given by DGO as per Ex. P.3 with regard to the alleged loan is false. PW.2 and 3 have nothing against DGO to depose falsely before this authority. The ir evidence appears to be cogent and reliable and I do not find any reason to disbelieve their evidence. In their cross - examination also, defense counsel failed to elicit any material contradictions to discard their evidence. The defense of DGO that he rec eived loan amount from PW.1 advanced by him to his brother -in -law cannot be accepted. ” 11 12 The enquiry report concluded in this backdrop that the misconduct was established on the basis of the evidence of PW2 and PW3. Referring to the evidence of the complainant, the i nquiry officer held that if in truth the respondent had not demanded a bribe and PW1 was returning a loan amount to the respondent as stated by DW 1, there was no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of the Lokayukta and to sign a complaint . The complainant was also present for the pre- trap and trap mahazar and appended his signatures. The enquiry report finds that there was no reason for PW2 and PW3 to depose falsely. No material inconsistencies were eli cited during the cross examination by the respondent. Consequently , the defense that the amount which was recovered from the respondent represented a loan was disbelieved and the misconduct was held to be proved. 13 The principle s which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment . Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt , in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilit ies. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are di stinct from those which govern a disciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the 12 accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 14 In a judgment of a three judge Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh 5, Justice V R Krishna Iyer set out the principle s which govern a disciplinary proceedings as follows : “ 4 . It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply . All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible . There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case- law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages fro m American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled 5 (1977) 2 SCC 491 13 against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” (emphasis supplied) These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions of this Court including State of Rajasthan v. B K Meena 6; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh 7; Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 8; and CISF v Abrar Ali 9. 15 In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed reliance on the decision in the Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar 10. In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed the punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the payment could be the expectation of a commission amount . The respondent placed reliance on the following passages from the decision: “21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi -criminal nature was required to be 6 (1966) 6 SCC 417 7 (2004) 8 SCC 200 8 (2005) 7 SCC 764 9 (2017) 4 SCC 507 10 (2009) 12 SCC 78 14 proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities. 31. […] wherein it has been held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misc onduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal consequences. ” The observations in paragraph 21 are not the ratio decidendi of the case . These observations were made while discussing the judgment of High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh (supra) was reiterated: “ “35. …an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statue defining t he misconduct.” 36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and t here has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non- existing material and failed to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” (emphasis supplied) 15 On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the witnes ses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriv ing at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with. 16 In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v . C. Nagaraju , this Court has held: "9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power t o conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different.” The Cour t also held that: “ Having considered the submissions made on b ehalf of the Appellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is different from that produ ced during the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for 16 the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a D epartmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the Criminal Court, is j ustified and needed no interference by the High Court." 17 In the exercise of judicial review , the Court does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The court does not re -appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of a disciplinary enquiry . The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to determine whether : (i ) the rules of natural jus tice have been complied wit h; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii ) the statutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct. 11 However, none of the above tests for attracting the interference of the High Court were attracted in the present case. The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having exercised the power of judicial review found no reason to interfere with the award of punishment of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon a domain which falls within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The findings of the i nquiry officer 11 State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; R.S. Saini v State of Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90; and CISF v Abrar Ali (2017) 4 SCC 507. 17 and the disciplinary authority are sustainable with reference to the evidence which was adduced during the enquiry . The acquittal of the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of the disciplinary authority or the finding of misconduct in the disciplinary proceeding. 18 For these reasons, we allow the appeal s and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at the Kalaburagi Bench dated 29 November 2017 in Writ Petition Nos. 202250- 251/2016 (S -KAT). The Petition instituted by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution shall stand dismissed. The finding of misconduct and the punishment of compulsory retirement are restored. 19 There shall be no order as to costs. 20 Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. …. ………….. ……………………………..J [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud ] ……. …………………………. ……………J [Surya Kant ] New Delhi; March 22, 2022