/2022 INSC 0222/
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1345­1346 OF 2022
The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee       ..Appellant (S)
Bangalore 
Versus
The State of Karnataka & Ors.                             ..Respondent (S)
With 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1347­1374 OF 2022
J U D G M E N T 
M. R. Shah, J.
1. As common question of law   and facts arise in this group of
appeals   and   as   such   are   between   the   same   parties,   all
these appeals are decided and disposed of together by this
common judgment and order.    
2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order in respective writ appeals preferred by
1

the  appellant  herein  –  the Agricultural  Produce Marketing
Committee,   Bangalore   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“APMC”),   by   which   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
has   dismissed   the   said   writ   appeals   and   confirmed   the
common judgment and order passed by the learned Single
Judge   passed   in   respective   writ   petitions   preferred   by   the
private   respondents   herein   –   original   land   owners   and
declared that the acquisitions of the lands in question has
lapsed   under   Section   24(2)   of   the   Right   to   Fair
Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,
Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “the   Act,   2013”),   the   APMC,   Bangalore   has
preferred the present appeals. 
3. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeals   in   a   nutshell   are
as under: ­ 
3.1 That   the   lands   in   question   were   acquired   in   three   parts.
The first acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas
of   land   owned   by   respondent   No.4   –   Jamanlal   Bajaj   Seva
Trust (for short “Trust”). Second acquisition was in respect
2

of   104   acres   5   guntas   of   land   owned   by   very   respondent
No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3
acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of
appeals before this Court). 
3.2 The   relevant   facts   in   respect   of   first   and   second
acquisitions are as under: ­
In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)
3.2.1 That   a   notification   was   issued   under   Section   4(1)   of   the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act,   1894”)   on   03.09.1994   in   respect   of   172   acres   22
guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 herein – Trust in
Srigandadakaval Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru
for   establishing   a   mega   market   by   the   appellant   –   APMC,
Bangalore.
3.2.2 One   Rajajinagar   House   Building   Co­operative   Society
challenged   the   notification   issued   under   Section   4(1),
before the High Court of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition
No.28988/1994.   It   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   said
society that the land should be acquired for them and not
3

for  APMC.  The  said   writ   petition   came   to   be   dismissed   by
the High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.
3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of the
Act,   1894   was   issued   on   10.10.1996   and   published   on
13.10.1996. A draft award was prepared in respect of 172
acres 22 guntas of land on 12.08.1998. 
3.3.4 On the instructions given by  the Land Acquisition Officer,
the   appellant   –   APMC   deposited   Rs.9,14,14,873/­   on
19.08.1998 towards approximate cost of the acquisition. 
3.3.5 It   appears   that   the   aforesaid   Rajajinagar   House   Building
Co­operative   Society   filed   another   writ   petition  being   W.P.
No.6880/1997   before   the   High   Court,   before   the
acquisition   of   172.50   acres   of   land   at   Srigandadakaval
Village could be completed.  The High Court granted an ex­
parte  order   of  stay  of   acquisition   proceedings vide  interim
order   dated   16.09.1998.   Thereafter   respondent   no.4   –
original   land   owner   filed   Writ   Petition   No.3884/1998
before   the   High   Court,   challenging   the   acquisition
4

proceedings.   Vide   interim   order   dated   08.02.1999,   the
High Court ordered stay of dispossession.              
In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)
3.4 That   a   notification   under   Section   4(1)   read   with   Section
17(4) of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of
hearing was issued on 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres
5   guntas   of   land   owned   by   respondent   No.4   –   Trust   in
Herohalli   Village,   Yeshwanthpura   Hobli,   Bangalore   North
Taluk,   for   establishing   a   mega   market   by   the   appellant   –
APMC.   A   final   notification   under   Section   6(1)   read   with
Section   17(1)   to   17(4)   was   issued   in   respect   of   100   acres
11   guntas   out   of   104   acres   5   guntas   which   had   been
notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leaving an area
of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry  under
Section 5A was dispensed with.
3.4.1 That   one   Vishwaneedam   Trust   filed   Writ   Petition
No.708/2000   before   the   High   Court   challenging   the   said
acquisition.   The   High   Court   granted   stay   of   dispossession
in   respect   of   35   acres   out   of   the   100   acres   5   guntas
situated in Herohalli Village. 
5

3.4.2 Respondent   No.4   –   Trust   –   original   land   owner   filed   Writ
Petition   No.37140/2000   challenging   the   notifications
dated   13.04.1999   and   26.10.1999   in   respect   of   the   lands
at Herohalli Village. 
3.4.3 According   to   the   appellant,   possession   was   taken   and
handed   over   to   the   APMC   by   the   Land   Acquisition   Officer
vide   an   Official   Memorandum   of   Possession   dated
06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19 guntas of the lands at
Herohalli Village.
3.4.4 That   an   award   was   made   by   the   State   Land   Acquisition
Officer   (SLAO)   on   22.05.2002,   referring   to   a   Government
order dated 26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas
covered   by   Section   6   notification   dated   26.10.1999.   The
award   provided   for   payment   of   compensation   to
respondent   No.4   –   Trust   after   excluding   34   acres   14
guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab
belonging   to   the   Government   and   further   excluding   35
acres   in   respect   of   the   writ   petition   filed   Vishwaneedam
6

trust in which an  order  of  stay  of dispossession had been
passed   by   the   High   Court.   The   said   compensation   was
accepted   by   respondent   No.4   under   protest.   Respondent
No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition
Case   No.1/2003   seeking   enhancement   of   compensation
which seems to be pending.
3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4
–   original   land   owner   was   in   respect   of   172   acres   22
guntas   of   land.   Writ   Petition   Nos.37140­37146/2000   was
in   respect   of   100   acres   of   land   and   Writ   Petition
No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respect
of second acquisition (part). 
3.6 A   common   statement   of   objections   was   filed   by   the
appellant – APMC to all the writ petitions. 
3.7 That   the   APMC   filed   IA   No.01/2007   in   W.P.
No.37140/2000,   to   permit   APMC   to   hand   over   9   acres   of
land   out   of   65   acres   11   guntas   to   the   Bangalore
Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to the Bangalore
Water   Supply   and   Sewerage   Board   (BWSSB).   That   vide
7

order  dated  21.03.2007,  the  learned  Single  Judge  allowed
the   said   IA   No.01/2007   and   granted   permission   to   the
APMC as prayed. 
3.8 At   this   stage,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   respect   to
the   lands   in   question   and   other   lands   owned   by
respondent No.4 – Trust, proceedings were pending before
the   Land   Reforms   Tribunal,   Bangalore   N.   Taluk.   At   this
stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case
on   behalf   of   the   State   and   the   APMC   that   unless   the
proceedings   under   the   Karnataka   Land   Reforms   Act   (KLR
Act)   are   disposed   of,   the   compensation   is   not   required   to
be   deposited   as,   if   ultimately   it   is   held   that   the   land
acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions of KLR
Act,   in   that   case,   the   said   land   would   vest   with   the   State
Government   and   therefore,   no   compensation   would   be
payable.   Therefore,   since   the   Government   was   not
proceeding   with   making   of   awards   or   offering
compensation   on   the   ground   that   proceedings   were
pending   before   the   Land   Reforms   Tribunal,   by   the   same
order  dated   21.03.2007   the  learned   Single   Judge   directed
8

the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/74­75
under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.  
3.9 The   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   dated
21.03.2007 granting permission to the APMC to hand over
9 acres of land to BDA and 4 acres of land to BWSSB was
challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court by
way   of   Writ   Appeal   No.1011/2007.   The   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court   stayed   the   order   of   the   learned   Single
Judge.   The   said   appeal   along   with   some   companion
appeals came to be disposed of by the Division Bench vide
order  dated  28.06.2012,  directing  learned  Single  Judge  to
decide   all   the   connected   writ   petitions   finally   and
continued   the  interim   stay  granted   by   the  Division   Bench
until the final disposal of all the petitions.
3.10 Thereafter   APMC   filed   IA   No.03/2008   seeking   permission
to build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be
allowed   vide   order   dated   12.02.2009.   It   is   reported   that
thereafter APMC has completed the fencing work. 
Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal
9

3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
“the   Tribunal”)   passed   an   order   dated   12.01.2010   in   the
proceedings under  the KLR Act holding  that  213 acres 20
guntas  of  respondent  No.4 – Trust’s land was excess land
under the said Act. 
3.11.1 The   order   passed   by   the   Tribunal   was   challenged   before
the High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High
Court   vide   order   dated   24.03.2014   remitted   the
proceedings   to   the   Tribunal   with   directions   for   a   fresh
consideration. 
3.11.2 On   remand   the   Tribunal   passed   a   fresh   order   dated
22.09.2015   and   declared   that   265   acres   24   guntas   of
land   held   by   respondent   No.4   –   Trust   was   excess   land.
That  the order  passed by  the Tribunal  dated 22.09.2015
was challenged before the High Court and the High Court
vide   order   dated   02.05.2017   set   aside   the   order   passed
by   the   Tribunal   dated   22.09.2015   and   once   again
remitted the matter to the Tribunal. 
10

3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017
and  declared that  354 acres 10 guntas  was excess land.
The   order   passed  by   the   Tribunal   dated  28.11.2017   was
again the subject matter before the High Court by way of
Writ   Petition   No.55344/2017.   By   judgment   and   order
dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed
and set aside the Tribunal’s order dated 28.11.2017. It is
reported   that   against   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by
the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   dated
30.06.2021   passed   in   Writ   Petition   No.55344/2017,   the
State has preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21,
which is reported to be pending before the Division Bench
of the High Court. 
3.12 That   all   the   aforesaid   writ   petitions   being   W.P.
No.3884/1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos.
37140­37146/2000   (in   respect   of   100   acres   of   land)   and
others  writ  petitions   being   W.P.  No.708/2000  and   19579­
19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendency
of   the   aforesaid   writ   petitions   the   Act,   2013   came   into
force.   Therefore,   the   writ   petitioners   submitted   an
11

application dated 24.02.2014 seeking to invoke the benefit
of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisions of
the said Act would be available to it. 
3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following points
for consideration: ­
a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should
be   deferred   pending   adjudication   and
determination   by   the   Land   Tribunal,   Bangalore
North  Taluk   of  the  excess  holdings   or  otherwise
under   the   provisions   of   the   Karnataka   Land
Reforms   Act,   1961   of   the   very   lands   which   are
the subject matter herein. 
b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands
in   question   having   said   to   have   been   given   to
APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance
with law. 
c. Whether   the   invocation   of   Section   17   of   the   LA
Act   in   the   acquisition   of   a   portion   of   the   lands
for the same purpose was justified. 
d. Whether   the   acquiring   authority   could   keeping
abeyance   the   mandate   to   pay   or   deposit   the
compensation   amount   pending   disposal   of   the
proceedings  before the Land Tribunal in respect
of the lands. 
e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virtue of the 2013 Act.      
3.14 That   though   some   observations   were   made   on   the
proceedings   under   the   Act,   1894,   thereafter,   without
further   finally   deciding   any   other   point   framed   for
12

consideration,   as   reproduced   hereinabove,   the   learned
Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that
respective acquisitions  have lapsed under  Section  24(2) of
the Act, 2013. 
3.15 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge
dated 24.06.2014 holding that respective acquisitions have
lapsed   under   Section   24(2)   of   the   Act,   2013,   the   APMC
preferred   writ   appeals   before   the   High   Court.   By   the
impugned   common   judgment   and   order,   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said   appeals
confirming  the  judgment  and  order  passed by   the learned
Single   Judge   declaring   that   the   acquisition   have   lapsed
under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. 
3.16 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court in respective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014
and   others   along   with   accompanied   appeals,   the   APMC,
Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals.  
13

4 Shri   V.   Giri,   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf
of the appellant – APMC has vehemently contended that in
the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court
has erred in holding that the acquisitions in respect of the
lands   in   question   have   lapsed   under   Section   24(2)   of   the
Act, 2013. 
4.1 It is further contended that in respect of acquisition of 172
acres   land   no   award   was   declared   in   view   of   the   stay
granted   by   the   High   Court   in   various   proceedings.   It   is
submitted   that   therefore   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of
the  Act, 2013 shall not  be applicable. It is submitted that
therefore   the   High   Court   has   erred   in   declaring   that   the
acquisitions   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section
24 of the Act, 2013. 
4.2 It   is   further   submitted   that   so   far   as   the   acquisition   in
respect of 100 acres of land situated at Herohalli Village is
concerned,   the   award   in   respect   of   65   acres   of   land   was
declared and the possession was also taken over. Further,
the   amount   of   compensation   was   deposited   and   the
14

respondent – original land owner withdrew Rs.2.37 crores,
therefore it cannot be said that the acquisition has lapsed
under sub­section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013. 
4.3 It   is   urged   that   the   High   Court   has   not   properly
appreciated   the   fact   that   in   respect   of   acquisition   of   172
acres and in respect of remaining 35 acres out of the 100
acres of land, the awards could not be declared in view of
the   stay   orders   granted   by   the   High   Court   in   various
proceedings.  Therefore,  for  the  purpose  of  Section  24(1)(a)
of the Act, 2013, being made applicable, the period during
which   the   stay   orders   were   in   operation   have   to   be
excluded. 
4.4 Now   so   far   as   the   observations   made   by   the   High   Court
that the appellant was not ready to deposit the amount of
compensation, it is submitted that the High Court ought to
have   appreciated   that   as   such   there   was   a   very   valid
reason and/or justification for the APMC not to deposit the
entire   amount   of   compensation.   It   is   submitted   that   with
respect to the very land in question the proceedings under
15

the   KLR   Act   were   pending   before   the   Land   Reforms
Tribunal   and   the   Tribunal   had   to   take   a   call   and/or
decision   that   the   respondent­Trust   is   holding   any   excess
vacant land or not and therefore, it was thought fit to wait
till   the   outcome   of   the   proceedings   under   the   Land
Reforms   Act.   It   is   submitted   that   the   aforesaid   reason
cannot   be   ascribed   against   the   appellant   on   the   ground
that   the   appellant   was   not   ready   to   deposit/pay   the
compensation. 
4.5 It   is   further   submitted   that   even   the   High   Court   has
materially erred in holding that possession in respect of 65
acres   of   land   was   illegal   which   was   taken   by   invoking
urgency clause and not complying with the deposit of 80%
of   compensation   as   required   under   Section   17   of   the   Act,
1894. 
4.6 It   is   further   submitted   that   as   such   in   the   impugned
judgment and order the High Court has not at all quashed
and set aside the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the
Act, 1894 in  respect of  172 acres and 100 acres of  lands,
16

respectively. It is submitted that after some discussion on
the   proceedings   under   the   Act,   1894,   the   High   Court   has
straightway   considered   the   applicability   of   the   Act,   2013
and   has   held   that   the   acquisitions   in   respect   of   both   the
lands   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of
the Act, 2013. 
4.7 Relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court   reported   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development
Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors.,  (2020) 8 SCC 129, it is
submitted   that   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed
by   the   High   Court   holding   that   the   acquisitions   have
lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of   the   Act,
2013, is not sustainable. 
4.8 A number of submissions are sought to be made by Shri V.
Giri,   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellant – APMC on repeal of the Act, 1894 in view of the
enactment of the Act, 2013 and the effect of the Act, 2013
on the acquisitions  under   the Act,  1894. However, for  the
reasons stated hereinbelow and as the High Court has not
17

at   all   considered   any   of   the   submissions/issues   on   the
validity   of   the   notifications   issued   under   Section   4   and   6
and   the   High   Court   having   considered   and   dealt   with   the
applicability   of   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of   the   Act,
2013   and   having   held   that   the   acquisitions   have   lapsed
under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of   the   Act,   2013,   we
propose to remand the matter to the High Court to decide
the other issues raised afresh, in accordance with law and
on   merits.   Therefore,   we   have   not   dealt   with   any   of   the
submissions made by Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate
and   even   Shri   C.U.   Singh,   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the respondent – Trust on merits on
other   issues.   Hence,   we   have   restricted   the   consideration
of   the   present   appeals   to   the   impugned   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court   declaring   that   the
acquisitions   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section
24 of the Act, 2013.  
5 Shri   V.N.   Raghupathy,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   State   has   supported   the   appellant   –   APMC.
He   has   stated   that   the   Writ   Appeal   No.1089/21
18

challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge quashing  and setting  aside the order passed
by   the   Tribunal,   is   pending   before   the   Division   Bench   of
the   High   Court.   Therefore,   it   is   prayed   that   if   this
honourable   Court   proposes,   to   remand   the   matter   to   the
learned Single Judge, in that case, the aforesaid appeal be
directed to be heard first by the Division Bench of the High
Court.
6 All   these   appeals   are   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   C.U.
Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent   –   Trust   –   original   land   owner.   It   is   submitted
that in the present case respondent – Trust is undertaking
various   activities   and   running   the   ashram   in   furtherance
of the object of the Trust. It is submitted that respondent –
Trust   is   not   an   ordinary   individual   land   owner.   That   the
Trust   was   established   in   the   year   1960.   It   is   submitted
that the lands in question was purchased in the year 1960
and   the   same   is   being   used   to   carry   out   Gandhian
activities and in furtherance of the object of the Trust.
19

6.1 It is submitted that in the present case the High Court has
rightly observed that the State Government/APMC have no
intention of paying any compensation for the acquisition of
the   subject   lands   and   accordingly,   chose   to   abandon   the
acquisition of the lands or to allow the same deliberately to
lapse.
6.2 Shri Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
respondent   –   Trust   has   also   made   elaborate   submissions
on   the   legality   and   validity   of   the   notifications   under
section 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 in respect of the acquisitions
of   172   acres   and   100   acres   lands,   respectively.   However,
by   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   the   High   Court  has
not declared and set aside the  notifications under  Section
4   and   6   of   the   Act,   1894   and   has   held   and   declared   that
the   acquisitions   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of
Section 24 of the Act, 2013 and the High Court has not at
all   decided   the   other   issues   which   were   placed   before   it.
We   propose   not   to   deal   with   any   of   the   submissions   on
other   issues   on   which   there   is   no   decision   by   the   High
Court   and   we   confine   the   present   appeals   to   the   decision
20

of   the   High   Court   declaring   and   holding   that   the
acquisitions   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section
24 of the Act, 2013 and for the other issues we propose to
remand the matter to the High Court.
6.3 Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court holding and declaring that the acquisitions
have lapsed under sub­section (2) of Section 24 of the Act,
2013,   Shri   Singh   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on
behalf   of   respondent   –   Trust   has   fairly   conceded   that   in
view of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of
Indore Development Authority  (supra), the view taken by
the   High   Court   that   the   acquisitions   have   lapsed   under
sub­section   (2)   of   Section   24   of   the   Act,   2013   is
unsustainable.   However,   he   has   submitted   that   the
learned Single Judge and even the learned Division Bench
of the High Court were right in holding so, considering the
law prevailing at that time when the learned Single Judge
decided the matters. It is submitted that the learned Single
Judge followed the law prevailing  at the relevant time and
the  learned Single Judge decided the  matters accordingly.
21

It   is   submitted   that   therefore   no   fault   can   be   found   with
the view taken by the learned Single Judge.  
7 We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length. 
8 At the outset it is required to be noted that the proceedings
before the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High   Court  by   way
of   writ  petition   No.  3884  of   1998  was   with   respect  to   172
acres   22   guntas   of   land   acquired.   In   the   writ   petition   No.
3884   of   1998,   the   original   land   owners   prayed   for   the
following reliefs: ­
(i) Declare   that   the   entire   acquisition   proceedings
commencing   with   the   issue   of   a   preliminary
notification  gazette  on   3.9.1994   marked  as  Annexure­
A   in   the   writ   petition   have   lapsed   on   account   of   the
award   not   having   been   made   within   a   period   of   two
years   in  terms   of   Section   11A   of   the   Land   Acquisition
Act.
(ii) Issue   a   writ   of   certiorari   or   any   other   writ,   order   or
direction   to   quash   Annexure­A,   the   preliminary
notification   LAQ   (2)   SR/32/94­95   DATED   2.9.1994
PUBLISHE  DIN   TH  Karnataka   Gazette  dated  3.9.1994
and   Annexure   the   final   notification   No.   RDD   21   LAQ
96   dated   10.10.1996   published   in   the   Karnataka
Gazette dated 31. l 0.1996.
By way of amendment the original writ petitioners – original
land   owners   also   prayed   to   declare   that   the   acquisition
22

proceedings   are   deemed   to   have   lapsed   in   view   of   the
provisions   of   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement Act, 2013. 
8.1 Writ petition Nos. 37140­37146 of 2000 filed by the original
writ   petitioners   –   original   land   owners   was   with   respect   to
100 acres of acquired land. In the said writ petitions original
writ petitioners prayed for the following reliefs: ­ 
(i) Issue   a   Writ   of   certiorari   or   any   other   writ   or   order,
quashing   the   impugned   notification   at   Annexure­B
dated 13.04.1999 gazetted on 17.04.1999 in LAC(2) SR
2/99­2000   issued   by   the   second   respondent   and   also
the   notification   at   Annexure­C   dated   26.10.1999
gazetted   on   18.11.1999   in   No.   Kam.E.68.AQ8­99
issued by the first respondent. 
OR
(ii) In   the   alternative   direct   the   respondents   to   pay
compensation   to   the   petitioner   in   terms   of   the
proceedings   of   the   meeting   dated   29.04.1999   Vide
Annexure­D
By   way   of   amendment   the   original   writ   petitioners   also
prayed   to   declare   the   acquisition   proceedings   having   been
lapsed under the provisions of the Act, 2013.
 
8.2 That the learned Single Judge framed the following common
points for consideration: ­
a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should
be   deferred   pending   adjudication   and
determination   by   the   Land   Tribunal,   Bangalore
North  Taluk   of  the  excess  holdings   or  otherwise
23

under   the   provisions   of   the   Karnataka   Land
Reforms   Act,   1961   of   the   very   lands   which   are
the subject matter herein. 
b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands
in   question   having   said   to   have   been   given   to
APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance
with law. 
c. Whether   the   invocation   of   Section   17   of   the   LA
Act   in   the   acquisition   of   a   portion   of   the   lands
for the same purpose was justified. 
d. Whether   the   acquiring   authority   could   keeping
abeyance   the   mandate   to   pay   or   deposit   the
compensation   amount   pending   disposal   of   the
proceedings  before the Land Tribunal in respect
of the lands. 
e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
by virtue of the 2013 Act.      
Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were
raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of
the   acquisition   proceedings,   the   learned   Single   Judge
decided   only   one   issue,   namely,   whether   the   acquisition
proceedings   have   lapsed   by   virtue   of   the   2013   Act.
Whereas   a   number   of   issues/grounds   were   raised   and   as
such   the   original   reliefs   sought   (acquisition   proceedings
under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were required
to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the learned
Single   Judge   did   not   give   findings   on   the   other
issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed
24

hereinabove,   disposed   of   the   writ   petitions   considering
only   one   relief/ground,   namely,   whether   the   acquisition
proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a
number   of   submissions   were   made   on   the   other
issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court
ought   to   have   considered   the   other   issues   and   ought   to
have   given   the   findings   on   other   issues   also.   Because   of
not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only
on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one
issue,   is   held   to   be   bad   in   law   for   the   reasons   stated
hereinbelow,   this   Court   has   no   other   alternative   but   to
remand   the   matters   to   the   learned   Single   Judge   for
deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.
   
8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order
14   Rule   2   (as   amended   w.e.f.   01.02.1977),   this   Court   in
the   case   of   Nusli   Neville   Wadia   Vs.   Ivory   Properties   &
Ors ,   (2020)   6   SCC   557,   has   observed   and   held   that   after
the   amendment   w.e.f.   01.02.1977,   though   Order   14   Rule
2(2)   enables   the   court   to   decide   the   issue   of   law   as   a
preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction
of court or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time
25

being   in   force,   a   departure   has   been   made   in   amended
provision whereby now it mandates the court to pronounce
judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be
disposed   of   on   a   preliminary   issue.   It   is   further   observed
that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand
in an appealable case for deciding other issues. 
8.4 Therefore,   the   courts   should   adjudicate   on   all   the   issues
and   give   its   findings   on   all   the   issues   and   not   to
pronounce   the   judgment   only   on   one   of   the   issues.   As
such   it   is   the   duty   cast   upon   the   courts   to   adjudicate   on
all   the   issues   and   pronounce   the   judgment   on   all   the
issues   rather   than   adopting   a   shortcut   approach   and
pronouncing   the   judgment   on   only   one   issue.   By   such   a
practice,   it   would   increase   the   burden   on   the   appellate
court   and   in   many   cases   if   the   decision   on   the   issue
decided is found to be erroneous and on other issues there
is   no   adjudication   and   no   findings   recorded   by   the   court,
the  appellate court  will have  no  option  but to  remand  the
matter   for   its   fresh   decision.   Therefore,   to   avoid   such   an
eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues
26

raised in a case and render findings and the judgment on
all the issues involved.   
9 Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order
passed   by   the   High   Court   declaring   that   the   acquisition
proceedings   have   lapsed   under   sub­section   (2)   of   Section
24   of   the   Act,   2013,   is   concerned,   the   same   is
unsustainable   in   view   of   the   decision   of   the   Constitution
bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Indore   Development
Authority  (supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph
365 and 366 as under: ­ 
“365.   Resultantly,   the   decision   rendered   in   Pune
Municipal   Corpn.   [ Pune   Municipal
Corpn.   v.   Harakchand   Misirimal   Solanki ,   (2014)   3   SCC
183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and
all   other   decisions   in   which   Pune   Municipal
Corpn.   [ Pune Municipal Corpn.   v.   Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki ,   (2014)   3   SCC   183   :   (2014)   2   SCC   (Civ)   274]
has   been   followed,   are   also   overruled.   The   decision
in   Sree   Balaji   Nagar   Residential   Assn.   [ Sree   Balaji
Nagar   Residential   Assn.   v.   State   of   T.N. ,   (2015)   3   SCC
353   :   (2015)   2   SCC   (Civ)   298]   cannot   be   said   to   be
laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following   the   same   are   also   overruled.   In   Indore
Development   Authority   v.   Shailendra   [ Indore
Development Authority   v.   Shailendra , (2018) 3 SCC 412
:   (2018)   2   SCC   (Civ)   426]   ,   the   aspect   with   respect   to
the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be
read   as   “nor”   or   as   “and”   was   not   placed   for
consideration.   Therefore,   that   decision   too   cannot
prevail,   in   the   light   of   the   discussion   in   the   present
judgment.
27

366.   In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   we   answer
the questions as under:
366.1.   Under the provisions of Section 24(1)( a ) in case
the   award   is   not   made   as   on   1­1­2014,   the   date   of
commencement   of   the   2013   Act,   there   is   no   lapse   of
proceedings.   Compensation   has   to   be   determined
under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2.   In   case   the   award   has   been   passed   within   the
window   period   of   five   years   excluding   the   period
covered   by   an   interim   order   of   the   court,   then
proceedings   shall   continue   as   provided   under   Section
24(1)( b ) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has
not been repealed.
366.3.   The   word   “or”   used   in   Section   24(2)   between
possession   and   compensation   has   to   be   read   as   “nor”
or   as   “and”.   The   deemed   lapse   of   land   acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five years
or   more   prior   to   commencement   of   the   said   Act,   the
possession   of   land   has   not   been   taken   nor
compensation   has   been   paid.   In   other   words,   in   case
possession   has   been   taken,   compensation   has   not
been   paid   then   there   is   no   lapse.   Similarly,   if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
366.4.   The   expression   “paid”   in   the   main   part   of
Section   24(2)   of   the   2013   Act   does   not   include   a
deposit   of  compensation  in  court.  The  consequence  of
non­deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in   case   it   has   not   been   deposited   with   respect   to
majority   of   landholdings   then   all   beneficiaries
(landowners)   as   on   the   date   of   notification   for   land
acquisition   under   Section   4   of   the   1894   Act   shall   be
entitled   to   compensation   in   accordance   with   the
provisions   of   the   2013   Act.   In   case   the   obligation
under   Section   31   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Non­deposit of compensation
(in   court)   does   not   result   in   the   lapse   of   land
acquisition   proceedings.   In   case   of   non­deposit   with
respect   to   the   majority   of   holdings   for   five   years   or
more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid
28

to   the   “landowners”   as   on   the   date   of   notification   for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5.   In   case   a   person   has   been   tendered   the
compensation   as   provided   under   Section   31(1)   of   the
1894   Act,   it   is   not   open   to   him   to   claim   that
acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non­
payment or non­deposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused
to   accept   compensation   or   who   sought   reference   for
higher   compensation,   cannot   claim   that   the
acquisition   proceedings   had   lapsed   under   Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6.   The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is
to   be   treated   as   part   of   Section   24(2),   not   part   of
Section 24(1)( b ).
366.7.   The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act   and   as   contemplated   under   Section   24(2)   is   by
drawing   of   inquest   report/memorandum.   Once   award
has   been   passed   on   taking   possession   under   Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act,
as   once   possession   has   been   taken   there   is   no   lapse
under Section 24(2).
366.8.   The   provisions   of   Section   24(2)   providing   for   a
deemed   lapse   of   proceedings   are   applicable   in   case
authorities   have   failed   due   to   their   inaction   to   take
possession   and   pay   compensation   for   five   years   or
more   before   the   2013   Act   came   into   force,   in   a
proceeding   for   land   acquisition   pending   with   the
authority   concerned   as   on   1­1­2014.   The   period   of
subsistence   of   interim   orders   passed   by   court   has   to
be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9.   Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise
to   new   cause   of   action   to   question   the   legality   of
concluded   proceedings   of   land   acquisition.   Section  24
applies   to   a   proceeding   pending   on   the   date   of
enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1­1­2014. It does not
revive   stale   and   time­barred   claims   and   does   not
reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to
question   the   legality   of   mode   of   taking   possession   to
reopen   proceedings   or   mode   of   deposit   of
29

compensation   in   the   treasury   instead   of   court   to
invalidate acquisition.”
We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that
all   judgments   rendered   on   the   basis   of   Pune   Municipal
Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki  [(2014)
3   SCC   183]   are   overruled   in   view   of   the   interpretation
made   to   Section   24(2)   of   the   Act,   2013,   in   Indore
Development   Authority   (supra).   There   has   been   a   trend
of   land   owners   filing   fresh   cases   seeking   lapse   of
acquisition  on  the  basis  of Section  24(2)  of the  Act, 2013,
although   such   land   owners   may   have   earlier
unsuccessfully   filed   writ   petitions   challenging   the
acquisition notifications. Such land owners may  have had
the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings
in   the   acquisition   process   or   dispossession   resulting   in   a
delay in the making  of the award and payment/deposit of
the   compensation   and   consequently   in   taking   over
possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the
passing   of   the   award   owing   to   interim   orders   granted   by
the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may
30

have   been   filed   against   acquiring   bodies,   the   land   owners
cannot   now   take   advantage   of   the   same   so   as   to   contend
that no award has been made and consequently there has
been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that
possession of the acquired land continues with them. The
land   owners   having   had   the   benefit   of   interim   orders
granted   in   their   favour   in   proceedings   initiated   by   them
against   the   acquisition   cannot   take   benefit   under   Section
24(2)   of   the   Act,   2013.   The   High   Court   or   the   civil   courts
which   may   have   granted   interim   orders   in   favour   of   the
land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before
applying   Section   24(2)   of   the   Act,   2013   in   favour   of   the
land owners. 
10 Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Indore Development Authority   (supra) to the facts of the
case   on   hand,   the   view   taken   by   the   High   Court   while
declaring   the   acquisition   proceedings   have   lapsed   under
sub­section   (2)   of   section   24   of   the   Act,   2013,   is
unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by
this   Court   in   the   case   Indore   Development   Authority
31

(supra).  Even  the   same  is also   not   disputed  by  Shri  C.  U.
Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
original   writ   petitioners   –   original   land   owners.   Therefore,
the common judgment and order passed by the High Court
allowing   the   writ   petitions   and   declaring   that   the
acquisition   proceedings   with   respect   to   the   lands   in
question have lapsed under sub­section (2) of section 24 of
the   Act,   2013   cannot   stand   and   the   same   deserve   to   be
quashed and set aside. 
11 As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues
were   raised   on   the   legality   of   the   acquisition   proceedings
under   the   Act,   1894   and   though   other   points   for
consideration   were   raised/framed   by   the   High   Court
reproduced   hereinabove,   since   none   of   the   issues   are
adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other
alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single
Judge   for   deciding   the   writ   petitions   afresh   and   to
adjudicate on  all the other  issues, other  than  the lapse of
acquisitions under sub­section (2) of section 24 of the Act,
2013.   At   the   cost   of   repetition,   we   observe   that   the   High
32

Court   ought   to   have   adjudicated   on   all   the   issues   raised
and   ought   not   to   have   decided   and   disposed   of   the   writ
petitions,   adjudicating   only   on   one   issue   which   has   been
found   to   be   erroneous.   The   Division   Bench   has   also   not
applied   its   mind   to   this   aspect   of   the   matter   and   has
simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.
12 In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated
above,   all   these   appeals   are   allowed.   The   impugned
common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of   the   High   Court   as   well   as   the   common   judgment   and
order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   writ   petition(s)   No.
3884/1998   and   Nos.   37140­37146/2000   are   hereby
quashed and  set  aside.   The  matters are remitted back to
the   learned   Single   Judge   to   decide   and   dispose   of   the
aforesaid writ petitions afresh and in accordance with law
and   on   their   own   merits.   The   learned   Single   Judge   to
adjudicate  all other  issues  which  were  framed  reproduced
hereinabove and pronounce the judgment on all the points
framed   for   consideration.   The   aforesaid   exercise   shall   be
33

completed within  a  period of twelve months from  the date
of receipt of the present order. 
It   is   made   clear   that   we   have   not   expressed   anything
on   the   merits   of   these   cases,   in   favour   of   either   of   the
parties on other issues and it is ultimately for the learned
Single   Judge   to   deal   with   and   consider   the   same   in
accordance   with   law   and   on   their   own   merits.   It   is   also
made   clear   that   on   remand   the   learned   Single   Judge   to
adjudicate and pronounce the judgment on all other issues
except the issue with respect to the lapse of the acquisition
proceedings by virtue of the Act, 2013. All the appeals are
allowed accordingly.  
We also observe and direct that Writ Appeal No.1089 of
2021 be  heard  first  and  to   be  decided  and  disposed of  on
or before 31.12.2022.  There shall be no order as to costs.  
…………………………………J.
                  (M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi, 
March 22, 2022.
34